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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
1. IDSTORICAL BACKGROUND 
3 
Since Jacob VINER, in 1923, published his famous and outstanding book «Dumping : a Problem 
in International Trade» 1, d\lmping has traditionally~_d_efined-as-pJice._discrimination between 
national markets. Anti-dumping law, though, dates from wep before that year. In 1904, Canada 
was the first country to enact anti-dumping law. In terms of free trade, Canadian anti-dumping 
law was enacted with a positive in tent, i.e., to allow anti-dumping relief only when and where 
necessary : contrary to tariffs having a global and permanent scope, anti-dumping relief would 
only temporarily be applicable to imports coming from a restricted number of countries. 
Soon other countries too enacted anti-dumping laws, e.g., New Zealand (1905), Australia (1908), 
South Africa (1914) and the United States of America (1916). In the period from 1920 to 1921, 
no less than ten countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, adopted new anti-dumping laws. Those anti-dumping laws would ultimately serve as a 
basis for . ·-ng-p~ions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(hereinafter : GATT) signed in 1947~ Indeed, in the meantime,__!he notion of dumping had been . 
..-=--------.~~-·-···--·-~---~~---
e~ended beyond the notion of pri~iscriminatim:tJ.o..,..encompass sa.Jes at a loss (anti-dumping 
laws of the United Kingdom and of New Zealand) ; in addition, the idea had been introduced that 
dumping should only be ~b-le-if-it-eaused or threatened to cause injury to the domestic 
indus~ of the importing country (anti-dumping law of the United e~ 
All those elements were, indeed, incorporated in GA TI anti-dumping law. It may appear qui te 
peculiar that GATT, being based on non-discrimination and on the most-favoured-nation clause 
and enacting a general stop on tariff increases and other trade restrictions in order to organi~e and 
enhance free trade, still allowed its Contracting Parties _!~_3QQ~ti-dump!ng_relief--in:\[oJ.ring__> 
------------------------ ... ~--------
l VINER, J., Dumping: A Problem in International Traik, in Reprints of Economie Classics, New York, Kelly, 1966 (reprint; 
original date of publication : 1923), 381 p. 
2 
·BOUDANT, J., L'anli-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 16; DALE, R., Anti-dumping Law in a I.iberal Trade Order, New 
York, St. Martin's Presa, 1980, 12-14; STEWART, T.P. (ed.), 1he GA1T Uruguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Deventer, Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, vol. II, 1390-1410; WARES, W.A., 1he 1heory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy, Lexington, 
Lexington Books, 1977, l #,-15. ' 
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restrictions on trade coming from certain countries. By incorporating provisions on dumping, 
GA 'IT probably made publicity to the possibilities of anti-dumping law, especially in view of its 
prohibition to enact or to increase other trade restrictions. lndeed, though it did not require its 
Contracting Parties to adopt national anti-dumping laws, GA 'IT eventually resulted in an 
increasing number of countries enacting such laws. For example, the comparative study carried 
out by GA 'IT as to the national anti-dumping laws of its Contracting Parties shows that in 1957 
already twenty Contracting Parties had enacted anti-dumping laws and that eight countries actually 
resorted to them3 . 
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed, creating the European Economie Community (since the 
Treaty of Maastricht : the European Community) (hereinafter : EC). At the end of the 
transitional period, on 1 January 1970, -the. Community became empowered as to foreign trade, 
including anti-dumping policy. However, even before the end __ QtJ1u.LtransitioI!_~_j)~~~d, __ ~amely 
on 5 April 19-_68.,_tb~Communi~:y-~ri~cted its_fi.rst anti-dumping legislation. lts entry into force, on 
~ ------------- ------ ----- -------
1 July 1968, coincided with that of the first GA 'IT Anti-dumping Code. It was only on 15 April 
1977 that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) enacted its first anti-dumping 
legislation, though the Treaty establishing the ECSC had been signed on 18 April 1951. 
Since 1968, both EC and ECSC (hereinafter: the Community), on several occasions, have 
modified their anti-dumping legislatipn (h~ European anti-dumping law), usually in ~ider-
<==>1 ---~---- ---------·-~~·---~-------~o-~- ---~just it to the d~v~!QPJJJents~jn_GAIT_anti::dumpi.ng.Jaw,  e themselves contributed 
sh~pe. Indeed, in 1979 and, recently, in 1994, new GA rr\ Anti-dumping Codes have been 
drafted. However, only EC anti.:.dumping legislation bas been adapted to the 1994 GATT Anti-
/ 
dumping Code, which bas entered into force on 1 January 1995. 
From the outset, the Community would prove to be an active user of anti-dumping law. It was 
only after the end of the transitional period in 1970, though, that European anti-dumping law was 
applied for the first time. Since then, the number of anti-dumping proceedings bas considerably 
increased : from 2 anti-dumping cases in 1970 up to 36 in 1993, i.e., an increase of 1,700 %. 
Over the period 1970-1993, the average number of cases amounts to 38 per annum. Since 1978, 
the year in which a spectacular increase in the number of anti-dumping proceedings occurred, the 
number of anti-dumping proceedings bas stabilized at 54 cases on a year average (1978-1993) (see 
table 1). 
3 GATI, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, Geneva, (JATI, 1958, 165 p. 
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Table 1 - Number of European anti-dumping proceedings 
1 
year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
total 
• 
•• 
••• 
initiation review total• 
EC ECSC total EC ECSC total• 
ordinary assem- additional 
review• bly" duty••• 
2 2 2 
2 2 2 
8 8 8 
1 1 1 
2 2 2 
3 3 3 
6 6 6 
12 ' 3 15 15 
38 47 85 85 
50· 6 56 (1) 1 1 (1) 57 (1) 
25 25 2 (1) 2 (1) 27 (1) 
47 47 17 17 64 
48 7 55 23 23 78 
34 2 36 6 (1) 6 (1) 42 (1) 
48 48 5 5 53 
32 4 36 22 22 58 
22 2 24 16 16 40 
34 5 39 5 3 8 47 
37 1 38 25 4 3 32 70 
24 24 18 2 20 44 
35 8 43 20 4 5 29 72 
18 2 20 13 13 33 
36 2 38 24 24 62 
21 21 15 15 36 
Il 585 1 89 1 67411 211 (3) 1 / 9 1 4 1 91 233 (3) Il 907 (3) 1 
/ 
The numbers between brackets refer to reviews of ~tional anti-dumping duties . 
«Assembly» refers to the reviews initiated against the production or assembly of the like products in the Community in cases where 
definitive anti-dumping duties apply to the exports of that product coming from the dumping country (Article 13 Council Regulation 
(EC) No 3283/94"). . 
«Additional duty» refers to reviews initiated because the dumping exporter is alleged to bear partly or wholly the burden of the 
definitive anti-dumping duty (Article 12 Council Regulation (EC) No 3283/94 and 13(11) Commission Decision No 2424/88/ECSd). 
Source : Official Journal of the European Communities. 
In view of this yearly high number of anti-dumping cases, an investigation into the application of 
actual European anti-dumping law seems warranted. The new GATI Anti-dumping Code and the 
new legislative action adapting EC anti-dumping law to the new GA TI provisions, are further a 
good occasion to examine whether the Community really needs any anti-dumping law at all and 
whether anti-dumping law is developing as it should from an economie point of view. 
· 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 3283/94 of 22 December 1994 on protection against dumped imports from countrles not members of the European 
Community, O.J., 31December1994, No L 349/1. 
5 Commission Decision No 2424/88/ECSC of 29 July 1988 on protection against dumped or aubsidized imports from countries not members of the 
European Steel and Coal Community, O.J., 2 August 1988, No L 209/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 5October1988, No L 273/19). 
l 
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2. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
2.1. EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK 
2.1.1. European anti-dumping law 
2.1.1.1. EC anti-dumping law 
Before the end of the transitional period, the initia! anti-dumping regulation, i.e. , Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 459/68 of 5 April 1968 on protection against dumping or the granting of 
bounties or subsidies by the countries which are not members of the European Economie 
Community'>, was adopted in pursuance of Article 113 EC Treaty and was meant to enact the 
1968 GATT Anti-dumping Code into EC law7• 
On several occasions, EC anti-dumping legislation has been modified in order to adapt it to the 
1980 and 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Codes8 or to improve or specify the existing anti-dumping 
provisions, frequently on the basis of the anti-dumping case law built up by the European anti-
dumping authorities (i.e., the Council and the Commission9), as well as on the basis of the anti-
dumping case law of the Court of Justice10• Prevailing EC anti-dumping law is contained in 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3283/94 of 22 December 1994 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Community11 (hereinafter : «basic EC 
Regulation»), which has already once been amended in order to determine its scope ratione 
temporis12• 
6 O.J., 17 April 1968, No L 93/1. 
7 See: infra, 12. 
8 See : infra, 12. 
9 For their respective powers in anti-dumping proceedings, see : infra, 10..11. 
10 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2011/73 of 24 July 1973, O.J., 27 July 1973, No L 206/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1411/77 of 
27 June 1977, O.J., 30 June 1977, No L 160/4; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1681/79 of 1 August 1979, O.J., 2 August 1979, No 
L 196/1; Council Regulation No 3017n9 of 20 December 1979, O.J., 31 December 1979, No L 339/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 April 
1980, No L 89/22) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1580/82 of 14 June 1982, O.J., 22 June 1982, No L 178/9 ; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2176/84 of 23 July 1984, O.J., 30 July 1984, No L 201/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1761/87 of 22 June 1987, O.J., 26 
June 1987, No L 167/9; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988, O.J., 2 August 1988, No L 209/1; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 521194 of 7 March 1994, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 66n; Council Regulation (EC) No 522/94 of 7 March 1994, 
O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 66/10 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 March 1994, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89. 
11 O.J., 31December1994, No L 349/1. 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No 355195 of 20 February 1995 amending Regulation (EC) No 3283/94 on protéction against dumped imports from 
countries not member of the European Community, O.J., 23 February 1995, No L 41/2. 
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Since the enactment of the basic EC regulations, all anti-dumping decisions must conform to 
them. It is not possible to deviate from them by making anti-dumping decisions sui generis, based 
directly on Article 113 EC Treaty, without interfering with the legislative system of the EC and 
distorting the equality before the law of those to whom the law applies13 • 1 
2.1.1.2. ECSC anti-dumping law 
The first ECSC anti-dumping case, initiated on 3 February 1977, was based directly on Article 74 
ECSC Treaty. At that time, no specific ECSC anti-dumping legislation had been enacted. Two 
mpnths later, i.e., nine years after the introduction of the initial EC anti-dumping regulation, the 
first ECSC anti-dumping recommendation, i.e., Commission Recommendation 77 /329/ECSC of 
15 April 1977 on protection against dumping or the granting of bounties or subsidies by the 
countries whfoh are not members of the European Economie Community14, was adopted in· 
pursuance of Articles 74 and 86 ECSC Treaty. As for EC anti-dumping law15, the enactment of 
the ECSC recommendation on anti-dumping law probably also excludes anti-dumping proceedings 
based directly on the ECSC Treaty, for it would also interfere with the ESCS legislative system 
and the principle of equal treatment. 1 
The ECSC recommendation made the provisions of EC anti-dumping legislation applicable to anti-
dumping cases under the ECSC Treaty, due allowance being made for the special. features of the 
ECSC Treaty which essentially concern the division of powers between the Council and the 
Commission as anti-dumping authorities. ECSC anti-dumping legislation, like EC anti-dumping 
legislation, has frequently been modified16• Prevailing ECSC anti-dumping law is contained in 
Commission Decision No 2424/88/ECSC of 29 July 1988 on protection against dumped or 
subsidized imports from countries not ~embers of the European Coal and Steel Community17 
(hereinafter : «basic ECSC Decision»). Until 1994, the modifications of EC and ECSC anti-
lJ C.J.E.C., case 113n7, 29 March 1979, NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, (1185), 1209; C.J.E.C., 
case 11Bn7, 29 March 1979, Import Standard Office (ISO) v Council, E.C.R., 1979, (1277), 1298; C.J.E.C., case 119fl7, 29 March 
1979, Nippon Seüco KK a.o. v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1979, (1303), 1331; C.J.E.C., case .120fl7, 29 March 1979, Koyo 
Seüco Co. Ltd. a.o. v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1979, (1337), 1357-1358; C.J.E.C., case 12ln7, 29 March 1979, Nachi 
Fujücoshi Corporation a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, (1363), 1383. 
14 O.J., 5 May 1977, No L 11416. 
15 Supra, 1. 
16 Commission Recommendation No 3004!77/ECSC of 28 December 1977, O.J., 31 December 1977, No L 352/13; Commission 
Recommendation No 15Bn9/ECSC of 29 January 1979, O.J., 30 January 1979, No L 21114; Commission Recommendation No 
301Bn9/ECSC of 21 December 1979, O.J., 31 December 1979, No L 339/15 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 April 1980, No L 89/22) ; 
Commission Recommendation No 1995/82/ECSC of 22 July 1982, O.J., 23 July 1982, No L 215/28; Commission Recommendatfon 
No 3025/82/ECSC of 12 November 1982, O.J., 13 November 1982, No L 317/17; Commission Decision No 2177/84/ECSC of 27 July 
1984, O.J., 30 July 1984, No L 201117. 
17 O.J., 2 August 1988, No L 209/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 October 1988, No L 273/19). 
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dumping legislation were parallel. Since then, however, ECSC anti-dumping legislation did not 
entirely follow the development of EC anti-dumping legislation. Like EC anti-dumping law, it 
has only been amended in order to take account of the fundamental politica! and economie changes 
in the East and Central European countries18• As a result, ECSC· anti-dumping lêgislation does 
not incorporate the procedural innovations in EC anti-dumping legislation19 , nor has it been 
adjusted to the new GATT Anti-dumping Code20• In fact, ECSC anti-dumping law is still 
identical to former EC anti-dumping law and, consequently, the interpretations by the anti-
. dumping authorities, the Court of Justice or scholarly publications of former EC anti-dumping law 
still hold for pr~vailing ECSC anti-dumping law21• Nevertheless, insofar as there is still some 
degree of similanty, both EC and ECSC anti-dumping legislation will in this work be referred to 
as «basic EC legislation». 
2.1. 2. Scope of application 
2.1.2.1. Ratione materiae 
Since «(a)n anti-dumping duty may be applied to any dumped product whose release for free 
circulation in the Community causes injury» (Article 1(1) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(1) basic 
ECSC Decision) (emphasis added}, European anti-dumping law applies only to products and not to 
services22• 
With regard to products, a distinction must be made between, on the one hand, coal and basic 
steel products, falling under the ECSC Treaty23 , to which the basic ECSC Decision applies, 
l S Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from eert.aio third countries and repealing Regulations 
(EEC) No 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89. 
19 See : Council Regulation (EC) No 521 /94 of 7 March 1994 on the introduction of time limits for investigation procedures carried out against 
dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Community and amending Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88, O.J., 10 
March 1994, No L 66n ; Council Regulation (EC) No 522/94 of 7 March 1994 on the streamlining of decision-making procedures for eert.aio 
Community instrument& of commercial defence and amending Regulations (EEC) no 2641184 and No 2423/88, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 66110. 
20 See : Council Regulation (EC) No 3283/94 of 22 December 1994 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the 
EuropeanCommunity, O.J., 31December1994, No L 349/1. 
21 For the interpretation of ECSC anti-dumping law, therefore, reference will also be made to interpretations of former EC anti-dumping law 
insofar as prevailing ECSC anti-dumping law and former EC anti-dumping law are identical. 
22 Answer of the Commiseion to written queetion No 1012/80, O.J., 3 December 1980, No C 316/12. 
With regard of services only dumping in the sector of maritime transport can be eanctioned under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4057/86 of 22 December 1986 on unfair pricing practices in maritime transport, O.J., 31 December 1986, No L 378/14 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 5 May 1988, No L 117/35). 
23 These products are lieted in Annex 1 of the ECSC Treaty. 
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and, on the other hand, all the other products, including agricultural24 as well as nuclear25 
products, to which the basic EC Regulation applies. 
2.1.2.2. Ratione loci 
European anti-dumping law applies to dumped imports coming from third countries which are not 
members of the Community (see : Article 1 basic ECSC Decision). It is, thus, not appliGable-te""""' 
intra-community _9umping. European anti-dumping law does not make a distinction among 
COiiîiiOeS:-;heth~r or not they are parties to GA TI or the GA TI Anti-dumping Code. This 
distinction is, however, important. Indeed, only in respect of countries which are parties to 
GATT or the GA TI Anti-dumping Code, European anti-dumping law must comply with GA TI, 
respectively, GATT Anti-dumping Code. 
2.1.2.3. Ratione temporis 
The prevailing basic EC Regulation entered into force on 1 January 1995 (Article 24 basic EC 
Regulation). However, former EC anti-dumping law26 continues to apply to proceedings in 
relation to which an investigation pending on 1 September 1994 bas not been concluded by the 
date of entry into force of the prevailing basic EC Regulation, or in relation to which an expiry 
review investigation is initiated following the publication before 1 September 1994 of a notice of 
impending expiry (Article 23 basic EC Regulation27). References to prior European anti-
dumping legislation must be construed as references to the actual basic EC Regulation where 
appropriate (Article 24 basic EC Regulation28). 
24 Anewer of the Commiesion to written queetion No 50/68, 0.J., 9 July 1968, No C 6818. 
According to ite Article 22(ii), the basic EC Regulation ehall not preclude the application of the Community Regulatione in the 
agricultural sector and of Regulatione (EEC) No 1059/69 (0.J., 12 June 1969, No L 141/1), (EEC) No 2730n5 (0.J., 1 November 
1975, No L 281120) and (EEC) No L 2783'76 (0.J., 1 November 1976, No L 282/104) ; the basic EC Regulation ehall operate by way 
of complement to those Regulatione and in derogation from any provieione thereof which preclude the application of anti-dumping 
dutiee (see aleo: Answer of the Commieeion to written queetion No 1047n8, O.J., 27 August 1979, No C 214/6). 
25 See: Article 232(2) EC Treaty, according to which the EC Treaty and ite eubeidiary legielation apply to nuclear producte in eo 
far as the Euratom Treaty does not expreeely derogate from them. 
26 I.e., Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on protection against dumped or aubaidized importa from countries not membera of 
the European Economie Community, O.J., 2 August 1988, No L 209/1 (amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 521/94 of 7 March 1994 (O.J., 
10 March 1994, No L 6617), Council Regulation (EC) No 522/94 of 7 March 1994 (O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 66/10) and Council Regulation 
(EC) No 519/94 of 7 March 1994 (O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89)). 
27 Aa amended by Article 1(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 355195 of 20 February 1995, O.J., 23 February 1995, No L 4112. 
28 As amended by Article 1(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 355195of20 February 1995, O.J., 23 February 1995, No L 4112. 
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The prevailing basic ECSC Decision entered into force on 5 August 1988. It is applicable to all 
anti-dumping proceedings, including those already initiated (Article 19 basic ECSC Decision)29• 
References to prior European anti-dumping legislation have to be construed as reference to the 
actual basic EC legislation (Article 18 basic ECSC Decision). 
2.1. 3. Institutiona,l framework 
Though this work does not investigate procedural anti-dumping law, a short description of the 
course of an anti-dumping proceeding will nevertheless be made here. This overview is confined 
to the main procedural aspects of an anti-dumping proceeding, which it is useful to be acquainted 
with in order to have a good understanding of the analysis, which is to follow, of substantive anti-
dumping law. Specific procedural. aspects·, which are necessary to understand certain elements of 
substantive anti-dumping law, will be treated at the occasion of the analysis of the aspect of 
substantive anti-dumping law for which they are relevant. 
In many aspects, EC and ECSC anti-dumping proceedings are identical. Therefore, after the 
overview of an EC anti-dumping proceeding (section 2.1.3.1.), the section on ECSC procedural 
anti-dumping law will only point out the differences characteristic to an ECSC anti-dumping 
proceeding (section 2.1. 3. 2.). 
2.1.3.1. . EC anti-dumping proceedings 
When a complaint about injurfous dumping on behalf of a Community industry is lodged, the 
Commission must decide whether or not to initiate an anti-dumping proceeding (Article 5 basic 
EC Regulation). 
After a decision to initiate an anti-dumping proceeding, the Commission investigates whether 
injurious dumping is being practised and whether anti-dumping relief is in the interests of the 
Community (Article 6 basic EC Regulation). The Commission must . consult the Advisory 
Committee on the various aspects of its investigation, such as the existence of injurious dumping 
and the kind of anti-dumping relief which should be granted. The Advisory Committee consists 
of representatives of each Member State and a representative of the Commission as chairman 
(Article 15 basic EC Regulation). 
If it does not find injurious dumping against which the interests of the Community call for anti-
dumping relief, the Commission takes a decision to terminate the proceeding without anti-dumping 
relief (Article 9(2) basic EC Regulation). If an objection has been raised within the Advisory 
Committee, the Commission must submit to the Council a report on the. results of the consultation, 
together with a proposal that the proceeding be terminated. lf the Council does not decide 
otherwise, the proceeding is terminated (Article 9(2) basic EC Regulation). 
~ . 
See: C.J.E.C., case 312/84, 24 February 1987, Continentale Produkten Gesellachaft Ehrhardt-Renken (GmbH & Co.) v 
Commiasion, E.C.R., 1987, 841. 
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If the Commission finds injurious dumping against which the interests of the Community call for 
anti-dumping relief, the Commission takes a decision to terminate the anti-dumping investigation 
on the basis of the acceptance of an undertaking (Article 8 basic EC Regulation), or it enacts a 
regulation imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty by means of which, sometimes, the 
Commission also accepts undertakings (Article 7 basic EC Regulation). With regard to exporters 
subject to a provisional anti-dumping duty, the investigation is terminated when the Commission 
takes afterwards a decision to accept an undertaking, or when the Council enacts a regulation 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty (Article 9(4) basic EC Regulation). Such a Council 
regulation usually also orders the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty 
(Article 10(2) and (3) basic EC Regulation). Provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties are 
collected by the Member States (Article 14(1) basic EC Regulation). 
Provisional anti-dumping duties have a maximum periocl of validity of nine months : they may be 
imposed for six months and extended for a further three months, or they may be imposed for nine 
months. However ,, they may only be extended or imposed for a nine-month periode, when the 
dumping exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade involved so request or do not 
object (Article 7(7) basic EC Regulation). Undertakings and definitive anti-dumping duties lapse 
after five years from the date they entered into force or were last moclified or confirmed (Article 
11(2) basic EC Regulation). 
The Council may, under certain conditions, extend the scope of definitive anti-dumping duties to . 
the proclucts which are identical to the dumped product and which are assembled in the 
Community (Article 13 basic EC Regulation). It may also amend definitive anti-dumping duties 
in order to compensate for the amount of the definitive anti-dumping duty home by the dumping 
exporter (Article 12 basic EC Regulation). 
The decisions accepting undertakings and the regulations imposing definitive anti-dumping duties 
may be subject to review. The determinations initiating and terminating the review investigation 
are similar to those initiating and terminating the initia! anti-dumping investigation (Article 11(2) 
till (7), (9) and (10) basic EC Regulation). 
When an anti-dumping duty is imposed, the importers may request the refund of the amount of 
duty exceeding the dumping margin. When such a request is made, the Commission must take a 
decision whether or not to refund the duty collected (Article 11(8) till (10) basic EC Regulation). 
2.1.3 .2. ECSC anti-dumping proceedings · 
The main difference with EC anti-dumping law is that the Council has no part in an ECSC anti-
dumping proceeding. The Commission is the sole ECSC anti-dumping authority and decides 
always by means of an ECSC decision, rather than by way of a regulation. As a consequence, an 
anti-dumping proceeding will be terminated by the Commission if it finds no injurious dumping 
against which the Community interests call for anti-dumping relief, irrespective of any objections 
within the Advisory Committee (Article 9(1) basic ECSC Decision). Provisional anti-dumping 
duties are imposed by Commission decision. Definitive anti-dumping duties are imposed by the 
Commission decision and not by Council Regulation. 
Another difference consists in there being no possibility of extending definitive anti-dumping 
duties to assembly operations. 
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2.2. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
2.2.1. GAIT anti-dumping law 
The first and still valid international provisions on dumping are contained in Article VI GATT 
ado~~oes not forbid dumping. It only allows the importing countries to 
undertake anti-dum~ actions h causes injury to their domestic producers. 
However, Article VI is vague (especially in connection with the injury requirement) and 
incomplete (especially the lack of procedural provisions). Moreover, several countries, like the 
United States of America, were, under the Protocol of Provisional Application (the so-called 
«Grandfather Clause»), bound by Article VI only insofar as Article VI was not inconsistent with 
their existing legislation. 
In order to remedy those deficiencies, the «Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
Genera! Agreement on Tariffs and Trade»30 (commonly known as the GATT Anti-dumping 
Code) was concluded and entered into force on 1 July 1968. The Code provided more detailed 
rules conceming the definition of the substantive concepts used in Article VI, especially in respect 
of the injury requirement. It contained also provisions with regard to the anti-dumping procedure 
to be followed. Thereby, a «Committee on Anti-dumping Practices» was established in order to 
provide a forum of consultation to the parties to the Code. Furthermore, the Code did not fall 
under the «Grandfather Clause». Instead the Code was obligatory for all the States which had 
accepted it. 
Because of an intemal discussion in the Congress of the United States of America, particularly 
conceming the provisions as to the injury requirement, the 1968 Code was never fully 
incorporated in United States anti-dumping law. The other Parties to the 1968 Code, however, 
had adapted their anti-dumping laws. This dichotomy resulted in a new «Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the Genera! Agreement on Tariff s and Trade31 (hereinafter 
called the «1980 GATT Anti-dumping Code») which entered into force on 1 January 1980. The 
injury requirement was further specified and modified. Moreover, special attention was paid to 
the problems of developing countries. Finally, a consultation, conciliation and dispute settlement 
procedure was set up. 
JO Publiehed in : B.l.S.D., Fifteenth Supplement, Geneva, GAT!', 1968, 24-35. 
Jl Publiehed in: B.l.S.D., Twenty-eixth Supplement, Geneva, GAT!', 1980, 171-188; O.J., 17 March 1980, No L 71190. 
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Anti-dumping law bas been put on the agenda of the Uruguay Round in order to improve the 1980 
GATT Anti-dumping Code. As tQe 1980 Code was generally considered to be sound, 
fundamental modifications were not expected. The basic concepts of GATT anti-dumping law 
-- --
would- only he fuuJle~ified......,,..in order-to.---ti~n_!heir. jpte~~tion32~~~·· During - the 
negotiations on GATT anti-dumping law, it became clear that the many quite vague provisions of 
substantive GA TI anti-dumping law resulted in fundamentally different interpretations upheld by, 
on the one hand, countries actively applying anti-dumping law and, on the other hand, exporting 
countries frequently subject to anti-dumping proceedings. Moreover, the exporting countries 
claimed more detailed provisions on procedural anti-dumping law, whereas the countries applying 
an.ti-dumping law demanded that the new GATI anti-dumping law would encompass anti-
circumvention rules33 • As a result, an entirely new «Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the Genera! Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994» (hereinafter called the «GATT Anti-
dumping Code») was drafted. It has been signed on 16 April 1994 and has entered into force on 1 
January 1995. However, as no agreement could be~.~~çl!~ on the subject of anti-circumvention 
measures~4 , the new codJ has not produCed~·Y real inn~vahèîn;-bm--iátherPi~~i<lës-fllither 
~ 
speciflcations of several aspects of substantive anti-dumping law and elaborates many aspects of 
procedural anti-dumping law. 
2.2.2. Relevancy for European anti-dumping law 
GATT bas been concluded in 1947, while the ECSC Treaty and the EC Treaty date from 
respectively 1951 and 1957. Thus, the Community could impossibly be an original Contracting 
Party to GA TI. All its Member States, however, are Contracting Parties to GATT. Although 
the Community bas not acceded to GATT, it is bound by it. lndeed, as the Court of Justice, after 
having underscored that the Member S~tes could not nor did desire to withdraw from their 
obligations under GATT, concluded in the International Fruit case, the GATT provisions bind the 
Community because the Member States conferred the powers concerning tariff and trade policy on 
the Community, and, thus indicated their wish to bind the Community by the obligations entered 
in to under GA TT35• 
32 MESSERLIN, P., ecThe EC Antidum.ping Regulatione : A First Economie Appraieal, 1980-85", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 1989, 
(563), 563. 
33 See: STEWART, T.P. (ed.), 1he GA1T Urnguay Round. À Negotiating History (1986-1992), Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1993, vol. II, 1462-1536. 
0AER, P. and VERMULSr, E" •EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice aller the UruguayRound. A New Lease of Llfe ?•, Joumal of World 
Trade, 199412, (5), 20. 
35 C.J.E.C., joined cases 21 to 24172, 12 December 1972, International Fruit Compan.y NV, Kooy Rotterdam NV, Velleman. en Tas 
NV and Jan. Van den Brink'• Im- en Exporthandel NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, E.C.R., 1972, (1219), 1226-1227. 
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The Community is equally bound by the various GATT Anti-dumping Codes since those Codes 
were adopted for the purpose of implementing Article VI GA rr36• Another important 
argument is that the Community, along with its Member States, has accepted the 1968 and 1994 
GATT Anti-dumping Codes, whereas the 1980 GATT Anti-dumping Code has only been approved 
by the Community. lndeed, since the expiry of the transitional period on 1 January 1970, the 
Community, by virtue of Article 113 EC Treaty and Article 74 ECSC Treaty, has become 
exclusively competent for matters of trade policy. It may, therefore, be argued that the Member 
· States are no longer empowered to accept the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code. It seems, 
however, that their approval results from the fact that the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code, along 
with all other GATT Agreements and Understandings some of which the Member States are 
indeed empowered for, is incorporated in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay ~ 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations which must be adopted as a whole. J 
3. SCOPE OF Tms WORK 
, GA TI and European anti-dumping law allow anti-dumping relief against dumping which caus~s 
injury to the domestic industry of the importing country. I;uropean anti-dumping law furtherm~~~---
r~e-ant~relief~be .. J!1"'~. th~_!Q!er~~~s ·-~~--~~~-~-~1!1E1uni_~Y :_.- Besides these 
substantive rules, GATT and European anti-dumping law also encompass provisions regulating the 
course of anti-dumping proceedings. 
This work will not investigate procedural anti-dumping Iaw37, but rather substantive anti-
dumping law. ~~ substantive anti-dumping law from a legal and 
~~ryJew. This law-and-economics approach is clearly distinct from t e traditional 
legal approach. Under the traditional legal approach, there is much skepticism as to policy 
arguments, but those are the very arguments which are typical of the law-and-economics 
approach. Indeed, a ~es~ics sc~nvestigates whether an existing legal rule ~s .. 
ec~.ally-efticient and which legal rule would be the most efficient one. It examines whether 
---------- . ---- .J 
36 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2178. 
37 A short overview, though, is provided in section 2.1.3. of this Chapter (supra, 10-11). For more detailed information, see e.g. : BESELER, 
J.F., and Wll..LIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. 1he European Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 171-259; • 
BOUDANT, J., L'anli-dumping communaUlaire, Paria, Economica, 1991, 161-194; HERMITTE, M.A., «Les procédures anti-dumping en droit 
communautaire»,Droit et Pratique du Commerce international, 1991, 42-58; VAN BAEL, J., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade 
Protection Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 178-221; VERMULST, E.A., Anlidumping Law and Practice in the United States and 
the European Communities. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 194-336. 
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the consequences of legal rules correspond to the policy goals which are or shoJ!).d_he-ai.m@d-at-bY-
.___ - -----theJOVernment. E&Qnomics pr_Qvide a theory for evaluating those ~o~~uence! ~f the ~w. The 
traditional legal approach, though, holds no theory by which to evaluate the consequences of the 
legal rules ; it mainly investigates the meaning and the scope of legal rules, as well as the internal 
coherence of a legal system. 
In this work both the legal and economie analyses will be made on a general level and on a 
specific on~ The general legal approach investigates the gene~ characteristics of prevailing 
GA TI and European anti-dumping law, whereas the general economie approach discusses whether 
th~dumpiflg btw~,jf..s.u,.Jio.w~ci~genera] .. characteristies-sbould hé-l The 
specific approach, on the other hand, starts from the general characteristics of prevailing GA TI 
and European anti~dumping law and does not bring them up for discussion. The specific legal 
approach examines how the specific provisions are actually interpreted and applied and whether 
this implementation is legally correct. Therefore, it concentrates ess~ally on the cas~ law 
el~rated by the European anti-dumpin~_ ~!h9r.ities s~970, though, of course, attention will 
"""""-L..:..._~"~---.... ---~--
also be paid to scholarly publications. As several aspects of GATI and European anti-dumping 
law have been modified on several occassions, only the case law which is an application of 
rovisions identical to the prevailing ones will be t:aKen i t,_even if it dates from before 
e entry into force of the prevailing GATI Anti-dumping Code and basic EC legislation. The 
specific economie approach investigates whether, in view of the conclusions of the genera! 
approach, the specific anti-dumping provisions and their implementation are economically justified 
and, if not, how they can be optimized. 
This twofold (general versus specific) approach clearly investigates anti-dumping law from a 
different angle. The general approach reaches solutions for the long run as it challenges the 
fundamentals of prevailing anti-dumping law. The .speci.f.iG--approaeh~rooemm.ends. short-nm 
improv~~~!l~ ~.J1l_~y_ comp~y- with __ ~he -~~~lleral_ ~ha,.racte~stics_J>f.PI~Y~ilin&-™1ti~Q.l!~J2~!}g la~ . 
Hence, this work does not only aspire to be a purely academie approach of anti-dumping law 
reaching conclusions which are disposed of as being ignorant of current international polities. It 
tries also to be relevant for the daily implementation of anti-dumping law by recommending 
changes in interpretations which do not require any legislative action or by recommending 
legislative amendments which do not upset the fundamentals of prevailing anti-dumping law. 
Nevertheless, this work is based on the conviction that a fundamental academie approach is 
necessary, even if it will not have any noticeable effects on international polities in the near 
future. A fundamental academie approach does influence international polities not only in the 
long run, but also - be it less spectacular - in the short run. Indeed, govemements, when 
~y confronted with studies on the effec_ts_of_trade_law q_QJ!!_~rn_~_:_~~~~-~~?_e __ ~~-~~!_f~~~ -
will probably think t~~~--1:>-~fQ!"~- ~nacting_ any trade law and will probably try, insofar as--
=-----~ --- - ------ --------------------------------------------------·----::-~..,.--
politically possible, _tç __ inc.oJJK!ra_UUbl:uxmclusions of" fundame~ch. Por example, if 
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fundamental research points out the welfare decreasing, effects of trade restrictive laws, 
probably prevent governements to enact laws having too excessive trade restrictive effects and 
governements will presumably only enact trade restrictive laws insofar as they are politically 
necessary. 
J 
The twofold legal and economie approach will be applied to the two parts this work comprisesr 
Part I examines the practise of dumping. Chapter II involves the genera! legal and economie 
approach~ It examines whether dumping, as defined by GATT and European anti-dumping law, 
actually distorts competition. It will show that the genera! definition of dumping provided by 
G~TI and Eur~~ anti-du~ping law is;simultaneo~~~~~-~~ toorestrictive. The legal 
notion of dumpmg mvolves mstances wh1ch do not 'dlstort com~tion, but does not encompass 1 
other cases which do distort competition. · · · _ ,/ 
Chapter m investigates the specific details of the notion of dumping as presently defined by 
GATT and European anti-dumping law and implemented by the European anti-dumping 
authorities. It studies whether, from a legal point of view, European anti-dumping law bas 
J' ~an:::;~~=tly~he~~ :uit~~ZP::Ss::~~:mie~~ 
r:~~(~/ analysis are each time confronted with economie theory. For example, according to its genera! 
1
/ legal definition, the notion of dumping should encompass all instances of price discrimination. 
1 . 
The specific economie approach investigates whether European anti-dumping law actually assesses 
\
1 all cases of price discrimination and how the law should be amended in order to detect all those 
instances, though, from a general economie point of view, anti-dumping law should not sanction 
each case of price discrimination. 
Part Il __ examines §:e characteástics of anti-dumping relid) Chapter IV investigates, from a 
genera! perspective, whether anti-dumping relief, as defined by GATT and European anti-dumping 
law, actually increases the welfare of the Community. It shows that there may be circumstances -
though hard to assess - in which anti-dumping. relief may enhance the Community welfare, hut 
that GATT and European anti-dumping allow anti-dumping relief irrespective of whether the 
conditions necessary for anti-dumping relief to increase the Community welfare are fulfilled. 
Chapters V, VI and VII start from prevailing GATI and European anti-dumping law on anti-
dumping relief which they subject to t~g&__~d economie analysis. In pursuance of 
GATT anti-dumping law, European anti-dumping law pays--speciaf ~attëfltion to one component of 
th~ty----W_~lf3-:!~~--~~, __ the _inteJ"~~!.~~!!!!!!lit.Y-pro.ducers. Ind~~-GATr-aDa 
European anti-dumping law only allow anti-dumping relief if the dumping inflicts injury upon the 
Community producers. In Chapter V, the specific legal analysis examinesJ10w-1he-Rumpean-anti-
dumping__~µtboriti.eLassess~this~injucy--and~wbethecthei-r~methad--i-s-legal. The specific economie 
_"'_--~-
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analysis revolves essentially around the question whether the method applied by the European anti-
dumping authorities actually enables them to detect all instances of injurious dumping and prevents 
them from confounding injurious dumping with instances in which the dumping does not inflict 
injury upon the Community producers. 
Chapter ~amines the legal requirement that anti-dumping relief may only be imposed if it is in 
the intetl!of the Community. This requirement is specific to European anti-dumping law, 
though not contrary to GATT anti-dumping law. Chapter VI investigates, from a legal point of 
view, how the European anti-dumping authorities implement the notion of Community interests. 
The economie analysis starts from the idea that the notion of Communit interests coincides with 
the of Co munity e. Accordingly, this an is revolves around the question 
whether, by means of the interp~etation given by the European anti-dumping authorities, this 
notion captures all the components of the Community, which may be affected by anti-dumping 
relief and whether the European anti-dumping authorities evaluate those components correctly. It 
will also investigate whether the objectives aimed at under the heading «Community interests» may 
not be attained by means of altemative policy instruments which, compared with anti-dumping 
relief, result in higher Community welfare. 
Chapter VII examines in detail the characteristics of the various types of anti-dumping relief. It 
investigates whether European anti-dumping law does not create certain types of anti-dumping 
relief which are at variance with GATT anti-dumping law. The characteristics of the anti-
dumping measures as imposed by the European anti-dumping authorities will also be compared 
with GA IT and European anti-dumping law. Chapter VII will further investigate whether th~ 
differ~nt characteristics are economical.ly rele~ant and ~~ether their economie effects are actually 
taken mto account by the European anti-dumping authonties. 
Finally, Chapter VIII concludes this work. It provides an overview of the most important findings 
of the twofold legal and economie analysis made in this work. On the basis of those findings, it 
will, by way of conclusion, make some recommendations, both on a general and a specific level. 
Thus, it will suggest an altemative for traditional anti-dumping law, as well as improvements of 
existing, traditional anti-dumping law. 
PART 1 
DUMPING 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1 
Dumpin.g i~-~-=~~~J,_hel!!JQ_b.__:_an unfair-trad~~p?c~ce.' Preci~ly b~use of ~at convicti9~. 
GATI,,,:though 1t promotes free tràde, allows tràde restrictive remedies agamst dumping. o/ 
, - ----------··-----------··-----·--- ··- ----· ----·--· - _..__-______ ---o---~-----......._,r , 
(~~:::#;:.;~t~t;~~~~~:t!1t~~:s~::o=:~~ ::~:;~~~!~:~~~~::r 
1/ ~ofü~ri __ QL:t:i_~_~aimess stands economie th~ry?-(If shows that this notion is not economiCally 
underbûilt, ~unless it- is. equated t<\~redatoTtJij_Çkg. But then dumping will not always be unfair 
since not all dumping is predatory :~-~~~ 
In view ofthis .concltision, section 3 examines why GATT has aceepted thefgo§eral unfairness} of 
dumping and whether the GATT rules on dumping do not contain ~h~~germs to erode the GA îT ~~-tràd~yste~t. is:'i;dêe,çthe Cë~tri~füleSiS-~~thl;··;~;k ~at. eri-~~g·~~~~~f~g~ 
//ttireatens the free trade system from the ms1de, prec1selt becau~~"_JLls--repres~nted as Be1ng ~< /~ 
( essential part of it. ~;;~:: ~. ~~. ) ( ' 
'.........__........_____ -~ " u ".;i-->-- •• -.-;.-_-,.;-__ . .:;_-,_;~_:· .. ~ -:: -
~~,---....... -~ ~~ --=- ~-~ - ~ -·--·- -~---·- --,- .,...- - .. , •• '"-"-"> -~---.-=---•-~1'".-,• _ _,,_.,-----......-. ,,___....,.,---,_"'""J:L---
2. DUMPING: AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE? 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Legally, dumping is defined as exporting products at prices below either the prices charged in the 
exporting country or the production costs·: F~r the consumers in the importing_~ 
simply marvelou__s~since~the.y~cao_get the,~,product~P.lY~ The importing country's producers, 
n - ~~ 
how~~~~-~Jabel _s~~~ i!11!'_<'rts ~ u~air38 J~ntui~;~;~i~ see~s, indeed, not fair that they ~~.) 
cqnfrönted w1th low pnces, whereastneir colleagues m the exporting country are not. Also pnces 
~ ( 
~hich do not permit the reèovery of the production costs, are generally accepted to be unfair~---// 
---- -
On further consideration, however, it becomes apparent that one does not really care about low 
prices as such. Indeed, GATT does not prohibit dumping in se. It allows anti-dumping relief 
only if the dumping causes in jury _t() __ fue_importing countr:y-!s--industry ... Tbe core of the problem is _J" 
.tqeçcompetition- the--importing country's industry has to cope with as a result of'fow pnces39• 
un.fiµm~~s,.does-·nof rerer:·-~lÎer~-t~-unbal~-ced trade, 1 ê~, the disequilibriunl in the bilateral trade 
flows between two countries (one country exports more to another country th~.jt. imports from 
it). Of course, imports at extremely low prices may contribute to such a _9isêêÎuilibrium, but the 
-·--.-- __ , ___ •·· ''·. --,_ --------- _".-.•'.. - . ~ 
main pro!>l~ms~msis~jn~t~éffects.:aumping may have. on _the cow~tition in the importing 
_,...,_.,;-~~---,.=~'----~ - ,-,.,_ .•. '--- '- - - - " - • -- -,, --·-- .-- - - • /( ---......~----=-----.._---,, __ ~-,--~-~,....,,__-~-,."---r•---,,-.. --~..--~---._----o=--,--~ 
. coun~t. With regard to dumping, unfair trade, thus, ~pis to rely on the idea that the 
impOrtlng country's industry has a kind of commercial property ·right in existing customers or 
price levels40• However, even ordinary competition between producers in ·different countries 
may infringe that right41 . Since free trade presumes free competition, ~ c~~~er_ci(l} property 
right in existing customers or pripe levels negates free trade. rThe-"'aovantages of free 'trad~: are.~ 
. ~i:;:ri-!~n;:1y a~P~~~i&t\i :;~==~:~~e~d it t~::u1~~~:;:~f') 
(/ ;::::~: the claim that dumping is unfair, should not _be accepted unless the dumping i' ( · 
The main threat to competition is, indeed, predatory pricing. A producer engaged in predatory 
pricing aims at destroying or preventing competition by means of abnormally low prices in order 
~ high monopoly profits once competition is destroyed and preve. nted. Within national 
mark~"\;~~s fight such predatory conduct. The non-existence of international antitrust 
law, how~ot imply that international trade is free of predatory pricing. It only implies 
that producers who want to engage in predatory conduct, are given free play in -international trade, 
unless GATT and, in pursuance thereof, European anti-dumping law offer a good alternative to 
international anti trust law. lndeed, since predatory priç!p_g_JJ~yall)'. ,}1!,esumes low prices, dumping 
may perhaps be another word f'(Pfedi,itory1)rfChîgi~-intemational ~d'è;, For an exporter might 
-,-~,_.__ 
38 BHAGWATI, J., Protectionism, Cambridge (Mass.), MlT Press, 1988, 34-35. 
39 LOWENFELD, A:F., «Fair or Unfair Trade : Does it Matter ?», Cornell International Law Journal, 1980, (205), 206. 
40 BARCELÓ, J.J., Jntidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade - The United States an the International Antidumping Code», 
Cornell Law Review, 1971-1972, (491), 603. 
41 BARCELÓ, J.J., «Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade - The United States an the Internation~ Antidumping Code», 
Cornell Law Review, 1971-1972, (491), 603. 
23 
try to monopolise hls export market by practising dumping, i.e., by charging export prices below 
hls domestic market prices or below his prodygion"-costs,,,._wher~~-- anti-dumping law might 
~~~n ~s_mongp.olising his export mru:ket2.'.\ Therefore, this section wiii. i~VêStiiiïtëî~ 
~umpmg IS predatory. ..---e··"é., · 
'-,.________ -~·--·---·--···--" --·----~--·--""'·',""'""-"'"'·~----~--~~-~ ~.",~""_"_,,_ .. 
---------.---~~~---"--- -- ·---
Since three types of dumping are being distinguished under GATI and European anti-dumping 
law, namely price discrimination, sales at a loss and NME dumping, this section is split up in 
~ ----------·-
three subsections. After a short explanatiOîlOr'their legal definition, these subsections investigate 
from an economie point of view whether and when each type of dumping is predatory42. 
Finally, they confront the f~~~~~~~~.~~.~~~~~~~nlic-~~~gs:) 
2.2. DUMPING AS PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
2. 2.1. Le gal definition 
Under GATT and European anti-dumping law, dumping occurs when the export price of a product 
is below the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined 
for consumption in the exporting country. It also occurs when the export price is less than a 
comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of 
trade (Article VI(l) GATI ; Articles 2.1. and 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Articles 1(2) and 
2(1) and (3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(2) and (3) basic ECSC Decision). Clearly, price 
discrimination between national markets is a type of dumping, but not all price discrimination 
------~'"'--=""'~-...::-----''.:...-·~-"------'-,-;,_,__~,.._.,.,_ _ _.b.·~~-·-<:,_r",;;::-'-----.--.• _ _,_-:-~,.-_-· ' - -- ";.!_,_,.,_-_._-'---------· , ,,-_.,,.-... ~T"S------___.....,-i::::.·:.-:;s~-"-·l':'".'!!.~~ 
comes ~~thin the legal definition of dumping. Indeed, if the exporter charges a higher price 
...___.. ' . - '. 
abroad than at home, he does not dump. The legal definition of dumping, thus, does not 
comprise «reverse dumping», i.e., the price on the market of the exporting country is less than the 
export price. It comprises only «dumping proper», i.e., the price on the market of the expor:ting 
country is higher than the export price. As a consequence, cases of reverse dumping are fully 
disregarded and, therefore, cannot offset cases of «dumping proper». 
42 This work will concentrate on the question w~(and_which)._an~~y.Ju.atiticq. lt is not interested in the effects 
anti-dumping law may have on the economie behavioul· of domestic and foreign producers. Therefore, it will only inquire why exporters practise 
dumping when therc is no anti-dumping law. Hence, this work does not investigate dumping which is being practised by exporters faced with the 
positive probability of a future voluntary export restraint and subject to possible anti-dumping enforcement (see : ANDERSON, J.E., «Domino 
Dumping, 1: Competitive Exporter&», American Economie Review, 1992, (65), 65-83; ANDERSON, J.E., «Domino dumping Il: Anti-dumping-., 
Joumal of Jntemalional Economics, 1993/35, (133), 133-150). lt does not investigate either the effecta, for instance, of the mere existence of anti-
dumping law on the production decisions (LEIDY, M.P., and HOEKMAN, B.M., «Production effects of price- and cost-based anti-dumping laws 
under flexible exchange ratca., Canadian Joumal of Economics, 1990, (873), 873-895) or on the investment decisions of the dumping exporter 
(see: STAIGER, R.W., and WOLAK, F.A., «The effects of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly•, Joumal of 
International Economics, 1992132, (265), 265-287). 
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As GA TI and European anti-dumping law require that due allowance is made for differences in 
conditions and terms of sale and for other differences affecting price comparability (such as 
differences in transport costs, quantity, physical characteristics) (Article VI(l) GATI ; Article 
2.4. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(10) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(9) and (10) basic 
ECSC Decision), the legal definition of dumping also covers «non-price dumping». Indeed, price 
discrimination may occur not only when different prices are charged in different markets, but also 
when identical prices are charged which do not fully reflect differences in conditions and terms of 
sale or similar differences affecting prices. 
2. 2. 2. Economie theory 
In economics, dumping in the sense of price discrimiriation comprises both «dumping proper» and 
«reverse dumping». Thus, the economie definition is larger than the legal one. 
In order to know if and when dumping is predatory, the distinction between «dumping proper>> and 
«reverse dumping» is not to the point. Regardless of the market in which the exporter charges the 
lowest price, economics shows that price discrimination is frequently not predatory, but the result 
of competitive pricing. Competitive pricing, resulting from short-run profit maximization, is 
con~i~er_~-~tJQ._b~_the __ ordin~_~onoITii~J~~~yfql1~"~,:_QLpr9êiii~~~s:· ·---such competiiIOn~·maximizes 
welfare because. it drives the less efficient producers out of the market or prevents them from 
entering it so that only the most efficient producers remain43 • 
Unlike competitive pricing, predatory pricing is a strategie pricing policy which departs from 
short-run profit maximization. Instead, it is a strategy which aims at destroying or preventing 
competition in order to eventually gain monopoly profits. It may be directed against existing or 
potential competitors. lts object is to drive existing competitors out of the market, to prevent 
en try by potential competitors44, or to compel them to cooperate by reducing output or by 
merging on favourable terms with the predator. To attain this object, prices are usually set below 
their short-run profit maximizing levels45• At the end the predator will obtain a monopoly 
position or market leadership. From then on, he will be able to increase prices and thus obtain 
43 DEMSETZ, H., ccBarriers To Entryn, American. Economie Review, 1982, (47), 52-53. 
44 In economics predatory pricing against market entrants is called limit pricing. Since the conclusions which will be made 
afterwards are identical for all types of predatory pricing, the notion ccpredatory pricingn will refer here also to limit pricing. 
45 AREEDA, P., and TURNER, D.F., ccPredatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act", Harvard 
Law Review, 1974-1975, (697), 698 and 703 ; BAUMOL, W.J., ccQuasi-Permanence of Price Reductions : A Policy for Prevention of 
Predatory Pricing», Yale Law Journ.cU, 1979-1980, (1), 1; BORK, R.H., The Antitruat Paradox: A Policy at War with ltself, New 
York, Baeic Books, 1978, 144 ; JOSKOW, P .L., and KLEVORICK, A.K., ccA. Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policyn, 
Y ale Law Journal., 1979-1980, (213), 213 ; MILGROM, P., and ROBERTS, J., d..imit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete 
Information: An Equilibrium Analysisn, Econometrica, 1982, (443), 443; YAMEY, B.S., ccPredatory Price Cutting: Notes and 
Comments>>, Journ.cU of Law and Economica, 1972, (129), 134. 
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monopoly profits. Since the predator's original low prices lie below short-run profit maximizing 
level, they do not reflect his degree of efficiency. He may be less efficient than his competitors. 
In order to succeed, the predator must only be powerful enough to outlast his competitors when 
prices are low and re-entry must be practically impossible in order to enable him to charge high 
monopoly prices46 • Predation, therefore, does not maximize welfare. It does not result in 
efficient allocation of resources, since a less efficient predator may drive more efficient 
competitors out of the market or prevent their entry47• 
Predatory pricing is, however, easily confused with competitive pricing. Low prices in general 
~d price discrimination in particular are no proof of predatory pricing. Neither is the fact that 
competitors are driven out of the market or that potential competitors are prevented from entering 
it. Whereas subsection 2.3. investigates when low prices, in the sense of prices below production 
costs, are predatory, this subsection undertakes to define all types of competitive price 
discrimination which are relevant in anti-dumping law, in order to distinguish them from 
predatory. price discrimination. 
2.2.2.1. Competitive price discrimination 
There are three instances of competitive price discrimination which are relevant for dumping : 
third-degree price discrimination, spatial price discrimination and second-degree price 
discrimination. Third-degree price discrimination and spatial price discrimination differ from 
second-degree price discrimination, as they imply that the producer, by some practical mark (e.g., 
nationality, distance), is.~bl~Jo break down consumers into two or more group~: Those groups of 
consumers each constitute a market and, as a distinction may be made among those group of 
consumers, those markets are sa.id to be separated. Therefore, third-degree price discrimination 
and spatial price discrimination imply dj§çrlmination be.tween @arkets. Third-degree price 
discrimination requires furthermore that each market has a different demand o~~ket 
structure. For spatial price discrimination, it is sufficient ated by d1stance:-
...- ~--------------;---, ----
demand and market structure need not to be different. As second-degree price disctjmmation 
~ 
- ____________________ ..::.-- --
occurs within one and the same mar.ket, it does not require market separation. It only requires 
--~ --·------ _.- .··-·----- ---~ 
that some ~~~füng_to pay a higher __ ~ric~~afid- that th~p~~~ucer is able to 
_dif~te_to_some extent between these different ~l_g_s~~s of consumers. Moreo~èr;as-tfieádi 
no market separation, the producer must supply all consu~~is--whi~ii-are willing to pay the price 
he charges. Under third-degree price discrimination and spatial price discrimination, the producer 
46 BREYER., S., Regulation and lts Reform, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University, 1982, 32. 
47 DEMSETZ, H., tcBarriers To Entry», American Economie Review, 1982, (47), 62-53. 
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may refuse to supply a market, irrespective of whether the price which the consumers on that 
market are willing to pay, exceeds the price he gets on the other markets. 
2.2.2.1.1. Third-degree price discrimination 
Dumping in the sense of price discrimination is usually considered as third-degree price 
discrimination48• The traditional economie approach explains this type of price discrimination 
· only by differences in demand, especially by differences in demand elasticity (i.e., the more 
elastic demand is, the greater the effect of a price change will be on the quantity demanded)49• 
According to it, third-degree price discrimination necessarily involves separated markets, each 
having a different demand elasticity, so that at least in one market the producer bas market power. 
lndeed, without market separation consumers will equalize prices on all markets through arbitrage, 
since they will buy the product on the market with the lowest price and re-sell it in the others. 
Also, if the producer bas no market power in any of the markets, prices in each market remain 
the same regardless of the quantity he sells. Consequently, he will sell bis entire output only in 
the market with the highest price. If, on the other hand, markets are separated, but the demand 
elasticities on all markets are equal, the responsiveness of consumers to price changes is the same 
on all markets so that the producer must charge the same price in all markets, even if he bas 
market power in those markets. 
Traditional economie theory does not pay any attention to market structure, unless the differences 
in market structure result from the required difference in demand elasticities. Indeed, a perfectly 
elastic demand corresponds to perfect competition, whereas demand in an imperfectly competitive 
market is not perfectly elastic. Traditionally, that imperfect competition is represented as a 
monopoly market structure and the results obtained with regard to such a market structure are 
assumed to apply equally to an oligopolistic market structure. 
However, more recent research shows that differences in market structure may also cause third-
degree price discrimination. It demonstrates that price . discrimination between oligopolistic 
markets having identical demand elasticities may occur when the degree of competition on each of 
48 BOLTUCK, R.D., ~Economie Analysis of Dumping», Journal of World Trade Law, 1987, (45), 45-47; FISHER, B.S., «The 
Antidumping Law of the United States: A Legal and Economie Analysie», Law and Policy in International Business, 1973, (85), 87-
89; KNOLL, M.S., ecUnited States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reeonsideration», Texas International Law Journai, 1987, 
(265), 280-281; LEONTIEF, W., ccThe Theory of Lim.ited and Unlimited Discrim.inationtt, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1939-
1940, (490), 490-501; YNTEMA, T.O., ccThe lnfluence of Dumping on Monopoly Price", Journal of Political Economy, 1928, (686), 
686-698. See also : PIGOU, A.C., The Economics of Welfare, London, MacMillan, 1952 (reprint - 4th ed.), 275-289 ; ROBINSON, J., 
The Economica of Imperfect Compatition, London, MacMillan, 1954 (reprint ; original date of publieation : 1933) 1933, 179-202. 
49 See also: DAS, S.P., «Market uncertainties and cyclical dumping», European Economie Review, 1992, (71), 75. 
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those markets is different. The more producers compete on a market, the lower the price will be 
on that market5°. 
Whether third-degree price discrimination is caused either by differences in demand elasticity or 
differences in market structure, the price discriminating producer can hardly be said to be acting 
predatory. His short-run profit maximization results in third-degree price discrimination only 
because markets are separated and have different demand elasticities or market structures, and 
because, on at least one of those market he bas, as a monopolist or an oligopolist, market power. 
Of course, the producer could be blamed for being a monopolist or an oligopolist in a protected 
market. Monopoly and oligopoly are, indeed, generally inferior to perfect competition because 
under monopoly or oligopoly output is lower and prices are higher than the marginal cost of 
producing the product. Also free trade is superior to restricted trade, since it procures maximal 
welfare. The ultimate responsability, however, lies with bis government which «subsidizes» the 
producer by allowing him to have a monopoly or oligopoly position at home and by protecting 
him against foreign competition51 . Indeed, if his government enacted and applied antitrust law 
and removed all trade harriers, the producer would not be a monopolist or an oligopolist, nor 
would his home market be separated from the other markets. Consequently, bis short-run profit 
maximization would not result in third-degree price discrimination. 
2.2.2.1.2. Spatial price discrimination 
Like third-degree price discrimination, spatial price discrimination results from market separation, 
hut markets are now separated by distance. In this respect, it is particularly relevant for dumping 
since dumping occurs between national markets which are by definition separated in space. 
Contrary to third-degree price discrimination, spatial price discrimination does not require 
different demand elasticities or market structures. 
Figure 1 assumes two markets separated by distance with identical demand elasticities and an identical market 
structure, namely a monopoly. Bach market bas only one buyer. These buyers are evenly distributed along a line. 
Buyer 1 is proximat.e to the monopolist ; buyer 2 is located at a distance. Both buyers have each the same gross 
demand curve, Dl. Tuis cuive reflects the demand function at the buyers's site and bas to be distinguished from the 
net demand cuive, 0°. Net demand is the demand as seen by the monopolist at bis site. Transport costs make the 
difference between net and gross demand. If gross demand cuives are identical, ~ = ~1 = Dg2, and if transport 
5o EICHENGREEN, B., and VAN DER VEN, H., ccU.S. Antidumping Policiee: The Case of Steel", in The Structure and Evolution 
of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, BALDWIN, R.E., and KRUEGER, A.O. (ede.), Chicago, The Univereity of Chicago Prees, 1984, (67), 84-
88. 
51 BOURGEOIS, Jll.J., teEC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generatione Issues", in Antitrust and Trade Policy in 
the United State• and the European. Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 566-567; HOEKMAN, B.M., 
and LEIDY, M.P., «Dumping, Antidumping and Emergency Protection", Journal of World Trade, 1989/5, (27), 33-34; 
PETERSMANN, E.-U., teNeed for Reforming Antidumping Rules and Practices. The Meesy World of Fourth-Beet PolicieSat, 
Aussenwirtscha{t, 1990, (179), 184. 
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costs are constant per unit distance, the different net demand curves can be represented by parallel demand functions, 
0111 and D
0
2, with respective marginal revenue curves, MR
0
1 and MR02• Aggregate net demand, AD, with 
corresponding marginal revenue, AMR, are represented in figure l(b). The monopolist will maximize bis profit by 
equating bis marginal costs, MC, to marginal revenue and, thus, by producing a quantity Oq*. He will sell a quantity 
Oq1 to the distant buyer at a delivered price OP1, and a quantity Oq2 to the proximale buyer at a delivered price OP2• 
When comparing these delivered prices, the producer seems to practise reverse dumping. However, if transport casts 
are accounted for, the ex-factory prices are OP3 for the distant buyer and OP2 for the proximale buyer. The producer, 
thus, practises du~ing proper on the ex-factory level and this dumping is caused only by the fact that buyers are 
spatially distributed 2• 
· Spatial distribution of buyers affects delivered prices, which include transport costs, as well as ex-
factory prices. If demand elasticities and market structure are identical, it will result in price 
discrimination in terms of either delivered prices or ex-factory prices. In terms of ~x-factory 
prices, it may result in freight absorption (i.e. , the technica! term for dumping proper in spatial 
economics), phantom freight (i.e., reverse dumping) or no price discrimination, depending on 
demand conditions53. Market structure too plays a role, for spatial price discrimination does not 
require monopoly. In terms of d~livered prices, the relative degree of competition on all the 
markets is decisive for there being price discrimination or not : the degree of price discrimination 
increases if the more distant market is more competitive than the more proximate one54• In 
terms of ex-factory prices, on the other hand, freight absorption does not necessarily require the 
producer' s home market to have a less competitive market structure than the importing country. 
For, instance, if the home and export market are equally competitive, there will be no price 
discrimination in terms of delivered prices ; however, if transport costs are accounted for, each 
producer will charge an ex-factory price in his export market which is lower than his home 
52 A special case of spatial price discrimination may be found in: BRANDER, J., and KRUGMAN, P., c.A 'Reciprocal Dumping' 
Model of International Trade», Journal of International Economics, 1983/15, (313), 313-316. They show that two firms, having a 
monopoly position in their home market and having a Cournot perception (i.e., each of them assumes the other fi.rm's output as 
fixed in each market), will dump in each others market if markets are separated and transport casts have to be incurred for 
exporting to the foreign market. 
53 The producer in figure 1 absorbs freight because net demand is linear and, therefore, less convex than a negative exponential. 
lndeed, for freight absorption to occur, net demand must be less convex than a negative exponential. lf, however, net demand is 
less convex than a negative exponential, price discrimination will be practised against proximate buyers. lf net demand is a 
negative exponential, no spatial price discrimination will occur (BENSON, BL., ccOn the Ability of Spatial Competitors to Price 
Discriminate", Journal of lndustrial Economics, 1984-1985, (251), 251-255; GREENIIlJT, ML., NORMAN, G., and HUNG, C.-8., 
The economics of imperfect competitioTL A spatial approach, Cambridge, Cambridge University Prees, 1987, 25-27 and 101-110; 
GREENHUT, ML., and OHTA, H., Theory of Spatial Pricing and Market Areas, Dur ham N .C., Duke Univ~rsity Press, 1975, 51-
88; HOOVER, E.M., tcSpatial Price Discrimination», Review of Economie Studies, 1936-1937, (182), 182-191; NORMAN, G., tcA. 
Geometrie Note on Some Propositions in Spatial Pricing Policy", Economics Letters, 1983/12, (341), 341-347; PHLIPS, L., La 
formation des prix, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabay, 1983, 43-55; SINGER, H.W., tcA. Note on Spatial Price Discrimination", Review of 
Economie Studies, 1937-1938, (75), 75-77). 
54 DORW ARD, N ., ccRecent Developments in the Analysis of Spatial Competition and their lmplications for lndustrial Economics», 
Journal of lndustrial Economics, 1982-1983, (133), 135-141 ; GREENHUT, J.G., and GREENIIlJT, ML., ccSpatial Price 
Discrimination, Competition and Locational Effects», Economica, 1975, (401), 401-419; GREENHUT, ML., NORMAN, G., and 
HUNG, C.-8., The economics of imperfect competitioTL A spatial approach, Cambridge, Cambridge Univers~ty Prees, 1987, 135-143; 
GREENHUT, ML., and OHTA, H., Theory of Spatial Pricing and Market Areas, Durham N.C., Duke University Prees, 1975, 124-
150; PHLIPS, L., La formation delf prix, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabay, 1983, 57-73. 
bi) C\J 
O' 
* O' 
0 
Cl O' 
Il S:: ...-l 
bi) ...-l Cl 
Cl Il 
Il 
Il() 
Cl 
C\J 
O' 
0 
--- ----- ------------------ ----------
30 
market price at the ex-factory leveI55. Moreover, freight absorption may occur even if the 
producer' s home market is more competitive than the export market56. 
Consequently, ·the objection against third-degree price discrimination57, namely the assertion that 
the producer is a monopolist or an oligopolist, cannot always be raised · against spatial price 
discrimination. And, for the cases, in which it might be possible, the answer is identical : the 
absence of (well-enforced) antitrust faw in the producer's home country is the ultimate cause ; the 
producer practises only short-run profit maximization and cannot be blamed for acting predatorily. 
2.2.2.1.3. Second-degree price discrimination 
In case of spatial price discrimination, transport costs are accounted for differently. Likewise, 
second-degree price discrimination implies that other elements affecting price comparability, such 
as differences in physical characteristics, differences in quantity, or differences in conditions and 
terms of sale, are accounted for differently. For example, second-degree price discrimination 
----occurs when products of different quality are sold at the same price. lt also occurs when different 
services are not accounted proportionally for in the price58• 
It differs from spatial as well as from third-degree price discrimination in that markets are not 
separated. On the contrary, the producer is faced with only one demand function covering both 
his home and export market. Demand, however, is composed of heterogeneous customers. Some 
of them value the product highly and want to pay a higher price than the others. 
If the producer bas perfect information about each customer's preferences, he can practise perfect 
price discrimination (also called first-degree price discrimination) by charging different prices for 
each unit sold or by offering personalized bundles (price and quality, price and quantity, price and 
time of delivery) to each customer. Usually the producer will not be able to perfectly price 
discriminate since he does not have full information. Therefore, he will resort to a less complete 
form of first-degree price discrimination, namely second-degree price discrimination. Hence, he 
55 Tuis case is called «reeiprocal dumping•. Sec: BRANDER, J., and KRUGMAN, P" .,.A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Tradei., 
Joumal of Intemalional Economics, 1983/15, (313), 314-318. 
56 Fora specific example, sec: WEINSTEIN, D.E" .,.competition and unilateral dumping-, Joumal of International Economics, 1992/32, (379), 
379-388. In the model developed by D.E. WEINSTEIN, freight absorption by the producers in the most competitive market may occur, for 
instance, if those producers are able to lower their home market price to a level at which it is unprofitable for the producers in the less competitive 
market to export to the first market. But even then, the price in the less competitive market ia still high enough to allow the producers in the most 
competitive market to export to the less competitive one. Moreover, they will even resort to dumping and, thus, practise freight absorption. 
57 Supra, 27. 
58 See : TIROLE, J., The Theory of lndustrial Organi.zation, Cambridge (Maes.), The MlT Prees, 1988, 142-152. 
will discriminate by offering the customers a menu of bundles to choose from. Thereby, he must 
determine the bundles so as to make sure that he can differentiate between customers who . are 
willing to pay a higher price and those who are not. Otherwise all customers would pay the ~~ 
lowest price and the producer would not be able to practise second-degree price discrimination f:l 
and, consequently, to maximize his profits59• 
Figure 2 illustrates both first-degree and second-degre.e price discrimination. It assumes that each customer buys not 
more than one unit of the homogeneous product. If the profit maximizing monopolist does not price discriminate, he 
will equate bis marginal cost (MC) to bis marginal revenue (MR). As a consequence, he will sell a quantity Oq2 at a 
price OP2• If the monopolist perfectly knows the demand of each customer, he will practise first-degre.e price 
discrimination and charge for each unit sold a different price. lndeed, the customer at Oq1 will pay a price OP 1, 
whereas the customer at °'1J will only pay a price OP3• Under first-degree price discrimination the monopolist will 
sell a total quantity °'14 to Oq4 consumers, since it is profitable for bim to offer product units as long as the price of 
the marginal unit offered does not fall below marginal cost. 
Usually, however, the monopolist does not have perfect information. If he bas only some rather rough indications as 
to the preferences of the different customers, he will discriminate by group of consumers. In figure 2, he will charge 
a price OP1 at the group consumers Oq1, a price OP2 at the group q1q2 and a price OP4 at the group q2q4. By 
practising second-degre.e price discrimination the monopolist captures partly consumer surplus. Under first-degre.e 
price discrimination the monopolist appropriates total consumer surplus. 
Differences in the customers' preferences do not necessarily coincide with national borders. 
Customers with different preferences may be present in one and the same national market. 
Customers with the same preference may be dispersed over several national markets. As a 
consequence, the second-degree price-discriminating exporter may well practise at the same time 
dumping proper, reverse dumping as well as no dumping. It depends on which sales to which 
customers are compared : if sales to customers with the same preference are compared, no 
dumping will be found ; if sales to customers with different preferences are compared, dumping 
proper or reverse dumping will be found, depending on whether the customers with the highest 
preferenee are located in respectively the.producer's home country or export country. Usually, a 
mix of cases with no dumping, dumping proper and reverse dumping will be found. In this 
respect, second-degree price discrimination differs from third-degree and spatial price 
discrimination which are characterized by either dumping proper, reverse dumping or no 
dumping. 
59 For the concepts of first-degree and second-degree price discrimination, see : PIGOU, A.C., The Economics of Welfare, London, 
MacMillan, 1952 (reprint - 4th ed.), 275-289. 
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Nevertheless, like third-degr~ and spatial price discrimination, second-degree price discrimination 
results from the producer' s competitive pricing. Therefore, the producer cannot be said to act 
predatorily. The ultimate cause of second-degree price discrimination also resides in the absence 
of perfect competition. Contrary to third-degree and spatial price discrimination, imperfect 
competition is present in both the producer's home and export market. Therefore, not the 
producer, hut the govemements of both countries are to be blamed for not having enacted or 
applied antitrust law. 
2.2.2.2. Predatory price discrimination 
Predatory price discrimination will be practised if export prices are determined at a level lower 
than short-run profit maximizing prices in order to drive competitors out of the market or to 
prevent them from entering it. As soon as competitors are driven out of the market, export prices 
are raised, hut only to a level which prevents re-en try. 
This subsection examines whether producers will actually engage in predatory price discrimination 
and whether predatory price discrimination can be distinguished from competitive price 
discrimination. 
2.2.2-.2.1. Occurrence of predatory price discrimination 
In respect of predatory price discrimination, one automatically thinks of the cross-subsidy 
argument according to which a producer is able to charge low prices in his export market, since 
he can finance his lower income with the profits he earns in his home market, where he charges 
higher prices60• Tuis is, however, a weak argument. It only refers to the needed financial 
staying power of the predating producer, namely the fact that his profits in other markets enable 
him to charge ex tremel y low prices for an extended period of time in bis home mar ket. It 
overlooks the fact that the price discriminating predator' s high home market prices may attract 
competitors to enter bis home market. Either their entry will grant the predator' s competitors an 
identical financial staying power, so that they can face the predator' s low export prices ; or, it 
will cause, through increased competition, the prices on the predator's home market to decline so 
that the predator' s financial staying power vanishes. 
Of course, the cross-subsidy argument seems to hold, if there are entry harriers preventing the 
competitors from entering the predator' s home market. However, even if market entry does not 
60 BARCELÓ, J.J., ccA.ntidumping Lawe as Barriere to Trade - The United State~ an the International Antidumping Code•, 
Cornell Law Review, 1971-1972, (491), 503-506; BERCK, P., and PERLOFF, J.M., ccDynamic Dumpingn, International Journal of 
Industrial Organ.izati.on, 1990, (225), 225 ; SCHUNK, E.H., ccSoviet Bloc Dumping, the Revenue Act of 1916, and Economie Policy11, 
UCLA Law Review, 1979-1980, (1365), 1374. 
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endanger the predator's financial staying power, predatory price discrimination will only seldom 
occur. Successful predatory price discrimination also requires that the predator is able to 
convince his competitors of his predatory pricing strategy. lntuitively one would think that a 
more ·efficient producer will have no trouble to drive out less efficient producers. Economie 
theory, however, shows that even a low cost producer with a (not endangered) monopoly position 
in his home market and facing a competitive fringe of higher cost producers in his export market, 
may resort successfully to predatory price discrimination, only if he can commit toa certain price 
path for an extended period of time. Without commitment, the low cost producer will charge 
short-run profit maximizing prices and tolerate fringe producers. Indeed, if the low-cost producer 
cannot credibly commit to a certain price path, the fringe producers will expect the low-cost 
producer to charge short-run profit-maximizing prices and will stay in the market. But, if they 
will not leave the market, the low-cost producer will effectively charge short-run profit-
maximizing prices, as he will not be able to compensate his lower prices by higher monopoly 
prices once the fringe producers have left the market. As a commitment for an extended period 
of time is difficult to sustain, predatory price discrimination will only exceptionnally be 
successful. Moreover, economie theory shows that, if commitment is possible, the low cost firm 
needs not to price discriminate in order to drive fringe competitors out of his export market61. 
2.2.2.2.2. Discernability of predatory price discrimination 
Predatory price discrimination is difficult to distinguish from competitive pricing. Intuitively one 
would think of predatory price discrimination when exports prices lie below production costs62• 
However, predatory price discrimination may occur without sales at a . loss63 • Conversely, 
competitive price discrimination may occur with sales at a loss, especially when producers are 
61 BERCK, P., and PERLOFF, J.M., ccDynamic Dumpingn, International Journal of lndustrial Organ.ization, 1990, (225), 228-242. 
62 Even economiste define predation as selling below costs, see: BERCK, P., and PERLOFF, J.M., ccDynamic Dumpingn, 
International Journal of Industrial Organ.ization, 1990, (225), 234. 
63 BERCK, P.,· and PERLOFF, J.M., «Dynamic Dumpingn, International Journal of lndustrial Organ.ization, 1990, (225), 234. 
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uncertain about future demand conditions64. One might also think that only less efficient 
producers must engage in predatory price discrimination in order to drive their competitors out of 
the market. However, economie theory shows that ev~n a low cost producer must engage in 
predatory price discrimination, if he wants to drive bis competitors out of bis export market65• 
2.2.3. Legal theory and economie theory compared 
~ GA 'IT and European anti-dumping law do not distinguish competitive and predatory price ~ dlscrimination. As allowance must be made for differences affecting price comp.arability, they apply to all kinds of price discrimination. European anti-dumping authorities do not even consider 
the cross-subsidy argument as a relevant criterion for the application of anti-dumping Iaw66, l though they are convinced that charging high domestic prices facilitates dumping67 and 
predatory pricing on the Community market68• From an economie point of view, however, 
64 If confronted with uncertainty and perfect competition on his export market, a risk-neutra! producer, who is a monopolist on his 
home market, may engage in non-predatory third-degree price discrimination charging export prices below marginal cost (DA VIES, 
S.W., and McGUINNESS, A.J., ccDumping at less than Marginal Cosb1, Journal of International Economics, 1982/12, (169), 171-
176). 
Also uncertainty on their home market may induce the same risk-neutra!, as well as a risk-averse producer, who practices non-
predatory third-degree price discrimination, to charge export prices below marginal costs. The probability of export prices below 
marginal costs ie higher under risk-neutrality than under risk-aversion (HILLMAN, AL.,· and KATZ, E., ccDomestic uncertainty 
and foreign dumping», Can.adian Journal of Economics, 1986, (403), 403-416). Economie theory, thus, ~ems to confirm the 
contention that producers are willing to sell at any positive price on the world market in order to dispose of their output surplus. 
Possibly, they do not want to sell their output surplus on their home market because selling all available output on the domestic 
market could drive domestic marginal revenue below the world price or could even make domestic marginal revenue negatif. Thus, 
exports are used as a means to emooth out (unanticipated) changes in domestic demand. This practice of so-called cyclical dumping 
has been empirically investigated. The results of these investigations are, however, not univocal: whereas W.E. TAKACS finds 
evidence of cyclical dumping, D.G. TARR rejects in all cases the cyclical dumping hypotheeis (l'AKACS, W.E., ccCyclical Dumping 
of Steel Product&. Comment», Journ.al of International Economies, 1982/12, (381), 381-383 ; TARR, D.G., ccCyclical Dumping. The 
case of steel productSN, Journal of International Economies, 197919, (57), 57-63). The absence of univocal empirical results could be 
interpreted that economie theory gives a realistic explication of price discrimination. lndeed, it shows that under domestic \market 
uncertainty dumping ie poeeihle, hut does not necessarily occur. 
If the risk-averse producer is not only a monopolist on his home mar ket, hut has also market power on his export mar ket, and if he 
practices a quantity setting strategy, uncertainty on his export market may induce him to charge lower prices on his home market 
than on his export market (KATZ, E., PAROUSH, J., and KAHANA, N., ccPrice Uncertainty and the Price Discriminating Firm in 
International Trade11e, International Economie Review, 1982, (389), 3&9-393). If the same producer adopts a price-setting instead of a 
quantity-setting policy, he may practice non-predatory price discrimination with exports prices below marginal costs (BLAIR, R.D., 
and CHENG, L., tcOn Dumping», Southern. Economie Journal, 1983-1984, (857), 857-865). 
65 BERCK, P., and PERLOFF, J.M., ccDynamic Dumping", International Journ.al of Industrial Organization, 1990, (225), 228-234 
and 239-240. 
66 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewri-
ters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1. 
67 Commission Deciaion 93/521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping review in respect of 
imports of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil, tenninating the anti-subsidy review proceeding with regard to these imports and tenninating 
the anti-dumping and anti-aubaidy review in respect of imports of binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, No 
L 251/28. 
68 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties on imports of television camen 
systems originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No L 27111. 
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only predatory price discrimination should be prohibited or sanctioned. As, in practice, 
competitive and predatory price discrimination may be easily confused and predatory price 
discrimination is seldom successful (i.e., the predator seldom obtains the monopoly position he 
seeks), it seems appropriate that the price discriminating firm should enjoy the benefit of the 
doubt : price discrimination should not be sanctioned as such. lndeed, the welfare cost of 
disregarding the few instances of successful predatory price discrimination (i.e., the cost of not 
having prevented the monopolization of the market), will be below the overall welfare cost of 
distorting competition by sanctioning all instances of price discrimination. Price discrimination 
may, at most, be a first indication of predation, but it can never be sufficient proof of it. 
Moreover, as predation does not always require price discrimination, anti-dumping law should not 
be restricted to predatory price discrimination. lt should also apply to non-price discriminating 
predation69• 
The sole objection against competitive price discrimination is that it may only be practised if the 
government of the producer's home country subsidizes the producer by the absence of (well-
applied) antitrust law and by the protection of his home market against foreign competitors. This 
objection, though, is not always valid as competitive (spatial) price discrimination may occur even 
when the producer' s home market is more competitive than his export mar ket. But, even where 
the objection holds, both imperfect competition and protectionism do not come within the scope of 
anti-dumping law. Indeed, if the home and export market are imperfectly competitive to the same 
degree and have identical demand elasticities, no price discrimination will occur and anti-dumping 
law will be without object. Similarly, if the export market is less perfectly competitive and bas a 
lower demand elasticity than the producer' s home mar ket, reverse dumping will occur and anti-
dumping law will not apply either. Even more so, the producer who practices second-degree 
price discrimination, will be sanctioned for the instances of dumping proper, whereas anti-
dumping law disregards the instances without dumping and those of reverse dumping which may 
occur at the same time and may outweigh the instances of dumping proper. Such a selective 
application is all the more conspicuous because the same market imperfection causes dumping 
proper as well as reverse dumping and the absence of dumping. 
Moreover, anti-dumping law does not even remedy both causes of competitive price 
discrimination, namely the lower degree of competition and the protection against foreign 
competition on the price-discriminating producer's home market. Indeed, it does not render 
markets more competitive70, nor does it remove protectionism. On the contrary, anti-dumping 
law results in protecting the import markets and, thus, may reduce the degree of competition on 
69 The question whether anti-dumping law applies to non-price discriminating predation is examined hereinafter (infra, 42-52). 
?O BARCELÓ, J.J., cc.Antidumping Laws as Barriers · to Trade - The United States and the Iiiternational Antidumping Code", 
Cornell Law Review, 1971-1972, (491), 506-507. 
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those markets. It, therefore, closely resembles retaliation : it allows to restrict trade in reaction to 
the fact that the exporting country protects bis home market against foreign trade. Only if anti-
dumping action can be used to break through the exporting country's protectionist policy, it might 
be accepted. As this is a rather theoretica! hypothesis 71 , anti-dumping law will, like all 
retaliatory actions 72, may be assumed to lower the welfare of both importing and exporting 
country73• 
2.3. DUMPING AS SELLING ATA LOSS 
2.3.1. Legal definition 
Under GA TI and E~ropean anti-dumping law, dumping occurs when the export price of a product 
lies below the product's «~QQsti:uctectxalJ!e>>. Since the constructed value is defined as covering 
the producti<Jn costs _plus a reasona.bl~ mêfg~~ for overheads and profit (Article VI(l) GATI ; 
Article 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Articles 1(2) and 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(2) 
and (3) basic ECSC Decision), .!llimRing_g_çç:ursjf_ the product exported is solc!__~.-~Jpss, r~g~41e~s 
of whether price __ discrimination .. is being practised. GATI and European anti-dumping law 
,..--~---~-~---
undoubtedly require that~!!~~~!~.-Y!1:~e .co~prise~ alLcosts,_ botl:i fixed and variable, since they 
treat of «!he cost of production» without making any distinction between fixed and variable costs. 
GA TI and European anti-dumping do f!f:>t -·~!5~~ ~ase~ of ~es at a _loss to be compensated by 
cases of prgfitable . sales.. They define dumping as exports made at prices below the constructed 
value (Artiele VI(l) GATI; Articles 2.1. and 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Articles 1(2) and 
2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(2) and (3) basic ECSC Decision)) and, therefore, disregard 
all cases in which the export price is above the constructed value. 
2. 3. 2. Economie theory 
The classica! economie definition limits dumping to price discrimination 74 and refuses to equate 
dumping to sales at a loss. More recent economie .. theory, broadens the economie definition of 
71 BHAGWATI, J" Protectionism, Cambridge (Maes.), MIT Prees, 1988, 25-26; PETERSMANN, E.-U., ccNeed for Reforming 
Antidumping Rules and Practices. The Messy World of Fourth-Best Policies•>, Aussenwirtschaft, 1990, (179), 186. 
72 BHAGWATI, J" Protectionism, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Prees, 1988, 108-109. 
73 lnfra, 343-373. 
74 VINER, J" Dumping: A Problem in International Tr~, New York, Kelly, 1966, (reprint; original date of publication: 1923), 
3. 
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dumping to sales ~elow__ç_Q~! for t\v() :reasons .. ·,:···E'iI_~t,. it corresponds to the perception of the 
layman. that dumpi~g and sales at ~- loss . are~one and the same. Second, economie theory has 
become sophisticated enough to deal with problems such as market imperfections, fluctuations in 
demand and uncertainty, all causes of sales below cost75• 
Economie theory, however, doe~---~E.Lélgr~ ~ith the Ja.y!Ilan that ~~s élL a loss aJ'e ahy~ys 
QredalQry. Market imperfections, fluctuations in demand_ and unçettainty may, indeed, cause_ -a 
~ ---·--·-·--···- .. ·-· ·- - . -· .. - -·· . . . 
· producer not engaged in predatory pricing . to sell at a loss. Such sales at a loss are the result of 
--·'--- ---- --· - - - ' . ' . ---------------~-J ---------~~ 
·-short-run profit maximization (or loss mipjmj~ti_on) and do not aim at destroying or preventing 
·-·-=·~·--·----····-----~---·--·---···--·----·-· ~':···::·.~.:.··<:·l,.i;':i:'°:" --~-"-~---"·• __ _._, __ , _ _,_. ___ ·--~---·~-.~---~-------.-·· 
competition. This subsection tries to distinguish competitive sales at a loss from predatory sales at 
J·----.-.r 
a loss. Therefore, it investigates how short-run prqfit tnaximization can result _in sales at a loss 
and how to diseern predatory sales at a loss. 
2.3.2.1. Competitive sales at a loss 
In order to show how short-run profit maximization may result in sales at a loss, the standc:tid case 
·•:.:.~.::..::.,-::'.'.,-:: _ :_,;_-:_.:,_-_.·_" --~·--1.•;;;~---:_-,.A 
should be distin_gui~hed from the ca_se of sales at a loss under unc~rajE~y1 _.~.çlj_µ_stm~v_tcosts. or 
econonü~s .of- scale~ In the standard case, there is no unce~nty nor are there adjustments costs 
~... • ' -- ...._---··..:~-~-··'------------~-.-- ,, -- ·- - .-- - ____ "--·----~--- ------- -- _J 
or econo~i~s of ~cale : the p_Eod!!.~~~----lmQ~S- exactly (future) ~~arket ~111and, can ~djust all. 
var!able production factors ~HhQ~! any costs . and has no incentive to iricrease his productiqn 
output in order .. to. gain economies of scale. Economie theory distinguishes fixed from variable 
production costs. Contrary to variable cost, fixed costs cannot be adjusted. 
2.3.2.1.1. The stanclard case 
j '.J 1 ~!lonlicJb~!Y generally accepts,that sal~s at .ptic~es __ ~whi~~--~~-E-~!J~.~!mit _th~ r~~v~i:y~J>Lfixed 
·\ \:. : costs, may be nonnal busü1es_s _praçtiçe?~. ~!~?'1-~t!on, mar. ~e ec~nom .. ically N.stifi~, ev~n whçn 
\ 
1 
. prices are below total costs. Indeed, a producer who does not produce, incurs a loss equal to 
11 \ J1• .--- , .. ··". ..". ··"· ... ,-··- - --- ••... - ·-- " .. "j• ,,., ·-"•:,-· ' ·-· p ~. fix ..~ ... · .. _ .. ,ço.sts._;.· . How. ev ..e. r ... ' .. g. y.pr. pd .... µc.· i.n~ .. h. e. can rec1uce bis loss if the. ~rice :of .t.he._ product coyers all 
\ \ lvanable costs, 11.s well as part of hts. fixed costs. In that case, h1s loss w1ll amount only to the 
75 ETHIER, W.J., •Dumping», Journal of Political Economy, 1982, (487), 488-490. 
76 BRANDT, H., and ZEITLER, W .A., "Unfair Import Trade Practica Jurisdiction : The Applicability of Section 337 and the 
Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Lawe», Law and Policy in International Buain.ess, 1980, (95), 111 ; VERMULST, E.A., 
ccl>umping in the United Statee and the European Community : A Comparative Analyeie», Legal Issues of European ln.tegration., 
198412, (103), 109 ; VERMULST, E.A., An.tidumping Law and Practice in the United States and the European Communties. A 
Comparative An.alysia, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 431-432 and 486. 
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other, non-recovered part of his fixed costs and will, consequently, be lower than the loss he 
would incur without productior® -
Of course,-~ th:. Iong_~~11-~--~ ~-~18-c~u~UJ~.C.OY.ered, for -~--~8-~.~-~!LYariahhçjaJhe lon.,g_.~_!!· 
But even then all costs need not to be covered in each period. ?rofits <l,uring certain IX!riods may 
compensate losses _ incurr~ during other periods so that eventually all costs are covered in the 
'fong run. ·T'<---"~~»=---;" ·c - • ,- - • .. • " • • • 
2.3.2.1.2. Sales at a loss under unce~~~~y ~mLadjustmenLc~ 
2.3.2.1.2.1. Uncertainty 
The standard case could give the impression that prices which do not cover variable costs are not 
the result of short-run profit maximization. As the standard case assumes certainty, this 
impression is deceptive. In real life, a cproducer has to __ make his investment and price decisions 
for the future at a moment when the future is . not yet kpowl). That uncertainty about the future 
........,__;_~~· __ .___~_· __ ,.=~--~ . ...:.___ . ,, ,_ ,. 1.·. . -
affects the producer's decisions. 
In terms of investment d~ision~ uncertainty reduÇ'.~s-~t!t~ __ p_rpbability __ Qf. sales ._at. a_ ~9SS. An 
., :. '.'.. -- ~-· ~ : - '· . ---.,_--,..--~-,-----......,.--.,-.=~=- = -- - ' ,_ - -· - -, - .. -·-~,· .J' 
investment decision requires the producer to choose between productie>!l ._. fä,ctors which may be 
"---.-:c.~- --;;-r-- -, -·-· ___ --,.. - - • ·-. - ~ - - • • -'fl 
adjusted in the short _ run and thos~ which are fixed . one~ _ the investment decision is made. 
Economie theory -.sh~~s th~t a ~!Î~~~~y-~rse78 Pi~fit~rn~i~i~~~g g~Q~ucer will choose an 
investment w!th. ~- §tnall~r- _amo1mt_ot fi~~- ~~gg_l}çti~p. __ (~~!Qt::~ t1nder uncertainty than under 
-----~- ---- ' ·--· - - . 
certainty. By doing so, the producer reduces his losses when demand does not live up the 
- -·· ----~~----"--__......-~ .... 
As he will not choose the optima! ratio between fixed and non-fixed production 
-~---~-~l·_::::_~~fi--""o>-~--'•-•~_o.;.'.~_,.J..._......._-~,,,--_,l·'~.-.,,'_·._--,.- -=-- ._, -'-"-' - ---- , _._-_.-. ___ --· -._,__ __ .- __ 'L .\- -• ,-, 
77 Only once bas it been accepted in European anti-dumping law that only variable costs had to be covered. In the anti-dumping 
case in question it was found that total fixed costs should be allocated over the products of standard quality so that only variable 
costs had to be allocated to the products below standard quality (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 163/83 of 21 January 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 26 
January 1983, No L 2319; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, No L 199/4). 
In fact, it was not a deviation from European anti-dumping law. lndeed, over the whole like product category, both fixed and 
variable costs were covered. The fact that to the products below standard quality only variable costs were allocated was merely an 
application of the rule that all cost calculations have to be based on available accounting data (see : Article 2(5) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(11) basic ECSC Decision). The repartition of fixed and variable costs over the different product qualities was, 
indeed, based on the accounting principle retained by the complainant. 
78 There are three types of risk attitude: risk neutrality, risk aversion and risk preference. Risk aversion seems t'ge risk attitude 
<!Lthe.~<?_st~.f!.~~quept occurr!~çe,. Moreover, uncertainty implies usually no effect on decisions of a risk neutral producer and the 
effects of risk preference are usually the opposite of those of risk aversion. 
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factors (i.e., the ratio under certainty), he reduces also bis profits when demand 1s higher than 
expected79• 
In têrms of Rrice decisio_ns_, however, 1!!1~rtai1_1ty increases the probability . of . sales at a _ loss., 
Indeed, economie theory bas shown that increasing uncertainty inc~~Ses tfie-·prob~biiity of sal~~- ~t 
a loss, when a profit maximizing producers is risk-neutra! (so uncertainty does not affect bis 
investment decision) and adopts a quantity-setting strategy (i.e., he determines, on the basis of bis 
expectations, bis output before actual demand is known and makes later on the necessary 
adjustments in terms of the price charged80) 81 • 
l·_.1·.'\·· .. However, under uncertainty, producers generally adopt a ptjce-setting strateg .. y, i .. e., they set, on 
'.\ · .. t1 the basis -of their expectations, price befor~ the actual demand is known and make later on the 
·1 · /. --~--- ·' _, ' ' . - ' .... ' " ' ' " 
h~ ~~s~. Cldjustments ~>' tneans of the quan~ty they proc1uce82• Economie theory shows that, 
when a profit max.inûzing producer adopts such a priçe setting Strategy, price decreases and output 
Jncr~s~~fue~~Ill.o~~~Jhe~.i>_{qd~~~~-,-·i_~_ !Ï~k-averse83 . Economie theor;, is unable to show which 
· effect of uncertainty will prevail. The outcome depends on the characteristics of each individual 
case. Nevertheless, economie theory demonstrates that sales at a loss do not contradict ~hort-ruµ 
' '· " ,_-.- ----·--t -~ 
profit maximization under uncertainty~ 
2.3.2.1.2.2. Adjustment costs 
The .~tandard case assumes that variable production factors are so flexible that producers can at 
'"""- - .- ~-· - - - \ ' - ,., 
every moment in 'time make the necessary adjustments. This assumption is, however, n.e>J~Y~n' 
' . -
realistic since, in real life, producers are frequently confronted with adjustment costs. Such costs 
,.__-,_,--~- - - -· .-·---- ,- . ·- - -
79 See: BATRA, R.N., and ULLAH, A., «Competitive Finn and the Theory of Input Demand under Price Uncertainty", Journal of 
Political Economy, 1974, 637-548 ; DAS, 8.P., ccFurther Reeulte on Input Choicee. under Uncertain demandu, American Economie 
Review, 1980, 628-532 ; HOLTHAUSEN, D.M., cclnput Choicee and Uncertain Demand», American. Economie Review, 1976, 94-103 ; 
STEWART, M.B., ccFactor-Price Uncertainty with Variable Proportione11, American Economie Review, 1978, 468-473. 
SO When faced with demand uncertainty, the producer may choose between a price-eetting and/or quantity-setting etrategy. Under 
perfect competition, the producer ie a price taker, i.e., he cannot determine nor influence the price, and, tliue, may only adopt a 
quantity-setting etrategy (BLAIR, R.D., and CHENG, L., ccOn Dumping", Southern. Economie Journal, 1983-1984, (857), 859). 
81 DAS, S.P., «Market uncertainties and cyclical dumping•, European Economie Review, 1992, (71), 11-19: 
82 As, under perfect competition, the producer cannot determine nor influence the price, a price setting etrategy ie poeeible only 
when there is no perfect competition. Ueually, there ie no perfect competition and, apparently, producers choose often a price 
setting etrategy (BLAIR, R.D., and CHENG, L., ccOn Dumping", Southern Economie Journ.al, 1983-1984, (857), 859). 
83 BARON, D.P., .Demand Uncertainty in Imperfect Competition", International Economie Review, 1S71, (196), 202-203. See 
aleo : LEI.AND, H.E., «Theory of the Finn Facing Uncertain Demand», American. Economie Review, 1972, 278-291. 
_Fll:~? adjustment costs ~fept_~fü~,, prqdµc~r:S .)n_y~~tm~nL~~~sJon.,, Indeed, ~r1_ the. face. c,of 
adjustment costs, a profit-maximizing producer will choose an investment with a higher capacity 
;i~de~~~~~h -an investment ~lows the evasion ·of adjustment costs84• J!ig!l~!~ __ gt.Q'!C~ty, however, 
implies higher fixed costs and, thus, a higher probabilityc of sales.~aLa_loss_ .. 
,..,,_ • _-...--o•-,c-- •-+--'"' - ,--- - ·~-~- • 
. S~qn_Q., once the investment decision is made, adjustment costs make adjustment also to be rather 
sluggish and incomplete. P_roducers do . not ii:nmajiately _ diswse. of .alLsuperfluous. .variable 
p_~Qd~ctioJ1 ~~ctors if theicreplace!llent ,is difficult ,ancl cos~y. For example,J~Q-21.lf.. is generally 
considered to be a __ y(U'Ïabl~ p,r~ucp911. f~Ç~C>r",; nevertheless, if the actual demand is low, a profit 
maximizing producer will_not ,immediatly __ lay off _specialized labourers in whose training he has 
~vested8~. As a consequence, adjust111ent costs increase the probability of sales at a loss since 
the producer will bear the . costs of variable production façtors which he cannot employ for the 
time being. 
2.3.2.1.2.3. Uncertainty and adjustment costs 
The combinatio~_Qf._Qo!Jl, uncertainty and adjustment costs further !~~e~""~he~P!~~~~~~~!~--~~- sales at 
a loss. The decreasing eff~!- of . uns~~nty _on the 'prices,. of a profit-maximizing risk-averse 
producer subsists. But the effect of uncertainty on the producer' s investment decision to restrain 
-c~---'---=--...-~-~-•-"-~..:..... ~-----....0--------- --• -- - --- ' - - - ' ' -- '', ,' 
!~e-~~_Qf !'ïxed P!~~~~-~~ factors i~ cm1nterbal.anc(Xf by tjle fact that_adjustment c~sts induce hi!Jl 
~~ use as much as J><?~S~gle f~~ _ prQduction factors, and to apply variable production factors as 
little as possible. 
Economie theory furthermore shows that, with uncertainty and adjustment costs, actual demand 
must not fall below the lowest expected demand for profit maximizing producers to sell at prices 
below production costs. " Sales at a loss _may occur when the actual demé;Uld equals _the )owest_ 
~t~ d_~111an~86 . Moreover, if cl~lTiat)~gJ_~)()W, sh011-run prpfit maximization may even resul,t 
_i~ _p~ces whic~ __ do no~ _c_over al! vari~ble costs87• Thus, -~Y~~-prices pelo~vaf.i~ble ~O~!S are no 
proof of predatory prici11g~, ,_, 
~-'-- " ___ , __ ----·-~-- _ _,__,-:_. - ._•."-,,-- ,_,_.," 
84 BERNHARDT, D., d>umping, Adjustment Costs and Uncertaintyn, Journal of Economie Dynamics and Control, 198418, (349), 
358. 
85 ETHIER, W., u Dumping", Journal of Political Economy, 1982, (487), 497. 
86 BERNHARDT, D., tcDumping, Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty,,, Journal of Economie Dynamics and Control, 198418, (349), 
358 ; ETHIER, W" te Dumping." Journal of Political Economy, 1982, (487), 497. 
87 BERNHARDT, D., d>umping, Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty", Journal of Economie Dynamics and Control, 1984/8, (349), 
352-362 ; ETHIER, W.J., uDumping,,, Journal of Political Economy, 1982, (487), 497 .. 
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2.3.2.1.3. Sales at a loss and economies of scale 
There are economies of scale when the · productivity of a producer depends on the size of bis 
,output (in~rnal ~n~mies of scále) or on the. siz~ of the industry ~t is part of (~xternal economies 
of. scale). There may be internal economies of scale when substantial inititial investments are' 
required (e.g., research and development outlays) to develop new products. There will also be 
intemal economies of scale when production processes are characterized by learning effects, i.e., 
by producing the producer will gain experience which will reduce bis future production costs88• 
An industry will be characterized by external economies of scale when, for instance, producers, 
because their being located near to one another, have a better access to mar kets of intermediate 
goods and specialized labour and, thus, may exert market power on those markets to a certain 
extent89• 
It bas been demonstrated that ~hQrt:JUJJ_ profit maximizing producers, when faced w!th learning 
·- - ------~--~"---- ----·----~---· ---- ." . ..._ _____ , _____ ,_ -·--·------~-~---·--
' e.ffec. ts, may se.t. cu .. rr. e .. nt. _pric.·es belo .. w· ... curren·t··.·. c. o. s-t. s .... in .. order .... to··-·._---~;" .. ·rt -~xpetjenc~. . Overall 
production costs will .. be covered by both present and future sal~~ Clearly, such pricing 
policy _90n~~~~- said to be predatory as it results fr?m short~run profit maxirniza.tion. 
-...____,,~-.<'-'-"~- -- •. ,_. --
2.3.2.2. Predatory sales at a loss 
_Sales at_ëJ.Jc:>~s are :Rred_atory when a producer incurs losses in order to drive bis competitors out of 
---------·- ---==--- ----- '---·--- - --- - --·-·· -· . . . ' 
the_ market or to prevent them from entering it. As soon as he bas driven bis competitors out of 
the market, he will aj~e- _bis prices in order to recoup bis losses. However, since re-en try is 
possi~~' he can raise bis prices only to a level which prevents re-en try. 
---- ---
This subsection examines whether predatory sales at a loss frequently occur and how they can be 
distinguished from competitive sales at a loss. 
2.3.2.2.1. Occurrence of predatory sales at a loss 
Traditional economie theory advances that producers rather exceptionally engage in predatory 
pncing_ (includlng predatory sales at a loss) as it is quite inefficient. Indeed, traditional economie 
·theory~~'l}mes that there are tto market imperfections and that information is perfect. If there are 
88 BALDWIN, R.E., «Are Economists' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid ?-., Joumal of Economie lilerature, 1992, (804), 820 ; VAN 
BERGEUK, P.A.G" and KABEL, D.L" «Strategie Trade Theories and Trade Policy-., Joumal of World Trade, 1993/6, (175), 176-177. 
89 KRUGMAN, P. and OBSTFELD, M., lntemalional Economics, Glenview (Ill.), Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988, 127. 
9o DICK, A.R., «Learning by doing and dumping in the semiconductor industry-., Joumal of Law anJ' Economics, 1991, (133), 133-159; 
GRUENSPECHT, H.K., «Dumping and Dynamic Competition-., Journal oflnternalional Economics, 1988/25, (225), 230-233. 
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no market imperfections,_, capital markets must be perfect and producers, who are at least as 
-----~----~-------"-·--·--·-.------ __.L....--·---- .... ---------·-----'--·-- ---- ' 
effici~nt as the predator, will have sufficient financial staying power to survive a predatory 
_____..- - - --~ ~- -· a~c~=~,~ If th~re is je~ect informatio~~ producers know whether they are at least as efficient as_ 
the predator. If,.they are at least as efficient, they will ignore any predatory actior,i. As they will 
~~{)eave~.the ~~k~t,--~the predator will not be able .to raise hls prices an~ recoup bis losses 
afterwards92.: Since the predator h~ also perfect information, he knows that he will be worse 
• . ' 1 ,____ - -' :·' 
off with predatory pricing than without it and, therefore, he will not engage into it. 
According to traditional economie theory, predation is also inefficient even if it is considered as 
~ investment in the reputation for thoughness, i.e., the predator will always fight back each 
producer who enters the market. Indeed, if there is perfect information, a producer will not be 
deterred by the predator's actions against another producer. To demonstrate this, assume a 
predator and ten potential entrants. The predator will fight the first entrant in order to deter the 
second ; he will fight the second in order to deter the third and so on. However, he will not fight 
the tenth entrant in order to built up his reputation for thoughness since there is no eleventh 
entrant. As the tenth entrant will actually enter the market, the predator has no need to fight the 
ninth entrant and this one will also enter the market. But then, the predator does not benefit from 
fighting the eighth entrant. This reasoning holds true up to the first entrant. As the entrants have 
perfect information, the predator's actions will not deter them and, therefore, the predator, who 
also is perfectly informeel, will not engage in predatory pricing93 . 
More recen~ _economie the<)ry, especially game theory, however, shows that the assumptions about 
the ~_absence of m~~et imperfections and perfect information make pr,edatory pricing inefficient. 
Since, in real life, information and markets are not perfect, it may be rational for a predator to 
engage in predatory pricing. 
91 It is generally considered that financial staying power determines whlch producer will be the first to leave the market. Thus, if 
the predator has the largest financial staying power, he will succeed in driving out hls competitors, even if he is lees efficient than 
hls competitors (AREEDA, P., and TURNER, D.F., ccPredatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act», 
Haruard Law Reuiew, 1974-1976, (697), 698; GREER, ccA Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory PracticesN, 
Antitrust Bulletin, 1979, (233), 240). 
However, thls propoaition holde only if capita! markets are imperfect (STIGLER, G.J., Theory of Price, London, Collier-MacMillan, 
1962, 227-228; TELSER, L.G., ccCutthroat Competition and the Long Puree", Journal of Law and Economics, 1966, (259), 268 and 
270; YAMEY, B.S., ccPredatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments», Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, (129), 131. lndeed, if 
capital markets are perfect, the more efficient producer will have an easier access to the capital market, as it is more profitable to 
invest in a more efficient producer than to provide capita! funds to lees efficient ones (DEMSETZ, H., ccBarriere To Entry•, 
American Economie Reuiew, 1982, (47), 56). 
92 BAIN, J.S., MA Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopolyn, Amèrican Economie Reuiew, 1949, (448), 452; DORWARD, N., The 
· Prici.ng Deci.si.on : Economie Theory and Business Practice, London, Harper & Row, a.d., 91 ; McGEE, J.S., ccPredatory Pricing 
Revisited", Journal of Law and Economics, 1980, (289), 311; MODIGLIANI, F., ccNew Developments on the Oligopoly Front», 
Journal of Politieal Economy, 1968, (216), 217; SPULBER, D.F., ccCapacity, Output, and Sequentia! Entry••, American Economie 
Reuiew, 1981, (603), 503. 
93 SELTEN, R., ccThe chain-store paradoxN, Theory and Deci.si.on, 1978, (127), 127-159. See also: KREPS, D.M., and WILSON, R., 
ccReputation and Imperfect lnformationN, .Tourn.al of Economie Theory, 1982127, (263), 264-266. 
44 
There are, for example, imperfections on the capita! market when the, ~n~~1 _ ~-~~ }~ at least as 
efficient as the predator, faces financial constraints. c As bis financial constraints prevent him ·rrom 
t':-·-· - • ' - -- --- -- - . ' "- '·- ~- ----~ ---
outlasting a predatory a~ta.._çk, the predator will be able to engage successfully in predatory 
priciiig94'~----Aclj~stment costs are ano!her ~xample of market imperfections. Traditional 
- -·-- - '. - ' • - ,. - l. 
economie theory generally assumes that entrants expect the predator to maintain bis pre-entry 
output level when entry occurs95• However, since traditional economie theory assumes perfect 
information and the absence of market imperfections, the entrants know that the predator will 
· incur losses by maintaining bis output level, while, by decreasing bis output level, he could make 
profits. lf, however, there are adjustments costs, it will be costly for the predator to change bis 
production plans after they have been made. Then, the entrants will know that the predator is 
committed to a certain output path, with corresponding prices, and bis predatory action will be 
credible96• 
There is _I!O Rerfeç_~}n_for111atio~ i~~ . for example, ~ntrants are uncertain about de~and conditions : 
prices may be low because market conditions are bad (low demand) or because the predator 
practices predatory pricing97• Entrants may also be uncertain about the predator's pay-offs : the 
predator may charge low prices, because bis production costs are low or because he is engaged in 
predatory pricing98• They may equally be uncertain as to the predator' s motivations and 
behaviour : perhaps the predator is not behaving rational or is able to precommit himself to an 
94 BENOIT, J.-P., d'inancially conetrained entry in a game with incomplete information11, Rand Journal of Economics, 1984, 
(490), 490-499. 
95 This is the so-called ccSylos postulate11, see: BAIN, J.S., ccA Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly11, American Economie 
Review, 1949, (448), 452; DORWARD, N., The Pricing Decision: Economie Theory and Business Practice, London, Harper & Row, 
1987, 91; GASKINS, D., J)ynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing Under Threat of Entrytt, Journal of Economie Theory, 197117, 
(306), 306-322; KAMIEN, M.l., and SCHWARTZ, NL., ccLimit Pricing and Uncertain Entry", Econometrica, 1971, (441), 442; 
KAMIEN, M.L, and SCHWARTZ, NL., tcCournot Oligopoly With Uncertain Entrytt, Review of Economie Studies, 1975, (125), 125; 
McGEE, J.S., tcPredatory Pricing Revisitedtt, Journal of Law and Economics, 1980, (289), 311; MODIGLIANI, F., ccNew 
Developments on the Oligopoly Front», Journal of Political Economy, 1958, (215), 217 ; PYATr, G., ccProfit Maximisation and the 
Threat of New Entry•, Economie Journal, 1971, (242), 247. 
96 FLAHERTIIY, M.T., «Dynamic Limit Pricing, Barriers to Entry, and Rational Firmstt, Journal of Economie Theory, 1980, (160), 
160-182. 
Also several traditional economie models show the rationality of predation when current price levels reflect an irreversible decision 
because producers have high adjustment costs and, therefore, hold excess capacity (SALOP, S.C., ccStrategic Entry Deterrence•, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-First Annual Meeting of the American Economie Association, August 29-31, 1978, in American. 
Economie Review, 1979, (335), 335-338; SPENCE, A.M., ccEntry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing", Bell Journ.al of 
Economies, 1977, (534), 634-544; SPULBER, D.F., ccCapacity, Output, and Sequential Entrytt, American Economie Review, 1981, 
(503), 603-514). 
97 ROBERTS, J., tcA. Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing11, Oxford Economie Papers, 1986, (75), 75. 
98 KREPS, D.M., and WILSON, R., « Reputation and Imperfect lnformationtt, Journal. of Economie Theory, 1982/27, (253), 254 and 
256 ; MILGROM, P., and ROBERTS, J., «Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information : An Equilibrium Analysis,,, 
Econometriea, 1982, (443), 444 
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aggressive course of action99• Entrants cannot see through the predator' s reputation since, if 
demand conditions are bad or if the predator' s production costs are low, the predator will charge 
low prices even in respect of the last entrant. They can only base their expectations about future 
~'.. predation on past conduct, making it worth~il~ for_ the predatc:>r to build up a reputat~on of, 
1f th~ug1!11ess100• 'fhereby, the predat()r can induce exit-or prevent entry. However, entrants will 
not always be fooled. As they know that the predator will try to present market conditions as bad 
or his production costs as low, they may enter or stay in the market, as if there was perfect 
information101. Then, if the predator is also uncertain about the entrants' pay-offs, the entrants 
-- -- - L j 
too may have the incentive to . ~uild up a reputation of thoughness and a price war may start 
between them and the predato1'!~i) 
Though the CJ.SSump~~~s ~,~ _g~-~~-~~~~ry about market imperfections and incomplete information 
seem quite realistic, most empirical studies do not find any indication of actual predatory 
pricing103• However, the lack of hard empirica! evidence may precisely prove that ,game 
theory is right in __ that it asserts that predation is only rational insofar a~ A is_ difficult to distingl}ish 
it __ f_r~~n_ o!dinary competitio~. Insof~ as predation is obvim1s, it is less credible .and should not 
99 MILGROM, P., and ROBERTS, J., «Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence», Journal of Economie Theory, 1982/27, (280), 
285-286 and 302-303. 
lOO MILGROM, P., and ROBERTS, J., «Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence», Journal of Economie Theory, 1982127, 
(280), 283-284. 
lOl MILGROM, P., and ROBERTS, J., ccLimit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analyeie", 
Econometriea, 1982, (443), 443-444 and 457 ; ROBERTS, J., ccA. Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing", Oxford Economie Papers, 
1986, (75), 75. 
102 KREPS, D.M., and Wil.SON, R., &putation and Imperfect Information", Journal of Economie Theory, 1982/27, (253), 254 
and 266-275. 
lOJ All case studies conclude predatory pricing ie non-existent, eee : BORK, R.H., The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
ltself, New York, Basic Books, 1978, 149-155; BURNS, M.R., ccOuteide Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: The Case of the 
'Plug War' and the Union Tobacco Company», Business History Review, 1982, (33), 33-53; ELZINGA, K.G., ccPredatory Pricing: 
The Case of the Gunpowder Trust", Journal of Law and Economies, 1970, (223), 223-240; KAMERSCHEN, D.R., ccPredatory 
Pricing, Vertical Integration and Market Forecloeure : The Case of Ready Mix Concrete in Memphie", lndustrial Organization 
Review, 1974, (143), 143-168; KOLLER, R.H., «The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirica! Study", Antitrust Law and 
Economies Review, 1971, (105), 105-123; MARIGER, R., ccPredatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil of New Jersey Case 
Revieited», Exploration.a of Economie History, 1978, (341), 341-367; McGEE, J.S., ccPredatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil 
(N.J.) Case», Journ.al of Law and Economies, 1958, (137), 137-169; McGEE, J.S., ccPredatory Pricing Revieited", Journal of Law and 
Economies, 1980, (289), 289-330; TELSER, L.G., ccCutthroat Competition and the Long Puree", Journal of Law and Economie•, 
1966, (259), 259-277; ZERBE, R., ccThe American Sugar Refinery Company, 1887-1914: The Story of a Monopoly>>, Journ.al of Law 
and Economies, 1969, (339), 339-375. 
Aleo a laboratory experiment found predation to be exceptional, eee : ISAAC, R.M., and SMITH, VL., ccln Search of Predatory 
Pricing», Journ.al of Politieal Economy, 1985, (320), 320-345. 
Only one study, which ueed a multiple regreeeion model, ehowed predation not to be eo exceptional as generally thought, eee: 
BURNS, M.R., ecPredatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitore», Journal of Politieal Economy, 1986, (266), 266-296. 
j 
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occur104• On the other hand, game theory, though showing the rationality of predation, does 
not prove that producers frequently engage in it. 
2.3.2.2.2. Discernability of predatory sales at a loss 
Economie theory proposes several rules in order to distinguish predatory pricing from competitive 
pricing, a short overview of which will be give@. 
2.3.2.2.2.1. Cost-based rules 
Frequently, economie theory proposes a . çost ~ba~~ rule. However, there is_ t'lQ JJJlanimity as to 
the ex~~~!ent of such a_rule as different .cost-bas~_ rules are proposed, namely rules according 
to which pricing is predato~ wh~ILpxices ar~_~elo~ ~!the!" short-run margina1 costs106, average 
variable co~ or average total costs108. -----· --- -·-- --~---·---~-- -- -----·-· ---·----- , 
~=------=-=-~--~-~~·--~----~--~----"-'·---"-~'----- -r~-_-,rc - -- - ' 
However, a ~-~~=1J~sed ____ rule __ is not appropriate.l as it does not distin~l!!s~-- ~r~~t()ry from .. 
competitive pricing. Such a rule may consider competitive pricing as predatory and vice-versa, 
~ - . - - .,,,..,..__~.r-~ •--·----- - ----" - ' 
since prices below production costs may result from short-run profit maximization, especially in 
the face of the uncertainty and adjustment costs109, while, on the other hand, predation may be 
practised without prices below production costs110• 
l04 EASLEY, D., MASSON, R.T., and REYNOLDS, R.J., ccPreying for Time», Journal of Industrial Economics, 1984-1985, (445), 
445-446 and 455-456 ; O.E.C.D., Predatory Pricing, Paris, O.E.C.D., 1989, 21. 
lOS For amore complete overview, see : O.E.C.D., Predatory Pricing, Paris, O.E.C.D., 1989, 23-32. 
l06 BERCK, P., and PERLOFF, J.M., ccDynamic Dumpingn, International Journal of In.dustrial Organization, 1990, (225), 228-234. 
P. BERCK and J.M. PERLOFF do not explain why predation is defined as selling below short run marginal costs. Probably they 
rely on P. AREEDA and D.F. TURNER according to whom short run marginal costs are the first-best criterion for distinguishing 
predatory pricing. P. AREEDA and D.F. TURNER were, however, of the opinion that the criterion of short run marginal costs was 
practically unworkable. Therefore, they proposed average variable costs as second-best criterion (AREEDA, P., and TURNER, D.F., 
cc~edatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act», Harvard Law, Review, 1974-1975, (697), 697-718.). 
107 AREEDA, P., and TURNER, D.F., ccPredatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act", Harvard 
Law Review, 1974-1975, (697), 697-718. 
lOS POSNER, R., Antitrust Law: An Economie Perspective, Chicago (Ill.), University of Chicago Press, 1976, 190-192; 
WILLIAMSON, O.E., ccPredatory Pricing: A Strategie and Welfare Analysis", Yale Law Journal, 1977-1978, (283), 333-337. 
109 Supra, 38-42. 
llO EASLEY, D., MASSON, R.T., and REYNOLDS, R.J., ccPreying for Time", Journal of Industrial Eco~mics, 1984-1985, (445), 
457 ; ROBERTS, J., tcA. Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing", Oxford Economie Papers, 1986, (75), 78, note 2, and 91-92. 
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2.3.2.2.2.2. Output expansion rule 
As predatory pricing does not necessarily imply sales at a loss, an output expansion rule bas been 
proposed. It is~gy~_Jh~! a _Eroducer will ~~-<:>Pc~_!!~~-~ÇQ!!~~ct _t~ _cost~Q<J.$~_ru1~~. and, therefore, 
_will inyes~_in ov~r~p~~!~ so that he can ~-l!~~~~~his ~~~~t !~!~~PQn~~ tQ ~ntr,y_~!~9_!!!_~!~-!~~ng 
~-applicabÎ~- ~st-based _ rul~111 • To avoid-th~~~~ effects a rule bas been proposed which 
prohibits outputillc~~~ -i~- re~ponse to entry for a certain period112• As the cost-based rules, 
this output expansion nile also _ fails to detect all instances of _ predat()ry _ pricing since preciation 
-~;y-;~ur~j~Q~!~~i~~~tP~~-~;~p~~!~H113. ~- ---~ -- - - -- -~--- - -- - ---- - -------
2.3.2.2.2"3. Dynamic pricing rule 
As predation usual_Jyjnvolves low p!}_c_~~_JQllQW~ !Jy __ high ll}9nopoly prices_ once market power is 
~-~~~~~~-~ --~----
obtained, economie theory bas also proposed a dynamic pricing rule which prohibits producers to 
raise their prices during a certain period after the disappearance of a competitor, unless it can be 
shown that price rises are due to changes in demand or production costs114• 
Besides the practical _j)roblem of ~ç!Lstinguishing price rises caused by changes in demand and 
~- ~~----=-=-----....-, -_....., ___ --~~--,,,.-.-~~,,_-,..~---···~---------- - -·-~--·- '~-,... 
production costs _ fmm predatory prj~_ rj.~e~, such a prohibition would also affect promotional 
____ _...,._...,.,,=--==·"'-··--~~-,....~---....i::'>-'----"--·-----·-- -- J 
pricing. :t:>romQtiQm~l_p_tiç1rrg also consists of çharging temporarily low p~ces in order to gain a 
,___ ·--~--'"'- - - - - --- -- ---- - -.- - - -- - --- - ~-- --- - ~ 
durable fi __ 90_ thold on a market, hut, Q~ce such a föothold is obtained, higher prj.~e_s will Q~_ç_h_arged. 
__ c_ ~ 
" However, contrary to predatory pricing, promot!onal~~-PI"!~~ng ___ is considered to be a normal 
compet!~~~_prich1g stfa:tegy115 and should, therefore, not be sanctioned. 
l l l This is the case of limit pricing which consists of charging the_ highest price possible, hut at the same time expanding output, 
thereby leaving insufficient residual demand for entry on a eufticient scale. See : BAIN, J.S., ccA Note on Pricing in Monopoly and 
Oligopoly», American Economie Review, 1949, (448), 44~64; MODIGLIANI, F., ccNew Developmente on the Oligopoly Front», 
Journal of Political Economy, 1958, (215), 215-232. See also: DORWARD, N., The Pricing Decision: Economie Theory and 
Business Practice, London, Harper & Row, 1987, 90-96; WILLIAMSON, O.E., ccPredatory Pricing: A Strategie and Welfare 
AnalysiB», Yale Law Journal, 1977-1978, (284), 295-299. 
112 WILLIAMSON, O.E., ccPredatory Pricing: A Strategie and Welfare AnalysiB», Yale Law Journal, 1977-1978, (284), 331-336. 
l lJ ROBERTS, J., ccA Signaling Model of hedatory Pricing,,, Oxford Economiè Papers, 1986, (74), 91-92. 
114 BAUMOL, W.J., ccQuasi-Permanence of Price Reductione: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory pricingn, Yale Law Journal, 
1979-1980, (1), '-8. 
llS Promotional pricing is based on a penetration strategy. This is a normal competitive strategy of starting with a low price 
which will be increased in the long run as soon as market circumstances are fävollr'able (DORWARD, N., The Pricing Decision: 
Economie Theory and Business Practice, London, Harper & Row, 1987, 126). 
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2.3.2.2.2.4. lntent 
Since intent is the !J~ly crue~~ difference bet~een predatory and promotional pricing1.16, one 
might think of an approach based on intent. It is, indeed, the intent ~Q_ ~Urnina~~--~! __ !o prevent 
~mpetition that ___ ~-~~~ p!Ï_cin~ predatory 1 ~7 • However, it is generally accepted that it is 
~Uffiçult,JL!!Qt J~possible to prove predatory intent~ 18 • Especially if the predator bas a high 
legal sophistication, he will not leave any trace of such an intent when predatory intent is used as 
a legal criterion 119• Moreover, j_J}tent as such _ js _eç.Qoe>m.içally Jrrele_yan..t. The effects oi_a_ 
p_ricing~!!a~~gy ___ are __ equally ~r~J~yant and a pricing strategy, intented to be predatory, does not 
always have predatory effects. From an ~~n-~!!!AÇ~J>2i~tQf_view, ~nly a_producer_wbo ai111s at 
Q~~!r<:>Ying ___ gr _prev~J!ting competition and_ who manage~ to or _bas already succeeded in 
l!!_Q!lopoli~i-~g_ th~mélrket, _slmµld _ _Q_~ _S41!1_çtlo~êd 1~0 • 
2.3.2.2.2.5. Rule-of-reason test 
:t:lone of the .l'.11les _proposed above allows to ~Js_ti_n_guish predato:ry ___ ptjçjng __ from~_-competitive 
--- - ' 
ppciQg. They only discern some instances of predatory pricing, while they sometimes mistake 
competitive pricing for predatory pricing. As they do not satisfy entirely, a rule-of-reason .test bas 
been proposed121 • §µch .aJest implies an inquiry into all the. facto!:~- ~~II<?ll_nding the predator's 
~onduct, ~lJC}_l_ as _pri~es, __ prodt1~tion_ costs, output, Jntent, .as.-well _as the producers' relatiye 
~fficiency and market structure such __ as_ the existence of market_ imperfections __ (e.g., _adjustment, 
costs) or the lack of perfect information or other entry harriers. None of these factors is decisive. 
Of course, such a test is less workable than the p!ight_-!!!!~-~!":~~- ~a_!Jo~t cost~!_-~!:l_tpu~,. p~ç~~ _and 
ipt~!!~~ · In order _!o mak~ the rule-of-reason test more wo~~l'!le, a ~~o-tJeI' approach bas been 
--~-~---- - - - -- -- ~--- --- - ---- - -· ~:::;,_,-~::_~--;_..- ---·-----
proposed : bright"'."l~rules should be QQly. applied in markets with a structure in which predatory_ .. 
pric.il'lg ~ol!!~-~ec_~_tj_g_n~,. Thus, in the !'ï-rst _stage, it should be ,e)Camined whether, in view of the 
structural characteristics of the market, it seems reasonable to expect prt!dat9ry pticing to occur 
116 Though a penetration strategy is usually aé~pted as a norm.al competitive pricing strategy, it may also be used with the 
intent of discouraging new entrants (DEAN, J., ccPricing Policies for New Producten, Haruard B~iness Reuiew, 1950, (45), 51). 
Only because of intent, a penetration strategy becomes predatory. 
117 YAMEY, B.S., ccPredatory Price Cutting : Notes and Commentsn, Journal of Law an.d Economics, 1972, (129), 135 and 137. 
118 POSNER, R., Antitrust Law: An Economie Perspective, Chicago (Ill.), University of Chicago Prees, 1976, 185; YAMEY, B.S., 
ccPredatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments», Journal of Law and Economics, 1972, (129), 135and137. 
119 POSNER, R., Antitrust Law : An Economie Perspective, Chicago (Ill.), University of Chicago Prees, 1976, 189-190. 
120 DEMSETZ, H., ccBarriers To Entry», American. Economie Reuiew, 1982, (47), 54-56. 
121 SHERER, F .M., ccPredatory Pricing and the Sherm.an Act : A Comment», Haruard Law Reuiew, 1975-1976, (869), 890. 
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and actually to succeed. _ OnlY.J!lJ!~~~-L~ilYÄtiQn~ ,Wlliçb_Ju-e _con_duçiye tq predatory prici~g, it 
should, in a second Stage, be examined, py means of ~~gM-l~ne rules, wh~tller.the. proc!ucer.~-~~s 
actually_ ~~g~g~d i~--p~~~t_o!Y~r!çing. This two-tier-~pp~Jä~h is.c ~d to be less time-consuming 
-· ---~- ....._ __ ~_ . ..__,._,~ 
and less complicated as the first tier would require only an analysis of structural evidence 
available from public sources (e.g., number of competitors, (the development of) their respective 
market shares, number of new entrants, the cost of initial investments, whether the product is 
homogeneous or differentiated). It would, moreover, rule out many allegations of predatory 
pricing, as not many market situations are conducive to predatory pricing122• This two-tier 
approach seems indeed to render the rule-of-reason test more workable. __ H<;>wever,_jt s!io.uW ~e. 
~pli~~!!1-~~--~~~~~le way : it shc,mld n~tpreclu~e preda~ory p~cing.from b~ing found in market~ 
the structure of which probably makes predation irrational. 
Despite the complexity of its application, the merit of the rule-of-reason test, though, is that it 
~..o-~.-'CO"-.=.o.~-==--"~"""'-"-..,-;--,-:-1·,-;c-,---0--.,---_-- --- ---- ""'' 
allows to distinguish ·predation from ordinary competition with all available evidence at hand : it 
------~--~~--"~·.,--'--~------.-.-- - ---- - - - J 
does not impose to take into account only one element and to disregard all other relevant 
information123• Moreover, it -~~~~co~~~--"~!_E~~nt g~~e theory which precisely ~hows 
predation to be rational when certain structural characteristics, such as market imperfections and 
~--=---'-----~--·-------'-------··----·- - -- - - --- ·--- -
~~ck ~f ~.:!"_~t-~nförmation, are present. ~/ ~ ~~ vv'9{ rJ-kff- c-l ( p ç ' ) 
2.3.3. Legal theory and economie theory compared 
As they defiI!_~ _du~pi~~ -~ _ ~elli!}!t éi,Lpripes below total production _ ço~~' Q!\TI__ and_ Europ~ 
anti-dumping law -~pply one_ of t~~ ~()_S!~~~~~-EJl~~, · proposed by economie theory in order to 
distinguish predatory pricing from competitive pricing. The ·first J~robl~!!1 with GATT and 
European_ anti-dumping law, though, is t~at they ~J!P~Y ~'!.JQ!'lg_-:nin standard · (prices may not be 
lower than fixed and variable production costs), ~ut d~ not allow that, in the long_rnn, scµ~_s a.:t a 
loss are compensated !>Y prqfitable sale~ si~ce they disregard reverse dumping. Economie theory, 
"~-:___,_,_ ___ ___:_,_____, ______ ----- -··- -- -· ' __ , __ . .C.~-- - . "-'"~----AL-----,.,~~---.-- J 
on the other hand, shows that ~.es at a _loss may result, from short-run_ profit maximization, 
especially if, i.!L!h~~1-~~~- ~~-~~ ~y~I"aj!_ sal_es ~e made _at a pro~t. But even if GA TI and European 
anti-dumping law took account of reverse dumping, there 1would _still_ be a problem as they -~~ 
account ~ ~o~~~ ~~()~f!_ ~Ji~ _of mi!1imu111 six months12,4, seldom exceeding one-year (the so-
Ciiled «i~vestigation period») for assessing dumping. Hence, if the exporter is not able, to cover 
122 JOSKOW, P .L., . and KLEVORICK, A.K., ccA Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy», Yale Law Journal, 1979-
1980, (213), 213-270; ORDOVER, J.A., and WILLIG, R.D., ccAn Economie Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product 
Innovation.>t, Y ale Law Journal, 1981-1982, (8), ~21. 
l2J O.E.C.D., Predatory Pricing, Paria, O.E.C.D., 1989, 29-30. 
124 The investigation period must normally cover a period of not lees than eix monthe (Article 6(1) basic EC Regulation ; Article 
7(1Xc) basic ECSC Decision). 
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all his production costs during this rather short investigation period, he will be found to practise 
dumping, though he may be making considerable profits over a longer period of time and, 
therefore, may not be dumping (in the sense of selling at a loss). In order to solve this problem, 
reverse dumping should be considered. Moreover, a longer investigation period should be taken 
into account, namely a period in which all costs should be covered. If it would be impossible to 
take in to account longer investigation periods, another solution could seem to be the application ?f 
the cost-based rule according to which only variable costs must be covered. However, this cost-
based rule bas the same flaw as the cost-based rule applied under GATT and European anti-
dumping law.· 
Indeed, the ~~nd problem with GATT and European anti-dumping law is that the cost-based rule 
they apply, as all the others, d<?~S_not discel"ll a}l ins~ces of_ predatory pricin~ _ since _pr~~clatiçn 
may occur wi~~out sales at _a_ lo~s., They may also mistake competitive pri~ing for __ predatqry 
..,.___, ____ c_. ___ _______.._.~------'--- - ·-- ~--'-··-- -=-----------·-' -- -· -·---·- ' -- -·---~-- .,_ ---- --
~r!~ing_. a~ . ~es at a loss may result from competitive pricing, especially when there are 
uncertainty and adjustment costs. As only predatory pricing should be sanctioned, GATf an4 
European anti_:du~pi~~~~ S~()uld not employ a cost-based rule. 
In ID!Qi_µo!!_aj_ .~Qmic ... JheoLy, it is frequently argued that no rule should be applied since 
1 lr~atl)!y __ pric!i:ig occ~_r_~ --cbut_ ex_~S'~~nallX; G!_me theofl'_!_._~~w~~:!, shows that, }~ -~~~_Jac~ __ o_f 
market_ im~r'fections ()r imJ>erfect informatiop., predation may be ration~. Though game theory is 
~~t yet able t~-~ak~---~i'~fi~iti~e+ policy r~~~~e~dations12.s, it see~~ appropriate to provide a 
rule on predatory pricing since the assumptions made in game theory about market imperfections 
and lack of information, are quite realistic. 
That rule should not be ·restricted to predatory sales at a loss, but should apply to all instances of 
predatory pricing. Economie theory proposes many bright-line rules to discem predatory pricing 
from competitive pricing. However, each of them fails as they do not detect all instances of 
predatory pricing and may mistake ordinary competition for predation. As each of these rules bas 
f\:-_ _,, also its merits, the rule-of reason test seems more appropri~~e,, since it allows to apply all those 
bright-line rules simultaneously and to take all other relevanf 'ihformation into account. If, on the 
1- - - - ""---.......:,___ __ ,";-__ ~-
basis of one or more of these rules, there is evidence of predatory pricing, this may serve as an 
indication. However, the existence of sales at a loss, as well as output expansion in response to 
entry or a price rise after market exit, should not be automatically decisive. Neither do the 
absence of sales at a loss, output expansion or price-rises prove that there is no predation. No 
absolute prevalence should be given to those bright-line rules. Otherwise, they may serve as a 
kind of instruction manual for predators on how to avoid liability when preying : predators will 
l2S ROBERTS, J., tcA. Signaling Model of Predatory Pricing», Oxford Economie Papers, 1986, (74), 91-92. 
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adapt their behaviour so as to reduce, if not to eliminate, their vulnerability to legal 
. sanction 126• Instead, all other evidence available should be taken in to account, such as . the 
- --- .. --_._....-~·---~__:---~~ .... ..-.....~ ...... ,;;:.....__....i '"'-""-..,__,. _ _,__-~ 
existence of market imperfections, the lack of perfect infomi~tion or the producers' relative 
----....--.---~~-_..;:,__. ______ ---=---·- ___ . __ ......_~'-·-- - _,,.;:. ......... .._-:-,_~----=--- -' •. i-~· ·~"-"''"-'-"....._ "" -· .• ~ .... - - ,,.,_ ---· ' - .• •.! - , ---~-··>------_:-.__-~_,,._._,;. __ ...,. __ ,::~.--'- ~--~ 
efficiency. All elements should be weighed against each other. In doing so, the rule-of-reason 
~-..:-:o~,._, 
test should be applied with the utmost care and caution, since enforcement authorities, as 
producers, do not have perfect information and predators will try to conceal their predatory 
actions and present them as competitive pricing, especially when predatory pricing is illegal. 
·;cvJJ Moreover, as game theory shows,. predation is only rational if it closely resembles ordinary 
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5competitiq!1· Like the empirical studies, a cautious application of the rule-of-reason test may only 
seldom find predation. Possibly, such an approach may disregard some instances of predation. 
Nevertheless, a cautious application of the rule-of-reason test is warranted. Indeed, as the rule-of-
reason test requires the assessment of complex economie situations, it may result in finding 
producers to practise predatory dumping when in fact they did not engage in it. Such producers 
do not want to be found to practise predatory pricing and will take care to adopt such a pricing 
policy which could not be confused with a predatory one127• By doing so, they will depart 
from competitive pricing, i.e., they will charge export prices well above production costs even if 
it would be economically justified to sell at a loss128• If the producers do not charge 
competitive prices, the rule-of-reason test will eventually distort competition. Clearly, 
competition should be prevented from being distorted by a non-cautious application of the rule-of-
reason test, especially since distortion of competition by not detecting all instances of actual 
predatory pricing seems limited. Indeed, if it is true that there are not many markets having a 
structure in which predatory pricing would be rational 129, predation may be more exceptional 
than generally thought ; or, at least, the cost of not detecting it will be smaller since the 
126 EASLEY; D., MASSON, R.T., and REYNOLDS, R.J., ccPreying for Time», Journal of lndustrial Ecorwmics, 1984-1985, (445), 
445-447; JOSKOW, P.L., and KLEVORICK, A.K., c<A. Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy», Yale Law Journal, 
1979-1980, (213), 240; WILLIAMSON, O.E., ccPredatory Pricing: A Strategie and Welfare Analysis,,, Yale Law Journal, 1977-1978, 
(284), 285. 
127 See: COOTER., R., and ULEN, T., LAw and Economics, Glenview, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988, 401-402; JOSKOW, P.L., and 
KLEVORICK, A.K., «A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy•, Yale LAw Joumal, 1979-1980, (213), 237-239. 
Producers will also adapt their decisions on production and on investment in order to avoid anti-dumping action (LEIDY, M.P., and. HOEKMAN, 
B.M., «Production effecll of price- and cost-based anti-dumping laws under flexible exchange rate&>, Canadian Joumal of Economics, 1990, (873), 
873-895; STAIGER, R.W., and WOLAK, F.A., «The effects of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly•, Joumal of 
International Economics, 1992132, (265), 265-287). 
128 Producers will have an identical rcaction in case of price discrimination : in order to prevent their from being subjected to an anti-dumping 
proceeding, they will charge export prices well above their domestic market prices, even if it would be economically justified to charge lower prices 
in their export marketa. 
129 JOSKOW, P.L., and KLEVORICK, A.K., «A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy•, Yale LAw Joumal, 1979-1980, (213), 
258. 
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probability of predatory pricing resulting in the monopolization will be low in markets without a 
structure . conducive to predatory pricing130. 
2.4. NME DUMPING 
2. 4.1. Le gal de.finition 
Initially, GA TI anti-dumping law did not contain any special provision conceming dumping from 
non-market economy (hereinafter NME) countries. There was no need to. GATI, like any other 
international agreement, is only applicable to its signatories, and, at the time GATI was 
concluded, none of the original Contracting Parties to GATT could be considered as a NME 
· country, not even Czechoslovakia. However, in 1948 Czechoslovakia became a NME country 
while remaining a Contracting Party to GA TI131• GA TI law, being drafted for market 
economy (hereinafter ME) countries, then had to be adapted to take account of the special features 
of NME countries. Since 1948 several NME countries have attained membership of GA TI at the 
time they had a NME system (e.g., Poland, Romania, Hungary), whereas Cuba, originally a ME 
country party to GATT, has become a NME country while remaining party to GATT. Thus, 
since 1948, the importance of NME countries within GATI has increased and, in 1955, GATT 
anti-dumping law was adapted to dumping from NME countries (acceptance of Note No 2 ad 
Article VI(l) GATT). 
Since 1989, however, radical politica! and consequent economie systemic reforms towards 
democracy and ME systems have started in many NME countries of Bast and Centra! Europe. 
Hence, the importance of the NME provisions of GATI anti-dumping law seems bound to 
decline. Nevertheless, in the near future, they will remain applicable to countries of Bast and 
Central Europe in which the politica! and economie reforms area long-term process. In some of 
the countries which have emerged as a result from the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., such as 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and even Ukraine, a minimum of economie reforms has been pursued132• 
Moreover, Asian NME countries, such as the People's Republic of China, North Korea and 
Vietnam, have also undertaken economie reforms, introducing ME elements in their economie 
l30 JOSKOW, P.L., and KLEVORICK, A.K., «A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy», Yale Law Joumal, 1979-1980, (213), 
223-239" 
131 FLORY, T., Le G.A. T.T. Droit international et commerce mondial, Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1968, 
196; GRZYBOWSKI, K., teSocialist Countries in GA'IT», American Journal of Comparatiue Law, 1980, (539), 547. China, on the 
other hand, left GA'IT after it had changed into a NME country. 
132 ÁSLUND, A., «Lessons of the First Four Years of Systemic Chnage in Eastern Europe», Joumal of Comparalive.Economics, 1994119, (22), 
29-30. 
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system, which, however, remains essentially a NME one133 • Also Cuba has still a NME 
system and it is yet unclear which economie system Cuba will develop into. As some of those 
countries are Contracting Parties to GATT (e.g., Cuba) or intend to rejoin GATT (e.g., the 
People' s Republic of China 134), it is still useful to investigate whether imports from NME 
countries may be dumped and, if so, whether such dumping may be called unfair. Subsequently, 
it will also be investigated which rules have to be applied for determining unfair NME dumping. 
Under GA TI anti-dumping law, a strict comparison with domestic prices in NME cannot always 
be appropriate (Note No 2 ad Article Vl{l) GATT ; Article 2.7. GATT Anti-dumping Code). In 
pursuance of that Note, European anti-dumping law considers dumping from NME countries to 
occur if their export price is less than t~ 
(a) the price .at which the like product of a ME third country is actually sold : 
(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that country, or 
(ii) to other countries, including the Community, or 
(b) the constructed value of the like product in a ME third country, or, 
(c) if neither price nor constructed value as established under (a) or (b) provides an adequate 
basis, (any other reasonable basis including)135 the price actually paid or payable in the 
Community for the like product (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC 
Decision). 
Hence, NME countries are assumed to practise dumping if they export their products at prices 
below the prices or even the production costs of their competitors established in ME · countries. 
NME dumping, thus, -bas an entirely different content than dumping practised by producers 
established in ME countries. 
GA IT anti-dumping law defines a NME country as a country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State 
(Note No 2 ad Article VI(l) GATT). European anti-dumping law does not provide a definition of 
a NME country, but uses a list of countries which are considered to be NME countries (Article 
2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision136). GATT anti-dumping law 
133 CHEN, K., JEFFERSON, G.H., and SINGH, 1., 411..essons from China's Economie Reform-, Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1992/16, 
(201), 201-225; ELLMAN, M. 4<Transfonnation, Depression, and Economics: Some Leuo11S», Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994/19, (1), 
18-19; FISCHER, S., 4( Socialist Economy Refonn: Lessons of the First Three Years», American Economie Review, 1993, (390), 392-393. 
134 The People'• Republic of China, though not a Contracting Party to GATT, haa 1igned the Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiationa and the Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization on 16 April 1994 (see, e.g. : WANG, G., 
.china's Return to GATT. Legal and Economie lmplications», Joumal of Wor/J. Trade, 199413, (51), 51). 
135 Under ECSC anti-dumping law, the third standerd must always be the price actually paid or payable in the Community for the like product. 
Any other reasonable basis is leg~lly impossible. 
136 As amended by Regulation (EC) No 519194 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries and repealing 
Regulations (EEC) No1 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67 /89. 
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does not provide any further interpretation of its definition of NME countries137• It is 
unavailing to try and find more clarifying information in European anti-dumping law138• Only 
the Court of Justice once made an half-way attempt : it held that the GA TI definition was not 
met, as there was no system of price fixing and there were three companies in the market, which 
proved that there was no monopoly139• The Court, however, failed to investigate whether 
those companies were State-owned, for, if they were, there would have been a monopoly. Thus, 
the GA TI definition of NME countries is not quite obvious. For instance, it is not clear whether 
govemmental price controls should always be regarded as a form of price fixing by the State, or 
from which degree of price control on there is price fixing. In ME countries too, price controls 
are a policy instrument of the govemment140• So the question arises where the line should be 
drawn. Therefore, a closer look into the characteristics of NME countries is warranted, in order 
to ascertain whether and how NME countries should be treated differently. 
137 See : B.l.S.D., Twenty-fifth supplement, Geneva, GA'l'T, 1979, 25, coneideration 25. lt ie reported that a member of the GA'l'T 
Committee on Anti-dumping Practicee held that Note No 2 ad Article Vl(l} GA'l'T containe a «very clear definitionn of what was 
meant by the term State-trading countriee. 
138 In eeveral European anti-dumping case~~ it was held that the allegedly dumping country cchae a eubetantially complete 
monopoly of its trade and that the pricee are fixed by the State" without any further explanation (Commieeion Recommendation No 
811/78/ECSC of 21 April 1978 impoeing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and platee, of iron or steel, originating in 
Bulgaria, the German Democratie Republic and Romania, O.J., 22 April 1978, No L 108/26; Commieeion Recommendation No 
932n8/ECSC of 2 May 1978 impoeing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Bulgaria, 
O.J., 4 May 1978, No L 120/22; Commieeion Recommendation No 1006n8/ECSC of 18 May 1978 impoeing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on certain galvanized sheets and platee originating in the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 19 May 1978, No 
L 131/8 ; Commission Recommendation No 1704n8/ECSC of 19 July 1978 impoeing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoelovak.ia, Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 July 1978, No L 195/17; 
Commieeion Regulation (EEC} No 322n9 of 16 February 1979 impoeing a provieional anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide 
originating in Romania, O.J., 21 February 1979, No L 44/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 955n9 of 15 May 1979 impoeing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 17 May 1979, No L 121/5}. 
All these cases are an application of Recommendation No 77/1329/ECSC and of Regulation (EEC} No 459/68 which, prior to ite 
modification by Regulation (EEC} No 1681/79, contained a provieion identical to the lnterpretative Note No. 2 to Article VI(l) 
GATr. . 
From Regulation (EEC) No 168ln9 onwards, European anti-dumping law does no longer provide thoee two GA'l'T criteria 
explicitely. Instead it uees the concept tenon-market economy countriee••, thereby referring to a list of euch countries (Article 2(7) 
basic EC Regulation j Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decieion}. Nevertheleee, in one anti-dumping case, which was an application of thie 
new anti-dumping Regulation, reference has been made to the two GATr criteria (Commieeion Decision 82/285/EEC of 6 May 1982 
terminating the review of the anti-dumping proceedinge concerning importe of a herbicide from Romania, O.J., 11 May 1982, No 
L 128/17). This reference was in fäct euperfluous for the country in queetion figured on the liet to which European anti-dumping 
law refers and no further specifications of the GA'l'T criteria were given. 
139 C.J.E.C., Joincd cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neoiype TechmashexpoT1 GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, 
(2945), 3000-3001. See also: C.J.E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sennes v Directeur des services des douanes de Strasbourg, E.C.R., 
1990, 1, (3027), 3052. 
Advocate General VAN GER.VEN even seems to allow to take into consideration other elements than the two conditions of the GATI definition. 
For he held that the shortage of foreign currency seems to be a common characteristic of NME countries, hut that this factor is not sufficient for a 
country to be regarded as having a NME system (C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neoiype TechmashexpoT1 GmbH v 
Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (2945), 2976-2977 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GER.VEN). lt may be doubted whether he ia 
giving an exact interpretation of GATI anti-dumping law. There is no relationship between one of the two elements of the GATI definition and 
the shortage of foreign currency. 
l40 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neoiype TechmashexpoT1 GmbH v Cominission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, 
(2945), 2960 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the Council). 
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2. 4. 2. Economie theory 
This section will provide a general description of the economie system of NME countries and 
compare it with the ME system. It will describe the role of prices in a NME system (section 
2.4.2.1.) and the NME trade organisation (section 2.4.2.2.). It will further investigate whether 
NME countries may actually practise dumping in the sense of price discrimination and sales at. a 
loss, and whether they may engage in predatory dumping (section 2.4.2.3.). This section will not 
go in to the specific details of each NME country, but it should be home in mind that there are 
substantial differences in the economie system of countries having (had) a NME system141 • 
2.4.2.1. The pricing mecanism in NME countries 
The pricing mecanis~ in a NME country is essentially different from that in a ME country. As 
the concepts «market economy» versus «non-market economy» suggest, the distinguishing criterion 
between both economie systems is the role the market plays in each of them. In a ME system, 
the market, through its pricing system, coordinates all consumption and production decisions and 
eventually reaches an equilibrium between demand and supply. Prices are the translation of the 
private value or scarcity of goods and factors, and are, therefore, used by producers and 
consumers as information in order to maximize respectively their profits and utility142• 
In a NME country the plan replaces the market as coordination and information rriechanism. The 
market is denied any function because the micro-economie objectives of profit and utility 
maximization, which is characteristic of producers and consumers in a ME, are rejected and 
teplaced by macro-economie objectives based upon ideological, social and economie values143• 
Those objectives and values vary from .one ·situation to another. Ideological reasons are also 
determining for the planning technique used in a NME country144• In particular, the use of 
prices which measure scarcity, is usually rejected because such prices are considered not to 
141 GRZ'YBOWSKI, K., ccSocialist Countries in GA'JT,,, American. Journal of Comparative Law, 1980, (539), 542-547. 
142 GREGORY, P.R., and STUART, R.C., Comparative Economie Systems, Boston, Houghton Miftlin, 1980, 17; LAYARD, P.R.G., 
and WALTERS, A.A., Microeconomic Theory, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978, 28. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 
of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, 
Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49, where the Council 
noted that ccin mar ket economies prices are not set solely on the basis of production costs hut also take into account demandn. 
143 SCHNIT'LER, M.C., and NORDYKE, J.W., Comparative Economie Systems, Cincinnati, South-Western Publishing Co., 1977, 
344; VER.MULST, E.A., ccDumping in the United States and the European Community: A Comparative Analysisn, Legal lssuea of 
European lntegration, 198412, (103), 109 ; WJLCZY'NSKI, J., ccDumping and Central Planning,,, Journal of Political Economy, 1966, 
(250), 257. 
144 GREGORY, P.R., and STUART, R.C., R.C., Comparatiue Economie Systema, Boston, Houghton Miftlin, 1980, 127. 
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contribute to social value145• Therefore, NME countries usually apply non-price planning146 
based on material balances. In such a case, the plan specifies which goods and in what quantities 
they are to be produced. The planning authorities must make sure that a balance exists between 
output, on the one hand, and input and production factors, on the other hand. Such a balance 
must be reached not only for each item, hut also on the aggregate level. When both sides are not 
in balance, quantity ajustements must be carried out147• 
Notwithstanding a certain reticence as to prices, non-price planning implies the use of prices. 
Indeed, there must be an equilibrium between production supply and consumption demand. As 
this equilibrium is not automatically established by the plan, retail prices are used in order to 
balance supply and demand148• Those retail prices are not comparable to those in a ME 
system. Retail prices are set by the planning authorities at a level at which consumers will buy 
the exact quantity produced. Hence, those prices do not necessarily reflect private value, 
consumer preferences or scarcity149• 
Prices are also necessary in order to select the most optima! plan between different altematives. 
Therefore, the planning authorities must know the value of the various production factors and 
inputs, measuring their scarcity150• This valuation is provided by producers' prices, which are 
145 NOVE, A., The Economics of Feasible Socialism, London, Allen & Unwin, 1984, 97; WILCZYNSKI, J., Socialist Economie 
Develcpment and Reforms. From Extensive to Intensive Growth under Central Planning in the USSR, Eastern Europe and 
Yugoslavia, London, Mac Millan, 1972, 76. 
146 Beeidee non-price planning, price planning ie aleo poeeible. In the case of price planning, pricee are ueed ae source of 
information and as coordination mechaniem. All the pricee in the economy are eet by the planning authoritiee in order to obtain 
the maximization of the objectivee of the plan. Ae in a market economy, the economie agente will uee the pricee of the plan as 
information to make their decieions. Each oftheee decieione conducee to the maximization of the objectivee of the plan, ifthe latter 
are correctly reflected by the pricee. Thie will be the case if the pricee are intended to reflect the relative valuee or ecarcitiee. 
These valuee or ecarcitiee will be different from thoee in a market economy for the maximization of different objectivee ie aimed at. 
If the objectivee were identical in both economie eyeteme, the prices would be completely comparable. Price planning ie difficult to 
apply for it ie characterieed by insurmountable probleme of data, aggregation and knowledge of the complex interrelationshipe in a 
modern economy (GREGORY, P.R., and STUART, R.C., R.C., Comparatwe Economie Systems, Boston, Houghton Miffiin, 1980, 138-
140; LAYARD, P.R.G., and WALTERS, A.A., Mieroeconomic Theory, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978, 28-29). 
147 GREGORY, P.R., and STUART, Comparative Economie Systems, Boston, Houghton Miffiin, 1980, 130-131; !SACHSEN, A.J., 
HAMILTON, C.B., and GYLFASON, T., ccUnderetanding the Market Economy. Aepecte of Planning,,, Journal of World Trade, 
1992/5, (25), 25-26. 
148 SCHUNK, Ell., ccSoviet Bloc Dumping, the Revenue Act of 1916, and Economie Policy», UCLA Law Review, 1979-1980, 
(1365), 1378; WARES, W .A., The Theory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lexington Booke, 1977, 104. 
149 CHAVANCE, B., Le aystème économique sovietique, Parie, Le Sycomore, 1983, 52-54; !SACHSEN, A.J., HAMILTON, C.B., and 
GYLFASON, T., •Understanding the Market Economy. Aepecte of Planning•, Journal of World Trade, 1992/5, (25), 28-29; 
SCHNITZER, M.C., and NORDYKE, J.W., Comparatwe Economie Systems, Cincinnati, South-Weetern Publiehing Co., 1977, 359-
360; WARES, W.A., The Theory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1977, 104; 
WILCZ™SKI, J., Socialist Economie Develcpment and Reforms. From Extenswe to Intensive Growth under Central Planning in the 
USSR, Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, London, Mac Millan, 1972, 81. 
150 WILCZ'YNSKI, J., Socialist Economie Develcpment and Reforms. From Extensive to Intensive Growth under Central Planning 
in the USSR, Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, London,Mac Millan, 1972, 73-74. 
57 
based on the average production costs of the entire branch of the industry, plus a profit 
margin 151 . Although efforts are usually made to reduce the gap between retail prices and 
producers' prices, they are stil determined independently from each other and retail prices do not 
necessarily reflect production costs152• 
As retail prices, producers' prices are not comparable to ME prices either. First, producers' 
prices are not the prices charged to the consumers on the domestic market of the NME country. 
Second, producers' prices are a kind of full-cost pricing, whereas in a ME system marginal 
pricing is prevalent153 . They are a specific type of full-cost pricing because the actual 
production costs of each individual producer are not taken into account, hut producers' prices are 
based on the average costs of the entire branch of industry. Third, the prices of the inputs and 
production factors, i.e., the production costs being used as basis for the producers' prices, are 
determined in the . same way as the prices of the final products154• They do not necessarily 
reflect their scarcity. Indeed, quite often, the planning authorities set the price of production 
factors and inputs at an unusually low level155. Finally, profit has a different meaning in the 
two economie systems. In a ME system, profits are the net earnings and, therefore, the incentive 
for the producer to produce as effidently as possible. In a NME system, they are, in principle, 
mere accounting devices to ensure that companies try to cover their costs out of their own 
ressources, where possible156 ; moreover, the planning authorities may manipulate profit 
margins in order to set prices at a level they consider to be appropriate157. 
151 CHAVANCE, B., Le aystème économique sovietique, Paris, Le Sycomore, 1983, 52-53; SCHNITZER, M.C., and NORDYKE, 
J.W., Comparative Economie Systems, Cincinnati, South-Western Publiehing Co., 1977, 359; WILCZYNSKI, J., Socialist Economie 
Development and Reform•. From Extensive to Intensive Growth under Central Planning in the USSR, Eastern Europe and 
Yugoslavia, London, Mac Millan, 1972, 79. 
152 CHA VANCE, B., Le aystème économique sovietique, . Paris, Le Sycomore, 1983, 52-54; SCHNITZER, M.C., and NORDYKE, 
J.W., Comparative Economie Systems, Cincinnati, South-Western Publiehing Co., 1977, 359-360; WARES, W.A., The Theory of 
Dumping and American Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lexington Booke, 1977, 104; WILCZYNSKI, J., Socialist Economie 
Development and Reform&. From Ertensive to Intensive Growth under Central Planning in the USSR, Eastern Europe and 
Yugoslavia, London, Mac Millan, 1972, 81. 
153 With regard to the difference between full-cost pricing and marginal pricing, eee: infra, 161-162. 
154 SCHONK, E.H., ccSoviet Bloc Dumping, the Revenue Act of 1916, and Economie Policyn, UCLA Law Review, 1979-1980, 
(1365), 1382. 
155 WILCZYNSKI, J., ccDumping and Centra! Planningn, Journal of Political Economy, 1966, (250), 254-256. 
156 SCHNITZER M.C., and NORDYKE, J.W., Comparative Economie Systems, Cincinnati, South-Weetern Publiehing Co., 1977, 
360. 
157 WILCZYNSKI, J., ccDumping and Centra! Planningn, Journal of Political Economy, 1966, (250), 256. 
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2.4.2.2. The trading mechanism in NME-countries 
Trade of ME countries is based on comparative advantage and profit maximization. Trade of 
NME countries, on the other hand, is characterised by trade aversion (i.e., NME countries reduce 
their imports coming from third countries to the minimum required for obtaining the goods they 
cannot produce themselves) and based on foreign currency maximization (i.e., to eam the largest 
possible amount of foreign currency on their exports in order to finance their imports). In NME 
countries, the plan govems their trade with third countries. However, the planning authorities do 
not control the world market to the same extent as their domestic market. Moreover, they cannot 
predict the fluctuations and disturbances to which the world market is subject. Therefore, NME 
countries reduce trade to a minimum and have only recourse to imports in order· to provide for the 
missing necessities and to fill up the deficits in the material balances of the plan. The convertible 
. foreign currencies required to pay those imports, are gained by means of exports158• 
Though NME trade does not aim at profit maximization and is not based on comparative 
advantages, their exports to ME countries cannot be classified as exclusively having a NME 
character. Indeed, those exports are situated right in between ME and NME systems. This is 
illustrated by the fact that, in the trade with ME countries, export prices charged by NME 
countries are based on world market prices159• NME export prices to ME countries are the 
combined result of the market mechanism in the importing ME countries and the specific objective 
of NME exporting, namely foreign currency maximization. Contrary to NME retail prices and 
producer's prices, NME export prices to ME countries can, thus, not be said to be totally 
arbitrary, as the NME planning authorities do not fully control export prices. However, NME 
export prices to other NME countries are not comparable to NME export prices to ME countries. 
Indeed, though, in trade between NME countries, world market prices are also used, world 
market prices are viewed as capitalist prices and, therefore, are usually cleansed of the capitalist 
elements and are adjusted to socialist principles160• 
158 BERMAN, H.J., and BUSTIN, GL., «The Soviet System of Foreign Trade", Law an.d Poliey in Internatwnal Business, 1975, 
(987), 1026-1041; BRENSCHEIDT, M., «The Legal Status of the Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly in the· Federal Republic of 
Germany", In.tern.atwnal Lawyer, 1975, (197), 198-199 ; DE JONG, H.W., ccThe Significance of Dumping in International Trade", 
Journal of World Tradit Law, 1968, (162), 182; DENTON, R., ccThe Non-Market Economy Rules of the European Community's 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Legislation", In.ternatwnal Comparatwe Law Quarterly, 1987, (198), 202-203; GREGORY, 
P.R., and STUART, R.C., Comparatwe Economie Systems, Boston, Houghton Miftlin, 1980, 330-340 ; WILCZYNSKI, J., «Dumping 
and Centra! Planning.., Journal of Political Economy, 1966, (250), 257-259. · 
159 GREGORY, P.R., and STUART, R.C., Comparatwe Economie Systems, Boston, Houghton Miffiin, 1980, 335 ; NOVE, A., The 
Economies of Feaaible Socialism, London, Allen & Unwin, 1984, 108-109 ; WILCZYNSKI, J., Socialist Economie Development and 
Reforms, London, MacMillan, 1972, 90. 
160 WD..CZYNSKJ, J ., Socialist Economie Development and Rejonns, London, MacMillan, 1972, 91. 
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2.4.2.3. Dumping as price discrimination and selling at a loss 
Under GATT and European anti-dumping law, dumping occurs if the export ·price is below either 
the domestic market price charged by of the allegedly dumping exporter, his production costs or 
his export prices to third countries (Article Vl(l) GATT ; Articles 2.1. and 2.2. GATI Anti-
dumping Code ; Article 2(1) and (3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(2) and (3) basic ECSC 
Decision). 
Obviously, export prices of NME countries may be below their domestic prices (retail prices as 
well as producers' prices) or their production costsi61 • However, those instances of price 
discrimination and sa.les at a loss should not be sanctioned under anti-dumping law since their 
export prices are not comparable to their domestic prices and production costs. Indeed, whereas 
their export prices are the result of foreign currency maximization, their domestic prices and 
production costs are completely laid down in the plan. As their export prices, on the one hand, 
and their domestic prices and production costs, on the other hand, are determined in a different 
way, it is quite possible that they will not coincide and that the NME country is either practising 
price discrimination or is selling at a loss. However, those instances of price discrimination and 
sa.les at a loss must not be considered as unfair. Calling them unfair would amount to calling all 
NME trade towards ME countries unfair as the export prices of NME countries. are always 
determined in a different way than their domestic prices and production costs and, therefore, will 
only coincide by mere accident. In view of the incomparability between the NME country's 
export prices, on the one hand, and their domestic prices and production costs, on the other hand, 
it must be concluded that the notion of dumping in the sense of price discrimination between the 
exporting NME country and the Community, or in the sense of sa.les at a loss, is inapplicable to 
NME exports. 
The export prices the NME countries charge to different ME countries are not necessarily 
identical either. Indeed, NME countries may practise price discrimination between different ME 
countries162• The export prices they charge to each ME country, are quite comparable as they 
all are the result of foreign currency maximization. Moreover, NME export prices to ME 
countries cannot be manipulated more than ME prices. If such price discrimination is the result 
of the NME country's foreign currency maximizing export policy, it should not be considered 
161 For eelling at pricee below production coete, it ie eufficient for the producer to be aiming at maximizing eales revenue inetead 
of profite (DA VIES, 8.W., and McGUINNESS, A.J., «Dumping at lees than Marginal Cost», Journ.al of International Econ.omics, 
1982/12, (169), 176-177). NME countriee' exporte aim at maximizing foreign currency. Thue, they aim at maximizing ealee 
revenuee, because the higher the sales revenues are, the higher the foreign currency revenues will be. 
162 It hae, for inetance, been shown that epatial price discrimination may be optimal, if firms aim at maximizing ealee revenuee. 
More specifically, it will be optimal Ü there ie no profit conetraint (NORMAN, G., «Uniform Pricing as an Optimal Spatial Pricing 
Policyn, Econ.omica, 1981, (87), 87-91). Maximizing eales revenue comes down to the eame as maximizing foreign currency revenue. 
Thus, MNE countriee will find it optimal to epatially price diecriminate, for they do not have to attain a certain profit level. 
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unfair. But, perhaps, NME planning authorities could adopt a strategie export policy, rather than 
their foreign currency maximizing export policy, just like ME producers do when adopting a 
predatory pricing policy. Such. a strategie export policy could also be of a predatory nature. 
Indeed, in order to earn a higher amount of foreign currencies afterwards, NME countries could 
try to monopolize their export mar kets by charging prices which are temporaril y below the prices 
they would have charged under short-run foreign currency maximization. Only such cases of 
export predation should be sanctioned under anti-dumping law. 
2.4.3. Legal theory and economie theory compared 
2.4.3 .1. Domestic prices and production casts 
From an economie point of view, NME domestic prices (retail and producers' prices) and 
production costs, on the one hand, and NME export prices, on the other hand, are not 
comparable, as they are determined differently : NME domestic prices and production costs are 
determined by the plan, whereas NME export prices result from foreign currency maximization. 
In addition to their incomparability with NME export prices, NME domestic prices and production 
costs are also an unreliable basis for determining dumping, as the NME planning authorities may 
arbitrarily manipulate them in order to circumvent the application of anti-dumping law. Of 
course, producers established in ME countries may also try to manipulate the prices of their 
products in order to escape the application of anti-dumping law. But, contrary to NME planning 
authorities, their opportunity of price manipulation is limited by the fact that they have to attain 
some degree of profitability, at least in the long run. Moreover, ME producers will usually not 
be able to influence the prices of inputs and production factors, in order to conceal that they are 
actually selling at a loss. Therefore, production costs may be a reliable basis to assess dumping in 
respect of ME producers, if those producers are shown to have manipulated their domestic market 
prices. 'Because of both the incomparability and the unreliability of NME domestic prices and 
production costs, it should be concluded that dumping, in the sense of price discrimination 
between the NME exporting country and the Community, as well as in the sense of sales at a loss, 
is inapplicable to NME trade. 
GATT anti-dumping law takes into account only part of this conclusion. It does not postulate the 
downright incomparability between NME domestic prices and production costs, on the one hand, 
and NME export prices, on the other hand. It only allows for the possibility that a strict 
comparison between NME domestic prices and NME export prices may not always be appropriate 
(Note No 2 ad Article Vl(l) GATT). Thus, it does not preclude the use of NME domestic prices. 
As it · provides that a comparison between the NME domestic prices and export prices may not 
always be appropriate (Note No 2 ad Article VI(l) GATT), a contrario, a comparison between 
NME domestic prices and export prices may sometimes (i.e., not always) be appropriate. There 
~·~~~-~~~~-~~---~--~. --~ 
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is, however, one instance in which a coml? ·son will always be impossible under GATI anti-
dumping law. Indeed, NME producers' prlçes do not meet the definition of the domestic prices 
taken into account for determining dumping : producers' prices are not the prices charged to 
consumers in NME countries, whereas, under GATI anti-dumping law, only the prices charged to 
consumers on the domestic market may be taken into account (Article VI(l) GATI). 
GA TI anti-dumping law does not treat explicitly of NME production costs. It does not refer to 
any incomparability between NME production costs and export prices. On the contrary, under a 
strict interpretation of GA TI anti-dumping law, it seems that NME production costs may be· used 
i~ a comparison between NME domestic prices and export prices is not appropriate. Indeed, as 
GA TI anti-dumping law does not explicitly indicate what will happen when a strict comparison 
with domestic prices is inappropriate, the genera! rule should apply, according to which 
production costs may be used instead of the domestic prices, when no comparable sales are being 
made in the exporting country (Article VI(l)(b) GATI; Article 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code). 
European anti-dumping law, on the other hand, seems to have understood economie theory as it 
prohibits the use of all NME domestic prices (including retail prices) and production costs in all 
circumstances. Instead, though, it defines NME dumping as charging export prices below the 
prices (domestic or export prices) or the production costs of a third ME country (Article 2(7) 
basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision). This is, however, not a solution for 
the problem caused by the incomparability between NME domestic prices and production costs, on 
the one hand, and NME export prices, on the other hand. European anti-dumping law only shifts 
the problem, since ME prices and production costs are not comparable either with NME export 
prices. Indeed, ME prices and production costs are the result of profit maximization, whereas 
NME export prices result from foreign c~rrency maximization. From an economie point of view, 
the European notion of NME dumping, therefore, should be rejected. Moreover, it makes it 
impossible for the NME producers to know in advance whether they will be found to practise 
dumping, since they have no knowledge as to the prices and production costs in other, ME 
countries163• 
European anti-dumping law only remedies the unreliability of the NME domestic prices and 
production costs. Indeed, according to the Court of Justice, the object of European anti-dumping 
law is «to prevent account from being taken of prices and costs in NME countries, which are not 
163 VERMULST, E.A., and HOODER, J.J., «Annotation on Case C-69/89, Nakajima AU Precision Co. v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 1991, 
not yet reportcd; Case C-358/89, Extramet v. Council, Judgment of 16 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-49/88, .Al-Jubail Fertiüzer Company 
(Samad) and Saudi .Arabian. Fertiüzer Company (Safco) v. Council, Judgment of 17 June 1991, not yet reported; Case C-16/90, Detlef Nölle v. 
HaupzoUamt Bremen-Freihafen, Judgment of 22 October 1991, not yet reported•, Common Market Law Review, 1992, (380), 392. 
I;~: 
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the nonnal result of market forceS»164• On account of that, the European anti-dumping 
authorities do not rely on NME production costs165 and always reject166 adjustments to the 
prices or production costs of third ME countries for comparative advantages167 as well as for 
164 C.J.E.C., joined cases 294/86 and 77/87, 5 October 1988, Technointorg v Commiasion. and Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6102-
6103 and 6113; C.J.E.C., joined cases C-306/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype TechmCJ1Jhexport GmbH v Commission and 
Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (2945), 3000; C.J.E.C., case C-157/87, 11 July 1990, Electroimpex a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (3021), 
3023; C.J.E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sermes v Directeur des services des douanes de StrCJ1Jbourg, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (3027), 
3062; C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nöl'le v Hauptzol'lamt Bremen.-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (5163), 5179 
(Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GER.VEN) and 5203. 
165 CommiBlion Regulation (EEC) No 1034/91 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of video tapes in cassettes 
originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 1991, No L 106/15; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5• microdiaka) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People'• 
Republic of China, and collecting detinitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, No L 262/4. 
The refusal to take account of NME production costs must not be confused with adjustmenta made in order to account for (too) high production 
costs in the third ME country, the production costs of which are used for determining NME dumping. For, in European anti-dumping case law, 
only the production coats incurred in the ordinary course of trade in the third ME country are taken into account and. adjustments are made for 
«extra-ordinaryi. production coats (see : infra, 224-226). They must not be confused either with adjustments for differences in physical 
characteristics between the dumped product and the product manufactured in that third ME country (see : injra, 310-313). 
166 In dihydrostreptomycin.from the People's Republic of China, however, adjustments for differences in the ma~ufacturing process between the 
reference country and the NME were refused because of lack of evidence (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People'• Republic of China and detinitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1). Hence, if there had been sufticient evidence, such adjustments would have 
been made and, thu1, the production process in the NME country would have been taken into account. lt was not made clear whether the 
adjustments werc rcquested because of so-called «natural advantage&», for which the European anti-dumping authorities allow adjustments. If they 
did not relate to such natural adjustments, this anti-dumping case deviates from the rule of principle according to which comparative advantages and 
economies of scale of NME countries must be disregarded. 
167 Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
natura! magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371121; 
Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natura! 
magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., 30 December 1982, No 
L 371125; Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 27 April 1983, No 
L 110/11 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium 
chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, No 
L 22Stl8 ; Comm.ission Decision 84/129/EEC of 6 March 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
caustic-burned natural magnesite originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 March 1984, No L 66/32; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports ·of standardized multi-
phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW hut not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, No L 280/68; Commission 
Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dW:nping proceeding concerning 
imports of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the 
investigation reg~ding imports of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the 
USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/25; Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 ~posing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep freezers originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 8 January 1987, No L 6/1; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-
phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts secured. as 
provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, 
O.J., 25 August 1988, No L 235/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of ayrithetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49 ; Commission Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakings 
offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia or 
Romania, confirming the undertakings accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the 
investigations, O.J., 24 February 1989, No L 52/37; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and 
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economies of scale of NME countries168• They only allow adjustments for so-called «natural 
advantageS» of NME countries, because such advantages are not due to or influenced by the NME 
system 169• Natural advantages are mainly the easier access to raw materials ( degree of purity 
of the raw material (ore/spoil ratio)) making the extraction and processing of the product easier or 
making some processing operations unnecessary in the NME country170. They do not 
comprise, for instance, differences in labour costs171 or the proximity of the mines where the 
raw materials are being extracted, to the production plant172, because they are due to the 
economie system of the NME exporting country : the planning authorities determine labour 
definitively collecting the provieional anti-dumping duty on euch importe, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24. 
However, in polyester fibres from Roman.ia, the Romanian producer claimed to have a comparative advantage in terms of oil eupply. 
The European anti-dumping authoritiee replied that any advantage enjoyed by the Romanian producer was not significant because 
the producers established in the third ME country, whose production costs were ueed to aesess the alleged NME dumping, could 
obtain low-cost raw materials on their domestic market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the 
anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping meaeuree applicable to imports of synthetic polyester fibres 
originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and terminating the eaid review in respect of imports of synthetic polyester fibree originating in Mexico and the United 
States of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, No L 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68)). Here, the European anti-
dumping did take account of the comparative advantage of the NME country, for they would have allowed an adjustment if the 
third NME country did not enjoy a comparative advantage offsetting the NME comparative advantage. Perhaps, however, the 
NME comparative advantage was considered to be a so-called ccnatural advantage• for which adjustements are allowed, hut this ie 
rather unlikely in view of the implementation of the concept ccnatural advantagee» in European anti-dumping case law (as 
demonetrated below in this section). Moreover, the European anti-dumping authoritiee did not classify them as natural 
advantagee. 
168 Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized 
multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW hut not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoelo-
vak.ia, the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts secured as 
provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1. 
169 Council Regulation (EC) No 486/94 of 4 March 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of fluorspar originating in the 
People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 5 March ~994, No L 62/1 ; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of 
China, Poland, the Ruasian Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/21. See also: C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, 
Eugen NiJUe v HauptzoUamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (5163), 5184-5185 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 5206. 
17° Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93of14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dead-bumed (sintered) magnesia 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, No L 306/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 486/94 of 4 March 1994 
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of fluorspar originating in the People'• Republic of China and collecting definitively the 
provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 5 March 1994, No L 62/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importa of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April .1994, No L 104/5; 
Commission Deciaion 94/389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refined antimony trioxide 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41. 
171 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 
April 1994, No L 94/21. 
172 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importa of dead-bumed (sintered) magnesia originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, No 
L 306/16. 
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wages, as well as the location of the production plants. Nevertheless, sometimes the European 
anti-dumping authorities take account of the transport costs within the NME country and, in order 
to calculate them, of the distance between the production een tres and the ports 173 , though the 
location of production een tres - except for mines174 - is also decided by the planning authorities 
and the transport costs too are determined by them 175• Though it is true that comparative 
advantages and economies of scale are not decision-making elements in a NME system, a NME 
country may be more efficient than a ME country in a specific branch of industry176• Such 
higher efficiency, if effectively proven, should be taken into account Otherwise, NME countries 
may be sanctioned for being more efficient than ME countries177• As GATT anti-dumping law 
does not downright prohibit NME prices and production costs from being considered, it does not 
preclude that higher efficiency of NME countries be taken into account. Hence, there may be a 
problem as to the concordance of European and GATT anti-dumping law. From an economie 
point of view, the latter provides the approach to be preferred, at least within the framework of 
the European notion of NME dumping, which - it should be recalled - is economically 
unwarranted. 
2.4.3.2. Export prices to third ME countries 
As all NME export prices to ME countries are determined by foreign currency maximization, 
there is, from an economie point of view, no problem in comparing them. GA TI anti-dumping 
law seems to allow the NME export price to the Community to be compared to the NME export 
price to third ME countries. As it does not explicitly treat of NME export prices, the general rule 
should apply and export prices to third countries may be used when domestic market prices do not 
permit a proper comparison (Article Vl(l)(b) GATT ; Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code). 
173 Council Regulation (EC) No 486/94 of 4 March 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of tluorspar originating in the 
People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 5 March 1994, No L 62/1. 
174 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 of 23 October 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium chloride 
originating'in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 24 October 1992, No L 308/41. 
175 The European anti-dumping authorities have compared normal value and export price at fob level because they considered it to be the first 
appropriate stage of compariaon given that costs in NME countries cannot be taken into account in determining prices on the basis of which the 
c<;unpariaon between export prices and. nonnal value is made (Conunission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 
1994, No L 330/15). 
176 DENTON, R., ecThe Non-Market Economy Rules of the European Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Dutiea 
Legislation», International Comparative Law Quarterly, 1987, (198), 230; SPAK, G.J., tcGeorg'etown Steel Corp v. United State11: 
Applying the Countervailing Duty Law to lmports from Nonmarket Economy Countrie&>,, Law and Policy in International BuaineBB, 
1986, (313), 335; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States and the European Communitie11. A 
Comparative Analy•Ïll, Amsterdam, Nmth-Holland, 1987, 434 ; W ARES, W .A., The Theory of Dumping and American Commercial 
Policy, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1977, 106. 
177 SCHUNK, E.H., ccSoviet Bloc Dumping, the Revenue Act of 1916, and Economie Policy", UCLA. Law Review, 1979-1980, 
(1365), 1384. 
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GATT anti-dumping law, though, also allows the use of NME export prices to third NME 
countries, since it does not make any distinction between them. As those export prices are not 
determined by foreign currency maximization, but mainly by political considerations, they are not 
comparable with NME export prices to the Community and should, therefore, not be taken into 
account. Contrary to economie theory. and GATT anti-dumping law, European anti-dumping law, 
however, downright rejects the use of all NME export prices to third countries (Article 2(7) basic 
EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision)178• 
The use of NME export prices to third ME countries has been criticized for several reasons : the 
export price to third countries may be a dumping price ; not all production costs may be covered ; 
there is no guarantee that their costs are rationally determined by productivity and factor 
abundance179• As the first reason is equally valid for ME export prices and since export prices 
to third countries may be used for determining ME dumping, their use should also be allowed for 
determining NME dumping. The second reason does not hold if the same rule is applied to NME 
dumping as the one applicable to ME dumping and according to which export prices to third 
countries below production costs may be disregarded (Article 2.2.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code; 
Article 2(4) basic EC Regulation) ; if, however, no such rule applies (see : basic ECSC 
Decision), this second reason does not hold either since, in the absence of such a rule, NME 
export prices, as . well as ME export prices below production costs may be used. The third reason 
cannot be accepted either because it equates rationality to ME rationality, which amount to a mere 
condemnation of the economie system of NME countries. Moreover, what really matters in 
finding price discrimination is that prices are determined in the same way and are, therefore, 
comparable. 
178 Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdiska) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21April1993, No L 95/5. 
179 WARES,WA., The Th.eory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1977, 106. 
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NME export prices to third ME countries are the best of all possible standards180 for 
lSO Different standards for determining NME dumping have been propoeed: 
(i) in the United States of America, the method of the simulated constructed value ie used. lt implies that that the production 
method of the NME country is used, but that the value of inputs and production factors is valued in terms of a third ME 
country (19 C.F .R. Section 153.7(c) (1979) ; eee : MEUSER, RL., te Dumping from 'Controlled Economy' Countries : The Polish 
Golf Car Case11, Law an.d Policy in International Business, 1979, (777), 777-794; SCIWNK, E.H., ccSoviet Bloc Dumping, the 
Revenue Act of 1916, and Economie Policy», UCLA Law Review, 1979-1980, (1365), 1385-1387 ; VERMULST, E.A., ccDumping 
in the United States and the European Community: A Comparative Analysis-, Legal Issues of European. Integration, 198412, 
(103), 110 ; VER.MULST, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d · Practice in the Un.ited States an.d the European. Communities. A 
Comparatiue Analysia, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 359-361). 
In European anti-dumping case law, this method has been propoeed once, but ita application has been rejected (Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2495/86, August 1, 1986, imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on potassium permanganate originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., August 5, 1986, No. L 217/12). 
The European anti-dumping authorities have rejected also another method cloeely reeembling the simulated constructed 
value. This mèthod consists of determining a constructed value by tak.ing account of the costs of the components the NME 
producer sourced from related companies in ME countries, the remaining costs being established on the basis of a ME country 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No 
L 95/5). 
The method of the simulated constructed value is a step in the right direction, for it allows to take account of certain specific 
features of the NME country. However, it is not the best solution. It introducee, to a large extent, arbitrariness (FELLER, 
P.B., ccThe Antidumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade», Michigan. Law Review, 1967, (114), 129-133; G.J. SPAK 
(ccGeorgetown. Steel Corp v. United States: Applying the Countervailing Duty Law to lmports from Nonmarket Economy 
Countries-, Law and Policy in. International Business, 1986, (313), 334) is of the opinion that this arbitrariness would still 
meet the standard or reasonableness), especially in view of the fact that it is difficult to determine the comparative advantage 
of NME countries becauee of the weaknesees of their domestic price system (GREGORY, P.R., and STUART, R.C., 
Comparative Economie Systems, Boston, Houghton Miffiin, 1980, 340). But even if the opposite was true, the method of the 
simulated constructed value would not make it possible to reflect the differences in endowments and, thus, in value of inputs 
and production factors between the third ME country and the NME country. Thoee differences, indeed, seem to be a non-
neglegible problem for in European anti-dumping case law every time when reference was made to differences in comparative 
advantage, it concerned differences concerning the endowment and value of inputs and production factors. 
(ii) Another proposal consists of using the NME domestic price when it has been established that the domestic price is not 
affected by governmental controle. The test proposed for determining whether the domestic price. is not affected by 
governmental controle, consists in establishing a price ratio between the domestic price of the product concerned and the 
domestic price of a basket of different products for the NME country in question and for a ME country ; only if these price 
ratios are equal to each other, the domestic price of the NME country may be used (ANTHONY, R.A., ccThe American 
Response to Dumping from Capitalist and Social Countries: Substantive Premises and Restructured Procedures aftar the 
1967 GATT Code», Corn.ell Law Review, 1969, (159), 205-210). 
This proposal cannot be accepted for eeveral reasons. First, it still contains a reference to a ME country. Second, the 
administrative feasibility of the test within a reasonable period can be questioned. Third, it has been demonstrated that 
relativa prices in different countries do not necessarily coincide, although there is a same level of governmental control 
(MEUSER, RL., cc Dumping from 'Controlled Economy' Countries : The Polish Golf Car Case••, Law an.d Policy in. 
International Business, 1979, (777), 797 ; W ARES, W .A., The Theory of Dumping an.d American. Commercial Policy, 
Lexington, Lexington Books, 1977, 105). 
In European anti-dumping case law certain exporters claimed a treatment different from that of State-owned companies 
becauee they operated on a ME basis. The Commission rejected this claim becauee these exporters' production costs were also 
largely influenced by the general economie environment prevailing in the NME country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 1991, No L 106/15). 
(iii) A third proposal is based on a comparison of four sets of prices : 
(a) the price charged by domestic Community suppliers ; 
(b} the price charged by the NME exporter under investigation; 
(c) the lowest price charged by ME suppliers ; and 
(d) the price charged by the largest ME supplier. 
lf the largest foreign supplier to the Community is a ME country, NME dumping will occur, if the NME export price to the 
Community is lower than the prices charged by both domestic Community suppliers and the cheapest ME supplier. lf the 
largest foreign supplier is the NME exporter under investigation, there will be NME d~ping, if the NME export price is 
lower than the prices charged by both domestic Community producers and the largest ME supplier (HIRSCH, S., ccAnti-
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determining NME dumping 181 • Besides their comparability with NME export prices to the 
Community, they should be used because of two other reasons. First, NME countries will not be 
sanctioned for being more efficient than ME countries (or, conversely, they will not be rewarded 
for being less efficient than ME countries), since their own export prices will be taken into 
account. Second, NME countries will have the opportunity of knowing in advance whether. or not 
they are practising dumping, as they determine or, at least, are informed of the prices they get for 
their exports to ME countries. 
Another advantage of NME export prices to third ME countries is that, in terms of price 
d~scrimination, NME countries will be treated the same way as ME countries since NME dumping 
will not, as under European anti-dumping law, have a different meaning than ME dumping ; 
instead, they will both refer to price discrimination. However, contrary to ME dumping, NME 
dumping does not cover sa.les at a loss, hut this difference in meaning is the mere consequence of 
the inapplicability of ·dumping in the sense of sa.les at a loss to NME countries. 
More importantly, though, is that NME dumping, when confined to price discrimination, will be 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive at the same time. It will be over-inclusive because action is 
warranted only against predatory dumping and not all price discrimination is predatory. It will be 
under-inclusive, because there may be instances of predatory pricing occurring without price 
discrimination. As in respect of ME dumping, a rule-of-reason test seems to be appropriate in 
order to detect NME predatory dumping. However, contrary to ME dumping, cost-based rules 
cannot offer any indication as to whether NME dumping is predatory since NME production 
costs, being determined by the planning authorities, are not comparable with NME export prices 
and may also be unreliable. As a result, predatory NME dumping will be even harder to 
establish, hut this should not be an excuse for applying other standards, such as the prices and 
production costs of third ME countries, in order to assess NME dumping. In view of the trade 
aversion, characteristic to NME countries, and, more importantly, because of the fact that NME 
countries usually align their export prices to world market prices, it seems safe to conclude that 
predatory NME dumping will be rather exceptional. Indeed, by aligning their export prices to 
dumping Actions in Brussels and East-West Trade», World Economy, 1988, (465), 479). 
The fundamental problem arising with this proposal is that it denies that NME countries can be more efficient than ME 
countries. In fact, it is not fundamentally different from existing European anti-dumping law. The only difference is that it 
limits the discretion of the European anti-dumping authorities in choosing the third ME country. For, in this proposal, the 
ME country has to be either the country with the lowest price or the country with the largest supply to the Community, 
whereas in European anti-dumping law not any criterion is determined in this respect. As it reduces arbitrariness, it is a 
step in the right direction. The question, however, is whether they are relevant criteria for determining the ME country. 
The fact that, in this proposal, the NME export price bas to be compared also with the prices of the Community producers, 
will have no substantial impact on European anti-dumping practice. lndeed, if the NME export prices do no undercut the 
Community producers' prices either, the Community industry will not file an anti-dumping complaint or no injury will be 
found. · 
lSl FELLER, P:B., tcThe Antidumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade>>, Michigan Law Review, 1967, (114), 126-129. 
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world market prices, they do not engage in price undercutting in order to drive their competitors 
out of the world market or to prevent them from entering it. This price alignment also shows that 
they do not control the market price, whereas the ability to control the market price is 
characteristic of markets conducive to predatory pricing182• 
3. DUMPING AND FREE TRADE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
GATT is intended to enhance a free-trade system, but, at the same time, allows trade-restrictive 
remedies against dumping which injures the importing country's industry. It considers such 
injurious dumping to be unfair and to contradict free trade. This alleged unfairness of dumping 
does not refer to unfair trade in the sense of unbalanced bilateral trade and, thus, does not 
contradict GA IT which provides a framework for organising a multilateral free-trade system in 
which trade flows are based on comparative advantages and imbalances in bilateral trade flows 
may occur. 
The claimed unfairness of dumping rather refers to its effects on the competition in the importing 
country's market between foreign exporters and domestic producers. The previous section bas 
shown that, from an economie point of view, only predatory pricing goes against free trade, as it 
distorts (international) competition, and that the alleged unfairness of dumping does not refer to 
unfair trade in the sense of unbalanced bilateral trade. GATT clearly ignores this economie point 
of view. First, it does not define dumping as predatory pricing, but rather defines it as price 
discrimination, sales at a loss and NME dumping. As shown in the previous section, those three 
cases of dumping are not necessarily predatory and predatory pricing does not require dumping, 
as defined by GATT. 
Second, GA ~pa)l-any-attentien-to--the-_effec__ts--of-dumpi-ng-~mational) 
CQ!!!petiti6ii. Instead, it focuses on the injurious effects dumping bas on the importing country's 
industry. There is, however, a great difference between anti-co_!!!P__Jilitive-.oi:-predatQcy dunming, 
on ~~one-hand, and inj_urious dumping, QILthe other hand. fuat(iV]umping ~refers to a 
ucer who obtains a monopoly position by adopting a strategy of charging prices below their 
182 JOSKOW, P.L., and KLEVORICK, A.K., «A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy•, Yale Law Joumal, 1979-1980, (213), 
225-227. 
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short-run profit.;.maximizing level to drive his competitors out of the market or to prevent them 
from entering it, and eventually to reap monopoly profits. It results in a reduction or even in the 
elimination of competition, but not because the predating producer is more efficient than his 
competitors or enjoys economies of scal~ The notion of «injurious dumping», on the other hand, 
only pays attention to the effect of imports on the importing country's industry (e.g., declining 
market shares or profitability of the importing country's industry because of the dumping), 
irrespective of whethe_!_CQIDpet.itiruLOtLthe..Jm_pgrt!!!_g_~!l~~try' s market is being reduced or not. 
For instance, the importing country's industry may be driv~~--out--ofihe-markêCoecause-foFei.gn­
producers are more efficient, but competition on the importing country's market is not reduced 
because a large number of foreign producers who are more efficient, have entered it. 
By condemning injurious dumping, regardless of whether or not it is predatory, GATT allows free 
trade to be drnortea--o-y-J>rorective- mëasures-ana-~--fäus;-·-rmPffes ___ protecti~~ii~~->< --1"IlêïëêëCtrade:--
resfrictlVe--re~~ies- against non-predatory, bui"lnJiïnous-dumping dist~rt--free trade, as they grant 
protection to less efficient industries in importing countries, which should, in the ordinary free 
play of competition, disappear. 
This section will investigate the said intemal contradiction in GA TI between free trade and 
protectionism. First, it will try to answer the question why GA TI, which is intended to organise 
and promote freetrade, nevertheless opens the door for protectionism, by allowing and regulating 
anti-dumping relief sub-section 3.2.) Second, it will show that such legally allowed and 
regulated protectionism j~p_Cl!,~~s~s __ -~~-J!ë!de .m<m~.lhM~=(grbid.deJLa.nd_JIJlregul~ted~Rr.Qt~tiçm~m. 
~------------------------· .· .-- . . . . . 
Indèed, legally allowed and regulated protect1omsm may be alleged to be m conform1ty w1th the 
free-trade system of GATI and, accordingly, may even be said to enhance free trade (sub-section 
3.3.). 
3.2. THE CONTRADICTION WITHIN GATr : FREE TRADE AND ANTI-
DUMPING LA W 
3. 2.1. lntroduction 
The overall idea of GA TI is to organise and enhance free trade. Therefore, it bas created a 
mechanism, based on the most-favoured-nation standard183 and the national treatment 
lSJ By means of the most-favoured-nation clause States agree to extend to oach other the advantages, favours, privileges and 
immunities granted to third States. See Article 1 GA1T. 
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standard184, which, in combination with the principle of reciprocity, gradually should lead to 
freer trade185• It also restrains its Contracting Parties in enacting trade restrictive remedies, 
such as quantitative restrictions, or in increasing tariff rates. 
Remarkably, however, GA 'IT allows anti-dumping relief taking the shape of anti-dumping du ties 
and undertakings. As these measures restrict trade, GA'IT seems to incorporate protectionism and 
to negate its own free trade spirit and goal. This contradiction is generally done with as being 
only apparent, for dumping is said to be an unfair trade practice which contradicts and endangers 
free trade. However, since dumping, as defined by GA TI, does not coincide with predatory 
pricing, the contradiction between freetrade and dumping is not apparent. Only predatory pricing 
can be considered to be unfair : it does not result from competition, but aims at destroying 
competition. Por dumping to be unfair, the GA 'IT definition of dumping is simultaneously over-
. inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive since dumping, as defined by GA 'IT, will 
frequently be the result of ordinary international competition, even if it injures the importing 
country's industry. It is under-inclusive since there are many instances of predatory pricing which 
do not meet the GA 'IT definition of dumping. 
In order to explain this contradiction in GA 'IT, the question why States have concluded GA 'IT 
and, thus, have agreed to limit their sovereignty in the field of economie policy, should be 
answered first (sub-section 3.2.2.). The answer to that question will help explain why GA'IT 
allows trade restrictive measures against dumping (sub-section 3.2.3.). 
3.2.2. The conclusion of GATT: its rationality 
In economics, it is generally agreed upon that free trade usually is the best system to preserve the 
interests of each country individually and of the whole of the world as well. By enabling each 
country to specialise its production where it has comparative advantages, free trade results in the 
optima! use of the world' s scarce resources. As it also enables each country to buy products 
184 The national treatment clause requires a State to grant foreign citizens and products the same treatment as its own citizens 
and products. See Article m GATr. 
185 The most-favoured-nation clause is usually considered to be the best instrument for liberaliz.ing international trade. However, 
the most-favoured-nation clause does not guarantee trade liberalization. It is quite possible that it reinforces protectionism. States 
could not be willing to grant concessions, merely because they fear that some parties would enjoy these concessions without 
returning the favour by means of equivalent concessions. Reciprocity was introduced in order to prevent the possible protectionist 
effect of the most-favoured-nation clause. Through reciprocity, each nation is guaranteed that its own concessions are balanced by 
equivalent concessions. CURZON, G., Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and lts 
Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques, London, Michael Joseph, 1965, 59 ; FINGER, J.M." ccTrade Liberalization : 
A Public Choice· Perrspective». in Challenges to a Liberal International Economie Order, AMACHER, R.C., HABERLER, G., and 
WILLE'IT, T.D. (ede.), Washington, American Enterprose Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979, (421), 426-427. 
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\ where they are the cheapest, it maximizes global welfare186• In view of this well-known free l trade theory, one would expect that countries spontaneously behave accordingly, i.e., that they 
would not interfere with free trade and would freely refrain fmm trade-restrictive measures. In 
reality, however, countries do interfere with free trade and do enact trade.:.restrictive measures, yet 
they have concluded GATT which is, in general, precisely the embodiment of free trade theory. 
This contradiction requires some explanation. One explanation might be that countries have no 
knowledge of free trade theory or do not understand it. As free trade theory is generally known 
and is quite easy to understand, this explanation does not hold, especially not since free trade 
theory lies ar the basis of GATT. The real explanation is far more complex and is to be found on 
two levels : a domestic and an international one. 
3.2.2.1. On the domestic level 
(On ~:J.omestic:ever; a diS~CtiO~, ~hould ~e made between a coun~ and its go~~~~~: 
~ rtugn _fr~ ~de 1s generall:_~~--~~~-~~~~trx'.~~--!~1.~fil:~ t~e governme~t-~~!l_~_()_~-ctlway~)~-~~=~~~ 
~mg m 1ts mterest~d_/·The 1mport-com~-~~-~---~~~~~~_es -~~! ___ ~_be ____ sh~!!~!ed from fore1gn 
compattion--and-thû's to sell mor~m ___ <?! ___ !~ chru:_g~ high~r p_tj~es __ on their domestic market. 
Accordingly, the. g~-tn~Q_t !~. confronted with .the _demand_ for protecJjon __ ()f import-C()i:rt~t!J!g 
jndustries agajl}~ttllat foreign competition. As the government wants to stay in power and, in a 
"--------__ _,__ ______ , _ __,~- -
democratie regime, to~~_!eel~~.!. it may grant pr_q!~_tjQ_n in order to -~n .!~~-~~p1?9rt of thos~ 
iJ1!~!!:.com~~ngJndus_tries. Whereas __ pr()tection benefits import-competing industries, it !edU~~ 
the welfare of consumers. Indeed, protection will affect the consumers, because of its price-
increasing effects : the consumers will have to pay more or to consume less. The consumers' 
demand for free trade is, ___ however, not as clearly pronounced as the import-éompctf~g industries' 
::s: """'"""- ~-~-------------'" . . . . ··-·· --- -· - -·---------- ----·· -·· ·-· ,•. --- - -· ----·-. ··---·-- ------· --·--·-----·· --------- ---
oemand for protection. This is becaüse, compared to import-competing industries, co~~~e, 
primarily for two reasons, less able to get organised, to lobby and to set up com_~Q.n_ ~_c_tjg_vs. 
First, COl)~-iTI~;~----;~ far more numer~us --~cl dl~per~ th~ firms ~d ~orkers in import-
......-:--~ ... -- -- ' ----- -- . 
competing industries. Second, the import-competing industries' attention is focused o_n a limited 
r-=''=--- - - '• -- _ __ _ _ . _ ·--•--- -.,<-- _ ·--- -- --'--'-- C-, .• r_ -- _,----•~ .- - ,_,_ -><•--"'- ·' 
~ale of prajµctsc" whereas ~ose products . represent only a small . fraction of the _ produ~ts 
~ll§_~mers buy. For both reasons, the loss of each individual consumer is smaller than the gain of 
~·-. _,__ --~ ~ ,.-J -- -~"'--------- ---·---- ~ -··--" ~--- _ _. - ' 
eé!_~h individual firm or wor!cer in import-competing industries and, as a consequence, the 
"""~- ----~----- - ·- - ~ - ------- - - - - .' ··-- -- - -- " 
consumers will have a weaker incentive than import-competing industries to get organised, to 
186 Recent economie theory, which dates from the late 1980s, shows that in some instances free trade does not maximize a 
country's welfare. However, as its oonclusions depend on highly sensitive assumptions, it is extremely difficult to deduce general 
criteria for government intervention from this recent theory. Therefore, it has not challenged seriously free trade theory on the 
level of international trade policy : free trade is still advocated as the policy to be pursued, even though free trade does not always 
serves a country'& interest& the best (ABBO'IT, K.W., ccThe Trading Nation's Dilemma : The Functions of the Law of International 
Trade", Harvard International Law Journal, 1985, (501), 510 ; KRUGMAN, P.R., and OBSTFELD, M., International Economie•. 
Theory and Policy, Glenview (Illinois), Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988, 206-207; RUIGROK, W., ccParadigm Crisis in 
International Trade Theory•, Journal of World Tradl!, 199111, (77), 78-80). 
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lobby and to set up common actions. This disequilibrium biases the government' s policy towards 
protecti~I_!i~m. 
~--~~------
This view may create the impression · that governments, on the domestic level, are never 
confronted with demands for a more liberal trade policy. It is, however, a very_ ~imRlis.tiç 
caricature of political _ r~~ty_: . First, within a country, there are also domestic industries which use 
the · 1mp0riecfpr0duct as input, as well as exporting industries. Both industries benefit from free 
trade and are injured by protection. As import-competing industries, domestic industries which 
use the imported product as input, are less numerous and dispersed than consumers, and are also 
interested in a limited scale of products. Therefore, they feel an as sharp incentive as import-
competing industries to get organised and to lobby187• Exporting industries, on the other hand, 
are less able to get organised and to lobby : they seldom perceive the causal relationship between 
protection and its negative effect on their export performance, and this negative effect is slight 
since it is dispersed over all exporting firms188• Second, a -~~!!!n'~~lJcJ __ ~s ~o~restricted to 
economie w.elfare. Generally, its .PQ!içy Js_p(!sed_ona_ mixture ofPQfüi~~~--so~~~!-~~!!o~j_c an~ 
,nili~ _ con_sid~ratio_n~, and J!1:1f~!-l~~ ~~als {)_t~~r than economie welfare_, csyç_b jlS __ Q_IJ.tlQ!léil_~~-urity 
and. sociaj. _ objective~~~9 • Some of --~Q~~e goals may support a protectionist policy. For 
---~· ~-~-- --~•-~' -.:___,___._,_ _ __...:...· .. ---·-·--,. _._._ ___ .-c•.o_________ '·- ' - - 1,----,--- ·---- --·--- -•-:-------- -:: 
~xample, the ~ffort to stre!}gthen the balance of payments may urge a country to adopt import 
;estri~tive ~easurf!s~~c~· .. Other goals may require a fr~-trade policy, such- as the-maximization-
of the strength of the national economy or maintaining friendly relations with other 
countries191• In this respect, academie and other studies on free trade theory may bolster a 
country's free trade policy192• Generally, however, only long-term goals reg1Jire_ af:r~~tmç!e 
l?-Qlicy, whereas go~~~~~~nt~u-~av-; a _short: run perspectlve, because of-the politi_c~ a~_piié\tions JQ 
stay in power and, in democratie regimes, to be-reelected193.- As a result, a goverment's 
J)olicy ·will be predominantly--p~~t~ti~ni~t- which long-term, free-trade con-~iCi-eiations -may have 
only a mitigatingeffecfon. 
------~------------------- - -
lS? ABBOTI', K.W., .cThe Tl-ading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International 1i-ade11, Harvard International 
Law Journal, 1986, (601), 619-520. 
188 ETHIER, W., Modern International Economics, New York, Norton, 1983, 217. 
189 RUIGROK, W., te Paradigm. Crisis in International Tl-ade Theory11, Journal of World Trade, 199111, (77), 83-86. 
19° COOPER, R.N., ccNational Economie Policy in an Interdependent World Economy", Yale Law Journal, 1966-1967, (1273), 1285-
1287. 
191 ABBOTI', K.W., .cThe Tl-ading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International 1i-ade11, Harvard International 
Law Journal, 1986, (601), 616. 
192 RIEGER, H.C., aGame Theory and the Analysis of Protectionist Trends11, World Economy, 1986, (171), 175. 
193 ABBOTI', K.W., «The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International 1i-ade11, Harvard International 
law Journal, 1986, (601), 516-517. 
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3.2.2.2. On the intemational level 194 
This view, however, explains but half of the problem, i.e., why, contrary to free trade theory, 
gove!!!_l!),en~jst trade policies. In order to explain why governements conclude 
agr~riÎents on free tfl1-de,-- -·~ closer look at the international scene is necessary. Though 
(~~y think a protectionist policy to be the most appropriate instrument for 
(~ing/ their intere~s, they know that such a policy probably will provoke retaliatory actions by 
'--Otller govemements: Indeed, as such a protectionist policy will reduce the export opportunities of 
the other countries, the governements of those countries will be faced not only with the already 
exJsting demand for protecting their import-competing industries, but also with the displeasure of 
their exporting industries about their lost export opportunities. Those govemements will want to 
show their exporti_~g _industries .that"they .do. something __ about Jhe _Joreign protectionist_ action. 
Th~y/wnr-iettl.i~te by means of trade-restrictive measures, as they think protectionism tob~ -ilîe1 // . ' 
(oést policy to respond to their import-competing industries' request and, in view of the displeasure 
oLtl!_~ir exporting industries, to break through the foreign protectionist action. 
---·--=--
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Governements now will find them~lv~~-i~ a g~e ~~~ situation known as Prisoner's Dile~-m-a. ----- 1 
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a game in which each player acts in his own interest and has a 
dominant strategy. It is an oligopolistic game where each player' s action affects the condition of 
the other. lts equilibrium outcome is a situation in which each player is worse off than if each 
had choosen the alternative strategy. On the assumption that there are only two countries, figure 
3 depicts the Prisoner's dilemma in which their governements find themselves on the international 
trade scene. 
-In figure 3, each government may ch90se ·one of two strategies, either a free trade or a 
protectionist one. Government A plays the rows : it chooses either the top or bottom row. 
Government B plays the columns : it chooses either the right or left column. Figure 3 shows the 
pay-offs of each strategy, as viewed by the govemments : B (best outcome for a government), S 
(second-best outcome), T (third-best outcome) and W (worst outcome). 
194 Based on: ABBOTI', K.W., ccThe Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Traden, Harvard 
International Law Journal, 1985, (501), 501-532 ; KRUGMAN, P.R., and OBSTFELD, M., International Economics. . Theory and 
Policy, Glenview (Illinois), Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988, 216-218. 
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Figure 3 
governement B 
freetrade protectionism 
freetrade 
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governement A 
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Source: ABBO'IT, K.W., «The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade», Harvard International 
Law Joumal, 1985, (501), 505. 
Clearly, to each government, protectionism is the dominant strategy, whatever strategy the other 
government chooses. Indeed, if government B plays the free trade strategy, government A must 
choose between B (protectionism) and S (free trade) ; as B is superior, it will choose 
protectionism. If government B plays the protectionist strategy, government A must choose 
between T (protectionism) and W (freetrade) ; as T is superior, it will choose protectionism. The 
55ne of reasoning holds for government B. Thus, both governments will choose on· m and for both of th~ the pay-off will be T (square 4 in figure 3). If, on the other , both had played the\~~~~tegy, !heir pay-off would have been S, which is 
superi_gr-ta~'f-(square-L~l-inL figure .3) :-~~g·t:tlte,y .~e .. fäced··wifü ·a ·anemma· : ·· even-if .. they know that 
tJle'Pay-off of each is · higher when both adopt a free-trade policy, each of them Jèar-s". and 
~:::~::: ;:::::n::, ::y0:~· s:~c:d:: ~;;;~~~~;;; ::~~:~: ~f~de=::ho!s ~: 
pre-empt1ve strike. -~·-·-· __ -."_, ..... -.... // 
~------ ··•··· ----· .. .-• . .- -~---~--~------:..-------------------
This game will bemffmtely repeareo:~~"Tlîe~retalfátion of the other governements will provoke a 
counter-retaliation by the former government. Moreover, the suc~es of the first import-competing 
industries will attract an increasing number of import-competing industries requesting protection, 
and, as protectionist actions multiply, the exporting~ries' displeasure increases. Thus, by 
acting unilaterally, governments will end up in a~. As each new game starts in the 
square where the previous game has ended (i.e., square 4, see figure 4), the situation for each 
governme~~.~eteriorates. Eventually, he Ion - di dvan 
~~ort-rurt benefits of p~on as a trade war may conflict with the other policy goals o a 
g~~ for exa~ th~ pro~tionist era of the 1930s shows, it may undermine 
economie grOWtn-aruilnendly. relations wlth other governments. 
-~-~~~~~1··.-~. 
--
i---
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Figure 4 
government B 
GAMEl 
government A · 1 
GAME2 
2 4-+ 1 
GAME3 
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2 4 --+ 1 
Source: ABBOTI, K.W., «The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade•, Harvard Iniernational 
Law Journal, 1985, (501), 529. 
From the moment on that long-term disadvantages begin to outweigh the short-run advantages of 
pr~tectio~sm, ~Înents ~~~~~~}?~~~~fünis~. The only ef~ective way to attain 
this goal, 1s to cooperate-·antf-to-condude-an-agreement to refram from protectlon, such as GATT, 
as only an agreement can ta](~Law.ay.-the.Jears-oLa._unilat~rnt defection. Indeed, such an agreement 
of~r-Sgovel"IJ:lJlentS iC Váiid ·~ument against the demand fo; P~~lêCliOII-~ their import-competing 
irtQ_ustries, as it enables them to argue that they must honour the Jigrrellfent. This argument may 
also--;:-educe--the-sfiört~run-political_cnsts_for __ govemmentf-asth~y may point to their obligations 
under the agreement and, at the same time, criticize them. Moreover, as the agreement will also 
provide sanctions for defections and since those sanctions generally take the shape of retaliatory 
trade-restrictive measures, the agreement reduces the benefits of unilateral defection, as well as 
the uncertainty of whether and how other governments will react against protectionist actions. 
3.2.3. GA1T anti-dumping law: its rationality 
GA IT meets exactly the rationality of international trade agreements. It was concluded in order 
to put a stop to protectionism as it existed during the 1930s and to its disastrous economie effects. 
Therefore, it did not create free trade as such by abolishing immediately all protectionist 
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· measures. Instead, it allowed many existing trade-restrictive measures, hut refrained governments 
to go further on the path towards protectionism and created mechanisms which gradually make 
trade freer. 
GATT anti-dumping law, however, seems to contradict this rationality as it allows trade-restrictive 
measures in a field where protectionism nearly existed at that time. Then, indeed, only a few 
countries had enacted anti-dumping legislation195 which they seldom applied196• By 
legitimizing anti-dumping law, GATT now incited all Contracting Parties to adopt their own anti-
dumping legislation and to enforce it. Dumping, as defined by GATT, though, is frequently not 
predatory, hut rather the result of free trade. Hence, anti-dumping law seems not to fit within 
A TT, as it allows to sanction dumping by allowing the adoption of trade-restrictive measures . 
. A closer look, however, shows that GATT anti-dumping law relies on the same rationality as 
GATT. First, even when governments see that the long-term costs of protectionism outweigh its 
short-run benefits and decide to conclude an agreement to refrain from protectionism, they will 
continue to have a protectionist reflex as they will go on seeing unilateral protectionism as 
providing them the highest pay-off. GATT anti-dumping law precisely ·offers such unilateral 
protectionism. It allows a government to enact trade-restrictive measures against dumping and 
guarantees that the government of the exporting country does not retaliate. 
Second, even if governments did not intend to legitimize anti-dumping law by international 
agreement, it was difficult for them to resist the argument that import-competing industries must 
be protected against unfair expórt practices of selling products abroad at a lower price than at 
home. Of course, the argument that it is not fair for a domestic industry to have to face such 
harsh competition which does not exist on the domestic market of the exporting country, is 
intuitively appealing197• But, more fundamentally, economie theory since the 1920s provides 
elements for legitimizing anti-dumping law. First, dumping was associated with the exploitation 
of monopoly power or, especially since Joan ROBINSON's oustanding work on «The Economics 
of Imperfect Competition»198 , of oligopoly or even monopolistic competition. Joan 
l ~S W ARES, W .A., The Theory of Dumping and American. Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lexington Booke, 1977, 12-22. 
196 CLUBB, B.E., ccConflicting Assumptions about International Trade .: Neo-Protectionism or Reasonable Accom.modation or 
National interest&?», Proceedings of the American. Society of International Law, Sixty-Fifth Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., 
April 29 - May 1, 1971, in American. Journal of International Law, 1971, (192), 195. 
"
197 J. BHAGWATI (Protectionism, Cambridge (Maes.), MlT Prees, 1988, 35) rendered this argument by means of an analogy: 
ccWould one be wise t.o receive stolen property simply because it is cheaper, or would one rather vote to prohibit such transactions 
because of their systemic consequences ?». 
198 ROBINSON, J., The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London, MacMillan, 1954 (reprint; orgh~al date of publication: 
1933), 352 p. 
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ROBINSON, indeed, shows that any producer who has some con trol over its domestic price, will 
charge prices above marginal costs and will charge lower prices in markets where he has less 
market power. Tuis association with imperfect competition and exploitation of market power, 
gave dumping a bad connotation199• Second, Jacob VINER's exceptionally thorough book on 
«Dumping: A Problem in International Trade»200 provided another impulse for enacting anti-
dumping law. He distinguishes three types of dumping : 
sporadic dumping is occasional and casual, occurs only in scattered instances and at irregular 
intervals and is not the manifestation of a deliberately established price policy on the part of 
the dumping exporter. It may occur merely unintentionally or in order to dispose of a casual 
overstock; 
short-run or intermittent dumping is continued steadily and Systematically for a period of 
limited duration. It is practised in accordance with a definitively established export policy 
and involves the deliberate production of products to be dumped. It is practised in order to 
obtain or maintain a market position or to prevent or eliminate competition ; 
long-run or continuous dumping is carried on continuously over a prospectively permanent 
period. It may be caused by economies of scale which the dumping producer wants to obtain 
or maintain. 
According to Jacob VINER, sporadic dumping is not dangerous, for it lasts so shortl y that it will 
not have any significant effect on the importing country. Continuous dumping bas the advantage 
of providing consumers in the importing country permanently with cheap supply of the dumped 
products. He considers only intermittent dumping as being dangerous to the economie welfare of 
the importing country, for it may result in great injury being done to the domestic industry in the 
importing country without providing the consumers with a permanent source of cheap 
products201 • Though he only warns against the negative effects of intermittent dumping, Jacob 
VINER, nevertheless, opened the door widely for anti-dumping law against all kinds of dumping. 
After having admitted that the distinction on the basis of continuity is difficult to make in advance, 
he noted - curiously without offering any proof - that the «fact that foreign producers are 
exporting at dumping prices affords a strong presumption that these prices are temporarily and 
abnormally low»202• Of course, govemments, the dominant policy of which is protectionist, 
did not ignore this clear language in economics and agreed upon anti-dumping law applicable to 
all kinds of dumping. Joan ROBINSON, though, bas shown that price discrimination is frequently 
199 WARES, W.A., The Theory of Dumping and American. Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1977, 8-10. 
200 VINER, J., Dumping : A Problem in. International Trade, New York, Kelly, 1966 (reprint ; original date of publication : 1923), 
381 p. 
201 VINER, J., Dumping: A Problem in. International Trade, New York, Kelly, 1966 (reprint; original date of publication: 1923), 
23-31. 
202 VINER, J., Dumping: A Problem in. l:iern.ation.al Trade, New York, Kelly, 1966 (reprint; original date of publication: 1923), 
146. 
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permanent as it results from imperfect competition. The contradiction between VINER's 
presumption as to the temporary nature of dumping and Joan ROBINSON' s conclusion that price 
discrimination is permanent, seemingly did not bother them : to them, dumping was unfair for 
both the reasons of its temporary nature and its resulting from imperfect competition, regardless 
of whether these reasons contradicted each other. 
Third, anti-dumping law may offset the import-eompeting industries' opposition against freetrade, 
without offending the exporting industries. Indeed, even if governements are eonvineed of the 
necessity to conclude an agreement on free trade, they will still be faeed with the import-
competing industries' demand for protection. They may meet this demand by means of anti-
dumping law whieh guarantees import-competing industries protection against the presumably 
unfair trade practice of dumping. Vis-à-vis their exporting industries, they may argue that anti-
dumping relief will not provoke retaliation and that even economie theory, whieh promotes the 
case of free trade, recommends anti-dumping law. Thus, anti-dumping law seems to be one of the 
necessary escape valves for the import-eompeting industries' pressure for protectionism. Without 
such escape valves, governments are probably unable to conelude agreements on free trade203 • 
Thus, GATI anti-dumping law, as an instanee of unilateral protectionism, clearly relies on the 
same rationality as GA TI, where it enhances free trade. As govemments eonsider unilateral 
protectionism to grant them the highest pay-off and know that the payoff of mutual protectionism 
is lower than free trade, they will try to guarantee, in the first place, unilateral protectionism and, 
only when this is not feasible, free trade. If economie theory, moreover, provides them rather 
convincing arguments in favour of unilateral protectionism, nothing can stop them to conclude an 
agreement on such unilateral protectionism, especially not when sueh unilateral protectionism is 
necessary as an escape valve for overcoming the opposition of their import-eompeting industries 
against free trade. 
203 BHAGWATI, J., Protectionism, Cambridge (Maes.), MlT Prees, 1988, 35; CLUBB, B.E" ccConflicting Assumptions about 
International Trade: Neo-Protectionism or Reaeonable Accommodation or National Interests ?", Proceedings of the American. 
Society of International Law, Sixty-Fifth Annual Meeting, W aehington D.C" April 29 - May 1, 1971, in American Journal of 
International Law, 1971, (192), 196-197; FINGER, J.M., ccThat Old GATI' Magie No More Casts lts Spell (How the Uruguay Round 
Failed)t,, Journal of World Trade, 199112, (19), 21-22 ; LOWENFELD, A:F., ccFair or Unfair Trade : Does it Matter ?u, Cornell 
International Law Journal, 1980, (205); 209-210; MATSUSHITA, M., ccCoordinating International Trade with Competition 
Policies••, in The New GATI' Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and Economie Pr;;blems, PETERSMANN, E.-U., and 
HILF, M. (ede.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1988, (395), 403. 
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3.3. ANTI-DUMPING LA W : A DANGER TO FREE TRADE ? 
3.3.1. The problem: procedural protectionism 
Anti-d~,!!lping,,fa:W'"ifprob~biy·~~~".~{ihe''elêmënts··without,,which .. it"would~_hav,eJi~n _im:Qoss~ to 
_,., ~ 
~lude GATT. The question which will be investigated in this sub-section, is whether GA TI) 
~~t opened the door all too widely for unilateral protectionism. The issu: i~ e.:v~n. wersen:éd; 
since GArr·-sevetelrTestncts~tlre--use~of~th~trae,itianal~pfoteetianist~mea:sûfes, such as tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions, whereas the pressure of import-competing industries on their 
governements for protectiQn _Q~SJ1C>talter at ·all. Governments seem to be faced with a difficult 
,- . " ... , - . ~ " . -,_ - ., ", "-' " '. " __ :_" - . --
ch~~ tq.,obey GATT or to grant protection in violation of GATT~ '~Theif"'Wtslr;·-howe~er~--i~ to 
enc~-~~~~~rnatives: to grant protection and, at the same time, to obey GATI. . . ./ 
In order to obtain ~~s, govemments seek~o exploit the Joopholes in ÜA TI, and féî~s there 
are. In fact, they have found two lucrative loopholes. Th . ~ loophole concerns the fact that 
GATT does not impose free trade as such, but only regulat and restricts the use of a limited 
number of well-specified trade-restrictive measures, in particular those which were used at the 
time of the conclusion of GATT. lt also pertains to the fact that GATT originally only regulated 
trade in products and not in services. Govemments have managed to find other instruments which 
GATT originally did not regulate. Of these, voluntary export restraints (so-called VERs) were the 
most prominent example. Governments argued that they did obey GATT when they applied such 
instruments, since GATT did not explicitly forbid or restrict their use. Thereby, - consciously or 
not - they ignore that such instruments are 'against t~e free traae-sp1~t"?f-~Ä~ Another 
application ·of this loophole is the Community Regulation on unfair pricing practices in maritime 
transport which renders, to a great extent, GATT anti-dumping law applicable to services. At the 
time this Regulation was being enacted, the Community did not have to worry about a violation of 
GATT, as services did not fall within the scope of GATT. lt could even refer to GATT in order 
to strengthen its position, by arguing that dumping in services required the same repair as 
dumping of products and its anti-dumping law applicable to services· closely resembles GATT anti-
dumping law. 
~-~~ ' 
The/ second loo~ole'êÓncems the trade remedy laws provided under GATT. Besides anti-
dumping law, countervailing du ties against subsidized imports (Article VI GATT) and safeguard 
measures against abnormally increased imports (Article XIX GATT) are examples of such trade 
remedy laws : they allow trade-restrictive remedies against trade practices which are presumed to 
be <(j~-e~~11iltol'rimëlnattonal--competîtlê>!P This loophole bas resulted in «procedural 
~=~~c---~--c-·----~~~--~--~-~-~-~--' - , _ . -- -~ 
protectionism», whicli consists iri-ffiè-enäctment and enforcement of national trade remedy laws by 
the Contracting Parties of GATT in a protectionist manner. These laws are represented as an 
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application of GATT and, therefore, may claim a certain degree of legitimacy204• The 
question, however, is whether they really are hut a mere application of GATT and do not involve 
a protectionist-biased interpretation of it. If the latter is true, the fac!Jbat-,,they seem to -be,,part of 
the GATT free trade system, makes this kind of protectionism,highly dangerous : it looks 1,~ke free 
~actually straightforward protectionism. If, on the othe~~~~~-' }_t_does_notlook to be 
in accordance with~GAIT~ ___ Çontracting Partie~ __ :wiU-try--to--arrrena GATT so as to convert their 
--~~-~----·----
illegal interpretations into GATT law. This has been the case with anti-dumping law on the 
occasion of the Uruguay Round. For instance, many protectionist-biased interpretations applied 
by some of its Contracting Parties have been incorporated jnto--GA'IT äiifi-dumpi11g-Ja_~ by means 
of the 1994 GATT Anti-dumplng Cod~Jl~rotectionist interpretations pr~bábly will 
attain their _inaxïntµm-i'r-em-tlleîiloiiiêiî on /fuat their illegality is obvious and must be legal~\ by 
me~1,ns--t>I amendments of GATT law. Indeed, from then on, the Contracting Parties will realise 
ihat their protectionist interpretations, once they are incorporated in GATT law, are available to 
! - -
1all Parties and may be used against their exports. It seems that this tuming point }Jas~nót yet been 
\ . 205 . --------------------------~-------~ 
reachaj_ . ------------~---
As anti-dumping law may lend itself to procedural protectionism, the next sub-section will 
investigate the characteristics of procedural protectionism, with special regard to European anti-
dumping law. 
3.3.2. Procedural protectionism : legal certainty or one-way flexibility ? 
3.3.2.1. Legal certainty ? 
1'7 ; , 
Procedural protectionisni seems to enhance legal certainty, as it replaces discretion by objecti~ ~f'Y"° 
legal criteria. A characteristic of trade remedy laws, indeed, is that they allow trade-restrictive 
measures only if certain legally defined conditions are being met.· As compared with tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions, the imposition of which is not subject to any legal criteria but results 
from a pure politica! decision, trade remedy laws prevent or, at least, reduce discretion in the 
enactment of trade restrictive measures206• 
204 GRINOLS, EL., ccProcedural Protectioniem: The American Trade Bill and the New Interventionist Mode», 
Weüwirtschaftliches Archiv, 1989, (501), 518. 
205 HORLICK, G.N., «How the GAIT Became Protectionist. An Analysis of the Uruguay Round Draft Final Antidumping Code», Joumal of 
World Trade, 199315, (5), 16-17; PETERSMANN, E.-U., «Need for Reforming Antidumping Rules and Practic~s. The Messy World of Fourth-
Best Policiea», Aussenwinschaft, 1990, (179), 194. 
206 See: BOURGEOIS, Jll.J., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generatione Issues", in Antitrust and Trade 
Policy in the United State• and the European Community, HA WK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 584-585 ; GRINOLS, 
EL., «Procedural Protectioniem: The American Trade Bill and the New Interventionist Mode", Weüwirtschaftliches Archiv, 1989, 
(501), 518-519; PETERSMANN, E.-U., ccNeed for Reforming Antidumping Rulee and Practicee. The Meeey World of Fourth-Best 
Policiee», Auaaenwirtschaft, 1990, (179), 191-193. 
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However, to the degree that national trade remedy laws are only a mere application of GATI, 
discretion is only marginally reduced. Indeed, GA TI contains many open-ended and even vague 
prov1s1ons which are open to interpretation and, thus, to discretion207. In order to really 
reduce or even exclude discretion, national trade remedy laws must be more than a mere 
application of GATI. They must further specify GATI. In doing so, they may either exclude 
discretion totally, or leave some room for it. 
In some respects, European anti-dumping law seems to have further specified GA TI anti-dumping 
law, but bas not substantially reduced discretion. Indeed, on several occasions, the Court of 
Justice bas underscored the discretion of the European anti-dumping authorities in applying 
European anti-dumping law and, therefore, only marginally controls the way it is applied208• 
European anti-dumping law, thus, only marginally contributes to legal certainty. Only a 
consistent anti-dumping case law may increase legal certainty. But, of course, case law can never 
guarantee legal certainty as much as legislation, since it is easier and less conspicuous to modify 
207 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalcajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2086 (Report for the hearing: 
conclusions of the applicant), 2089 (Report for the hearing: conclusions of the Council), and 2130 and 2134 (Opinion of Advocate-General 
LENZ); THARAKAN, P.K.M., and WAELBROECK, J., •Antidumping and countervailing duty decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S. An 
experiment in comparativc political economy», European Economie Review, 1994, (171), 1n. 
208 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo Bearing Company Limited a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1987, (1809), 1854-1855; 
C.J.E.C, case 255/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1861), 1890-1891; C.J.E.C., case 258184, 7 
May 1987, Nippon Seiko KK v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1987, (1923), 1964-1965 and 1967; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea 
Compan.y Limited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1975), 2005-2006; C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo 
Electri.c Company Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5920; C.J.E.C., case 121/86, 28 November 1989, Anonymos 
Etaireia Epi.cheiriaeon Metalle~ikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon AE a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1989, (3919), 3952; C.J.E.C., joined 
cases 133/87 and 150/87, 14 March 1990, Nashua Corporation v Commi.ssion and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (719), 760-762 and 777; 
C.J.E.C., case C-156187, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commi.ssion, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (781), 839; C.J.E.C., 
case C-189/88, 27 March 1990, Cartorobica SpA v Mini.stero delle Fin.an.ze dello Stato, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (1269), 1286 and 1298; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commi.ssion and Council, E.C.R., 
1990, 1, (2945), 3002 and 3006-3007; C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Preci.sion Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, 
(2069), 2186, 2189-2191, 2195 and 2200 ; C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, 
E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), ~203; C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1289 and 1294; 
C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 1400, 1402, 1404 and 1406; C.J.E.C., case 
C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd and Matsushita Electri.c Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 
1, (1409), 1483, 1'85, 1487 and 1489 ; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Koni.shiroku Photo Industry Co. Ltd v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1493), 1527, 1529, 1531 and 1533; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1535), 1569, 1570, 1573 and 1574; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1631; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1635), 1681, 
1682, 1685 and 1686. 
See also: C.J.E.C., joined cases 113 and 118-121177, 29 March 1979, NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, 
(1185), 1266 (opinion of Advocate Genera! J.P. WARNER); C.J.E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sermes v Directeur des 
serui.ces des douane• de Stras'bourg, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (3027), 3041 (opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN); C.J.E.C., case C-
49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (3187), 3208 
and 3226 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! DARMON) ; C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-
Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (5163), 5179, 5186-5187 and 5193-5194 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN); C.J.E.C., case C-
315/90, 27 November 1991, Groupement des Industries de Matériels d'Equipement Electrique et de l'Electronique Industrielle 
Associée (Gimelec) a.o.' v Commi.ssion, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (5589), 5605 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN); C.J.E.C., case C-
105/90, 13 February 1992, Golàstar Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 709 and 712 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN 
GERVEN); C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1268 (Opinion of Advocate 
Genera! MISCHO); C.J.E.C., case C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita Industrial Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1301), 1321 
(Opinion of Advocate Genera! MISCHO); C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 
1377 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! MISCHO); C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 
1992, 1, (1577), 1618 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! MISCHO). 
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it, as it is not required to go through the whole legislative process. Moreover, case law is less 
accessible than legislation : it consists of a countless number of particular cases which have to be 
traced and studied in order to have a good knowledge of case Iaw209• 
This low degree of legal certainty will affect the foreign exporters' behaviour. They know that, 
under uncertainty, there is a probability that non-dumping exporters may be held to practise 
dumping. As they will try to avoid a finding of dumping, especially when they do not engage in 
dumping, exporters will take more precaution than they would under ·certainty, and charge export 
prices which are well above their domestic market prices or production costs210• Thus, one 
might expect that only few exporters will be found to dump. Many exporters charged with 
dumping, though, are actually found to have been practising dumping. In view of the vagueness 
of anti-dumping law, they may have Underestimated the probability of being found dumping and 
. the precaution they have taken may not be sufficient211 • In particular, they may have 
underestimated the probability that anti-dumping authorities apply their discretion in a protectionist 
way and, thus, find dumping in cases where in fact it is not being practised. 
3.3.2.2. One-way flexibility 
As GATI leaves a large room for discretion, the question arises how the Contracting Parties will 
make use of that discretion when enacting and enforcing their trade remedy laws. The discretion 
which GA Tf leaves, offers them the opportunity to respond in a flexible manner to the 
complexity of economie reality212• As GATT contains open-ended and even vague provisions, 
they may apply it to the most divergent circumstances and take into account all aspects _of 
economie reality. Thereby, they may either stay within the free trade spirit of GATT or choose 
the protectionist way. For two reasons, they will probably apply GATT in a «one-way flexible» 
manner, i.e. , they will make use of the flexibility of GA TI in one and the same protectionist 
direction. 8t, as bas already been noted, import-competing_jn~u_stries__k~ding_prQt~n, even 
1 when a treaty on free trade has been concluded. In order to predispose them, governments will 
209 See: THARAKAN, P.K.M., and WAELBROECK, J., 4<Antidumping and countervailing duty dccisions in the E.C. and in the U.S. An 
experiment in comparativc political cconomy», European Economie R~ew, 1994, (171), 172. 
210 Sec: COOTER, R.., and ULEN, T., Law and EconomJcs, Glenview, Scott, Foresman and Company: 1988, 401~2; JOSKOW, P.L., and 
KLEVORICK, A.K., 4<A Framcwork: for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy», Yale Law JoumaJ, 1979-1980, (213), 237-239. 
211 See: COOTER, R., and ULEN, T., Law and Economics, Glenview, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988, 415-417. 
212 BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., «EC Anti-dumping Enforccment - Selccted Second Generations lsauc1», in A.ntitrust and TraJ.e Policy in the United 
Stales and the European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 587-588. 
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try to exploit the trade remedy laws provided by GATT in a protectionist manner through placing 
a broad interpretation on the opportunities given by GATT to enact trade-restrictive measures. 
/~trade remedy laws, such as anti-dumping law, are of a highly technica! nature. This high 
~cility reduces their transparency and accessibility, as a good understanding of such laws 
requires a profound investigation. Since such an investigation requires time and is costly, those 
who have little at stake, such as consumers and domestic exporting industies, will not have the 
incentive to overcome this technical entry harrier. In fact, probably only import-competing 
industries, who have much to gain from protection, will make the effort to obtain the necessary 
technical skills in order to get the desired protection, in pursuance of the trade remedy laws213• 
The other group ~nfücli t~-lo~ fro~~J>r0iec1ion, involves the foreign exporting industries. 
However, the accessibility for them is even smaller as they will have to make efforts to 
understand foreign trade remedy laws. Moreover, if they export to several countries, they will 
have to understand the various trade remedy laws of all those countries. If those trade remedy 
laws are to a great ex tent embodied in case law, this will be an almost hopeless task. The 
disequilibrium between import-competing and exporting industries will affect case law, and 
eventually legislation. As the import-competing industries are best informed on all aspects, 
particularities and loopholes of their country's trade remedy laws, they will be able to develop the 
most sophisticated and convincing arguments and to bend trade remedy laws to their protectionist 
will. A good proof of this disequilibrium is the fact that the mere initiating of an anti-dumping 
proceeding bas a «chilling effect» on the volume of the allegedly dumped imports : even if 
eventually no injurious dumping is found and the exporter, thus, had nothing to be afraid of, it 
puts a stop to the increase in volume214• This proves that exporters expect the enactment of 
anti-dumping measures, whenever an anti-dumping proceeding is initiated, regardless of whether 
or ·not they actually dump. They, thus, view anti-dumping law as protectionist-biased. Their 
perception will 1eventually result in a vicious cercle : as the initiation of an anti-dumping 
proceeding generates uncertainty as to the profitability of their export market, their already low 
incentive to study the importing country's anti-dumping law will further shrink ; consequently, 
their defence will not be adequately underbuilt and_ the import-competing industries will have more 
free play to influence the anti-dumping authorities to adopt an increasingly protectionist 
interpretation. The more anti-dumping law becomes protectionist, _ the more it will have a 
213 See: THARAKAN, P.K.M., and WAELBROECK, J., «Antidumping and countervailing duty decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S. An 
experiment in comparative political economyi., EuropeanEconomic Review, 19941 (171), 183 and 187. 
214 MESSERLIN, P., ccThe EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economie Appraisal, 1980-85", Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 
1989, (563), 572. 
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«chilling» effect on allegedly dumped imports and, eventually, the import-competing industries 
may even initiate anti-dumping proceedings merely to harass import competition215• 
3.3.2.3. Legal remedies against one-way flexibility 
If «one-way flexibility» actually renders anti-dumping law increasingly protectionist, it probably 
will eventually reach a point at which anti-dumping case law becomes illegal. Indeed, the open-
ended and vague rules of GATT and European anti-dumping law are unlikely to be infinitely 
elastic. If the point of illegality is reached, legal remedies should be available. It should be 
pointed out, from the very beginning, that those legal remedies do not provide an effective remedy 
against the main deficiency of GATT and European anti-dumping law, i.e., that their scope is not 
limited to predatory pricing216• They offer no protection either against «One-way flexible», but 
legal interpretations of GATT and European anti-dumping law. They can only provide a remedy 
against illegal interpretations. It will be investigated hereinafter which legal remedies are 
available and whether they actually do put a stop to «one-way flexibility». A distinction is being 
made between European and GATT anti-dumping law. 
3.3.2.3.1. Legal remedies guaranteeing the observance of European anti-dumping law 
European anti-dumping law does not provide specific legal remedies against unlawful anti-
dumping determinations. Only the ordinary legal remedies provided under the EC Treaty and the 
ECSC Treaty217 are available. Thus, the Court of Justice and, since 15 March 1994, the Court 
of First Instance218 play a crucial role in reviewing alleged infringements of European anti-
dumping law. Those legal remedies seem to comply with the GATT Anti-dumping Code, which 
requires the Contracting Parties having domestic anti-dumping legislation to provide for judicial 
review of domestic anti-dumping determinations (Article 13). 
Since the first judgement given in 1979 by the Court of Justice on anti-dumping law, the nuinber 
of judgements bas considerably increased, especially since 1987 (see : table 2). 
215 FINGER, J.M., and MURRA Y, T., ccPolicing Unfair lmports : The United States Examplen, Journal of World Trade, 1990/4, 
(39), 47-48. 
216 PETERSMANN, E.-U., «GATI Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law», Common Market law Review, 1991, 
(69), 112. 
217 Hereinafter, attention will only be paid to the legal remedies provided under the EC Treaty, becauee the legal remedies laid 
down under the ECSC Treaty are identical and the majority of the cases introduced before the Court of Justice concern the basic 
EC Regulation. 
218 Article 168A EC Treaty; Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities (O.J., 25 November 1988, No L 319/1), as amended by Council Decision 93/350/ÈCSC, EEC, Euratom of 8 June 1993 
(O.J., 16 June 1993, No L 144/21) and by Council Decision 94/149/ECSC, EC of 7 March 1994 (O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 66/29). 
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Table 2 - Number of judgements passed by the Courl of Justice on anti-dumping law 
(excluding orders of the President of the Courl) 
1 Year 1 Number of judgementl 1 
1979 5 
1982 1 
1984 1 
1985 4 
1986 1 
1987 12 
1988 7 
1989 4 
1990 9 
1991 5 
1992 11 
1993 4 
1 Total 1 64 1 
Source : European Court Reports. 
Most cases concern actions for annulment introduced by individuals before the Court of Justice 
(Article 173(4) EC Treaty) and references for preliminary rulings by domestic courts before which 
the legality ·of anti-dumping decisions is raised (Article 177 EC Treaty). There has been only one 
action for annulment introduced by a M;ember State (Article 173(2) EC Treaty), and only one 
objection of inapplicability bas been raised by an individual (Article 184 EC Treaty). 
Furthermore, only one action has been introduced by an individual against the European anti-
dumping authorities for damages, caused by those institutions or their servants in the performance 
of their duties (Articles 178, iuncto 215(2) EC Treaty). Of course, the other ordinary actions are 
also available in the field of anti-dumping law (actions introduced by a Member State, a 
Community institution or an individual against the failure of the Council or the Commission to 
take a decision (Article 175 EC Treaty) ; actions introduced by the Commission or a Member 
State against the failure of a Member State to comply with its obligations under the EC Treaty 
(Articles 169 and 170 EC Treaty)). 
In its five 1979 judgements, the Court, moreover, held that all anti-dumping decisions should 
comply with basic EC legislation. The European anti-dumping authorities must not deviate from 
basic EC legi~lation by making anti-dumping determinations sui generis, based directly on Article 
--1-.-._~_-.-_ ,-. 
1_::: 
~~3 
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113 EC Treaty, without interfering with the legislative system of the Community and destroying 
the equality before the law of those. to whom the law applies219• 
lt, thus, would seem that there are broad opportunities for securing the observance of European 
anti-dumping law and for restricting «One-way flexibility». Indeed, the Court of Justice, being an 
independent judiciary body, will probably .place a more objective interpretation on anti-dumping 
law than the European anti-dumping authorities do220• The Court of Justice, however, 
· exercises only a marginal judicia! control : its review is largely restricted to manifest errors in 
assessing the facts, violations of procedural anti-dumping law and abuses of the wide margin of 
discretion which the Court grants to the European anti-dumping authorities221 • This reticence 
probably explains the low number of cases in which the Court upholds the claims of the applicant 
(see table 3). 
Table 3 shows that only 22 % of the lawsuits were gained by the applicant. lt also shows that 
most cases were brought by those categories of applicants who are disadvantaged by anti-dumping 
relief and, thus, by a «one-way flexible» interpretation of anti-dumping law. Indeed, actions 
brought by dumping exporters, importers and consumers represent 92 % of all judgements given 
by the Court of Justice. As those categories of applicants may be presumed to have challenged a 
«one-way flexible» interpretation of anti-dumping law, table 3 may offer an indication of the Court 
of Justice not being a waterproof guarantee against cases of «one-way flexibility» which are not 
manifestly illega1222• 
219 C.J.E.C., case 113/77, 29 March 1979, NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, (1185), 1209; C.J.E.C., 
case 11Bn7, 29 March 1979, Import Stan.dard Office (ISO) v Council, E.C.R., 1979, (1277), 1298; C.J.E.C., case 119n7, 29 March 
1979, Nippon Seiko KK a.o. v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1979, (1303), 1331; C.J.E.C., case 12on1, 29 March 1979, Koyo 
Seiko Co. Ltd. a.o. v Council and Commiasion, E.C.R., 1979, (1337), 1357-1358; C.J.E.C., case 121n7, 29 March 1979, Nachi 
Fujikoshi Corporation a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, (1363), 1383. 
220 SCHERMERS, H.G., «The Direct Application of Treaties with Third States: Note Concerning the Polydor and Pabst Cases», Common 
Market Law Review, 1982, (563), 564-565. 
221 FEENSTRA, J., «Annotation on case C-121186, Epikhiriseon Metalleftikon Viomikhanikon Kai Naftiliakon AE and Others v. Council, 
Judgment of 28 November 1989, not yet reported; Case C-122/86, Epikhiriseon Metalleftikon Viomikhanikon Kai Naftiliakon AE and Others v. 
Commission and Council, Judgmcnt of 28 November 1989, not yet reported; Case C-129/86, HeUenic Republic v. Council, Judgment of 28 
November 1989, not yet reported•, Common Marlcet Law Review, 1991, (200), 202; PETERSMANN, E.-U., «Need for Refonning Antidumping 
Rules and Practice1. The Me11y World of Fourth-Best PolicieS>, .Aussenwinschajt, 1990, (179), 193 ; PETERSMANN, E.-U., «GATT Dispute 
Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law•, Common Marlcet Law Review, 1991, (69), 101. 
222 In the same sense: PETERSMANN, E.-U., «GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law•, Common Market Law 
Review, 1991, (69), 107 and 109. 
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Table 3 - Number of judgements of the Courl of Justice on anti-dumping law by category of 
appücant and number of lawsuits gained by the appücant (excluding orders of the 
President of the Courl) (1979-1993) 
1 Category of applicanta 1 Number of judgements• Number of lawsuits gained• 
Dumping exporten 34 7 
Importen 24 (11) 6 (4) 
Consumers 1 0 
Community producen 4 1 
Member State• 1 0 
1 Total Il 64 (11) 1 14 (4) 1 
• The number betwcen brackets refer to actions brought by dumping exporten and their 11sociated importers together. 
Source: European Court Reports. 
Since 15 March 1994 the Court of First Instance became empowered to exercise at first instance 
the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of J ustice by the EC Treaty in actions brought by 
individuals for annulment (Article 173(4)EEC Treaty) or for damages (Article 178 EC Treaty) and 
against the failure of the Council or the Commission to take a decision (Article 175 EC Treaty) 
and relating to cases of dumping223 • The Court of First Instance bas not yet passed any 
judgement on anti-dumping law, so it is not yet clear whether the Court of First Instance will only 
exercise a marginal judicial control, leaving much discretion to the European anti-dumping 
authorities, and whether its judgements will eventually affect the case law of the Court of 
J ustice224• 
3.3.2.3.2. Legal remedies guaranteeing the observance of GATT anti-dumping law 
On two levels, remedies have been provided, guaranteeing the observance of GATT anti-dumping 
law. On the Community level, actions may be brought before the Court of Justice or the Court of 
First Instance225 for reviewing the compatibility of the European anti-dumping law with GATT 
223 Article 168A EC Treaty; Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 24 October 1988 establishing a Court of First Instance of the 
European Communitiea (O.J., 25 November 1988, No L 319/1), as amended by Council Decision 93/350/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 8 June 1993 
(O.J., 16 Junc 1993, No L 144/21) and by Council Decision 94/149/ECSC, EC of 7 March 1994 (O.J" 10 March 1994, No L 66/29). 
224 The fear that the Court of First Instance may alter the case law of the Court of Justice ia probably the reason why the Commission and France 
have tried to oppoae the tramfer of anti-dumping cases to the Court of First Instance (see : PETERSMANN, E.-U" «Need for Refonning 
Antidumping Rulea and Practicea. The Messy World of Fourth-Best Policie&», Aussenwirtschajt, 1990, (179), 194). 
225 Hereinafter, attention will be paid exclusively to the Court of Justice since the Court of First Instance bas not yet examined the compatibility 
of European anti-dumping law with GA TI anti-dumping law. 
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anti-dumping law. On the GA TI level, dispute settlement proceedings between Contracting 
Parties are available, whenever a Contracting Party is being alleged by another Contracting Party 
of having infringed on GA TI law. However, not one of them seems to be able to prevent or to 
remedy all instances of «one-way flexibility» infringing upon GA TI anti-dumping law. 
3.3.2.3.2.1. Community level 
According to the Court of Justice226, international agreements, ·which are binding on the 
Community, are «an integral part of Community law». Therefore, as GATI and the GATI Anti-
dumping Code are binding on the Community, they must be considered to be Community acts. 
However, GA TI and the GA TI Anti-dumping Code may not . always be relied upon in cases 
. brought before the Court of Justice. Indeed, with regard to the legal remedies available on the 
Community level guaranteeing the observance of GA TI anti-dumping law, a distinction must be 
made between, on the one hand, references for preliminary rulings (Article 177 EC Treaty) and, 
on the other hand, actions for annulment (Article 173 EC Article) and objections of inapplicability 
(Article 184 EC Treaty) of Community acts. 
(i) References for preliminary rulings 
In several cases, GATT bas been invoked before the domestic courts of Member States, resulting 
in references for preliminary rulings before the Court of Justice (Article 177 EC Treaty) 
concerning the conformity of Cómmunity acts with GATI. According to the Court of Justice, in 
its 1972 International Fruit case artd its 1973 Schlüter case, the validity, within the scope of 
Article 177 EC Treafy, of measures taken by the Community institutions may be judged with · 
reference to a provision of international law, when that provision binds the Community and is 
· capable of conferring on individuals rights which they can invoke before the courts. The Court 
found GA TI, in view of its «spirit, general scheme and terms», not to have such direct effect. In 
this respect, the Court pointed out that GA TI «is characterized by the great flexibility of its 
provisions, in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation, the measures to be taken 
when confronted with exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts between the 
226 . . . . 
C.J.E.C., case 181173, 30 April 1974, Haegeman. v Belgian. State, E.C.R., 1974, (449), 460; C.J.E.C., case 104/81, 26 October 
1982, Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg, E.C.R., 1982, (3641), 3662. 
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Contracting PartieS»227• In 1983, the Court reaffirmed that GATT and, in particular, Article 
IV (the anti-dumping provision of GATT) do not have direct effect228• 
In the meantime, however, the Court of Justice bas passed two dissenting judgements. Indeed, in 
the Nederlandse Spoorwegen case, the Court of Justice bas stated that «the Community authorities 
have not, in any sense, unilaterally increased a duty bound under GA TI»229 • Similarly, after 
having noted that the allegedly illegal measure was legally justified by the provisions of 
Community law, the Court of Justice, in the Dürbeck case, bas concluded that «{l)ikewise, the 
argument advanced by the plaintiff in the main action that the protective measures in issue are 
contrary to the commitments entered into by the Community under GATI (was) not capable in 
this case of putting the validity of those measures in question»230• · In both cases, which are an 
application of Article 177 EC Treaty, the Court bas in fact reviewed _ the conformity of 
Community law to ·GA TI law without examining whether GATT confers rights on individuals 
within the Community which they can invoke before the courts. Whereas they initially might 
have been considered to be a mitigation of the prior International Fruit case and Schlüter case, 
they, since 1983, are considered as the obvious exceptions to the rule231 . 
227 C.J.E.C.,joined cases 21to24172, 12December1972, lnlernalional Fruit Company NV, Kooy Rotterdam NV, Velleman en_ Tas NV and Jan 
Van den Brink.'s lm- en Expo11handel NV v Produlctschap voor Groenlen en Fruit, E.C.R., 1972, (1219), 1227; C.J.E.C., case 9173, 24 October 
1973, Carl Schlüterv Hauptz.ollamt Lömich, E.C.R., 1973, 1135. 
228 C.J.E.C., joined cases 267 to 269/81, 16 March 1983, Amministrazione delle Fin.anze dello Sta.to v Società Petrolifera ltalian.a 
(SPI) and SpA Micheling ltaliana (SAMI), E.C.R., 1983, (801), 830. 
On the same grounds, direct effect has been denied to : 
229 
- Article II (C.J.E.C., case 9n3, 24 October 1973, Carl" Schlüter v Hauptzollamt Lörrach, E.C.R., 1973, (1135), 1157-1158; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases 267 to 269/81, 16 March 1983, Amministrazione delle Fin.anze dello Sta.to v Società Petrolifera ltalian.a 
(SPI) and SpA Micheling ltalian.a (SA'MI), E.C.R., 1983, (801), 830; C.J.E.C., joined cases 290 and 291/81, 16 March 1983, 
Compagnia Singer SpA and Geigy SpA v Amministrazione delle Fin.anze dello Stato, E.C.R., 1983, (847), 861); 
Article m (C.J.E.C., joined cases 267 to 269/81, 16 March 1983, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Società 
Petrolifera ltaliana (SPI) and SpA Micheling ltaliana (SA'MI), E.C.R., 1983, (801), 830); 
Article V (C.J.E.C., case 266/81, 16 March 1983, Società ltaliana per l'Oleoclotto Transalpino (SJOT) v Ministero delle Finanze, 
Ministero della Marina Mercantile, Circoscrizione cloganale di Trieste and Ente Autonomo del Porto di Trieste, E.C.R., 1983, 
(731), 780) ; 
Article vm (C.J.E.C., joined cases 267 to 269/81, 16 March 1983, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Società 
Petrolifera ltaliana (SPI) and SpA Micheling ltalian.a (SAMI), E.C.R., 1983, (801), 830.); 
Article XI (C.J.E.C., joined cases 21 to 24n2, 12 December 1972, International Fruit Company NV, Kooy Rotterdam NV, 
Velleman en Taa NV and Jan Van den Brink's lm- en Exporthandel NV v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, E.C.R., 1972, 
(1219), 1227-1228) ; and 
the Tariff Protocols (C.J.E.C., joined cases 267 to 269/81, 16 March 1983, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Società 
Petrolifera ltaliana (SPI) and SpA Micheling ltaliana (SAMI), E.C.R., 1983, (801), 830). 
C.J.E.C., case 38175, 19 November 1975, Douaneagent der NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen, 
E.C.R., 1975, (1439), 1450. 
2JO C.J.E.C., case 112/80, 5 May 1981, Finna Anion Dürbeck v Hauptz.ollamt Fran/ifun am Main-Flughafen, E.C.R., 1981, (1095), 1120. 
2Jl See: BEBR, G., «Gemeinschaftsabkommen und ihre mögliche unmittelbare w;rksamkeit>, Europarecht, 1983, 128-160; MARCH 
HUNNINGS, N., cEnforceability of the EEC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements•, European Law Review, 1977, (163), 176-177; PETERSMANN, E.-
U ., «Application of GATI by the Court of Justice of the European Communitie11», Common Marlcet Law Review, 1983, 397-437. 
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As a result, individuals cannot rely on GATT in actions before the domestic courts in order to 
limit too extreme and illegal «one-way flexibility» in the European anti-dumping authorities' case 
law. This is all the more regrettable since the Court of Justice has denieq direct effect to GATT 
for the wrong reasons. On several occasions, the Court of Justice has found international 
agreements other than GATT to have direct effect because of the high degree of specificity of 
their provisions232• However, the provisions of those international agreements are 
characterized by at least the same high flexibility as the GA IT provisions233• The only valid 
reason to deny direct effect to GA IT is that the majority of the Member States has not 
promulgated GA IT in accordance with their domestic constitutional laws234• 
Only in the 1990 Cartorobica case, the problem of the conformity of Community acts with the 
GATT Anti-dumping Code has been referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
Here, the Court held that it was not necessary to consider whether the provisions of the GATT 
Anti-dumping Code, to which the. domestic court had referred, were capable to giving rise to the 
right for individuals to rely on them in legal pro~eedings, since those provisions were not relevant 
to the question referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling235• Tuis judgement probably 
explains why the Nederlandse Spoorwegen case and the Dürbeck case should be considered as not 
reversing the Court's case law on GATT : if European law is not at variance with GATT, it is not 
necessary to examine whether or not GATT has direct effect. Por the same reason, the 1993 
Findling Wtilzlager case, in which the Court held that the GATT Anti-dumping Code and 
232 MASTELLONE, C., ccAnnotation on Case 266/81, S.1.0.T. (Società ltalian.a per l'Oleodotto Tran.salpino) s.p.a. v Ministero delle 
Fin.an.ze, Ministero della Marina Mercan.tile, Circoscrizioiie dogan.ale di Trieste, Ente autonome del porto di Trieste, and Joined Cases 
267-269/81, Amministrazione delle Fin.an.ze dello State v S.P.1. (Società Petrolifera ltalian.a) a.p.a. (267/81) and Amministrazione delle 
Fin.an.ze dello Stato v S.A.M.1. (S.p.a. Michelin ltaliana) (268-269/8l)n, Common Market Law Review, 1983, (568), 576-578. 
233 See e.g. : CAEmOS, A., «L'effet direct des accords internationaux conclus par la CEEn, Revue du Marché Commun, · 1984, 
(526), 531-533; GROUX, J., .L'"invocabilité en justice" des accords internationaux des Communautés européennes à propos de 
plusieurs arrêts récents de la C.J.C.E.», Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen., 1983, (203), 217-223 ; HILF, M., ccThe Application 
of GA'IT within the Member States of the European Community, with Special Reference to the Federal Republic of Germany», in 
The European. Community and GATT, HJLF, M., JACOBS, F.G., and PETERSMANN, E.-U. (eds.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1986, (153), 
179; MASTELLONE, C., ccAnnotation on Case 266/81, S.1.0.T. (Società ltalian.a per l'Oleodotto Tran.salpino) s.p.a. v Ministero delle 
Finanze, Ministero della Marina Mercan.tile, Circoscrizione dogan.ale di Trieste, Ente autonome del porto di Trieste, and Joined Cases 
267-269/81, Ammini.tra.z:ione delle Fin.an.ze dello State v S.P.I. (Società Petrolifera ltaliana) a.p.a. (267/81) and Amministrazione delle 
Fin.an.ze dello Stato v S.A.M.I. (S.p.a. Michelin ltalian.a) (268-269/Sl)n, Common Market Law Review, 1983, (568), 576-578; 
McGOVERN, E" .Dispute Settlement in the GA'IT- Adjudication or Negotiation ?», in The European Community and GATT, 
HILF, M" JACOBS, F.G" and PETERSMANN, E.-U. (eds.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1986, (73), 81 ; PETERSMANN, E.-U., ccThe EEC as 
a GA'IT Member - Legal Conflicts between GATr Law and European Community Law», in The European Community and GATT, 
HILF, M" JACOBS, F.G" and PETERSMANN, E.-U. (eds.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1986, (23), 58 ; TAGARAS, H.N., ccL'effet direct des 
accords internationaux de la Communauté11~ C.D.E" 1984, (15), 32-49; MARCH HUNNINGS, N., ccEnforceability of the EEC-EFTA 
Free Trade Agreement&», European. Law Review, 1977, (163), 180-181. See, however: MARESCEAU, M" ccThe GA'IT in the Case-
Law of the European Court of Justice", in The European. Community and GATT, HILF, M., JACOBS, F.G., and PETERSMANN, 
E.-U. (eds.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1986, (107), 122. 
234 HILF, M., ecThe Application of GA'IT within the Member States of the European Community, with Special Reference to the 
Federal Republic of Germany11, in The European Community and GATT, HILF, M., JACOBS, F.G., and PETERSMANN, E.-U. 
(eds.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1986, (153), 175-176. 
235 C.J.E.C, case C-189/88, 27 March 1990, Cartorobica SpA v Ministero delle Finanze dello SlalO, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (1269), 1297. 
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European anti-dumping law imposed the same principle as to the amount of anti-dumping 
duties236, should probably not be considered as a change in the Court's case law237• 
The Court's judgement in the Canorobica case, though, does not answer the question whether the 
GATI Anti-dumping Code has direct effect. If the Court's case law established in respect of 
GA TI is applied to the GA TI Anti-dumping Code, the Court probably will deny the GA TI Anti-
dumping Code to have direct effect238 • For, according to the Court of Justice, the GATI 
Anti-dumping Code is characterized by the same «great flexibility» as the provisions of the GA TI. 
Indeed, the dispute settlement proceedings under the GA TI Anti-dumping Code closely resemble 
th~se of GATI (see: Article 17 GATT Anti-dumping Code)239• 
However, if the case law of the Court of Justice established in respect of other international 
agreements is applied to the GA TI Anti-dumping Code, the Code should have direct effect. 
First, in comparison ·with Article VI GA TI, the provisions of the GA TI Anti-dumping Code are 
more specific240• Second, many provisions of the GA TI Anti-dumping Code are not less 
specific than the provisions of European anti-dumping law (e.g., the provisions conceming the 
injury requirement), the latter being applied by the Court of J ustice as legal standard for 
individual anti-dumping determinations241 • Third, unlike GATT, the GATT Anti-dumping 
Code has been formally concluded by the Community and duly promulgated242. 
236 C.J.E.C., case C-136/91, 1 April 1993, Findüng Wlllzlager Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Karlsruhe, consideration 13 (not yet 
reported). 
237 Contra : C.J.E.C., case C-136/91, 1 April 1993, Findüng Wlllzlager Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Karlsruhe, recital 11 (Opinion 
of Advocate Gencral VAN GER.VEN) (not yet reported). 
238 See also: CARREAU, D., ccLes négotiations commerciales multilatérales au sein du GATI': Le "Tokyo Round" (1973-1979).., 
Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1980, (145), 154. 
239 The only essential difference is the role the GATI' Committee on Anti-dumping Practices plays within the scope of the dispute 
settlement proceedings under the GATI' Anti-dumping Code (FLORY, T., ccLe code anti-dumping du G.A.T.T.n, Droit et pratique du 
commerce international, 1991, (6), 14). 
240 VER.MULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the Un.ited State• and the European. Communties. A Comparatiue 
Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 9-10. 
241 Supra, 85-86. 
242 HILF, M., «The application of GATI' within the Member States of the European Community, with Special Reference to the 
Federal Republic of Germanyn, in The European. Community and GATT, HJLF, M., JACOBS, F.G., and PETERSMANN, E.-U. 
(eds.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1986, (153), 179. 
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(ii) Actions for annulment and objedions of inapplicability 
When the Court of Justice, in the 1989 Fediol II/ case, in which an action for annulment of a 
Community act (Article 173(4) EC Treaty) was brought, reaffirmed that GATT does not have 
direct effect, it seemed that the Court would apply the same case law as the one it had elaborated 
in its judgements on references for preliminary rulings. In the 1989 Fediol /Il case, though, the 
Court of Justice did investigate whether the Commission had not violated GATT. As the 
Commission decision, which was being challenged, was based on Community legislation which 
made its application dependent on the observance of GATT by the Community institutions, it 
seemed that the Court of Justice was of the opinion that GATT does confer rights on to 
individuals, when Community law entitles them to rely on GATT, whereby a simple reference to 
GATT may be sufficient243 • 
As a consequence, when the Court, in the 1990 Electroimpex case, found that the Community 
definition of the notion of dumping corresponded to GATT and to the GATT Anti-dumping 
Code244, this judgement seemed to apply the same line of thinking as the 1990 Cartoribica 
case : as long as Community law does not infringe upon GATT or upon the GATT Anti-dumping 
Code, the question of their not having direct effect may be disregarded, since the outcome will 
always be the same. 
The tuming point was the 1991 Nakajima case, which concemed an objection of inapplicability of 
the basic EC anti-dumping legislation, because of it being incompatible with the GATT Anti-
dumping Code (Article 184 EC Treaty). The Court held it necessary to examine whether the 
basic EC legislation went beyond the legal framework laid down under the GATT Anti-dumping 
Code245• As the Court pointed out that the applicant did not rely on the direct effect of the 
Code246, it thus probably agreed with the applicant, who argued that individuals do not have a 
243 C.J.E.C., case 70/87, 22 June 1989, Fédération de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission, E.C.R., 1989, 1781. 
Advocate-Genera! W. VAN GERVEN in bis opinion regarding this case makes an interesting and clarifying comparison between 
such a reference to GA1T and the legal concept of renvoi in private international law. By such a reference, the provisions of the 
GA1T are made applicable and, as a consequence, are granted direct effect, in the sense that they may be invoked by individuals 
in any event as an interpretative criterion hut also as a criterion for assessing the validity of inferior norms and measures 
(C.J.E.C., case 70/87, 22 June 1989, Fédération de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission, E.C.R.,.1989, (1781), 
. 1806-1808 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN) See also : CASTILLO DE LA TORRE, F., ccThe Status of GA1T in EEC 
Law. Some New Developments", .Tournal of World Trade, 1992/5, (35), 40. 
244 CJ.E.C., case C-157/87, 11July1990, Electroimpex a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (3021), 3022. 
245 C.J.E.C., caae C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2178. See also : C.J.E.C., case 
C-104/90, 13 October 1993, MalSushita Electric lndustria! Co. Lid v Council, recital 19 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) (not yet 
reported); C.J.E.C., caae C-216/91, 7 December 1993, Rim~1 Electrometalurgia SA v Council, recital 37 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ (not 
yet reported). 
246 C.J.E.C., caae C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima .AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2178. 
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subjective right to invoke the provisions of GATI and the GATT Anti-dumping Code before 
domestic courts, hut that they do have the possibility, in actions for annulment or by means of an 
objection of inapplicability, to request the Court of Justice to examine whether a Community act is 
lawful in the light of those provisions247• . Thus, the Court seems to make a distinction between 
that subjective right of individuals and the objective duty of the Community institutions to observe 
their international obligations248• 
As the grounds for review of legality, such as an infringement on the EC Treaty or on any rule of 
law relating to its application, are identical for actions for annulment (Article 173 EC Treaty) and 
objections of inapplicability, it should not come as a surprise that, since then, the Court of Justice_ 
bas, on several occasions, reviewed the compatibility of the basic EC legislation with the GATT 
Anti-dumping Code with regard to actions for annulment (Article 173 EC Treaty). However, in 
none of those cases, the Court bas found any breach of GATI or of the GATI Anti-dumping 
Code249• This is not surprising since GATT and the GATT Anti-dumping Code are at least as 
inprecise and vague as the basic EC anti-dumping legislation. Indeed, frequently, basic EC 
legislation is almost completely identical to the GA TI Anti-dumping Code250• 
It was only in the 1994 Banana case that the Court of Justice summarized its case law 
coherently : it held that, as GA TI does not have direct effect, the Court cannot take in to 
consideration provisions of GATI to assess the lawfulness of a Community act in an action for 
annulment251 , unless the Community intended to implement a particular obligation entered into 
within the framework of GATI, or unless the Community act expressly refers to specific 
provisions of GATT252• Hence, the fact that the basic EC legislation, according to its 
preambles, is intended to transpose GA TI anti-dumping law in to European law and many of its 
provisions are an exact copy of the GATI Anti-dumping Code, explains why the Court of Justice 
247 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2086 (Report for the Hearing: 
conclusions of the applicant). 
248 Contra: C.J.E.C., case C-136/91, 1 April 1993, Findüng Wiilzlager Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Karlsruhe, recital 11 (Opinion 
of Advocate General VAN GER.VEN) (not yet reported). 
249 C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 723-726; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 
March 1992, Ma1sushita Electric lndustrial Co. Lid and Maisushita Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1477-1478; 
CJ.E.C., case C-188/88, 10 March 1992, NMB (Deuischland) GmbH a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1689), 1735 and 1739-1741. See 
also: C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lid v Council, E;C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1630; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 
March 1992, Sharp Corporatlon v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1635), 1675. 
25o C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2128 (Opinion of Advocate 
General LENZ). 
251 The samc prevaila for objections of illegality, since the grounds for. review of legality are the same as those in respect of actions for 
annulment. 
252 C.J.E.C., case C-280/93, 5 October 1994, Federal Repubüc of Gennany v Council, E.C.R., 1994, 1, (5039), 5071-5074. 
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bas assessed the lawfulness of European anti-dumping law from the point of view of GA TI anti-
dumping law. 
3.3.2.3.2.2. GAT/' level 
If the Community infringes upon Article VI GATT, the other Contracting Parties may have 
recourse to the consultation, conciliation and dispute settlement procedures provided under 
Articles XXII and XXIII GATT. The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations encompasses a new Understanding on Rules and Procedures on 
Dispute Settlement (hereinafter : the U nderstanding). This U nderstanding elaborates the 
consultation, conciliation and dispute settlement procedures as provided under Articles XXII and 
XXIII GATT, and imposes deadlines throughout the process, provides appelate review and 
establishes rules to govern adoption and implementation of GATT rulings. For example, the so-
called Dispute Settlement Body which the Understanding bas created, will settle all disputes on 
GATT law on the basis of reports drafted by independent panels composed of specialists in the 
matter under dispute. As the Dispute Setllement Body may only by consensus refuse to adopt 
those reports, the Understanding will enhance the settlement of disputes in a way in which 
political considerations, in principle, should not play a (dominant) role. 
The Understanding provides, moreover, an integrated dispute settlement system which also applies 
to, inter alia, disputes under the GATT Anti-dumping Code, but for the specific provisions 
explicitly provided under this Code (see : Article 17 GATT Anti-dumping Code). In this respect, 
the Dispute Settlement Body win, inter alia, decide whether the specific dispute settlement rules 
of the GATT Anti-dumping Code apply, if the parties to the dispute do not agree. 
Before the Uruguay Round, no such integrated dispute setllement system existed. In principle, 
infringements upon Article VI GATT had to be settled under the consultation, conciliation and 
dispute settlement procedures under Articles XXII and XXIII GA TT253 • For violations of the 
GATT Anti-dumping Code, specific consultation, conciliation and dispute settlement procedures 
were provided for (Article 15 1980 GATT Anti-dumping Code). Those procedures were largely 
modelled on those of the Articles XXII and XXIII GA TT254• The Parties to the Code had to 
c~mplete the dispute settlement procedures under the Code before invoking any rights which they 
have under GATT (Note No 1 ad Article 15 GATT Anti-dumping Code). However, as there 
seemed to be a broad agreement within the GATT Committee on Anti-dumping Practices that 
253 The practicea which have arisen from the application of the Articlea XXII and XXm GATI have been incorporated into the «Underatanding 
rcgarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance> of 28 November 1979. 
254 McGOVERN, E., J)ispute Settlement in the GATl'-Adjudication or Negotiation ?»,in The European, Community and GATT, 
HILF, M., JACOBS, F.G., and PETERSMANN, E.-U. (eds.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1986, (73), 77 ; PETERSMANN, E.-U., "GA'IT 
Diepute Settlement Proceedinge in the Field of Antidumping Law11, Common Mar'/r.et Law Reuiew, 1991, (69), 84. 
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there was no legally binding obligation to complete the dispute settlement procedures under the 
Code before invoking rights under GA TT255 , disputes about the GATT Anti-dumping Code 
have been settled under Articles XXII and XXIII GATT instead of under Article 15 GATT Anti-
dumping Code. 
As to disputes regarding anti-dumping law under the former regime, the dispute settlement 
proceeding under GATT bas only been applied in three cases, whereas the dispute settlement 
proceeding under the GATT Anti-dumping Code bas been applied seven times256• This low 
number may be explained by the fact that those proceedings are only open to States Parties to 
GATT, respectively to the GATT Anti-dumping Code. States will only criticize infringements on 
GATT anti-dumping law, which they consider contrary to their own government interests, hut 
they will not always consider their government interests to coincide with the interests of their 
exporters257• Moreover, the interests of importers, domestic consumers and processing 
industries located in the importing State which commits the infringement of GATT anti-dumping 
law, will find no protection under the GATT dispute settlement proceedings258 . Their only 
protection against such illegal anti-dumping acts is to be found in their domestic law. 
Problems in connection with anti-dumping law are usually discussed within the GATT Committee 
on Anti-dumping Practices (Article 16 GATT Anti-dumping Code), apart from the dispute 
settlement proceeding of the GATT Anti-dumping Code. States may hold that, if they do not 
apply the GATT dispute settlement proceedings, they will avoid exposure to attacks of other States 
and condemnations. Discussions in the GATT Committee on Anti-dumping Practices appear to be 
amore friendly method to settle their disputes as it requires a consensus. 
Both the dispute settlement procedures and the discussions in the GATT Committee on Anti-
dumping Practices are usually hut an indication for future amendments of GATT anti-dumping 
law. As, during the Uruguay Round negotiations, there was a marked increase in dispute 
settlement procedures on anti-dumping law (namely one under Article XXIII GATT and all seven 
under the GATT Anti-dumping Code), it even seems that recently disputes were filed to increase 
255 PETERSMANN, E.-U., ccGATI Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Lawn, Common Mark.et Law 
Review, 1991, (69), 86-87. 
256 STEWART, T.P. (ed.), The GATT Uruguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1993, vol. Il, 1642-1644. 
257 BRONCKERS, M.C.E.J., ccNon-Judicial and Judicia! Remedies in International Trade Disputes : Some Reflections at the Close 
of the Uruguay Roundat, Journal of World Trade, 199016, (121), 121; PETERSMANN, E.-U., ccGATI Dispute Settlement 
Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law», Common Market Law Review, 1991, (69), 101-102. 
2.SS BRONCKERS, M.C.E.J., ccNon-Judicial and Judicia! Remedies in International Trade Disputes : Some Reflections at the Close 
of the Uruguay Round», Journal. of World Trade, 199016, (121), 122; PETERSMANN, E.-U., ccGATI Dispute Settlement 
Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law», Common Mark.et Law Review, 1991, (69), 94-95. 
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leverage in the negotiations. Concerns existed also that decisions made under the dispute 
settlement procedure were blocked or not implemented to increase leverage in the 
negotiations259• Indeed, if, under the dispute settlement procedures, a Party was found to 
infringe ripon GA TI anti-dumping law, or if, within the GA TI Committee on Anti-dumping 
Practices, the majority of the Parties were convinced that a Party had been breaching GATT anti-
dumping law, several aspects of GATI anti-dumping law have been amended, on the occasion of 
the following GA TI rounds, in order to legalize those illegal practices. At least, serious attempts 
are normally being made to obtain such amendments260• 
In 1954, for example,· ltaly, under Article XXIII GATI, lodged a complaint against Sweden which levied anti-
dumping duties whenever the export price was lower than the relevant minimum price fixed by the Swedish 
Government. Under the GA TI dispute settlement procedure, the Swedish basic price system was found not to be 
inconsistent with GATI anti-dumping law. lt was held that, in practice, the administration of that system might easily 
run into conflict with GATI anti-dumping law, unless the basic prices were constantly kept under review to make sure 
that they did not exceed the actually prevailing domestic market prices in the exporting country261 • ,, On the first 
occasion which arose to amend GATI anti-dumping law, i.e., the Kennedy Round, the 1968 GATT Anti-dumping 
Code was concluded, Article 8( d) of which encompassed specific provisions on basic price systems which were 
identical to the finding on the Swedish basic price system. Those provisions were deleted, though, from the 1994 
GATI Anti-dumping Code. 
Another good example in this respect pertains to the lack of implementation of the injury requirement contained in the 
1968 GATI Anti-dumping Code by the United States of America. Under United States anti-dumping law injury 
which is not immaterial was being considered as material. Several Parties to the 1968 Anti-dumping Code were of the 
opinion that the United States thereby did not comply with the injury requirement of the 1968 Anti-dumping Code. 
The 1968 Anti-dumping Code imposed a strict injury requirement: the dumped imports had demonstrably to be the 
principal cause of the injury suffered by the domestic industry of the importing country ; therefore, the effect of the 
dumping had to be weighted against the other factors which could adversely affect the domestic industry (Article 3(a) 
1968 GATI Anti-dumping Code). In the published reports of the GATI Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, 
traces may be found since 1972 of the discussion about the implementation of the injury requirement by the United 
States of America262• Tuis discussion resulted in the review of the injury requirement. For, in the 1980 GATT 
Anti-dumping Code, the injury requirement was watered down: it must be demonstrated that the dumping causes 
material injury, whereas the injurious effects of other factors must not be attributed to the dumping (Article 3(4) 1980 
GA TI Anti-dumping Code). 
In 1990, on a complaint lodged by Japan against the Community, the European anti-circumvention measures, allowing 
to impose anti-dumping duties on products assembled in the Community, using parts imported from the dumping 
259 STEWART, T.P. (ed.), 7he GA1T Uroguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1993, vol. Il, 1679. Sec also: PETERSMANN, E.-U., 4<Need for Refonning Antidumping Rulcs and Practices. The Messy World of Fourth-Best 
Policie11», Aussenwirrschajt, 1990, (179), 181-182. 
260 Contra: PETERSMANN, E.~u., 4<GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law», Common Market Law Review, 
1991, (69), 112, who points out that 4<the GATT dispute settlement proceedings have been of decisive importance for the progressive development 
of the GATT legal aystem on a step-by-step basis by incorporating agreed dispute settlement rulings and well-tried GATT practices into GATT 
law». 
261 B.J.S.D., Third Supplement, Geneva, GATT, 1955, 86, recital 17. 
262 See: B.J.S.D., Eightcenth Supplement, Geneva, GATI, 1972, 47, recital 7; B.J.S.D., Nineteenth Supplement, Geneva, GATT, 1973, 16-17, 
recitals 9-10; B.l.S.D" Twentieth Supplement, Geneva, GATT, 1974, 44, recital 7; B.J.S.D" Twenty-fi~t Supplement, Geneva, GATT, 1915, 
31-32, recital 8 ; B.J.S.D., Twenty-second Supplement, Geneva, GATT, 1976, 24-25, recital 12. 
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country, were found to infringe upon GATI law263 • During the next GATI round, i.e., the Uruguay Round, the 
Community, along with the United States of America, Australia and Canada, made serious efforts to insert its anti-
circumvention measures into the new GATI Anti-dumping Code264• indeed, the United States of America· had 
only accepted the conclusion that the European anti-circumvention measures were illegal on the proviso that the 
Uruguay Round negotiations on anti-dumping law would address the circumvention issue265 . Nonetheless, the 1994 
GATI Anti-dumping Code does not contain any anti-circumvention measures, hut the Community bas not yet given 
in. lndeed, it bas obtained that the desirability of the applicability of uniform rules in this area is recognized and that 
the matter is referred to the GAIT Committee for Anti-dumping Practices for resolution (Part III of the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations). 
In those examples, chosen because of their having been one of the mam topics during the 
negotiations of each of the three successive GA TI Anti-dumping Codes, GA TI anti-dumping law 
bas been or probably will be amended in a «One-way flexiblt> way, since those amendments relax 
the conditions for granting anti-dumping relief. 
Notwithstanding thei_r many welcome innovations mentioned above, the new U nderstanding on 
Rules and Procedures on Dispute Settlement nor the new GA TI Anti-dumping Code can remedy 
such an improper use of the dispute settlement procedures and the GATI Committee on Anti-
dumping Practices resulting in «one-way flexible>> amendments of GATI anti-dumping law. In 
fact, there exists no such remedy. It seems, though, that the specific provisions of the new GATI 
Anti-dumping Code provide broader standards of review of GATI violations. Under this Code, it 
must be examined whether the establisment of the facts was proper and whether the assessment 
was unbiased and objective ; such an· unbiased and objective evaluation must not be overtumed, 
even if a different conclusion might be reached. It must, moreover, be examined whether the 
interpretation placed by the Contracting Party on the GA TI Anti-dumping Code, is permissible, it 
being admitted that more than one permissible interpretation is possible (Article 17. 6.). 
Especially, · the standard of «permissible interpretations» may result in a broad interpretation of 
GA TI anti-dumping law266, probably allowing «one-way flexible>> interpretations bordening on 
illegality. 
263 GAT!' Doe. No. IJ6657, 22 March 1990. 
264 STEWART, T.P. (ed.), The GA1T Uroguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1993, vol. Il, 1617-1640. 
265 PETERSMANN, E.-U., «GATT Dispute Settlement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Lawi., Common Market Law Review, 1991, 
(69), 109; STEWART, T.P. (ed.), 1he GA1T Uroguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986-1992), Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1993, vol. Il, 1620. 
266 WAER, P., and VF.RMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?», Joumal of 
World Trade, 199412, (5), 9. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Economie theory submits free trade as the best device to maximize the welfare of the world as a 
whole. It also shows that free trade generally maximizes the welfare of each country individually, 
except in a number of specific cases of imperfect competition and market imperfections. GATT 
seems to translate economie theory in law : it has created a mechanism aimed at reducing 
protectionism and, thus, at freeing ever increasingly trade. 
It seems that the Contracting Parties to GATT had a complete knowledge of economie theory 
prevailing in 194 7. Economie theory had not onl y demonstrated that, in principle, free trade is 
the best system. Imperfect competition had also just been studied and was SQQ_!\'.'~---~~ssibly 
result i!!_J?ILCC~,_disctlmination. Wh~ sucg __ _p~tjç~ __ c!i~çtj.ft1ination occurred b~tw~o __ nationaLmarkets, 
~-- - - ------~-
it was called-«dumping». Those new developments in economie theory were very welcome to 
--------
govemments which feit it hard to resist the demand of their import-competing industries to shelter {/-
~;mra:o:a:~:~:::::: to ~:;;!iiü:t~t~:~:::::Pfu~~tc~i;~h:r:~ffi=:tf1::::t 
~mJ;etitors--collld--g~~-high p~~fits on their home markets, was very persuasive. However, it did 
not correspond to the conclusions of economie theory. Indeed, from the very start, economie f 
theory had only objected against predatory price discrimination and had pointed out that it was ' 
very difficult to distingyi&b __ p.redationJmm-~comJletitive"-price-di~cri_in!!l~-~ion. 
~---------"~------------~·-·--- -
However, such nuances were not heard - or, perhaps, even consciously ignored - by the 
govemments when signing GA 'IT. They agreed to incorporate the pos_sibility to sanction __ dum.piQg 
~--------- ------·- . 
in QA'IT and, from the __ ~~' pJ~ced a broa~--~n~~!]>_r~_~t!f>!l:_~!l. th~~_nqtioJ!_~gJ_l~mping». Indeed, 
----------------------------- -- --""~------ =--=-c--=---'-----'-~----- ------- --- - ' - ·. --
dumping would include· not only all ins~s_ofjrice discrimination, but also all instances of 
sales at a lo~~ Later on, GA 'IT allowed special provisions in respect of NME countries and the 
Community made use of this possibility to provide dumping with a third meaning, namely by 
defining NME dumping as sales at prices below the prices or production costs of other countries 
having a ME system. 
At first sight, recent economie theory has given in to those legislative developments, as it bas 
started by defining dumping not only as price discrimination, but also as sales at_ a loss. 
However, economie theory has not withdrawn its general conclusion that only predatory ·dump!!!& 
·-:~~- - ---- -- -- __ , __ 
should _ ~~-~ctioned-and-that-sales __ at_ a los_s ar~ notn~(!ssaril y_ preci.atory. 
-~11:~~~~-~~ry,, moreover, got further refined. In respect of"pri~e-~~!crimination, it bas pointed 
out that i! __ !~ !!__~~ n~~~ for the_ p_ric~ _ discriminating producé~ -to __ be a mon~~polist on his home 
"1:'1~~~Lan~J~!tJL!sc_!l_~!-~~~~~- eitber __ for bis home market Jo be_prot~t~~=a~~n~t-_forei~n -· 
c~mpetition. Instead, the ~ifference in distance between producers and customers in the various ·, 
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countries may result in (spatial) price discrimination or (second-degree) price discrimination may 
. be"--ca~~- -bf~i~f~!enceS jB__j~e ·_P~!!!erences of the cÜSiomers--)QCaie<l- In the various- countfies: 
"---?Vforeover, --for price discrimination to occur, it is not necessary that -the export market be less 
competitive, as the producers established in the most competitive market may practise (spatial) 
price discrimination when exporting to a less competitive market. Economie theory has also 
shown that the quite persuasive argument of eross-subsidization between the priee diseriminating 
pfoëfücer's~·--höffié--~aDO~-export~markeT-wiff .. only:-sef4om= h()~d. lndeed, as econ~~i~ -th~ry bas 
,_____.,.___-·~·~· --~-"------·--·---~-----=-·--- •'-" ~--- --'-•••- -~L • -,~ - - ->>\-'- -
shown, predatory price discrimination will only be successful, if the predator can commit to a 
~ . -· - ~-~------~--~"--~--------~~-~~~~--~--·--~-----'"-------~---------~---~-
certain price path over an extended period of time, but such a commitment is difficult to sustain. 
--""'--=- _, ____ __,__~---'-'-·-~~--==---o~r-'-"'-=-i""-···--L- ---~. _-_"_",..__. - -- --""'- ~::- -'•' ~•'' --- -- - ~-' __ ,_ -- ___..,... -- ~··- · -·~- . __ • ....,._ ._.,.,,_,,,_== "'"~-....__~ _ ,_~,--..--~-- ---=-,;---= -~-,-
In respect of ~eL~~L~~~,. the initia! and sole wisdom was that only sales whieh do not cover 
variable costs:-=-áre--n~._ih~ result of short-run profit maximization. ~~~omic th~ry now_ ~ints 
out that, in the face of uncertainty, adjustment costs or economies of seale, sales at priees below 
---------------~------ ------- ---·• ·---··---~----·•-'--' ---·-- . ·-o•"'"'-•-•------n,,, ____ ,_,,_~--·- -- _, __ -~-~------·--~ ,,_- -,- ,,_ - •-~- ,_ ' , -
variable costs too are not necessarily_pr~~tory. 
·"---"'"'....___,_-__ -~- __ .,, _,.. __ ;..:t~-~o~----'- --
In respect of NME trade, economie theory shows that price discrimination between the NME 
exporting country and a ME importing country, as well as sales at a loss are not applicable. 
NME domestie prices and production costs are not comparable with NME export prices as they 
are determined by different economie systems. NME domestic prices and production costs are 
entirely determined within the NME system, i.e., by the plan which, contrary to a ME system, is 
not aimed at profit maximization, but at other ideological, social and economie goals. NME 
export prices, on the other hand, are right in between ME and NME systems and are the result of 
foreign eurrency maximization. They too, thus, differ from ME prices and production costs, 
whieh are the result of profit maximization. Therefore, unlike under European anti-dumping law, 
NME export prices should not be eompared with ME prices and production costs : they are just 
not comparable. Instead, from an economie point of view, NME export prices are eomparable 
and, therefore, in respect of NME exports, th.e QQtion __ oLdumping_~s.l10:1JkLb~.cQnfinedJQj~ 
of NME. pri~ __ disçri_mination between.various--ME--countries. 
Economie th~!Y. also shows that predation may occur without any price discrimination or sales at 
•=-.;,.:::_ __ ...,,::;:-..._-,:_•~-~--~~---- -- ----·-- --'C"---·•• - •. --·------,·-=~------~-- ,---'L"-" ---~"=-"""~------,--·-·-• f .-,--~.::_ ___ ._,. __ -.--.-.-.--0,-c-.'-"Oi--;>-· "---\- -. '•' ---·--4 
a loss. ~'?!lsequently, ~A1T and Eur9p~ @t!::-dumpinglaw __ providetoo~broad_and,.at the ~!!l~--~~ 
·-time, too narrow a definition ofdumping. There is, however, a =PI<?blem as no bright-line rules 
,....'---""._ -· ·~-~-: -- - --,-,----------· - .. ,_ -- - , ____ - --- -
are available whieh make it possible to distinguish predatory dumping. Çontrary to what 
• .--- ,
0
-. "' - • ,-- , -- - -- -~----- • -, --· - ·, ·- ----- ---,--- -.·--·,o-·-· -;---·,-7 IL __ ,__, _ .::_,----= ,_ _ __ _ • --:--.•/ 
economie tl!_~ry initially presumed, there màycbejnstances~of~predation. Indeed, recent economi~ 
....__~__,-_ ___.:-.:...~-~--- _-- --·-- - - ·-
. theory, especially game theory_, sh.ows Jhat, in the face" ()f "ITl~~~timperfections and. imper{~t 
information, predatory pricing may be ratiQllal, but that it is extremely diffieu~t to di~!!!lg!Jish)t 
from competitive pricing~ _ ffherefore, a rule-{)~~~t;~Ll~s _s~_gg~:_"_aÏLevldence__~ailable 
, should be ~~tLiPto __ accoun.t."-in-onier--te~~~s-~-;-;:_whether~·~an~expalteF--nas=-~engaged""-in_~pr__eda.ti.mla.,_ 
---~,;------------"~-·-·--:--'--•-~ 
Predatory prieing should not be eonfined to price discrimination and sales at a loss. On the other 
-r 
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hand, __ price discri~!l!l~on and ~~~~~_loss, ~s well as all the bright-line ~les which have been 
--··-·'-------------·-~- --~------ -- -- -~---- ---- - - --,.,_ 
suggested, m~y be indicative of predatory pricing, without being decisive. 
Of course, the rule-of-reason test is not as ea~y t.o ._~PP~Y. as a bright-line rule, such as, for 
instance, GA TI and European anti-dumping law, onder which price · discrimination and sales at a 
loss are actionable. Moreover, it grants a country's government á broad rooJl1_fQI". c:Iiscretion : the 
.i...:::....:.:__..:_--'-----2.---::'...:: •• ..::_:-__ °""_-_.,-- --- --- ·' _-,-_:: _ _ -_::·_ - ...... ,.~-:_····--·-~ ·-- _, - - - .• 
government will have to decide on a cas~~~X:~"~ b~~is which factors are taken into account and 
which of those factors are decisive. In comparison with bright-lin~ .rules, · a~~~~~f:~~~9n..Jest 
offers less legal certainty and, when applied to trade matters, more room for «()ne_-~'!Y fl.~!iQfüty~. 
---~-__,_.-~~"-·-"· ., -- - .. ··---- ...... ·-·--· - -
Indeed, onder the rule-of-reason test, each case must be assessed on its own merits and all factors 
and indications must be taken into account. Obviously, as each instance of alleged predation will 
be different, each investigation into alleged predation will be specific and complex and it will be 
. difficult to draw general conclusions and to know in advance how the authorities will apply such a 
test to a particular case. Moreover, though free trade may usually be assumed to maximize a ·\ 
country's welfare, that country's government may not consider free trade to be in its own '. 
::::g i=~=;s,~::;:m::t~:::::h~~tr~!~~~~d r:;~r~~j:~0:r =~~=:~~t7s~81' 
----=-'-----'-~"'-..,;.._~, ----------- ~'- ----------· -·_;., -_ _,, __ , __ ~-------~- ..... .._,_._~----·----=---- ---- :;: ' ,,, -- -; : \.: -_-:-,,-·-----·-------------~----,-- --- __ _,,__,-- ,--~~__:._-~::J 
con_~uence,_ m~-ft~~ibillty of_the_rule-of-reason test, leaving a wid_~ margjn_ofdJscretion to the 
-g~vernment, may well result in proteptionism. Moreover, the ~ore complex the rule is -~hlch 
regulates the conditions for providing protection against import competition, the easier it is for the 
government to conceal a protectionist application of it. Through such a protectionist-biased, «one-
way flexible» interpretation, predation may even be found, though the pricing was not predatory at 
all. 
This is no overstatement. Indeed~ GA IT and European anti-dumping law apparently contain · ~ 
bright-line rules as it is fairly easy to distinguish price discrimination and sales at a loss : there 
will be price discrimination if different prices are charged and sales will be made at a loss if 
prices are below production costs. Nevertheless, ·as will be shown in the next Chapter, GATI 
and European anti-dumping law offer little legal certainty and ~}~W~}nl!~~--«?ne-\\'~Y flexib!lity». 
This is especially so, as there are no judicia! remedies available providing a waterproof guarantee 
against all instances of «one-way flexibility» violating GA IT or European anti-dumping law. 
~us, apparently bright-line anti-dumping laws have not prevented the European anti-dumping 
authorities from pursuing a protectionist policy. Or, perhaps, GA IT and European anti-dumping 
law are not that simple as they appear. But, then they show that complex rules result. in .. ~ittle 
1~11__ty_~and_much-$(on~way-flex-ibilit-y.»-. If that is the case, the. complexity of the rule-of-
rèàson test and its inherent opportunity for «one-way flexibility» are no obstacle to adopting it and 
to repealing legal provisions which, from an economie point of view, are not correct. 
CHAPTER 111 
DETERMINATION OF DUMPING 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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In Chapter 1 it is stated that anti-dumping law, as an instrument of procedural protectionism, is 
characterised by «one-way flexibility». Through «One-way flexibility» anti-dumping law may apply 
to cases of no-dumping. The present Chapter investigates whether GATT and European anti-
dumping law are interpreted broadly to encompass cases of no-dumping. 
As is being pointed out in Chapter 1, anti-dumping law, as an instrument of procedural 
protectionism, is said to enhance legal certainty. Seemingly, it only allows anti-dumping relief 
under strictly specified conditions, such as the existence of dumping. However, legal certainty 
requires the exporters to be able to predict whether or not those conditions have been fulfilled. 
The present Chapter examines whether GATT and European anti-dumping law allow exporters to 
ascertain in advance whether or not they will be found to practise dumping. 
The determination of dumping involves four stages, which will be discussed in this chapter : the 
determination of normal value (section 2), the determination of export price (section 3), the 
adjustments to normal value and export price in order to make them comparable (section 4), and 
the dete~ination of the dumping margin on the basis of a comparison between normal value and 
export price (section 5). 
2. NORMAL V ALUE ST ANDARDS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As dumping is found when normal value exceeds the export price, normal value may be said to be 
the minimum price for exports. 
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In the present section, normal value determination will be examined from four different angles. 
First, the present section examines the hierarchy among the different normal value standards and 
the way they have to be determined. Second, it investigates whether normal value determination 
is tainted by 4<0ne-way flexibility», i.e. , whether it is a search for a normal value as high as 
· possible. For the higher normal value, the more probable dumping will be found. Third, the 
present section inquires whether normal value determination guarantees legal certainty, i.e., that 
exporters are able to know in advance whether they are dumping. The latter requires that they 
must have the opportunity of knowing in advance which normal value will be used. Fourth, at the 
same time, the present section examines whether the products are valued in an economically 
jµstified way, i.e. , whether normal value is determined in the same way as market prices are 
under short-run profit maximization. 
For normal value determination, European anti-dumping law makes a distinction between exports 
coming from market economy countries (hereinafter called ME countries) and non-market 
economy countries (hereinafter called NME countries). Section 2.2., therefore, investigates 
normal value determination for ME countries, together with the determination of the prices and 
production costs of the reference country. Section 2.3. focuses on the aspects in which normal 
value determination for NME countries differs from normal value determination for ME countries. 
2.2. NORMAL VALUE STANDARDS FOR MARKET ECONOMY 
COUNTRIES 
· 2. 2.1. Hierarchy 
In GATT anti-dumping law seven different normal value standards are being distinguished : 
(i) the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined 
for consumption in the exporting country (Article VI(l) GATT ; Article 2.1. GATT Anti-
dumping Code) ; 
(ii) a comparable price of the like product when exported to a third country (Article VI(l) 
GATT ; Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code) ; , 
(iii) the cost of production in the country of origin, plus a reasonable amount for 
administrative, selling and general costs and for profits based on actual data pertaining to 
production and sales on the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or 
producer under investigation (Article VI(l) GATT ; Articles 2.2. and 2.2.2. GATT Anti-
dumping Code) ; 
(iv) the cost of production in the country of origin, plus a reasonable amount for 
administrative, selling and genera! costs and for profits, determined on the basis of the 
actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter or producer in question in respect of 
production and sales in the dornestic rnarket of the country of origin of the sarne genera! 
category of products (Article VI(l) GATT ; Articles 2.2. and 2.2.2.(i) GATT Anti-
durnping Code) ; 
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(v) the cost of production in the country of ongm, plus a reasonable amount for 
administrative, selling and genera! costs and for profits determined on the basis of the 
weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized by other exporters . or 
producers subject to investigation in respect of production and sales of the like product in 
the domestic market of the country of origin (Article VI(l) GATI ; Articles 2.2. and 
2.2.2.(ii) GATI Anti-Dumping Code) ; 
(vi) the cost of production in the country of origin, plus a reasonable amount for 
administrative, selling and genera! costs and for profits determined on the basis of any 
other reasonable method (Article VI(l) GATI ; Articles 2.2. and 2.2.2.(iii) GATI Anti-
dumping Code) ; · 
(vii) a nonnal value determined on the basis of the facts available (Article 6.8. GATI Anti-
dumping Code). 
Because it was. thought «desirable to lay down clear and detailed rules on the calculation of normal 
value» (recital in the preamble to basic EC legislation ; see also : preamble to basic ECSC 
Decision), the number of normal value standards has been increased in European anti-dumping 
law: 
1 1 EC anti-dumping law 1 ECSC anti-dumping law 1 
(i) the comparable price paid or payable to the comparable price actually paid or 
the exporter, in the ordinary course of payable in the ordinary course of trade 
trade for the like product, by for the like product intended for 
independent customers in the exporting consumption in the exporting country 
country (Articles 1(2) and 2(1) basic or the country of origin (Article 
EC Regulation), hereinafter called the 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision), 
domestic market price. hereinafter called the domestic market 
price 
(ii) the comparable price of the like product when exported toa third country 
(Articles 1(2) and 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(i) basic ECSC 
Decision), hereinafter called the export price to third countries 
(iii) the constructed value, on the basis of the constructed value, on the basis of 
the production cost in the country of the production cost in the country of 
origin, plus a reasonable amount for origin plus a reasonable amount for 
selling, administrative and other selling, administrative and other 
genera! expenses and for profits based genera! expenses and a reasonable 
on actual data pertaining to production margin of profit of the producer or 
and sales, in the ordinary course of exporter of the like product in the 
trade, of the like product, by the country of origin or export (Article 
exporter or producer under 2(3)(b )(ii) basic ECSC Decision) 
investigation (Article 2(3) and (6) basic 
EC Regulation) 
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(iv) the constructed value, on the basis of the constructed value, on the basis of 
the production cost in the country of the production cost in the country of 
origin, plus a reasonable amount for origin, plus a reasonable amount for 
selling, administrative and other selling, administrative and other 
genera! expenses and for profits general expenses and a reasonable 
determined on the basis of the weighted margin of profit of other producers or 
average of the actual amounts for exporters of the like product in the 
selling, administrative and other country of origin or export (Article 
general expenses and the weighted 2(3)(b )(ii) basic ECSC Decision) 
average actual profit margins 
detennined for other exporters or 
producers subject to the anti-dumping 
investigation in respect of production 
and sales of the like product in the 
domestic market of the country of 
origin (Article 2(3) and 2(6)(i) basic 
EC Regulation) 
(v) the constructed value, on the basis of the constructed value, on the basis of 
the production cost in the country of the production cost in the country of 
origin, plus a reasonable amount for origin, plus a reasonable amount for 
selling, administrative and other selling, administrative and other 
general expenses and for profits general expenses and a reasonable 
determined on the basis of the actual margin of profit of the exporter in the 
amounts of selling, administrative and same business sector in the country of 
other general expenses and the actual origin or export (Article 2(3)(b )(ii) 
profit margin applicable to production basic ECSC Decision)267 
and sales, in the ordinary course of 
trade, of the sa.me general category of 
products for the exporter or producer in 
question in the domestic market of the 
country of origin (Article 2(3) and 
2(6)(ii) basic EC Regulation) 
(vi) / the constructed value, on the basis of 
the production cost in the country of 
origin, plus a reasonable amount for 
selling, administrative and other 
genera! expenses and a reasonable 
margin of profit of other producers or 
exporters in the same business sector 
in the country of origin or export 
(Article 2(3)(b )(ii) basic ECSC 
Decision) 
267 See e.g. : urea ammonium nitrate solution jrom Poland, wbere the Polish exporter did not sell the dumped product on bis domestic market. 
Therefore, bis selling, administrative and general expenses, as we11 as bis profit margin were based on bis domestic sales of fertilizer, the dumpcd 
product being a fertilizer (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium 
nitrate solution originating in Bulgaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16). 
(vil) the constructed value, on the basis of the production cost in the country of origin, 
plus a reasonable amount for selling, administrative and other genera! expenses 
and for profits determined on the basis of any other reasonable method (Article 
2(3) and 2(6)(iü) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b )(il) basic ECSC 
Decision)268 
268 The following have been used as reasonable. basis : 
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the selling, administrative and general expenses relating to sales of the like product of the producer/exporter to third 
countries (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3522/90 of 4 December 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 with regard to 
the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong 
Kong, O.J., 7 December 1990, No L 34311); 
the selling, administrative and general expenses of the only producer having sales on the domestic market of the exporting 
country, though those sales are not made in the same business sector (CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 534/94 of 9 March 
1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong 
Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5) ; 
the selling, administrative and general expenses in the product sector in the dumping country, which must be distinguished 
from the busineBB sector as the European anti-dumping authorities held that those expenses were established on the basis of 
data available .since there were no domestic sales in representative quantities (of the dumped product) or of products in the 
same busineBB sectol'Jt (Council Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on 
imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 
December 1993, No L 302/1); 
the selling, administrative and general expenses, and a profit on the basis of the costs borne and profits made by the dumping 
producers' associated exporter in a third country (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 
1994, No L 120/3) ; 
the selling, administrative and general expenses, and profit established for another dumping country, which, among the 
markets investigated, was considered to be the one most comparable to the dumping country in question, in particular in 
terms of size and level of market development in the like product sector (Commiseion Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 
September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, 
the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50) ; 
the weighted average profit margin realized by the exporters on their profitable sales to third countries (Commission Decision 
90/138/EEC of 16 March 1990 accepting an undertaking given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of certain diesel engines originating in Finland and Sweden, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 22 March 1990, 
No L 76128); 
the profit realized on certain product types exported from the allegedly dumping country, hut re-imported into this country by 
an independent company which incorporates them into a finished product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/90 of 13 
June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not 
exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 152/24) ; 
.ca» profit margin which was considered reasonable in view of the higher profit realized by other exporters from other 
countries and in view of the fact that the research and development costs incurred in the country in question were very low 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133/20) . 
a profit margin considered reasonable in the light of the productive investment requirements of the kind of industry involved 
(CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-
silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, No L 18318. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 341/90 of 5 
February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in 
lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose 
undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1); 
a profit margin determined on the basis of factors which determine the profit rate for the world-wide business of the product, 
in particular the market situation in the exporting country (research and development costs, capital expenditures 
necessaryfor mass production, duration of innovation cycles, the risky nature of a cyclical business sector), as well as on the 
basis of the Commission's experience in the product sector concerned in previous anti-dumping proceedings (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 impoeing a provieional anti-dumping duty on importe of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits k.nown as DRAMe (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 
September 1992, No L 272/13) ; 
a profit margin considered reasonable in view of ccall the relevant establiehed facts of the investigation11 (Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television 
receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 
October 1994, No L 255/50) ; 
a profit margin as alleged by the complainante (Commiesion Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 April 1993 imposing a 
provieional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 21April1993, No L 95/5). -
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(viii) the comparable price for the like the prices or costs of other sellers or 
product of other sellers or producers producers, and especially of the 
(Articles 1(2) and 2(l)(a) basic EC exporter's supplier, in the country of 
Regulation) origin in the same manner as 
mentioned in (i) until (vii) (Article 
2(3)(c) basic ECSC Decision) 
' (ix) / basic prices, if the above nientioned 
normal value standards do not produce 
a significantly different result (Article 
2(6)(b) basic ECSC Decision) 
(x) when necessary, exact and reliable information is not available, the normal value 
on the basis of the facts available (Article 18 basic EC Regulation ; Article 
7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision) 
No full hierarchy exists between the various normal value standards. In principle, the domestic 
marke! price must be used as normal value standard under GATT and European anti-dumping law 
(Article VI(l) GATI; Article 2.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(1) basic EC 
. Regulation ; Article 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision). If there are no comparable sales in the 
ordinary course of trade, either the export price to third countries or the constructed value must be 
used (Article VI(l) GATT ; Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(3) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b )(ii) basic ECSC Decision)269 as there is no hierarchy between the 
The actual expenses incurred upon exportation to the Community and a reasonable export profit margin have also been suggested. 
The starting point of this is the idea that the constructed value may and should be the reasonable value of the exported products, 
instead of being a surrogate of the domestic market price,. when there are no sales at all (not even uncomparable sales or sales not 
heilig made in the ordinary course of trade) on the domestic mar ket of the country of origin or the exporting country (C.J.E.C., case 
C-69/89, 7 May 1991, NaJcqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, ], (2069), 2139-2145 (opinion of Advocate General 
LENZ)). Thia •tarting point, however, cannot be ticcepted (infra, 159-161). Neverthe'less, the suggestion is useful: although the 
coMtructed value ia a surrogate for the domestic market price, there may be circumstances in which the export expeMes and 
profit• may coMtitute a reasonab'le basis for constructing normal value. 
269 C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/85, 6 Oçtober 1988, Canon Ine. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 5799; C.J.E.C., case C-
105190, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (677), 720; C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon 
Ine. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1287; C.J.E.C., case C-175187, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co; Ltd and 
Matsuahita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1472; C.J.E.C., case C-179187, 10 March 1992, Sharp 
Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, ], (1635), 1674; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on import• of cotton yarn originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 8211. 
Contrary to the clear wording of GATI' and European anti-dumping law, the European anti-dumping authorities seemingly think 
that there is no legally binding hierarchy between, on the one hand, the domestic market price and, on the other, the constructed 
value and the export price to third countrie• : 
as to the •uggeation to use the export price to third countries, the Council, however, has replied that it is «preferable» (sic) to 
use the domeatic market price when even poBBible (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear · tungsten halogen lamp• originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No 
L 1411); 
for the •alce of easy administrability and in order not to delay the investigation unduly unduly, the Commission has used the 
constructed ualue, although there were comparable sales in to ordinary course of trade (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
650193 of 6 March 1993 imposing a provisional antHlumping duty on import• of bicycles originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58112; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receiver• originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of 
China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255150). 
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export price to third countries and the constructed value270• Under GA TI and EC anti-
dumping law, there is no hierarchy either between the different constructed values which are not 
determined on the basis of the actual selling, genera! and administrative expenses and profits of 
the exporter or producer under investigation (Article VI(l) GATI ; Articles 2.2. and 2.2.2. 
GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(3) and (6) basic EC Regulation) ; under ECSC anti-
dumping law, though, there is a strict hierarchy among the different constructed values (Article 
2(3)(b )(il) basic ECSC Decision)271 • Moreover, under ECSC anti-dumping law, basic prices 
may be used instead of one of the above mentioned normal value standards, if they do not produce 
a significantly different result (Article 2(6)(b) basic ECSC Decision). Furthermore, normal value 
may be determined on the basis of the best facts available, if the producer/exporter does not 
cooperate or acts in bad faith so that the information available does not enable the European anti-
dumping authorities to establish normal value on one of the bases mentioned in European anti-
270 According to the GA'IT Group of Experts, a bierarchy between the export price and the constructed value cannot be imposed. 
Although usually the export price can be determined more readily, they hold it may sometimes be preferable to use the constructed 
value. In their view, the use of the export price may result in errors, because it is normal and reasonable that different prices are 
used in different markets (JJ.I.S.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GA'IT, 1960, 147-148. See also: GA'IT Panel on Complaints, 
February 26, 1954, Swedish anti-dumping duties, B.I.S.D., Third Supplement, Geneva, GA'IT, 1955, 89, consideration 28. See 
also : C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon Ine. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 5800 ; C.J.E.C., case C-
69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2139 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! LENZ); 
BELLIS, J.-F., «La réglementation anti-dumping de la Communauté Economique Ew-opéenne>>, Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1979, 
(495), 505; BESELER, J.-F., ccEEC Protection against Dumping and Subsidies from Third Countriesu, Common Market Law 
Review, 1968-1969, (327), 333; BOUDANT, J., L'cmti-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 80; BRIET, L.A.E" 
ccAntidumping in de EEG - De kinderschoenen ontgroeid?», S.E. W., 1982, (145), 149; LANDSI'ITEL, R., Dumping in 
AuJJerhan.dels- und Wett'bewerksrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, 23 ; LESGUILLONS, H., ccLe régime anti-dumping de la 
Communauté européenne•, Droit et pratique du commerce international, 1978, (459), 466 ; LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime 
communautaire ae protection co"ntre le dumping et les subventions, Paris, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 46; STANBROOK, C" Dumping. A 
Manual of the EEC Anti-Dumping Law and Procedure, Chequers, European Business Publications, 1980, 20-21 ; VAN BAEL, 1., 
«The E.E.C. Antidumping Rules - A Practical Approach", International Lawyer, 1978, 525 ; VERMULST, E.A., uDumping in the 
United States and the European Community: A Comparative Analysisu, Lego.l Issuea of European Integration, 1984/2, (103), 107; 
VER.MULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States and the European Communities. A Comparative Analysi.s, 
Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 419-422). 
271 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakojima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2139 (Opinion of 
Advocate Genera! LENZ), 2175 and 2186; C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Gold.star Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, 
(677), 725. 
For an application, see: Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players 9riginating 
in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 112/90of16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players 
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, No 
L 13121 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2064/90 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, No 
L 321/19) ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276'1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017192 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties 
following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, 
Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of.Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating 
the said review in respect of imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United States of America, O.J., 22 
October 1992, No L 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68). 
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dumping law (Article 6.8. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 18 basic EC Regulation Article 
7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision)272• 
ECSC anti-dumping law, moreover, states that, in the case of sales at a loss which may be 
. 
considered as not having been made in the ordinary course of trade, normal value may be 
determined on the basis of : 
(i) the comparable price actually paid or payable for the remaining sales which have been 
(ü) 
(iü) 
(iv) 
made in the ordinary course of trade for the like product intended for consumption in the 
exporting country or the country of origin ; 
the comparable price of the like product when exported to third countries ; 
the constructed value ; 
the adjusted sub-production-cost price in order to eliminate loss and provide for a 
reasonable profit (Article 2(4) basic ECSC Decision). 
Under GATI anti-dumping law, the domestic market price must always be used, unless there are 
no sales in the ordinary course of trade. As it does not impose any hierarchy between those 
various normal value standards273 , which are in fact identical to either the domestic market 
price, the constructed value or the export price to third countries274, European anti-dumping 
law violates GA TI anti-dumping law because it allows the use of the constructed value and the 
export price to third countries in cases where the (remaining) sales have been made in the 
ordinary course of trade and where, accordingly, the domestic market price should be used. 
272 C.J.E.C., caee 53183, 23 May 1985, Allied Corporation a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1985, (1621), 1658; VAN BAEL, 1., and BEI.LIS, 
·J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 42. 
For an application, see : Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 April 1993 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports 
of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, No L 10414. 
273 KRETSCHMER, H., Das Antidumping- und Antisubventionsrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, FrankfurtJMain, VWV-
Verlag, 1980, 31. 
274 In respect of sales at a loss, European anti-dumping law seems to introduce two additional, alternative normal value 
etandards, i.e., the comparable price actually paid or payable for the remaining sales which have been made in the ordinary course 
of trade for the like product intended for consumption in the exporting country or the country of origin, and the adjusted sub-
production-cost price in order to eliminate loss and provide for a reasonable profit 
The first normal value standard is an application the domestic market price. lndeed, the price of the remaining sales which are 
not made at a lose, may be ueed as normal value standard only if these sales have been made in the ordinary course of trade (VAN 
BAEL, 1., and BEI.LIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection Law• of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 63). 
The second normal value standard coincides with the conetructed value for it equals the costs of production plus a reaeonable 
amount for overhead& and profits. Indeed, like the constructed value, the acljusted sub-production-coet price must cover all 
production coats, including general expenees, and provide a reaeonable profit. Otherwise it would not eliminate loss and provide a 
reasonable profit (Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting undertakings offered in connection with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United 
States of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371/47, where the ccconstructed value" was 
obtained by acljusting the eub-production-cost price with an amount corresponding to the losses made. See also: Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1337 /81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain textured polyester 
fabrics originating in the United States of America, O.J., 20 May 1981, No L 133117; BRIET, L.A.E., ccAntidumping in de EEG -
De kinderschoenen ontgroeid?", S.E. W., 1982, (145), 161, note 23 ; VAN BAEL, 1., and BEI.LIS, J.-F., International Trade Law and 
Practice of the European. Community. EEC Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection Laws, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1985, 64). 
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Compared with GA Tl' anti-dumping law, European anti-dumping law has not enhanced legal 
certainty substantially, although it bas increased the number of normal value standards275• The 
producers/exporters are unable to know in advance which normal value standard will be used. 
First, it does not impose a stricter hierarchy between the different normal value standards. By 
imposing any hierarchy between the normal value standards in case of sales at a loss, ECSC anti-
dumping law, moreover, looses the GA Tf hierarchy which grants the domestic market price the 
strict priority. Second, the hierarchy under ECSC anti-dumping law between the various general 
expenses and profit margins to be used for determining the constructed value depends on the 
availability of reliable and suitable data. ECSC anti-dumping law, though, does not provide when 
data are reliable and suitable. As to the Court of Justice, the requirement of reliable and suitable 
data, in essence, refers to reasonableness : data are not reliable or suitable when their being taken 
into consideration would not be reasèmable276• This interpretation, however, does not make 
. things much clearer. In the view of the Court of Justice, this requirement of reasonableness 
grants a broad room for discretion to the European antidumping authorities277 . 
European anti-dumping case law does not shed much more light on the way the European anti-
dumping authorities implement their discretionary power. Only in respect of the choice between 
the constructed value and the export price to third countries, it reveals a general preference for the 
constructed value278 - a general preference which the European anti-dumping authorities can 
easily deviate from without violating GA Tf and European anti-dumping law. 
Legal certainty is further reduced because European anti-dumping authorities do not hesitate to 
violate GA Tf and European anti-dumping law. Such violation results from their general 
275 Conlra: C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2096 (Report for the 
Hearing : concluaiona of the Council). 
The Court of Justice aeems not to be fully convinced as it bas held that present European anti-dumping law, by increasing the number of normal 
value standards, ia «likely to increase legal certainty» (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R" 
1991, 1, (2069), 2184). 
276 C.J.E.C" caae C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R" 1991, 1, (2069), 2179-2180. See also: 
BOUDANT, J., L'antl-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 83 ; WAER, P" «Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin 
Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach•,Joumal of World Trade, 1993/3, (47), 49-50. 
277 C.J.E.C" joined casea 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo EJeclric Company Lid (IEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R" 1988, (5855), 5888 
and 5898 (Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon SL YNN) and 5920. 
Under former European anti-dumping law, as well as under present GATI anti-dumping law, European anti-dumping authorities were granted full 
discretion, by the proviaion that general expenses and profit margins must be calculated on «a reaaonable basis» (C.J.E.C" case C-69/89, 7 May 
1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R" 1991, 1, (2069), 2175 and 2177). Under ptesent European anti-dumping law, the 
discretion bas been limited, hut still remains broad. Indeed, according to the Court of Justice, present European anti-dumping law «does not differ 
substantially from the earlier method» of determing general expenses and profit margins, hut is a mere clarification of former anti-dumping law and 
«is for that reaaon likely to increase legal certainty» (C.J.E.C" case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E:C.R" 
1991, 1, (2069), 2175-2177 and 2184) (emphasi1 added). See also: C.J.E.C" case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, 
E. C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 724. 
278 lnfro., 166-169. 
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preference for the domestic market price, which is so marked that it results in a breach of the 
hierarchy of nonnal value standards. Indeed, if the domestic market price of the 
producer/exporter of the like product cannot be determined, the domestic market price of the 
producer/exporter of similar products will sometimes used279• However, under GA TI and 
European anti-dumping law, the domestic market price must be the price of the like product 
(Article Vl(l) GATI ; Article 2.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 1(2) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision). The domestic market price of similar products 
may be used only as best information available when no other normal value standard (i.e. , 
domestic market price (of the like product), constructed value, export price to third countries, and 
prices and costs of other producers/exporters) is available and when the producer/exporter does 
not cooperate in good faith (Article 6.8. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 18 basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). European anti-dumping case law did not 
279 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertak.ings in connection with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
.Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181/19; Commission Decision 82/397/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings in 
connection with the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of certain polypropylene film for capacitors originating in Japan 
and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/44; Commission Decision 841259/EEC of 10 May 1984 accepting 
undertak.ings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain sensitized paper for colour .. 
photographs originating in Japan and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 11 May 1984, No L 124/45; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3669/84 of 21 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered 
roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, No L 340/37 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 
27 June 1985, No L 167/3; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in connection 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovak.ia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51173; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361/87 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-
calcium/calcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 May 1987, No L 129/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 
June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, ·No L 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/58) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O . .f,, 17 June 1988, No L 151147; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, 
O.J., 16 December 1988, No L 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of 
America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49; Council Regulation cEEC) No 501/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and 
definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, No L 67/55. See also: ball bearings originating in Japan an.cl 
Singapore, where the exporter did not sell on his domestic market a type identical to the type exported to the Community. The 
European anti-dumping authorities' intention to determine normal value on the basis of the domestic market price of the most 
similar type proved to he impossible because the differences in the production cost& of the various types were not adequately 
reflected in the sales prices. Instead, normal value was determined on the basis of the constructed value (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3528/87 of 23 November 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 26 November 1987, No L 336/1). 
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represent the domestic market price of similar products as the best information available, hut only 
noted that the domestic market price of the like product could not be used280. 
European anti-dumping law only clarifies GA TI anti-dumping law in that it defines that, in 
principle, the domestic market price should be the price of the producer/exporter under 
investigation. Indeed, GA IT anti-dumping law does not treat of this matter. EC anti-dumping 
law, on the other hand, stipulates that, where the producer/exporter does not produce or does not 
sell the like product, the normal value may be established on the basis of prices of other sellers or 
producers (Article 2(l)(a) basic EC Regulation). ECSC anti-dumping law allows the use of the 
prices or costs of other sellers or producers, and especially the producer/exporter's supplier when 
the producer/exporter neither produces nor sells the product in the country of origin (Article 
2(3)(c) basic ECSC Decision)281 • The difference ·between EC and ECSC anti-dumping law 
consists in the fact that ECSC anti-dumping law also allows the use of the production costs of 
other sellers or producers, whereas EC anti-dumping law, like GA TI anti-dumping law, does not 
clarify whose production costs must be taken into account for constructing normal value (Article 
2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation). With regard to the place of 
the prices and costs of other sellers and producers, European anti-dumping law is rather obscure. 
The European anti-dumping authorities do not view the price of other producers/exporters as 
being a separate normal value standard, hut they consider it to fall under the notion of «domestic 
280 Even in cases where normal value is explicitly said to be based on the facts available, it is sometimes not inquired whether 
the domestic market price (of the like product), the export price to third countries, the constructed value, and the prices and costs of 
other producers/exporters are all unavailable nor any reference made to producers/exporters not cooperating or acting in bad f aith : 
only the absence of domestic sales was underscored in: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1321/81of15 May 1981 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 384/81 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United States 
of America, O.J., 19 May 1981, No L 132/17; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81 of 15 July 1981 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United States of America, 0.J., 18 July 1981, No L 195/22; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the 
United States of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, No L 12/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn 
originating in the United States of America, O.J., 23 February 1983, No L 50/1; Council Decision 83/162/EEC of 18 April 
1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of acrylonitrile originating in the United State& of 
America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101/29; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2823/85 of 7 October 1985 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 10 October 1985, No L 268/11; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 264/86 of 4 February 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain clogs 
originating in Sweden and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 February 1986, No L 32/1; 
only the absence of domestic sales together with the absence of domestic production was underscored in : Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 101/83 of 17 January 1983 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemical fertilizer originating in the 
United States of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, No L 15/1; 
only the absence of domestic sales together with the absence of comparable export prices to third countries was underscored 
in: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1591/81 of 10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on paraxylene (]> 
xylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United States of America and the US Virgin lslands, O.J., 16 June 1981, No L 15Bn. 
Evidently, these cases also violate GA'IT and European anti-dumping law. 
281 For an application in this respect, see: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 547/90 of 2 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain glutamic acid and its ealte originating in lndoneeia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand, and accepting undertakings in connection with importe of certain glutamic acid and its ealte originating in these 
countriee, O.J., 3 March 1990, No L 56/23 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064/90 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provieional anti-
dumping duty on import& of linear tungeten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 21 November 1990, No L 321/19); Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 
0
1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of linear tungeten halogen lampe originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1. 
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market price» (i.e., as an application of Article 2(1) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(a) basic 
ECSC Decision)282• With regard to EC anti-dumping law, this interpretation may seem to be 
correct. Indeed, the possibility of using the prices of other sellers or producers is treated in the 
provision conceming the domestic market price (Article 2(1) basic EC Regulation). However, the 
condition upon which the prices of other sellers or producers may be used, is that «the exporter 
(under investigation) does not produce or does not sell the like product» (emphasis added). The 
wording «does not produce» may refer to the impossibility of using the constructed value as 
normal value standard. Indeed, if the producer/exporter does not produce, it will be impossible to 
calculate his production costs (there no production costs) and, thus, to determine his constructed 
value (unless the production costs of other producers are used). Consequently, it may be argued 
that the price of other sellers or producers may only be used if it is impossible to determine the 
constructed value on the basis of the production costs of the producer/exporter under 
investigation. This line of reasoning seems to be even more correct with regard to ECSC anti-
dumping law, which treats of not only of the prices, but also of the costs of other sellers and 
producers in a separate legal provision (Article 2(3)(c) basic ECSC Decision) which follows the 
legal provisions on the domestic market price (Article 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision) and the 
constructed value (Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision). 
Another question with regard to the place of the prices and costs of other sellers or producers in 
the hierarchy of normal value standards, is whether they may be used though the export price to a 
third country is also available as normal value standard. The answer is offered by the European 
anti-dumping authorities, according to whom the prices and costs of other sellers or producers 
may also be used when the producer/exporter does not sell or produce in the ordinary course of 
trade283 • This interpretation appears to be legal : as European anti-dumping law prohibits the 
use of the domestic market price in such cases and requires the constructed value to be calculated 
on the basis of production costs in the ordinary course of trade, the absence of sales or production 
in the ordinary course of trade is legally the same as the absence of sales and production. 
However, as the absence of sales and the absence of sales in the ordinary course of trade are 
_legally the same, not only the prices and costs of other sellers or producers, but also the export 
price to third countries of the producer/exporter may be used as normal value standard, when the 
producer/exporter does not sell or produce in his domestic market. Indeed, European anti-
dumping law allows the use of the prices and, under ECSC anti-dumping las, of the costs of other 
sellers -and producers when there are no sales nor production of the producer/exporter «in the 
country of origin» (Article 2(l)(a) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(c) basic ECSC Decision). If 
282 Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importe of linear 
tungsten halogen lampe originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 1411. 
283 Commiesion Decision 90/421/EEC of 6 August 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importe of denim 
fabric originating in Turkey, lndoneeia, Hong Kong and Macao, O.J., 17 August 1990, No L 222/50. 
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there are no such sa.les, obviously, the exporter/producer cannot have sold in the ordinary. course 
of trade. But this is the very condition allowing the use of the export price to third countries of 
the producer/exporter involved (Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(i) basic ECSC 
Decision). Accordingly, when a producer/exporter does not sell or produce in the country of 
origin, hut exports to third countries, European anti-dumping authorities may freely choose 
between either the export price to third countries of the producer/exporter involved or the prices 
or costs of other sellers or producers. 
The use of the prices, production costs, including general expenses, and profit margins of other 
producers/exporters, whether or not in conformity with the hierarchy set up by European anti-
dumping law, implies the rejection of the idea of «knowledge of dumping», i.e., it is not required 
that the producer/exporter bas decided to dump, or, at least, should have the opportunity of 
knowing in advance whether he will be found to dump284• This rejection results in some 
degree of uncertainty for the producer/exporter and disregards comparative advantages. First, the 
producer/exporter cannot know whose data will be used, especially because the European anti-
dumping authorities consider this information to be confidentia1285• Second, he usually bas no 
knowledge as to the prices, costs and profits of the other producers/exporters286• Third, 
comparative advantages, if any, and possible specificity of the producer/exporter are not taken 
284 See in this respect the opinion of Advocate-Genera! Sir GORDON SL YNN according to whom it is not ccwholly accurate» that 
ccan exporter could never know how to set (hls) prices so as to avoid dumping and would find it impossible to take steps so as to 
avoid dumping». For he states that cc(t)here will necessarily come a point at which the exporter is made aware that a finding of 
dumping is poesible, and he can then offer to raise hls prices so as to eliminate the dumping : Article 10 of the Basic Regulation. If 
he is too late to come within the time specified in Article 10 (1), he may still raise his prices voluntarily and request a review of the 
anti-dumping regulation under Article 14 of the Basic Regulation» (C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo 
Electric Compan.y. Ltd (TEC) a..o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5890). His opinion, however, cannot be accepted. Advocate-
General Sir GORDON SL YNN ignores that the European anti-dumping authorities are not obliged to accept undertakings, even if 
the undertakings offered are sufficient to stop the dumping. Thus, a producer/exporter who is willing to stop dumping, can be 
subjected to an anti-dumping duty. The producer/exporter can request the review of anti-dumping duties if he actually stops 
dumping. However, he can request a review only a full year after the imposition of the anti-dumping duty (Article 11(3) basic EC 
Regulation; Article 14(1) basic ECSC Decision). Thus, he will be subjected to the anti-dumping duty during at least one year. 
Advocate-Genera! Sir GORDON SL YNN also ignores the costs which an anti-dumping proceeding involves for the allegedly 
dumping exporter (e.g., costs for legal representation). Nor does he take account of the chilling effect of the initiation of an anti-
dumping proceeding on imports in cases where the anti-dumping proceeding results in a finding of no-dumping (MESSERLIN, P., 
ccThe EC Antidumping Regulations : A First Economie Appraisal, 1980-85", Wel.twirtschaftliches Archiv, 1989, (563), 572). 
285 BELLIS, J.-F., VER.MULST, E.A., and WAER, P., ccFurther Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation: A Codification of 
Controversial MethodologieB», Journal of World Trade, 1989, (21), 26 ; VER.MULST, E.A., and HOOIJER, J.J., ccA.nnotation on 
Case C-69/89, Nahajima All Precision Co. v. Coun.cil, Judgment of 7 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-358/89, &tram.et v. 
Coun.cil, Judgment of 16 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian. 
Fertilizer Compan.y (Safco) v. Council, Judgment of 17 June 1991, not yet reported; Case C-16/90, Detkf Nöll,e v. Haupzollamt 
Bremen-Freihafen, Judgment of 22 October 1991, not yet reported", Common Market Law Review, 1992, (380), 392-393 ; 
VER.MULST, E.A., and WAER, P., "De nieuwe EEG Anti-dumping Verordening 2423188: Een stille revolutie", S.E. W., 1989, (151), 
152-153. See also : C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y Ltd (TEC) a.o. v . Coun.cil, 
E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5917, where the Court of Justice found the unpredictability ofEuropean anti-dumping law unavoidable. 
286 VERMULST, E.A., and HOOUER, J.J., «Annotation on Case C-69/89, Nakajima AU Precision Co. v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 1991, 
not yet reported; Case C-358/89, Extramel v. Council, Judgment of 16 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company 
(Samad) and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (Safco) v. Council, Judgment of 17 June 1991, not yet reported; Case C-16/90, Detlef NiiUe v. 
HaupzoUamt Bremen-F~fen, Judgment of 22 October 1991, not yet reported•, Common Marlcel Law Review, 1992, (380), 392; WAER., P., 
«Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach-, Journal of World Trade, 1993/3, (47), 60. 
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into account, so that he may be found to practise dumping merely because he is more efficient or 
admits lower profits287• In the opinion of the Court of J ustice, the use of data relating to the 
individual producer/exporter is the approach most suited to ensure that the normal value 
corresponds as closely as possible to the individual producer/exporter's own specific 
characteristics288• According to a strict interpretation, the use of the prices, costs and profits 
of other producers/exporters is, nevertheless, not contrary to GATT anti-dumping law. For 
GATT anti-dumping law does not specify whose prices, costs and profits must be taken in to 
account289• As GATI anti-dumping law does not impose the use of the prices, costs and 
profits of other producers/exporters either, the use of these prices, costs and profits might be 
p~ohibited. Their use should even be banned if it is true that the underlying rationale of GATI 
anti-dumping law requires an investigation of individual producers/exporters and, thus, ensures 
that a finding of dumping regarding one producer/exporter does not affect another 
producer/exporter who does not engage in dumping practices290• At least, the hierarchy of 
normal value standàrds imposed by European anti-dumping . law should be modified and, of 
course, strictly observed. In particular, there should be a hierarchy between the export price of 
the producer/exporter to third countries and the prices, costs and profits of other 
producers/exporters. Thus, the use of the constructed value determined on the basis of the 
genera! expenses and profit of other producers/exporters and the domestic market prices, the 
export prices to third countries and the constructed value determined on . the basis of the 
production costs, including genera! expenses and a profit margin, of other producers/exporters 
should only be allowed if the export price of the producer/exporter involved to third countries 
cannot be used. 
287 WAER., P., «Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach», JoumaJ of World Trade, 
1993/3, (47), 60. 
Advocate Genera! MISCHO qualitics the use of costa and protits of other exporten as reasonable, though he admits that their use benetits exporten 
whose costs and protits are higher, hut disadvantages exporten whose costs and protits are lower (C.J.E.C., case C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita 
lndustrial Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1301), 1321-1322 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! MISCHO)). 
288 C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 725 and 728. This statement of the Court 
of Justice relates only to the coats and protits used for calculating the constructed value. Evidently, it also applies to all other data used for 
detennining the nonnal value. 
289 In respect of the costs and profits, see : C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, 
(677), 707 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN) and 724. 
Only within the framework of the GATT Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, some members have expressed their concern about 
the practice of using the domestic market price of the allegedly dumping producer/exporter's competitors as normal value standard 
(B.l.S.D., Twenty-first Supplement, Geneva, GATT, 1975, 32-33). 
290 About the underlying rationale of GATI anti-dumping law, see: C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, 
E. C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 691 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the Council) and 707 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN). 
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2. 2. 2. Which country 's domestic market ? 
2.2.2.1. Country of origin v exporting country 
The exporting country does not always coincide with the country of origin. Products can be re-
exported. The choice between the country of origin and the exporting country for determining 
normal value may be important. Domestic market prices and production costs may, indeed, differ 
between those two countries. Moreover, the scope of anti-dumping cases will also be affected. 
Indeed, if the country of origin is used as a reference, the anti-dumping case will cover all 
products originating in that country, regardless of the country of export291 • If the exporting 
country is used as a reference, the anti-dumping case will cover all the products exported from 
that country, regardless of their origin. · Moreover, the country of origin and the exporting 
291 Comrnission Regulation (EEC) No 720/90 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on irnports of silicon metal originating 
in the People's Republic of China, O.J" 27 March 1990, No L 80/9. 
The scope of the provisional anti-dumping duties imposed on imports of hemalite graphite spheroidaJ pig iron jrom Brazil, steel pi.ales and iron 
pi.ales from Spain and steel angles, shapes . and sections from Spain was defined by the origin of the dumped products (Comrnission 
Recommendation No 267 n9/ECSC of 9 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, 1 or H sections 
of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled .or extruded, originating in Spain, O.J., 13 February 1979, No L 37/21; Comrnis8ion 
Reconunendation No 294n9/ECSC of 13 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain hernatite pig iron originating in 
Brazil, O.J., 16 February 1979,"No L 41129; Comrnission Recommendation No 433179/ECSC of 27 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti- · 
dumping duty on certain sheeta and plates of iron or steel originating in Spain and repealing certain suspended anti-dumping duties, O.J., 3 March 
1979, No L 53/21). Thus, they should apply to all imports originating in the dumping countries, including the imports exported from ·other 
countries. In regard to the imports originating in and exported from the dumping countries, the provisional anti-dumping duties were withdrawn 
because the Community had reached an agreement with the Government of the dumping countries (Comrnission Recommendation No 720n9/0CSC 
of 9 April 1979 providiog for the termination of the application of the provisional anti-dumping duty established in relation to imports of certain 
hematite pig iron originating in Brazil, O.J., 11 April 1979, No L 92/10; Commission Recommendation No 787179/0CSC of 20 April 1979 
providing for the tcnnination of the provisional anti-dumping duties established in relation to imports of certain steel product& originating in Spain, 
O.J., 21 April 1979, No L 99/31). As to the imports originating in the dumping countries, hut exported from other countries, on the other hand, 
definitive anti-dumping dutiea were imposed (Commission Recommendation No 935179/0CSC of 8 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on certain angles, shapea and U, 1 or H sections of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Spain hut 
imported from aome Olher non-member country, O.J., 12 May 1979, No L 117/16; Comrnission Recommendation No 950179/ECSC of 14 May 
1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain hematite pig iron originating in Brazil but imported from some other non-member country, 
O.J., 16 May 1979, No L 120/11 ; Commission Recommendation No 1083179/0CSC of 30 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain plates of iron or steel originating in Spain but imported from some other non-member country, O.J., 1 June 1979, Nó L 135/54). 
Undertakings the scope of which ia also defined by the origin of the dumped products, also apply to imports originating in the dumping country 
which are exportcd from another country. Indeed, several undertakings oblige the exporter to take the necessary action in order to avoid 
circumvention of the undertaking by means of imports of bis dumped product& exported from another country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
101183 of 17 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 
19 January 1983, No L 15/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 14/88of23 December 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of roller chaina for cycles originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J" 6 January 1988, No L 3/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3052/88 of 29 September 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating in 
the People'a Republic of China, O.J" 4 October 1988, No L 272/16; Council Deciaion 88/576/EOC of 14 November 1988 repealing Decision 
87/104/EOC accepting an undertaking given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding conccrning imports of paint, distemper, varnish and 
similar brushes originating in the People'• Republic of China and terminating the investigation, O.J., 18 November 1988, No L 312/33; C.J.E.C., 
joined cases 133/87 and 150/87, 14 March 1990, Nashua Corporation v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (719), 742.). 
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country may fall under a different regime in GATI and European anti-dumping law if one of 
them is a ME country and the other a NME country292• 
292 Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour 
television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 
October 1994, No L 255/50. 
In several cases, the country of origin was a NME country whose product& where exported through a ME country. In all these 
cases, the origin was decisive. As a consequence, normal value was determined along the rules provided by law as to NME 
countries, ie., on the basis of the prices or costs of a third ME country (the so-called reference country) (see : Article 2(7) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision ; infra, 191) : 
in uacuum cleaner• {rom Polan.d the vacuum cleaners produced in Poland were exported to the Community via a Swiss 
enterprise. For normal value determination, Portugal was selected as reference country (Commission Decision 82/398/EEC of 
14 June 1982 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping procedure concerning cylinder vacuum 
cleaners originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic and Poland and terminating the procedure, O.J., 18 
June 1982, No L 172/47); 
in artificial corundum {rom Hungary the Hungarian exports to the Community had been delivered by a commercial 
enterprise having its seat in Austria. For normal value determination, Yugoslavia was selected as reference country. The 
fact that in artificial corundum {rom Hungary the Austrian enterprise, in which the Hungarian producer possessed less than 
half of the shares, acted as an agent can explain why the origin was decisive (Commission Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 
September 1986 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of artificial 
corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 23 September 1986, No 
L 271126); 
in potassium permangan.ate {rom the USSR all the Soviet exports to the Community were indirectly made from Austria. For 
normal value determination,· the United States of America were selected as reference country. The choice of the country of 
origin was found to be the most · appropriate because the product appeared not to be produced in Austria, hut was merely 
transshipped through this country. (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 14519) ; 
in polyester yarn.a {rom the People's Republic of China a Chinese exporter made all of his sales to the Community through a 
company in Hong Kong. For norm al value determination, India was selected as reference country. The fact that in polyester 
yarns {rom the Peopk'a Republic of China the Hong Kong company was financially related to the Chinese exporter can 
explain why the origin was decisive (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191of27 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the 
People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns 
origin~ting in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276n) ; 
in gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters {rom the Peopk's Republic of China the Chinese products were imported to 
the Community via Hong Kong. As the products were merely transhipped through Hong Kong, the normal value was .. 
determined in respect of the People's Republic of China, ie., a NME country, and Thailand was selected as reference country 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 3433191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 November 1991, No L 326/1); 
in bicyclea {rom the Peopk's Republic of China and magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) from the Peopk's Republic of China, a 
conipany established in Hong Kong exported the allegedly dumped product&, which were declared to be of Chinese origin, to 
the Community. For normal value determination, Taiwan was selected as reference country (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 550193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People's 
Repti.blic of China, O.J., 11March1993, No L 58/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 April 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of 
China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1); 
in photo album• {rom the Peopk's Republic of China the Chinese product& were exported to the Community through a 
company established in Hong Kong. For normal value determination, South Korea was selected as reference country 
(Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2477193 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16). 
See also : bruahe1 {rom the Peopk'a Republic of China, where, in the provisional determination direct exports and indirect exports 
via Hong-Kong were · taking into account to investigate whether the anti-dumping undertaking had been lived up (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3052/88 of 29 September 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, 
varnish and similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 4 October 1988, No L 272/16). In the definitive 
anti-dumping determination no mention was made of indirect exports. Reference was made to exports originating in China. 
Undoubtedly they included direct and indirect exports. Normal value was determined in the way as prescribed for NME countries, 
ie., Sri Lanka, a third ME country, was selected as reference country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's 
Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24). 
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GA TI anti-dumping law prefers the exporting country. lndeed, Article VI GATT refers only to 
the exporting country. Nevertheless, the use of the country of origin was not considered to be 
contrary to GA TI293• Only since the conclusion of the 1968 Anti-dumping Code, the problem 
of indirect dumping through a third exporting country was explicitly taken into account294• 
Thus, according to GA TI anti-dumping law, the exporting country should normally be used as a 
reference. However, the domestic market price in the country of origin may be taken into 
consideration if the products are merely transhipped through the exporting country, if such 
products are not produced in the exporting country, or if there is no comparable price for them in 
the exporting country (Article 2.5. GATI Anti-dumping Code). 
Likewise, European .anti-dumping law provides the same three examples of cases in which the use 
of the price in the country of origin might be appropriate. Contrary to GATI anti-dumping law, 
ECSC anti-dumping law does not express any preference for either the exporting country or the 
country of origin (Article 2(6)(a) basic ECSC Decision). Hence, the choice is up to the European 
anti-dumping authorities, who always define the scope of the anti-dumping proceeding by 
reference to the country of origin295 and use the price in that country, unless none of the three 
293 Within the framework of GATr, the possibility that exporting country and country of origin are not the same, was first raised 
in 1955. In its report of 3 March 1955, the Working Party of GATI agreed that where goods are not imported directly from the 
country of origin, it would be in accordance with the terms of Article VI to determine the margin of dumping by comparing the 
price at which the products are sold from the exporting country to the importing country with the comparable price in either the 
exporting country or the country of origin (JJ.1.S.D., Third Supplement, Geneva, GATI, 1955, 223, consideration 5). This view was 
also adopted by the GATI Group of Experts in its report of 1959 (B.l.S.D., Eigth Supplement, Geneva, GA'IT, 1960, 148-149, 
consideration 11). 
294 See Article 2(c) 1968 GATI Anti-dumping Code, of which ~iele 2(3) 1980 GATr Anti-dumping Code is an exact copy. 
295 Though it is possible to define the scope of an anti-dumping proceeding by means of the exporting country (see : Article 14(2) 
basic EC Regulation ; Article 13(2) basic ECSC Decision), anti-dumping proceedings have been terminated because the origin of the 
allegedly dumped products could not be determined (Commission Decision 85/158/EEC of 22 February 1985 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 27 February 1985, No L 59/30; 
Commission Decision 86/193/EEC of 23 May 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of electronic 
typewriters originating in Taiwan, O.J., 27 May 1986, No L 140/52), or because the products exported do not originate in the 
allegedly dumping country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761/90 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of tungsten ores and concentrates originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding 
concerning import& originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83/23; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 
September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the 
People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50). 
Similarly, no dumping margin bas been calculated for the exporting country when a dumping margin had already been determined 
for the country of origin (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 720/90 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 27 March 1990, No L 80/9; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made 
staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 27Gn; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles 
originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 
April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477193 of 6 
September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16). 
Moreover, in the anti-dumping cases concerning hematite graphite spheroidal pig iron from Brazil (Commission Recommendation No 
294/79/ECSC of 13 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain hematite pig iron originating in Brazil, 
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conditions under which that price might .be appropriate, is being fulfilled296• This case law bas 
been incorporated in EC anti-dumping law, according to which the exporting country shall 
normally be the country of origin ; it may be an intermediate country in inter alia the three cases 
enumerated by GAIT anti-dumping law (Article 1(3) basic EC Regulation). Thus, GATT and 
European ·anti-dumping law express opposite preferences. 
2.2.2.2. Definition of the concept «Origin» 
The preference in European anti-dumping law for the country of origin may be said to be contrary 
to the spirit of GA IT anti-dumping law. Because of the focus on the exporting country, the idea 
of «knowledge of dumping» is present in GATT anti-dumping ·1aw. For only the exporter 
established in the exporting country may know whether he is dumping because he, instead of the 
producer established in the country of origin, decides at what price he exports to the Community. 
In European anti-dumping law, however, the idea of «knowledge of dumping» will only be 
accepted, if such an interpretation is placed on the concept of «origin» that the exporting country 
is reduced to a country of transit where prices cannot be influenced. 
The GATT Agreement on Rules of Origin, which was drafted on the occassion of the GATT 
Uruguay Round,. limits the discretion of the European anti-dumping authorities, as it stipulates that 
it applies to anti-dumping proceedings (Article 1.2.). European anti-dumping law provides that 
the rules on the common definition of the concept of «origin» are applicable to anti-dumping 
proceedings. EC anti-dumping law allows the European anti-dumping authorities to adopt special 
provisions in pursuance with this common definition (Article 14(3) basic EC Regulation). ECSC 
anti-dumping law equally allows the European anti-dumping authorities to adopt special 
provisions, but seems that those special provisions may deviate from the common definition 
O.J., 16 February 1979, No L 41/29; Commission Recommendation No 720n9/ECSC of 9 April 1979 providing for the termination 
of the application of the provisional anti-dumping duty eetablished in relation to imports of certain hematite pig iron originating in 
Brazil, O.J., 11April1979, No L 92/10; CommiBBion Recommendation No 950n9/ECSC of 14 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on certain hematite pig iron originating in Brazil hut imported from some other non-member country, O.J., 16 May 
1979, No L 120/11), •teel pUJtes and iron plates from Spain (Commission Recommendation No 433n9/ECSC of 27 February 1979 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates of iron or steel originating in Spain and repealing certain 
suspended anti-dumping duties, O.J., 3 March 1979, No L 53/21; Commission Recommendation No 787n9/ECSC of 20 April 1979 
providing for the termination of the provisional anti-dumping duties eetablished in relation to imports of certain steel products 
originating in Spain, O.J., 21April1979, No L 99/31; Commission Recommendation No 1083/79/ECSC of 30 May 1979 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on certain plates of iron or steel originating in Spain hut imported from some other non-member 
country, O.J., 1 June 1979, No L 135/54) and steel angks, shapes and sections from Spain (Commission Recommendation No 
267n9/ECSC of 9 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, 1 or H sections of iron 
or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Spain, O.J., 13 February 1979, No L 37/21; Commission 
Recommendation No 787n9/ECSC of 20 April 1979 providing for the term.ination of the provisional anti-dumping dutiea 
eetablished in relation to imports of certain steel products originating in Spain, O.J., 21 April 1979, No L 99/31; CommiBBion 
Recommendation No 935n9/ECSC of 8 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, 1 or H 
sections of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Spain hut imported from eome other non-
member country, O.J., 12 May 1979, No L 117/16) anti-dumping duties were impoaed only on indirect trade, hut the scope of the 
duties was determined by reference to the origin of the dumped products. 
296 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1391/91 of 27 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of of aspartame originating in 
Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, No L 134/1. 
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(Article 13(7) basic ECSC Decision). Clearly, in that case, ECSC anti-dumping law is, unlike EC 
anti-dumping law, at variance with the GA IT Agreement on Rules of Origin and should be 
amended as soon as possible. 
Though the GA TI Agreement on Rules of Origin prohibits any deviation from the common 
definition of origin, it does not entirely deprive the European anti-dumping authorities of their 
discretionary powers, as the common rules on origin are open to many divergent 
implementations297• According to the European common definition of the concept «origin», a 
product must be «deemed to originate in the country where they underwent their last, substantial, 
economically justified processing or working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose and 
resulting in the . manufacture of a new product or representing an important stage of 
manufacture»298• For the Court of Justice, the decisive criterion is that ·of the last substantial 
process or operation. The Court of Justice considers a process or operation to be substantial if, 
through that process or operation, the use to which the component parts are to be put becomes 
definite and the processed products are given their specific qualities. If the use of that criterion is 
not conclusive, the Court of Justice allows the use of the value-added test299 • The European 
anti-dumping authorities seem to apply the common definition of the concept «origin» correctly. 
Sometimes, they explicitly refer to the common definition300 and, in general, they use the 
value-added test in order to determine the substantiality of the operation301 • 
The European anti-dumping authorities place, however, a broad interpretation on the concept 
«origin». They regard trade via subsidiaries established in third countries as direct trade and 
297 VERMULST, E., «R.ules of Ongin as Commercial Policy lnstruments - Revisited», Joumal of World Trade, 1992/6, (61), 95-96. 
298 Article 24 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establiehing the Community Cuetome Code, O.J., 19 
October 1992, No L 30211. 
299 C.J.E.C., case 26/88, 13 December 1989, Brot~r International GmbH v Hau.ptzollamt Gie/Jen, E.C.R., 1989, (4253), 4278-4281. 
3oo Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82of18 January 1982 impoeing a definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the 
United States of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, No L 12/1; Co:rnmission Decision 86/193/EEC of 23 May 1986 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of electronic typewriters originating in Taiwan, O.J., 27 May 1986, No L 140/52. The 
Regulations taken by the Commiseion in execution of Council Regulation (EEC) No 802/68 (i.e., the former Regulation on the 
common definition of the concept of the origin of goods (0.J., June 28, 1968, No. L 148/1}} are also taken into account, see: 
Commission Decision 85/158/EEC of 22 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 27 February 1985, No L 59/30; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 129/91 of 11 January 
1991 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small-screen colour televieion receivers originating in Hong Kong and 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/31; Commission Regulation (EC} No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of 
China, the Republic ofK~rea, Singap0re and Thailand, O.J., 1October1994, No L 255/50. 
301 See : pMnol from ~ United States of America, where the American exporter argued that on the basis of the value added test 
the products were of European origin instead of American origin. The European anti-dumping authorities were of the opinion that 
the products were of American origin because the last process took place in the United States of America and created a new 
product (Council Regulation (EEC} No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in 
the United States of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, No L 12/1). 
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consider countries in which the product underwent a delay or a judicia! act that does not have a 
direct relationship with transport, to be exporting countries302• Moreover, they seem to accept 
low value added operations may confer origin303• That broad interpretation may go against the 
common definition of the concept «origin». Moreover, it may be contrary to the spirit of GATT 
anti-dumping law, which, in view of its preference for the exporting country, incorporates the 
idea of «knowledge of dumping». Because, in their eyes, price manipulation in third countries 
does not affect the origin of the product, the European anti-dumping authorities have not adopted 
an interpretation of the concept «origin» by means of which the idea of «knowledge of dumping», 
may be incorporated in European anti-dumping law. Moreover, that broad interpretation results in 
th~ highest degree of protection as possible. Indeed, such an interpretation enlarges the scope of 
anti-dumping protection304 and reduces the possibilities of circumvention, e.g., by establishing 
packaging, labelling, sorting, mixing, labelling and simple assembly operations in another country 
that does not come within the scope of application of anti-dumping protection305• 
2. 2. 3. Whose normal value ? 
Producer and exporter do not always coincide. GATT anti-dumping law does not define whose 
prices and costs must be used for determining normal value. European anti-dumping law seems to 
pref er the exporting side, as it allows the use of the prices and, under ECSC anti-dumping law, 
the costs of other sellers and producers if «the exporteI"» in the country of origin neither produces 
nor sells the like product in the country of origin» (Article 2(l)(a) basic EC Regulation ; Article 
2(3)(c) basic ECSC Decision). Thus, normal value must apparently be based on the prices or 
costs of the exporter insofar as he sells or produces the like product on bis domestic market. 
302 In the anti-dumping cases concerning hematite graphite spheroidal pig iron from Brazil , steel plates and iron plates from Spain 
and steel ang'lea, ahapes and aections from Spain the Commission defined _the exporting country as the last intermediate country in 
which the product concerned underwent a delay or a judicia! act that does not have a direct relationship with transport 
(Commission Recommendation No 1218179/ECSC of 19 June 1979 supplementing recommendations No 935n9/ECSC, No 
950n9/ECSC and No 1083179/ECSC concerning anti-dumping duties on certain steel products, O.J., 21 June 1979, No L 153/17). 
J03 An increase in value between 45 and 50 % would be considered as a significant factor in the detennination of origin in recent European anti-
dumping case law (VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and olher Trade Protection Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 
224-225). The European anti-dumping authorities, though, have stated that «no threshold bas been specified in either Community legislation or in 
previous (anti-dumping) cases for the minimum value added that must be respected in order for a producer to qualify as part of Community 
industry> and accept.cd a value added of hut 20 to 35 % sufficient for conferring Community origin to products assembled in the Community 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopien 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12). As the discretionary powen of the European anti-dumping authorities regarding the 
definition of origin apply to all aspects of European anti-dumping law, such a broad interpretation may also be applied to the products imported into 
the Community. 
304 See : McQUEEN, M., d.omé and the Protective Effect of Rules of Origin», Journal of World Trade Law, 1982, (119), 124-126. 
3o5 See : McQUEEN, M., d.omé and the Protective Effect of Rules of Origin », Journal of World Trade Law, 1982, (119), 124-127 ; 
NUSBAUMER, J., tcOrigin Systems and the Trade of Develloping Countriesn, Journal of World Trade Law, 1979, (34), 35. The 
conclusion of M. McQUEEN and J. NUSBAUMER is the opposite to the conclusion made here, but anti-dumping measures have 
the opposite effect with regard to tariff preferences. 
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However, European anti-dumping law also treats of «the exporter or producer» when explaining 
how the constructed value must be determined (Article 2(6) basic EC Regulation). It, thus seems 
that the terminology of European anti-dumping is quite inaccurate and, therefore, does not allow 
to draw conclusions as to whose normal value should be determined. 
According to the European anti-dumping authorities,- «their usual method (consists in) calculating 
normal value on the basis of transactions by the producers»306, because an exporter who does 
not manufacture the product «is normally free to purchase from any source, and may change its 
source of supply whenever convenient»307• In practice, though, there usually is not any 
problem since producer and exporter are practically always identical. Moreover, in one case, the 
European anti-dumping authorities have calculated the normal value on the basis of the 
transactions of the exporter3°8• 
The exporter is the one who sells the product for export to the Community3°9• He does not 
have to actually export it. This definition of the exporter coincides with the definition of the 
export price. As, under European anti-dumping law, the export price is defined as the price «for 
the product when sold from the exporting country to the Community» (Article 2(8) basic EC 
Regulation) or as the price «for the product sold for export to the Community» (Article 2(8)(a) 
J06 CommiBBion Decision 91/142/EEC of 15 March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Atlantic 
salmon originating in Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, No L 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 1991, No L 75/64). 
3o7 Comrniuion Regulation (EC) No 371/94 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, No L 48/10. 
3os See: Atlantic aalmon from Norway, where the norm.al value was based on the transactions of the exporter. Because hls 
transactions on the Norwegian market were made at a loss, the constructed value was used. It was calculated on the basis of the 
production costs of the producers, including their profits, the genera! e:xpenses of the ezporters and a reasonable profit margin on 
their resale activities (Commission Decision 91/142/EEC of 15 March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of Atlantic salmon originating in Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, No L 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 1991, No 
L 75/64)). If it was the usual method of calculating norm.al value on the basis of the transactions of the producers, the European 
anti-dumping authorities could have calculated the constructed value for them; i.e., without adding the genera! e:xpenses and a 
profit margin of the exportera. However, they chose not to do so. 
3o9 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1411/81 of 25 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on orthoxylene (~Xylene) 
originating in Puerto Rico and the United States of America, O.J., 27 May 1981, No L 141129; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1591/81of10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on paraxylene (p-xylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United 
States of America and the US Virgin lslands, O.J., 16 June 1981, No L 158f7; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81 of 15 
July 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the Unlted States of America, O.J., 18 July 1981, No 
L 195/22; Council Regulation (EEC) No 551/83 of 8 March 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on kraftliner paper and 
board originating in the United States of America and accepting undertakings given in connection with the review of the anti-
dumping proceeding on kraftliner paper and board originating in Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the Soviet Union and 
Sweden, O.J., 10 March 1983, No L 64125; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 744/84of19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, No L 79/8 
(corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, No L 86/31); Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain ball hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No 
L 167/3; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3421/90 of 26 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
aspartame originating in Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 29 November 1990, No L 330/16; C.J.E.C" joined cases 
133/87 and 150/87, 14March1990, Naahua Corporation v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (719), 754 and 774. 
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basic ECSC Decision31°), the export price is the price paid to the exporter. Through that 
coincidence, the idea of «knowledge of dumping» would be present in European anti-dumping case 
law if normal value was determined in respect of the exporter. Por the exporter should then have 
the opportunity of knowing in advance whether or not he is dumping, when normal value and 
export price are both based on data which the exporter may influence or at least should be aware 
of. · However, as it usually assesses normal value in respect of the producer, European anti-
dumping case law is not characterised by the idea of «knowledge of dumping», unless, by mere 
coincidence, namely when the producer is also the exporter. 
2. 2. 4. Comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade 
The determination of dumping depends on the interpretation placed on the concept «comparable 
sales in the ordinary course of trade». The domestic market price may be used as normal value 
standard only if there are comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade (Article Vl(l) GATI ; 
Articles 2.1. and 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Articles 1(2) and 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; 
Article 2(3) basic ECSC Decision). The more restrictive the interpretation of the concept 
«comparable sa.les in the ordinary course of trade», the more the alternative normal value 
standards, especially the constructed value, will be used. The use of the alternative normal value 
standards may alter the outc~me of the dumping examination. Indeed, the domestic market price 
should merely be established on the basis of invoices. The constructed value, the most frequently 
used alternative nonnal value standard, is based on production costs, general expenses and profits. 
It is susceptible to calculation errors and even arbitrariness. Indeed, the production costs, general 
expenses and profits must be determined on the basis of accounting records, not aimed at. 
specifying product prices. The allocation of production costs, general expenses and profits 
between the different products produced by the exporter on the basis of accounting records is 
difficult and may result in miscalculations. Moreover, the amount for general expenses and 
profits must be reasonable (Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(3) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision). A concept as vague as «reasonable» opens 
the door to arbitrariness. 
The concept «comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade>> comprises two elements : the 
concept of «ordinary course of trade» (section 2.2.4.1.) and the concept of «comparable sales» 
(section 2.2.4.2.)3 11• 
3 tO lnfra, 240-243. 
311 C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R" 1992, 1, (677), 701 (Opinion of Advocate Genera( VAN 
GERVEN) and 720. 
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2.2.4.1. Ordinary course of trade 
GATI anti-dumping law does not define the concept «ordinary course of trade>>. European anti-
dumping law mentions sales between associated parties and sales at a loss as examples of 
situations which may be considered as not representing the ordinary course of trade (Article_ 2.2.1. 
GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(1)(b) and (4) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(4) and (7) 
basic ECSC Decision)312• According to European anti-dumping authorities, ordinary course of 
trade requires that the domestic market prices are generally available to all existing and potential 
buyers and that they include all production costs regardless of whether competition is influenced 
by the existence of a cartel, a monopoly or a minimum-price arrangement3 13 . The genera! 
availability of prices does not seem to be an additional example of a situation not representing the 
ordinary course of trade. It would seem to refer to sales between associated parties, i.e. , sales at 
prices only available to associated parties, are made not in the ordinary course of trade-1 14• 
In view of European anti-dumping case law, ordinary course of trade requires also a certain 
degree of competition315• That requirement is not illegal. European anti-dumping law does 
not provide an exhaustive definition of the concept «ordinary course of trade>> where. it mentions 
312 C.J.E.C., caae C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Gold.star Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 701 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN 
GER.VEN) and 720. 
313 Commission Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain 
pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, No 
L 196122. See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2936/82 of 28 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 4 November 1982, No L 30Bn; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 
September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting 
the undertakings in connection with the investigation of imports of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the 
German Democratie Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of certain 
deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14. 
314 In titanium mill products from Japan. and welded tubes from Yugoslcwia two conditions are applied in order to investigate the 
existence of an ordinary course of trade. One condition concerns the coverage of all production costs whereas the other condition is 
the requirement that sales are made to non-associated buyers (Commission Decision 85/252/EEC of 23 April 1985 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain titanium mill products originating in Japan and the United States of 
America, O.J., 26 April 1985, No L 113130; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89of11 October 1989 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No L 294110). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the condition of general availability of prices implies that the domestic market prices must be 
prices charged to all non-associated buyers. 
Though both conditions have to be fulfilled, the condition that all production costs must be covered eeems to be the most 
fundamental. In aensitised paper for colour photographs from Japan the existence of a reasonable relationship between prices and 
production costs falaifies the presumption concerning the impact of associations between parties on selling prices (Commission 
Decision 841259/EEC of 10 May 1984 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of certain sensitized paper for colour photographs originating in Japan and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 11 May 
1984, No L 124/45). 
315 Commission Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain 
pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, No 
L 196122; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in connection with the investigation of imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Democratie Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating 
the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11September1986, No L 259/14. 
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sa.les between associated parties and sa.les at a loss as examples of sa.les not taking place in the 
ordinary course of trade. 
GATT anti-dumping law recognizes that special regard must be given by developed countries to 
the special situation of developing countries when considering the application of anti-dumping 
measures (Article 15 GATT Anti-dumping Code). Accordingly, sa.les on the domestic market of 
developing countries might be considered as not having been made in the ordinary course of trade. 
European anti-dumping law does not contain such a provision nor has European anti-dumping case 
law yet applied this provision of GATT anti-dumping law in connection with the normal value 
determination. However, as European anti-dumping law does not provide an exhaustive definition 
of the concept 4<0rdinary course of trade», it does not prohibit to consider sa.les on the domestic 
market of developing countries as not having been made in the ordinary course of trade. 
This section investigates sales between associated parties (section 2.2.4.1.1.), sales at a loss 
(section 2.2.4.1.2.), sales on a competitive domestic market (section 2.2.4.1.3.) and sales on the 
domestic market of developing countries (section 2.2.4.1.4.). 
2.2.4.1.1. Sales between associated parties 
A manufacturing company may circumvent anti-dumping law by creating a legally distinct, but 
fully owned sa.les company. This sales company would buy the products of the manufacturing 
company at a price equal to or below the export price, and resell them on the domestic market of 
the exporting country at a price above the export price. The fact that the profits made on the 
domestic market are located within the sales company, makes no difference to the manufacturer, 
because he owns the sales company. 
In order to prevent such a circumvention, sales between associated parties may be considered as 
not having been made in the ordinary course of trade (Article 2(l)(b) basic EC Regulation ; 
Article 2(7) basic ECSC Decision). European anti-dumping law does not provide a definition of 
the notion 4<a8sociated»316• Moreover, it requires only that the parties <<appear>> to be 
associated317• Thus, it grants the European anti-dumping authorities a large discretion in 
interpreting the concept <<association». 
316 BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr von. Dumping un.d Subvention.en. durch die Europäiache Gemein.schaften., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1980, 58; BOUDANT, J., L'an.ti-dumpin.g communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 88; BRIET, L.A.E., ccA.ntidumping in de EEG -
De kinderschoenen ontgroeid?», S.E. W., 1982, (145), 162, note (30); LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautaire de protection. 
con.tre Ie dumping et les aubvention.s, Paris, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 68; VAN BAEL, 1., and BEI.LIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other 
Trade Protection. Lawa of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 46. 
317 VAN BAEL, I.~ and BEI.LIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Prote.ction. Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd, 
1990, 46. 
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Thus far, the European anti-dumping authorities have not paid much attention to the concept 
ccassociation». When being confronted with presumably associated parties, they always investigate 
whether those parties do not constitute an economie unit. lndeed, as they do not accept the forma! 
distinction between sa.les departments incorporated within the manufacturing company and sales 
companies associated with the manufacturing company318, they apply the economie unit theory. 
Originally, the European anti-dumping authorities placed a broad i~terpretation on the notion of 
economie unit. Thus, they held a sales company3 19 to constitute an economie unit with the 
manufacturing company if: 
(i) the principal function of the sa.les company is to sell or to facilitate the sa.Ie of the 
corporate p~oduct320 ; or 
(ii) (a) the fact that the sa.les company is wholly owned by the corporate entity ; or 
(b) the fact that the sa.les company is wholly controlled by the corporate entity ; or 
(iii) the existence of strong links with respect to management personnel and stafl:921 • 
According to the European anti-dumping authorities, these three conditions need not be fulfilled 
cumulatively322• 
318 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a d~finitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ball 
hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic scales originating in Japan 
and accepting undertaltlngs and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, 
O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5. 
319 Economie unit theory is not applied to sales departments. It can only be applied to legally distinct parties. Parties not having 
separate legal personality are an economie as well as a legal unity. Indeed, in photocopiers from Japan., the Commission held that 
ccwhen a sales organisation ( ... )is only apart of a concern contemphiting the production and the sale of specific products, article 2, 
paragraph 7, ia not applicable on the transfer of these products from one part of the concern to another, e.g., from the 
manufacturing to the selling.. (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5). Thus, Article 2(1)(b) basic EC 
Regulation and Article 2(7) basic ECSC Decision are not applicable to a sales organisation. On the other hand, it follows from 
European anti-dumping case law that those Articles are applicable to sales companies. A sales organisation differs from a salea 
company in that it is a legally distinct entity. 
320 This condition is still fulfilled when the manufacturing company carries out a limited number of sales functions (C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 
March 1992, Matsushita Eleclrlc lndustrlal Co. Ud and Matsushita Electrlc Trading Co. Ud v Council, E. C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1456 (Opinion of 
Advocate General MISCHO) and 1472). 
321 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports ·of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 Octoher 1985 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings 
and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No 
L 275/5; Commisaion Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres 
of polyesters originating in the German Democratie Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No L 103/38. 
322 In electronic typewriter• from Japan and synthetic polyster fibres from Turkey, the Council and the Commiseion respectively 
determined the existence of an economie unity because ccone or more of these three conditions» were fulfilled (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in 
Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the German Democratie Republic, Romania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No L 103/38). 
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The Court of J ustice, though approving the application of the economie unit theory to anti-
dumping Iaw323, did not accept this broad interpretation placed upon the notion of «economie 
unit». Instead, it required the following two conditions to be met cumulatively : 
(i) the sales company carries out tasks which are normally the responsibility of an intemal sales 
department of the manufacturing organization ; and 
(il) the manufacturing company bas con trol over the sales company324• 
Since the Court's first judgements on this matter, the European anti-dumping authorities seem to 
have adopted this less broad interpretation325• 
The sa.me seems to hold 
oondition (i), European 
agreements to constitute 
with regard to the implementation of those two conditions. As to 
anti-dumping authorities originally considered sole representation 
an association326• However, since Advocate-Genera! J .P. 
323 C.1.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Eleclric Company Lid (1EC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5919; 
C.J.E.C., joincd cases 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limiied a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5975; C.1.E.C., case C-
171187, 10 Marcb 1992, Canon Ine. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1287; C.1.E.C., cue C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lid v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 1391 ; C.1.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, MaLsushita Electric lnduslrial Co. Lid and MaLsushita Electric 
Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1471-1472; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 march 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lid v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1624-1625; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1635), 1673. 
324 C.1.E.C" joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Company Lid (1EC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5919; 
C.1.E.C., joincd cases 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limiied a.o. v Councll, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5915; C.J.E.C., case C-
171187, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Council, E.C.R" 1992, 1, (1237), 1287; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lid v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 1391 ; C.1.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Maisushita Electric /ndus1rial Co. Lid and Maisushita Electric 
Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1471-1472; C.J.E.C., c~se C-178/87, 10 march 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lid v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1624-1625; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporalion v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1635), 1673; 
·c.1.E.C., case C-104/90, 13 October 1993, MaLsushita Electric Industrial Co. Lid v Council, recital 18 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN 
GERVEN) and considerations 8-10 (not yet reported). 
The Court of Juatice, thus, appliea the aame economie unit theory to anti-dumping law 111 the one it applies to antitrust law (compare with : 
C.1.E.C., case 48/69, July 14, 1972, lmperial Oiemical Industries Lid v Commission, E.C.R., 1972, 619; C.J.E.C. joined cases 6-7173, March 6, 
1974, lnslitulO Olemioterapico Itaüano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporalion v Commission, E.C.R., 1974, 223 ; C.1.E.C., case 15174, 
October 31, 1974, Centra/arm BV a.o. v Sieeling Drug, E.C.R., 1974, 1147; Decision No. 70/332/EEC, June 30, 1970, Kodak, O.J., July 7, 
1970, No. L 147/24. See alao: Decision No. 69/195/EEC, June 18, 1969, Christiani &: Nielsen, O.J., July 5, 1969, No. L 165/12; Decision No. 
72/457/EEC, December 14, 1972, Zoja C.S.C.-1.C.I., O.J., December 31, 1972, No. L 299/51 ; BARACK, B., 1he tipplication of the Compelilion 
rules (anlitnut law) of the European Economie Communiiy, Deventer, Kluwer, 1981, 55; MANN, F.A., ~The Doctrine of International 
1urisdiction Reviaitcd Aftcr Twenty Yeal'S», Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit /ntemalional, 1984/m, (11), 65). 
325 See e.g. : electronic weighing scales from JapfUI, where an economie unit was found between a producer and a sales company because the 
producer had tinancial control over the aales company and had divided tasks of marketing bis production among the manufacturing company, selling 
directly to diatributora or dealen, the aalea department of the manufacturing company and two related sales companies which sold to end-users 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 993/93 of 26 April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic weighing scales 
originating in 1apan, O.J., 29 April 1993, No L 104/4). 
326 Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 26VT7 of 4 Fehruary 1977 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on hall bearings, 
tapered roller hearings and parts thereof originating in Japan, O.J., 5 Fehruary 1977, No L 34160; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
177Bn7 of 26 July 1977 concerning the application of the anti-dumping duty on hall hearings and tapered roller hearings, 
originating in Japan, O.J., 3 August 1977, No L 196/1. It concerned a sole representation agreement hetween an exporter and an 
importer (see: C.J.E.C., joined cases 113 and 118-12VT7, March 29, 1979, NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 
1979, (1185), 1254-1255 (opinion of Advocate-Genera! J.P. W ARNER)). In investigating and estahlishing the existence of an 
association, European anti-dumping law has adopted the same approach for sales within the domestic market as for export&, see : 
BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N, Anti-Dumping ·and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 66. 
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W ARNER327, followed later by the Court of Justice328 , bas stated that a sole representation 
agreement cannot be considered to constitute an association, European anti-dumping case law does 
not provide any evidence as to sole representation agreements329• 
With regard to condition (ii), European anti-dumping case law seems to be in line with the Court 
of Justice's case law. The control of the manufacturing company over the sales company is 
usually founded on stock ownership330• Whole stock ownership is deemed to create the 
327 C.J.E.C., joined cases 113 and 118-121177, March 29, 1979, NTN Toyo Bearing Compan.y Ltd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, 
(1185), 1264-1256 (opinion of Advocate-Genera! J.P. WARNER), where Advocate-Genera! J.P. WARNER held that a contractual 
link, such as a eole representation agreement, does not constitue an aseociation. Though the Court of Justice did not pass a 
judgement on this point, the Ew-opean anti-dumping authorities, contrary to their prior decisions (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 261177 of 4 Fehruary 1977 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on hall hearings, tapered roller hearings and parts thereof 
originating in Japan, O.J., 6 Fehruary 1977, No L 34160 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1778!17 of 26 July 1977 concerning the 
application of the anti-dumping duty on hall hearings and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, O.J., 3 August 1977, No 
L 196/1), did no longer consider this agreement to be an aseociation in the following of the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
hall hearings from Japan (Commission Decision 81/406/EEC of 4 June 1981 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of hall and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet 
Union and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 11 June 1981, No L 152/44; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3669/84 of 21 
December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings 
originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, No L 340/37 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 
1985, No L 167/3). 
328 C.J.E.C., case 205/87, 11-Novemher 1987, Nuova Ceam Srl v Commission., E.C.R" 1987, (4427), 4430; C.J.E.C., case 279/86, 8 
July 1987, SA Serme• v Commission., E.C.R., 1987, (3109), 3112 and 3114; C.J.E.C., case 301/86, 8 July 1987, R. Frimodt Pe<krsen. 
AIS v Commiasion, E.C.R., 1987, (3123), 3126. 
329 Th . Eu ·-c1 • 1 th . d . d led . f 1 . . . 1 Indeed . us, m ropean anti umpmg aw, e same attitu e as a op m respect o so e representataon agreements as m antatrust aw. , m 
European antitruat case law, the question whether an exclusive selling agreement constitutes a aufficient ground to concede to the existence of an 
economie unit bctwccn the grantor of the concession and the concessionary bas been answered in the negative. In the Sugar Union Case (C.J .E.C., 
joined cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113-114n3, December 16, 1975, Sugar Union UA a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1975, 1663) the Court of 
Justice held that a rcprcscntative will constitute an economie unit with the principal, if he sells the principal's product& on behalf of and for account 
of the principal, if he bas to follow the instructions of the principal and to look after the principal's interest& ; if, however, the representative acts at 
bis own risk and on his account, there will be no economie unit between him and bis principal. A non-negligible circumstance was the fact that the 
representative was carrying out other activities than selling the principal's products. In the Piusburgh Coming Europe Case (Commission Decision 
No 72/403/EEC of 23 November 1972, Piusburgh Coring Europe, O.J., 5 December 1972, No L 272/35) the Commission adopted the aamc 
attitude towards exclusive selling agreements. The fact that the representative had other activities than selling the principal's product&, was also 
decisive. But in the B.M. W. Case (Commiasion Decision No 78/155/EEC, 23 December 1978, B.M. W. Belgium N.V. and Belgian B.M. W.-
dealers, O.J., 17 February 1978, No L 46/33) this circumstance was not present. Nevertheleas the Commission held that an exclusive conceasion 
agreement did not create auch a degree of economie dependence that the concessionaries had no alternative but to aubscribe the instructions of the 
grantor of the conceuion. lt was recognized that this agreement caused aome degrec of economie dependence liable to condition the 
conceasionaries' room for initiative and decision. This was nota aufficient degree to concede to an economie unit. The Commiasion's B.M.W.-
decision was brought bcfore the Court of Justice which reaffirmed it (C.J.E.C., joined cases 32 and 36-82178, July 12, 1979, B.M. W. Belgium N.V. 
a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1979, 2435). 
33o Exceptionally, the control is found because of other «mutual link&» (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertak.ings and terminating the 
proceeding in respect of certain imports of such product& originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5). The notion «mutual links» bas 
not yet been clarificd. 
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unrebuttable presumption that the entirely owned company is wholly controlled by its owner331 • 
However, a majority stock ownership may also imply the control of the majority stock bolder over 
the sales company. The European anti-dumping authorities have considered a 50 % share 
holding332, as well as a 5 % share holding333, to represent a majority stock ownership. The 
Court of Justice too has considered a 20 % share holding to be sufficient for a majority stock 
ownership334• A 5 or 20 % share holding, though, will not always be sufficient. A majority 
stock ownership normally depends upon the degree of dispersion of stock ownership335. Thus, 
if there is only a majority stock ownership, it should be investigated whether it is the majority 
stock owner who controls the sales company. 
It seems that the notion of economie unit is less broad than the notion of association. For an 
association to exist, only condition (ii) must be fullfilled336• For example, there will be an 
association, but not an economie unit, when a manufacturing company controls another 
manufacturing company which buys and processes the first company's product. In this case, 
condition (il) is not met and, thus, there will be no economie unit, though there is an association. 
This interpretation placed. on the concept «association» is accompanied by the rebuttable 
presumption that the sales prices between associated parties are influenced by the association. 
331 See : Commission Recommendation No 259/83/ECSC of 27 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on broad-
flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 1 February 1983, No L 30/61 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1983, No L 36/10; 
Commission Decision No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and 
plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 July 1987, No L 207121; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 
August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain i.mports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5 ; Commission Decision 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain seamless tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Austria, O.J., 28 January. 
1989, No L 25/87. 
332 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5. 
333 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic 
scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, No L 97/1. 
· 
334 C.J.E.C., case C-104/90, 13 October 1993, Matsushita Electric lndustrial Co. Lid v Council, recital 3 (Opinion Advocate General VAN 
OER.VEN) and consideration 8 (not yet reported). 
335 In electronic typewriter• from Japan the Commission stated that the manufacturing company possessed a majority stock 
ownerehip because the other ownere had each individually only a verry small share-holding (Commiesion Regulation (EEC) No 
3643/84 of 20 December 1984 impoeing a provieional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, 0.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43). 
336 Sec : polyester yams from the People 's Repubüc of China, where an association was found between companies of which il was only noted that 
they were financially linkcd to cach other (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa of certain polyester yams (man-made slapie fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and temûnating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 
1991, No L 276n, where it concerned an association between an exporter and importers. Nevertheless, it is relevant becausc European anti-
dumping law bas adopted the same approach for sales between associated parties on the domestic market of the exporting country as for exporta to 
the Community (BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, 'A.N, Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. 1he European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 56)). 
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Under European anti-dumping case law, the rebuttal is successful when the sa.les prices between 
associated parties are comparable337 to price actually charged between non-associated 
parties338• The sa.les price between · non-associated parties is a rather rough standard. It is 
quite possible that transactions between non-associated parties do not take place in the ordinary 
course of trade, or that non-associated parties are less efficient and, therefore, must charge higher 
prices than the associated parties. 
In only one European anti-dumping case, the transactions between associated parties were 
considered to be made in the ordinary course of trade not only because the prices were 
comparable to those between non-associated parties, but also because there was a reasonable 
relationship between the prices and _production costs and because sa.les took place under conditions 
which for a reasonable time had been normal in · the trade under consideration339• In this 
respect, the condition that the sa.les between associated parties must correspond to sales made in 
the ordinary course of trade, is combined with the condition that prices between associated parties 
must be comparable to prices between non-associated parties. As a result, the rebuttal is made 
more difficult. Because of the difficulties in rejecting the presumption that prices are influenced 
by the association, together with the broad interpretation placed on the concept «association», the 
337 Both prices must be comparable to each other. If there is a difference between both prices and ü there are circumstances, 
other than the association, which can explain this difference, e.g., the quantities sold, the presumption will be rebutted, see: 
Commission Regulation (EEC} No 1500/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of outboard motors 
originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, No L 152/18. 
338 Commission Regulation (EEC} No 1500/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of outboard 
motors originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, No L 152/18 ; Commission Decision 84/259/EEC of_ 10 May 1984 accepting 
undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain sensitized paper for colour 
photographs originating in Japan and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 11 May 1984, No L 124/45 ; Council Regulation (EEC} No 
1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 
June 1985, No L 16311 ; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 
10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the German 
Democratie Republie, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No L 103138; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 
1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Czeehoslovakia, the German 
Democratie Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No 
L 121111. 
The rebuttal has been rejected merely beeause there were no transactions bet ween the producer/exporter and an independent party. 
See: Commission Deeision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetie fibres of 
polyesters originating in the German Democratie Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No L 103/38; 
Commission Regulation (EEC} No 2140/89of12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact 
disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 257/27}. 
Sometimes, it is not even investigated whether the assumption actually holde and the transactions between associated parties are 
disregarded (Commission Regulation (EC} No 3119/94of19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21December1994, No L 330/15}. 
339 Commission Decision 841259/EEC of 10 May 1984 accepting undertakings given in connect!on with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning imports of certain sensitized paper for colour photographs originating in Japan and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 11May1984, No L 124145. 
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actually charged prices on the domestic market will seldom be used, whenever some kind of 
association may be detected. 
2.2.4.1.2. Sales at a loss 
Under GATT and EC anti-dumping law, sales may be considered as not being in the ordinary 
course of trade if it is determined that : 
(i) when they are made at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) production costs ; 
(il) if it is determined that those sales are made within an extended period of time in 
substantial quantities ; and 
(iii) are at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period 
of time (Article 2.2.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(4) basic EC Regulation). 
Under ECSC anti-dumping law, sales may considered as not having been made in the ordinary 
course of trade : 
(i) whenever there are reasonable grounds for believing or suspecting that the price at which 
a product is actually sold for consumption in the country of origin is less than the cost of 
production ; 
(il) if such sales have been made in substantial quantities during the investigation period ; and 
(iii) are not at prices which permit recovery of all costs, reasonably allocated, within the 
investigation period in the normal course of trade (Article 2(4) basic ECSC Decision). 
Condition (i) concerns the (suspected) existence of sales at a loss. Conditions (ii) and (iii) define 
the circumstances in which sales at a loss are not made in the ordinary course of trade. These 
three conditions have to be fullfilled cumulatively340• 
The major difference between GATT and EC anti-dumping and ECSC anti-dumping law concerns 
the onus of proof. Under ECSC anti-dumping law, it is sufficient that «there are reasonable 
grounds for believing or suspecting that the price ( ... ) is less than the cost of production» (Article 
2(4) basic ECSC Decision) (emphasis added). An allegation made by the complainant Community 
producers about sales at a loss may be such a reasonable ground. For it bas created the rebuttable 
presumption that sales are made at a loss and, consequently, shift the onus of proof onto the 
340 BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 63 ; KRETSCHMER, H., DCJB Anti.dumping- und Antisubventionsrecht der Europäischen Gemein.schaften, 
Frankfurt/Main, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 29; LANDSI'ITEL, R., Dumping in. Au/Jerhan.dela- und Wettbewerbsrecht, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 1987, 26; STANBROOK, C., Dumping. A Man.ual of the EEC Anti-Dumping Law and Procedure, Chequers, European 
Business Publications, 1980, 21. lf not all three conditions are fulfilled, the domestic market price of all sales on the exporter's 
domestic market must be used, including the sales made at prices below the production costs. lndeed, in saccharin.e {rom the 
Un.ited States of America, the Commission determined that the prices of certain sales did not permit recovery of all production 
costs. Nevertheless, the Commission used the weighted average price of all sales - thue i~cluding the sales below the production 
costs - on the domestic market as normal value (Commission Decision 80/1116/EEC of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings 
offered by the exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the United States of America and terminating the 
proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 9 December 
1980, No L 331/41). Probably conditions (ii) and (iii), unlike condition (i), were not fulfilled. 
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exporters341 • In ECSC anti-dumping law, however, no straightforward rule about the onus of 
proof exists342• Indeed, the onus of proof may lie with the exporters in cases not providing 
any evidence of an allegatlon by the complainant Community producers about sales at a loss343 • 
The absence of a straightforward rule as to the onus of proof most certainly does not enhance 
legal certainty. GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, on the other hand, require that prices are below 
341 See e.g. : polye•ter yarna from the United States of America (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United States, O.J., 30 May 1980, No C 129/2 (corrigendum, O.J., June 18, 
1980, No. C 149/19); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 of 22 December 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain polyester yam originating in the United States of America, O.J., 31 December 1980, No L 358191) ; titanium mill 
products from Japan. and the United State• (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of titanium mill 
products originating in Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 7 September 1984, No c·23712; Commission Decision 
85/252/EEC of 23 April 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain titanium mill products 
originating in Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 26 April 1985, No L 113/30); clogs from Sweden (Notice of initiation 
of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 19 February 1985, No C 47/2; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2823/85 of 7 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain clogs originating in 
Sweden, O.J., 10 October 1985, No L 268/11; Commission Decision 86121/EEC of 4 February 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
connection with the anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 7 February 1986, 
No L 32/28) ; •ynthetic fibre• of polyester from the Republic of Korea (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of synthetic fibres of polyester originating in India .and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 21 November 1990, No C 291120; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956192 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres 
of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, No L 197/25 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 54193 
of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 9/2). 
It would seem that the allegation of the complainants must be grounded sufficiently. See: propan.-1-ol from the United States of 
America, where the exporter was not able to provide evidence that hls prices were not below hls production costs. Nevertheless, 
the Comm.ission seems not to have had any reasonable grounds for believing or suspecting that sales were made at a loss 
(Commission Decision 841229/EEC of 13 April 1984 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of propan-1-ol (propyl alcohol) originating in the United States of America, and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 19 April 1984, No L 106/55). Probably the allegation of the complainants was not grounded sufficiently. lndeed, in the notice 
initiating the proceeding no mention was made about any sales at a loss (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding 
concerningimports of propyl alcohol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 14 October 1983, No C 275/3). 
342 European anti-dumping law is not identical to the anti-dumping practice of the United States of America. In the United 
States of America· the complainants must substantiate that sales have been made at a loss. lf they succeed, the onus of proof 
usually lies with the allegedly dumping exporters (DICKEY, W L., ccA Guide for Pricing Commodities to Enter the Commerce of the 
United State&», Law and Policy in International Business, 1979, (491), 500). 
343 See : acrylic fibres from the United States of America (Notice concerning an anti-dumping/anti-subsidy proceeding in respect of 
certain acrylic fibres originating in Greece, Japan, Spain, Turkey and the United Btates of America, O.J., 12 June 1979, No 
C 146/2 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 of 30 April 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres 
originating in the United States of America, 0 . .1., 3 May 1980, No L 114/37); ortlwxylene from Puerto Rico an.d the United State• 
(Notice in connection with the review of the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of o-:xylene (ortho:xylene) originating in Puerto 
Rico and the United States of America, O.J., 15 May 1982, No C 124/2; Council Regulation (EEC) No 906/83 of 18 April 1983 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2761/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on o-:xylene (ortho:xylene) originating in Puerto 
Rico and the United States of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101/4); p-xylene from Puerto Rico, the United States of America 
and the American Virgin l•"lands (Notice in connection with the review of the definitive anti-dumping duty on import& ~f p-:xylene 
(para:xylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United States of America and the American Virgin Islands, O.J., 15 May 1985, No 
C 12412; Council Regulation (EEC) No 905/83of18 April 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2940/81 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on p-xylene (para:xylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United States of America and the United States Virgin 
lslands, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101/l) ; leraftliner from the United States of America (Notice in connection with the review of the 
definitive anti-dumping duty on kraftliner originating in de the United Btates of America and accepting the undertakings for 
kraftliner originating in Canada, Finland, Austria, Portugal, the Soviet Union and Sweden, O.J., 21 August 1982, No C 21712 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 551/83 of 8 March 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on kraftliner paper and board 
originating in the United States of America and accepting undertakings given in connection with the review of the anti-dumping 
proceeding on kraftliner paper and board originating in Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the Soviet Union and Sweden, O.J., 10 
March 1983, No L 64125); wire rod from Brazil an.d Portugal (Notice in connection with the introduction of an anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imports of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 20 February 
1985, No C 4812; CommiBBion Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, 0 . .1., 13 November 1985, No L 299/18). 
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production costs. Thus, reasonable grounds for believing or suspecting, such as an allegation, 
that sa.les are made at a loss will not suffice. Moreover, even if prices are below production 
costs, the onus of proof cannot be shifted onto the exporters. Indeed, under GATT and EC anti-
dumping law, it must be «determined» that those sales are made within an extended period of time 
in substantial quantities and are at prices which do not permit the recovery of all costs (Article 
2.2.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code : Article 2(4) basic EC Regulation). Such a determination is 
clearly different from a determination that exporters are unable to provide the proof to the 
contrary. Moreover, GA TI anti-dumping law explicitly stipulates that «the authorities» must 
determine whether all conditions for sales at a loss are fulfilled (Article 2.2.1. GATT Anti-
d-µmping Code), and, thus, indicates how EC anti-dumping law must be interpreted. As they 
provide a straigthforward rule as to the onus of proof, GATT and EC anti-dumping law should be 
preferred and, in order to stop it from violating GATT anti-dumping law, ECSC anti-dumping law 
should be amended or, at least, its interpretation should be altered. 
The major problem with GATT and European anti-dumping law is that they do not guarantee that 
only sa.les at a loss will be identified which, from an economie point of view, are not made in the 
ordinary course of trade. From an economie point of view, only sales at a loss which do not 
result from short-run profit maximization should be considered as not having been made in the 
ordinary course of trade. Short-run profit maximization may result in sales at prices which cover 
variable and possibly apart of the fixed production costs. For it is more profitable to sell at such 
prices than to stop production and incur a loss equal to total fixed production costs344• In 
condition (i), however, the concept of «cost of production» refers to all variable and fixed 
production costs. 
The con~pt «all costs» used in conditio~ (iii) also refers to variable and fixed production costs. 
lts definition may, however, be economically justified. Condition (iii) differs from condition (i), 
for under condition (iii) it is investigated whether all sales - sales at a loss and profitable sales -
344 . 
Supra, 38-39. 
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cover all production costs345• Indeed, GA TI and EC anti-dumping law stipulate that prices, 
which are above weighted average costs for the investigation period, must be considered to 
provide for the recovery of costs within a reasonable period of time (Article 2.2.1. GATI Anti-
dumping Code; Article 2(4)(a) basic EC Regulation). This seems to meet the economie 
requirement that in the long run total production costs must be covered. 
Condition (il) also seems to render the same economie requirement. For, if substantial 
quantities346 are sold at a loss, total production costs will probably not be covered by the 
revenue of all sales. This is explicitly affirmed by GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, which 
consider sales at a loss to have been made in substantial quantities when it is established that the 
weighted average selling price is below the weighted average unit cost (Note 5 ad Article 2.2.1. 
GA 'IT Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2( 4 )(b) basic EC Regulation). However, condition (ii) does 
not meet condition (iii) entirely, as GATI and EC anti-dumping law consider condition (ii) to be 
equally fulfilled if the volume of sales below unit cost is not less than 20 % of sales being used to 
345 For condition (iii) to be fulfilled the weighted average price of all sales must be below total production costs (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertak.ings offered by certain 
e:xporters in connection with the anti-dumping. proceeding concerning imports of these products and term.inating the investigation 
in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 
February 1990, No L 38/44) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, 
No L 34/8; Commieeion Regulation (EEC) No 1994192 of 14 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into 
the Community of outer rings of tapered roller bearings originating in Japan, O.J., 18 July 1992, No L 199/8 ; BESELER, J.F., and 
WILLIAMS, A.N ., Anti-Dumping and Anti.-Subsi.dy Law. The European Commun.i.ties, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 63 ; see 
also: KRETSCHMER, H. Daa Anti.dumping- un.d Anti.subvention.srecht <kr Europäi.schen. Gemein.schaften., Frankfurt/Main, VWV-
Verlag, 1980, 30), or the weighted average price must cover the average unit cost of production (Commission Regulation (EC) No 
3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisfonal anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, 
Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No L 330/15). Thus, in plain. paper photocopiers from Japan (C.J.E.C., 
case C-178/87, 10 march 1992, Mi.n.olta Camera Co. Ltd v Counci.l, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1626; Council Regulation (EEC) No· 
535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, 
O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54112) and small screen colour televi.sion receivers from the Republic of Korea (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 8282/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour television 
receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1) sales which were considered as profitable, 
covered all sales at an average price above the production costs, including the sales at a loss. In those cases, condition (i) was 
fulfilled - there were sales at a loee -, hut condition (iii) was not. 
346 No further attention will be paid to the interpretation placed on the concept of "substantial quantities>1, For European anti-
dumping case law provides too little information : 
in wire rod from Tri.ni.dad and Tobago and Venezuela condition (ii) was obviously fulfilled because all the domestic 
transactions were made at a loee (Commission Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 term.inating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 13 
November 1985, No L 299/18) ; 
in potato granules from Canada the European anti-dumping authorities considered two thirds of the domestic sales as 
substantial quantity ; the other sales were considered to be comparable sales having been made in the ordinary course of 
trade (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2467/81 of 24 August 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on potato granules 
originating in Canada, O.J., 26 August 1981, No L 243/1; Commission Decision 81/663/EEC of 24 August 1981 accepting 
undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning potato granules originating in Canada, O.J., 26 
August 1981, No L 243/16) ; 
aodi.um carlxmate from the Uni.ted States of America the sales at a loss represented on average 70 % of total domestic sales 
(Commiuion Decision 90/507 /EEC of 7 September 1990 term.inating the review of the anti-dumping measures concerning 
danse sodium carbonate originating in the United States of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, No L 283/38); 
in hematite pig iron from Brazil, more than 90 % of the sales on the domestic market of the e:xporting country were made at a 
loss (Commieeion Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5). 
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determine normal value (Note 5 ad Article 2.2.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(4)(b) 
basic EC Regulation). Here, GATT and EC anti-dumping law grant a broad room for manoeuvre 
to the anti-dumping authorities : the latter can influence the fulfilment of condition (ii) by 
selecting the sales taken into account for the determination of normal value so that 20 % or more 
of those sales are made at a loss. In genera!, GATT and EC anti-dumping law expose the 
weakness of the system : the outcome of an investigation into sales at a loss, depends to a great 
extent on the sales taken into account. 
A similar weakness concerns the period taken into account. Under ECSC anti-dumping law, only 
the sales made during the investigation period are taken into account (Article 2(4)(l)(a) and (b) 
basic ECSC Decision)347• GATT and EC anti-dumping law require that an extended period of 
time, as well as a reasonable period of time be taken into account ; the extended period of time 
should normally be one year but shall in no case be less than six months, whereas the reasonable 
period of time may coincide with the investigation period (Article 2.2.1. GATT Anti-dumping 
Code ; Article 2(4) basic EC Regulation). That investigation period must normally cover a period 
of not less than six months (Article 6(1) basic EC Regulation ; Article 7(1)(c) basic ECSC 
legislation). The choice of those periods may determine whether or not sales at a loss will be 
considered as having been made in the ordinary course of trade. Indeed, the shorter/longer the 
period, the lower/higher the probability that production costs will be covered, unless a short 
period is taken into account in which practically no sales at a loss are made. It may be argued 
that, from an economie point of view, the period taken in to account should be equivalent to a 
business cycle348• GATT and European anti-dumping law seem to guarantee a minimum 
period of six months. However, with the approval of the Court of Justice349, that guarantee 
has been misused upon a pretext that a period of six months is amply sufficient, even if it does 
347 Thus, future sales must not be taken into account. See, however: DIDIER, P., ccEEC Antidumping Rules and Practices», 
Common. Mar/eet Law Reuiew, 1980, (349), 355-356. 
348 VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in. the Un.ited States and the European Commun.ties. A Comparaliue 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 430. 
349 C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 march 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1613-1614 (Opinion of Advocate 
General MISCHO) and 1627. 
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not coincide with a business cycle350• Accordingly, by guaranteeing a minimum period, GATI 
and European anti-dumping law may entail too short periods which do not cover a business cycle. 
As a consequence, under European anti-dumping law, sales at a loss resulting from short-run 
profit maximization may be considered as not having been made in the ordinary course of trade. 
2.2.4.1.3. Sales on a competitive domestic market 
Under European anti-dumping law, ordinary course of trade implies that there is competition in 
the market, hut does not require the competition to be perfect. It encompasses also imperfect 
competition, such as situations in which competition is restricted by a cartel or a monopoly351 . 
From an economie point of view, this is a necessary interpretation for dumping to include all 
cases of price discrimination. For the most important cause of price discrimination is the 
existence of imperfect competition on . the domestic market of the exporting country. As a 
35o In plain paper photocopiers from Japan, the Council considered that an investigation period covering seven months met the 
criterion of «an extended period of timen. It also refused to accept the variation of profitability of a product over its lüetime as a 
genera! principle (C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 march 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1593 (Report 
for the Hearing : conclusions of the Council)). 
In urea from Malay•ia, the exporter · contended that the production cycle was equivalent to eighteen months. The Commission 
replied that «an investigation period is determined on a neutral manner for all parties concerned at the anti-dumping investigation 
and (that) a deviation from such a period in favour of one party is not possible. Moreover, the investigation period amounted to 
twice the minimum indicated by Article 7(1)(c), of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 (i.e., the former basic EC legislation). The 
investigation period used in this proceeding is, therefore, thought not unreasonable» (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 
24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, 
the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, No L 235/5). 
In DRAMs from Japan and EPROMs from Japan., the Commission could not accept the dumping exporters' argument that all costs 
would have been recovered, albeit over a longer period than the investigation period. It rejected the dumping exporters' argument 
because the investigation period covered a whole year. lt considered that within such a period prices which do not permit the 
recovery of all costs cannot be regarded as having been made in the ordinary course of trade (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known 
as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in 
connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these product& and terminating the investigation in their 
respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22'19; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, 
No L 38/44; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91of4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmable read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 
March 1991, No L 65/1). 
351 Commission Decision 83/360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain 
pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, No 
L 196122 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in connection with the investigation of imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Democratie Republic and terminating the investigation, anq terminating 
the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14. 
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consequence, high domestic market prices, caused by a carte! or a monopoly, may be used as 
normal value352• 
As it refers to competition, ordinary course of trade also implies prices to be determined by the 
market, i.e., the interaction between demand and supply. Hence, according to European anti-
dumping case law, prices determined by the government are not in the ordinary course of 
trade353 , unless, at least, they cover all production costs354, like market prices should do in 
order to fit in with the concept «ordinary course of trade». If they also take into account 
competition from other products, they certainly will fit in with the concept «ordinary course of 
trade»355• This aspect of European case law smells of «one-way flexibility» : it has an 
increasing effect on normal value determination as prices determined by the government may be 
used as nonna! value if they cover all production costs, i.e., if they are high enough. 
352 In a8partame from the United States of America, the American exporter claimed that hls domeetic market pricee could not be 
used becauee of the differencee in the price-elasticity of aspartame between the American and the Community markete. The 
Commiesion rejected hie claim becauee a difference in price-elasticity ie a prerequieite for price diff erentiation and dumping could 
never be eanctioned if ac:ljuetmente for differencee in price-elasticity had to be made (Commieeion Regulation (EEC) No 3421/90 of 
26 November 1990 impoeing a provieional anti-dumping duty on importe of aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statee 
of America, O . .T., 29 November 1990, No L 330/16). For dumping to be determined the price-elasticity on the market of the 
exporting country has to be lees than that on the Community market. The higheet poeeible price-elaeticity equale infinity. Thue, 
the price-elaeticity on the market of the exporting country must alwaye be lower than infinity and euch a price-elasticity alwaye 
correeponde to imperfect competition. Supra, 25-33. 
See aleo : dih.ydroatreptomycin from the People'• Republic of China, where the Commieeion refueed to make any adjuetm.ent for the 
monopoly the Japaneee producer (who was taken as reference for the determination of the normal value of China being a non-
market economy (NME) country (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decieion)) had on hie domestic market. 
According to the Commiesion, harmful price differentiation ie contrary to European and international law, irreepective of the 
reaeone (Commiesion. Regulation (EEC) No 2054191 of 11 July 1991 impoeing a provieional anti-dumping duty on importe of 
dihydroetreptomycin originating in the People'e Republic of China, O.J., 13July1991, No L 187/23). 
See, however, the Chinese brushes. c<J8e, in which the Court of Justice rejected the choice of Sri Lanka as reference country (for the 
determination of the normal value of China being a NME country (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic EC 
legielation)) because the Sri Lankan domestic market pricee were too high (C.J.E.C., case C-16190, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v 
Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, E. C.R., 1991, 1, (5163), 5207). These high pricee may have been the reeult of the duopoly on the 
Sri Lankan market. The Court, though, etated in genera! that a duopoly does not, in iteelf, prevent pricee being the reeult of real 
competition, but did not investigate the Sri Lankan duopoly in particular (C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v 
Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (5163), 5207). 
353 In cotton yarn from Egypt, the cotton yarn spinning companiee were etate-owned and the domeetic market pricee of cotton yarn 
were fixed by the government. The Commiesion considered these pricee to be influenced by non-market forcee to euch an extent 
that their artificiality prevented them from being coneidered as having been made in the ordinary course of trade (Commieeion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 impoeing a provieional anti-dumping duty on importe of cotton yarn originating 
in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yarn originating in India and 
Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117) . 
. 
354 Commieeion Regulation (EEC) No 2936/82 of 28 October 1982 impoeing a provisional anti-dumping duty on copper eulphate 
originating in Yugoelavia, O.J., 4 November 1982, No L 30Bn; Commieeion Decieion 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importe of certain peare in eyrup, originating in Auetralia, the People'e Republic of China 
and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, No L 196/22. 
3~5 CommiBBion Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importe of certain 
peare in eyrup, originating in Auetralia, the People'e Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, No 
L 196122. 
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Economically, this interpretation is not justified. Indeed, economie theory shows that, under short-
run profit maximization, prices do not always cover all production costs. 
2.2.4.1.4. Sales on the domestic market of developing countries 
Whereas European anti-dumping law does not pay attention to dumping from developing 
countries, GA TI anti-dumping law recognizes «that special regard . must be given by developed 
country Members to the special situation of developing country Members when considering the 
application of anti-dumping measures under (the GATI Anti-dumping Code). Possibilities of 
constructive remedies provided for by (the GATT Anti-dumping Code) shall be explored before 
applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country 
Members» (Article 15 GATT Anti-dumping Code). Under a strict and literal interpretation, 
GATT anti-dumping law allows to adopt constructive remedies, hut does not affect the rules on 
the determination of dumping. Such an interpretation does not seem to be intended by GATT. 
For on 5 May 1981 the GATT Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, cognizant of the 
commitment in Article 13 of the 1980 GATT Anti-dumping Code (which bas become Article 15 
GATT Anti-dumping Code), decided that: 
c( d)ue consideration should be given to all cases where, because special economie conditions affect prices in 
the home market, these prices do not provide a commercially realistic basis for dumping calculations. In 
such cases the nonnal value for the purposes of ascertaining whether the goods are being dumped shall be 
determined by methods such as a comparison of the export price with the comparable price of the like 
product when exported to any third country or the cost of production of the exported goods in the country 
of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and any other costs and for profits»356• 
By suggesting the use of the export price to third countries or the production costs (i.e. , the 
constructed value), the GATT Committee implicitly admits that sales on the domestic market of 
developing countries are not being made in the ordinary course of trade. For, according to GATT 
anti-dumping law, the export price to third countries or the constructed value may only be used as 
normal value standard if the sales on the domestic market of the exporting country are ·not made 
in the ordinary course of trade (Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code). This interpretation of 
Article 15 is probably meant to benefit the developing countries. For domestic market prices in 
developing countries are usually higher because of the high protection their domestic markets 
enjoy. By using other normal value standards instead of domestic market prices, the probability 
of finding dumping will be reduced. 
European anti-dumping authorities reject such a favourable treatment of imports from developing 
countries. Contrary to the GATT Committee, they uphold a strict and literal interpretation, which 
356 . 
B.l.S.D., Twenty-seventh Supplement, Geneva, GA1T, 1981, 17. 
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limits the scope of the GATT provision about developing countries to the choice of anti-dumping 
measures357• 
2.2.4.2. Comparable sales 
2.2.4.2.1. The concept of «Sale»358 
GATT and European anti-dumping law do not define the concept «sale». Of course, as the Court 
of. Justice bas pointed out, there is a difference between sales and production : sales are the vital 
element, regardless of whether there is production at the same time359• 
European anti-dumping case law places a casuistic interpretation on it. Indeed, transactions of 
small quantities for testing purposes360 as well as transactions sent by sample post361 do not 
meet the definition .of the concept «sale», but development samples da362. Moreover, barter 
357 See : Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertak.ings given in connection with imports of binder and 
haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 6 February 1987, No L 34/55; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, 
O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in connection with imports. of 
urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia 
and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1. 
358 All c~s mentioned in connection with the interpretation of the concept of ccsale» are export transactions towards the 
Community. Those transactions may be relevant only for the the export price determination. As GA'IT and European anti-
dumping law use the concept of ccsale11 in connection with both normal value and export price, the same interpretation in respect of 
normal value may be expected. 
359 C.J.E.C., caae C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 720-721. 
360 The anti-dumping proceeding concerning fZuid cracking catalysts {rom the United States of America has been terminated 
against two exporters because they exported small quantities for testing purposes only and did not intend to export in commercial 
quantities (Commission Decision 82/31/EEC of 14 January 1982 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of fluid crack.ing catalysts originating in the United States of America and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11126). 
361 Without providing any explanation, the Council did not take into account the export transaction sent by sample post in 
polyester yàrn.11 {rom the United States of America (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2585/85 of 12 September 1985 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the 
United States of America, O.J., 13 September 1985, No L 246/57). 
362 In acrylic fibrea {rom the United States of America, development samples which constituted a high proportion of total sales and 
for which a Oow) price had been charged, were taken into account (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2712n9 of 30 November 1979 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres originating in the United States of America, O.J., 4 December 
1979, No L 308/11; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 of 30 April 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
acrylic fibres originating in the United States of America, O.J., 3 May 1980, No L 114/37). 
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trade seems not to fit in with the concept «sale»363 • Renting and leasing transactions, 
furthermore, have not been taken into account merely because of the practical difficulties involved 
in obtaining a net return per product364• Thus, if there were no such practical difficulties, 
renting and leasing transactions would come within the concept «sale». 
The casuistic interpretation placed on the concept · «sale» cannot be accepted for it increases 
arbitrariness. Because of the absence of a definition in GA IT and European anti-dumping law, 
the concept «sale» should be interpreted in its usual legal meaning, i.e. , the transfer of property in 
change of the payment of a price expressed in a monetary unit. Such an interpretation may create 
an opportunity for circumvention : if the products are not sold, but are instead rented or leased, 
anti-dumping law would be circumvented. In order to prevent such circumvention, the concept 
«sale» could be extended, but it should be· prohibited that legally different types of transactions be 
compared (e.g., a comparison between leasing transactions on the domestic market of the 
exporting country and export sales transactions towards the Community). Comparing two legally 
different transactions implies too many and too large adjustments and, thus, increases the 
probability of errors and arbitrariness to a far too high degree. 
2.2.4.2.2. lnsufficient quantities 
Sales which permit a proper comparison are sales which are sufficiently representative, i.e., which 
reflect normal behaviour on the part of purchasers and result from normal pattems of price 
363 From tubes of iron or 1teel from Romania it may be deduced that barter trade does not fit the concept of ccsaleu. lndeed, the 
Council did not meet the objection of the importers that the import of Romanian tubes into the Community was partly made in 
return of export transactions to Romania. The Council only referred to the provisional findings of the Commission. There, the 
Commission determined the export price on the basis of the Romanian export prices reported by the Romanian exporter. The 
Commission, thus, seems to have made no use of barter trade transactions (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 250/82 of 29 January 
1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain welded iron or steel tubes originating in Romania, O.J., 3 February 
1982, No L 26/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1304/82 of 25 May 1982 establishing the definitive collection of the provisional 
anti-dumping duty on ce:rtain welded steel tubes originating in Romania, O.J., 29 May 1982, No L 150/l; Commission Regulation · 
(EEC) No 1334182 of 28 May 1982 accepting an undertaking offered in connection with the anti-dumping procedure concerning 
certain welded steel tubes originating in Romania, terminating that procedure and cancelling the provisional anti-dumping duty, 
O.J., 29 May 1982, No L 16on9). 
364 In the provisional assessment on plain paper photocpiers from Japan, the Commission, moreover, did not think it necessary to 
take into account the renting and leasing transactions because the investigation covered more than 70 % of all transactions and 
the transactions taken into account were considered to be representative (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 
1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, 
No L 239/5). However, the definitive finding concerning plain paper photocopiers from Japan took account of renting transactions 
to determine iltjury, namely to determine the evolution of the marketed product& (Council Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 of 23 
February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
February 1987, No L 64112), which the Court of Justice (implicitly) approved (C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. 
Ltd v CouncU, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 1399 and 1402; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric lndustrial Co. 
Ltd and Matau.hita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1483 and 1486; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 
1992, Koniahiroliu Photo lnduatry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1493), 1627 and 1629; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 Merch 
1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1535), 1568 and 1570; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp 
Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1635), 1680 and 1682). 
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formation365• As to the European anti-dumping authorities, sales representing a quantity of 
less than 5 % of the volume of total exports of the exporting country to the Community, in 
principle366, are not representative because such sales may be influenced by other than normal 
commercial considerations and because their quantities may be residual or so negligible that they 
cannot be considered as reliably reflecting pricing in the ordinary course of trade367. GATT 
and EC anti-dumping law have recently codified this aspect of European case law (note 2 ad 
Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(2) basic EC Regulation). 
365 C.1.E.C., case C-105190, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R" 1992, 1, (677), 701-702 (Opinion of Advocate General 
VAN GER.VEN) and 720. 
366 The threshold of 5 % is but a guideline which offers traders a degree of legal certainty as regard the interpretation of the 
notion cccomparable sale&». In exceptional circumstances, the threshold may be deviated from. Such circumstances may arise 
where the total volume on the domestic market is not sufficiently large for prices to be determined by supply and demand (C.J.E.C" 
case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 702-703 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN 
GERVEN) and 720-722; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85of19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports 
of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; VERMULST, E.A., and HOOIJER, J.J., 
ccAnnotation on Case C-170/89, Bureau Européen cks Unions ck Consommateurs v. Commission, Judgment of 28 November 1991; 
Case C-105/90, Goldstar Co. Ltd. v. Council, Judgment of 13 February 1992; Case C-188/88, NMB (Deutschland) GmbH, NMB 
Italia Sr~ N'MB (UK) Ltd. v. Commission. of the European. Communities, Judgment of 10 March 1992; Case 171/87, Canon Ine. v. 
Council; Case 172/87, Mita ln.duatrial Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 174/87, Ricoh. Compan.y Ltd. v. Council; Case 175/87, Matsush.ita 
Electric Industrial Co. Ltd and Matsuahita Electric Trading Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 176/87, Konishiroky Photo Industry Co. Ltd. 
v. Council; Case 177/87, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 178/87, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 179/87, Sharp 
Corporation v. Coun.cil, Judgments of 10 March 1992; Case C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Judgment of 11 June 
1992", Common. Mar'/eet Law Review, 1993, (115), 164-165). 
The threshold only applies to sales made in the ordinary course of trade. H substantial quantities are sold at a loss and the 
remaining profitable sales on the domestic market do not reach the threshold of 5 %, the domestic market price of the profitable 
sales will not be used as nonna! value standard. It is of irrelevant whether total sales constitute a quantity of more than 5 % 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact 
dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 
1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, 
collecting defi:nitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape 
reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 17411 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic 
random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in connection with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 
1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); Commission 
Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-dumping measures concerning dense sodium 
carbonate originating in the United States of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, No L 283/38). 
367 C.J.E.C., case 250/85, 5 October 1988, Brother Industries Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5683), 5721-5722; C.J.E.C., joined cases 
277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon. Ine. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 5799-5800; C.J.E.C" joined cases 273/85 and 
107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5959 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! Sir Gordon 
SLYNN); C.J.E.C., case C-105190, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 720-721; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, 
No L 335/43. 
Contra: J. BOUDANT (L'antWlumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 81) argues that the European anti-dumping 
authorities have never indicated the percentage of overall production or exports below which domestic sales do not permit a proper 
comparison. 
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It appears that sales of small quantities are presumed to have been made at very low prices in 
order to circumvent anti-dumping law368• That presumption is probably home out by the fact 
that the smaller the quantity sold on the domestic market of the exporting country, the smaller the 
loss will be for the producer/exporter to charge low prices on his domestic market. However, 
sales of small quantities may be also the result of short-run profit maximization. Moreover, the 
prices of such sales may even be lower than the export prices (i.e. , reverse dumping) when 
merely the domestic market of the exporting country is smaller than the Community. 
In figure 5, market demand, D1D1, with corresponding marginal revenue curve, D1 MR1, represents the domestic 
market of the exporter. The latter is assumed to be a monopolist and, therefore, is a price-maker. He is also 
assumed to export to the Community. The demand curve D2D2, with corresponding marginal revenue curve D2MR2, 
represents demand on the Community market. The Community market only differs from the exporter's domestic 
market because of its larger size. The exporter's total demand curve is the sum of D1D1 and D2D2, which is 
represented by the curve D2AD, the corresponding total marginal revenue curve being D2BMR. His marginal cost 
curve, MC, which is assumed to be constant, cuts the total marginal revenue curve at a total quantity Oq*. The 
exporter, thus, produces a quantity Oq*. If he chooses to charge a uniform price in both markets, he will charge a 
price OP*. At that price he will sell a quantity Oq*1 in his domestic market and export a quantity Oq*2 to the 
Community. If the exporter wants to maximize his profits, he will choose a price discriminating strategy. Profit 
maximization implies that in each market marginal revenue equals marginal cost. At the uniform price OP*, marginal 
cost is lower than marginal revenue in the domestic market, hut higher than marginal revenue in the Community 
market. If he equates in each market marginal revenue to marginal cost at a total quantity of Oq*, the exporter will 
sell a quantity Oq1 at a price of OP 1 on his domestic market, whereas a quantity of OCJi will be exported at a price of 
OP2 to the Community. As a result, the exporter does not dump : his products are not sold at a loss and the price 
charged in the Community is higher than in the domestic market of the exportei369• The exporter practices reverse 
dumping. 
Low prices of sales of small quantities, thus, may result from short-run profit maximization. 
Moreover, a profit-maximizing exporter may practise reverse dumping if bis domestic market is 
smaller than the Community market. By considering sales of small quantities to be, in principle, 
no comparable sales, the European anti-dumping authorities place a «one-way flexible» 
interpretation on European anti-dumping law. They disregard that the exporter may practice 
reverse dumping in order to maximize bis profits. Moreover, as they allow the use of altemative 
normal value standards which result in a higher · normal value, they increase the probability of 
finding dumping in cases in which reverse dumping is practised. Sales of small quantities at low 
prices may, of course, also result from circumventing European anti-dumping law. In order to 
368 If, on the other hand, prices are relatively high, sales of small quantities probably will be qualified as being comparable. The Court of Justice 
bas, for instance, referred to the product life cycle where there is a gradual increase in the volume of sales with a parraliel downward trend in 
prices, in order to qualify the sales of small quantities of a newly developed product at high prices as being comparable (C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 
13 Febnaary 1992, Gok/star Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 721). Il is, however, the question whether the Court would adopt the samc 
attitude towards sales of small quantities at low prices which can be explained by a low demand for the product on the domestic market (i.e., the 
case as depictcd in figurc 5 below). 
369 In figure 6 the domestic mar ket sales represent more than 6 % of total exports to the Community. The illustration of a 
domestic market Ieee than 6 % of total exports would require a scale too small for illustrative clarity. lt should, however, be clear 
from figure 6 that the smaller the domestic market, the lower the price on the domestic market will be. 
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prevent both «0ne-way flexibility» and circumvention, sales of small quantities should be 
considered to be comparable sales unless it is demonstrated that the prices on the exporter' s 
domestic market are lower than their short-run profit-maximizing level. 
2.2.4.2.3. Sales transactions intended for consumption 
Comparable sales are sales intended for consumption on the don:iestic market of the exporter 
(Article VI(l) GATI ; Article 2.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(1) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision). 
European anti-dumping case law bas disregarded sales intended for export in determining the 
normal value without offering any explanation370• Probably, those sales were excluded because 
they were clearly not intended for consumption (on the domestic market). 
European anti-dumping case law is even more obscure on the qualification of texturing, processing 
and conversion operations. In some cases, those operations are considered as not having been 
intended for consumption371, hut in other cases they are considered as not having been made in 
the ordinary course of trade372• The doctrine pays only attention to the last cases : it qualifies 
these operations as compensatory arrangements, which, by definition, are not made in the 
ordinary course of trade (see : Article 2(1)(b) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(7) basic ECSC 
37o Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United States of America, O.J., 23 February 1983, No L 50/1; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2585/85 of 12 September 1985 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a defiiiitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United States of America, O.J., 13 September 1985, No 
L 246/57. 
371 Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United States of America, O.J., 23 February 1983, No L 50/1 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2221185 of 29 July 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of basic chromium 
sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 August 1985, No L 205/12; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the German Democratie 
Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No L 103/38. 
372 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 of 12 May 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate monomer 
originating in the United States of America, O.J., 15 May 1981, No L 129/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81of15 July 
1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 18 July 1981, No 
L 195/22 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in 
the United Statea of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, No L 12/1; Commission Decision 82/397/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting 
undertak.ings in connection with the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of certain polypropylene film for capacitors 
originating in Japan and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172144 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2172193 
of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ethanolamine originating in the United States of America, 
O.J., 4 August 1993, No L 195/5. 
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Decision )373 • European anti-dumping case law though bas never qualified them as 
compensatory arrangements. 
Only when texturing, processing and conversion operations are made on the captive market (i.e., 
the use of the product by the producer who bas produced it, in the manufacture of other products), 
they may be qualified as not being made in the ordinary course of trade. Indeed, as stated by the 
European anti-dumping authorities, the buyers in such a · case are not free in their choice of 
suppliers374• 
~evertheless, texturing, processing and conversion operations on the captive market, just like 
those made on the open market, are also operations not intended for consumption. A comparison 
with the regime for inward processing operations, i.e., processing operations in another country 
than the country of origin of the products to be processed, shows that processing operations are 
not compensatory a.ITangements. In European anti-dumping case law, the export price has been 
determined on the basis of inward processing operations375• As compensatory arrangements 
are considered not to constitute a reliable basis for the determination of the export price (Article 
2.3. GAIT Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(9) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(8)(b) basic ECSC 
Decision), inward processing operations seem not to come within the concept of «compensatory 
arrangement». As European anti-dumping law does not require export transactions to be intended 
for consumption, this probably explains why inward processing operations may be taken into 
373 BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr von. Dumping un.d. Subve.ntion.en. durch die Europäische Gemeinschaften, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1980, 60 ; BOUDANT, J., L'anti-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 89 ; BRIET, L.A.E., ccA.ntidumping in de EEG -
De kinderschoenen ontgroeid ?», S.E. W., 1982, (145), 150 ; VAN BAEL, I., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping an.d other Trade 
Protection Law11 of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd, 1990, 48; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d Practice in the 
Un.ited State• and the European. Communities. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 429. 
374 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2172/93 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ethanolamine originating 
in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, No L 195/5. 
375 Council Decision 83/162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importe of acrylonitrile 
originating in the United States of America, O • .T., 20 April 1983, No L 101/29; CommiBBion Decieion 84/229/EEC of 13 April 1984 
accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of propan-1-ol (propyl alcohol) 
originating in the United Statee of America, and terminating that proceeding, O . .T., 19 April 1984, No L 106/55; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate 
originating in Bulgaria, the German Democratie Republic, Poland and Romania, O . .T., 13 May 1989, No L 131/4; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits. known as DRAMs (dynamic random acceBB memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakinge offered by certain 
exporters in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these producte and terminating the inveetigation 
in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22f19; corrigendum, O . .T., 10 
February 1990, No L 38144). In one case the inward processing arrangement& were taken into account merely for practical reasons. 
lndeed, in this caee European anti-dumping authorities were confronted with the practical difficulty that the products were sold to 
subsidiaries in the European Community who processed the imported product and did not resell it to independent customers in the 
European Community. See: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on etyrene monomer originating in the United States of America and terminating the inveetigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, No 
L 258/20. 
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account for determining the export price376. Since there is basically no difference between 
domestic processing operations and inward processing operations, but for their location, it may be 
concluded that domestic processing operations are not compensatory arrangements and should be 
disregarded only for not being intended for consumption .. 
In view of European anti-dumping case law regarding the determination of the export price, a 
compensatory arrangement seems to be a kind of financial arrangement. Indeed, an agreement on 
the reimbursement of certain advertising expenses was held not to be a compensatory arrangement 
merely because of the circumstances of the agreement377• Regarding the determination of the 
normal value, explicit reference bas been made in but one case to the existence of compensatory 
arrangements, without any further information being provided though378• 
2.2.5. Domestic market price 
2.2.5.1. Net price actually paid or payable 
The domestic market price is the comparable price paid or payable in the ordinary course of trade 
for the like product intended for consumption in the exporting country or country of origin 
(Articles 1(2) and 2(1) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision). ECSC anti-
dumping law further requires that those prices are actually paid or payable. It is not yet clear 
whether the recent disappearan_ce of the word «actually» in EC anti-dumping law will have any 
effect. 
The words «actually paid or payable>> imply that the domestic market price must be the price 
charged in connection with actual transactions. These transactions include all transactions made 
376 Though it is legally not required, European antidumping case law possibly takes account only of export prices intended for 
consumption. For, in video cassette recorders from Japan., it was noted that the exports were intended for consumption in the 
Community and were, therefore, taken into account (Commiesion Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 
31 August 1988, No L 240/6). It is, however, unclear whether the terms ccdestined for consumption" were added with a specific 
meaning. 
377 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048/90 of 26 April 1990 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of small-screen 
colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, 
No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133/92). See aleo: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115/91 of 29 April 1991 
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in connection with the review of anti-dumping measurée concerning imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 11111; Commission Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting undertakings 
oft'ered by certain exporters in connection with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of ferro.silicon originating 
in Brazil and terminating the investigation as regards those exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 111/47, where a compensatory 
arrangement was found. No explanation was given about its content. 
378 Commisaion Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-
manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No L 330/15. 
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unconditionally, regardless of whether they are afterwards cancelled or postponed for reasons of 
error or bad quality379• The prices of these transactions are the prices shown in the invoices 
and other accounting documents of the supplier involved380• However, invoices and accounting 
documents are not necessarily decisive381 • In principle, price lists must not be used, if they do 
not reflect actual prices382• In European anti-dumping case law, however, price lists are 
379 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064/90 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, No 
L 321/19) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1. 
38° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2936/82 of 28 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on copper sulphate 
originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 4 November 1982, No L sosn; Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, 
O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of 
America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/47; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy 
Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 54 ; BUHART, J., ccLe régime communautaire de 
l'antidumping: vingt ans d'expérience», Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 1988, (253), 261. --
381 Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12. 
382 Commission Decision 80/1175/EEC of 16 December 1980 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
pressure sensitive paper mask.ing tape originating in the United States of America, O.J., 19 December 1980, No L 344/57; 
Commission · Decision 871236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originating in the German Democratie Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, 0.J., 15 April 1987, No L 103/38; 
Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or 
steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/47; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, 
No L 348/49; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296192 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the 
Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the 
former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, 
No L 328/15; BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr von Dumping und Subventionen. durch die Europäiache Gemeinschaften, Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 1980, 47; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subaidy Law. The European Communities, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 54 ; DIDIER, P., «EEC Antidumping Rules and PracticeBH, Common Market Law Reviex, 1980, 
(349), 353; DIDIER, P., Jleux années d'application du nouveau règlement antidumping de la CEE", Cahiers de Droit Européen, 
1982, (21), 26 ; GIJLSTRA, D.J., tcAnti-Dumping Policy of the EEC in Practica», in Protectioniam and the European Community. 
Import Relief Meaaurea taken by the European. Economie Community and the Member Statea, and the Legal Remedies Available 'to 
Private Partiea, VÖLKER, E.L.M. (ed.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1983, (147), 163. 
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sometimes used without there taking place any inquiry whether they reflect actual prices or 
not383 • The use of price lists, however, increases the dumping margin as price lists often are 
only a basis for discounting rather than actual prices that customers in genera! are expected to 
pay384• Therefore, the use of price lists is only. in accordance with European anti-dumping 
law, if allowance is made for discounts. 
2.2.5.2. Associated parties 
2.2.5.2.1. Legal approach 
Under European anti-dumping law, sales between associated parties may be considered as not 
being made in the ordinary course of trade (Article 2(l)(b) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(7) 
basic ECSC Decision). According to GATT and European anti-dumping law, the domestic 
market price must not be used as normal value standard when there are no sales in the ordinary 
course of trade. Instead, either the export price to third countries or the constructed value must 
be used (Article VI(l) GATT ; Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(3} basic EC 
legislation)385• 
However, if the producer and bis sales company are associated, European anti-dumping authorities 
do not use the export price to third countries nor the constructed value. They use the resale price 
383 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 im:posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre 
building. board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in connection with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181/19; Commission Recommendation No 2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No 
L 312/10. 
Only once price lists have been used as best information available. Their use was motivated by the lack of cooperation of several 
producers/exporten (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports 
of linear tungeten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1). Only then their use is legal. 
Price lists of other producers established in the exporting country hut who did not export to the Community, have been used as 
touchstone for determining whether the domestic market prices of the allegedly dumping exporters were representative and could, 
therefore, be used as normal value standard (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064/90 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 
(corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, No L 321/19) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1). 
384 GOVINDARAJAN, V"and ANTHONY, R.N" ccHow firma use cost data in price decisions11, Management Accounting, July 
1983, 1983, (30), 30-36; STIGLER, G.J" and KINDAHL, J" The Behcwiour of lnduatrial Prices, New York, University Prees 
Columbia New York (N.Y.), 1970, 202 p. 
385 BUHART, J., .J.e régime communautaire de l'antidumping: vingt ans d'expérience•, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 
1988, (253), 263 ; LESGUILLONS, H" Le régime communautaire de protection. con.tre le dumping et les. subven.tion.s, Paris, 
F.E.D.U.C.I" 1983, 67 ; VERMULST, E.A" Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States ~ the European. Communities. A 
Comparatwe Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 420. 
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charged by the associated sales company to· third independent parties on its domestic market386• 
That resale price is considered to be the domestic mar ket price (in the sen se of Article 2( 1) basic 
EC Regulation and of Article 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision)387• It includes all the 
administrative, selling and other genera! expenses as well as a profit margin, irrespective of 
whether they are borne by either the exporter or his associated sales company388• 
The interpretation placed by the European anti-dumping authorities on European anti-dumping law 
might seem illegal and in violation of GATT anti-dumping law. However, their interpretation is 
386 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, No L 193/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 
December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3669/84 of 21 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings 
and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, No L 340/37; Commission Decision 851252/EEC of 23 
April 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain titanium mill products originating in Japan and 
the United States of America, O.J., 26 April 1985, No L 113/30 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and 
tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 
October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting 
undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 
1985, No L 275/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, No L 97/1; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 
August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 
1986, No L 221/16; Council Regulation (EEC) No 374187 of 5 February 1987 definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping 
duty and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 6 February 1987, 
No L 35/32; Commiasion Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic 
fibres of polyesters originating in the German Democratie Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No 
L 103/38 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in connection with 
imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1. 
387 C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon Ine. a.o. v Couneil, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 5799 ; C.J.E.C., case C-
171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Couneil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1287; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd 
v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 1371 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1391; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, 
Matauahita Eleetric In.du.trial Co. Ltd and Matauahita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1454 (Opinion of 
Advocate General MISCHO) and 1472; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, ~O March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, 
(1635), 1673-1674; C.J.E.C., case C-104/90, 13 October 1993, MataU8hita Eleetric Indu&trial Co. Ltd v Council, consideration 16 (not 
yet reported); CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All 
Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43 ; BEI.LIS, J.-F., ccThe EEC Antidumping System.a, in Anti.dumping Law and Practice. 
A Comparatiue Study, JACKSON, J.H., and VERMULST, E.A. (eds.), New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41) 71. 
388 C.J.E.C., joined cases 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5975; 
C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Couneil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1288; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 
1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 1391; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Mataushita Eleetric Induatrial 
Co. Ltd and Matau.hita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1456-1458 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO) and 1472; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Bharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1635), 1673-1674. 
Expenses and profit& of the aBSOCiated sales company due to other activities than the resale of the product in question are not 
included (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
plain paper photOcopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 
May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 
May 1988, No L 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of eerial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1). 
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the logical consequence of the economie unit theory they apply389• Under the economie unit 
theory, the producer and his associated sales company are assumed to be one and the same 
person, although they are legally distinct companies. As a consequence, the resales made by the 
associated sa.les company are imputed to the one person constituted by the producer and bis sales 
company390• Therefore, resale . prices may be subsumed under the concept «domestic market 
price» (Article VI(l)(a) GATI; Article 2.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(1) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision391). 
2.2.5.2.2. Economie approach 
In economics it is investigated what price would prevail between associated parties if they do not 
determine their intemal transfer prices in order to evade the application of the law, such as 
national tax laws and tariffs. That price is usually indeterminate or practically impossible to 
determine. This is also the case when associated parties try to evade the application of European 
anti-dumping law. 
/ 
The basic Copithome model of transfer pricing may be used for dumping analysis. It demonstrates that intemal 
transfer prices are indeterminate or difficult to determine. This model is a partial equilibrium model of a vertically 
integrated enterprise392• lt assumes there are no corporate taxes nor tariffs. lt, thus, applies to sales between a 
manufacturing company and a sales company, both established in the same country and part of one enterprise. 
Because they are established in the same country, both companies are subjected to the same corporate taxes. If these 
taxes are proportionate taxes, they may be ignored, because only the difference in tax rates plays a role in determining 
transfer prices393• Moreover, their intemal sales take place within one country and, thus, one customs area. 
Therefore, they are not subjected to any tariff. 
389 . Supra, 124-128. 
39o Conversely, if the exporter and bis associated company do not constitute an economie unit, their resale prices will not constitute the '4<domestic 
market pricei.. The pricea actually paid or payable to the exporter by his associated company will be used as nonnal value, or, if the transactions 
between the cxporter and bis a880Ciated company are not comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade, nonnal value will have to be constructed 
or the export pricc to third countries will have to be used (as provided in Article 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code and Article 2(3) basic EC 
legislation) 
391 C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon. Ine. a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 5774 (Opinion of 
Advocate Genera! Sir Gordon SL YNN) ; C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Compcmy Ltd 
(TEC) a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5896-5897 (Opinion of Advocate-Genera! Sir GORDON SLYNN); C.J.E.C" joined cases 
273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limi.ted a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5959 (Opinion of Advocate-Genera! Sir 
GORDON SLYNN); C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon. Ine. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1267 (Opinion of 
Advocate Genera! MISCHO) and 1287; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 
1371 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! MISCHO) and 1391; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric ln.dustrial Co. 
Ltd and Matsuahi.ta Electri.c Tradin.g Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1454 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! MISCHO) and 
1472; C.J~E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1635), 1673-1674. 
392 See: COPITHORNE, L.W., cclnternational Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policyn, Can.adian. Journ.al of 
Econ.omics, 1971, (324), 324-341; COPITHORNE, L.W., ccLa théorie des prix de transfert internes des grandes sociétésn, L'actuali.té 
écon.omique, 1976, (324), 324-352; EDEN, L., ccThe Microeconomics of Transfer Pricing•, in Multinationals and Transfer Pricin.g, 
RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L. (eds.), London, Croom Helm, 1985, (13), 20-22. 
393 ln.fra, 252-262. 
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The manufacturing company (company 1) owns the sales company (company 2). Company 1 produces an output Y of 
which it exports Y 1 to the Community at a price P 1, and sells Y 2 at a transfer price R to company 2. Company 2 is a 
typical sales company : it does not manufacture any product. lt only resells the products bought from company 1 on 
its domestic market at a price P2• Company 1 incurs costs of producing and selling its products. Company 2 bas to 
bear the costs of reselling the products it bought from company 1. Their cost functions are given by q(Yi) where 
i = 1, 2. The profit functions of companies 1 and 2 are : 
(1) 
(2) 
The total profit function of the entire enterprise, consisting of companies 1 and 2, is : 
(3) 
Because total output Y of company 1 is sold either to company 2 or for export to the Community: 
(4) 
Maximizing profits yields the following first order conditions : 
(5) 
(6) 
The first order conditions (5) and (6) may be rewritten as : 
(7) 
It follows from the general first order condition (7) that the transfer price R is indetenninate. Indeed, the term RY2 
in the profit functions (1) and (2) is cancelled out in the total profit function (3). 
The basic Copithome model assumes that the enterprise bas only one objective, i.e., total profit maximization. 
However, within one jurisdiction, an enterprise may have different objectives, such as supporting a newly established 
subsidiary, helping a subsidiary in penetrating a new market or locating profits in divisions where the leadership of the 
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enterprise bas the greatest black of sha~94• Tbose different objectives may be grasped in one basic objective, 
i.e. , the maximi:zation of total profits of the enterprise on the condition of obtaining a certain nomina! profit in each of 
the divisions of the enterprise395• lt may be proven that, through the introduction of that condition in the objective 
function of the enterprise, the transfer price becomes determinate396• 
Moreover, even when operating within only one jurisdiction, the enterprise may have tax and tariff incentives which 
influence transfer prices. It can be proven that, when corporale tax rates are a non-linear function of profits, the 
enterprise will allocate its profits so that marginal tax rates are identical. In that case, transfer prices are also 
determinate397. In practice, however, corporate taxes, in most countries, are a linear function of protitSJ98 • As 
a consequence, transfer prices are generally indeterminate399• 
Tariffs too, especially anti-dumping duties, may influence transfer prices in the domestic market of the exporting 
enterprise. That effect of anti-dumping duties is illustrated in figure 6. Figure 6 corresponds to the mathematical 
model of transfer pricing described above. Figure 6(a) depicts the situation of the sales corporation (company 2). 
The NMR2 curve is the vertical difference between the marginal revenue curve (MRi) and the marginal cost curve 
(Me;) of company 2. ·Tuis company is faced with the domestic demand curve D2. The manufacturing company 
(company 1) is faced with the demand of the importer who imports the products sold by company 1 into the 
Community. Tuis demand is represented by the curve D1 in figure 6(b), the corresponding marginal revenue curve 
· being MR1• The introduction of an importer, when evaluating the effects of an anti-dumping duty, is essential in view 
of European anti-dumping law. According to European anti-dumping law, the burden of an imposed anti-dumping 
duty bas to lie with the consumers in the Community as it stipulates that the burden must not be carried by the 
exporter (Article 12 basic EC Regulation; Article 13(ll)(a) basic ECSC Decision). In other words, the anti-dumping 
duty must be paid by the importer who will shift this burden onto the consumers. Finally, the marginal cost curve of 
company 1 (MC1) and the sum of NMR2 and MR1 (NMR2 + MR1) are provided in figure 6(c). 
394 COPITHORNE, L.W., «International Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy", Canadian Journal of Ecotwmics, 
1971, (324), 332; JANS, P., Les transferts indirects de bénéfices entre sociétés interdépen.dantes. Droit fi.scal bel.ge et comparé. 
Perspecti.vea internationales et communautaires européennes, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1976, 29-30; KANT, C., ccForeign Subsidiary, 
Transfer Pricing and Tariff&>a, Southern Ecotwmic Journal, 1988-1989, (162), 162-170 ; PLASSCHAERT, S., Transfer pricing and 
multinational corporationa: an. overview of concepts, mechanisms and regulationa, Hampshire, Saxon House, 1979, 67-69; 
PLASSCHAERT, S., Les prix de transferts et les entrepriaes multinationales. Une uue globale, Paris, P.U .F., 1979, 88-89. 
395 See e.g. : KANT, C., tcForeign Subsidiary, Transfer Pricing ans Tariffs", Southern Ecotwmic Journal, 1988-1989, (162), 164-
165. In the model of C. KANT, the ohjective of the enterprise is the maximization of its global profits. However, the parent 
company does not wholly own the suhsidiary. Therefore, it is more profitable for the enterprise to shift all profits to the parent 
company. This is translated in the condition that the profit of the partially owned suhsidiary has to be zero. 
39~ See: BOOTH, E.J.R., and JENSEN, O.W., ccTransfer prices in the global corporation under internal and external constraints", 
Can.adian Journal of Ecotwmics, 1977, (434), 434-446; COPITHORNE, L. W., tclnternational Corporate Transfer Prices and 
Government Policy•, Can.adian Journal of Economics, 1971, (324), 327-328 and 339; KANT, C., ccForeign Subsidiary, Transfer 
Pricing and Tarift'SJt, Southern Ecotwmic Journal, 1988-1989, (162), 164-167. 
397 See: COPITHORNE, L. W., cclnternational Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policyn, Canadian Journal of 
Ecotwmics, 1971, (324), 329-330 and 339-340. 
398 COPITHORNE, L.W., tcLa théorie des prix de transfert internes des grandes eociétéSJt, L'actualité écotwmique, 1976, (324), 361. 
399 COPITHORNE, L.W., tclnternational Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy", Can.adian Journal of Ecotwmics, 
1971, (324), 329 and 340. 
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In the absence of any anti-dumping law in the importing country, MR1 and NMR2 ( = MR2 - M<;) must equal MC1 
(see : equation (7)). This equality is reached at point a in figure 6(c), i.e., the intersection of MC1 and NMR2 + 
MR1• Company 1, thus, manufactures the output OY. It exports a quantity OY1 at a price OP1 and sells a quantity 
OY2 at company 2. The latter resells quantity OY2 at a price OP2 on the domestic market. The transfer price is not 
determinate. 
However, the Community bas a far adequate anti-dumping law. According to European anti-dumping law, an anti-
dumping duty will be levied when the export price to the Community is lower than the normal value. At the most, 
the anti-dumping duty may amount to the difference between normal value and export price (Articles 7(2) and 9(4) 
basic EC Regulation; Article 13(3) basic ECSC Decision). In principle, nonnal value is equal to the price charged 
by the producer of the exported good on bis domestic market. In the model illustrated in figure 6, the producer 
charges only one price on bis domestic market, i.e. , the transfer price to bis sales corporation. lf this transfer price is 
used as domestic market price and, thus, as nonnal value standard, the producer bas an incentive to equate his 
transfer price to bis export price. 
lf, however, the producer (company 1) charges a higher transfer price, an anti-dumping duty will be levied. The 
burden of this duty will lie with the consumers in the importing ·country. They, thus, will have to pay a higher price 
and the quantity bought by them will decline. As a consequence, the demand of the importer will also decrease. As a 
result, the curve D1 shifts to D 1 '. Correspondingly, the MR1 curve shifts to MR1' and the curve NMR2 + MR1 
decreases to NMR2 + MR1'. Total output of company 1 drops to OY', OY 1' ( < OY 1) of which is exported at a price 
OP1' ( < OP1) and OY2' (> OYi) is sold by company 2 on the domestic market at a price OP2' ( < OPi). The fact that 
a smaller output is sold at lower prices results in a lower total profit of the whole enterprise. The enterprise, 
however, may avoid the decline in profits by charging a transfer price equal to or higher than the export price. In 
this case, no anti-dumping duty can be levied according to European anti-dumping law and the demand curve D1 will, 
ceteris paribus, not fall. Besides the effect of evading the levy of an anti-dumping duty, equating the transfer price to 
the export price bas not any effect on the profits of the whole enterprise. For, even when the possibility of the levy 
of an anti-dumping duty is introduced in the model, transfer prices remain indeterminate. 
Thus, associated parties determine their internal transfer prices at a level at least as high as their 
export prices in order to evade the application of European anti-dumping law. By doing this, they 
will maintain their total output and profit level at the same level as if market forces were not 
distorted by a trade harrier like anti-dumping law. From an economie point of view, their attempt 
to evade the application of European anti-dumping law is an efficient response to the market 
distortion created by European anti-dumping law. Moreover, by nullifying the market distorting 
effects of European anti-dumping law, they increase global welfare400. 
The Community, however, will not accept the evasion of its anti-dumping law, even if such 
evasion might be efficient from an economie point of view. For, should the arguments concerning 
market distortion and global welfare have been convincing, the Community would not have 
enacted anti-dumping law401 • In order to prevent the evasion of anti-dumping law, the transfer 
price which would prevail between associated parties if they do not try to evade the application of 
anti-dumping law, should be determined. However, that transfer price is indeterminate or hard to 
400 RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L., cclntroduction••, in Multinationals and Tran.8fer Pricing, RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L. 
(ede.), London, Croom Helm, 1986, (1), 6. 
401 lnfra, 343-358. 
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determine402• On the other hand, under conditions of technological403 and demand404 
independence between the operations of the different divisions of the enterprise, the efficient 
transfer price405 would equal the marginal cost of the manufacturing company, irrespective of 
whether perfect competition prevails in the extemal market406• Marginal costs are also hard to 
determine, especially for authorities, as they cannot have all inside information on the cost 
structure of the enterprise407• Moreover, the conditions of technological independence and 
demand independence are rather seldom fulfilled408• 
Because of the difficulties to determine marginal cost, the «dealing at arm' s length» price, i.e. , the 
actual price charged for comparable transactions of comparable products between independent 
parties409, is usually proposed as the least inefficient standard for evaluating transactions 
between associated parties410• · Such comparable transactions frequently do not exist411 • In 
402 Transfer prices are determinate if there are some non-linear corporate profit taxes or if the enterprise's objective to maximize 
its profits is subjected to some other motive. However, in most countries there are no non-linear corporate taxes. Moreover, it will 
be rather difficult to determine the effective tax rate, which incorporates all the rules and pecularities (special discounts, 
exemptions) of a corporate trut system. The motives of an enterprise such as supporting a newly established subsidiary or helping a 
subsidiary to penetrate a new market, which makes transfer prices determinate, will also be hard to quantify into a certain level of 
nomina! profits a subsidiary should attain. Moreover, it is quite possible that an enterprise sets this nomina! profit to such alevel 
that the transfer price equals the export price, not because its objective is to obtain this level of nomina! profit in its subsidiary 
which is perfectly lawful, hut because its real objective is nothing else than avoiding the application of the anti-dumping law. 
403 Technological independence means that the level of operations being carried on by one division does not have any effect on the 
costs of the other division. 
404 Demand independence means that an additional external sale made by one di vision does not decrease the external demand for 
the products of the other division. 
40S The efficient transfer price may be considered to be a shadow price. It is not the profit maximizing price when taxes and 
tariffs exist, hut serves only as a means for allocating resources in a divisionalized enterprise (see : DIEWERT, W.E., «Transfer 
Pricing and Economie Efficiency», in Multinationals and Transfer Pricing, RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L. (eds.), London, Croom 
Helm, 1985, (47), 47-81). 
406 HIRSHLEIFER, J., «On the economics of transfer pricing», Journal of Business, 1956, (172), 172-184. See also : 
HIRSHLEIFER, J., ..Economics of the divisionalized firm», Journal of BusineBS, 1957, (96), 96-108 ; GOULD, J.R., cclnternal pricing 
in firms when there are costs of using an outside market.1, Journal of Business, 1957, (61), 61-67. 
407 See: AREEDA, P., and TURNER, D.F., «Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.1, 
Harvard Law Review, 1974-1975, (697), 716, who point out this problem in connection with searching a standard for distinguishing 
predatory pricing from norm.al short run profit maximization. 
408 HIRSHLEIFER, J., ccOn the economie& of transfer pricing», Business Journal, 1956, (172), 173 and 180-183 ; PLASSCHAERT, 
8., Transfer pricing ans multinational corporations : an overview of concepts, mechan.isma and regulations, Hampshire, Saxon House, 
1979, 31; VER.LAGE, H.C., Transfer pricing for multinational enterprises, Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Prees, 1975, 177. 
409 O.E.C-.D., Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises. Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris, O.E.C.D., 
1979, 13 and 33. 
4to RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L., cclntroduction», in Multinationals and Transfer Pricing, RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L. 
(eds.), London, Croom Helm, 1985, (1), 9. 
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such a case, either the actual transfer price has to be adjusted or the resale price, i.e., the price 
charged to the first independent seller after deduction of the expenses and the profits of the 
reseller, must be used as altemative «dealing at arm's length» price. For both the adjusted actual 
transfer price and the resale. price, price adjustments are necessary in order to obtain the «dealing 
at arm's length» price412• As. price adjustments hold the danger of calculation errors and 
arbitrariness, they should be restricted as far as possible and adjusted, hypothetical «dealing at 
arm's length» prices should only be used when really necessary413 • 
Under European anti-dumping law the «dealing at arm's lenght» price is not consistently used for 
determining normal value. Instead a peculiar mix of the «dealing at arm' s length» price and the 
economie unit · theory is applied. If actual transfer prices between associated parties are 
comparable to prices between independent parties, the «dealing at arm' s lenght» price is used as 
normal value standard and normal value does not include the expenses and profit of the associated 
sales company. If, however, actual transfer prices between associated parties are not comparable 
to prices between independent parties, resale prices charged to independent buyers are used as 
normal value standard. In that case, the normal value includes the expenses and the profits of the 
associated sa.les company. Consequently, the resale price, as applied in European anti-dumping 
law, is higher and, thus, results in a higher dumping margin than the «dealing at arm's length» 
price. However, the resale price should be a substitute for the «dealing at arm' s lenght» price 
and, therefore, should result in the same dumping margin. 
2. 2. 6. &port price to third countries 
In choosing an export · price to third countries a8 normal value standard, the European anti-
dumping authorities have the broadest margin of discretion414• They do not have to take into 
consideration all export prices to every third country. Merely one export price to only one third 
411 ALWORTH, J.S., The Fin.cmce, lnvestment and Taxation Deciaiona of Multinationals, Oxford, Baeil Blackwell; l,988, 220; 
PLASSCHAERT, S., Transfer Pricing and Multinational Corporationa : an oueruiew of concepts, mechaniams and regulations, 
Hampehire, Saxon House, 1979, 32 ; VER.LAGE, H.C., Transfer pricing for multinational enterprises, Rotterdam, Rotterdam 
univereity Prees, 1975, 179. 
412 ALWORTH, J., The Fin.ance, Investment and Taxation Deciaions of Multinationals, Oxford, Baeil Blackwell, 1988, 222 .. 
413 O.E.C.D., Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises. Report of the OECD Committee on Fiacal Affairs, Paris, O.E.C.D., 
1979, 16. 
414 BRIET, L.A.E., ec.Antidum.ping in de EEG - De kinderschoenen ontgroeid?.,., S.E. W., 1982, (145), 149; KRETSCHMER, H., Das 
Antidumping- un.d Antisubuentionsrecht der Europäiachen Gemeinach.aften, Frankfurt/Main, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 27. 
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country is sufficient415• Different rules apply to the choice of that export price. Under GATT, 
it should be the «highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third country in 
the ordinary course of trade» (Article VI(l)(b)(i) GATT). In pursuance of the 1980 GATT Anti-
dumping Code (Article 2(4)), ECSC anti-dumping law bas translated that provision into the 
provision that it should be «the comparable price of the like product when exported to any third 
country, which may be the highest such export price but should be a representative price» (Article 
2(3)(b)(i) basic ECSC Decision). But, pursuant to the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code (Article 
2.2.), EC anti-dumping legislation stipulates that normal value may be based on «the export 
prices, in the ordinary course of trade, to an appropriate third country, provided that these prices 
are representative» (Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation) ; it, moreover, requires that those prices are 
comparable (Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Article 1(2) basic EC Regulation) and that 
those export sales are not made at a loss (Article 2.2.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(4) 
basic EC Regulation). It, thus, seems that the strict rule of GATT that the highest export price 
should be used, bas· been watered down to the requirement of a representative price covering 
production costs. This is a welcome development since a representative price should be preferred 
to an exceptionally high price. 
It is, however, difficult to predict how this development will affect anti-dumping case law. 
European anti-dumping case law, applying the ECSC rule on export prices, only sporadically 
provides information : export prices are not comparable when no or insufficient quantities are 
415 The European anti-dumping authorities have never tried to take into consideration the export price to more than one third 
country, see: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2182/80 of 14 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 15 August 1980, No L 212/43; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3171/80 of 4 December 1980 repealing a national anti-dumping duty on saccharin and its salts originating in the Republic of 
Korea imposed under the transitional provisions of the Act of Accession, O.J., 9 December 1980, No L 331125; Council Decision 
87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in connection with imports of binder and haler twine originating in 
Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, No L 84155; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 
of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Lihya and Saudi Arahia and 
accepting undertakings given .in connection with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, 
Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1. 
Not all export prices to all third countries should be taken into account. Their determination or, at least, the determination of 
their comparability or representativity is usually impossihle (BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr van. Dumping und Subventionen durch 
die Europäi.ache Gemeinachaften, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980, 48). 
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exported416 ; they are not representative when large exchange rate fluctuations of certain 
important currencies are a too important factor of uncertainty in the choice of an appropriate 
export market417• Though it is not required under GA TI or European anti-dumping law, only 
export prices actually paid or payable are used in European anti-dumping case law. According to 
the European anti-dumping authorities, it is not necessary to adjust the price charged between 
associated parties418• Notwithstanding their broad discretionary powers, the European anti-
dumping authorities are rather reluctant to use export prices to third countries. Probably they 
think such prices will deflate the normal value. According to the GA TI Group of Experts, the 
export price to third countries should not be used as normal value standard when dumping occurs 
in exports to third countries419 • The European anti-dumping authorities are equally reluctant to 
use the export price to third countries because they suspect the producer/exporter to dump on third 
416 No export&, see : Commi88ion Decision 82/397/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-
dumping procedure concerning import& of certain polypropylene film for capacitors originating in Japan and terminating that 
procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/44 ; Commission Decision 83/428/EEC of 26 August 1983 accepting an undertaking given 
in connection with the. anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of caravans for camping and parts thereof originating in 
Yugoslavia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 August 1983, No L 240/12; Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 
January 1988 imposing a p~visional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31. 
lnsufficient quantities, see : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2182/80 of 14 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 16 August 1980, No L 212/43; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 349/81of9 February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating 
in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4 ; Commission Decision 81/35/EEC of 9 February 1981 accepting 
undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United 
States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/35 ; Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-
dumping procedure concerning import& of furfural originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 11 July 1981, No L 189/67. 
417 Commi88ion Decision 861497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding import& of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J.; 10 October 1986, No L 287/26; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341/90 of 6 February 
1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings have 
been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 3811. 
418 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 744184 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, No L 79/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, No L 86131); 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1986, No L 163/1. 
419 B.I.S.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GAT!', 1960, 148. 
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markets420. In fact, when anti-dumping investigations are initiated in the Community, similar 
investigations in third countries are likely to take place as to the same products421 . 
The new GAIT Anti-dumping Code and EC anti-dumping law seem to reverse this interpretation 
on the representativity of export prices to third countries. They have omitted the provision that 
the export price to third countries may be the highest export price. They further maintain the 
requirement that the export price be representative, but now specify, pursuant to GA TI, that the 
representativity of the export prices involves exports having been made in the ordinary course of 
trade. This reference to the notion «ordinary course of trade» implies that the export prices may 
be taken into account insofar as the corresponding export transactions are not made within an 
extended period of time in substantial quantities at prices below costs (Article 2.2.1. GATT Anti-
dumping Code ; Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation). As the GATT Anti-dumping Code and EC 
42° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 163/83 of 21 January 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, No L 23/9; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 744184 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in 
Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, No L 79/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, No L 86/31); Commission Decision 
86/497/EEC of 7 Oct.ober 1986 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the inveetigation 
regarding imports of that product originating in the People'e Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoelovakia, the USSR and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 Oct.ober 1986, No L 287/25; Council Decieion 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakinge given in 
connection with i.mports of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the inveetigatione, O.J., 5 
February 1987, No L S4/55 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakinge given in connection with i.mporte of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoelavia and 
terminating these inveetigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341/90 of 5 February 1990 
accepting undertakings and impoeing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoelavia, except thoee eold for export to the Community by companiee whoee undertakings have been·· 
accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1; Commieeion Decieion No 3692/91/ECSC of 12 December 1991 repealing Decieion No 
2132/88/ECSC imposing definitive anti-dumping dutiee on importe of certain iron or steel coile, originating in Algeria, Mexico and 
Yugoelavia, O.J., 19 December 1991, No L 350/11. See aleo: BELLIS, J.-F., ccLa règlementation anti-dumping de la Communauté 
Economique Européenne", Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1979, (495), 505; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and 
Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 57 ; KRETSCHMER, H., Das Anitdumping- und 
Antisubventiomrecht der Europäischen Gemeinscha{ten, Frankfurt/Main, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 25; NORALL, C., ccNew trends in 
Anti-dumping Practice in Brussel&», World Economy, 1986, (97), 103 ; STANBROOK, C., Dumping. A Man.ual on the EEC Anti.-
Dumping Law and Procedure, Chequere, European Business Publicatione, 1980, 21; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti.-
Dumping and other Trade Protection Lawa of the EEC, Biceeter, CCH Editions, 1990, 63 ; VERMULST, E.A., ccDumping in the 
United States and the European Community: A Comparative Analyeie», Legal Issues of European Integration, 198412, (103), 107; 
VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States and the European Communities. A Comparative Analysis, 
Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 422. 
Though E.A. VER.MULST (Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States an.d the European Communities. A Comparative 
Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 422) thinks that there are indications that the European anti-dumping authorities 
might pay more attention to the export prices to third countries, European anti-dumping case law does not show any change in the 
preference of the European anti-dumping authoritiee. Moreover, J. BUHART (ccLe régime communautaire de l'antidumping : vingt 
ans d'expérience•, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 1988, (253), 265) notee that the EC questionnaire intended for producers 
and exporters of product& againet which an anti-dumping complaint ie lodged, does no longer contain any queetion for information 
about the export pricee to third countriee. P. WAER (ccConetructed Norm.al Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculatione. Fiction, 
or a Realietic Approach.., Journal of World Trade, 199313, (47), 48) too pointe out that routinely the anti-dumping authoritiee do not 
requeet subm.ission of detailed data on such export pricee and that respondente in anti-dumping proceedinge have rarely claimed 
use of those prices. 
421 BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 57. 
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anti-dumping law only allow a sales-at-a-loss test422, it will no longer be possible to reject the 
use of export prices to third countries because they are made in insufficient quantities. 
Fluctuations in exchange rates and dumping in third countries will no longer be a reason either for 
not using export prices to third countries, unless they have resulted in sales at a loss. On the 
other hand, prices charged between associated parties, may still be used. 
The GA TI Anti-dumping Code and EC anti..:dumping law, therefore, seem to open up possibilities 
for a more frequent use of export prices to third countries, which seems a welcome 
development423• Indeed, as the GA TI Group of Experts has already stated in 1959, it might 
often prove easier to collect the necessary information on the export price to third countries than 
to determine the :·constructed value424• However, the determination of the export price to third 
countries requires the cooperation of the exporter and, usually, also of the importer in the third 
country. When information about the export price to third countries is not in the interest of the 
exporter, often no cooperation will be offered425• 
2. 2. 7. Constructed value 
2.2.7.1. Definition 
The constructed value is determined by adding cost of production, including selling, administrative 
and other general expenses and a reasonable profit margin (Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping 
Code ; Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision). 
It is generally admitted that the constructed value is intended to be a surrogate for the domestic 
market price whenever the domestic market price cannot be used as normal value standard. 
422 WAER., P., and VF.RMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?•, Joumal of 
World Trade, 1994/2, (5), 10. 
423 WAER., P., and VERMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?•, Joumal of 
World Trade, 199412, (5), 10. 
Contra: 1. BOUDANT (L'anli-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 82), who welcomes the infrequent use of the export price to 
third countries because this normal value standard will lead to the alignment of the lower Community prices to the higher export prices to third 
countries. For this standard prohibits the exporter to charge lower prices to the Community than elsewhere. J. BOUDANT does not repeat the 
same criticism in respect of the other normal value standards, though it also applies to those standards. 
424 B.I.S.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GATr, 1960, 148. 
425 KRETSCHMER, H., Das Antidumping- und Antisubventionsrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Frankfurt/Main, VWV-
Verlag, 1980, 25. Hitherto, in only one case, it was explicitly mentioned that the export price to_ third countries could not be used 
because of the lack of cooperation by the exporter : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 222Ïl85 of 29 July 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of basic chromium sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 August 1985, No L 205/12. 
lîJ 
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Therefore, the production costs incurred and the profits realised on the exporter' s domestic market 
are used (Article 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 
2(3)(b )(ii) basic ECSC Decision)426• 
It bas been argued that such a constructed value goes against the «natural» interpretation of anti-
. dumping law. A «natural» interpretation of anti-dumping law would be that a reference or normal 
expon price should be constructed427. lt bas, indeed, been argued that it is impossible to 
deduce from GA TI anti-dumping law whether the constructed value should be a surrogate of the 
domestic market price or whether it should be the reasonable value of the exported products. The 
rule that the production costs to be taken into account are those of the exporter's domestic market 
is obvious. and not conclusive : both the products sold on the doniestic mar ket as those exported 
originate and, thus, are produced in the exporter' s home country. The requirement of GA TI anti-
dumping law that the amount to be added for profit must not exceed the profit normally realized 
on the exporter's domestic market, does not, as so is being argued, concern the determination of 
the profit to be taken into consideration, but simply lays down a maximum limit428. This 
reasoning is rather peculiar. First, it disregards the fact that dumping, in its traditional economie 
definition means price discrimination between national markets. Under that definition, the 
exporter's export price bas to be compared to bis domestic market price. GATT and European 
anti-dumping law apply that economie definition, since the first normal value standard to be used 
is the domestic market price. In a «natural» interpretation, the constructed value should then be a 
426 C.J.E.C., case 250/85, 5 October 1988, Brother lndu8tries Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5683), 5723; C.J.E.C., case 301/85, 5 
October 1988, Sharp Corporation, v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6813), 6823; C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 6 October 1988, 
Tokyo Electric Company Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5895-5896 and 5918-5919; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273/85 and 
107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limited a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5960 and 5975; C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 
1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2186-2187; C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, 
Gold.star Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 709 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 728; C.J.E.C., case C-
171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1272 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO); C.J.E.C., case 
C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita lndiutrial Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1301), 1319-1320 (Opinion of Advocate General 
:MISCHO) and 1330; C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1335), 1372-1373 (Opinion 
of Advocate General MISCHO); C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Matsuahita Electric lndustrial Co. Ltd and Matsushita 
Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1475-1476; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. 
Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1609-1610 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1626; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in 
Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85of19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of 
Korea, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, No L 23612. See also: BELLIS, J.-F., 
VERMULST, E.A., and W AER, P., ccFurther Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation : A Codification of Controversial 
Methodologie&», .Tournal of World Trade, 1989, (21), 25; BESELER, J.F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy 
Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 59 and 104; BOUDANT, J., L'anti-dumping communautaire, 
Paris, Economica, 1991, 83; LESGUILLONS, H., ccLe régime anti-dumping de la Communauté européenne", Droit et pratique du 
commerce international, 1978, (459), 471; LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautaire ck protection contre Ie dumping et lei 
subventiona, Paris, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 48 and 47; WAER, P., "Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. 
Fiction, or a Realistic Approach", Journal of World Trade, 1993/3, (47), 48. 
427 HINDLEY, B., tcDumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community", World Economy, 1988, (445), 450. 
428 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2129 (Opinion of Advocate 
General LENZ) ; ace alao : ibidem, 2139-2145). 
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surrogate of the domestic market price and must be based on the production costs realised and the 
profits made on the exporter's domestic market429 . Second, if the constructed value was 
intended as a reasonable value of the exported products, the amount to be added for profit should 
equal the profit (normally) realized on export sales, irrespective of whether it exceeded the profit 
normally realized on the exporter' s domestic market. 
It bas also been argued that the use of the constructed value fav~urs the finding of dumping 
· because it comprises the genera! expenses and profits of domestic sales organisations solel y 
engaged in domestic sales, whereas the export price does not430• Tuis argument is right as it 
criticizes the fact that normal value and export price are not compared at the same level of 
trade431 • However, it is not specific to the constructed value. It is valid for both the domestic 
market price and the constructed value, for the very reason that the latter is a surrogate for the 
first and, thus, like the first, comprises the genera! expenses and profits of domestic sales 
organisations432• 
2.2.7.2. Full cost pricing versus marginal pricing 
By defining the constructed value as the addition of all production costs and profits, GA TI and 
European anti-dumping law seem to have opted for the method of full-cost pricing. Under full-
. cost pricing, attention is only being paid to the cost structure of the firm. Economie theory, 
however, usually upholds the method of marginal pricing. Marginal pricing implies that a 
producer maximizes bis profits by producing a quantity in order for the additional cost of 
producing the last unit (the so-called marginal cost) to equal the additional revenue gained from 
the sale of the last unit (the so-called marginal revenue). Under marginal pricing, not only the 
cost structure ·of the firm, hut also the revenue side (consumer demand and market structure) are 
taken into account. 
429 Chapter Il (•upra, 37) defines dumping as selling at a loss when the constructed value is used as normal value standard. If 
the constructed value is a perfect surrogate for the domestic market price, dumping could never have that meaning, hut would 
always be price discrimination. However, the constructed value is nota perfect surrogate for the domestic market price. Since it is 
defined as the addition of all production costs and a profit margin, it disregards the fact that sales at a loss may result from non-
predatory short-run profit maximization and, consequently, its definition enlarges the meaning of dumping to sales at a loss. 
43o VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trcuk Protection Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd, 
1990, 59. See also: C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All PreciBion Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2180 
(plea in law of the applicant). 
431 lnfra, 279-283. 
432 CJ.E.C., caae C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2132-2133 (Opinion of Advocate 
General LENZ). 
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Pure forms of explicit marginal pricing and rigid full-cost pricing are very rare in actual business 
life. Firms apparently use either implicit marginal pricing433 or flexible full-cost pricing434• 
Empirica! studies have demonstrated that only a small minority of firms explicitly stated that they 
adhered to a marginal pricing policy. Most companies declared that they practise full-cost 
pricing. As they took into consideration demand and competitive forces, it may be doubted, 
however, that they in fact adhered to rigid full-cost pricing435• 
Because firms do not give evidence of a rigid full cost pricing policy, a rigid and purely 
mechanica! link between production costs and constructed value cannot be accepted. Constructed 
yalue should be applied in a flexible way in GA TI and European anti-dumping law. This 
flexibility, however, should not be unlimited. Besides the production side, only considerations 
conceming demand and competitive forces may be taken into consideration in order to determine 
the constructed value. Sections 2.2.7.3. up to 2.2.7.5. will examine whether the European anti-
dumping authorities apply the required flexibility in determining the constructed value. 
433 lmplicit marginal pricing implies that firma determine their prices on the basis of the best available information they have 
about production coats, demand and competitive pressures. Their information ie a conglomerate of cchard facta", euch as historica! 
production coats, and subjective eetim.ates and expectations about future demand and competitive forcee, as well as about futura 
production coats. These elements do not have to coincide with mathematica! calculated marginal cost, marginal revenue and 
numerical determinated demand elaeticity. 
434 Flexible full-cost pricing impliee that prices are determined not only on the basis of average total coete, hut also ~n the basis of 
other information - be it a eubjective eetim.ate about demand and market etructure and even about production coets and their 
allocation. 
435 For a brief, but good overview of the. empirica! research on this field, eee : DORW ARD, N ., The Pricing Decision : Economie 
Theory and BuaineH Practice, London, Harper & Row, 1987, 109-123; NOOTEBOOM, B., KLEIJWEG, A., and THURIK, R., 
«Normal coats and demand effecte in price setting", European Economie Review, 1988, (999), 999-1011. 
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2.2. 7 .3. Production costs actually incurred in the ordinary course of trade 
2.2. 7 .3.1. Production costs actually incurred 
ECSC anti-dumping law explicitly states that the production costs comprise all fixed436 and 
variable437 production costs438 actually incurred (Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision). 
This definition of the production costs is clearly based on full-cost pricing and, therefore goes 
against economie theory439• Moreover, it also disregards that, as economie theory shows, 
prices resulting from ordinary competition do not always cover all production costs440• By 
disregarding those findings of economie theory, ECSC anti-dumping law results in high normal 
values. 
-GATI and EC anti-dumping law do not define the notion «the cost of production» (Article 2.2. 
GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation). Probably, this notion also refers 
to all fixed and variable production costs since GA TI and EC anti-dumping law allow to 
436 Fixed costs are, for example, the non-operating costs of an entire factory (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 
January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs 
(dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in connection with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importe of these products and terminating the inveetigation in their respect, O.J., 25 
January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44)). 
437 Fora critical oom.ment, see supra, 38-39. 
438 Pr d et' ~- . o u ion CO•wt compr1se e.g. : 
royaltiee (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89of19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video 
cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 
June 1989, No L 17411); 
financing costs (Commiseion Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea 
ammonium nitrate eolution originating in Bulgaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16); 
the cost of (non-reconstitubale) waste (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the 
provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape reels originating in 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 17411 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341/90 of 5 February 1990 accepting 
undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those eold for export to. the Community by companies whose undertakings have been 
accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1). 
They do not comprise the production costs of a by-product (Council Regulation (EEC) No 341/90 of 5 February 1990 accepting 
undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those eold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings ·have been accepted, 
O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1). 
They have neither to be adjusted for gaine or losses from financial operations unconnected with the production process (e.g., short-
term bank investmente, traneferable securities, exchange operations) (Council Regulation (EEÇ) No 341190 of 6 February 1990 
accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings have been 
accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1). 
439 Supra, 161-162. 
440 Supra, 38~9. 
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disregard sales at a loss and . define those sales by referring to all fixed and variable production 
costs (Article 2.2.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Article 2(4) basic EC Regulation). Therefore it 
may be concluded that the interpretation placed on ECSC anti-dumping law will also prevail for 
EC anti-dumping law, unless the latter contains special provisions which clearly deviate from 
ECSC anti-dumping law. 
GA TI and European anti-dumping law, thus, impose the application of full cost pricing, rather 
than the application of marginal pricing. However, not only GATI and European anti-dumping 
law result in high normal values which are economically not justified. Through a literal and 
restrictive interpretation of the concept «all production costs actually incurred», European anti-
dumping authorities have created a mechanica! link between constructed value and production 
costs. Hereinafter, it will be shown that this mechanica! link usually inflates normal value, except 
in the case of input dumping and social dumping. 
The requirement that all costs must be taken into account, is interpreted literally. The 
interpretation is literal because the constructed value includes casts which would have been 
incurred if there were no positive economies of scope (i.e. , the decreasing effect the production of 
another product may have on the production casts of the product involved). Por example, when 
the waste resulting from another production process is used as input for the production of the 
allegedly dumped product, the value of that waste as input in the production process of the 
allegedly dumped product will be taken into account in calculating the production costs441 • By 
disregarding those positive economies of scope, the finding of (a higher degree of) dumping is 
favoured. On the other hand, if the production of the allegedly dumped product causes waste 
which is subsequently used to manufacture another product, the value that waste has as an input in 
the other production process, will be deducted from the production costs of the allegedly dumped 
product and a lower dumping margin will be obtained442• 
The requirement that all costs have to be taken into account is also interpreted in a strict sense. 
Indeed, under ECSC anti-dumping law, a special treatment of new investments is refused for three 
reasons : 
«Î) neither Article VI of the GATI nor the (1980) GATI Antidumping Code nor yet (farmer basic EC 
Regulation (and present ECSC Decision)) provide fora different set of rules to be applied to exporters 
in a start-up or expansion phase ; 
441 In furfural from the Dominican Republic the allegedly dumping exporter used bagasse as fuel in his sugar mill for the 
production of furfural. By using bagasse as fuel he reduced bis energy coats. Bagasse is a by-product of the exporter's sugar 
production. Due to disproportionately high transport costs, there is no demand for bagasse in the Dominican Republic or elsewhere 
and, therefore, no market price. For estimating the value of bagasse, the Commission used a method based on potential savings 
(Commiesion Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of furfural 
originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11July1981, No L 189/57). 
442 Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yam originating in 
Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1. 
1 
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ü) more favorable treatment to one exporter would constitute a discrimination against others which are 
not in a start-up or expansion phase ; 
iii) producers who have recently invested and who have not yet reached their expected economies of scale, 
should not engage in "pre-emptive pricing", i.e. selling below both their current nonnal value and the 
prices charged by the Community industry, on a scale large enough to cause material injury, whether 
to try to generale future economies of scale, or to break into and capture part of the Community 
market, or for any other purpose» 443 
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Of these three reasons, at first sight·, only the first seems convincing under ECSC anti-dumping 
law. Indeed, no specific rules with regard to new investments are provided by ECSC anti-
dumping law. However, ECSC anti-dumping law requires that the production costs taken into 
account for determining the constructed value, should have been incurred in the ordinary course of 
trade. Insofar as production costs incurred in a start-up or expansion phase are not incurred in 
the ordinary course -of trade, they should not be taken in to account444. Moreover, as the new 
GATT Anti-dumping Code requires adjustments to be made for start-up operations, the European 
anti-dumping authorities will not be able to uphold their case law. In pursuance of the GATT 
Anti-dumping Code, they should take into account the costs at the end of the start-up period or, if 
that period extends beyond the investigation period, the most recent costs which may reasonably 
be taken into account (Article 2.2.1.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code). Clearly, ECSC anti-dumping 
law should be amended as soon as possible or, at least, should be interpreted in a way conform to 
GATT anti-dumping law. EC anti-dumping bas already been amended in order to comply with 
the GATT Anti-dumping Code (Article 2(5)(b) basic EC Regulation). However, EC anti-dumping 
law provides a more elaborate description of the adjustments for start-up costs. That descripti~n 
may restrict the scope of those adjustments more than allowed by GA TI -anti-dumping law and 
may, thus, increase the amount of production costs. Indeed, whereas GATI anti-dumping law 
does not define for which kind of start-up costs the adjustments are necessary, EC anti-dumping 
law only allows adjustments. when the costs are affected by the use of new production facilities 
requiring additional investment and by low capacity utilization rates, which are the result of start-
up operations which take place within or during the investigation period. As a consequence, no 
adjustments will be allowed under EC anti-dumping law for low capacity utilization rates because 
of start-up operations if those start-up operations took place just before the investigation period. 
443 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, No L 193/1. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 
19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 
1985, No L 163/1; Commission Decision 85/443/EEC of 23 September 1985 accepting an undertaking given in connection with the 
anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of container corner fittings of worked cast steel originating in Austria and 
terminating that investigation, O.J., 27 September 1985, No L 256/44; C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon ln.c. v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1248-1249 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council). 
See also: Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 
O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50, where the production costs were considered to be in the ordinary course of trade, as no sufficient 
evidence was provided that genuine start-up costs had been incurred. 
444 lnfra, 171-172. 
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GATI anti-dumping law, however, does not exclude adjustments for such start-up operations. 
Furthermore, whereas GA'IT anti-dumping law does not define the length of the start-up phase, 
EC anti-dumping law stipulates that the length of that phase must be determined in relation to the 
circumstances of the exporter, but must not exceed an appropriate initia! porti.on of the period of 
cost recovery. Here, EC anti-dumping law provides the instruments to drive up unit costs. 
Indeed, the notion «appropriate» is open to many interpretations, including a restrictive one ; and 
the shorter the period of cost recovery, the higher unit costs will be. Another difference between 
GA 'IT and EC anti-dumping law is the fact that, according to GA TI anti-dumping law, the 
adjustment made for start-up costs must reflect the costs at the end of the start-up period or, if 
that period extends beyond the investigation period, the most recent costs which can reasonably be 
taken into account by the anti-dumping authorities during the investigation. EC anti-dumping law 
alters this provision as follows : instead of the costs at the end of the start-up period, the weighted 
average costs at the end of the start-up phase must be used ; and, information conceming the start-
up phase which extends beyond the investigation period, must be taken into account insofar as it is 
submitted prior to verification visits and within three months from the initiation of the 
investigation. Clearly, whereas the first element is undoubtedly a correct explicitation of what is 
meant by GATI anti-dumping law, the latter definition severely limits the information on the most 
recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account. EC anti-dumping law promotes the 
finding of high production costs, since the costs will be lower the more the start-up period is 
coming. 
The second reason, the principle of non-discrimination, is not convincing. Non-discrimination 
implies that equals are treated equally and unequals unequally. However, producers in a start-up 
or expansion phase differ profoundly from those who are not in such a phase, precisely because 
so-called pre-emptive pricing is not unusual for producers in a start-up or expansion phase445• 
The third reason, the pre-emptive pricing, is also unconvincing. The European anti-dumping 
authorities do not allow pre-emptive pricing strategies probably because they consider them to be 
predatory. However, af ter a new investment, _pre-emptive pricing resulting in sales below 
production costs is not necessarily predatory446• Indeed, during the first peripd after an 
investment has been made, total costs cannot be recovered because full capacity of the new 
445 NORALL, C., ccNew Trends in Anti-dumping Practice in Brussels,,, World Econom;y, 1986, (97}, 106. 
446 For exam.ple, P. AREEDA and D.F. TURNER in their circumstantial search to identify every form of predatory pricing, admit 
that pricing below average variable cost - this is their criterion to identify predatory pricing - does not play in the face of new 
investment. To them, ccthe primary nonpredatory justification for prices below average variable cost is that the fi.rm is actually 
only starting up and has not yet reached expected production levels. Firma in this situation, however, will not be in violation of a 
rule that prohibits prices below reasonably anticipated average variable cost" .(AREEDA, P., and TURNER, ccPredatory Pricing and 
Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act», Harvard Law Review, 1974-1975, (697}, 717-718}. 
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investment will usually not be reached during the warming-up period447• Moreover, · a 
penetration strategy, which implies low prices in the beginning and a rising price path in the long 
run, is generally accepted as a normal pricing strategy448• 
The requirement to take into account only the production costs actually incurred, is, furthermore, 
interpreted literally. The value of the production costs is determined on the basis of either the 
price actually paid for the production factors and inputs449 or the production costs incurred for 
· producing the inputs450. Thus, anti-dumping law does not sanction input dumping nor social 
dumping451• Input dumping occurs when the producer can buy an input at a very low price 
447 NORALL, C., .New Trends in Anti-dumping Practice in Brussels11, World Economy, 1986, (97), 105. 
448 DEAN, J., J>ricing Policies for New Products», Harvard BusÎMBB Review, 1950, (45), 50-52; DORWARD, N., The Pricing 
Decision.: Economie Theory and BusiMss Practice, London, Harper & Row, 1987, 126. 
449 See e.g. : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 
17 June 1988, No L 151147 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49. 
45o Commission Decision 83193/EEC of 1 March 1983 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 4 March 1983, No L 57/20; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 744/84 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, No L 79/8 
(corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, No L 86/31); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763/90 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of 
China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of those products from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 
March 1990, No L 83136 ; Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 M~ch 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, 
No L 83/117. 
451 Answer of the Commission to written question No 1647/81, O.J., 13 April 1982, No C 92/37; Answer of the Commission to 
written question No 1502192, O.J., 18 October 1993, No C 280/8; BESELER, J.-F., «EEC Protection against Dumping and 
Subsidies from Third Countriee», Common. Market Law Review, 1968-1969, (327), 332 ; VER.MULST, E.A., An.tidumping Law an.d 
Practice in. the Un.ited State• and the European Communities. A Comparative Analyais, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 423. However, 
for R. BARENTS and J. STEENBERGEN (Inleiding tot het mededingingsrecht, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1984, 187), it is not clear 
whether social dumping and input dumping are not sanctionable. 
See also: polyes'ler yarTu form the United States of America, where the producer/exporter had to pay a lower price for his inputs 
when the finished product was destined for export than when it was sold on hls domestic market. Only the lower input price was 
taken into account for the determination of the constructed value. As a consequence, the producer/exporter was not sanci;ioned for 
input dumping (Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United States of America, O.J., 23 February 
1983, No L 50/1. Regulation (EEC) No. 407/83, which is the sole anti-dumping determination which may refer to input dumping. 
Contrary to the mejority of the doctrine (BIERWAGEN, R.M., and HAILBRONNER, K., cclnput, Downstream, Secondary, 
Diversionary and Components or Subassembly Dumpingn, Journal of World Trade, 1988, (27), 38; BESELER, J.-F., and 
WJLLIAMS, A.N ., Anti-Dumping an.d An.ti-Subsidy Law. The European Commun.itiea, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 79, note 
65; BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., ccEC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generation Issuesn, in Antitrust and Trade Policy in. 
the Un.ited State• and the European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 581; VER.MULST, E.A., 
Anti.dumping Law an.d Practice in the Un.ited States and the European Communitiea. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1987, 461, note 35), it cannot be deduced from Regulation (EEC) No. 3439/80). 
There may be one exception, riamely when prices and wages of inputs and production factors are determined by the government of 
the exporting country (see : in.fra, 172-173). 
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which is usually below the production costs452• · Social dumping implies that a producer takes 
advantage of the fact that in his domestic market some production factors, such as labour, can be 
hired at a very low wage, though not necessarily below their marginal product in that country. As 
long as the wages are not below the marginal product, social dumping is in fact an application of 
the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem453• The low wages result from the comparative advantage the 
producer' s country bas because of its relative labour abundance. However, even when those 
wages are below the marginal product of labour and, accordingly, do not reflect exactly the 
country's comparative advantage, anti-dumping law should not sanction social dumping . 
. Domestic market imperfections cause wages to fall below labour's marginal product. Anti-
d;umping measures cannot cure such imperfections. They cannot even remedy the symptoms. 
lndeed, the price increase caused by anti-dumping measures benefits either the Community 
institutions or the dumping exporters454• There is no guarantee that the dumping exporters will 
transfer the said benefits to their employees or not even an incentive for them to do so. When the 
producer buys the production factors and inputs he needs at the lowest possible price, he should 
not be sanctioned for such a sound economie behaviour455• Even more, he cannot be 
sanctioned, since the purchase of production factors and inputs takes place in the exporting 
country and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the importing country456• It would also 
be difficult to administer input and social dumping. The anti-dumping authorities would have to 
inquire for each production factor and input whether they are not sold at a loss or hired at a wage 
below their marginal product. This would prove to be unworkable, especially as the cooperation 
452 BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
·Maxwell, 1986·, 78-79; BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generations Issues", in Antitrust 
and Trade Policy in the United States and the European Community, HA WK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 580. 
453 DAILLIER, P., .La pratique communautaire de lutte contre Ie dumping", Revue du Marché Commun, 1979, (557), 558 ; 
GREENA WA Y, D., and MILNER, C., Protectionism again ... '! Causes ans Consequences of a Retreat {rom Freer Trade to Economie 
Nationalism, London, lnstitute for Economie Affaire, 1979, 16-17; HINDLEY, B., and NICOLAIDES, E., Taking the New 
Protectionism Seriously, London, Trade Policy Research Centre, 1983, 60-62 ; KRA VIS, 1.B., ccThe Current Case for Import 
Limitations», in Changing Patterns in Foreign Trade and Payments, BALLASA, B. (ed.), New York, Norton & Company, 1978, (1), 
17-18 ; LANGJOUW, G.J., «Protectie ten opzichte van de ontwikkelingslanden", Maandschrift voor Economie, 1981, (1), 7 ; 
STANBROOK, C., Dumping. A Manual on the EEC Anti-Dumping Law and Procedure, Chequers, European Business Publications, 
1980, 5 ; W ARES, W .A., The Theory of Dumping ctn.d American Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1977, 6. 
For the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, eee e.g. : ETHIER, W., Modern International Economics, New York, Norton, 1983, 95-97. 
454 lnfra, 347-349. 
455 BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 79; BIERWAGEN, R.M., and HAILBRONNER, K., cclnput, Downstream, Secondary, Diversionary and Components 
or Subassembly Dumping», Journal of World Trade Law, 1988, (27), 40 ; BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., ccEC Anti-dumping Enforcement -
Selected Second Generations Issues", in Antitrust and Trade Policy in the United States and the European Community, HA WK, 
B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 581. 
Contra : BOUDANT, J., L'an.ti-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 275-278. 
456 IERW d . B AGEN, R.M., an HAILBRONNER, K.,. cclnput, Downstream, Secondary, Diversionary and Components or 
Subaseembly Dumping», Journal of World Trade Law, 1988, (27), · 39. 
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of the supplier of the production factor or input would be required - who even may be established 
in a third country457• 
2.2.7.3.2. Ordinary course of trade 
Under European anti-dumping law, the production ·costs used for determining the constructed 
value must be incurred in the ordinary course of trade (Articles 1(2) and 2(3) basic EC 
Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision). European anti-dumping law may be in 
violation of GA TI anti-dumping law. Indeed, GA TI anti-dumping law does not require the 
production costs to have been incurred in the ordinary course of trade (see : Article VI(l) GA TI ; 
Article 2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code). Consequently, under GATI anti-dumping law, the 
constructed value may be determined on the basis of production costs which have not been 
incurred in the ordinary course of trade. 
Though they might resort to it in order to disregard too high production costs, European anti-
dumping authorities rely on the concept «ordinary course of trade» in order to submit higher 
production costs than those actually incurred. As actual production costs are the minimum to be 
taken into account, the requirement that production costs be incurred in the ordinary· course of 
trade only increases normal value. 
European anti-dumping case law offers three examples which show that production costs in the 
ordinary course of trade equal at least those actually incurred. First, the European anti-dumping 
authorities apply the concept <1Jroduction costs in the ordinary course of trade>> in respect of 
associations between the producer and the supplier of his inputs458 • As is also the case for the 
domestic market price (see : Article 2(l)(b) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(7) basic ECSC 
Decision), transactions conceming inputs between associated parties are assumed not to have been 
451 BESELER, J.-F., and WlLLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 79; BIERWAGEN, R.M., and HAILBRONNER, K., «Input, Downstream, Secondary, Diversionary and Components 
or Subaesembly Dumping•, Journal of World Trade Law, 1988, (27), 39-40 ; KRETSCHMER, H., DCJ1J Antidumping- und 
Antiaubventionarecht der Europäiachen Gemein.schaften, FrankfurtJMain, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 32: 
458 See : BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., ccEC Antidumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generation Issues», in Antitrust and Trade Policy 
in the United State• and the European Community, HA WK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 581-582, who points out in 
this respect that the •approach vis-à-vis input dumping (between aesociated parties) results from the Community's view that the 
1979 GATI' Antidumping Code, no provision of which specifically authorizes application of antidumping duties to input dumping (a 
term which does not even appear in the Code) should not be interpreted extensively and, where a need appears for an evolving 
interpretation, an understanding within the framework of GATI' should be reachedit. No such agreement hae been concluded. 
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made in the ordinary course of trade459• The assumption is rebutted when the prices charged 
between associated parties are comparable with the prices charged between independent 
parties460• If associated parties constitute an economie unity, the production costs in genera! 
and the selling, administrative and other genera! expenses in particular of the company associated 
with the allegedly dumping producer/exporter, are added to the production costs . of the 
producer/exporter461 • This is especially so when the European anti-dumping authorities are 
459 Commission Decision 80n83/EEC of 27 August 1980 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings 
concerning import& of studded welded-link chain, originating in Spain and Sweden and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 2 
September 1980, No L 231/10 ; Commission Decision 811366/EEC of 18 May 1981 accepting an undertaking given in connection 
with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning louvre doors originating in Malaysia and Singapore and terminating the 
proceedings, O.J., 22 May 1981, No L 135/33; Commission Decision 86/151/EEC of 29 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 113/61; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3522/90 of 4 December 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1768189 with regard to the imposition of a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video .cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 7 December 
1990, No L 343/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076/94 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11May1994, No L 120/3. 
460 Commission Decision 80n83/EEC of 27 August 1980 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings 
concerning import& of studded welded-link chain, originating in Spain and Sweden and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 2 
September 1980, No L 231/10 ; Commission Decision 86/151/EEC of 29 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 113/61; BESELER, J.-F., and 
WILLIAMS, A.N ., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsicly Law. The European. Communitie11, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 59 ; 
BUHART, J., ccLe régime communautaire de l'antidumping: vingt ans d'expériencea., Reuue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 1988, 
(253), 266. 
461 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3453/81of2 December 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
cotton yarns originating in Turkey, O.J., 3 December 1981, No L 347/19; Council Regulation (EEC) No 789/82 of 2 April 1982 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain cotton yarns originating in Turkey, O.J., 3 March 1982, No L 90/l; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 
December 1984, No L 335/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698185of19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 
of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and . 
accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 
October 1985, No L 275/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, No L 97/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 
of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 
August 1986, No L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3528/87 of 23 November 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 26 November 1987, No L 336/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, No L 235/5; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic 
random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in connection with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 
1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmable read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No 
L 65/1; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 59. 
The production costs not only of associated suppliers or sales companies, hut also of the holding company of the producer/exporter 
are added (Commission Decision 86/151/EEC. of 29 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 30 April 1986,.No L 113/61). Moreover, the associated company must not be 
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convinced that the production costs borne by the associated company should normally have been 
borne by the producer/exporter462• 
Second, exceptionally high production costs caused by an economie recovery programme of the 
government of the exporting country are considered to be in the ordinary course of trade as they 
represent the general economie situation of the exporting country463 
Third, European anti-dumping law offers the possibility to take account of the specific situation of 
producers in a start-up or expansion phase. Indeed, during a start-up or expansion phase, 
production costs are unusually high in respect of prices, so that it seems but normal that they are 
not fully covered by the prices charged. Therefore, it may be argued that in a start-up or 
expansion phase production costs are not incurred in the ordinary course of trade. In only one 
European anti-dumping case, the production costs of a new production plant during its start-up 
phase have not been considered as being incurred in the ordinary course of trade and were, 
therefore, not taken in to account464• It is, however, an isolated case which probably has been 
established in the country of origin (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262/90 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 
November 1990, No L 313/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36)). 
462 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3262/90 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of audio 
tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/6 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36). 
463 Council Regulation {EEC) No 2305/92 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in 
Brazil and definitively collecting the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/1. 
464 In chemical ferti.lizer from the United States of America, the investigation period covered the period from 1 January to 30 
September 1980. As domestic sales had been made at a loss during that period, the constructed value was used as normal value 
standard. However, the constructed value «Was established on the basis of the costs of production including a reasonable margin 
for overheads and profit for the third quarter of 1980, this being the period (.") when its new production plant was operating for the 
first time under normal condition.SH (Council Regulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4; Commission 
Decision 81/35/EEC of 9 February 1981 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping proceedinge concerning 
certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/35). The wording «normal 
conditiollB>t was probably UBed in order to indicate that the production costs incurred during the third quarter of 1980 were in the 
ordinary course of trade. A contrario, the production costs incurred during the first two quarters of 1980 were not in the ordinary 
course of trade. 
There is still another case in which attention has been paid to temporary and exceptional costs incurred during the start-up phase 
of production. lndeed, in potassium chloride from Belarus, Russia or Ukrai.ne, normal value has been established on the basis of 
the domestic market price, though it did not cover all production costs. Normally, such domestic market price is disregarded (infra, 
226). It was nevertheless, applied as normal value standard because it covered all production costs, . except for the temporary and 
exceptional costs specific to the start-up phase (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 of 23 October 1992 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 24 October 1992, No L 308/41). 
This case, though, does not show that production coste incurred during the start-up phase are coneidered as not. being incurred in 
the ordinary course of trade. lndeed, those production costs were dieregarded because they were specific to the reference country 
(normal value for NME countries is determined on the basis of the pricee or costs in a third ME country, the so-called reference 
country, see: Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision) and n~t to the NME countries under 
investigation and it would have been unfair to take them into account. 
j 
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overruled by later anti-dumping case law465 in which all production costs incurred during the 
start-up or expansion phase were taken into account. According to anti-dumping case law, former 
GA TI and EC anti-dumping law and present ECSC anti-dumping law do not provide for a 
different set of rules to be applied to exporters in a start-up or expansion phase. Whereas 
European anti-dumping authorities are right in respect of former GA TI anti-dumping law, they 
interprete the concept «production costs incurred in the ordinary course of trade>> in a way that 
. cannot be justified from an economie point of view. Moreover, as the new GA TI Anti-dumping 
Code (Article 2.2.1.1.) and prevailing EC anti-dumping law (Article 2(5)(b) basic EC Regulation) 
require adjustments to be made for start-up operations, the European anti-dumping authorities will 
have to change their case law (including their case law in respect of ECSC anti-dumping law, the 
legislation of which should be best amended too )466 • 
As transactions of inputs at prices below their production costs are considered to have been made 
in the ordinary course of trade, the actual input prices are taken in to account467• Hence, input 
465 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, No L 193/1. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 
19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 
1985, No L 163/1; Commission Decision 85/443/EEC of 23 September 1985 accepting an undertaking given in connection with the 
anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of container corner fittings of worked cast steel originating in Austria and 
terminating that investigation, O.J., 27 September 1985, No L 256/44; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, 
Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121/11; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi 
Arabia and accepting undertakings given in connection with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 
November 1987, No L 317/1. 
See also : cotton. yarn. from Egypt, where the exporter claimed that his production costs were exceptionally high during the period of 
investigation and decreased in following years. The Commission answered that factors relating to a period outside the period of 
investigation cannot be taken into consideration (Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of cotton yarn originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1). 
466 Supra, 164-166. 
467 In electron.ic typewriters from Japan., the production costs of the Japanese producer of electronic typewriters were adjusted 
because he had purchased components of one of his production Uliits at a price below the cost of production (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1698185 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in 
Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1). It is not made clear whether the too low price or the association was decisive. According 
to the doctrine, it was the association which made the adjustment necessary. Thus, the price at which inputs and production 
factors are bought, have to be taken as such in establishing the constructed value, unless the producer could have had some 
infl.uence on this price, e.g., through a certain relationship with his supplier (BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping 
and An.ti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 78-80). 
In cotton. yarn. from Egypt, the price for raw cotton (i.e., the main input for cotton yarn) was not considered to be in the ordinary 
course of trade. It was pointed out that raw cotton was sold on the domestic market at a considerably lower price than the price of 
raw cotton exported from Egypt and that this had a direct impact on the domestic price of cotton yarn. However, it seems that the 
price difference alone was not the fundamental reason for disregarding the price for raw cotton. For it was also pointed out that 
the domestic prices of raw cotton and cotton yarn were both fixed by the Egyptian government and that the cotton yarn spinning 
companies were state owned (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of cotton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
cotton yam originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117). It seems that these circumstances are the 
reason why the price for raw cotton was disregarded, or, at least, they make low input p~ices suspicious. A governement that 
determines both the input price and the price of the finished product, may circumvent anti-dumping law. If it fixes a low input 
price, a low domestic market price of the fmished product will not be below the production costs and, therefore, cannot ·be 
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and social dumping are not actionable under European anti-dumping law. This may seem quite 
peculiar because, in respect of domestic market prices, sales at a loss are not considered to be 
made in the ordinary course of trade (see : Article 2.2.1. GA IT Anti-dumping Code ; Article 
2(4) basic EC legislation468). From an economie point of view, however, the absence of a 
strict identical interpretation of the concept «ordinary course of trade» in respect of domestic 
market prices and input prices below production costs, is justitieel since anti-dumping law should 
not sanction a producer for buying bis inputs at the lowest possible price, even if these prices are 
below production costs469• 
There is only one exception to the rule that actually incurred production costs are the minimum to 
be taken into account. It concerns the case of dumping exporters established in an East-European 
country at the time that this country had switched from a non-market economy system to a market 
economy system. In view of the different stages of economie and commercial reforms within the 
companies established in that country, the accounting data did not always reflect the costs 
normally home by companies that produce in a market economy and had to be adjusted470. 
2.2. 7.4. A reasonable amount for selling, administrative and other general 
expenses and a reasonable profit margin 
The constructed value must include a reasonable amount for selling, administrative and other 
genera! expenses as well as a reasonable profit margin (Article VI(l) GATI ; Article 2.2. GATT 
Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision). 
considered as not being in the ordinary course of trade. As a result, that low domestic market price must be used as normal value 
standard and the lower the normal value, the lower the probability of finding dumping. 
468 Supra, 130-133. 
469 Supra, 167-169. 
47o Commisaion Dcciaion No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
hematitc pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Ruaaia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5. 
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The fundamental reason471 why a positive472 amount for genera! expenses and profit must 
always be added, is the fact that the constructed value is a surrogate method to obtain a normal 
value, as if sales on the domestic market had taken place in the ordinary course of trade. Under 
European anti-dumping law, the price for such sales is assumed to include a reasonable amount 
for genera! expenses and profit473 • This assumption, however, does not match economie 
realities. It may, indeed, be economically justified not to make any profits, or even to suffer 
some losses474• Therefore, in cases where no profits or loss are economically justified, the 
dumping margin will be higher than if the constructed value is applies as normal value standard. 
471 Another, more legalistic reason has also been ueed: European anti-dumping law imposes the constructed value to be 
determined uby adding cost of production and a reasonable margin of profit>. (Article 2(3)(bXii) basic ECSC Decision) (emphasis 
added). According to the European anti-dumping authorities, the question, therefore, is not whether or not a profit margin should 
be added, hut rather what is a reasonable profit margin (Commission Decision 86/151/EEC of 29 April 1986 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 113/61; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya 
and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in connection with imports of wea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 
November 1987, No L 317/1). GATT and EC anti-dumping law probably also allow this legalistic interpretation since they define 
the conetructed value as .the cost of production plus a reasonable amount for (".) profits>t (Article 2.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; 
Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation) (emphasis added). This legalistic reason is, in fact, the legal corisequence of the fundamental 
reason : ü the constructed value is not considered to be a surrogate of the domestic market price in the ordinary course of trade and 
ü the domestic market price in the ordinary course of trade is not defined as comprising all production costs, including 
administrative, eelling and other general expenses, and a profit margin, the constructed value would not be defined as the addition 
of the production costs and a profit margin (see : C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y 
Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5898-5899 and 5921). 
472 A positive amount for general expenees and profit has always to he added, even ü no general expenses are incurred or if no 
profits are made (BEI.LIS, J.-F., teLa ràglementation anti-dumping de la Communauté Economique Européenne11, Cahiers de Droit 
Européen, 1979, (495), 507; BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr uon Dumping und Subuentionen durch die Europäische Gemeinschafkn, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980, 48; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy Law. The European 
Communitiea, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 60; DIDIER, P., ccEEC Antidumping Rules and Practices", Common Market Law 
Reuiew, 1980, (349), 355). 
See, however : anglea, ahapes an.d sections of iron or steel {rom Romania, where the constructed value of the reference country was 
used as nonnal value standard (see: Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision; infra, 191). However, no 
profit margin was ad.ded (Commission Decision 80/253/EEC of 26 February 1980 accepting undertakings off ered in connection with 
the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of certain angles, shapes and sections of iron or steel originating in Romania, and 
terminating that procedure, O.J., 29 February 1980, No L 56/34). The fact that it concerned the determination of normal value for 
a NME country is not relevant. In respect of NME countries, European anti-dumping law treats of ccthe constructed value» without 
any further specification (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5)(b) basic ECSC Decision). Therefore, the constructed value 
when ueed as norm.al value standard for NME countries, has to be taken in its norm.al meaning, i.e., in conformity with its 
definition given in respect of ME countries (Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(bXii) basic ECSC Decision). As a 
consequence, the constructed value should include a reasonable positive margin of profit, even in respect of NME countries. 
473 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, 
O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2865/85 of 1• October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan 
and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, 
O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, No L 97/1; Commission Decision 86/151/EEC of 29 
April 1986 tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 30 
April 1986, No L 113161 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of eerial impact fully formed character printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 17711. 
474 Supra, 38-42. 
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Under GATT and EC anti-dumping law, the amount for genera! expenses and profit has to be 
calculated on the basis of actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of 
trade (Article 2.2.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(6) basic EC Regulation). Under 
ECSC anti-dumping law, the amount for genera! expenses and profit has to calculated with 
reference to the genera! expenses incurred and the profit realized by the dumping 
producers/exporters on the profitable sales on their domestic market (Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic 
ECSC Decision). ECSC anti-dumping law, as interpreted by the European anti-dumping 
authorities coincides with GA TI and EC anti-dumping law : the actual costs and profits are taken 
into account, unless they do not pertain to sales in the ordinary course of trade. Indeed, as a rule, 
the genera! expenses actually incurred and the profit margin actually realized are used475• It is 
of no importance whether the expenses which are necessarily included in the selling price, are 
incurred by the producer or by his associated sales company with which he forms an economie 
. unit, even when this sa.les company is a legally distinct entity476• In the case of such an 
economie unit, the combined profit margins of the two companies may also be used in order to 
construct the normal value477• The profit margin actually realized is seen as the most realistic 
one, even if it is exceptional, exorbitant or the result of special circumstances. The European 
anti-dumping authorities argue that the domestic market price, when used as normal value 
standard, cannot be challenged for the reason that it contains such a profit margin478• They 
only require that the profit margin is realized on sales made in the ordinary course of trade. For 
475 VER.MULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in. the Un.ited States an.d the European. Commun.ities. A Comparatwe 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 425. 
476 C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo EJectric Company Lid (TEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5919; 
C.J.E.C" case C-178/87, 10 march 1992, Minolla Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1604-1605 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO) and 1625; CJ.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R" 1992, 1, (1635), 1674. See also: WAER, 
P" «Constructed Nonnal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach•, Joumal of World Trade, 1993/3, (47), 
49. 
477 C.J.E.C" joined cases 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Umited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5976; C.J.E.C., case 
C-178/87, 10 Marcb 1992, Minolla Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1627. 
478 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/l; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting 
undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, 
No L 287125; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33. 
The European anti-dumping authorities' argument must have convinced Advocate-Genera! Sir GORDON SL YNN who held, in 
respect of the Wie of the actually realized profit margin, that : cc(t)he purpose of constructed normal value ie to act as a substitute 
for domestic selling price as a basis for normal value where there are no domestic salea or where euch sales do no permit a proper 
comparison. A way of constructing normal value which brings it closer to actual domestic prices ie in line with that purpose» 
(C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y Ltd (TEC) o.a. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 
5889. See also: C.J.E.C., joined cases 273185 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limited a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 
5961). 
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example, profits . realized479, as well as genera! expenses incurred480 on sales made to the 
amount of less than 5 % of the volume of total exports to the Community, are not taken into 
account. When the dumping producers/exporters do not sell sufficient quantities on their domestic 
market, the genera! expenses incurred and the profit realized by other producers/exporters in the 
exporting country on profitable sales of the like product have to be used as reference under 
European anti-dumping law. Also here, the amount for general expenses and for profit added in 
order to calculate the constructed value coincides with the actual genera! expenses and profits of 
the producers/exporters, irrespective of whether these amounts are rather high· such as in the case 
of producers/exporters who sell their products through associated sales companies. Only if the 
producers/exporters concerned can prove that it is possible to be present on their domestic market 
without having an integrated sales structure, the genera! expenses actually incurred by the other 
producers/exporters will not be used481 • If the producers/exporters are not present on their 
domestic market, such evidence will probably impossible to provide482• Needless to point out 
that this application of European anti-dumping law results in high constructed values and, 
consequently, high dumping margins. 
Nevertheless, GA TI and European anti-dumping law allow a flexible approach. lndeed, by 
requiring that the amount for general expenses and for profits be reasonable (Article 2.2. GATI 
Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(3) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision), 
they allow the European anti-dumping authorities a wide margin of discretion in evaluating that 
amount483• Only a marginal judicia! con trol will be possible in view of the vague wording of 
479 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 of 16 
January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, No L 13/21. 
48° Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind uaed in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8 ; Commission Decision 92/313/EEC of 
13 June 1992 accepting an undertaking given in connection with the review proceeding of the anti-dumping measure concerning imports of 
container corner fittings of worked cast steel originating in Austria and terminating the investigation, O.J., 19 June 1992, No L 165/37; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, 
Kuakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, No L 302/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour telcvision receivers originating in Malaysia, the 
People's Republic of China, the Rcpublic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50. 
481 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2187 and 2201. 
482 VERMULST, E.A., and HOODER, J.J., .cAnnotation on Case C-69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 1991, 
not yet reported; Case C-358/89, Extramel v. Council, Judgment of 16 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Ferlilizer Company 
(Samad) and SaudJ Arabian FeT1ilizer Company (Sa/co) v. Council, Judgment of 17June 1991, not yct reported; Case C-16/90, Dellef Nölle v. 
Haupz.ollaml Bremen-Freihafen, Judgment of 22 Octobcr 1991, not yet reportedi., Common Mar/eet Law Review, 1992, (380), 384. 
483 C.J.E.C.,joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 6 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Company Ltd (TEC). o.a. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 
(6855), 5888 and 5898 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! Sir Gordon SL YNN), and 5920 ; C.J.E.C., case· C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima 
All Preciswn Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2089 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council) and 2186. 
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European anti-dumping law in this respect ( «reasonable» )484• For example, they do not require 
that the amount to be added for profits equals the profit realized. 
This flexible approach may result in lower profit margins than the profit actually realized485• 
484 C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y Ltd (TEC) o.a. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 
(5855), 5888 and 5898 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! Sir Gordon SL YNN), and 5920 ; C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima 
All Preci.sion Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2186; C.J.E.C., case C..171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1268 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1289. 
See in particular: C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Preci.sion Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2130 and 
2136 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! LENZ), and 2179-2180, where the Court, along with Advocate General LENZ, stated that the 
same search for reasonableness governs European as GA'IT anti-dumping law in respect of the determination of inter alia the 
amount for profits. 
485 In ball bearings from Singapore, a profit margin of 6 % was used for both the production units of the exporter, although the 
exporter had admitted that one of hls production units realized a profit of 6,65 %. The reason why a lower profit margin was used, 
was that the other production unit was in an expansion phase (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, No 
L 193/1). 
In magnetic disks (3,5" microdi.sks) from Hong Kong, a level of profit of 10 %, as alleged by the anti-dumping complaint, was used, 
though it was found to be lees than that realized by the allegedly dumping producers on their domestic market sales, albeit in 
unrepresentative quantities (Council Regulation (EC) No 2199194 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively 
the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, No L 236/2). 
In ammonium paratungstate from the Republic of Korea, the profit margin was restricted to 10 % to take account of the very strong 
pressure on the ammonium paratungstate prices on the world market (Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of 
China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83/117). 
In the definitive assessment concerning urea from Kuwait and Trinidad and Tobago the fact that market prices were depressed 
during the investigation period and that not any producer of urea was able to make some profit, were the reasons why a profit 
margin of 2,5 % was used. This profit margin was seen as the absolute minimum which is necessary in the sector to allow a 
producer to earn the necessary means to keep a factory technically up to the mark (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 
November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting 
undertakings given in connection with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoératic Republic, Kuwait, 
the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J" 7 November 1987, No L 317/1). 
Moreover, it probably lies below the profits actually realized. For in the provisional assessment a profit margin of 7 % was 
determined for Trinidad and Tobago on the basis of the profit margins realized by the other exporters of the other countries 
concerned in the same anti-dumping proceeding. One of these other countries was Kuwait, for which a profit margin of 7 % was 
found (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and_ Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111). 
In chemical ferti.lizers from 'the United State• of America a very low profit margin of 1 % was used because of the exceptional ratio 
between own and foreign capital (Council Regulation (EEC) No 349/81of9 February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4; Commission 
Decision 81/35/EEC of 9 February 1981 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning 
certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/35). 
In plain paper plwtooopiers from Japan (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12; C.J.E.C., joined 
cases 133/87 and 150/87, 14 March 1990, Nashua Corporation v Commi.ssion and Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (719), 776; C.J.E.C., 
case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Counci.l and Commi.ssion, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (781), 818 and 837; C.J.E.C., case 
C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mi.ta lndustrial Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1301), 1330; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, 
Matsushi.ta Electric lnduatrial Co. Ltd and Matsushi.ta Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1409), 1476) and in video 
cassette recorders from ,Japan and Korea (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on certain imports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31August1988, 
No L 240/5), a lower profit margin was used for some sales in order to take the difference either in production costs or in profits 
between different sales into account. -
~m 
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However, the flexibility allowed by GATI and Europe.an anti-dumping law cuts both ways. It 
may also result in higher profit margins486• As European anti-dumping case law is rather 
succint, it cannot be predicted in which direction the flexibility will be applied in a particular 
case. Nevertheless, it is safe to make forcasts for general high profit margins. For example, 
under European anti-dumping law, only profits realized on profitable sales may be retained since 
the profits taken into account must pertain to sales in the ordinary course of trade and sales at a 
loss are not considered to have been made in the ordinary course of trade (Article 2(3) and (4) 
basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(3)(b)(ii) basic ECSC Decision). In some European anti-dumping 
cases, only sa.les made at prices above production costs have been taken into account in 
application of that rule487• In most European anti-dumping cases, however, the meaning of the 
In compact diac playera from the Republic of Korea the profit margin for sales to .coriginal equipment manufacturers»> (so-called 
OEMs) was determined at a rate of 30 % of that realized on own-brand sales (C.J.E.C., case C-105190, 13 February 1992, Gold.star 
Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (677), 726-729). Similarly, in linear tungsten. ha.logen. lampa from Japan. and in colour televiaion. 
receivers from Malay•ia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, the profit margin of such sales was set at 33 % of that 
realized on own-brand sales (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in 
Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50) and 
in audio tape11 in. ca1111ettes from Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, it was set at 50 % of the profit realized on own-brand 
sales (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in 
cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure 
concerning Hong Kong, O.J., 14 May 1991, No L 119/35). 
486 WAER, P., ~onatnactcd Nonnal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach•, Joumal of World Trade, 
1993/3, (47), 67-68. 
For example, in radio-broadcasl receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, from the Republic of Korea the profit margin actually realized on sales 
to car-manufacturen (5.7 %) was augmented (by an amount of 3.9 %) in order to estimate the profit margin on sales to distributors and retailers. 
Only this increased profit margin was used since cxports were primarily sold to distributon and retailers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306/92 of 
4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21January1993, No L 13/20); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306/92 
of 4 August 1992 imposing a dcfinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in 
the Republic of Korea, O.J" 7 August 1992, No L 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21January1993, No L 13/20)). 
487 Different methods are used in order to disregard prices below production costs : 
in chemical fertilizer from the Un.ited States of America, only that part of the investigation period was taken into account for 
calculating the margin of profit during which the firm had been exporting to the Community and the new firm was operating 
under normal circumstances. As a consequence, the start-up period of the new fi.rm, in which profits are made seldom, was 
left out of consideration. Therefore, the profit margin was undoubtedly higher than when the whole investigation period 
would have been taken into account (Council Regulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4; 
Com.mission Decision 81/35/EEC of 9 February 1981 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping proceedings 
concerning certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/35); 
in ball hearing• origin.ating in. Japan. and Singapore, the profit margin was calculated on a weighted average basis, but where 
loss-making product types were left out of this calculation (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685190 of 17 September 1990 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings origina-
ting in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38). 
This aspect of European anti-dumping law has already been critizised by the allegedly dumping exporters because of leading to 
artificially high profit margins (C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 march 1992, Min.olta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1677), 
1587-1588 (Report for the Hearing: plea in law of the applicant) and 1626; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, 
No L 54112 (profit margin = 14.6 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33 (profit 
margin .= 37 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685/90of17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imporls of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No 
L 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38)). See also: BELLIS, J.-F., VERMULST, E.A., and WAER, P., ccFurther 
Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation : A Codification of Controversial Methodologies", Journ.al of World Trade, 1989, 
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concept «profitable saleS» is based on an interpretation a contrario of the definition of the concept 
«sales at a loss» (see : Article 2.2.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(4) basic EC 
legislation)488• Hence, sales have been hold profitable in cases where individual sales might 
have been made at prices below production costs, provided that sufficient sales made at a profit 
led to overall profits being realized during the investigation period489 • Only the latter 
interpretation is in accordance with GA TI .and European anti-dumping law. Indeed, under GA TI 
and European anti-dumping law, sales at a loss do not fit in with ~e definition of sales made in 
the ordinary course of trade, if they are made in substantial quantities and at prices which, all 
sales being taking into account, prevent the recovery of all production costs (Article 2.2.1. GATI 
(21), 25; WAER, P., tcConstructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach»>, Journal 
of World Trade, 199313, (47), 69-74 and 79-80. 
488 C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Ine. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1237), 1268 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO); C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1592 (Report for the 
Hearing: Opinion of the Council) and 1626; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of these products and ~rminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 
(corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22/79; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known 
as EPROMs (erasable programmable read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1. 
In several other anti-dumping cases the profit realized during profitable perioda has been taken into account. See e.g. : Commission 
Decision 83/93/EEC of 1 March 1983 accepting undertak.ings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of ferro-silicon originating in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 4 
March 1983, No L 57/20; Commission Decision 83/305/EEC of 16 June 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Egypt, O.J., 21 June 1983, No L 161/13; Commission Decision 
831306/EEC of 16 June 1983 accepting undertak.ings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
low carbon ferro-chromium originating in South Africa, Sweden, Turkey and Zimbabwe, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 
June 1983, No L 161115 ; Commission Deci~ion 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
imports of certain pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 
20 July 1983, No L 196122 ; Commission Decision 84/16/EEC of l6 January 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of exterior panel doors originating in Taiwan, O.J., 19 January 1984, No L 16/42; Commission Decision 
84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 t.erminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of non-alloyed unwrought 
aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, No L 57/19; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan and t.erminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, 
No L 335/43; Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 March 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1985, No L 68/13 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 
June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in 
Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, No L 176/1 ; Council Decision 86/468/EEC 
of 22 September 1986 accepting undertak.ings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and t.erminating the investigation, O.J., 24 Sept.ember 1986, No 
L 272129; Commiuion Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertak.ings given in connection with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding import& of that product originating in the People'& Republic of China, Norway, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/25; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88of14 
June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, 
Taiwan, Turkey, the United Stat.es of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/47. In profitable periode, some sales 
may be made at a lou in so far as they are compensat.ed for by profitable sales. 
489 For the European anti-dumping authorities the notion of profüable sales «does not, in certain circumstances, exclude a normal value which 
covers sales of like products on the domestic market which are not made under normal conditions, such as sales at a loss. (C.J .E.C., case C-69/89, 
7 May 1991, Nalcajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (2069), 2085 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council)) 
(emphasis added). See also: WAER., P., «Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach», 
Joumal of World Trade, 199313, (47), 68. 
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Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(4) basic EC legislation)490• As a result, only the profit realized 
on all sales, including sales at prices below the production costs, which permit the recovery of all 
costs, may be used491 • Only the latter interpretation of the concept «profitable sales» is, in 
principle, justitieel from an economie point of view. Indeed, sales at a loss are not uncommon in 
a world characterized by uncertainty and adjustment costs, in which, in the long run, the losses 
incurred are compensated for by the profits made on profitable sales492• The onl y problem is 
that the legal definition of sales at a loss leaves much room for manoeuvre : it may be that, from 
a legal point of view, sales are considered to have been made at a loss because too short a period 
of time was taken into account, i.e. , because that period is shorter than the business cycle during 
w~ich, from an economie point of view, production costs should be covered493 • Thus, if that 
part of a business cycle is selected during which profits are earned which in part serve to 
compensate the losses incurred during the rest of the business cycle, the profit margin will be 
over-evaluated. 
2.2.7.5. Cost allocation 
If a producer manufactures several products, production costs must be allocated among the various 
products. Similarly, if a producer incurs investment costs, those costs must be allocated over the 
years during which they should normally be recovered. 
Under GATT and EC anti-dumping law, costs should normally be calculated on the basis of the 
records kept by the exporter, provided that such records are in accordance with the generally 
accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and it is shown that the records reasonably 
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product (Article 2.2.1.1. GA TI 
Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(5) basic EÇ Regulation). Under ECSC anti-dumping law, all costs 
490 Supra, 130-135. 
491 C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 1, (1577), 1626-1627. 
492 Supra, 38-39. 
493 Supra, 134-135. 
181 
calculations must be based on available accounting data (Article 2(11) basic ECSC Decision), 
insofar as they are reliable494• 
Pursuant · to GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, consideration must be given to all evidence 
submitted on the proper allocation of costs, provided that the allocation of costs has been 
historically utilized. In the absence of a more appropriate method, EC anti-dumping law prefers 
the allocation of costs on the basis of tumover. Furthermore, costs must also be adjusted 
appropriately for those non-recurring items of costs which benefit future and/or current 
production, or for circumstances in which costs during the period of investigation are affected by 
start-up operations495 (Article 2.2.1.1. GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; Article 2(5) basic EC 
Regulation). 
Under ECSC anti-dumping law too, the production costs should normally be allocated in 
proportion to the tumover of each product and market under consideration (Article 2(11) basic 
ECSC Decision). Deviations from cost allocation on the basis of tumover are difficult to predict 
as European anti-dumping case law contains only incomplete information. Thus, other methods of 
cost allocation have been accepted when it was demonstrated that the proposed method was 
494 Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
originating in Bulgaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of 
Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50; Council Regulation (EC) No 3319/94 of 22 December 1994 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Bulgaria and Poland, exported by companies not exempted 
from the duty, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31December1994, No L 350/20. 
On the other hand, accounting data will not be used if reported coats do not fully reflect the overall coats in~urred during the investigation period, if 
the amount reported for depreciation under manufacturing overheads or for other coats (e.g., salary and wage costs) is understated, if certain 
general expemea are offset against other income unrelated to the aalea under consideration, if the allocation used for financing costs ia not juatified, 
or if a large interest-free loan from the parent company artificially reduces the real cost of long-term financing (Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malayaia, the 
People'a Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50). 
495 Supra, 164-165. 
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reasonable496 , 
turnover497 or 
accounting498• 
that it did not deviate considerably from the allocation on the basis of the 
that it was in accordance with generally accepted principles of cost 
A deviation from cost allocation on the basis of turnover bas also been allowed, 
496 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, 
No L 54/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 
of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 24 
December 1988, No L 356147; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 
22 June 1989, No L 17411 ; Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, 
accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these 
products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, 
No L 22n9; corrigendum, 0.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 3262/90 of 5 November 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36); Council Regulation (EEC) No· 
577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as 
EPROMs (erasable programmable read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1; BESELER, J.-F., 
and WILLIAMS, A.N., Ant~Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communitiea, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 60. 
497 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiera originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, 
No L 54/12. 
498 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, No L 199/4; Comm.ission Decision 
86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation 
regarding imports of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/25 ; Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; 
Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact 
fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 17711; Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 
23 December 1988 imJ>osing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the 
Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 24 December 1988, No L 356/47 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collec-
ting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape reels 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 174/1; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and 
Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 60 ; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F ., Anti-
Dumping and other Trade Protection Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 57. 
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e.g. , when it was proven that some costs were specific to the production of a particular 
product499 ; in such a case, those specific costs were allocated to the product concerned. For 
this reason, fixed production costs may also be allocated to only one of several types of the like 
product500• Sometimes, however, the European anti-dumping authorities strongly adhere to 
cost allocation on the basis of turnover, irrespective of whether such allocation is at variance with 
generally accepted principles of cost accounting. They have, for instance, allocated research and 
development expenses to the turnover during the investigation period, though they (implicitly) 
recognized that those expenses related to current, as well as future sales5°1• Their argument as 
to the uncertain recovery of those expenses in the future is hardly convincing, but it should be 
clear that their approach results in an excessively high constructed value. Furthermore, ECSC 
anti-dumping law does not provide for any adjustments for start-up periods502• Clearly, ECSC 
anti-dumping law does not comply with GATT anti-dumping law and should be adjusted as soon 
as possible in order to allow adjustments for start-up costs. 
From an economie point of view, the use of accounting records can be criticized, because they do 
not necessarily state the real economie value503 • Moreover, as GATT and EC anti-dumping 
499 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, 
O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/l; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic ecales originating in Japan 
and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, 
O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88of17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and video tape reels 
originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 24 December 1988, No L 356/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 
of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and 
Hong Kong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of 
video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 17411; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341/90 of 5 
February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in 
lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except thoee eold for export to the Community by companies whose 
undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/l; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 
imposing a · definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarne (man-made etaple fibres) originating in Taiwan, 
lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No 
L 88/l (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, No L 153/16) ; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade 
Protection La.we of the EEC, Biceeter, CCH Editions, 1990, 58 ; VERMULST, E.A., An.tidumping Law and Practice in the United 
States and the European. Communities. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 423. 
500 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 eetablishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
ieopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, No L 199/4. 
50l Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No 
L 272/13; Council Regulation (EEC) No 611/93 of 15 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs originating in the Republic of Korea and exported by companies not exempted from this duty, 
and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 March 1993, No L 66/1. 
502 Supra, 164-166. 
5o3 DEMSETZ, H., tcBarriers to Entry», American. Economie Review, 1982, (47), 47; KOHLER, H., lntermediate Economie•. 
Theory and Application.a, Glennview (Dl.), Scott, Foreman and Company, 1986, 149-150. 
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law indicate, the generally accepted accounting principles may vary from country to country and, 
thus, it will be a matter of discussion which principles are generally accepted. However, the 
accounting records will frequently be the only available objective data504• Moreover, although 
the market price cannot be merely taken from the average total production costs, production costs 
are generally the starting point for the producer's decisions. Besides the fact that they are easy to 
verify, accounting records are used in European anti-dumping law because at the time they were 
decisive criteria for the production and sales decision505• 
2. 2. 8. Basic prices506 
In ECSC anti-dumping cases, basic prices, i.e., prices determined on the basis of the production 
costs of the most efficient producer in the world, may be used as normal value standard. There 
is, however, some reticence as to the use of basic prices, because the other normal value 
standards should be applied when it becomes apparent that the use of basic prices would bring 
about a significantly different result (Article 2(6)(b) basic ECSC Decision). Therefore, basic 
504 DIDIER, P., ccDeux années d'application du nouveau règlement antidumping de la CEE", Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1982, 
(21), 30-31. 
5o5 . Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accept_ing undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding import& of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/25. 
506 For more information, especially about the history of the basic price system, see : BENYON, F., and BOURGEOIS, J., ccThe 
European Community-United States Steel Arrangement», Common Mark.et Law Reuiew, 1984, (305), 305-354; BESELER, J.-F., and 
WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communitiea, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 74-78; 
BOUDANT, J., L'anti-clumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 89-97; BRYAN, G., Taxing Unfair International Trade 
Practices. A Study of U.S. Antidumping and Counteruailing Duty Laws, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1980, 193-194 ; ENGLER, B., 
«Le marché sidérurgique américain et la pénétration européenne. Données et procédures», Reuue du Marché Commun, 1978, (505), 
512- 514 ; JACKSON, J.H., ecUnited States-EEC Trade Relations : Consitutional Problems of Economie lnterdependence», Common 
Mark.et Law Reuiew, (453), 470-473; LESGUILLONS, H., ccLe régime anti-dumping de la Communauté européenne», Droit et 
pratique du commerce international, 1978, (459), 476-483; LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautaire de protection contre Ie 
dumping et lea 1ubuention., Paris, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 69-73; MARKS, M.J., ecRemedies to 'Unfair' Tr~de: American Action against 
Steel IInportB», World Econ.omy, 1977-1978, (223), 223-237 ; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade 
Protection Lawa of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 243-24 7 ; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the 
United State• and the European. Communities. A Comparatiue Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 136-137, note 49; 
WE'ITER, T., ecTrade Policy Developments in the Steel Sector11, Journal of World Trade Law, 1985, (485), 496. 
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prices are usually applied only as a last resort in cases where nonnal value should be established 
on the basis of the best information available5°7• 
Contrary to the 1980 GATT Anti-dumping Code (Article 8(6)), the 1994 GATT Anti-dumping 
Code does not contain any provisions as to basic price systems. However, this does not imply 
that the use of basic prices will no longer be allowed. Indeed, under the GA IT dispute settlement 
procedure, basic prices were found to be consistent with GA IT an~-dumping law, provided that 
they did not fall below the lowest nonnal value of the exporting country, though, at the time of 
the dispute, GA IT anti-dumping law did not contain any explicit provisions as to basic 
prices508• As ECSC anti-dumping law does not make this a condition, its application may 
easily result in an infringement upon GATT anti-dumping law, if the basic prices are higher than 
the production costs of the most efficient producer in the world. In order to respect GATT anti-
dumping law, the European anti-dumping authorities must know exactly which producer is the 
5o7 BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d An.ti.-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 78. 
The use of basic prices has been motivated by the fact that basic prices were the best facta available in : CommiBBion Decision No 
702/83/ECSC of 24 March 1983 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on certain iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela and accepting price undertakings from two Canadian exporters, O.J., 29 March 1983, No 
L 82/9; Commission Decision No 295/84/ECSC of 2 February 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of concrete 
reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 4 February 1984, No L 33/15 (corrigendum, O.J., 7 March 1984, No L 65/15); 
Commission Decision No 2767/86/ECSC of 5 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets 
and plates, of iron or steel, origb1ating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 6 September 1986, No L 254/18 ; Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC 
of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, 
Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31; Commission Decision No 2131/88/ECSC of 18 July 1988 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia and definitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 19 July 1988, No L 188/14; Commission Decision No 
2158/88/ECSC of 20 July 1988 iinposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel sections originating in 
Yugoslavia or Turkey, O.J., 21 July 1988, No L 190/5; Commission Decision No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating in 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 March 1989, No L 78/14 ; Commission Decision No 3692/91/ECSC of 12 December 1991 repealing Decision No 
2132/88/ECSC imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 19 December 1991, No L 350/11; Commission Decision No 2297/92/ECSC of 31July1992 amending Decision No 
2131/88/ECSC, accepting undertakings offered in connection with imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating 
in the Republic of Slovenia and the Yugoslav republics of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding with regard to the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, O.J., 6 August 1992, No L 221/36. 
See also : concrete reinforcing bars from Spain, where in the provisional assessment basic prices were used panding the verification 
of the Spanish domestic market prices. However, such verification proved to be impossible due to the lack of cooperation of the 
Spanish exporters. Therefore, basic prices were used even in the definitive assessment as the most reasonable and fittèd 
information available (Commission Decision No 3113/83/ECSC of 4 November 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of concrete reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 6 November 1983, No L 303/13; Commission Decision No 
295/84/ECSC of 2 February 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of concrete reinforcing bars originating in 
Spain, O.J., 4 February 1984, No L 33/15 (corrigendum, O.J., 7 March 1984, No L 65/15)). 
See, however: iron or a"teel coila, hot-rolkcl, from Argentina an.d Canada, where the use of the basic prices was considered to be 
sufficiently explained by the fact that the domestic market price could not be used because of lack of sales in the ordinary course of 
trade. It was not investigated whether the other normal value standards might have been used and whether they produced a 
significantly different result (Commission Decision No 1056/89/ECSC of 19 April 1989 terminating the review of anti-dumping 
measures concerning import& of certain iron or steel coils, hot-rolled, originating in Argentina and Canada and confi.rming the 
expiry of those measures, O.J., 25 April 1989, No L 112/5). 
5os See: B.l.S.D., Third Supplement, Geneva, GA1T, 1955, 86, consideration 17. 
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most efficient worldwide, · and must constantly follow the global evolution in production 
costs509• This rnight prove a too high or too irrealistic obligation imposed on the European 
anti-dumping authorities. In fact, basic prices probably will not always reflect the production 
costs of the most efficient producer. As a consequence, producers/exporters may be held to 
· practise dumping merely because they are able to produce at lower production costs than the 
production costs used to determine the basic prices. Obviously, this result infringes upon. GA Tf 
anti-dumping law. 
The basic price system may have also the reverse effect : producers/exporters will not be found 
d~mping if their prices are not below the basic prices, irrespective of whether their prices are 
below their domestic market prices, their production costs or their export prices to third 
countries510• In other words, a less efficient producer is allowed to practise price 
discrimination or to sell at a loss, while an efficient producer is not allowed to charge the prices 
he normally would ·when maximizing bis profits. As such a result is not justified from an 
economie point of view, the basic price system should be repealed. 
2.2.9. Nonna/ value on the basis of the /acts available 
Normal value may be determined on the basis of the facts available, whenever any interested party 
or third country refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a 
reasonable period, or significantly impedes the investigation (Article 6.8. and Annex II GATT 
Anti-dumping Code ; Article 18 basic EC Regulation ; Article 7(7)(b) basic EC legislation)511 • 
Direct information as well as indirect iqforrriation has been used as best information available. 
Sources of direct information are the constructed value (when, in principle, the domestic market 
S09 See: B.1.S.D., Third Supplement, Geneva, GA'IT, 1955, 86, consideration 17. 
5tO See: sheet• and plates of iron or steel from Brazil, where basic prices were used instead of the Brazilian domestic market 
prices because the dumping margin obtained with basic prices was lower than with domestic market prices (Commission 
Recommendation No 2976/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of 
iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O . .T., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10). This anti-dumping case is an application of prior 
European anti-dumping law, under which it was not required to investigate whether the uee of the basic price system led to a 
significantly different result. 
Under current European anti-dumping law, this anti-dumping case would be illegal for the use of basic prices results in a different 
result than the other normal value standards. See : Commission Decision No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 July 1987, No L 207/21, 
where the domestic market price was used because the use of the basic prices would have produced a significantly different result. 
511 See: B.I.S.D., Thirty-second Supplement, Geneva, GA'IT, 1986, 66 and 70. 
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price should be used)512, the complaint513, information obtained from the Community 
industry514 or from EC Member States515 , · findings from the previous anti-dumping 
investigation516, previous but still applicable anti-dumping undertakings517, reports of 
studies centers518 and published statistics519• Sources of indirect information are prices and 
512 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 irnposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disb 
(3,5" microdisb) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5. 
513 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 of 29 August 1980 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
polyester yam originating in the United States of America, O.J., 2 September 1980, No L 231/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
163183 of 21 January 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United 
States of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, No L 2319; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, No 
L 199/4; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 328/85 of 6 February 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain glass mirrors originating in South Africa, O.J., 8 February 1985, No L 36/10; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2221/85 of 
29 July 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of basic chromium sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 
August 1985, No L 205/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
i.mports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in 
connection with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 699/88 of 16 March 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in Taiwan and South 
Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on i.mports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 
1988, No L 235/5; Commieeion Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91of27 September 1991 imposing a provieional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain polyester yarne (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China 
and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276f1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 371/94 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on i.mports into the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, No L 48/10 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3. 
514 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establiehing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'- . 
isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, No L 199/4; Commission Decision 
841404/EEC of 2ó July 1984 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, No L 215/16; Commission 
Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, No 
L 138/48; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191of23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of 
cotton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yarn 
originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271/17. 
515 Commission Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984 accepting undertakinge given in connection with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning imports of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, No 
L·215/16. 
516 Commisaion Dccision 93/521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting undertakings given in conncction with the anti-dumping review in respect 
of imports of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil, tenninating the anti-subsidy review proceeding with regard to these import& and 
tenninating the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy review in respect of imports of binder and haler twine origi~ting in Mexico, O.J" 8 October 1993, 
No L 251/28. 
517 Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/83 of 17 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemical 
fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, No L 15/1. 
518 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 of 30 April 1980 impoeing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres 
originating in the United States of America, O.J., 3 May 1980, No L 114/37. 
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costs of other sellers or producers in the exporting · country520 or even in another country521 , 
519 Commission Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning imports of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, No 
L 215/16 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton 
yilrn originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1. 
52° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2182/80of14 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! 
fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 15 August 1980, No L 212/43 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 
February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United States of America, 
O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4 ; Commission Decision 81/35/EEC of 9 February 1981 accepting undertakings in connection with 
the anti-dumping proceedings concerning certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 12 February 
1981, No L 39135; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1321/81 of 15 May 1981 amending Regulation (EEC) No 384/81 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 19 May 1981, No L 132/17; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1591/81 of 10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on paraxylene (p-xylene) 
originating in Puerto Rico, the United States of America and the US Virgin lslands, O.J.,. 16 June 1981, No L 15817; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81of15 July 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United States 
of America, O.J., 18 July 1981, No L 195/'l2; Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on phenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, No L 12/1; Commission Decision 
82/397 /EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings in connection with the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of certain 
polypropylene :film for capacitors originating in Japan and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/44 ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21February1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United States of America, O.J., 23 February 1983, No L 50/1; Council 
Decision 83/162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of acrylonitrile originating in 
the United States of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101/'l9; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2823/85 of 7 October 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 10 October 1985, No L 268/11; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 264/86 of 4 February 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain clogs 
originating in Sweden and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 February 1986, No L 32/1; 
Commission Decision 861232/EEC of 9 June 1986 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of hardboard originating in Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 12 
June 1986, No 157/61; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in connection with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in Israel, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and 
terminating the invastigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272/29; Commission Decision 88/305/EEC of 27 May 1988 accepting 
undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of inner tubes and new tyre cases for 
bicycles originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1988, No L 134/61; 
Council Regulation (EEC) ·No 341/90 of 5 February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on· · 
imports of ferro-silicon originating in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the 
Community by companies whose undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small-screen colour television 
receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14131; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain watch movements 
originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11May1994, No L 120/3. 
For sanctioning uncooperative behaviour, the European anti-dumping authorities may apply the highest normal value found for 
exporters who fully cooperate (Council Regulation (EEC) No 490/90 of 26 February 1990 repealing Regulations (EEC) No 1826/84 
and (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada and the 
United States of America respectively, O.J., 1 March 1990, No L 53/1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 
1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 0.J., 1October1994, No L 255/50). 
521 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1591/81 of 10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on paraxylene (p-xylene) 
originating in Puerto Rico, the United States of America and the US Virgin Islands, O.J., 16 June 1981, No L 15817; Commission 
Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of non-alloyed unwrought 
aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, No L 57/19 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of artificial corundum 
originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of artificial 
corundum originating in Spain and Yugoelavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, No L 25519 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421/90 of 
26 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame originating in Japan and the United States 
of America, O.J., 29 November 1990, No L 330/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194of12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94121; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3. 
189 
their price lists522, as well as prices and costs of other products523• 
At first sight, direct information should be preferred to indirect information. For the prices and 
costs of other sellers and producers or products usually will not coincide with the prices and costs 
of the producer/exporter or the product. Therefore, a producer/exporter may be found to be 
dumping while he is not and vice versa. However, certain types of direct information are not a 
guarantee against erronously found dumping either. Indeed, providing information resulting in an 
as high as possible normal value is in the interest of the complainant Community industry and 
probably also of the Community Member States which want to protect their domestic industry. 
Therefore, no source of information should be excluded a priori. 
Indeed, according to Annex II GATT Anti-dumping Code, anti-dumping authorities are allowed to 
use information from any source whatsoever, on the condition that they take all reasonable steps 
to avoid the use of information coming from unreliable sources. Thus, if they have to base their 
findings on information from secondary sources, including the information supplied in the 
complaint, they should do so with special circumspection. In such cases, they should check the 
reasonableness of the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as 
published price lists, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the 
522 Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 1411. 
S2J Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in connection with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria; O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181119; Commission Decision 82/397/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings in 
connection with the anti-dumping procedure concerning import& of certain polypropylene film for capacitors originating in Japan 
and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/44 ; Commission Decision 841259/EEC of 10 May 1984 accepting 
undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain sensitized paper for colour 
photographs originating in Japan and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 11 May 1984, No L 124/45; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3669/84 of 21 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered 
roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, No L 340/37 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 
i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 
27 June 1985, No L 167/3 ; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertaki:rigs entered into in connection 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categorie& of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51/73; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361187 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-
calcium/calcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 May 1987, No L 129/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 
June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151139 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/58) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151147; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, 
O.J., 16 December 1988, No L 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of 
America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 501/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on_imports of certain video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and 
definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, No L 67/55; Commission ~gulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 
April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5. 
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investigation. EC anti-dumping law bas already copied the requirement to use information from 
independent sources as a touchstone (Article 18(5) basic EC Regulation). The fact that ECSC 
anti-dumping law does not encompass this «safety rule», seems not pose any problems in practice. 
Indeed, in accordance with that GATI anti-dumping Iaw524, the Court of Justice bas held that 
the use of direct and indirect information is acceptable upon the condition that the information 
used approaches economie reality very closely525• 
2.3. NORMAL VALUE STANDARDS FOR NON-MARKET ECONOMY 
COUNTRIES 
2.3.1. Hierarchy 
GATI anti-dumping law, on the one hand, does not impose specific normal value standards in 
respect of NME countries. It only specifies that a comparison between the domestic price of a 
NME country and its export price may not always be appropriate (Note No 2 ad Article VI(l) 
GATI ; Article 2.7. GATI Anti-dumping Code). European anti-dumping law, on the other hand, 
provides the following specific normal value standards in regard to NME countries : 
(i) the price at which the like product of a market economy country is actually sold for 
consumption on the domestic market of that country (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; 
Article 2(5)(a)(i) basic ECSC Decision) ; 
(ii) the price at which the like product of a market economy country is actually sold to other 
countries, including the Community (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5)(a)(ii) 
basic ECSC Decision) ; 
(iii) the constructed value of the like product in a market economy third country (Article 2(7) 
basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5)(b )- basic ECSC Decision) ; 
(iv) if not any of the above mentioned normal value standards is possible526, (any other 
reasonable basis including)527 the price actually paid or payable in the Community for 
the like product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to include a reasonable profit margin 
(Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5)(c) basic ECSC Decision) ; 
(v) .within the framework of the ECSC Treaty, basic prices, if the normal value standards 
mentioned above do not produce a significantly different result (Article 2(6)(b) basic 
ECSC Decision) ; 
524 This judgcment of the Court is based on an agreement reached under former GATI anti-dumping law (B.J.S.D., Thirty-first Supplement, 
Geneva, GATI, 1985, 283-284). That agreement now constitutes Annex Il GATI Anti-dumping Code. 
525 
. C.J.E.C., case 63183, 23 mei 1986, Allied Corporatwn a.o. v Council, E. C.R" 1986, (1621), 1658. 
526 Under ECSC anti-dumping law : the price actually paid or payable in the Community may be used if the other normal value standards do not 
provide an adequate basis. 
527 Under ECSC anti-dumping law, the third standard must always be the price actually paid or payable in the Community for the like product. 
Any other reasonablc basis is legally impossible. 
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(vi) when necessary and just information is lacking, the normal value on the basis of the facts 
available (Article 18 basic EC Regulation ; Article 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). 
As its list of normal value standards is exhaustive528, European anti-dumping law violates 
GA Tl' anti-dumping law. Indeed, though GA TI anti-dumping law indicates that the domestic 
price of a NME country may not always be appropriate, it sometimes may be. 
The determination of the domestic market price, constructed value and export price is identical to 
that in respect of ME countries, but for two differences. First, normal value for NME countries 
is determined not on the basis of their own prices and costs, but on the basis of those of another, 
ME country, the so-called reference country. That reference country must be selected in an 
appropriate and not unreasonable manner. 
Second, European anti-dumping law does not impose a proper hierarchy among the different 
normal value standards. It only states that the Community may be used as reference country, if 
528 Therefore, are not accepted as norm.al value standard: 
the domestic price in the NME country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 26 
August 1988, No L 235/6; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of i2 December 1988 accepting undertakings given in 
connection with the anti-dumping review concerning i.mports of oxalic acid originating in China or Czechoslovakia and 
terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343134) ; 
the export price of the NME country's producers toa third ME country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93of15 April 
1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 96/6) ; 
normal value constructed on the basis of the structure of the own production costs of the NME country (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and 
Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in connection with i.mports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and· Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, 
O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1); 
normal value constructed on the basis of the costs of the components sourced by the NME country's producers from related 
companies situated in ME countries and, for the remaining costs, on the basis of the costs in a reference ME country 
(CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No 
L 96/5); 
indicative prices published in specialized bulletins (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of mercury originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 
1987, No L 227/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of mercury originating in the Soviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on 
such imports, O.J., 10 December 1987, No L 346/27; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores and concentrates originating in the People's Republic of China, 
and terminating the proceeding concerning imports originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83/23); . 
prices on the international market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 16 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie 
Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one Japanese exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of 
imports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 18 
June 1983, No L 160/18 ; Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
O.J., 28 February 1984, No L 67/19). 
See also : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a proVisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 365125, where the price corresponding to 
an offer from the producer in the reference country was refused to be used for not being adequate. Perhaps it was not adequate 
because it does not fit into one of the poBBible norm.al value standards. lndeed, it does not correepond to the price at which the 
product is actually eold because an offer is not an actual sale. 
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the nonna! value sta.ndards in another ME country are not possible. Moreover, as is the case for 
ME countries, basic prices may be used only if the other NME nonnal value standards do not 
produce a significantly different result and normal value may be based on the facts available only 
if the other nonnal value sta.ndards are not available, because the producers/exporters do not 
· cooperate or act in bad faith. When either a third NME country or the Community529 is 
chosen as reference country, the choice between domestic market price and constructed value and, 
if the reference country is a third ME country, the export price is free530. Under ECSC anti-
dumping law, it is only required that the nonnal value sta.ndard is chosen in an appropriate and 
not unreasonable manner531 • According to the Court of Justice, the requirements of 
appropriateness and reasonableness involve that the domestic market price be taken in the first 
instance since the constructed value is only a substitute which must be resorted to when it would 
be unreasonable, in view of the specific circumstances of the case, to use the domestic market 
price532• The Court's judgements seem to go a step beyond ECSC anti-dumping law which 
does not provide any hierarchy between domestic market price, constructed value and export 
price. As it presumes the domestic market price to be appropriate and not unreasonable insofar as 
comparable sales are made in the ordinary course of trade533, the Court applies the same 
hierarchy of nonnal value standards to NME countries as the one imposed by European anti-
dumping law in respect to ME countries, and, thus, respects the principle of equal treatment. In 
genera!, there is, indeed, no reason why there should be a differential treatment for NME 
529 Not only the price on the domestic market of the Community may be used as normal value standard ; also the constructed 
value within the Community may be used, be it in. its simplified form of the adjustment of the sub-production-cost price by the 
elimination of the loss and the incorporation of a reasonable profit margin. Indeed, in barium chloride {rom the People's Republic 
of China and the German Democratie Republic, the use of the production costs of Community producers was rejected because of the 
·hierarchy between third ME countries and the Community as reference country, hut not because this standard is not provided for 
by European anti-dumping law (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 27 
April 1983, No L 110/11). Contra : BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr uon. Dumping un.d Subuen.tion.en. durch die Europäische 
Gemein.schaften., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980, 64. 
53o C.J.E.C., joined cases 294186 and 77/87, 5 October 1988, Techn.ointerg v Commission. and Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6101-
6102 and 6114; BELLIS, J.-F., ccLa règlementation anti-dumping de la Communauté Economique Européennen, Cahiers de Droit 
Européen., 1979, (495), 509 ; BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr uon. Dumping un.d Subuen.tion.en. durch die Europäische Gemein.schaften., 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980, 54; BUCKSCH, G., ccDie Angemessenheit bei der Festsetzung des Normalwertes bei Antidumping 
(Art. 5 EWG-VO Nr. 3017n9)N, Recht der lntern.ationalen. Wirtschaft, 1983, (839), 840; DAILLIER, P., «La réglementation 
communautaire anti-dumping - Aspects matériels», Droit et pratique du commerce international, 1991, (17), 26 ; KRETSCHMER, H., 
Das Anticlumping- un.d Antisubuention.srecht der Europäischen. Gemein.schaften., Frankfurt/Main, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 34 ; 
LANDSITI'EL, R., Dumping im AufJerhandels- un.d Wettbewerbsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, 32. 
531 C.J.E.C., joined cases 294186 and 77/87, 5 October 1988, Techn.ointerg v Commission. and Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 611~ 
6114 ; BUCKSCH, G., · «Die Angemessenheit bei der Festsetzung des Normalwertee bei Antidumping (Art. 5 EWG-VO Nr. 
3017n9).-, Recht der lntern.ationalen. Wirtschaft, 1983, (839), 840; DAILLIER, P., ..La réglementation communautaire anti-
dumping - Aspects matérielBH, Droit et pratique du commerce international, 1991, (17), 26 ; FINE, F L., ccEEC Antidumping : The 
Problem of lmports from State-Trading Countries.1, Law and Policy in. International Buain.eaa, 1988, (91), 101. 
532 C.J.E.C., joined cases 294/86 and TI/87, 5 Octoher 1988, Technoinzorg v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6113-6114; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-320/86 and C-188/87, 11 July 1990, Stanko France v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, (3013), 3014; 
C.J .E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sennes v Directeur des services des douanes de Strasbourg, E. C.R., 1990, 1, (.3027), 3051. 
533 lnjra, 220-221. 
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countries. However, if such a reason would appear in a particular anti-dumping case involving a 
NME country, another hierarchy should be applied, insofar as it is appropriate and not 
unreasonable. ECSC anti-dumping law, indeed, does not impose such a strict hierarchy as the 
Court of Justice ; it requires only that normal value be determined in an appropriate and not 
unreasonable way which may sometimes require a deviation of the usual hierarchy. Perhaps, .in 
order to underscore the absence of hierarchy, EC anti-dumping law does not contain anymore the 
requirement that normal value is selected in an appropriate and not unreasonable manner. 
After an investigation into the definition of the concept «NME country» (section 2.3.2.), it is 
examined which impact this requirement bas on the choice of the reference country (section 
2.3.3.) and the normal value standard (section 2.3.4.). Like section 2.2. for ME countries, all 
three sections also inquire how normal value for NME countries is determined, whether «one-way 
flexibility» is penetrated into European anti-dumping law (i.e., whether (too) high normal values 
are found), whether legal certainty is guaranteed (i.e., whether NME exporters may know in 
advance whether or not they will be found to dump) and whether the method to determine NME 
dumping is economically justified. In this respect, it has to be bome in mind that the method to 
determine NME dumping is severely criticized in Chapter 1 : because normal value is exclusively 
determined on the basis of the prices and costs in a reference country, it does not guarantee legal 
certainty and it disregards the fact that NME countries may be more efficient than ME 
countries534• 
2.3.2. The concept «NME "country» 
GA TI anti-dumping law defines a NME country as a country which bas a complete or a · 
substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the State 
(Note No 2 ad Article VI(l) GA TI). European anti-dumping law does not define the concept 
«NME country». Instead, reference is made to «non-market economy ~ountries and, in particular, 
those to which Regulation (EC) No 519/94 applies» (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 
2(5) basic ECSC Decision535). European anti-dumping law, thus, refers to a list of countries 
contained in Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94536• Those countries are Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, the People's Republic of China, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, North Korea, 
534 Supra, 60-68. 
535 AB amended by Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries 
and repealing Regulationa (EEC) Nos 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89. 
536 Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 match 1994 on common rules for importa from certain third countries and repealing Regulatiom 
(EEC) Nos 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89. 
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Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
U zbekistan and Vietnam. 
Using a list has the advantage of limiting legal uncertainty. It is immediately clear which 
countries are considered to be NME countries537• However, such an approach is rather 
rigid538• A legislative action of the Council is required to strike of a country or to put it on 
the list539• It is possible that such legislative action comes too late540• As a consequence, 
531 VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade of European Community Ant-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to Imports from 
China», Joumal of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 15. 
From a legal point of view, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were, for example, still being treated as NME countries at the end of 1992 as 
they figured on the list of NME countries at the date the anti-dumping proceeding was initiated, although since then fundamental economie as well 
as political changes to ensure their transition toward market economies were taken place in these countries (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of certain 1C&mleaa pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Czechoalovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the 
Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of 
Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15). See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the 
provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1. 
538 VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade of European Community Ant-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to Imports from 
China•, Joumal of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 15-16. 
539 Until 31 January 1991, the countries listed were: Bulgaria, the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, the U.8.8.R., Vietnam, North Korea, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (see: Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1765/82 of 30 June 1982 on common rules for imports from state trading countries, O.J., 6 July 1982, No L 195/1; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1766/82 of 30 June 1982 on common rules for imports from the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 June 1982, 
No L 196/21). 
In order to take account Qf the economie systemic reforms in East and Centra! Europe, as well as of the dissolution of the former . 
U.S.S.R., it was neceesary to modify the list three times in lees than an half year and, eventually, aft.er two years later, to replace 
it by an entirely new list : · 
on 1 January 1992, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were placed on the list, whereas Chzechoslovakia was replaced by the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3859/91of23 December 1991, O.J., 31December1991, No 
L 362/83); 
on 3 March 1992, Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic were removed from the list (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 617/92 amending the autonomous import arrangements for products originating in Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), O.J., 29 February 1992, No L 56/1) ; 
on 7 April 1992, the U.S.S.R. was replaced in the list by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor~a, Kazakhstan, Kirgizkstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajik.istan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan (Council Regulation (EEC) No 848192 of 31March1992 
amending Regulations (EEC) No 288/82, No 1765/82 and (EEC) No 3420/83 in order to establish the import arrangements for 
product& originating in the independent States resulting from the former Soviet Union and suspend the application of certain 
quantitative restrictions to the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro, O.J., 4 April 1992, No L 89/1}; 
on 10 March 1994, an entirely new list was enacted, which is yet into force (Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 March 
1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries and repealing Regulations (EEC) Nos 1765/82, 1766/82 and 
3420/83, 0 . .1., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89). This new list· implied that Bulgaria, the German Democratie Republic and 
Romania were striken of the list, whereas Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were put on it. 
Moreover, on 3 October 1990, the German Democratie Republic has become part of the Federal Republic of Germany and, as a 
consequence, became an integral part of the Community. As European anti-dumping law does not apply to Member States of the 
Community, the anti-dumping measures imposed on dumped imports from the former German Democratie Republic into the 
Community of Twelve have no Jonger a legal basis and have become without any object (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1794/90 of 
28 June 1990 on tranaitional measures concerning trade with the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 29 June 1990, No L 166/1 ; 
Notice concerning anti-dumping measures on products originating in the territory formerly known as the German Democratie 
Republic, O.J., 29 December 1990, No C 327/14). Only on 10 March 1994, the German Democratie Republic did not figure anymore 
on the list of NME countries (Council Regulation (EC) No 619/94 of 7 March 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third 
countries and repealing Regulations (EEC) Nos 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89). 
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the list, at least temporarily, may be too extensive541 • In such a case, European anti-dumping 
law is in violation of GA IT anti-dumping law. For too extensive a list implies that ME countries 
are treated as NME countries which is contrary to GA Tf anti-dumping law. The list may also be 
too restrictive. Then it will be impossible to treat not enlisted MNE countries as NME countries, 
at least if the list is exhaustive. 
As the Court of Justice bas investigated whether a country not enlisted did have a NME system, it 
must consider the list as not exhaustive542• The Court, however, did offer an explanation for 
doing so. The main reason why the list should not be exhaustive, is the wording of European 
anti-dumping law (Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision) which 
reads as follows : «in the case of imports from, non-market economy _countries and, in panicular, 
those to which Regulation (EC) No 519/94 ( ... ) applies, ... » (emphasis added). Thus, the special 
provisions of this Article apply «in general» to NME countries543 • Another reason is the fact 
that Cuba, though not enlisted, is an obvious candidate to be classified as NME country544• In 
540 On 7 April 1992, the U.S.S.R. was replaced in the list by Annenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizkstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajilcistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbelcistan. As the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. into those new countries had taken place before 7 April 
1992, the amendment to the list was made applicable from 1 January 1992 (Councif Regulation (EEC) No 848/92 of 31 March 1992 amending 
Regulations (EEC) No 288/82, No 1765/82 and (EEC) No 3420/83 in order to establish the import arrangements for products originating in the 
independent Statcs resulting from the former Soviet Union and suspend the application of certain quantitative restrictions to the Yugoslav Republic 
of Montenegro, O.J., 4 April 1992, No L 89/1). 
541 For example, a country that is removed from the list of NME countries after the initiation of the anti-dumping proceeding, will still be treated 
as NME country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing detinitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain seamless 
pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and detinitively collecting provisional anti-
dumping duties, O.J., 15 May 1993, No L 120/34; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No 
L 94121 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
originating in Bulgaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16). 
See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide 
originating in the People'1Republic of China, O.J., 17June1993, No L 145/1. 
542 C.J.E.C" joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashe.xpo11 GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, 
(2945), 3000. Sec also: C.J.E.C" case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sennes v Directeur des services des douanes de Strasbourg, E.C.R., 1990, 1, 
(3027), 3052; BELLIS, J.-F., «The EEC Antidumping System•, in Antidumping Law and Praclice. A Comparative Study, JACKSON, J.H., and 
VERMULST, E.A. (eds.), New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, (4i), 76; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade. of European 
Community Ant-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to lmports from China•, Joumal of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 15. 
543 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype TechmCJ1Jhexport GmbH v Commission and Council, 
E.C.R., 1990, 1, (2945), 2976 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN) ;·LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautaire de 
protection contre 'Ie dumping et 'les subventions, Paris, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 54; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and 
other Trade Protection Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 67. See aleo : BESELER, J.F., Die Abwehr von Dumping 
und Subvention.en durch die Europäische Gemeinschaften, Baden-Baden, Nomoe, 1980, 91; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., 
Anti-Dumping and AnthSubsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 67 ; KRETSCHMER, H., Daa 
Anti.dumping- und Antiaubventionsrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Frankfurt/Main, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 34. However, 
according to DENTON, R., «The Non-Market Economy Rules of the European Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Dutiee Legielatio111t, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1987, (198), 209, the wordings of European anti-dumping law 
(Article 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; Article 2(5) basic ECSC Decision) is by no means conclusive. 
544 The Commission seema to share this opinion (sec: Answer of the Commission to wriuen question No 2430/92, O.J., 3 March 1993, No 
c 61/33). 
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European anti-dumping case law, . no evidence can be found as to whether or not enlisted countries 
have been treated as NME countries545. 
As the list is not exhaustive, the certainty it creates, is limited : it only guarantees that the 
countries listed will be treated as NME country. It is, however, difficult to predict for not 
enlisted countries whether they will be treated as a NME country. The European approach, 
indeed, bas the disadvantage that no criteria are provided as to the reason why countries are to be 
qualified as NME countries546• Hence, European anti-dumping authorities have discretionary 
powers on this point547, were it not for the definition of a NME country provided by 
GATI548. 
That GATI definition should also apply to the list of NME countries : only countries which meet 
the GA TI definition may be put on the list. It is, however, rather unclear to what extent the 
Community bas applied the GATT definition to its list. The preamble to Council Regulation (EC) 
No 519/94549 does not refer to that definition. When Hungary, Poland ·and the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic were striken of the list by Council Regulation (EEC) No 517 /92, the 
preamble to that Regulation only provided that those countries had «embarked on a large-scale 
programme of economie reform, aimed at ensuring their transition towards a market 
economy"550• This certainly cannot be said to be an application of the GATT definition. On 
the contrary, the preamble implied that those countries were still NME countries, as they were 
545
. Anti-dumping proceedings have been initiated against Cuba, which bas never been put on the list, and against Alhania which, 
at the time, did not figure on the list. In its decisions terminating those proceedings, the Commission made no statement about the 
. economie system of either of these two countries (sisal twine from Cuba, see : O.J., 2 February 1971, No C 10/22 ; Commission 
Decision 91/182/EEC of 8 April 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of high carbon ferro-chromium 
originating in Albania and the USSR, O.J., 11April1991, No L 90/38). 
546 DENTON, R., . tcThe Non-Market Economy Rules of the European Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
Legislatio~, international and Comparatwe Law Quarterly, 1987, (~98), 210. 
547 LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautaire de protection. con.tre le dumping et les subuen.tion.s, Paris, F.E.D.U.C.1., 1983, 55. 
548 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexpo11 GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, 1, 
(2945), 2976 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! VAN GERVEN). 
The Court of Justicc bas applied the same criteria as the GATI definition of NME countries, without referring to GATI anti-dumping law though, 
in order to assess whether a particular country had a NME system (C.J.E.C" joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype 
Techmashexpor1 GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R" 1990, 1, (2945), 3000-3001; C.J.E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sennes v 
Directeur des servicu des douanes de Strasbourg, E. C.R., 1990, 1, (3027), 3052). 
549 Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 7 match 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries and repealing Regulations 
(EEC) Nos 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83, O.J., 10 March 1994, No L 67/89. 
55o Council Regulation (EEC) No 517 /92 amending the autonomous import arrangements for products originating in Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech and Slovak Fedcral Republic (CSFR), O.J., 29 February 1992, No L 56/1. 
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only moving towards a ME system551 . Nevertheless, this amendment to the list did not raise 
any problem in respect of GA TI anti-dumping law whieh does not oblige to treat eaeh NME 
country as such552• The question, though, crops up why other countries, sueh as Estonia553 
and Russia554, whieh have embarked on similar programmes of economie reform as . well, are 
still on the list, whereas other countries, sueh as Romania, have been removed from it, though it 
is not yet entirely sure whether they will eventually adopt a full-fledged ME system555• 
Perhaps, Russia is not headed that straight for a ME system, as . eountries sueh as Polanci556. 
Estonia, however, bas opted for a swift systemie change and seems to be quite advaneed in its 
economie reform557• Moreover, even in eountries, sueh as Poland, where the transition 
towards a ME has gone farthest, a turnabout away from a ME system is not yet entirely to be 
excluded558• It seems that the list of NME eountries is not the result of an applieation of the 
GA TI definition of a NME country, but that it may have been been inspired by mere foreign 
polities. All East-European eountries have been removed from the list, whereas all eountries 
emerged out of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., as well as the Asian NME eountries, sueh as the 
551 Still on 12 January 1994, i.e., more than two years after the removal of Poland from the list, the European anti-dumping authorities have 
explicitly recognized that Poland was not yet a ME country, hut was still in transition towards a ME system (Commission Decision No (,7/94/ECSC 
of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, 
Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5). 
552 GATT anti-dumping law refers to •the possibiüty that a strict comparison with domestic priccs in such a country (i.e., a NME country) may 
not always be appropriate» (Note No 2 ad Article VI(l) GATI) (emphasis added). In other words, under GATT anti-dumping law, a comparison 
with the domestic prices in a NME country may sometimes be appropriate. 
553 ÁSLUND, A., •l..cssons of the First Four Years of Systemic Chnage in Eastem Europe», Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994/19, (22), 
29-30 and 33. 
554 ELI.MAN, M., •Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lcssons:., Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994/19, (1), 12; 
FISCHER, S., .Socialist Economy Reform: Lcssons of the First Three Years:., American Economie Review, 1993, (390), 391. 
555 ÁSLUND, A., •Lessons of the First Four Years of Systemic Chnage in Eastem Europe», Joumal of Comparative Economies, 1994/19, (22), 
29-31. 
556 ELLMAN, M., •Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lcssons:., Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994119, (1), 12 and 16-
17; FISCHER, S., .SOCialist Economy Reform: Lessons of the First Three Years•, American Economie Review, 1993, (390), 393. 
557 ÁSLUND, A., «Lessons of the First Four Years of Systemic Chnage in Eastem Europe•, Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994/19, (22), 
29-30 and 33. 
558 ELLMAN, M., «Transformation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lcssons», Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994/19, (1), 14 and 16-
17. 
198 
People's Republic of China559, are still on the list, irrespective of their economie reforms. The 
removal of the East European countries of the list was probably intended to support their efforts in 
moving towards a ME country and to tighten the ties with them560• From a legal point of 
view, the application of the GA TI definition is more appropriate, as it provides two objective 
criteria (complete or a substantially complete monopoly of the country's trade and the fixing of all 
559 In the People'• Republic of China, aa well aa in other Aaian countries, aucb u North Korea and Vietnam, economie refonns, implying 
incrcased price liberaliaation, have been and are atill being implemented. However, they differ from the economie reforms carried out in the East 
European countries in two respects. First, the economie reform is not accompanied by a political reform towards democratisation. Second, it is not 
a systemic reform : economie planning was not eliminated, hut reduced in order to give way, within the planning system, to market activities 
(CHEN, K., JEFFERSON, G.H., and SINGH, 1., «Lessons from China's Economie ReforID>, Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1992/16, (201), 
201-225; ELI.MAN, M., «Transfonnation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons», Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994/19, (1), 18-
19; FISCHER., S., «Socialist Economy Reform: Lessons of the First Three Years», .American Economie Review, 1993, (390), 392-393). 
Because economie planning ia atill predominant and, in particular, the centra) and, espccially, the local authorities in China do interfere in the 
companies' management (ace : CHEN, K., JEFFERSON, G.H" and SINGH, 1., «LellOns from China's Economie Reform», Joumal of 
Comparalive Economics, 1992/16, (201), 216-221), the European anti-dumping authorities usually ignore the economie refonns in the People's 
Republic of China (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of bicycle1 originating in the People'& Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 
September 1993, No L 228/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain pboto albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16. See also: C.J.E.C., case 
C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen NöUe v HauptzoUamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, 1, (5163), 5178-5179 (Opinion of Advocate Genera! 
VAN GER.VEN). Indeed, they treat the People's Republic of China as a NME country H a wbole and reject special individual treatment to 
Chinese companies engaged in the Chinese market economy sector, because those companies do not operate independently of the State or because 
there is no guarantce that they will continue to operate autonomously in the future (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 Marcb 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; Commission Decision 93/377/EPC of 22 June 1993 terminating the proceeding to 
review anti-dumping measures applicable to certain imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 30 June 1993, No L 158/43; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of tluorspar originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2474/93 of 8 September 1993 impo11ing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports imo the Community of bicycles originating in the People's 
Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of certain photo albums originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, No 
L 306/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 3664/93 of 22 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
pboto albumi in bookbound form originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 
31 December 1993, No L 333/67; Commission Decision 94/82/PC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of gum rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41150; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 
12 April 1994 impoaing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon caroide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/21). There is hut one exception which involved a company whicb was profit 
orientated, was totally independent in the administration of its business, in the setting of export prices and in the transfer of profits outside the 
People's Republic of China (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain magnetic disks (3,5• microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5• 
microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 
October 1993, No L 262/4). This special treatmenl does not concern the determination of nonnal value, but is confined to the use of the individual 
export prices of the companie1 in question and, thus, to the assessment of individual dumping margins. In principle, uniform normal values, export 
prices and, consequently, dumping margins are determined for NME countries (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles 
originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting detinitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/l ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain photo albums 
originating in the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 3664/93 of 22 December 1993 
imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of photo albums in bookbound fonn originating in the People'• Republic of 
China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1993, No L 333/67). 
560 There was widespread hope in many NME countries when starting their economie systemic reform, that they would soon be treated as full-
fledged ME countrie1. The refusal of the Community, as well as of the United States of America, to treat them as sucb, consequently, caused 
mucb ill will (ELI.MAN, M., «Transfonnation, Depression, and Economics: Some Lessons», Joumal of Comparative Economics, 1994/19, (1), 4-
5). Conversely, their being treated as ME countries will probably cause goodwill. 
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domèstic prices by the State) and, thus, increases legal certainty. Nevertheless, both criteria are 
quite vague and must be further implemented. lnsofar as they are applied so as to assess whether 
prices are not determined by the market, both criteria are also appropriate from an economie point 
of view. 
2.3.3. Selection of the reference country 
European anti-dumping authorities may choose any ME country in the world, including the 
Community (at least if another ME country is not available as reference country561), as 
561 Only five times, the Community bas been used as reference country : 
in oxalic acid from China and Czech.oslovakia six ME countries had been taken into consideration, hut were, for different 
reasons, unfitted to serve as reference country (Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting 
undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping review concerning i.mports of oxalic acid originating in China or 
Czechoslovakia and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343/34). The use of the Community as reference 
country was undoubtedly the consequence of the enlargment of the European Community to Spain because in the previous 
proceedings concerning oxalic acid from China and Czechoslovakia, Spain (then not a Member State of the Community) was 
used as reference country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 171/82 of 25 January 1982 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19/26 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 9 February 1982, No L 34111) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1283/82 of 17 May 1982 i.mposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on oxalic acid originating in China and definitively collecting the amounts secured by way of provisional duty 
on oxalic acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 May 1982, No L 148/37; Commission Decision 82/336/EEC 
of 18 May 1982 accepting an undertaking offered by the Czechoslovakian producer and terminating the anti-dumping 
procedure concerning oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 27 May 
1982, No L 148/51) ; 
in silicon. metal from the People's Republi.c of China, video tapes in. cassettes from the People's Republi.c of China and barium 
chloride origi.n.ating in. the People's Republic of China respectively four, nine and an unidentified number ME countries were 
taken into consideration, hut were not withheld because of lack of cooperation or incomplete information (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 720/90. of 22 March 1990 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 27 March 1990, No L 8019; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 of 27 
July 1990 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on i.mports of silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 28 July 1990, No L 198/57 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 541191 of 4 March 1991 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, No L 60/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 1991 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of video 
tapes in cauettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 1991, No L 106/15); 
in pure 1il1 typewriter ribbon fabri.c1 from the People's Republic of China the Community producer and the Chinese producer 
were the only producers of the product in the world (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1937190 of 4 July 1990 i.mposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of pure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China, 
and accepting an undertaking offered by the exporter, O.J., 7 July 1990, No L 174fl7). 
In ·Beamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy stee~ {rom Czech.oslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the Commission hesitated to use 
the proposed reference country. It then examined all other possible reference countries, including the Community. The 
Commission finally selected the proposed reference country as its use proved to result in the lowest normal value (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3296192 of 12 November 1992 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of certain seamless pipes 
and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15). 
In ph.oto album• in. booleboun.d form {rom the People's Republic of China, the exporters requested that the Community be used as 
reference country. The European anti-dumping authorities rejected this request, as another ME country provided an adequate 
basis and, as a consequence, the Community was excluded as reference country (Council Regulation (EC) No 3664193 of 22 
December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on i.mports into the Community of photo albums in bookbound form 
originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 
1993, No L 333/67). 
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reference country. The use of the Community as reference country has been severely 
criticised562• It offers the Community industry the opportunity to increase the dumping margin 
by raising its prices or production costs563 • However, the same applies for other reference 
countries : the producers of these countries may give false information about their prices and 
production costs ; by declaring higher prices and costs, they increase the dumping margin and, 
thereby, the chance that their competitors from the NME countries are found to be dumping564. 
The risk of using false information, however, is reduced by the great importance the European 
anti-dumping authorities attach to investigations on the spot565• Indeed, the possibility of 
verifying on the spot the information obtained, is a determining criterion for selecting the 
reference country566 insofar as the European anti-dumping authorities have made serious or 
562 DENTON, R., .cThe Non-Market Economy Rules of the European Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
Legislationn, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1987, (198), 212-213. 
563 DENTON, R., ccThe · Non-Market Economy Rules of the European Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
Legislationn, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1987, (198), 213. 
564 BEI.LIS, J.-F., .cThe EEC Antidumping System", in Antidumping Law and Practice. A Comparative Study, JACKSON, J.H., 
and VER.MULST, E.A. (ede.), New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 78; SPAK, GL., ccGeorgetown Steel Corp v. United 
Statea : Applying the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries", Law and Policy in International 
Business, 1986, (313), 331. 
565 LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautaire de protection contre le dumping et les subventions, Paris, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 63. 
566 A ME country has been selected as reference country because it was possible to verify at the spot the information obtained in : 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 250/82 of 29 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain welded iron or 
steel tubes originating in Romania, O.J., 3 February 1982, No L 26/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051/90 of 17 July 1990 
imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J.,. 
19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/38). 
ME countries have not been retained as reference country because investigations on the spot were refused or because, for some 
other reason, no suitable information can be obtained or verified, in : CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No 
L 11114; Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting undertakings offered in connection with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United States 
of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371/47; Commission Decision 84/182/EEC of 23 March 
1984 accepting an undertaking offered in connection with an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain iron or steel 
angles, shapes and eections originating in Romania, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 March 1984, No L 8319; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of artificial 
corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of 
artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, No L 255/9; Commission Decision 84/465/EEC 
of 26 September 1984 accepting undertakings given in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of asbestos-
cement corrugated sheets originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratie Republic and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 28 September 1984, No L 259/48; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of roller chains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 
1985, No L 217n ; CommiBBion Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports 
of Portland cement originating in the German Democratie Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardi-
zed multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW hut not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, No L 280/68; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 of 23 July 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches 
originating in the USSR, O.J., 4 August 1987, No L 213/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2512/87 of 18 August 1987 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia 
and the USSR, O.J., 20 August 1987, No L 235/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 1987, No L 259m; Commission Decision 
87/443/EEC of 30 July 1987 amending an undertaking and accepting an undertaking given in eonnection with the anti-dumping 
sufficient attempts to obtain the necessary information from the foreign producers567. 
of that criterion, there may be but one country which can serve as reference country. 
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Because 
In most 
review investigation concerning importsof copper sulphate originating in Poland and the USSR respectively, and terminating the 
investigation as it concerns these countries, O.J., 20 August 1987, NoL 235/22; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 
1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imports of oxalic acid originating in 
China or Czechoslovakia and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, NoL 343134; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 
of 23 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof copper sulphate originating in Buigaria or the Soviet 
Union, O.J., 27 January 1989, No L 23/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in 
Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 131/4; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 720190 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 27 March 1990, No L 80/9; Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning i.mports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and 
accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the proceeding concerning i.mports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovak.ia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, NoL 104/14; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/38); Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 541191 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, NoL 60/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034/91 of 23 April1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 
1991, NoL 106/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 ~ptember 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
i.mports of fluorspar originating· in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain photo albums originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16 ; 1Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of maximum 0,5 % Gow carbon 
ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/1; Commission Decision 94182/EC of 
10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof gum rosin originating in the People's &public of 
China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41/50; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Faderation and 
Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94121. 
When a verification visit to the producers in the raferenee country are provisionnally impossible, another country will he used 
during the provisional anti-dumping aasesament in order not to delay the proceeding unduly. Then, the European anti-dumping 
authorities promise to use the raferenee country in the definitive aasesament (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 
September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282123; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % Uow carbon ferro-chrome) originating 
in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, NoL 80/8), butsometimes actually do not (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-duinping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1). If, in the definitive assessment, the reference country submits complete and 
conclusive information and there is no indication that it is incorrect, normal value will he established on the basis of that 
information, though it the producers in that country do not allow verification of the information at their premises (Council· 
Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a 
carbon content by weight of maximum 0,5% Gow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 
October 1993, No L 246/1). 
567 C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen NöUe v Haupnollamt Bremen-Freihajen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5208. 
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cases, this country bas been taken as reference counuy568• When the producers in all possible 
reference countries refuse to cooperate, but the European anti-dumping authorities have some 
information as to one of these countries, they will use that country as reference country if the 
normal value calculated on that basis would be more favourable to the NME country than a 
· normal value based on the Community as reference569• 
Parties having an interest in the anti-dumping case have a say in the selection of the reference 
counuy570, . at least if they in time co me up with sufficient evidence which underbuilds their 
568 Council Regulation (EEC) No 955n9 of 15 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide origina-
ting in Romania, O.J., 17 May 1979, No L 121/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United States of America and the Boviet Union, O.J.~ 30 January 1980, 
No L 23/19 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, No L 31/23); Commission Decision 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of fibre building board originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, the Boviet Union and Sweden and determining those proceedings, O.J., 
11 June 1980, No L 145/39 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on mechanica! wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11/14 ; Commission Decision 82/285/EEC of 6 
May 1982 terminating the review of the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of a herbicide from Romania, O.J., 11 May 
1982, No L 128/17 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and the Boviet Union, O.J., 26 
October 1983, No L 29413; Commission Decision 83/522/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the undertaking given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of lithium hydroxide originating in the People's Republic of China and 
terminating that proceeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, NoL 294129; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 of 23 July 1987 imposing 
a defmitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originàting in the USSR, O.J., 4 August 1987, No L 213/5; 
Commission Decision 88147/EEC of 26 January 1988 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review 
proceeding concerning importsof a herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 30 January 1988, NoL 26/107; Commission Decision 
90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the 
proceeding coneerDing imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Romania, O.J., 24 April1990, NoL 104114; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537/90 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 145/9; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyolefin bags 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No 
L 256/38) ; Commission Decision 941389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding reg~ding imports of refined 
antimony trioxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, NoL 176/41. 
569 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a 
carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Ruuia and Uk.raine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8. 
570 BELLIS, J.-F., tcThe EEC Antidumping System••, in Antidumping Law an.d Practice. A Comparative Study, JACKSON, Jll., 
and VERMULST, E.A. (eds.), New York, Harvaster Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 77; DENTON, R., «The Non-Market Economy Rules of 
the Europaan Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Legislation .. , International an.d Comparative Law Quarterly, 
1987, (198), 216; FINE, F.L., aEEC Antidumping: The Problem of lmports from State-Trading Countries», Law an.d Policy in 
International Business, 1988, (91), 94-95 ; LESGun.LONS, H., Le régime communautaire de proteetion contre le dumping et les 
subven.tion.s, Paria, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 62; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., teA. Decade of Europaan Community Anti-
Dumping Law and Practica Aplicable to lmports from China»•, Journal of Worlel Trade, 1992/3, (5), 19. 
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propositions and arguments571 • Although the European anti-dumping authorities are not 
required to consider every reference country suggested, they must examine them when there are 
doubts as to their own choice572• Only in a minority of cases another reference country is 
571 lf there is no sufficient evidence is lacking, their suggestions and objections are usually not taken into consideration, see : 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on machanical wrist-watches 
originating in the USSR, 0 . .1., 16 January 1982, No L 11114; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof natural magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of 
China, 0 . .1., 30 December 1982, No L 371121; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natural magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People 's Republic of 
China and in North Korea, O . .T., 30 December 1982, No L 371125; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the 
German Demoeratic Republic, 0 . .1., 27 April 1983, NoL 110/11; Commission Decision 84/465/EEC of 26 September 1984 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of asbestos-cement corrugated sheets 
originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratie Republic and terminating that proceeding, 0 . .1., 28 September 1984, No 
L 259/48; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 10 October 1986, No L 287125; Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 
December 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain deep freezers originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 8 
January 1987, NoL 611; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the 
United Statea of America or Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 17 June 1988, NoL 151147; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on j.mports of paracetàlnol originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 
June 1988, No L 155/29 ; Commission Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia or Romania, confirming the 
undertakings accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the investigations, O.J., 24 February 
1989, No L 52/37 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 707/89 of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on · 
imports of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union, O . .T., 21 March 1989, No L 78110; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15; 
VERMULST, E.A., and HOOIJER, J.J., ccA.nnotation on Case C-69/89, Nakqjimo. All Precision Co. v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 
1991, not yet reported; Case C-358/89, Extramet v. Council, Judgment of 16 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-49/88, Al..Jubo.il 
Fertilizer Compo.n.y (So.mad) o.n.d So.udi Aro.bio.n. Fertilizer Compan.y (Safco) v. Coun.cil, Judgment of 17 June 1991, not yet reported; 
Case C-16190, Detlef Nölle v. Ho.upzollo.mt Bremen-Freihafen, Judgment of 22 October 1991, not yet reportedn, Common Market Law 
Review, 1992, (380), 402. 
lf the exporters do not contest in time the choice of the raferenee country as proposed by the complainants and do not suggest 
another reference country, the fll'st one will be used as raferenee without inquiring other possible raferenee countries, see : 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission o.nd Coun.cil, E.C.R., 
1990, I, (2945), 2956 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council) and 2960 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the 
Council). 
lf no alternative reference country is proposed, the Europaan anti-dumping authorities will retain the raferenee country originally 
selected (Council Regulation (EC) No 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium 
metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, 0 . .1., 21 October 1994, NoL 270/27). 
572 C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nlille v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5188-5190 (Opinion of 
Advocate Genent VAN GERVEN) and 5207; VERMULST, E.A., and HOOUER, J.J., «Annotation on Case C-69/89, Nakajima AU Precision Co. 
v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-358/89, Extramet v. Council, Judgment of 16 May 1991, not yet reported; Case 
C-49/88, Al-Jubail FertilJzer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian Fertiüzer Company (Sajco) v. Council, Judgment of 17 June 1991, nol yet 
reported; Case C-16/90, Dellef NöUe v. Haupzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, Judgment of 22 October 1991, not yet reported», Common Market Law 
Review, 1992, (380), 402. 
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chosen than the one suggested either by the complainants or the exporters and importers573• If 
573 Commieeion Regulation (EEC) No 1579/80 of 19 June 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! alarm 
clocks originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Soviet Union, and withdrawing a national anti-dumping duty on 
mechanica! alarm clocks originating in China, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 158/5; Commission Decision 80/600/EEC of 19 June 1980 
accepting the undertakings given by Chinese and Czechoslovakian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in 
respect of imports of machanical alarm clocks originating in China, Czechoslovakia, the German demoeratic Republic, Hong-Kong 
and the USSR, terminating the proceeding in respect of China, Czechoslovakia and Hong-Kong, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 158/18; 
Commission Decision 811247/EEC of 15 April 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of hermetic 
compressors originating in Brazil, Spain, Hungary, Japan and Singapore, O.J., 25 April 1981, No L 113/53; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 871/82 of 14 April 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on upright pianos originating in the USSR, 
O.J., 16 April1982, NoL 101130 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 April1982, NoL 115/22); Council Decision 821220/EEC of 14 April 1982 
terminating an anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of upright pianos originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic and Poland, O.J., 16 April 1982, NoL 101/45; Commission Decision 82/398/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning cylinder vacuum cleaners originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/47; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre building 
board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of import& of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, NoL 181/19; Commission Decision 82/543/EEC of 6 August 1982 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning paracetamol (INN) crystals or powder originating in China and 
terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1982, No L236/23; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hexamethylenetetramine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic 
and the Soviet Union, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of hexamethylenetetramine 
originating in Czechoslovakia and Roi::nania, O.J., 12 February 1983, NoL 40/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 
June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a prioe undertaking from one Japanese exporter and 
terminating the prooaeding in respect of imports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the 
German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, NoL 160/18; Council Regulation (EEC} No 2786/83 of 3 October 1983 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 7 October 1983, 
No L 27411; Commission Decision 831502/EEC of 10 October 1983 accepting the offer of an undertaking of a Czechoslovakian 
exporter of copper sulphate, O.J., 13 October 1983, No L 281122; Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium origÎnating in Norway, 
Surinam, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, NoL 57/19; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 
September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof artificial corundum originating in the People's Republic of 
China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of artificial corundum originating in Spain and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, NoL 25519; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings 
antered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categories of glass .. 
originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 
February 1986, No L 5lnS ; Commission Decision 86/100/EEC of 15 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 18 
April 1986, No L 102/31 ; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports ·of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No 
L 202/43 ; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating 
the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14; Commission Decision 
86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof 
silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation 
regarding importsof that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/25 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 
kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and 
definitively collecting the amounts secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 83/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mercury originating in the Union of Boviet 
Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, No L 227/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of mercury originating in the Boviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-
dumping duty imposed on such imports, O.J., 10 December 1987, NoL 346/27; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 
1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imports of oxalic acid originating in 
China or Czechoslovakia and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343134; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 
3074189 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and 
Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, NoL 294110; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 720190 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 27 March 1990, No L 8019; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungstic oxide 
and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83129; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
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that happens, it is usually a country subject to the same or to a similar anti-dumping 
proceedingS74 (see : Artiele 2(7)(a) basic EC Regulation). As a consequence, the fact that a 
No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide 
originating in the People 's Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceed.ing concerning imports of those products 
from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83136 ; Commission Decision 901154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 831117; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034/91 of 23 April 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 
1991, No L 106/15 ; Commission Decision 91/612/EEC of 26 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review 
of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, NoL 275/27. 
574 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1679/80 of 19 June 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on machanical alarm 
clocks originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Boviet Union, and withdrawing a national anti-dumping duty on 
machanical alarm clocks originating in China, O.J., 26 June 1980, NoL 168/5; Commission Decision 80/600/EEC of 19 June 1980 
accepting the undertakings given by Chinese and Czechoslovakian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in 
respect of imports of mechanica! alarm clocks originating in China, Czechoslovakia, the German demoeratic Republic, Hong-Kong 
and the USSR, terminating the proceeding in respect of China, Czechoslovakia and Hong-Kong, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 168/18; 
Commission Decision 81/247/EEC of 16 April 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of herroetic 
compressors originating in Brazil, Spain, Hungary, Japan and Singapore, O.J., 26 April 1981, No L 113153; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1633182 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre building board 
(hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/664/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting undertakings in 
conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the procesding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 
June 1982, No L 181119; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 of 3 October 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 7 October 1983, No L 274/1; Commission Decision 
83/602/EEC of 10 October 1983 accepting the offer of an undertaking of a Czechoslovakian exporter of copper sulphate, O.J., 13 
October 1983, No L 281122; Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Boviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 
28 February 1984, No L 67/19; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof artificial corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating 
the procesding in respect of import& of artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, No 
L 255/9 ; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and C:r.echoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51n3; Commission 
Decision 86/100/EEC of 15 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hall hearings and tapered 
roller hearings originating in Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 18 April 1986, No L 102/31; Commission Decision 
86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Portland cement originating in the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 26 July 1986, NoL 202/43; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 
of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, 
accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of importsof certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in 
the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of certain 
deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of 
C~na, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/26; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof standardized multi-
phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts secured as 
provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 83/1; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imports of oxalic acid originating in China or Czechoslovakia and 
terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343134; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 
1989, No L 294110; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 762/90 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83129; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten 
carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping procesding 
concerning imports of those products from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83136 ;Commission Decision 
90/164/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of . ammonium paratungstate 
originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83/117 ; Commission Decision 
91/512/EEC of 26 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
imports of artificial corundum originating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of 
China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of artificial corundum originating in Brazil and 
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country is accused of dumping, does not render this country unqualified to be used as reference 
country575. Similarly, the fact that a country is subject to anti-dumping relief, has not 
prevented that country from being selected as reference count:rf76. 
The efficient administration of the anti-dumping proceeding577 or the principle of non-
discrimination578 may justify the selection of a ME country- subject to the. same anti-dumping 
proceeding -, as reference country. It is not clear how non-discrimination interferes with the 
selection of the reference country. The only similarity between the NME country and the 
reference country is the coincidence that the Community industry has filed an anti-dumping 
complaint against both these countries. In fact, the application of the principle of non-
discrimination as well as the need of efficiently administered proceedings may help the 
Community industry to manipulate the anti-dumping investigation against NME countries. Indeed, 
Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 275/27 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 
October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of 
synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of importsof synthetic polyester fibres originating in 
Mexico and the United Statas of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, NoL 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, NoL 30/68). 
However, if the information gathered about a ME country in the course of another, though simHar anti-dumping proceeding does 
not relate to the investigation period selected for the anti-dumping proceeding against the NME country and this information 
cannot he updated, the ME country will not he chosen as raferenee country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034/91 of 23 April 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 26 April 1991, No L 106/15). 
515 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repaaiing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181119. 
576 Council Regulation (EC) No 3664/93 of 22 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of photo 
albums in bookbound fonn originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 
December 1993, NoL 333/67. 
577 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission cmd Council, 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 2978 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN); Commission Decision 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 
accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of fibre building board originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, the Boviet Union and Sweden and determining those proceedings, O.J., 
11 June 1980, No L 145/39 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repaaiing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 
1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from 
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceeding with 
regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 26 June 1982, No L 181119; Council Decision 83/9/EEC of 17 January 1983 
terminating the anti~umping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16/30; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1479/83 of 7 June 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 9 June 1983, No 
L 151124 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the Oerman Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111. 
578 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission cmd Council, 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 3004; Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of codeïne and its salts originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No 
L 16/30. 
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the Community industry may flle a complaint against a ME country whose different normal value 
standards exceed the NME country's export prices, anticipating the selection of that ME country 
as reference country. 
The margin of discretion the European anti-dumping authorities enjoy in choosing a reference 
country, is wide, but not unlimited, as the reference country must be selected in an appropriate 
and not unreasonable manner579• No formal, but material criteria must be applied for 
determining which ME countries are appropriate and not unreasonable reference countries. The 
reference country should resembie as much as possible the NME ~ountrr80 • The European 
anti-dumping authorities have refused to establish the resemblance between reference country and 
NME country on macro-economie indicia, such as level of development, gross national product, 
rate of inflation, population, di vision of Iabour, for reasoos of irrelevancy, as there is no· direct 
relationship between them and the cost of production581 • The size of the market, though, is an 
519 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype TechmCUJhe:cport GmbH v Commission and Council, 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 2977 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 3001-3002; C.J.E.C., case C-16190, 22 October 
1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Frei.hafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5179 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) 
and 5203; BUCKSCH, G., ccDie AngemeSBenheit bei der Festsetzung des Normal wertes bei Antidumping (Art. 5 EWG-VO Nr. 
3017 n9)u, RIWIA WD, 1983, (839), 841 ; KRETSCHMER, H., DCUJ Antidumping- und Antisubventionsrecht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, FrankfurtJMain, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 35; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade 
Proteetion Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 68; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United 
States and the European Communities. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 434; VERMULST, E.A., and 
GRAAFSMA, F., ccA Decade of European Community Ant-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to Imports from China», Journal 
of World Trade, 199213, (5), 17; VERMULST, E.A., and HOOIJER, J.J., c<A.nnotation on Case C-69/89, Nakqjima All Precision Co. 
v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-358/89, Extramet v. Council, Judgm.ent of 16 May 1991, not yet 
reported; Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (Samad) and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (Safco) v. Council, Judgm.ent 
of 17 June 1991, not yet reported; Case C-16190, Detlef Nölle v. Haupzollamt Bremen-Frei.hafen, Judgment of 22 October 1991, not 
yet reported», Common Market Law Review, 1992, (380), 400. 
58° C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollaml Bremen-Freihajen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5179-5180 and 5182 
(Opinion of Advocate General VAN. GERVEN). 
581 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium 
chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, No L 227/24; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports inu; the 
Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, 
0 . .1., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1. See also: gum rosin from the People's Republic of China, the rate of intlation did not (an 
adjustm.ent was made to take account of the high intlation in the reference country) (Commission Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 
1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof gum rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 
12 February 1994, No L 41/50). 
In most anti-dumping cases, the raferenee country selected has a higher gross national product than the NME country concerned 
(DENTON, R., ecThe Non-Market Economy Rules of the European Community's Anti-Dumping and Countervailjng Duties 
LegislatioD», International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1987, (198), 220; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping 
and other Trade Proteetion Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 72 ; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice 
in the United Statea and the European Communities. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 435). lndeed, in 
refrigerators from the Boviet Union the argument of the exporter that the purchasing power in the reference country was three 
times as high as the purchasing power in the non-market economy country, was disregarded (Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 
22 December 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep freezers originating in the Soviet Union, 
0 . .1., 8 January 1987, NoL 6/1). 
However, in some anti-dumping cases the level of development proved to he important : 
in ferrosilicon from the Boviet Union, woven polyolefin bags from the People'• Republic of China and polyester yarns from the 
People'• Republic of China the comparable level of development was considered as a positive element (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil 
and accepting undertakings offered by Italmagnesio SA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-lmport of the USSR, O.J., 8 August 
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important factor in the choice of the reference countrf82• However, along with the number of 
producers in competition583, it is held to indicate whether or not the dornestic prices in . the 
1987, No L 219124 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on 
import& of woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, NoL 187/36 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/38); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fi.bres) originating in Taiwan, 
lndonesia, India, .the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
import& ofthese yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, NoL 276n) 
in barium chloride from the People'• Republic of China an.d the German. Demoeratic Republic the ditTerenee in the level of 
development was found to have little or no influence on the manufacture of the product because the Iabour content was not 
decisive in fixing costs. Thus, if the Iabour content is decisive, the difference in the level of development could be important, 
if not decisive in the selection of the raferenee country ( Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or the German 
Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, NoL 227124); 
in tung•tic O%ide and tungstic acid from the People's Republic of China, tungsten carbide an.d fused tungsten carbide from the 
People'• Republic of China and ammonium paratungstate from the People'• Republic of China the Commission had to choose 
between Austria and South Korea as possible raferenee countries. South Korea was chosen because the economies of the 
People's Republic of China and South Korea were less dissimHar (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 762/90 of 26 March 1990 
imposing a provisional· anti-dumping duty on imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83129; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic 
of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of those products from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 
30 March 1990, No L 83136 ; Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/117); 
in deadburned (sintered) magnesia from the People's Republic of China and magnesium oxide from the People's Republic of 
China the level of economie development was one of the raasons for selecting the reference country. In magnesium oxide from . 
the People'• Republic of China it was even a decisive criterion for choosing another raferenee country than the one proposed 
by the complainant Community producers (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September ·1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 
September 1992, NoL 282123). 
Moreover, in the GA'IT Committee on Anti-dumping Practices, the representative of the Community held that the standarde of 
living of the NME country are taken into account (B.I.S.D., Twenty-fourth Supplement, Geneva, GA'IT, 1978, consideration 18), an 
opinion shared ·by Advocate-General M. DARMON (C.J.E.C., case 264/82, 20 March 1985, Timex Corporation u Council an.d 
Commission, E.C.R., 1985, 859). 
582 Commiuion Dcciaion 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof gum rosin originating in 
the People'• Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41/50; Council Regulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties on imporu of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1 ; Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping prococding conceming imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Uthuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with 
regard to theac countrie1 ; •• well as tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding èoncerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, 
Georgia, Turkmeniatan, Ukraine and Uzbekiatan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24; Commisaion Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 
imposing provisional duties on importsof urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1648/94 of 6 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of furazolidone originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, NoL 174/4; Council Regulation (EC) No 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of calcium roetal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 21 October 1994, No L 270/27; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate 
orginating in the People 's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32. 
583 See e.g. : Council Regulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-
dumping duties on importa of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, No L 80/l ; Commission 
Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
ammonium nitrate originating in Uthuania and Russia and tenninating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as ~tt~l as tenninating the 
anti-dumping proceeding conceming importsof ammonium nitrate.originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekiatan, O.J., 21 
May 1994, No L 129/24 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 impoaing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium 
nitrate 10lution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1648/94 of 6 July 1994 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of furazolidone originating in the Peop1e'a Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, No 
L 174/4; Council Regu1ation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 impoiling a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium 
permanganate orginating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32. 
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reference country are governed by normal market forces584• Indeed, the European anti-
dumping authorities require the market of the reference country to be representative in comparison 
with the allegedly dumped exports of the NME country, and to be open and competitive as 
well585• The difficult politica! situation (e.g., civil war or looming civil war in some parts of 
the country) in the proposed reference country does not prevent this country either from being 
selected, especially not when there are no other ME countries which would constitute an 
appropriate and not unreasonable alternativ~86 • In the great majority of anti-dumping cases, a 
sector approach is adopted and the similarity in the level of development of the branch of 
industry587, the product involved588, the production processes, including technology and 
584 Council Rcgulaûon (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties 
·on imports ofpotasaium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1648/94 of 6 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof furazolidonc originating in the People's Repoblie of China, O.J., 8 
July 1994, No L 174/4; Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
potassium pennanganate orginating in the People's Repoblie of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32. 
585 Sec e.g. : Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definiûve anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon carbide, 
originating in the Peop1e's Repoblie of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukrainc, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/21; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating in the People's 
Repoblie of China and Ruuia, O.J., 23 April 1994, NoL 104/5; Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting ondertakinga given 
in conneetion witb tbe anti-dumping proceeding conceming imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the 
investigation with regani to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping procecding conceming imports of ammonium nitrate 
originating in Belarus, Gcorgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urca ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 
June 1994, NoL 162/16; Commission Decision 94/389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refined 
antimony trioxide originaûng in tbc People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, NoL 176/41; Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 
December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazit and South 
Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15. · 
Sec, however : 
58~ 
fur:furaldehyde jrom the People 's Republic of China, where the market of the suggcsted rcfercnce country was found to be representative in 
comparison with tbc allegedly dumped NME cxports, but where no imports of the like product into the suggested reference country had been 
reconied. Nevcrthclcss, the auggesled refercnce country was retained because therc werc two producers whose size appeared similar to that 
of the NME producen and whose dornestic market priccs were in reasonable proportion to production costs, and because the acccsa to raw 
matcrials in the reference country was favourable. lt seems, however, that the suggested rcference country was the only possible one . 
. Indecd, in tbc othcr auggelled reference country willing to cooperate, there werc no imports cither and there was but one producer who 
produccd mostly for the caplive market (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783/94 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on importsof furfuraldehyde originating in tbc Pcople's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11) ; 
jurazolidone jrom the People 's Republic of Oaina, where the existence high customs duties on imports of the like product in the proposed 
reference country was eonsidered not to detract from the eompetitive nature of its market (Council Regulation (EC) No 2674/94 of 31 
October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof furazolidone originating in the People's Repoblie of China and colleeting 
definitivcly tbc provisional duty imposed, O.J., 4 November 1994, NoL 285/1). 
Commission Regulaûon (EBC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio seamle88 
pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Repoblie of Croatia and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding with regani to the Repoblies of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Repoblie of Macedonia, the Repoblie of 
Bosnia-Herzegovinaand the Repoblie ofSlovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, NoL 328/15. 
587 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-d~ping duty on imports of roller 
ebains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republie of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, No L 217n; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of espadrilles originating 
in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, NoL 365/25; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 26 April1991, NoL 106/15; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1812/91 of 24 June 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping 
duty, O.J., 28 June 1991, NoL 166/1. 
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technical norms589 , the scale of production590, the access to the main components of the 
588 Commission Decision 82/398/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
procedure concerning cylinder vacuum cleaners originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and 
terminating the procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/47; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of artificial corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and 
Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugoslavia, 
O.J., 25 September 1984, No L 255/9; CommiBBion Decision 84/650/EEC of 21 December 1984 accepting undertakings and 
repealing the provisional duty in conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of artificial corundum 
originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation with regard tothese countries, 
O.J., 28 December 1984, NoL 340/82; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 
May 1989, NoL 131/4; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No L 294/10 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
385190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate originating in 
Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 16 February 1990, No 
L 42/1; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dl.unping duty on imports of 
tungsten ores and concentratee originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports 
originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123 ;Commission Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& oftungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 
March 1990, No L 83129 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of those products from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83136; 
CommiBBion Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium 
paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 831117; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on importsof woven polyolefin 
bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No 
L 256/38); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and . 
Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133120; Commission Decision 91/512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of artificial corundum · originating in the Soviet Union, 
Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 
1991, No L 276/27; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1031192 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of potassium chloride (potash) originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 28 April 1992, No L 110/5; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in 
Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, NoL 18318; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-
dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in 
Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
terminating the said review in respect of import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statea of 
America, O.J., 22 October 1992, NoL 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, NoL 30/68); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or 
non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, NoL 328/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 650/93 
of 6 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 68/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the 
provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 
1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on importsof silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 
April 1994, NoL 94121; Commission Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April1994, NoL 104/5; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese 
originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/16. 
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589 Council Regulation (EEC) No 955n9 of 15 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide origina-
ting in Romania, O.J., 17 May 1979, NoL 12115; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407180 of 18 February 1980 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 22 February 1980, NoL 48/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 451180 of 22 February 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized electric 
multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but notmore than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 27 February 
1980, No L 53115 ; Commiuion Decision 801252/EEC of 22 February 1980 accepting undertakings given by exporters in Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing import& of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, 
originating in those countries, and terminating the procedure in respect of them, O.J., 27 February 1980, NoL 53121; Commission 
Decision 80/410/EEC of 10 April 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings coneerDing 
eertain fJJ.ament lamps for lighting exeeeding 28 volts, originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 15 April1980, NoL 97/59; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1560/80 of 20 June 
1980 coneerDing the defmitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of standardized electric multi-
phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 21 June 1980, No 
L 153145 ; Commiuion Decision 80/599/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing import& of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore 
than 75 kW, originating in the USSR and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153/48; Commission Decision 
80/875/EEC of 17 September 1980 accepting undertakings given by Romanian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proeeeding coneerDing import& of certain tubes of iron or steel originating in that country, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 
20 September 1980, NoL 249rl4 (corrigendum, O.J., 7 October 1980, NoL 26318); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 
January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 
1982, No L 11114 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 171182 of 25 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of oxalic acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, NoL 19rl6 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 
1982, No L 34/11); Commission Decision 82rl85/EEC of 6 May 1982 terminating the review of the anti-dumping proceedings 
coneerDing import& of a herbicide from Romania, O.J., 11 May 1982, No L 128/17 ; Council Decision 82/423/EEC of 21 June 1982 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of certain refrigerators originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoçratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 29 June 1982, NoL 184123; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2243182 of 12 August 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of methylamine, 
dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and accepting an undertaking and terminating 
the procedure in respect of import& of methylamine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in Romania, O.J., 13 August 
1982, NoL 238/35; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2568/82 of 17 September 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of polyvinyl chloride reains and compound& originating in Czechoslovakia, and accepting undertakings and terminating the 
proceeding in respect of import& of such product& originating in Romania, the German Demoeratic Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 
September 1982, NoL 274/15; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the 
Soviet Union, O.J., 6 October 1982, No L 283/9; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hexamethylenetetramine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the 
Soviet Union, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of hexamethylenetetramine 
originating in Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, No L 40124; Commission Decision 83/248/EEC of 24 May. 
1983 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of polyethylene 
originating in the Soviet Union, the German Demoeratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 27 May 1983, NoL 138/65; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1479/83 of 7 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 9 June 1983, No L 151rl4; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1613183 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of unwrought nickel, not 
alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 17 
June 1983, No L 159/43 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631183 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, 
accepting a price undertaking from one Japanese exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of certain glass 
textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, No L 160/18; 
Commission Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain pears in 
syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, NoL 196/22; 
CommiBBion Decision 831559/EEC of 15 November 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing import& of sanitary fixtures of porcelain or china originating in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and termina-
ting that proceeding, O.J., 22 November 1983, No L 325/18; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3578/83 of 15 December 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of choline chloride originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and 
Romania, O.J., 20 December 1983, No L 356/12; Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning importsof non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, No L 57/19; Commission Decision 84/182/EEC of 23 Márch 1984 accepting an 
undertaking offered in conneetion with an anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of certain iron or steel angles, shapes and 
sections originating in Romania, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 March 1984, No L 8319 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron or 
steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April1984, NoL 109/11; Commission Decision 84/406/EEC of 10 
August 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of horticultural 
glass and eertain drawn glass originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the 
USSR, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 August 1984, NoL 224rl6; Commission Decision 84/408/EEC of 16 August 1984 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review proeeeding coneerDing imports of copper sulphate 
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originating in Czechoslovakia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 August 1984, NoL 225/22; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2553184 of 4 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, accepting 
an undertaking offered by the exporter in the German Demoeratic Republic of oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding regarding 
import& of oxalic acid from the German Demoeratic Republic and Spain, O.J., 7 September 1984, NoL 239/8; Commission Decision 
85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proeeeding coneerDing imports of eertain boots with fitted iee 
skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, No L 52/48; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of roller ebains for cycles 
originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, NoL 217n; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC 
of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of Portland cement originating in the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43 ; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain acrylic fibres origina-
ting in Israel, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272/29 ; Commission 
Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
import& of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the 
investigation regarding import& of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the 
USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/25; Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting an 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proeeeding coneerDing import& of paint, distemper, varnish and simHar 
brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, No L 46/45; 
Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, NoL 103138; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating 
in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121/11; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 of 23 July 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on machanical wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 4 August 1987, No. L 21315 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and 
accepting undertakings offered by Italmagnesio SA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-lmport of the USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, No 
L 219/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
mercury originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, NoL 227/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2512/87 of 18 August 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof copper 
sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 20 August 1987, NoL 235/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 1987, 
NoL 259m; Commiuion Decision 87/443/EEC of 30 July 1987 amending an undertaking and accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping review investigation coneerDing imports of copper sulphate originating in Poland and the USSR 
respectively, and terminating the investigation as it concerns these countries, O.J., 20 August 1987, No L 235/22; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1198/88 of 25 April 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of roller chains for cycles 
originating in the People's Republic of China and providing for the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty on the 
said import&, O.J., 3 May 1988, No L 115/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States 
of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151/47; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, 
O.J.,. 25 August 1988, No L 235/6; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping review coneerDing imports of oxalic acid originating in China or Czechoslovakia and terminating 
the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343134; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the 
United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 23 January 
1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Buigaria or the Soviet Union, O.J., 27 
January 1989, No L 2311 ; Commission Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing importsof urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia or Romania, confirming 
the undertakings accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the investigations, O.J., 24 February 
1989, NoL 52/37; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
paint, distemper, varnish and simHar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, NoL 79/24; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 
1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 
1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or the 
German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, No L 227/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 
1989, No L 294/10; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing 
import& originating in HongKong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/23; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 762/90 of 26 March 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83129; Commission Decision 90/164/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing import& of ammonium paratungstate originating. in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 831117 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133120; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1472/91 of 29 May 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-dumping 
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proceeding in respect of imports of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns 
(man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No 
L 276fT ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-
silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, NoL 183/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 
1992, No L 282123 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the 
review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey 
and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro· and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in 
respect of im.ports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statesof America, O.J., 22 October 1992, No 
L 30611 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68) ; Commission Decision 94182/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of gum rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, 
No L 41/50 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium 
nitrate salution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1648194 of 
6 July 1994 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of furazolidone originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 8 July 1994, NoL 17414. 
59° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, No L 297/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 
January 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statesof America and the 
Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, NoL 23119 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, NoL 31/23); Council Regulation (EEC) No 
407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, 
O.J., 22 February 1980, No L 48/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 724182 of 30 March 1982 im.posing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on im.ports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 
kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating 
the proceeding in respect of imports of said products originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, No L 85/9 i Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natural magnesite, 
caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371121 i Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of natural magnesite, dead-burned 
(sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371125; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hexamethylenetetramine 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Soviet Union, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding 
in respect of importsof hexamethylenetetramine originating in Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, NoL 40/24; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1479/83 of 7 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof copper sulphate 
originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 9 June 1983, No L 151124; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/83 of 15 
June ·1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imporls of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced 
by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No L 159/43 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain glass textile fibres 
(rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one 
Japanase e:xporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of im.ports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in 
Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, NoL 160/18; Commission Decision 83/559/EEC of 15 
November 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of sanitary 
fixtures of porcelain or china originating in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 November 
1983, No L 325/18 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3578/83 of 15· December 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof choline chloride originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 20 December 1983, NoL 356/12; 
Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of non-alloyed 
unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, NoL 57/19; 
Commission Decision 841408/EEC of 16 August 1984 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review 
proceeding concerning importsof copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 August 
1984, No L 225/22 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2553184 of 4 September 1984 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
im.ports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, accepting an undertaking ofTered by the e:xporter in the German Demoeratic Republic of 
oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding regarding importsof oxalic acid from the German Democratie Republic and Spain, O.J., 
7 September 1984, No L 239/8 ; Commission Decision 85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning importsof certain boots with fitted ice skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,· Romania and Hungary, O.J., 
22 February 1985, No L 52/48 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on im.ports of roller ebains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, No 
L 217n ; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in Israel, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272129; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No L 103138; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the 
' 
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production cosf91 , and the level of dornestic sales592 may be decisive criteria. The Court 
. United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151147; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 
1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, 
Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, NoL 348/49; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89_ of 
20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof paint, distemper, varnishand simHar brushes orginating in 
the People's Republic of China and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, 
No L 79/24 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light 
sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes 
originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No L 294/10 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1808/92 of 30 June 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, No 
L 18318; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799192 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/15; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2800192 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282123 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017192 of 19 
October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of 
synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in 
Mexico and the United Statesof America, O.J., 22 October 1992, NoL 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, NoL 30/68); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with .regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 58/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 
April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477193 of 6 
September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720193 of 28 September 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/12. 
591 C.J.E.C., caac C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen NiJUe v Haup11.oUaml Bremen-Freihajen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5184-5185 (Opinion of 
Advocate General VAN GER.VEN) and 5206 ; Commission Regulation (EEC). No 1808/92 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa offcrro-ailicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, NoL 183/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of25 
·september 1992Împosing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in thc Peoplc's Republic of 
China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/15; Commission Rcgulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importa of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/23; Council 
Rcgulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicablc 
to importa of syntbetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkcy and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and tbc former 
Yugoslav Rcpublic of Macedonia and tenninating the said review in respect of importa of ayntbctic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and tbc 
United Statea of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, NoL 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, NoL 30/68); Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy 
steel, originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Hungary, Poland and tbe Republic of Croatia and tenninating tbe anti-dumping proceeding with regard to tbe 
Rcpublics of Serbia and of Montenegro, tbe formcr Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, thc Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of 
Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imporl8 of ferro-chrome witb a carbon content by wcight of max. 0,5 % (low carbon fcrro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importa of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5• microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and thc People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 
April 1993, NoL 9515; Commiuion Rcgulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of 
eertaio photo albums originating in tbc People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16; Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC 
of 12 January 1994 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, 
Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5; Commission Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 tenninating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importl of gum rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41/50; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon carbide, originating in thc People'a 
Rcpublic of China, Poland, the Russian Pederation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, NoL 94/21; Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 
1994 accepting undcrtakings given in conneetion witb tbc anti-dumping procecding concerning importa of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Lithuania and Ruuia and tenninating the inveatigation witb regard to these countries ; as well as tenninating tbc anti-dumping procecding 
conccrning importa of ammonium nitrate originating in Bclarus, Gcorgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbek.istan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 
129/24 ; Commiuion Rcgulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisiona1 duties on importa of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 Junc 1994, NoL 162/16; Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of ferro-silico-manganesc originating in Russia, Ukrainc, Brazit and Soutb Africa, O.J., 21 December 
1994, NoL 330/15. 
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of Justice agrees in principle with this approach593 , but considers major differences on the 
macro-economie level liable to render the selection of the reference country unappropriate and 
unreasonable594• The Court further holds that, in principle, the size of the dornestic market is 
not a factor capable of being taken into consideration in the choice of a reference country, insofar 
as there is a sufficient number of transactions to ensure the representative nature of the market in 
relation to the allegedly dumped exports of the NME country. In this respect, the Court bas 
recalled European anti-dumping law which sets the minimum level of representativity of the 
market at 5_ % of the allegedly dumped exports to the Communitf95• The sector approach is, 
nevertheless, to be preferred to the general macro-economie approach : similar macro-economie 
el~ments do not always imply that specific industrial sectors face a comparable production 
structure and production scale596• Factors, such as the size of the market and the number of 
competitors, therefore, are acceptable only insofar as they are used in order to determine whether 
the dornestic prices of the reference country are govemed by normal market forces. 
The criterion of the similarity in the product involved should be decisive for European anti-
dumping law explicitly states that normal value must be determined on the basis of the prices or 
costs of the like product in the reference country (Articles 1(2) and 2(7) basic EC Regulation ; 
592 Commission Regulaûon (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impmts of isobutanol 
originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/12. 
593 C.J.E.C., ca&e C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Niille v HauptzoUamt Bremen-Freihajen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5203-5207. 
594 The Court of Jultice haa held that, i~ principle, the size of the dornestic marleet ia nol a factor liable of being taleen into consideration in the 
choice of the reference country. lt, nevertheless, considered that the fact that the reference country'• total production represents less than 5 % of 
the aUegedly dumping country's exports to the Community, .amounts to an indication that the marleet of the reference country is oot very 
representative (C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 
1990, I, (2945), 3001 ; C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Niille v HauptzoUamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5182-
5183 (Opinion of Advocate GeneralVAN GERVEN) and 5205) 
595 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945}, 3001 ; C.J.E.C., ca&e C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Niille v Hauptzollaml Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5205. 
596 KRETSCHMER, H., DCJB Antidumping- un.d Anti.subuentionsrecht ckr Europäi.schen Gemeinschaften, Frankfurt/Main, VWV-
Verlag, 1980, 36; SPAK, G.J., "Georgetown Steel Corp u. United States: Applying the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from 
Nonmarket Economy CountrieBD, Law cuul Policy in International Business, 1986, (313), 330-331 ; VERMULST, E.A., ccDurnping in 
the United Statea and the Europaan Community: A Comparative Analysia», Legallssues of European. lntegration, 198412, (103), 
110; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United Stales and the European. Communities. A Comparative 
Analysi.s, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 436 ; VERMULST, E.A., and HOOIJER, J.J., .A.nnotation on Case C-69/89, Nakqjima 
All Precision Co. v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 1991, not yet reported; Case C-368/89, Extramet v. Council, Judgment of 16 May 
1991, not yet reported; Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Compan.y (Sam.ad) cuul Saudi Arabicm Fertilizer Compan.y (Safco) v. 
Council, Jud.gm.ent of 17 June 1991, not yet reported ; Case C-16190, Detlef Nölle v. Haupzollam.t Bremen-Freihafen, Judgment of 22 
October 1991, not yet reported.t, Common Market Law Reuiew, 1992, (380), 401; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., .A. 
Decade of Europaan Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Aplicable to lmports from China.», Journol of World Trade, 
1992/3, (5), 18; 
Admittedly, production coats may be higher in CO\Ultries with a higher level of development (VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, 
F., ccA. Decade of Europaan Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Aplicable to Imports from China.», Journal of World Trade, 
1992/3, (5), 19). Perhapa the Europaan anti-dumping authorities have taken into account the level of development (supra, 207-208, 
note 581) when differences in level of development result in differences in production coats. 
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Artiele 2(5) basic ECSC Decision)597• However, none of those criteria, not even the similarity 
of the product involved, are necessarily decisive in the selection of the reference country. They 
may outweigh each other598• It is also possible that they are counterbalanced by the dornestic 
market price in the reference country being lower than the prices in another ME country and in 
the Communitf99• 
591 C.I.E.C., case 264/82, 20 March 1985, nmex Corporalion v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1985, (849), 859 (Opinion of Advocate 
General DARMON); C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, 
E. C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 2957 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the Commission). 
598 The following element& have been outweighed by the other criteria : 
the similarity in the product involved (Commission Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakings ofTered 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia or 
Romania, confirming the undertakings accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the 
investigationa, O.J., 24 February 1989, NoL 52/37); 
the similarity in production processas (C.J.E.C., case 264/82, 20 March 1985, Ti.mex Corporati.on. v Counci.l an.d Commi.ssi.on., 
E.C.R., 1985, 859 (opinion of Advocate-General M. DARMON); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 of 23 July 1987 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating in _the USSR, O.J., 4 August 1987, No 
L 21315); 
the similarity in production scale (Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitivèly collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24). 
599 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2512/87 of 18 August 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 20 August 1987, No L 235/18 
(corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 1987, NoL 259n). 
In saveral anti-dumping cases, the raferenee country has been selected, because it has a lower dornestic market price than an 
alternative reference country, sae: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 of 3 October 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import. of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovak.ia and the USSR, O.J., 7 October 1983, NoL 274/1; Commission 
Decision 831502/EEC of 10 October 1983 accepting the offer of an undertaking of a Czechoslovakian exporter of capper sulphate, 
O.J., 13 October 1983, NoL 281122; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3578/83 of 15 December 1983 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of choline chloride originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 20 December 
1983, No L 356/12; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2495/86 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic ruid the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 5 August 1986, No L 217/12; Commission Decision 87/443/EEC of 30 July 1987 amending an undertaking and 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review investigation concerning imports of capper sulphate 
originating in Poland and the USSR respectively, and terminating the investigation as it concerns these countries, O.J., 20 August 
1987, No L 235122. 
The low damestic market prices must result from normal competition. If the low damestic market prices are influenced by low-
priced import&, the ME country will not he salected as reference country, sae: Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 
1982 accepting undertakings affered in conneetion with the ·anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of perchlorethylene 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United States of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 
December 1982, No L 371/47. · 
====-=- - -.~-~~~-· 
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Since the European anti-dumping authorities select as reference country a country with the lowest 
dornestic market price, a country which is one of the most efficient in the world600, one in 
which production costs are lower than the production costs in the NME country6°1, one which 
has a comparative advantage (e.g., the availability, the quality and the price of the inputs and 
production factors602) or one which enjoys economies of scale603 , NME countries are 
600 Commission Decision 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings 
concerning imports of fibre building board originating in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, the Soviet 
Union and Sweden and determining those proceedings, O.J., 11 June 1980, No L 145/39; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1633182 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in 
Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the 
proceeding in respect of importsof fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden 
and the Soviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No 
L 181119; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the 
Soviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No L 169/43 ; Commission Decision 841103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning importsof non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, No L 67/19; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores and concentratee originating in the People's Republic of China, and 
ter:m.inating the proceeding concerning imports originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic 
acid originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83129; Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 
March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 831117. See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of espadrilles originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, NoL 365/26; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1808/92 of 30 June 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports .of ferro-silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, No L 183/8 ; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3369/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating 
in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1. 
601 Commiaaion Regulaûon (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof calcium roetal originating 
in the People'aRepublic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April1994, NoL 104/5. 
602 C.J.E.C., case C-16190, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 6184-5186 
(Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 6205; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J~, 22 February 1980, No L 48/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 871182 of 14 April 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on upright pianos originating 
in the USSR, O.J., 16 April1982, NoL 101130 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 April1982, NoL 115/22); Council Decision 82/220/EEC of 14 
April 1982 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of upright pianos originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Poland, O.J., 16 April 1982, No L 101145; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 
February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hexamethylenetetramine originating in the German 
Demoeratic Republic and the Soviet Union, and accepting .undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of importsof 
hexamethylenetetramine originating in Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, NoL 40/24; Commission Decision 
84/129/EEC of 6 March 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of caustic-burned natural magnesite 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 March 1984, NoL 66/32 ; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in 
the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that 
product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 
1986, NoL 287126; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of ure a originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad . and 
Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No 
L 294/10 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of 
ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, No L 23712; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3369/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating 
in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of furfuraldehyde originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186/11. 
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favoured. The same applies when they do oot select a ME country as reference country because 
of its too high prices, production costs and wages604• Indeed, the lower the dornestic m~ket 
price of the reference country, the lower the normal value and, thus, the dumping margin of the 
NME country. The more efficient the reference country, the smaller the probability that NME 
countries are held liable for dumpingll05• The Court of Justice seems to approve the European 
anti-dumping authorities' case law in this respect, as it considered the fact that the dornestic 
market prices of the selected reference country were lower than those of an alternative reference 
country, to prove or, at least, to sustaio the appropriateness and the reasonableness of the choice 
The comparative advantage must originate in the normal functioning of the market. Therefore, if the comparative advantage, e.g., 
low input prices, is caused by governmental price controls, it will be an element for not selecting the ME country in question as 
reference country, see : Commission Decision 831248/EEC of 24 May 1983 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of palyethylene originating in the Soviet Union, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 May 1983, NoL 138/65. 
603 In several anti-dumping cases raferenee was made to the scale of production in absolute terms ; a comparison between the 
scale of production in the reference country and the scale of production in the NME country concerned was not made. The 
reference made to the absolute instead of the relativa size of the production scale may indicate that economies of scale are taken 
into account as a favourable element in selecting the reference country : ü economies of scale are pasitive, a large scale of 
production is in the favour of the NME country for the combination of pasitive economies of scale and a large production scale leads 
to a more efticient production. See : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 impasing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, No L 297/12; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the 
United Statea of America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, No L 23/19 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, No 
L 31123); Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 22 February 1980, No L 48/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 724/82 of 30 
March 1982 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of 
more than 0.76 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, 
Romania and the USSR, and terminating the proceeding in respect of imparts of said products originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 
March 1982, NoL 8619; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Soviet 
Union, O.J., 6 October 1982, NoL 28319; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 impasing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of natura! magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 
December 1982, NoL 371121; Commission Regulation (EEC)-No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 impasing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of natura! magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, 
O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371125; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of hexamethylenetetramine originating in the German Democratie Republic and the Soviet Union, and 
accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of hexamethylenetetramine originating in 
Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, No L 40/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one Japanase exporter and terminating the 
proceeding in respect of imports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic 
Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, NoL 160/18; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/86 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of roller ebains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 
August 1986, No L 217n ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2512/87 of 18 August 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 20 
August 1987, NoL 235/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 1987, NoL 259n). 
604 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisionalanti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio seamless 
pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and tenninating the anti-
dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of 
Boania-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15. 
605 This will be the case if the notion 4(efficiency» refers to the ability to produce at lower costa. In European anti-dumping case law, though, the 
inefticiency of the producer in the reference country was held oot to be relevant because, in the absence of profitable sales, nonnat value would be 
con.stnacted on the basis of bis production cost, plus an amount for general expenses and a reasonable profit margin (Council Regulation (EC) No 
2674/94 of 31 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof furazolidone originating in the People's Republic of China and 
collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 4 November 1994, No L 285/1). Clearly,- if that producer was actually inefficient, the 
very use of bis production costs would have caused more a problem than the use of bis (unprofitable) dornestic market prices. 
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of the reference country606• It likewise did not accept the appropriateness and the 
reasonableness of the selection of the reference country, when there were reasans to believe that 
the chosen reference country had a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis the allegedly dumping 
NME country607• Criteria such as the lowest dornestic market price and comparative 
advantages, though, are not a basis for an appropriate and reasonable selection of the reference 
country. For NME countries often will not be found dumping merely because they are less 
efficient than the selected reference country, whereas other NME countries may be found dumping 
merely because of their high efficiency. From a legal point of view, it might be argued that the 
dumping practices of the NME countries themselves should be investigated and that NME 
countries should not be punished for being more efficient. 
2.3.4. Selection of the normal value standartfl08 
Under EC anti-dumping law, the European anti-dumping authorities are entirely free in choosing 
between the various normal value standards. Under ECSC anti-dumping law, though, the normal 
value standard must be selected in an appropriate and not unreasonable manner (Article 2(5) basic 
ECSC Decision). In view of the vague notions «appropriate» and «not unreasonable>>, the ECSC 
anti-dumping authorities seem to enjoy a wide margin of discretion. They seem to be able to 
choose freely either the dornestic market price, the export price or the constructed value as normal 
value standard. However, the Court of Justice has held that the dornestic market price prevailing 
in the reference country must be taken in the first instance, since the constructed value is only a 
substitute to which recourse must be had when it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to 
use the dornestic market price609• 
606 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexpo11 GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945), 3002. Sec alao: CJ.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzolloml Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5207, 
wherc tbe Court of Justicc considcrcd tbc choicc of tbc rcfcrcncc country as not bcing appropriatc and rcasonable bccause its dornestic market 
priccs werc higher tban tbc priccs charged by tbe Conununity producers. 
607 C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen NöUe v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5206. 
608 Witb tbc cxccption of basic prices and normal value on tbe basis of the facts availablc. 
609 C.J.E.C., joined cases 294/86 and 77/87, 5 October 1988, Technointorg v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6113-6114; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-320/86 and C-188/87, 11 July 1990, Stanlco France v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3013), 3014. Sec 
also : C.J.E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sennes v Directeur des services des douanes de Slrasbourg, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3027), 3051. 
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European anti-dumping case law is in conformity with the Court's judgements, as it reveals a 
clear preferenee for the dornestic market price610, which may result in the choice of another 
reference country if the initially proposed country bas no «representative prices»611 . European 
anti-dumping case law does not define the concept «representative prices», though, in several 
61° Council Regulation (EC) No 721194 of 29 March.1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on isobutanol originating in the 
Russian Federation, O.J., 31 March 1994, No L 87/3; BUHART, J., c<Le régime communautaire de l'antidumping: vingt ans 
d'expérienee•, Reuue TrimestrielJe de Droit Européen, 1988, (253), 264 ; BRIET, L.A.E., ccA.ntidumping in de EEG - De 
)tinderschoenen ontgroeid?», S.E. W., 1982, (145), 149; DENTON, R., ccThe Non-Market Eco~omy Rules of the European 
Comm.unity's Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Legislationn, International and Comparatwe Law Quarterly, 1987, (198), 
212 ; DIDIER, P., .dleux années d'application du nouveau règlement de la CEEn, Cahier• de Droit Européen, 1982, (21), 33 ; FINE, 
F L., ccEEC Antidumping : The Problem of lmports from State-Trading Countriea», Law and Policy in International Business, 1988, 
(91), 102 ; GIJSLTRA, D.J., «Anti-Dumping Policy of the EEC in Practicen, in ProtectioniBm cmd the Europecm Community. Import 
Relief MeCJllureB taJcen by the European Economie Community and the Member States, and the Legal Remedies Auailable to Prwate 
Parties, VÖLKER, EL.M. (ed.), Deventer, Kluwer, 1983, (147), 158; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law cmd Practice in the 
Uniled State• and tM European Communitie•. A Comparatiue Analy•ÏB, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 437. 
611 Commission Decision 811247/EEC of 15 April 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure coneerDing imports of hermetic 
. compressors oii.ginating in Brazil, Spain, Hungary, Japan and Singapore, O.J., 25 April 1981, No L 113/53. See also : Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a· definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate 
originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114, where the choice 
of the raferenee country was inter alia supported by the fact that sales on the dornestic market of the raferenee country were big 
enough to be used as raferenee basis. lndeed, tbe producers of tbe raferenee country sold virtually tbeir entire output on tbeir 
dornestic market. 
The same idea underlies tbe rejection of tbe proposed raferenee country because of tbe limited number of competitors and tbe 
proteetion of tbat country's dornestic market by high import duties, as well as tbe acceptance of tbe proposed raferenee country 
because a sufficient number of competitors is present on tbat country's dornestic market to ensure a the existence of a competitive 
market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/12). lndeed, wben tbere is sufficient competition 
on tbe raferenee country's dornestic market, its dornestic market prices will be applied as normal value standard and will, tbus, be 
representative (infra, 227-228). 
Similarly, a suggested raferenee country bas been rejected because its dornestic priee oftbe main raw material for tbe production of 
tbe dumped product was governed by official regulations as aresult of whicb the coat priee of that raw material was significantly 
lower tban tbe price of substitute raw materials on whicb tbe European producers and tbe dumping exporters relled (Commission 
Decision 831248/EEC of 24 May 1983 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion witb the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
imports of polyethylene originating in tbe Boviet Union, the German Demoeratic Republic, Czecboslovakia and Poland and 
terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 May 1983, No L 138/65). Probably, because of tbe effect of tbose low prices of tbe raw 
material on tbe prices of tbe dumped product, tbe dornestic market prices of tbe suggested raferenee country were considered not to 
be representative. 
In explaining its choice of raferenee country, the Commission bas also ad vaneed tbe fact that for botb proposed reference countries 
tbe constructed value had to be used (Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 Marcb 1990 terminating tbe anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing import& of ammonium paratungstate originating in tbe People's Republic of China and tbe Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 
March 1990, NoL 831117). 
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cases, the dornestic market price bas been used because it was «representative>>612. Whereas 
dornestic market prices have been retained as normal value standard because they were made in 
the ordinary course of trade613 , the notion «representativenesS» probably also refers to sales 
made in the ordinary course of trade. Indeed, all the aspects of the concept «ordinary course of 
trade» have been relled upon, regarding the choice of the normal value standard : 
dornestic market prices are used, if the quantity sold on the dornestic market of the reference country is 
representative or represents the major part of the quantity producecf14• As for ME countries, the 5 % 
612 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 451180 of 22 February 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of 
sûmdardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in the 
USSR, O.J., 27 February 1980, NoL 53/15; Commission Decision 80/252/EEC of 22 February 1980 accepting undertakings given 
by exporters in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning i.mports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW 
but notmore than 75 kW, originating in those countries, and terminating the procedure in respect of them, O.J., 27 February 
1980, No L 53121 ; Commission Decision 80/410/EEC of 10 April 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceedings concermng certain filament lamps for lighting exceeding 28 volts, originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 15 April 1980, No L 97/59; Commission 
Decision 80/462/EEC of 29 April 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning 
certain car tyres originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania and Yugoslavia and terminating those 
proceedings, O.J., 1 May 1980, No L 113f70; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1560/80 of 20 June 1980 concerning the definitive 
collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty i.mposed on imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors ha ving an output of 
more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153/45 i Commission Decision 
80/599/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but notmore than 75 kW, originating in the 
USSR and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153/48; Commission Decision 80/875/EEC of 17 September 1980 
accepting undertakings given by Romanian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning i.mports of certain 
tubes of iron or steel originating in that country, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 20 September 1980, No L 249/24 
(corrigendum, O.J., 7 October 1980, No L 263/8) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 724182 of 30 March 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but 
notmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, 
and terminating the proceeding in respect of importsof said products originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, No L 85/9; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2568/82 of 17 September 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of polyvinyl 
chloride resins and compound& originating in Czechoslovakia, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of imparts of such products originating in Romania, the German Demoeratic Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 September 
1982, No L 274115. 
613 Council Regulation (EC) No 721194 of 29 March 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on isobutanol originating in the Russian 
Federation, O.J., 31 March 1994, NoL 87/3. 
614 In certain angles, sh.apes and sections of iron or steel originating in Romania (Commission Decision 84/182/EEC of 23 March 
1984 accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with an anti-dumping proceeding concerning i.mports of certain iron or steel 
angles, shapes and sections originating in Romania, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 March 1984, No L 83/9) and in 
certain an.gles, sh.apes and sections of iron or steel originating in the German Democratie Republic (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron or 
steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April 1984, No L 109/11) it was underscored that substantial 
quantities had been sold in the ordinary course of trade. 
In potCJBsium perman.ganate from Czechoslovakia it was noted that the sales on the market of the reference country were made to 
independent customers, at a comparable level of trade to export sales, at a profit and in substantial quantities (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 385/90 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating 
in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those i.mports, O.J., 16 February 1990, 
NoL 42/1). 
In seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy stee~ from Hungary, Polan.d an.d the Republic of Croatia, calcium metal from the 
People's Republic of China and Ruasia and urea ammonium nitrate salution from Bulgaria, sales activities on the dornestic market 
of the raferenee country were said to be representative in relation to the exports concerned (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 
of 14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and definitively collecting provisional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 15 
May 1993, No L 120/34; Commission Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April1994, NoL 10415; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating 
in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16). 
-· 
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threshold is used : if the transactions. on the reference country's dornestic market attain at least 5 % of the 
allegedly dumped exports, the dornestic market price will he used615• Conversely, if the quantity sold on the 
dornestic market does not attain 5 % of the quantity exported to the Community, the constructed value will he 
used616. 
In fluorspar from the People's Republic of China it was noted that the sales were made in the ordinary course of trade for 
consumption in the domestic market of the raferenee country and that they were made to unrelated companies on a regular basis in 
bulk quantities (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3). 
See also : Commission Decision 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceedings concerning imparts of fibre building board originating in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, 
the Boviet Union and Sweden and determining those proceedings, O.J., 11 June 1980, NoL 145/39; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2568/82 of 17 September 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of polyvinylchloride resine and compounds 
originating in Czechoslovakia, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of imparts of such products 
originating in Romania, the German Democratie Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 September 1982, No L 274/15; Commission 
Decision 84/182/EEC of 23 March 1984 accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with an anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of certain iron or steel angles, shapes and sections originating in Romania, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 
March 1984, No L 8319 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imparts of certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April 1984, 
NoL 109/11; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings affered by ltalmagnesio BA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-lmport of 
the USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, No L 219124 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 23 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Buigaria or the Boviet Union, O.J., 27 January 1989, No L 2311; . 
Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coilcerning imparts of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings affered in conneetion with the 
proceeding concerning import& of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, NoL 104/14; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively 
the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 721194 of 29 March 1994 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 31 March 1994, No L 87/3; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of silicon carbide, 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94121. 
615 C.J.E.C., joir1ed cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexpo11 GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945), 3001; C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollaml Bremen-Freihajen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5205. 
616 Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imparts of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding imparts of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 287/25; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 of 23 July 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 4 August 1987, No 
L 21316 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imparts of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 27Gn ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 October Ü~91 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional 
duty, O.J., 24 October 1991, NoL 29312; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1808/92 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imparts offerra-silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, NoL 183/8. 
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Dornestic market prices are used if all sales or a substantial part of them are made to unrelated buyers617• 
Conversely, the constructed value will also be used if the majority of the sales take place between related 
companies618. 
If the major part of the production is exported, the export price will be uJ19• The export price will also be 
used when the volume of sales on the dornestic market of the reference country is too small to he representative 
and the reference country's dornestic market and export market constitute one single highly competitive 
market620 ; 
617 Council Regulation (EEC) No 385/90 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof potassium permanganate 
originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 16 February 1990, No 
L 4211 ; Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar 
originating in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 
impoaing a defanitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon camide, originating in thc Pcople'a Republic of China, Poland, the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94/21. 
618 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of deadburned 
(sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/23. 
619 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 871/82 of 14 April 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on upright pianos 
originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 April 1982, No L 101/30 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 April 1982, No L 115/22); Council Decision 
82/220/EEC of 14 April 1982 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding in respect of i.mports of upright pianos originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland, O.J., 16 April1982, NoL 101145; Commission Decision 84/129/EEC 
of 6 March 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of caustic-burned natura! magnesite originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 March 1984, NoL 66/32 i Commission Decision 84/406/EEC of 10 August 1984 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of horticultural glass and certain drawn 
glass originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating 
that proceeding, O.J., 21 August 1984, No L 224126. 
On the other hand, the export price was not used in : 
620 
polyvinyl ch.lorick reains and compound. from Czechoilovakia and Romania because the major part of the production had been 
distributed on the dornestic market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2568/82 of 17 September 1982 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of polyvinyl chloride resine and compounds originating in Czechoslovakia, and accepting 
undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of such products originating in Romania, the German 
Demoeratic Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 September 1982, NoL 274/15) i 
woven polyolefin bag• from the People's Republic of China because the bags exported proved to be of little significanee 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of woven 
polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., · 20 
September 1990, No L 256/38)) ; 
espadrille• from the People's Republic of China because the exports to third countries were negligible compared to total 
production (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798/90 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, NoL 365125). 
Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 1031192 of 23 April .1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium chloride 
(potash) originating in Bclarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 28 April 1992, No L 110/5. 
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dornestic market prices are used if they bear a proper proportion to production costs621 and if the profits 
621 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, No L 297112; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 
February 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 22 
February 1980, NoL 4811; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Boviet 
Union, O.J., 6 October 1982, No L 28319; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importsof hexamethylenetetramine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Boviet Union, 
and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of hezamethylenetetramine originating in 
Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, No L 40/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the 
German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 April 1983, No L 110/11; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain glass textile · fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one Japanese exporter and terminating the 
proceeding in respect of imports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic 
Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, No L 160/18; Commission Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imports of certain pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic 
of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, NoL 196/22; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 191/80 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United States of America and 
the Soviet Union, O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 294/3; Commission Decision 831522/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of lithium hydroxide originating in the 
People's Republic of China and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, NoL 294/29; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3578/83 of 15 December 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of choline chloride originating in the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 20 December 1983, NoL 356/12; Commission Decision 84/182/EEC of 23 March 
1984 accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with an anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain iron or steel 
angles, shapes and sections originating in Romania, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 March 1984, No L 83/9 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain angles, 
shapes and sections, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April 1984, No L 109/11; 
Commission Decision.84/408/EEC of 16 August 1984 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review 
proceeding e<mcerning imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 August 
1984, No L 225/22 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2553184 of 4 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, accepting an undertaking offered by the exporter in the German Demoeratic Republic of 
oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding regarding importsof oxalic acid from the German Demoeratic Republic and Spain, O.J., 
7 September 1984, NoL 239/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2908/84 of 15 October 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of copper aulphate originating in Poland, accepting undertakings given by the Bulgarian and Hungarian exporters 
of copper sulphate, terminating the investigation regarding exports of copper sulphate from Buigaria and Hungary and terminating 
the proceeding regarding those from Spain, O.J., 18 October 1984, NoL 275/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2495/86 of 1 
August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, NoL 217/12; Council Decision 86/468/EEC 
of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain 
acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No 
L 272/29; Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof paint, distemper, varnishand similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, NoL 46/45; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April1987 terminating 
the anti-d11mping proceeding on imparts of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the German Democratie Republic, Romania, 
Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, NoL 103138; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in C~choslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and accepting 
undertakings offered by ltalmagnesio SA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-lmport of the USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, NoL 219/24; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof synthetic fibres 
of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No 
L 151147.; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, No L 235/5; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, 
No L 348/49 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, 
distemper, varnishand similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-
dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, NoL 79/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 
1989, No L 294110; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or 
non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic·of 
~~~.~~--~~~--~---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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realized are reasonable, though not excessive622• Conversely, the constructed value is applied if sales on the 
dornestic market of the reference country are made at a loss623 and if the production costs are in the ordinary 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2720193 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian 
Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/12; Commission Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceed.ing coneerDing import& of gum rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41150; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of furfuraldehyde 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186111 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2819194 of 17 
November 1994 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate orginating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, NoL 298/32. 
622 Commission Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing imports of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the 
investigation, O;J., 23 September 1986, NoL 271126; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1198/88 of 25 April1988 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of roller chains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China and providing for the 
definitive colleetion of the provisional anti-dumping duty on the said imports, O.J., 3 May 1988, NoL 115/1; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1531188 of 31 May 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof potassium permanganate originating in 
the People's Republic of China and definitively colleeting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 3 June 
1988, No L 138/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of paracetamol originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, No L 155/29 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
707/89 of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating in the People's 
Republic of China or the Boviet Union, O.J., 21 March 1989, NoL 78/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and simHar brushes orginating in the People's 
Republic of China and definitively colleeting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, NoL 79/24; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium 
carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 18 September 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China and the Boviet Union and definitively colleeting the provisional anti-dumping duty 
imposed on such imports, O.J., 20 September 1989, No L 27111 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 385/90 of 12 February 1990 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively colle_eting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 16 February 1990, NoL 42/1; Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 
10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating 
in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the proceeding concerning imports of 
methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, No 
L 104/14; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537/90 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 14519; Commission Regulation (EC) No 892194 of 21 
April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China 
and Russia, O.J., 23 April 1994, No L 10415. · · 
See also : video tapes in cassettes from th.e People's Republic of China, where the domestic market price allowing a ccconsiderable 
profit margin• was used (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3091/91 of 21 October 1991 impo~ing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively colleeting the provisional duty, 
O.J., 24 October 1991, No L 29312). 
623 Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing imports of perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statea of 
America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371147; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1479/83 of 7 
June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, 
O.J., 9 June 1983, NoL 151124; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of cathocles produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, 
originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No L 159/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by 
electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, No L 286/29; Commission 
Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing importsof artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 
23 September 1986, No L 271126; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of mercury originating in the Union of Boviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, No L 227/8; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores 
and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports originating in 
HongKong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/23; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary 
anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No 
L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/38); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3308/90 of 15 November 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyolefin sacks originating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitively colleeting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 17 November 1990, No L 31812 ; Commission 
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course of trade624• If the . production costs, on the basis of which the constructed value bas to be calculated, 
are not in the ordinary course of trade625 and, if profits are not reasonable626 , they may he adjusted up to 
that level. Moreover, export prices to third countries are rejected when the European anti-dumping authorities 
Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ferro-silicon originating 
in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, NoL 237/2; Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 
April1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof ammonium nitrate 
originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan, 0 . .1., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties 
on importsof urea ammonium nitrate salution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1648194 of 6 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of furazolidone originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, NoL 174/4. 
624 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of deadbumed 
(sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/23; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 
3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dead-bumed (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, NoL 306/16. 
625 If the prices of tbc inputs which the producers in the reference country import from the NME country subject to the anti-dumping proceeding, 
are considered as bcing too low, they will be adjusted (Conunission Regulation (EEC) No 2054/91 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importa of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, No L 187/23; Council 
Regu1ation (EEC).No 3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof dihydrostreptomycin originating in the 
People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1). 
Compare with the problem of input dumping in respect of ME countries, in respect of which input dumping is not sanctioned (supra, 167-169). 
This difference is perhaps due to the fact that the input dumping was practised by the NME country subject to the anti-dumping proceeding. 
Temporary and exceptional coats· incurred during the start-up phase of the producer in the reference country will be deducted from the dornestic 
market price (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1031/92 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium 
chloride (potssh) originating in Belarus, Russia or Uk.raine, O.J., 28 April 1992, No L 110/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 of 23 
October 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 24 October 
1992, No L 308/41). The same holds in respect of exceptional costs resulting from a change of ownership of the company established in the 
reference country (Council Regulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-
dumping duties on importa ofpotaasium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1). 
In magnesium oxide jrom the People 's Repuh/ie of China and dead-bumed (sintered) magnesia from the People 's Republic of China, an adjustment 
was made «to reileet the higher cost of the fuel oil• used by the producer established in the reference country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on impmts of 
dead-bumed (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, NoL 306/16). lt was notmade clear 
whether those higher costs were considered not to have been incurred in the ordinary course of trade. However, this should be the case. 
Otherwise, this adjustment would imply that account is being taken of the production costa in a NME country, but this would go against European 
anti-dumping case law which consistenly rejects to take account of NME production costs (sec :supra, 61-64). 
626 When the ME producer has a monopoly position on bis dornestic market, his profits may be considered exceptional and, therefore, it may he 
appropriate to apply a lower profit margin (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2054/91 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187/23; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of 
China and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1). 
Compare with the intcrpretation of reasonableness in respect of the profit margin for producen established in ME countries (supra, 176-180). 
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are not given the guarantee that these are not dumping prices627• Conversely, if it is established that the 
export prices to third countries are not being dumped, they may he used as normal value standarcf28 • 
A sufficient degree of competition629, either between dornestic producers630 or between dornestic producers 
627 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2568/82 of 17 September 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
polyvinyl chloride reains and compound& originating in Czechoslovakia, and accepting undertakings and terminating the 
proceeding in respect of importsof such product& originating in Romania, the German Demoeratic Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 
September 1982, No L 274/16 ; Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concernirig 
imports of codeïne and its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No 
L 16/30 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2908/84 of 16 October 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
copper sulphate originating in Poland, accepting undertakings given by the Bulgarian and Hungarian exporters of copper sulphate, 
terminating the investigation regarding exports of copper sulphate from Buigaria and Hungary and terminating the proceeding 
regarding those from Spain, O.J., 18 October 1984, No L 275/12 ; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting 
~dertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning import& of oxalic acid originating in China or 
Czechoslovakia .and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, NoL 343134; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 
May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in 
Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133120. 
628 Commission Deciaion 80/600/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakinga affered by thc ~ineac and Czechoslovak exporters in conneetion 
with tbc anti-dumping procccdiDg concerning importa of mechanica) alann clocka (other than travel alarms) originating in China, Czechoslovakia, 
the Oerman Demoeratic Rcpublic, Hong Kong and the USSR, terminating the procceding in respect of China, Czechoslovakia and Hong Kong, and 
withdrawing acceptancc of undcrtakings prcvioualy accepted by the United Kingdom Oovcrnmenl from the exporters in the Oerman Democratie 
Republic, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 158/18. 
629 C.J.E.C., case C-16190, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Frei.hafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 6207; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 724/82 of 30 March 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized 
multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Cze-
choslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating the proceeding in respect of 
importsof said product& originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, NoL 85/9; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2568/82 of 17 
September 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyvinyl chloride resins and compounds originating in 
Czechoslovakia, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of imparts of such products originating in 
Romania, the German Demoeratic Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 September 1982, No L 274115; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1198/88 of 26 April 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of roller chains for cycles originating in the People's 
Republic of China and providing for the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty on the said imports, O.J., 3 May 
1988, No L 116/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 721/94 of 29 March 
1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on isobutanol originating in the RUBBian Federation, O.J., 31 March 1994, NoL 87/3. 
63° C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11. July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 3001-3002; C.J.E.C., joined cases C-320/86 and C-188/87, 11 July 1990, Stan.ko France v Commission and 
Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3013), 3014; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 impasing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof hexamethylenetetramine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Soviet Union, and 
accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of hexamethylenetetramine originating in 
Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, No L 40/24 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 
impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of eertaio glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one Japanese exporter and terminating the 
proceeding in respect of imparts of eertaio glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic 
Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, No L 160/18; Commission Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imports of certain pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic 
of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, NoL 196122; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 191/80 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and 
the Soviet Union, O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 29413 ; Commission Decision 83/622/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of lithium hydroxide originating in the 
People's Republic of China and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, NoL 294/29; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3578/83 of 15 December 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of choline chloride originating in the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 20 December 1983, NoL 356/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2908/84 of 15 
October 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Poland, accepting 
undertakings given by the Bulgarian and Hungarian exporters of copper sulphate, terminating the investigation regarding exports 
of copper sulphate from Buigaria and Hungary and terminating the proceeding regarding those from Spain, O.J., 18 October 1984, 
No L 276/12; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272/29 ; Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting 
an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of paint, distemper, varnishand simHar 
----- --~~----- ---
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and imports631 , or the exercise of gaverrunental price controls632 are mentioned as a guarantee of such 
brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, No L 46/45; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings offered by Italmagnesio SA of BraziJ and from Promsyrio-lmport of the USSR, 
O.J., 8 August 1987, No L 219/24. 
631 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 451/80 of 22 February 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in the 
USSR, O.J., 27 February 1980, NoL 63116; Commission Decision 80/252/EEC of 22 February 1980 accepting undertakings given 
by exporters in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW 
but notmore than 75 kW, originating in those countries, and terminating the procedure in respect of them, O.J., 27 February 
1980, No L 63121; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1560/80 of 20 June 1980 concerning the definitive collection of the provisional 
anti-dumping duty imposed on importsof standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not 
more than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153145; Commission Decision 80/599/EEC of 19 June 1980 
accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of standardized electric multi-phase 
motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in the USSR and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1980, No L 163148; Commission Decision 80/875/EEC of 17 September 1980 accepting undertakings 
given by Romanian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain tubes of iron or steel 
originating in that country, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 20 September 1980, NoL 249/24 (corrigendum, O.J., 7 October 
1980, No L 26318) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 April 1983, No 
L 110/11 ; Commission Decision 831248/EEC of 24 May 1983 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene originating in the Soviet Union, the German Demoeratic Republic, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 May 1983, No L 138/66; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2495/86 of 1 
August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, NoL 217/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof standardized multi-phase electric motors 
having an output of more than 0,76 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1631/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in the People's 
Republic of China and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 3 June 1988, No 
L 138/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
paracetamol originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, No L 155/29; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, 
Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 
1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 131/4; Council Regulation (EEC) No 385/90 of 12 February 
1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and 
defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 16 February 1990, No L 42/1 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No-1537/90 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium 
permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9; Commission Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, 
O.J., 23 April 1994, No L 10415; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating 
the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekiatan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24; 
Commission Decision 941389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refined antimony 
trioxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 
November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports -of potassium permanganate orginating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32. 
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proper proportion between dornestic market prices and production costs633 • Wben the dornestic · market is not 
632 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, No L 297112; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 
February 1980 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 22 
February 1980, No L 4811 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 451/80 of 22 February 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, 
originating in the USSR, O.J., 27 February 1980, No L 53115; Commission Decision 801252/EEC of 22 February 1980 accepting 
undertakinga given by exporters in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of 
more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in those countries, and terminating the procedure in respect of them, 
O.J., 27 February 1980, NoL 53121; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1560/80 of 20 June 1980 concerning the definitive collection of 
the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 
0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153/45; Commission Decision 80/599/EEC of 
19 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of standardized electric 
multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 k.W, originating in the USSR and terminating 
that proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153148; Commission Decision 80/875/EEC of 17 September 1980 accepting undertakings 
given by Romanian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain tubes of iron or steel 
originating in that country, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 20 September 1980, NoL 249/24 (corrigendum, O.J., 7 October 
1980, No L 26318); Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Po land, Romania · and the Boviet 
Union, O.J., 6 October 1982, NoL 28319; Commission Decision 84/182/EEC of 23 March 1984 accepting an undertaking offered in 
conneetion with an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain iron or steel angles, shapes and sections originating in 
Romania, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 March 1984, NoL 8319; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 
1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, originating in the 
German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April 1984, No L 109/11. 
Contra, : potCJBsium permangan.ate from the USSR, where the absence of a governmental price control was put forward for 
motivating the use of the dornestic market price (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537/90 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports ofpotassium permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9). 
633 In many anti-dumping cases it was pointed out that governmental price controle together with substantial imports and, thus, 
a certain degree of competition, guaranteed a reasonable pricing level (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 451/80 of 22 February 
1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more 
than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 27 February 1980, No L 53115; Commission Decision 
80/252/EEC of 22 February 1980 accepting undertakings given by exporters in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of standardized 
electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in those countries, and 
terminating the procedure. in respect of them, O.J., 27 February 1980, No L 53121 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1560/80 of 20 
June 1980 concerning the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of standardized electric 
multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but notmore than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 21 June 
1980, NoL 153145; Commission Decision 80/599/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore 
than 75 k.W, originating in the USSR and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153148; Commission Decision 
80/875/EEC of 17 September 1980 accepting undertakings given by Romanian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof certain tubes of iron or steel originating in that country, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 
20 September 1980, NoL 249/24 (corrigendum, O.J., 7 October 1980, NoL 26318)). 
Referring to governmental price controle may seem quite peculiar : normal value can not be determined on the basis of the NME 
country itself, because the interference of the government in economie live is contrary to the concept ccordinary course of traden, 
whereas in selecting the normal value standard in the reference country governmental price controle are a reason to use the 
dornestic market price. 
It may be deduced from European anti-dumping case law that price controle are considered as a device to guarantee a proper 
proportion between prices and production coats if a sufficient degree of competition is lacking. lndeed, in potCJBsium permangan.ate 
from Czech.oilouakia, the Germcm Democro.tic Republic cmd the People's Republic of China" the absence of price controle was one of 
the raasons for using the dornestic market price ofthe raferenee country. In this anti-dumping case the use ofthe dornestic market 
price was motivated by the existence of a sufficient degree of competition between the dornestic monopolist and imports 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2495/86 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof potassium 
permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 6 August 
1986, No L 217/12). On the other hand, in certo.in angles, shapes and sections of iron or ateel originating in Romanio. and in certo.in 
angles, shape• and aectioru of iron or •teel originating in the Germcm Democro.tic Republic, the exercise of governmental price 
controle in the reference country did not prevent dornestic market prices from being applied, though the dornestic producer had 
made an important part of selling transactions iil the ordinary course of trade ( Commission Decision 84/182/EEC of 23 March 1984 
accepting an undertak.ing offered in conneetion with an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain iron or steel angles, 
shapes and sections originating in Romania, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 March 1984, No L 83/9; Commission 
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proteeled against imports, dornestic production is faced with stiffened international com~etition634 • When 
there is no sufficient degree of competition635 or a high degree of market protection6 6, the constructed 
value replaces the dornestic market price. 
Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain angles, shapes and 
sections, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April1984, NoL 109/Ü). The fact that in these 
two anti-dumping cases just one domestic producer is mentionned, which implies that there is a monopoly on the domestic mar ket, 
can reconcile these two cases with the case concerning potassium permangtJ114te from Czechoslouakia, the German. Democratie 
Republic an.d th.e People's Republic of China. 
It, thus, seems that the nature of governmental price controle is taken into consideration whether or not such controle reflects 
competitive conditions (VERMULST, EA., Antidumping Law and Practice in th.e Uniled States an.d the European. Communities. A 
Comparatwe All4lysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 436; VERMULST, EA., and GRAAFSMA, F., ccA. Decade of Europaan 
Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to lmports from China., Journ.al of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 19). 
634 Commission Decision 831248/EEC of 24 May 1983 accepting undertakings oft'ered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning i.mports of polyethylene originating in the Soviet Union, the German Demoeratic Republic, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 May 1983, NoL 138/65; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 
1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Commission 
Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings oft'ered in conneetion with the 
proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Romania, O.J., 24 April1990, NoL 104114. 
635 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 171182 of 25 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof oxalic 
acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19/26 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No 
L 34/11) ; Commission Decision 841465/EEC of 26 September 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of asbestos-cement corrugated sheets originating in Czechoslovakia and the German 
Demoeratic Republic and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 28 September 1984, NoL 259/48; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2054191 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, No L 187/23; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3433/91 of 25 November 1991 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 
November 1991, No L 326/1. 
See illso : gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters from the People's Republic of China, where it was pointed out that the use of 
the constructed value eliminated the risk of oomparing Chinese export prices with prices, the high level of which might be due to 
there being monopolies in the reference country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of 
China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133120). 
636 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 171182 of 25 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic 
acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January· 1982, No L 19/26 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No 
L 34/11) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181119; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1825/84 of 28 June 1984 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of hardboard originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 29 June 1984, No L 170/68 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of espadrilles originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 365/25 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 
1992, No L 282123. 
See also : ga.-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters from the People's Republic of China, where it was noted that the use of the 
constructed value eliminated the risk of oomparing Chinese export prices with prices which might be high because of the existence 
of import duties in the reference country (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133/20). 
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However, there are some deviations which do not equate the notion «comparable sales made in the 
ordinary course of trade» with the notion of an appropriate and not unreasonable normal value 
standard. Indeed, the European anti-dumping authorities have considered the dornestic market 
price to be relevant, even when no comparable dornestic sales were made in the ordinary course 
of trade : 
the small or medium size of the dornestic market does not preclude the use of the dornestic market price if prices 
bear a ~roper proportion to production costs637 or if there are sufficient dornestic competition and 
imports63 ; 
the dornestic market price is still used if the absence of dornestic competition (there being a dornestic monopoly 
with large scale production) is counterbalsneed by prices hearing a proper proportion to production costs639 ; 
even the fact that the market of the reference country is protected, does not exclude the use of the dornestic 
market price, if it is established that all dornestic markets are being protected640• 
On the other hand, even if comparable sales are made in the ordinary course of trade, dornestic 
market prices will not necessarily be used : 
the constructed value bas been used merely because the producer is one of the most efficient in the worl~41 ; 
637 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2512/87 of 18 August 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovak.ia and the USSR, O.J., 20 August 1987, No L 235/18 
(corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 1987, NoL 259n); Commission Decision 87/443/EEC of 30 July 1987 amending an undertak.ing 
and accepting an undertak.ing given in conneetion with the · anti-dumping review investigation concerning imports of copper 
sulphate originating in Poland and the USSR respectively, and terminating the investigation as it concerns these countries, O.J., 
20 August 1987, No L 235122. 
638 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulga-
ria, Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, No 
L 280/68. 
639 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
natural magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371/21; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natura} 
magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., 30 December 1982, No 
L 371125. 
640 Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and its 
salts originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No L 16/30. 
641 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertak.ings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, NoL 181/19; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into 
squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No L 159/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 
1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes 
produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, No L 286/29; 
Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of non-alloyed 
unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Boviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, No L 57/19; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1825/84 of 28 June 1984 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hardboard originating 
in the Boviet Union, O.J., 29 June 1984, No L 170/68. 
See also : tungsten ores and concentrales from the People'• Republic of China, where the efficiency of the producer in the raferenee 
country was an additional reason, besides the fact that sales were made at a loss, for using the constructed value (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores and 
concentratas originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing imports originating in Hong 
Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123). 
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the. constructed value bas been used because the product is not a homogenous product642 ; 
the constructed value bas been used because it was the only practical metbod todetermine normal value, in view 
of the many additional features of the product of the reference country compared to the dumped producé43• · 
It remains to be seen whether the Court of Justice will agree with those cases. The first series of 
them, implying a broadened application of the dornestic market price, might hold before the 
Court, as the Court has not held that reasonableness is fully identical to comparable sales in the 
ordinary course of trade. The second series, however, is likely to go against the Court's 
judgements which impose the use of the dornestic market price in the first in stance. However, 
European anti-dumping law does not provide such a strict preferenee for the dornestic market 
price as the Court. Under EC anti-dumping law, the European anti-dumping authorities are free 
in choosing between the different normal value standards. ECSC anti-dumping law only requires 
that normal value is determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable way and, therefore, allows 
that reasons other th~ those related to the existence of comparable sales in the ordinary course of 
trade, be taken into account insofar as they justify another normal value standard644• 
Another characteristic of European anti-dumping case law is the use of the same normal value 
standard for the NME country and the reference country if both countries are subject to the same 
anti-dumping proceeding645• According to the European anti-dumping authorities, there is no 
642 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-
watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, NoL 11114. 
643 Commission Regu1ation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisiona1 anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio photo albums 
originating in tbc People'aRcpublic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16. 
644 Supra, 192-193. 
645 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 3004; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2391n9 of 26 October 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statee of America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 31 October 1979, NoL 274126; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating 
in the United Statesof America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, NoL 23119 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, No 
L 31/23) ; Commission Decision 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceedings concerning imports of fibre building board originating in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, 
the Boviet Union and Sweden and determining those proceedings, O.J., 11 June 1980, No L 145/39; Commission Decision 
80/1116/EEC of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings ofTered by the exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China 
and the United Statesof America and terminating the proceedings concerning importsof saccharin and its salts from China, Japan 
and the United Statea of America, O.J., 9 December 1980, No L 331/41; Commission Decision 81/247/EEC of 15 April 1981 
terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning importsof hermetic compressors originating in Brazil, Spain, Hungary, Japan 
and Singapore, O.J., 25 April 1981, No L 113/53 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission 
Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre 
building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the 
proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181/19 ; Council Decision 82/423/EEC of 21 June 
1982 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain refrigerators originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 29 June 1982, No L 184123; 
· Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2127/82 of 28 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statea of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No 
L 223176 ; Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 Decembe~ 1982 accepting undertak.ings ofTered in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning importsof perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Romania, Spain and the United States 
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reason to discriminate between the NME country and the reference country646 • They consider 
of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371147 ; Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and its sal.ts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No L 16/30; Council Regulation (EEC) No 551183 of 8 March 1983 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on kraftUner paper and board originating in the United Statea of America and accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the review of the anti-dumping proceeding on kraftUner paper and board originating in 
Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the Boviet Union and Sweden, O.J., 10 March 1983, NoL 64125; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191180 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide 
originating in the United Statea of America and the Boviet Union, O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 294/3; Commission Decision 
831522/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
importsof lithium hydroxide originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, 
No L 294129 ; Commission ·Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports 
of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Boviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, 
No L 57/19; Commission Decision 84/408/EEC of 16 August 1984 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping review proceeding concerning imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 22 August 1984, NoL 225122; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2553184 of 4 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, accepting an undertaking offered by the exporter in the Oerman 
Demoeratic Republic of oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding regarding imports of oxalic acid from the German Demoeratic 
Republic and Spain, O.J., 7 September 1984, No L 239/8 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2908/84 of 15 October 1984 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Poland, accepting undertakings given by the Bulgarian 
and Hungarian exporters of copper sulphate, terminating the investigation regarding exports of copper sulphate from Buigaria and 
Hungary and terminating the proceeding regarding those from Spain, O.J., 18 October 1984, NoL 275/12; Commission Decision 
85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain boots with fitted ice 
, skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, No L 52/48; Commission 
Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports into Greece of certain categoriesof glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51173 ; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 
July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Portland cement originating in the Oerman Democratie 
RepubUc,. Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43; Coln.mission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 
.imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings 
in conneetion with the investigation of imports of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the Oerman Demoeratic 
Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 
September. 1986, No L 259/14; Council Decision 861468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in Israel, Mexico, Romania and Turkey 
and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272/29; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof silicon carbide originating in 
the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that 
product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 
1986, NoL 287125; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Oerman Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the 
amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA 
and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5; Commission Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakings 
offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia or 
Romania, confirming the undertakings accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the 
investigations, O.J., 24 February 1989, No L 52/37; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No 
L 294/10 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-
silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, No 
L 302/1; Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-
manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15. 
646 Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and its 
salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16/30. 
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it equitable647 as well as appropriate and oot unreasonable648 to use the same standard. 
However, exceptions mayalso be found in European anti-dumping case law : 
In synthetic polyester fibres from the Gennan Demoeratic Republic, Romania and Turkey649 and in urea from the · 
Gennan Demoeratic Republic, Saudi-Arabia, the Soviet Union and Chzechoslovakia650 , the normal value standard 
of the reference country was determined on the basis of the dornestic market prices charged to independent customers, 
whereas the normal value standard of the NME country was established by referring to the dornestic market prices as 
such of the reference country. Because the price to independent customers is considered to represent the dornestic 
market price (Article 2(1)(b) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision) in conneetion with ME 
oountries, this lack of nuance can be seen as an oblivion. Another explanation might be that the sales to associated 
buyers have been left aside. lndeed, not all dornestic sales of the reference country must be taken into account for 
determining the normal value of NME countries651 • This seems to be the case in canned pears from the People 's 
647 Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statee of 
America and terminating that proceeding, O . .T., 30 December 1982, NoL 371/47. 
648 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2127/82 of 28 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United States of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No 
L 223/76; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074189 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O . .T., 13 October 1989, NoL 294110. 
649 Commission Decision 871236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on importsof synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April1987, NoL 103/38. 
650 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O . .T., 9 May 1987, No L 121/11; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O . .T., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1. 
651 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 724182 of 30 March 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of import& of said products originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, NoL 85/9; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1958/82 of 16 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of photographic enlargers originating in Poland and 
the USSR, accepting an undertaking and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of photographic enlargers originating in 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 21 July 1982, No L 212/32; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one Japanase exporter and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of import& of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O . .T., 
18 June 1983, NoL 160/18; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa of atandardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O . .T., 1 
October 1986, No L 280/68; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864187 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating 
in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting 
the amounts secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 83/1; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O . .T., 15 April1987, NoL 103/38; Commission Decision 88/47/EEC of 26 January 1988 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review proceeding coneerDing imports of a herbicide 
originating in Romania, O . .T., 30 January 1988, No L 26/107 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the 
United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O . .T., 17 June 1988, NoL 151147; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of paracetamol originating in the People's Republiè of China, O . .T., 22 
June 1988, NoL 155129. 
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Republic of China and the Republic South-Africcf52 and in synthetic polyester .fibres from Romania and 
Turkey653 , where the normal value of the reference country was based on the dornestic market price, except for one 
exporter whose normal value wasbasedon the constructed value because saleshad been made at a loss; for the NME 
country, however, reference was only made to tbe dornestic market price of the reference country. Tbe sales at a loss 
had been left aside. This follows frorn the consideration in synthetic polyester jibres from Romania and Turkey that 
the dornestic market price of the reference country bad been used because of its proper proportion to production costs. 
No explanation can be found for the different treatment of the reference country and the NME country in artijicial 
corundum from the People's Republic of China, Czechoslovalda and Yugoslavitf54• White artificial corundum ha.d 
been sold at a loss in the reference country and, therefore, normal value was determined by the constructed value. 
However, normal value of white artificial corundum for the NME countries was based on tbe do mestic market price 
of the reference country. In another anti-dumping case concerning the same product but invalving other NME 
countries655 , the same reference country was used. Tbis time, bowever, the normal value of the NME countries 
was based on the dornestic market price of the reference country, except in respect of white artificial corundum for 
whicb the constructed value was used. 
In bicycles from Taiwan and the People 's Republic of Chimf56 it is impossible to find a reason explaining wby the 
dornestic market price of Taiwan was used as normal value standard for the People's Republic of China, whereas the 
constructed value was used for Taiwan. Tbe case is all the more peculiar as the constructed value was used for 
Taiwan on an illegal basis, since there were camparabie sales made in the ordinary course of trade and, in such 
circumstances, the dornestic market price must be used in respect of ME countries. On the otber band, there is no 
hierarcby between dornestic market price and constructed value in respect of NME countries. Moreover, according to 
the European anti-dumping autborities, this different treatment did not discrimiDate against tbe People's Re~ublic of 
China because the dornestic market prices of Taiwan were not higher than the constructed value65 • The 
consequent discrimination against Taiwan, thougb, seemingly did not matter, probably because Taiwan was found not 
to practise dumping658• 
652 Commission Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain 
pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, No 
L 196/22. 
653 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof syntheti~. 
fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 
1988, NoL 151/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports 
of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 
17 December 1988, No L 348/49. 
654 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
artificial corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of 
importsof artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, NoL 255/9. 
655 Commission Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 23 September 1986, NoL 271126. 
656 Conunisaion Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 58/12. 
657 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/1. 
658 Conunission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof bicycles originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; Commission Decision 93/485/EEC of 6 September 1993 tenninating the anti-
dumping proceeding conceming import& of bicyclea originating in Taiwan, O.J., 8 September 1993, No L 227/21. 
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A different treatment bas also been applied in mechanical alann clocks from China, Czechoslovalda, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Hong-Kong and the Soviet Union659• In this anti-dumping case, no dumping had been 
established in respect of the reference country by using the export price to third countries as well as the constructed 
value as normal value standard. With regard to the NME countries, the export price of the reference country to the 
Community was used as normal value standard, because this country had not been involved in dumping. As a 
consequence, the highest price possible was used as normal value standard for the NME countries. 
The anti-dumping cases concerning saccharine from China and Japan660 and hall hearings and tapered roller 
hearings from Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union661 are harder to understand. In respect of the 
reference country the dornestic market price was used. Though it had been established that · this country had been 
practising dumping, its export price was used as normal value standard for the NME countries. It is more difficult to 
grasp not only because it is a deviation of the principle of non-discrim.ination, but also because usually the export 
price of the reference country is rejected as normal value standard for NME countries, as dumping is probable or 
possible662• Wbereas in saccharine from China and Japan, any motivation is lacking, the only argument used in 
hall hearings and tapered roller hearings from Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, was the competition 
among the exports to the Community of the reference country and the NME countries. However, in polyvinylchloride 
from Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Gennan Demoeratic Repuhlic and Hungary663 , the export price of the 
reference country was not considered, because this price had possibly been influenced by the competition of low-
priced exports of other countries. 
Only in dihydrostreptomycin from the People 's Repuhlic of China, it was explained why a different normal value 
standard was used for the NME country than for the reference country. In particular, the dornestic market price was 
used for the reference country. That price was regarded as not being the right basis for the NME country. The sole 
producer of the reference country had a monopoly on bis dornestic market and could, thus, charge very high prices. 
It was found unreasonable for the NME country to have to bear the consequences of the monopoly on the dornestic 
659 Commission RegUlation (EEC) No 1579/80 of 19 June 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! alarm 
clocks originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Soviet Union, and withdrawing the national anti-dumping duty on 
mechanica! alarm clocks originating in China, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 158/5; Commission Decision 80/600/EEC of 19 June 1980 
accepting the undertakings given by Chinese and Czechoslovakian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in 
respect of import& of mechanica! alarm clocks originating in China, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Hong-Kong 
and the USSR, terminating the proceeding in conneetion with China, Czechoslovakia and Hong-Kong and withdrawing the 
undertakings accepted by the Government of the United Kongdom and given by the exporters of the German Demoeratic Republic 
and the USSR, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 158/18. 
660 
· Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3171/80 of 4 December 1980 repealing a national anti-dumping duty on saccharin and its 
salts originating in the Republic of Korea imposed under the transitional provisions ofthe Act of Acceeeion, O.J., 9 December 1980, 
No L 331/25 ; Commission Decision 80/1116/EEC of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings offered by the exporters of eaccharin 
and its salts originating in China and the United Statee of America and terminating the proceedinge concerning imports of 
saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the United Statee of America, O.J., 9 December 1980, NoL 331/41. 
661 Commission Decision 81/406/EEC of 4 June 1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of hall and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union and termina-
ting that proceeding, O.J., 11 June 1981, NoL 152/44. 
~2 Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and its 
salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16/30; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2908/84 of 15 October 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in 
Poland, accepting undertakings given by the Bulgarian and Hungarian exporters of copper sulphate, terminating the investigation 
regarding export& of copper sulphate from Buigaria and Hungary and terminating the proceeding regarding those from Spain, O.J., 
18 October 1984, NoL 275/12; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping review concerning importsof oxalic acid originating in China or Czechoslovakia and terminating the review, 
O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343/34; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provieional anti-
dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133/20. 
663 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2568/82 of 17 September 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
polyvinyl chloride reeins and compound& originating in Czechoelovakia, and accepting undertakinge and terminating the 
proceeding in respect ofimports of such product& originatingin Romania, the German Demoeratic Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 
September 1982, No L 274/15. 
237 
market of the reference country. Therefore, the constructed value was used as normal value standard for the NME 
country664. 
The discretionary power to select the normal value standard is, thus, vested in the European anti-
dumping authorities. Under ECSC anti-dumping law, they have only to prove that normal value 
is determined in an appropriate and not unreasonable manoer. In principle, normal value is 
selected with reference to the concept of «comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade» and 
the principle of non-discrimination. However, many exceptions may be found in European anti-
dumping case law, for which seldom an explicit motivation is provided. This does not enhance 
legal certainty. It is impossible to know which normal value standard will be used. Moreover, 
the «appropriate and not unreasonable» normal value standard used. in ECSC anti-dumping law is 
so vague that the dumping margin may be manipulated either for the benefit or to the detriment of 
the NME country665• 
3. EXPORT PRICE STANDARDS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 3 examines which are the export price standards and whether there is a hierarchy among 
them. It also looks into the ways of determining them. 
When applied to export price determination, «one-way flexibility» would imply that the European 
anti-dumping authorities try to determine an export price which is as low as possible. For the 
lower the export price, the more probable it would be for dumping to be found. Section 3 shows 
that «one-way flexibility» is applied, even if, therefore GA TI and European anti-dumping law 
must be violated. Moreover, for associated parties, it shows that «one-way flexibility» does not 
require any violation of GATI and European anti-dumping law, as they impose an export price 
664 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2054/91 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187/23. 
665 THARAKAN, P.K.M., and WAELBROECK, J., «Antidumping and countervailing duty decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S. An experiment 
in comparative politica! economy•, Europeon Economie Review, 1994, (171), 174-175 and 183. 
See also: MESSERLIN, P., «Anti-Dumping Regulations or Pro-Cartel Law? The EC Chemical Cases-, World Economy, 1990, (465), 479-480, 
where evidencc ia providcd that, in tbe two anti-dumping cases investigated by tbe autbor, tbe reasons given by tbe European anti-dumping 
autborities as to tbc choice of tbc normal value standard (i.e.,. the dornestic market price ia uscd because of the degree of competition on tbe 
dornestic market of the reference country), are not borne out by the facts. 
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standard for associated parties which leaves aside economie reality and will most likely result in 
too high an export price. 
In conneetion with the export price determination, no distinction is being made between ME 
countries and NME countries666• Like exports of ME countries, exports of NME countries to 
the Community are presumed to be subject to the laws of supply and demand667• There is but 
one exception : in principle, countrywide export prices for NME countries are being determined. 
Contrary to exporters established in ME countries, no individual export prices are being 
determined for companies established in a NME country, unless those companies operate 
in.dependently from the State and will continue to do so in the future668 • As companies will 
only request individual treatment when their export prices exceed those of the other companies, a 
countrywide treatment will result in lower export prices, and consequently, higher dumping 
margins for the companies requesting individual treatment669 • 
3.2. HIERARCHY 
In principle, the export price must be determined on the basis of the actual price. The actual 
export price, however, cannot be a relevant basis so that other standards have to be applied. 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law introduce a strict hierarchy of export price standards (Note 
No 1 ad Artiele Vl(1) GA TT ; Articles 2.1. and 2.3. GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 2(8) 
and (9) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8) basic ECSC Decision) : 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
the price actually paid or payable for the product sold from the exporting country to the 
Community, hereinafter called the actual export price ; 
the export price constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported product is 
first resold to an independent buyer, hereinafter called the constructed export price ; 
the export price determined on any reasonable basis ; 
666 FINE, F L., tcEEC Antidumping : The Problem of lmports from State-Trading Countriesn, Law and Policy in International 
Business, 1988, (91), 92-93. 
667 BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr von Dumping und Subventionen durch die Europäische Gemeinschaften, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1980,53. 
668 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the 
People'a Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 58/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importa into the Community of bicycles originating in the People 'a Republic of China and collecting definitively the 
provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/16. 
669 Sec e.g., in photo albums from the People 's Repubüc of China, only the exporter requesting individual treatment, cooperated during the anti-
dumping investigation. His lowest export price was used as best information available in order to establish the export price of the remaining 
Chinese exporta to the Community. Consequently, the countrywide export price was below bis individual prices, but was still applied to bis exports 
(Conullisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 · imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertsin photo albums 
originating in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16). 
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(iv) when necessary and just information is lacking, the normal value on the basis of the facts 
available (Article 6.8. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 18 basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). 
Therefore, the constructed export price must be used, if there is no actual export price, if this 
actual export price is unreliable, because of an association or a compensatory arrangement 
between the exporter and the importer or a third party (e.g., a company which performs the 
functions of an export department67~, or if the actual export price is unreliable for other 
reasons671 • The constructed export price, in its turn, must be disregarded and the export price 
must be determined on any reasonable basis, if the product is not resold to an independent buyer, 
or· if the product is not resold in the condition it was in when imported. 
3.3. ALTERNATIVE EXPORT PRICE STANDARDS 
3.3.1. Actual export price 
The actual export price is the price paid or payable for the product sold from the exporting 
country to the Community (Article 2(8) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8)(a) basic ECSC 
67° C.J.E.C., case C-156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I (781), 835-837; C.J.E.C., 
case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Jnc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1291 ; C.J.E.C., case C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita Jndustrial 
Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1301), 1332-1333; Commission Decision No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importa of ccrtain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 July 1987, No L 207/21 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC). No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio welded tubes of iron or non-
aUoy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with such import&, O.J., 15 December 1990, No 
L 351117. 
671 GATr anti-dumping law does not refer to those ccother reasons" as a ground for disregarding the actual export price. 
NevertheleBS, Advocate-General J.-P. WARNER has held that there is no violation of GA'IT anti-dumping law. He conaiders Note 
No 1 ad Artiele Vl(1) GATr, but also Artiele 2.3. of the GA'IT Anti-dumping Code, which treat only of associated parties, as mere 
interpretationa of Artiele VI of GA 'IT. According to him, these interpretationa are conceivable, but not restrictive (C.J.E.C., joined 
cases 113 and 118-121/77, March 29, 1979, NTN Toyo Bearing Compan.y Ltd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, 1254. See also: 
BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Ant~Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 86 ; STANBROOK, C., Dumping. A man.ual on the EEC Ant~Dumping Law and Procedure, Chequers, European 
Business Publicationa, 1980, 36, note 23. Contra : VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F ., Anti-Dumping an.d other Trade Proteetion 
Laws ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 78). 
The ccother reasoD.B» argument has never been used or, at most, but very rarely: 
in chemical fertilizer• from the Uniled States of America and ball bearinga and tapered roller bearings from Japan, the 
constructed export price was used, as there was no information about the actual export price (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
101/83 of 17 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United 
States of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, No L 15/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86 of 24 June 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 
June 1986, No L 167/3). It is, however, possible that the constructed export price was used not on the ccother reasoD.B» 
ground, but best information available (Article 18 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). lndeed, the 
absence of information is a sufficient condition for using the best information available ; 
in hand lcnitting yarn.. from Turkey, the constructed export price was used because the price paid by the trading fmn to the 
exporter could not be conaidered as having been made in the ordinary course of trade. No explanation was offered as to the 
meaning of the reference to the concept of ccordinary course of trade• (Commission Decision 84/131/EEC of 5 March 1984 
accepting an undertaking in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain synthetic fibre hand-
k.nitting yarn originating in Turkey and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 9 March 1984, NoL 67/60). 
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Decision). Only prices charged. in conneetion with actual export transactions, as shown in the 
invoices or other accounting documents of the exporter'i72, may be taken into account. 
Nevertheless, offers and irrevocable tenders673 , as well as prices that the exporters will charge 
as soon as they start to export to the Communitf74, seem also to fit in with the concept 
«payable export price». 
Under ECSC anti-dumping law, the export price is the price paid for the product «sold for export» 
(Article 2(8)(a) basic ECSC Decision). The wording «sold for export» indicates that the export 
price and not the import price must be used as export price standard675• EC anti-dumping law 
does not use such an accurate wording. It treats of the product «when sold from the exporting 
country to the Community» (Article 2(8) basic EC Regulation). It seems, though, that, under EC 
anti-dumping law, the export price should be used too since it always treats of «the export price» 
and there is no indication that the wording «export price» should be interpreted as meaning the 
import price. Another interpretation would be at varianee with GATI anti-dumping law, under 
672 Commission Recommendation No 2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
163/83 of 21 January 1983 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, NoL 23/9 i Council Decision 83/162/EEC of 18 April1983 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imparts of acrylonitrile originating in the United States of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101129 i 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of artificial 
corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of imparts of 
artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, NoL 255/9; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1289/87 of 8 May 1987 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No 
L 121111; Commission Decision No 3692/91/ECSC of 12 December 1991 repealing Decision No 2132/88/ECSC imposing definitive 
anti-dumping duties on imparts of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 19 December 
1991, NoL 350111. 
673 In herbicide from Romania the Commission found no export transaction during the investigation period. However, an offer 
had been made during that period to deliver a considerable quantity at a certain price. This price was used as export price 
standard (Commission Decision 88/47/EEC of 26 January 1988 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping review proceeding concerning imparts of a herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 30 January 1988, NoL 26/107). See 
also : VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the Uniled StaJe• and the European. Communities. A Comparatwe 
Analy•is, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,471, note 100. 
674 Council Replation (EC) No 1828/94 of 25 July 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton yam, originating in BraziJ and Turkey, O.J., 27 July 1994, No L 191/3. 
675 C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1607 (Opinion of Advocate 
General MISCHO) ; C.J.E.C., case C-216191, 7 December 1993, Rima Electrometalurgia SA v Council, recital 82 (Opinion of 
Advocate General LENZ) (not yet reported). 
In cotton yarna from Turkey, the use of the export price instead of the import price was explained on the basis of Artiele 2(10) basic 
EC Regulation (and Artiele 2(9) basic ECSC Decision) (Commission Decision 85/515/EEC of 22 November 1985 concerning 
applications submitted by Nellen & Quack GmbH & Co KG, Gronau, for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imparts 
of cotton yarn originating in Turkey, O.J., 27 ·November 1985, No L 316/54). In accordance with that Article, normal value and 
export price must he compared at the sam.e level of trade. If the price sold for export to the Community must he the import price, 
it would compriae costs and profits of merchants in third countries. This would he contrary to Artiele 2(10) basic EC Regulation 
(and Artiele 2(9) basic ECSC Decision). Such a price would not he comparable to normal value because normal value was 
established on the level ccfob-Turkey,. and, therefore, did notcamprise simHar costs and profits. The reasoning in catton yarns from 
Turkey is not convincing. lndeed, a clear distinction · has to be made between the determination of the export price and the 
comparison between the export price and normal value. See : infra, 280-281). 
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which a strict preferenee for the export price prevails, not withstanding the unclear wording of 
GATIon this poinfi76• 
The actual export price is the price which the producer/exporter receives, not only when he sells 
directly to the Community importer, but also when he sells via trading houses, merchants or 
brokers. In that case, the export price is the price paid by trading houses, merchants or brokers 
to the producer/exporter677• Price manipulation by the importer (i.e., when the importer sells 
676 GATr (Article VI(1) GATr) is not clear on this point. It refers to the price of the product exported, but also to the price at 
which products are introduced into the commerce of another country (BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d 
Anti-Subaidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 81; BOUDANT, J., L'an.ti-dumping 
communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 106 ; LESGUILLONS, H., t«Le régime anti-dumping de la Communauté européenne», 
Droit et pratique du commerce international, 1978, (459), 484 ; LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautaire de proteetion contre Ie 
dumping et ka aubventiona, Paris, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 77-78). In 1959 the GATr Group of Experts cut the knot: intheir opinion, 
normal value had to be compared with ccthe price at which the like product left [the exporting] country, not the price at which it 
entered the importing country» (B.I.S.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GATr, 1960, 146, consideration 5). The GATr Anti-dumping 
Code confirms their opinion by stressing that the export price is the price of the ecproduct exported from one country to another» 
(Article 2.1. GATr Anti-dumping Code). 
677 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1411181 of 25 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on orthoxylene (o-Xylene) 
originating in Puerto Rico and the Uriited Statesof America, O.J., 27 May 1981, NoL 141129; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1591181 of 10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on paraxylene (p-xylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United 
Statesof America and the US Virgin lslands, O.J., 16 June 1981, No L 158f7; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81 of 15 
July 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 18 July 1981, No 
L 195/22; Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in 
the United Statee of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, NoL 12/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 551/83 of 8 March 1983 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on kraftliner paper and board originating in the United States of America and accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the review of the anti-dumping proceeding on kraftliner paper and board originating in 
Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the Boviet Union and Sweden, O.J., 10 March 1983, NoL 64/25; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings 
originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3; Commission Decision 85/515/EEC of 22 November 1985 concerning 
applications submitted by Nellen & Quack GmbH & Co KG, Gronau, for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imports 
of ootton yam originating in Turkey, O.J., 27 November 1985, No L 316/54; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 
November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statesof _ 
America, O.J., 29 November 1990, No L 330/16 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating. in Hang Kong and the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14/31; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577191 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only 
memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2805191 of 23 September 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 
September 1991, NoL 270/15; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on importsof 
urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16. 
Contra : colour televuion receivers from the People'a Republic of China, where the export price was based on the last transaction for 
which the exporters were responsible, because, in certain cases where they had sold products to an independent intermediary, the 
exporters were unable to report the price finally charged to the Community importer (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 
27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the 
People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50). 
See also: aaccharine from Japan, chemical fertilizer from the Uniled Statea of America, electronic weighing scales originating in. 
Japan and bicyclea from the People's Republic of China, where the price paid to the independent trading firm, insteadof the price 
paid by this firm to the manufacturer/exporter, was used as export price. In chemical fertilizer from the United Statea of America, it 
was e:xplained that the price paid by the trading house to the exporter was used because of lack of information and, in bicyclea from 
the People'a Republic of China, the price invoiced by the trading fll'Dl was used as there was no invoice price between the producer 
and the trading firm (CommiBBion Decision 80/1116/EEC of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings affered by the exporters of 
saccharin and ita salta originating in China and the United Statesof America and terminating the proceedings concerning imports 
of saccharin and ita salta from China, Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 9 December 1980, NoL 331141; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 101183 of 17 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemical fertilizer originating 
in the United Statee of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, NoL 15/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 757/84 of 22 March 1984 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 24 March 1984, No 
L 80/9 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 April 1984, No L 104126); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a 
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the imported products at a price lower than the export price paid to the exporter) is irrelevant 
when there is no association or compensatory agreement between him and the exporter678 • 
In view of the wording «sold from the exporting country to the Community» (Article 2(8) basic EC 
Regulation) or «sold for export to the European Community» (Article 2(8)(a) basic ECSC 
Decision) (emphasis added), the producer/exporter should know that the destination of his 
products is the Community. In some European anti-dumping cases, the price paid to the 
producer/exporter by a trading firm was irrelevant when the producer/exporter did not know the 
destination679• The correctness of other European anti-dumping cases in which no knowledge 
of dumping on account of the producer/exporter was required680, may be doubted. A 
producer/exporter should be held liable for dumping, only if he bas the opportunity of knowingin 
provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No 
L 58112). 
678
' KRETSCHMER, H., DCUJ Antidumping- und Antisubventionsrecht der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, FrankfurtJMain, VWV-
Verlag, 1980, 38. 
679 
· Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985. im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, NoL 167/3. 
See also : orthoxylene from the United Stales of America, where no dumping margin was established for a producer because his 
export took place via international brokers and he therefore could not control hls sales to the Community (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 906/83 of 18 April 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2761/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on o-xylene 
(orthoxylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the United Statea of America, O.J., 20 April1983, NoL 101/4). 
680 It seems that the manufacturer in mercury from the Soviet Union must have known the destination of hls products for it was 
stressed that he sold bis products cccif harbour of the Community••· Thus, everything seems in order, was it not that the Council 
added that only the consequences of the behaviour of the e:xporter and not hls motives are decisive for the application of European 
anti-dumping law. This rather strange pronouncement can very well mean that it is of no im.portance whether the exporter knew 
the destination or not (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
im.ports of mercury originating in the Soviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such 
im.ports, O.J., 10 December 1987, NoL 346/27). 
See also: 
non-alloyed unwroUIIht aluminium from the Soviet Union, where the exports originating in the Soviet Union sold to 
international traders were taken into account (Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding coneerDing im.ports of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, No L 57/19); 
chemical ferti.Uzer from the United Statea of America and dicumyl peroxide from Japcm, where no inquiry is made into the 
knowledge of dumping (Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/83 of 17 January 1983 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, No L 15/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2079/83 of 25 July 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of dicumyl peroxide 
originating in Japan, O.J., 27 July 1983, NoL 203/13). 
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advance that he is dumping681 • Moreover, these anti-dumping cases are illegal, unless the 
price paid to the producer/exporter was the best information available682• 
Not all export transactions are relevant. According to European anti-dumping law, an anti-
dumping duty may be applied only «to any dumped product whose release for free circulation in 
the Community causes injury» (Article 1(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(1) basic ECSC 
Decision) (emphasis added). Hence, if exports are only released for free circulation when they 
have been the subject of a fmn offer from an independent customer in the Community, the 
dumping calculation will only be based on the products released into free circulation. Similarly, 
products imported under the inward processing regime are not released for free circulation and 
should, therefore, not be taken into account683 • However, · the European anti-dumping 
authorities have used inward processing operations as basis for determin~ng the export price684• 
According to them, there is no breach of European anti-dumping law, because the requirement of 
release for free circulation only applies to the levying of anti-dumping duties685• The result of 
their interpretation seems rather peculiar : inward processing arrangements may be used in 
establishing the dumping margin and, therefore, determine the maximum height of the anti-
dumping duty (see : Articles 7(2) and 9(4) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(3) basic ECSC 
Decision), but the anti-dumping duty can only be levied on the other export transactions. It may 
681 See also: VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the Uniled Stales an.d the European. Communities. A 
Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,440-441. 
682 In styrene monomere from the Uniled Statea of America, it was recognized that the manufacturer did not know the destination 
of bis products. Nevertheless, the price paid to him by merchants was used as export price, but this was done only by lack of other 
data. Thus, it could be an application of Artiele 17 basic EC Regulation (or Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision), according to which 
the export price may be determined on the best facta available when the producer/exporter does not cooperate in good faith 
(ColilmiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1321/81 of 15 May 198f amending Regulation (EEC) No 384/81 impasing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 19 May 1981, No L 132/17). 
683 BELLSTEDT, C., ccA.ntidumping-Zoll auf Einfuhren im aktiven Veredelungsverkehr ?» Recht der lnternationalen Wirtschaft, 
1983, (670), 671 and 672-673. 
684 Council Decision 831162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating tb~ anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imparts of acrylonitrile 
originating in the United Statas of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, NoL 101129; Commission Decision 84/229/EEC of 13 April1984 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of propan-l-ol (propyl alcohol) 
originating in the United States of America, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 19 April 1984, No L 106/55; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of light sodium carbonate 
originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, No L 13114; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain 
exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of these products and terminating the investigation 
in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 
February 1990, No L 38/44). In one case the inward processing arrangement& were taken into account merely for practical reasone. 
lndeed, in this case European anti-dumping authorities were confronted with the practical difficulty that the product& were sold to 
subsidiaries in the European Community who processed the imported product and did not resell it to independent customers in the 
European Community. See: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on styrene monomar originating in the United Statesof America and terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, No 
L 258120. 
685 Council Decision 831162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importsof acrylonitrile 
originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 20 April1983, NoL 101129. 
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be questioned, even though the European anti-dumping authorities may be right in arguing that 
inward processing arrangements may injure the Community industry and that it is difficult to 
control whether or not the inward processed products are re-exported. Indeed, their case law on 
inward processing arrangements contradiets that in respect of exports which are only released into 
· free circulation after a firm offer is made by an independent customer in the Community. Por the 
argument that it is difficult to determine when exactly exports imported under the · inward 
processing regime are released for free circulation, probably applies also to exports which are 
only released for free circulation after a fmn offer is made. Purthermore, the European anti-
dumping case law includes another contradiction : it treats inward processing arrangements 
djfferently in respect of the normal value calculation than in respect of the export price 
determination686 • Probably, «one-way flexibility» explains this strange interpretation advocated 
by the European anti-dumping authorities. The price charged for processing operations is 
undoubtedly lower than the price charged for sales transactions. By taking into account the lower 
price to establish thé export price and by disregarding it to determine normal value, the dumping 
margin is artificially increased. 
3.3.2. Constructed export price 
3.3.2.1. Definition 
The constructed export price is the price «constructed on the basis of the price at which the 
imported product is first resold to an independent buyer», allowance being made for <<all casts 
incurred between importation and resale» ( Artiele 2(9) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8)(b) basic 
ECSC Decision) (emphasis added)687• In view of the wording «on the basis of» the constructed 
export price does not have to equal exactly the price actually paid by the first independent buyer 
minus all costs between importation and resale. Por instance, the criterion «all costs incurred 
between importation and resale» is not interpreted literally. Allowance has to be made not only 
for costs incurred from the moment on the product enters the Community, but also for all costs 
incurred, as well as profits realized,. from the moment on the product leaves the country of origin 
686 Supra, 143-145. 
687 GAT!' anti-dumping law does not provide allowances for the costs incurred between imports and reaale and for a reasanabie 
profit margin. Nevertheless, as to the definition of the constructed export price, European anti-dumping law does not violate GA1T 
anti-dumping law. lndeed, GAT!' anti-dumping law provides that the constructed export price is calculated ccon the basis of the 
price at which the goods are resold by the importer» (Note No 1 ad Artiele Vl(1) GA'IT; Artiele 2.3. GAT!' Anti-dumping Code) 
(emphasis added). In European anti-dumping law the price at which the product is resold by the importer is, indeed, the basis for 
the constructed export price. THere may, however, be a problem on the level of comparison between normal value, which includes 
all costs between sale (by the 8880ciated party) and resale, and the export price, which does not (see : infra, 279-283). 
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or the exporting country688• In genera!, allowance has to be made for all costs and profits 
which relate to import activities689• Conversely, the export price must include all costs and 
profits which relate to export activities. This general rule is quite logica! since it is the price at 
which the product is sold for export that must be constructed690• This rule even seems simple 
to apply. However, the European anti-dumping authorities, with the consent of the Court of 
Justice, do not apply it consistently with regard to companies which are associated with the 
exporter and which perform the functions of an export department In principle, no allowance 
should be made for their costs and profits. This is the case as long as they are established in the 
exporting country691 or in a third country692. Then the price actually paid to them by the 
688 Therefore, allowance should he made for the costs and profits of all trading fmns and importers, even ü they are established 
outside the Community (Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/83 of 17 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain chemica! fertilizer. originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 19 January 1983, NoL 15/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2681/84 of 18 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of pentaerythritol originating in 
Canada and accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of pentaerythritol 
originating inSweden and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 September 1984, NoL 254/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 
of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 
1985, No L 1311 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, No L 20/46) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, 
NoL 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2172/93 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on importsof ethanolamine originating in the United States of 
America, O.J., 4 August 1993, No L 195/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional 
antidumping duties on imports of telavision camera systems originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No L 271/1). In these 
anti-dumping cases allowance has been made for all costs and for a profit margin of associated importers or non-associated trading 
houses not residing in the Community. See also: DIDIER, P., ccEEC Antidumping Rules and Practices", Common Market Law 
Review, 1980, (349), 356, who contends that deduction has to he made not only of the freight between the exporting country and the 
European Community, but also of the inland freight in the exporting country. This contention is the consequence of the fact that 
the export price is to he determined on an u factory basis, see: BELLIS, J.-F., VERMULST, EA., and WAER, P., ccFurther 
Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation: A Codification of Cantroversial Methodologies", Journal of World Trade, 1989, 
(21), 23. Contra: VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH 
Editions, 1990, 83). 
However,· in one anti-dumping case, no allowance wàs made for coats and profits of an associated sales company. The allowance 
was not made because it did not have any decisive effect on the rate of the anti-dumping duty (Commission Decision No 
2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, 
originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 July 1987, No L 207/21). 
In a num.her of cases allowance has been made for costs and profits of the associated company established in a third country, but is 
wasnotmade clear whether this company performed the functions of an import department (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 
of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's 
Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain photo albums 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16). 
689 Imp • • · ~ I · rd rfi · k . fu . . ' . th . th C . d ort activaties are, aor examp e, processmg o ers, pe onrung mar etmg. nctions, mvotemg e eustomers m e ommuruty an 
receiving payment (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2887/93 of 20 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on impotts of eertaio 
electrooie weighing scalea originating in Singapore and the Republie of Korea, O.J., 22 October 1993, NoL 263/1). 
69° C.J.E.C., case C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita Jndustrial Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1301), 1324 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO). 
691 C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Jnc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1289; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, 
Minolla·Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1591 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of ·the Council) and 1625; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5• mierodisks) 
originating in Hoog Kong and the Republie of Korea, and eolleeting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, No 
L 236/2. 
' 
... 
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first independent buyer is used as actual export price693 • However, when the same companies 
are established in the Community, their costs and profits are subtracted from the price paid by the 
fust independent buyer in order to construct the export price694 because their costs and profits 
reduce the amount received by the · exporteli95• The costs of associated companies established 
outside the Community though also reduce the amount received by the exporter. It has been 
argued, in respect of associated companies established in the Community and performing the 
functions of an export department, that their costs and profits must be deducted because, in the 
case of an independent importer, all the costs incurred after the products cross the Community 
frontier are normally borne by the importeli96• This argument is rather peculiar when the 
associated company is said to perform the functions of an export department, which are by 
definition different from the functions of an import department697• 
692 Co~ssion Decision No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio sheets and plates, of 
iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., · 29 July 1987, No L 207/21 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting 
undertakings offered in conneetion with such imports, O.J., 15 December 1990, No L 351117 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 
April 1993 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the 
People'a Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 95/5. 
In a number of cases allowance haa been made for coats and profits of the associated company catablished in a third country, but it has not been 
made clear whcthcr thia company performed thc functions of an import department or of an export department (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's 
Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio photo albums originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16). 
693 I.e., the actual export price as defined in Artiele 2(8) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 2(8)(a) basic ECSC Decision. 
694 I.e., the constructed export price as defined in Artiele 2(9) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision. 
695 In plain paper photocopiersfrom Japan, the subsidiary of the Japanese exporter established in the Community only handled customers' orders, 
send them the invoicca and received the relevant payments. After having made these payments, the purchaser took care of the importation of the 
dumped producta. ~ a result, the produels were not imported by the related subsidiary and could, therefore, not have been resold to an 
independent buyer. Moreover, the activities of the related subsidiary were pursued prior to the importation so that the related subsidiary could not 
have incurred any coats between importation and resale. As a consequence, the constructed export price could not be used as export price standard. 
Moreover, the price paid by the independent purchaser-importer to the related subsidiary was found to be unreliable because it was not the samc as 
the pricc invoiced by thc cxporter to his related subaidiary. Therefore, the export pricc was constructed on the basis of the pricc invoiced by thc 
related subsidiary to the independent purchaser-importer by making allowances for overheads and profits of the related subsidiary. For these coats 
were considered to reducc thc amount received by the exporter inasmuch as they are nonnally home by the importer (C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 
March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 835-837; C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, 
Canon Inc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1291; C.J.E.C., case C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita lndustrial Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 
I, (1301), 1332-1333). 
696 C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 836; C.J.E.C., case C-
171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Jnc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1251 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council); CJ.E.C., 
case C-172/87, 10 Marcb 1992, Mita Industrial Co. Lid v Council, E. C.R., 1992, I, (1301), 1312-1313 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the 
Council). 
697 Sec, howcver: CJ.E.C., case C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita Industrial Co. Lid v. Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1301), 1324-1325 (Opinion of 
Advocate General MISCH), whcre, according to Advocate General MISCHO, the associated company was performing the functions of an import 
department. 
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European anti-dumping law wants to preclude any manipulation of cost and profit allocation 
between exporter and importer which pushes up the heigth of the constructed export price by 
keeping down artificially the costs and profits of the importe~98 • The purpose of the 
construction of the export price is to arrive at the price as if it had been charged by the exporter 
to an independent importe~99 • Therefore, allowance should be made for «a reasonable margin 
for selling, general and administrative costs and profit» and for all costs 700, including «those 
698 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, 
No L 54/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 
of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan 
and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 
1988, No L 317/33 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, No 
L 356/47 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video 
cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the importsof video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, 
No L 174/1; BELLIS, J.-F., VERMULST, E.A., and WAER, P., ccFurther Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation: A 
Codification of Controversial Methodologie&», Journalof World Trade, 1989, (21), 23-24; VERMULST, E.A., and WAER, P., ccDe 
nieuwe EEG Anti-dumping Verordening 2423/88: Een stille revolutie••, S.E. W., 1989, (151), 154. 
This provision mayalso be to the benefit of the allegedly dumping exporter. lndeed, in electronic typewriters from Japan, certain 
costs borne directly by the exporter were excluded because they were found to relate to personnel seconded by the exporter in order 
to obtain market and product information, which did not relate to the product in question (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, NoL 335/43). 
699 C.J.E.C., case C-172/87, 10 March 1992, Mita lndustrial Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1301), 1313 (Report for the Hearing: 
conc1usions of thc Council). 
700 According to European anti-dumping law (Article 2(9)(b) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8)(b), basic ECSC Decision), the item~ . 
for which an adjustment must be made, include: 
(i) usual transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs ; 
(ii) customs duties, any anti-dumping duty and other taxes payable in the importing country by reason of the importation or sale 
of the goods ; 
(iii) any oommission usually paid or agreed. 
This list of allowances is not exhaustive (BUHART, J., ccLe régime communautaire de l'antidumping: vingt ans d'expérienceo, 
Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 1988, (253), 268). European anti-dumping case law has made allowances for : 
assembly and processing costs (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain textured polyester fabrics originating in the United States of America, O.J., 20 May 
1981, No L 133117 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in 
Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of these product& and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 27 January 1990, NoL 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44); Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 
of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as 
EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1) ; 
operating costs (Council Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional 
duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, NoL 13121); 
market research costs (Council Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, NoL 13/21); 
start-up costs (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
small-screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, 
o . .r., 27 April1990, NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192)); 
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payment terms (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of hall hearings with a graatest external diameter not exceeding 30 m.m. originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, 
NoL 152124); 
financing costa in conneetion with credits given to customers in the Comm.unity (Commission Decision 82/397/EEC of 14 June 
1982 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning i.mports of certain polypropylene film 
for capacitors originating in Japan and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/44 ; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1698185 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in 
Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1) ; 
interest charges paid to third parties in respect of e:xports to an associated i.m.porter (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 
25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of small-eereen colour telavision receivers origin,ating in 
the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 
May 1990, No L 133192)) ; 
coats reauiting from foreign currency exchange operations (Council Regulation (EEC) No 611193 of 15 March 1993 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain eleCtronic microcircuits known as DRAMs originating 
in the Republic of Korea and e:xported by companies not exempted from this duty, and collecting definitively the provisional 
anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 March 1993, NoL 66/1); 
free gifts and sales incentives in kind (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 364:3184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imparts of electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
with regard to Nakl\iima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, NoL 335/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 
1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, 
No L 16311 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of serial-impact dot-matrix printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 
1988, NoL 177/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No 
L 240/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
sarial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of video cassettes and video tape reels 
originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
34/89 of 5 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of serial impact fully formed (SIFF) character 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No L 5/23; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, 
collecting defmitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video 
~ape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 17411; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 
January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and 
the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, NoL 13121); 
discounts and rebates (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
· duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating·in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial-impact dot-matrix printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 
1988, No L 177/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No 
L 240/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
sarial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of video cassettes and video tape reels 
originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
34/89 of 5 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial impact fully formed (SIFF) character 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No L 5/23 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, 
collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video 
tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, NoL 17411 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 
12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and 
South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27); Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof small screen colour television 
receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 
January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and 
the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, No L 13/21; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 490/90 of 26 February 1990 repaaiing Regulations (EEC) No 1826/84 and (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing 
defmitive anti-dumping duties on imparts of vinyl acetate monomar originating in Canada and the United Statee of America 
respectively, O . .T., 1 March 1990, No L 5311; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong 
Kong, O.J.,· 13 November 1990, NoL 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36); Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour telavision receivers 
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normally home by an importer but paid by any party either in or outside the Community which 
appears to be associated or to have a compensatory arrangement with the importer or exporter» 
(Article 2(9)(b) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision) (emphasis added). 
To that end, it grants a broad margin of discretion to the European anti-dumping authorities. 
They only have to show that the margin for general expenses and profit is «reasonable» and that 
the allowed costs are «normally» borne by the importer. European anti-dumping case law 
provides but one indication as to the interpretation of the concept «normally», namely that all 
general expenses related to the export sales are considered to be normall y home by the 
importer701 • Thus, an associated importer ignores whether he is dumping and to what extent. 
The risk of «one-way flexibility» resulting in low export prices is clearly present. 
In principle, all cost calculations must be based on available accounting data (Article 2(5) basic 
EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(11) basic ECSC Decision). When associated parties try to manipulate 
701 
originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14/31; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket 
flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, 
NoL 133120; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2805/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports into the Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, No L 270/15; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-
broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 3418; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour 
telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 
O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50) ; 
advertising coats (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to 
Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, NoL 335/43; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports ~f video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of 
Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 24 December 1988, No L 356/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, 
collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video 
tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 17411 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 
24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof small screen colour telavision receivers originating 
in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 of 16 January 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of 
Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J.,. 17 January 1990, No L 13/21 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers 
originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/56 
(corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262/90 of 5 November 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong 
Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
611193 of 15 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain electronic 
microcircuits known as DRAMs originating in the Republic of Korea and exported by companies not exempted from this duty, 
and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 March 1993, NoL 66/1; Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour telavision receivers 
originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 
1994, No L 255/50) ; 
sponsorship coats (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50). 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television 
receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., I October 1994, No 
L 255/50. 
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costand profit allocation by means of incorrect accounting records, those records may be ignored, 
especially when the associated parties do not cooperate or do not act in good faith (Article 18 
basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). In several anti-dumping cases, the 
accounting profit and costs of the associated importer being affected by the association, are not 
taken into account702• Pro fits, instead, are determined on the basis of the profits realized by 
independent importers 703 and costs are calculated on the basis of the customary costs in the 
702 Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on im.ports of pentaerythritol 
originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, No L 20/46) ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of certain deep freezers 
originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of imports of certain deep freezers 
originating in Yugosiavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the 
proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14 i Council Regulation (EEC) No 374/87 
of 5 February 1987 definitiveiy collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 6 February 1987, NoL 35/32 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 
of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits k.nown as 
DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these product& and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 
January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22!79; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44); 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 
1991, No L 65/1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and 
Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50. 
703 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 744/84 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, NoL 79/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, NoL 86/31) i 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof artificial 
corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of 
artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugosiavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, NoL 255/9 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3669/84 of 21 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller 
hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, No L 340/37 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 328/85 of 6 February 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of certain glass mirrors originating in South Africa, O.J., 8 February 1985, 
No L 36/10 i Commission Decision 86/151/EEC of 29 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning im.ports of 
certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 113161; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 
July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 24 
December 1988, No L 356/47; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof small screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, NoL 314/1 ; 
Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-dumpi~g measures concerning dense 
sodium carbonate originating in the United Statas of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, NoL 283/38; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in 
Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, 
No L9/36) i Council Regulation (EEC) No 677/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 
March 1991, NoL 65/1 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of 
Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133/20; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093/91 of 16 July 1991 im.posing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importa of smali-screen coiour teievison receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of 
China and oollecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 18 July 1991, No L 196/1; BESELER, J.-F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., 
Ant~Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 84-85 i BUHART, J., «Le 
régime communautaire de l'antidumping: vingt ans d'expérience», Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 1988, (253), 269 i See 
also : VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the Uniled Statea and the European. Communities. A Comparative 
Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 443. 
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industry concemed704 or of the costs actually incurred as verified by the European anti-
dumping authorities705• Costs are allocated, in accordance with European anti-dumping law 
(Article 2(5)(a) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(11) basic ECSC Decision), in proportion to the 
turnover for each product and each market under consideration, unless an alternative method 
would reflect more appropriately the incidence of the costs 706• Financial transactions between 
the associated exporter and importer are not taken into consideration for determining the 
turnover 707• The best standards are, of course, the costs actually incurred and the profits 
(including losses) actually realized, as other importers may incur higher costs or make higher 
profits 708• However, if the importer is making losses, allowance has to be made for a 
704 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 328/85 of 6 February 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
glass mirrors originating in South Africa, O.J., 8 February 1985, No L 36/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 
1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 
January 1993, NoL 9n. 
705 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81 of 15 July 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in 
the United Statee of America, O.J., 18 July 1981, No L 195/22; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, No L 176/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain compact 
disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 257/27). 
706 Commi~ion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 Ocl:ober 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small 
screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties on imports of television camera systems originating 
in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No L 271/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 ·September 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50. 
707 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video 
cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47. 
See, however : Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685/90 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No 
L 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, NoL 7/38). 
708 Only exceptionally the costs and profits of other, independent importers are adjusted to the situation of the associated 
importer. lndeed, only in phenol from the Un.ited Statesof America, the characteristics of the associated importer were taken into 
account for determining the profit margin. The amount of the profit margin was found to depend on different special 
circumstances. In determining the profit margin for the associated importer, the following elements, therefore, were taken into 
account: the proportion and the structure of the transactions of the exporter in the Community, the proportion of investments in 
fixed assets, and the services performed by him. The comparison between those elements and the organisation of other traders, 
shows that the average of the various profit margins registered during the investigation, had to be used as reasonable minimum 
profit margin. Since these different profit margins fluctuated between 1 % and 10 %, a profit margin of 5 % was used (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United States 
of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, NoL 12/1). 
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reasonable profit margin 709 • In that case, the export price, thus calculated, will be lower than 
it should actually be. 
3.3.2.2. Efficiency in respect of associated parties 
The associated exporter and importer are presumed to manipulate their transfer prices as well as 
their cost and profit allocation in order to avoid the application of European anti-dumping law. 
The constructed export price may be used if the exporter is associated with the importer. The 
constructed export price is meant to reflect the export price not being affected by the endeavours 
made by the associated exporter's and the importer's to evade European anti-dumping law710• 
The price at which the imported product is first resold to an independent buyer, after deducting all 
costs incurred between importation and resale as well as a reasanabie profit margin, is used as 
constructed export price. It is, however, not clear whether the constructed export price 
corresponds to the price the exporter would have charged to his associated importer if he did not 
intend to avoid the application of European anti-dumping law. It is not clear either whether the 
constructed export price neutralizes all possible manipulation by the associated exporter and 
importer aimed at evading European anti-dumping law. Both questions will be examined 
hereinafter. 
As was the case for the topic concerning an association between an exporter and bis dornestic sales company 711 , 
the Copithome model will bere also he used in order to analyse the pricing policy between an exporter and bis 
associated importer. As for the analysis of the association between an exporter and bis dornestic sales company, the 
basic Copithome model should he used as starting point to analyse the effects of the association between an exporter 
and an importer on their pricing policy. 
709 See: 
plain paper photocopiers from Japan, where it was established that independent importers realized either losses or profits of 
more than 10% (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5). If this is true for independent 
importers, it may also he true for associated importers ; 
small-screen oolour televi&ion receiver• from the Republic of Korea, where the Commission, in determining the profit margin, 
refused to take account of the start-up situation of an associated i.m.porter because the very purpose of the reconstruction of an 
export price is to create a perfect situation comparable with that of an independent i.m.porter. Such an independent i.m.porter 
has to make, on average, a reasonable level of profit in order to stay in business (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048/90 of 25 
April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in the 
Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 
May 1990, No L 133192)). 
710 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain importsof 
such producte originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, No 
L 97/1; Commiseion Regulation (EEC} No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating 
the proceeding concerning importsof certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
374/87 of 6 February 1987 definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports ofhoused hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 6 February 1987, NoL 35/32. 
711 Supra, 149-153. 
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In the basic Copithome model712, no taxes or tariffs are presumed. The manufacturing company is established in 
the exporting country which is also the country of origin. It is associated with the importer who is established in the 
Community. The manufacturing company produces a quantity Y of the product concemed, of which it sells a quantity 
Y 1 on its dornestic market at a price P1• lt is assumed that P1 declines as Y 1 goes up, therefore : 
5P1 < 0 
5Y1 
(1) 
The remaining manufactured quantity, represented as Y 2, is exported to the associated importer at a transfer price R. 
The associated importer resells this quantity Y 2 on the dornestic market of the Community at a price P2• The 
manufacturing company and the importing company each have a cost function Ci = Ci(Yi) where i = 1, 2. 
The respective profit functions of each company are : 
(2) 
(3) 
Quite clearly, this situation is identical to the one treated in conneetion with the determination of the normal value 
when the products of the manufacturing company are sold on its dornestic market through an associated sales 
company. So bere too, the transfer price is indeterminate713 • 
In international trade, however, tariffs are not uncommon. If a tariff q is levied, the profit function of the importer, 
1r2, becomes : 
(4) 
CombiDing equations (2) and (4) gives the total profit function: 
(5) 
It follows from the last term of equation (5) that the corner solution is optima! to maximize total profits ; by choosing 
the lowest transfer price, the multinational enterprise (MNE) minimizes its tariff payments. So, in theory, the transfer 
price would be set at -oo. However, the MNE will, in fact, charge a transfer price equal to zero, as customs 
authorities will not accept a negative transfer price. 
For the purpose of comparison, the first order conditions in this case would be: 
712 See: COPITHORNE, L.W., cclnternational Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy", Ccmadian Joumal of 
Economics, 1971, (324), 324-341; COPITHORNE, L.W., ccLa théorie des prix de transfertinternes des grandes sociétés", L'actualité 
économique, 1976, (324), 324-352; EDEN, L., ccThe Microeconomics of Transfer Pricing», in Multinationals cmd Transfer Pricing, 
RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L. (eds.), London, Croom Helm, 1985, (13), 20-22. 
713 Supra, p .... 
254 
(6) 
(7) 
This is shown in fi.gure 7. When no tariffs are levied, the equilibrium point is a. Point a is the locus where MR1 and 
NMR2 ( = MR2 - MC:l) are equal to MC1• In this equilibrium point, the MNE sells a quantity OY 1 at the price OP1 
on its dornestic market ; it exports OY 2 to its related importer who resells this quantity at a price OP 2 on the intemal 
market of the importing country. If a tariff CT is imposed, the equilibrium point shifts from a to b because the M~ 
curve shifts to M<;' (= M<; + CTR), which causes a drop in the NMR2 curve to NMR2' (= MR2 - M~'). The 
consequences of the imposition of a tariff CT are clear from figure 7 : the MNE will sell more on its dornestic market 
at a }ower price, wbereas its importer Will import a }ower quantity wbicb he resells at a higher price.If the tariff CT is 
in fact an anti-dumping duty, according to European anti-dumping law, it will he equal to : 
q= 
NV-P x (8) 
NV and Px represent respectively normal value and export price, as defined by European anti-dumping law. 
If the anti-dumping duty CT is already imposed, there is no more room for influencing the height of CT. As in the case 
of a tariff, the optimal strategy for the enterprise is the corner salution by charging the lowest possible transfer price. 
Contrary to the case of a tariff, the MNE may influence the height of a possible, but not yet imposed anti-dumping 
duty ; it may even avoid that an anti-dumping duty will he imposed. Indeed, according to European anti-dumping 
law, an anti-dumping duty cannot exceed the dumping margin, i.e., the difference between the normal value NV and 
the export price P x· So, if P x è?: NV, no anti-dumping duty can he imposed. 
Because it is presumed that the sales in the exporting country are made in the ordinary course of trade, NV may he 
assumed to equal P1• For the moment, abstraction is made of the possibility to use the constructed export price 
(Article 2(9) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision). Therefore, P x may he assumed to equal R. 
So equation (8) can he rewritten : 
P1-R 
(J = (9) 
R 
The MNE may manipulate the transfer price R. If it bas some market power, i.e., if there is no perfect competition 
on its dornestic market, it may also manipulate its dornestic market price P1• If the enterprise wants to avoid the 
imposition of an anti-dumping duty, it must manipulate P1 and R in order for P1 ~ R714• Indeed, only if P1 ~ R, 
an anti-dumping duty cannot he imposed. 
Combining equation (9) with equation (5) results in the profit function of the importer, in which the tariff assumes the 
form of an anti-dumping duty : 
714 The examination of the possible manipulation of P1 and P 2 is basedon: SAMUELSON, L., ccThe Multinational Firm with 
Arm's Length Transfer Price Limits», Joumal of International Economics, 1982/12, (365), 365-374. 
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(10) 
. The total profit function from equations (2) and (10) : 
(11) 
The first order conditions are : 
(12) 
~11" pl - R 
- = MR2 - [MC2 - R R] - MC1 = 0 ~y2 
(13) 
Because u = (P1 - R)/R, equation (13) is identical to equation (7). The ability of the MNE to manipulate u, bas no 
effect on its exports. However, equation (12) shows that the MNE will sell more on its dornestic market at a lower 
price. Indeed, in view of the assumption made at (1), (~P1 /~Y 1)Y 2 < 0 prevails, which implies that the marginal 
revenue MR1 will he lower because of the anti-dumping duty. Finally, as may be deduced from the last term of 
equation (11), the corner solution, i.e., a transfer price R equal toto the dornestic market price P1, is optimal. But, 
because P1 will decrease - which is always advantageous if eventually an anti-dumping duty would be imposed -, the 
transfer price R will also be lower. 
]n tigure 8 these conclusions are vizualised. The equilibrium point b, as described in conneetion with tigure 7, is the 
starting point. The only difference with tigure 7 is that the tariff is now identified as an anti-dumping duty. The 
identification of the tariff as an anti-dumping duty shifts the equilibrium point b to c. This is, of course, only true if 
the MNE bas some market power on its dornestic market, which it being monopolist, clearly bas in tigure 8. Under 
this condition and in view of the equations (12) and (13), the equilibrium point is defined as : 
~P1 P1 - R 
MR1 - -Y2 = MC1 = MR2 - [MC2 + R R] ~yl 
(14) 
In tigure 8, the first term and the last term of equation (14) are provided, respectively, by MRt" and NMR2'. 
Starting from point c, we see that the MNE uses its monopoly power on its dornestic market to manipulate the 
imposition of an anti-dumping duty : it charges a lower price OP 1" while it sells a higher quantity OY 1 ". This reaction 
of the MNE to an anti-dumping duty simultaneously causes the exported quantity to drop to OY 2" and the price the 
related importer charges when he resells the quantity OY 2" to rise to OP2". 
Thus, in order to avoid the application of anti-dumping law, the NME will manipulate not only its intemal transfer 
prices, but also the price on its dornestic market as well as the price at which the product is resold on the market of 
the importing country. European anti-dumping law does not provide the possible manipulation, by an MNE, of the 
dornestic market price and the price at which the product is first resold to an independent buyer in the Community in 
order to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping duty. Only the possible manipulation of the transfer price between 
related parties is taken into consideration. According to European antidumping law, the export price must be 
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determined on the basis of the price which the importer charges when he resells the imported product to independent 
buyers in the Community ; allowance must he made for all the costs the importer bears between importation and 
resale (Article 2(9)(b) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision). 
Equating the export price P x with the price at which the product is resold to independent buyers in the Community, 
allowance being made for all costs between importation and resale, yields : 
The total profit function of the MNE is : 
The first order conditions are : 
where: T = 2[P2Y2 - C2(Y:z)]P1 Y2 - [MR2 - MC2]P1JÎ _ l 
[P2Y2 - C2(Y2)]2 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
Because [P2Y2 - ~(Yv] is, by definition, positive and because it is assumed that (~P1 /~Y 1 ) < 0, the last term in · 
equation (17) is positive ; this implies that, in this case too, the MNE will sell more on its dornestic market, which 
will cause P1 to decrease. lt is, however, ambiguons whether the term T is either positive or negative. This is quite 
logical : at first sight, one would expect the MNE to increase P2 and, as a consequence, to sell less Y2• This, 
however, is, except for constant marginal and, thus, average costs, affects the average cost term, c;,(Y ~IY 2, of 
equation (15). When there are increasing returns to scale, a drop in the quantity Y 2 will cause the average cost term 
to increase ; the contrary prevails when there decreasing returns to scale. lf the decline of Y 2 causes ~(Y ~/Y 2 to 
increase, the net effect on the export price standard, [P2 - C2(Y 2)/Y iJ, is ambiguous. Although the net effect on this 
export price standard is ambiguous, it is should he clear that it may he to the benefit of the MNE to manipulate P2• 
By equating the export price with the price at which the product is being resold to the frrst 
independent buyer, European anti-dumping law manages to preclude the manipulation of the 
transfer prices within an MNE. However, the constructed export price is no waterproof solution 
to rule out all price and even cost manipulation by the MNE. It offers the MNE another 
opportunity to manipulate the dumping margin and, thus, the height of the anti-dumping duty. 
First, it does not preclude the manipulation of the price on the dornestic market of the MNE nor 
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of the price at which the product is being resold to the first independent buyer. Second, it offers 
the MNE the opportunity to rnanipolate its intemal cost allocation. In view of the export price 
standard as defined in equation (15), the NME can increase Px not only by increasing P2, but also 
by decreasing ~(Y~, and, thus, by shifting some costs (including profits) from tbe importer to 
the exporter. The manipulation of total costs (C2(Y ~) is quite realistic in an MNE : profits may 
be shifted within an MNE by rnanipolating not only transfer prices, but also tbe allocation of costs 
between the different components of tbe NME. Within an MNE, tbere are general costs 
concerning each component of the NME ; moreover, various ifltra .. group services, loans, transfers 
of tecbnology and trade .. mark occur. The MNE may try to rnanipolate tbe allocation as well as 
the valuation of those various elements and, thereby, rnanipolate the costs of eacb of its different 
components715• In European anti .. dumping law, the manipulation of cost allocation is prevented 
by the practice that the accounting data are not used, if there are reasons to believe that tbe cost 
allocation is influenced by tbe association. Thus, only the manipulation of tbe price on tbe 
dornestic market of the NME and of tbe price at wbich the product is first resold to an 
independent buyer on the Community market is not precluded. However, an exporter not 
associated with his importer will also rnanipolate bis dornestic market prices, as well as bis export 
prices in view of a possible application of anti .. dumping law716• Therefore, tbe constructed 
715 See : O.E.C.D., Tr(JIUJfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises. Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Paris, 
O.E.C.D., 1979, 45-94 ; O.E.C.D., Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprisea. Three Taxation issues. Reports of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affair•, Paris, O.E.C.D., 1984, 71-91. 
716 Assume a firm producing at a cost C(Y) a quantity Y of the product in question. The product is either sold on the finn's 
dornestic market or exported to the Community. A quantity Y 1 is sold at a price P1 on his dornestic market and a quantity Y 2 is 
exported at a price P2 to the Community. Irthere is no European anti-dumping law, the f:arm's total profit function is: 
lts first order conditions are : 
Ö1r 
- = MR 1 - MC = 0 öY1 
Ö1r 
- = MR2 - MC = 0 öY2 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
However, because the Community actively applies its anti-dumping law, the f:arm knows that, if P2 is lower than P1, it will be 
subjected to an anti-dumping duty": 
(D) 
Therefore, the tirm's total profit function is: 
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export price may be accepted as the best possible export price standard. Nevertheless, in practice, 
the constructed export price will pose some problems at the disadvantage of the MNEs. It leaves 
the anti-dumping authorities much discretionary powers, which, in view of the «one-way 
flexibility» of anti-dumping law, may very well lead to findings of dumping in cases where no 
dumping is being practised. 
Until now, attention was only paid to the effects of anti-dumping law on transfer prices. 
However, transfer prices are affected by many other motives, such as corporate profit taxes, 
tariffs, exchange risks, repatriation of profits and capita!, supporting a newly established 
subsidiary, helping a subsidiary in penetrating a new mar ket. Those various motives will have a 
conflicting impact on transfer pricing : some of them imply high transfer prices, while low 
transfer prices are wanted to realize the other motives717• When establishing the export price 
for the application of the anti-dumping law, it is necessary to take in consideration all the relevant 
motives. When this is done, it will be clear that, under certain circumstances, over-invoicing is 
practised not (merely) to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping duty. 
The manufacturing company of the MNE must pay a corporate tax r 1 on its profits 1r1 in its home country
718
• The 
Community levies a corporate tax 'T2 on the profits '71"2 of the importer, as well as a tariff e on the imports of the 
(E) 
For profit maximization the fll'st order conditions are : 
(F) 
(G) 
Equation (F) is identical to equation (12). As a consequence, the non-associated fll'm will also sell more on its damestic market at a 
lower price. Thereby, it will influence the dumping margin precisely the same way as the MNE does. 
717 See: PLASSCHAERT, S., ccTransfer pricing problems in developing countriea., in Multinationals and Transfer Pricing, 
RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L. (eds.), London, Croom Helm, 1985, (247), 265. 
718 The model is inspired by: KANT, C., «Endogenous Transfer Pricing and the Effects of Uncertain Regulation••, Journol of 
International Economics, 1988, (147), 147-157. The penalty for underinvoicing with a probability & used in KANT's article, is 
replaced by the anti-dumping duty 11 imposed with a probability 1. 
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product concemed into the Community719• If European anti-dumping law is not taken into account, the respective 
profit functions of each company are : 
(19) 
(20) 
This results the following overall profit function of the MNE : 
Differentiating.equation (21) with respect to the transfer price R, provides : 
(22) 
The examination of the last term of equation (21) and of equation (22) shows that the MNE will always choose either 
the highest or the lowest possible transfer price. If the relative tax rate differential, provided by (r2 - r 1)/(1 - r 1), is 
less than the tariff rate, 9, the MNE will charge the lowest possible transfer price; in the opposite case, it will set the 
transfer price as high as possible120. 
If the anti-dumping legislation is introduced, and given the definition of the a.i:lti-dumping duty u, the profit function of 
the importer, '1"2, becomes : 
(23) 
Thus, total profit function 'I" is : 
.,... = (1 - T1) [P1Y1 - C1(Y)] + (1 - T2) [P2Y2 - C2(Y2)] + [(T2 - T1) - (1 - T2)8 - (1 - T~o)]RY2 
(24) 
The derivative of 'I" with respect to the transfer price R is : 
719 In economie theory research has been carried out not only into the effects of corporate profit taxes and tariffs on transfer 
pricing, but also into the effects of exchange rates. As, hereinafter the effects of exchanges rates are studied (see, infra, 302-306), it 
is not necessary to complicate the model by introducing exchange rate motives. For the effect of exchange rates on transfer pricing, 
see: BATRA, R.N., and HADAR, J., ccTheory ofthe Multinational Firm: Fixed versus Floating Exchange Rates", Oxford Economie 
Papers, 1979, (258), 258-269; EDEN, L., ccThe Microeconomics of Transfer Pricing", in Multinationals and Transfer Prieing, 
RUGMAN, A.M., and EDEN, L. (eds.), London, Croom Helm, 1985, (13), 30-37 ; ITAGAKI, T., ccTheory of the Multinational Firm : 
An Analysis of Effects of Government PolicieBN, International Economie Reuiew, 1979, (437), 437-448 ; ITAGAKI, T., ccThe theory of 
the multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty», Canadian Journal of Economies, 1981, (276), 276-297 ; ITAGAKI, T., 
ccSystems of Taxation of Multinational Firms under Exchange Risk••, Southern Economie Journal, 1981-1982, (708), 708-723. 
720 HORST, T., ccThe Theory of the Multinational Firm : Optima! Behavior under Different Tariff and Tax Rates••, Journal of 
Political Economy, 1971, (1059), 1060-1062. 
262 
(25) 
The comparison of equation (25) with equation (22) shows that the effect of an anti-dumping duty on the transfer price 
may be counterbalanced by the effect of corporate profit taxes and tariffs. This will specifically he the case when the 
relative tax rate differential (T2 - Tt)/(1 - Tt) is less than the tariff rate e : the MNE wants to under-invoice its 
products for tax and tariff purposes, whereas over-invoicing is warranted for avoiding the imposition of an anti-
dumping duty. In case of such conflicting motives, the effective transfer price will he between both corner solutions, 
which, in anti-dumping law, is equal to the resale price, P2, after deducting the average total cost, c;(Y 2)/Y 2 ( Artiele 
2(9) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision). Indeed, on the assumption that (T2 - T1)/(1 - T1) < 
9, the terms [(T2 - T1) -(1 - T~9 and (1 - T~a may he considered to be the marginal gain and the marginal loss, 
respectively, from under-invoicing : the higher the transfer price, the more the marginal loss will increase. 
A MNE may, thus, have other motives than pure profit maximization. Some of those motives 
entall over-invoicing, whereas others, like the aim to avoid anti-dumping measures, lead to under-
invoicing. The price, used as export price standard, should not be influenced by the motive of the 
MNE to avoid anti-dumping measures. On the other hand, the MNE should not be sanctioned for 
pursuing other motives than pure profit maximization. The MNE, however, may be sanctioned 
under European anti-dumping law for pursuing other motives than profit maximization, as prices 
charged by independent exporters are compared with the intemal transfer prices of the MNE in 
order to ascertain whether those transfer prices are influenced by the motive to evade European 
anti-dumping· law. Intemal transfer prices of MNEs will seldom coincide with the prices of 
independent exporters. Independent exporters will usually only aim at profit maximization. 
MNEs, however, may have other motives, which have an impact on their intemal transfer prices. 
As a consequence, transfer prices of MNEs influenced by such other motives, will be considered 
as having been influenced by the motive of avoiding anti-dumping measures. The MNE may, 
liowever, not have pursued the evasion of anti-dumping law. Therefore, a strict comparison 
between the prices charged by independent exporters and intemal transfer prices of MNEs should 
not be decisive. The MNEs should be allowed to prove that the difference between their intemal 
transfer prices and the prices of an independent exporter may be explained by other motives than 
the evasion of anti-dumping law. 
3.3.3. Export price constructed on any reasonable basis and export price based on 
the facts available 
In European anti-dumping law the export price constructed on any reasonable basis has not yet 
been applied explicitly. However, in three anti-dumping cases the conditions in which such an 
export price may be used, i.e., the product was not resold in the condition imported, have already 
been fulfilled. 
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In styrene monomere from the United Stales of America, exports to associated importers who did not resell the 
product or who used it to produce different other products, were not taken into account in order to determine the 
export price721 • 
In te:ctured polyester4abrics from the United States of America, the constructed export price was used, ajusted for 
the processing costs 2• 
In acrylonitrile from the United States of Alnerica and in N-propyl alcohol from the United States of America, the 
actual export price was used to determine the price for exports implying inward processing arrangements 723• 
More frequent use bas been made of the export price basedon the facts available (Article 18 basic 
EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). In the majority of cases in which the 
export price was determined on the facts available, the official statistics conceming imports of the 
Gommunity or the Member States have been used724• Other sourees of information are the 
721 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monoroer 
originating in the United Statesof America and terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, NoL 258/20. 
722 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
textured polyester fabrics originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 20 May 1981, NoL 133/17. 
723 Council Decision 83/162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importsof acrylonitrile 
originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 20 April1983, NoL 101129. 
724 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 384/81 of 13 February 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on styrene monoroer 
originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 14 February 1981, NoL 42/14; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2127/82 of 28 
July 1982 imposing a provisional ~ti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene originating in the German Democratie Republic and 
Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain 
and the United States of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No L 223/76 ; CommiBBion Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 
accepting undertakings oft'ered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of perchlorethylene originating 
in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statesof America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, No 
L 371/47; Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne 
and its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No L 16/30; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hexamethylenetetramine 
~riginating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Boviet Union, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding 
in respect of import& of hexamethylenetetramine originating in Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, No L 40/24 ; 
CommiBBion Decision No 702/83/ECSC of 24 March 1983 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on certain iron or steel coils for 
re-rolling originating in Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela and accepting price undertakings from two Canadian exporters, 
O.J., 29 March 1983, NoL 82/9; Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Boviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 
28 February 1984, NoL 57/19; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 
April1984, NoL 109/11; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 699/88 of 15 March 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of oxalic acid originating in Taiwan and South Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's 
Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, NoL 227/24; Council Regulation (EEC) No 385190 of 
12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potaBBium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia 
and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 16 February 1990, No L 42/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 720190 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 27 March 1990, No L 80/9; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 762/90 of 26 
March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83129; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of 
China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of those products from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 
March 1990, NoL 83136; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& ofpotaBBium permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200190 
of 27 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 28 July 1990, No L 198/57 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 541191 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7· March 1991, No L 60/1 i Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ootton yarn originating in Brazil, 
Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 
27 September 1991, No L 271117 i CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
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(lowest725) export price established by the European anti-dumping authorities in respect of 
other exports coming from the same country726, the price data communicated by the importers 
in their applications for import licenses727, the export prices mentioned in the anti-dumping 
dumping duty on importsof certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's 
Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % Oow carbon ferro-chrome) 
originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 
September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3 i Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 
January 1994, No L 12/5 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 486194 of 4 March 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports 
of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 5 
March 1994, No L 6211 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, No 
L 94/21 ; Commiuion Decision 94/389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refmed 
antimony trioxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, NoL 176/41; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, 
Ukraine, Brazit and South.Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15. 
The use of Eurostat statistics has been rejected : 
because they were said not be correct (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3434191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in India or the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 1991, No 
L 326/6); 
because they provided information in respect of a category of products which encompassed other products than the dumped 
one (Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into 
the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 
February 1994, No L 48/10). 
725 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2471/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio photo albums 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 3664/93 of 22 December 1993 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of photo albums in bookbound form originating in the People's Republic of 
China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1993, No L 333/67. 
726 Commisaion Regulation (EC) No 1783/94 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof furfuraldehyde originating 
in the Peop1e's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186/11. 
727 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-
watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11114 i Commission Decision No 3113/83/ECSC of 4 November 1983 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof concrete reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 5 November 1983, No 
L 303113 ; Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, NoL 18/31 i Commission Decision 
No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain flat-rolled products of iron or 
non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 March 1989, NoL 78/14. 
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complaint728 , information obtained from a producer in the Community and an importer729 or 
from some importers 730, or the information obtained during the on-spot verification by the 
European anti-dumping authorities731 • In review proceeding, the export price determined in 
the original investigation is sometimes the best in formation avallab Ie 732• The actual export 
price is also used when it is the only available information 733 • That actual export price may be 
728 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 of 29 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
polyester yarn originating in the United Statas of America, O.J., 2 September 1980, No L 23115 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2079/83 of 25 July 1983 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan, O.J., 27 
July 1983, No L 203113 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191180 imposing 
a defmitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statesof America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 26 
October 1983, NoL 294/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, No 
L 235/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 450/89 of 20 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in the United States of America or Venezuela and adjusting the defmitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi Arabia laid 
down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 24 February 1989, NoL 52/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1472/91 of 29 May 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding in respect of import& of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3434191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in 
India or the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 1991, No L 326/6; Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 
February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors 
originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, No L 48/10 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076/94 of 
6 May 1994 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertain watch movements originating in Malaysia and 
Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate orginating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No 
L 298/32. 
729 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April 1984, No L 109/11; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 328/85 of 6 February 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain glass 
mirrors originating in South Africa, O.J., 8 February 1985, NoL 36/10; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1472/91 of 29 May 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-dumping 
proeeeding in respect of imports of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62. 
73° Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of 
ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No 
L 83/117 ; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proeeeding coneerDing imports of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and terminating the investigation, 
O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import. of hall hearings with a graatest external diameter not exeeeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 
1990, NoL 152124; Com.miBBion Decision 911512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review 
of anti-dumping measures coneerDing imports of artificial corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of 
artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 275/27; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol 
originating in the RUBSian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/12; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the 
RUBSian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94/21. 
731 Commiaaion Rcgulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional dutiea on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16. 
732 Council Rcgulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-dumping dutiea 
on imports of potaaaium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, No L 80/1. 
733 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1321181 of 15 May 1981 amending Regulation (EEC) No 384/81 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on styrene monomar originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 19 May 1981, NoL 132/17. 
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the · weighted average of the actual export price of onl y 30 % of total exports to the 
Community734 0 Also the weighted average of the prices charged for all the different product 
types has been used as export price for only one of these types 735 0 Furthermore, the 
constructed export price may be used instead of the actual export price736o The constructed 
export price may be determined by calculating the difference between the lowest price charged by 
the exporter concerned in the Community market, and the costs incurred by another exporter 
between importation and resale, when there is no information available as to the prices paid by the 
first independent buyer to the exporter' s associated importer and costs of the exporter 
concerned737 0 Also the lowest export price of a fully cooperating exporter established in the 
same country 738 or the export prices of exporters established in another country subject to the 
same anti-dumping proceeding are being applied739 0 If the price actually charged to an 
associated importer reflects the fact that the assembied product contains components supplied, at 
no charge to the producer, by this impotter, the export price will be constructed by adding an 
amount representing the costof and the profit realizable on the components740. 
The sourees used as information available are often to the detriment of the allegedly dumping 
exportero Indeed, the export prices invoiced in the official import statistles will usually be 
undervalued by the exporter in order to minimize the customs duties to be paid. Also the 
734 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 365/25; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1812/91 of 24 June 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on inlports of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of 
ChiD.a and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumpi~ duty, O.J., 28 June 1991, NoL 166/1. 
735 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of woven 
polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 
1990, No L 256/38). 
736 Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/83 of 17 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! 
fertilizer originating in the United Statas of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, NoL 15/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 
24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating 
in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, NoL 167/3. 
737 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio magnetie disks 
(3,5" mierodisb) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republie of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 95/5. 
738 Commission Deciaion No 702/83/ECSC of 24 March 1983 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on eertaio iron or steel eoils for re-
rolling originating in Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela and aceepting price undcrtakings from two Canadian exporters, O.J., 29 March 
1983, NoL 82/9. 
739 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
aspartame originating in Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 29 November 1990, No L 330/16. 
740 Commission Regulation (EC) No 534/94 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio magnetie disks 
(3,5" microdisks) originating in HongKong and the Republie of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5. 
267 
complainant industry will undervalue export prices in order to increase the dumping margin741 • 
Likewise, the lowest export price of·a fully cooperating exporter will result in a higher dumping 
margin. Only once the European anti-dumping authorities have explained their case law of 
choosing relatively low export prices, namely they have held that the use of higher export prices 
would constitute a bonus for non-cooperation 742• This argumentation makes sense : where 
actual export prices are lower than the one used by the European anti-dumping authorities, the 
exporters would certainly protest and offer full cooperation. 
4. NORMAL V ALUE AND EXPORT PRICE COMPARED 
4.1. ADJUSTMENTS FOR ENSURING A FAIR COMPARISON 
Under GATT anti-dumping law a fair comparison must bemadebetween the normal value and the 
export price. Such a fair comparison implies that the two price standards must be compared at the 
same level of trade and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. In 
addition, due allowance must be made in each case for the differences which affect price 
comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, 
quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect 
price comparability (Article Vl(l) GATT ; Artiele 2.4. GATI Anti-dumping Code). In short, all 
differences affecting price comparability must be taken into account. GA TI anti-dumping law, in 
this respect, is intended, on the one hand, to detect all types of price discrimination, including 
cases of covert price discrimination, and, on the other hand, to ignore all situations which 
apparently seem to be price discriminating, but which, in fact, are not143 • 
Under European anti-dumping law, as under GATI anti-dumping law, normal value and export 
price must be compared at as nearly as possible the same time. However, under European anti-
dumping law, adjustments are admitted for but a limited number of differences : differences in 
741 See also: VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d Practice in the United Stales an.d the European. Communities. A 
Comparative Analyais, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,444. 
742 Commission Deciaion No 702/83/ECSC of 24 March 1983 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on eertaio iron or steel coils for re-
rolling originating in Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela and accepting price undertakinga from two Canadian exporters, O.J., 29 March 
1983, NoL 82/9. 
743 In a simHar sense, see: BESELER, J.F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. 
Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 89-93. 
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physical characteristics ; differences in import charges and indirect taxes ; differences in discounts 
and rebates ; differences in selling expenses resulting from sales made at different levels of trade, 
or in different quantities, or under different conditions and terms of sale (Article 2(10) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 2(9) and (10) basic ECSC Decision)744• Though GATI anti-dumping law 
provides that allowance must be made for all differences which are shown to affect price 
comparability (Article 2.4. GATT Anti-dumping Code), European anti-dumping law, however, 
does not necessarily vialate GA TT anti-dumping law. By restricting the number of differences, 
European anti-dumping law will not detect all cases of actual price discrimination. This does not 
go against GATT anti-dumping law which does not require to find and sanction all cases of 
du.mping. However, European anti-dumping law will vialate GATI anti-dumping law as, by 
restricting the number of differences, it will consider cases of apparent, but, in fact, not real price 
discrimination as actual price discrimination. In that case, anti-dumping relief may be granted, 
though no actual dumping is being practised745• But, perhaps, the European anti-dumping 
authorites may interpret the few categones of allowable differences broadly so as to allow 
adjustments for all kinds of differences, and to reduce or even to remove the possible breach of 
744 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo Bearing Compan.y Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1854; C.J.E.C., case 
266/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1889; C.J.E.C., case 268/84, 7 May 1987, Nippon Seiko 
KK v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1961; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebeu Compan.y Limited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 2004; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases 294/86 and 77/87, 6 October 1988, Technointorg v Commission an.d Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6114-6116; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-306/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 
1990, I, (2945), 2983 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN); C.J.E.C., joined cases C-320/86 and C-188/87, 11 July 1990, 
Stanko France v Commi .. ion an.d Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3013), 3016; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 
i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 163/1; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on i.mports of certain hall hearings 
and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, NoL 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 
October 1985 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and acceptiri.g 
undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain importsof such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 
1985, No L 275/6; WAER, P., «Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic 
Approach", -!ournal of World Tra.de, 199313, (47), 63-64. 
Therefore, adjustments are rejected if they cannot he subsumed in either of these categories, see : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2936/82 of 28 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 4 
November 1982, No L sosn ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 imposing a definitive. anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain deep freezers originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 8 January 1987, No L 6/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
864187 of 23 March 1987 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on i.mports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an 
output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, 
No L 83/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1043/87 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 14 April 1987, No L 102/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 June 1988 i.mposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on i.mports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No 
L 151139 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/58); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 i.mposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the 
United Btates of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151147 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 
1988 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, 0 . .1.., 16 December 1988, NoL 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a defi.nitive 
anti-dumping duty on i.mports of synthetic fi.bres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea 
of America or Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 17 December 1988, NoL 348/49. 
745 P. WAER (WAER, P., «Constructed Nonnal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculationa. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach», Joumal of 
World Trade, 1993/3, (47), 55), however, argues that Eluopean anti-dumping law alwaya violatea GAIT anti-dumping law by restricting the 
number of adjustmcnt categoriea. As he does distinguish between cases in which dumping ia found though there is actually no dumping, and casea 
in which the actual dumping is nol detected, he ignores that GA IT anti-dumping law doea nol oblige its Contracting Parties to detect all instances 
of actual dumping. 
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GA TT anti-dumping law. Heremafter, it will be investigated whether such a broad interpretation 
is provided or whether the interpretation upheld by European anti-dumping authorities may result 
in finding dumping in cases where no actual dumping is being practised. 
Moreover, under ECSC anti-dumping law, individual adjustments ha ving an ad valorem effect of 
less than 0,5 % of that price or value are ordinarily considered insignificant (Article 2(10)(e) basic 
ECSC Decision). The opportunity to disregard claims for adjustments which are insignificant in 
relation to the price or value of the affected transactions, also goes against GA TT anti-dumping 
law. The cumulation of several insignificant differences for which no adjustments are being 
Irtade, may result in the determination of a positive dumping margin and, thus, in the imposition 
of anti-dumping measures, though, in fact, no actual dumping is being practised746• In a 
number of anti-dumping cases, adjustments have not been made, if the differences did not 
substantially affect price comparability747• However, in none of those cases, various 
in significant differences have been cumulated. Moreover, the European anti-dumping authorities 
have refused to disregard claims for allowances having an ad valorem effect of less than 0.5 % 
when, taken together, they have an appreciable effect on the prices or the value of the transactions 
to which they are related748• Nevertheless, the opportunity of cumulation and of serious 
violations of GA TI anti-dumping law subsists. Perhaps, therefore, the provision on de minimis 
adjustments bas been deleted in EC anti-dumping law at the occasion of its adjusment to the new 
GA TT anti-dumping Code. A similar amendment to ECSC anti-dumping law is appropriate. 
746 BELi.Js, J.-F., VERMULST, E., and WAER, P., .ccFurther Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation: A Codification of 
Contraversial MethodologieBN, Joumal of World Trade, 1989, (21), 29. 
747 Commission Decision 80/316/EEC of 14 March 1980 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning stereo cassette tape 
heads originating in Japan, O.J., 16 March 1980, NoL 69/64; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 of 12 May 1981 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 15 May 1981, No 
L 129/1; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
natura! magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., 30 December 
1982, No L 371125 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 163/83 of 21 January 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, No L 23/9 ; Commission Regulation 
<EEC) No 909/85 of 2 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio kinds of polystyrene sheet 
originating in Spain, O.J., 4 April1986, NoL 97/30; Commission Decision 86/35/EEC of 21 February 1986 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of fibre building board from Finland and Sweden and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 25 February 1986, No L 46/23 ; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in 
lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272129; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour telavision 
receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 
1994, No L 255/50. 
748 Commiaaion Rcgulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind uscd in motor vehicles, Qriginating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2306/92 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 1993, NoL 13/20). 
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4.2. CATEGORIES OF ADJUSTMENTS 
4. 2.1. Differences in selling expenses 
4.2.1.1. General characteristics 
ECSC anti-dumping law allows adjustments only for three categones of differences affecting price 
comparability. One of those three categones is constituted by differences in selling expenses 
(Article 2(9)(a)(iii) basic ECSC Decision). Those differences have to follow from sales made at 
different levels of trade, or in different quantities, or under different conditions and terms of sale. 
Those selling expenses oomprise only five categones : 
(i) transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs ; 
(ü) packing ; 
(ili) credit ; 
(iv) warranties, guaranties, teehoical assistance and other after-sales services ; 
(v) other selling expenses, i.e., commissions and salaries paid to salesmen, i.e., personnel 
wholly engaged in direct selling activities. 
EC anti-dumping law does not treat of the general category of selling expenses. It allows, 
though, adjustments for the same categones : 
(i) transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs ; 
(ü) packing ; · 
(ili) credit ; 
(iv) warranties, guaranties, teehoical assistance and other after-sales services ; 
(v) commissions (Article 2(10) basic EC Regulation). 
Both lists are intended to be exhaustive749• Therefore, in some anti-dumping cases, the · 
European anti-dumping authorities have refused adj ustments for differences in selling expenses 
749 BELLIS, J.-F., •The EEC Antidumping Systemn, in Antidumping Law and Practice. A Comparatiue Study, JACKSON, J.H., 
and VERMULST, E.A. (ede.), New York, Harveeter Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 82; BELLIS, J.-F., VERMULST, E., and WAER, P., 
d'urther Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation : A Codification of Contraversial Methodologiesn, Journal of Worlel Trcule, 
1989, (21), 28; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., •cA Decade of European Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice 
Applicable to Imparts from China", Journal of Worlel Trade, 1992/3, (5), 25 ; VERMULST, E., and W AER, P., «De nieuwe EEG 
Anti-dumping Verordening 2423/88: Een stille revolutie", S.E. W., 1989; (151), 155; WAER,·P., «Constructed NormalValues in EC 
Dumping Margin Calculations. Fiction, or a Realistic Approach", Journal of Worlel Trade, 1993/3, (4 7), 55. 
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because such adjustments were not provided for by European anti-dumping law750 or have 
allowed an adjustment because it could be subsumed under one of the enlisted selling 
expenses 751 • However, as adjustments have been made for differences in selling expenses 
which are not enlisted752, European anti-dumping authorities possibly do not consider the list of 
75° Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a defmitive anti~umping duty on imports of polyester 
yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, NoL 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti~wnping duty on imports of certain compact 
disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 257/27) ; Commission Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 September 1989 terminating the anti~umping proceeding concerning import& of 
mica originating in Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, NoL 284/45; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in 
Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127) ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 
9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti~umping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong 
Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of 
China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50. 
751 The European anti-dumping authorities have made an allowance for the practice applied by the exporter on his dornestic market to indicate on 
the invoice a percentage of the amount of the invoice corresponding to the supply of spare parta frcc of charge, because this practice was considered 
to be equivalent to warrantiea for which European anti-dumping law allows adjustments (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 
1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South 
Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8). 
752 Adjustments have been made for : 
price diacounta and reductions for eertaio quantity sales, though ECSC anti-dumping law does not provide for such adjustments (Commission 
Deciaion 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 ternûnating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of eertaio seamless tubes of iron or 
non-alloy atccl originating in Austria, O.J., 28 January 1989, NoL 25/87); 
«differenccs in quantity» without any further cxplanation (Council Regulation (EEC) No 385/90 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-
dumping duty imposed on tbose imports, O.J., 16 February 1990, No L 42/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 of 27 July 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof silicon metal originating in tbc People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 July 1990, No 
L 198/57). Perbaps those «differences in quantity» affect one of the five categones of selling expenses (e.g., transport costs may he different 
depending on tbc quantity to be transported), but, if they do not, then ECSC anti-dumping law does not provide any adjustment for them ; 
barbour dues (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon 
metal originating in Brazil, O.J., 10 April 1992, No L 96/17), thougb European anti-dumping law does notprovide for such adjustmenta. 
Fortbey seem oot to ressort under tbe notion of ~transport costs» since in the samecase a separate adjustment for transport costs bas been 
allowed for ; 
costs reauiting from non-recoverable waste caused by successive loading and unloading of the export consignments (Commission Decision 
90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 ternûnating tbe review of tbe anti-dumping measures concerning dense sodium carbonale originating in tbe 
Uniled Statea of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, No L 283/38; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115/91 of 29 April 1991 imposing 
definitivc anti-dumping duties in conneetion witb the review of anti-dumping meaaurea conccrning imports of ferro-silicon originating in 
Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 111/1; Commission Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting undertakings offered by eertaio 
exporten in conneetion witb the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fcrro-silicon originating in Brazil and ternûnating 
tbe investigation as regards those exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 111/47). Through a broad interpretation, these costs may be subsumed 
under thc category of loading costs. However, European anti-dumping case law does not clarify whether they were considered to be loading 
costs or aome other selling expense provided under European anti-dumping law ; 
financing costa (Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon 
metal originatina in Brazil, O.J., 10 April 1992, No L 96/17), tbough European anti-dumping law does nol provide for such adjustments. 
Adjuatments have been rejccled for : 
savings in tbc coat of producing different quantities not because they are not provided under ECSC anti-dumping law, but because of lack of 
evidencc (Council Rcgulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serlal-impact 
dot-matrix prinlera originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33. Sec alao: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 
11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in 
Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion witb such imports, O.J., 15 December 1990, No L 351/17, where 
tbe Commiuion staled tbat «(n)o quantity discounts were granted». This statement only makes sense when adjustments would have been 
granled if quantity discounts had been made) or because they had already been taken into account (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 
of 4 Fcbruary 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, 
originating in Soutb Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8) ; 
~differenccs in quantity• oot because they are not provided under ECSC anti-dumping law, but because of lack of evidence (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2305/92 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in Brazil and 
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selling expenses to be exhaustive753• It is not yet clear which interpretation European anti-
dumping authorities will eventually uphold. For the moment, there is certainly no legal certainty. 
Moreover, if the list of selling expenses finally proves to be exhaustive, European anti-dumping 
law will sometimes violate GATT anti-dumping law754• It is, indeed, impossible to anticipate 
all types of differences in selling expenses, which may affect price comparison. 
Notall selling expenses enumerated in European anti-dumping law may give rise to adjustments in 
European anti-dumping law. Only for differences in selling expenses hearing a direct relationship 
to the sales of the product under investigation, adjustments may be made. By restricting the type 
of selling expenses for which adjustments are allowed, European anti-dumping law seems to beat 
varianee with GA TT anti-dumping law, which does not require such a direct relationship and, 
thus, allows adjustments for differences in all kinds of selling expenses, either directly or 
indirectly related755• European anti-dumping law does not define the form such a direct 
relationship should take. European anti-dumping authorities have chosen for a rather restrictive 
interpretation. They hold that the relationship should be functional ; selling expenses must be 
incurred because a particular sale is made, and must be strictly necessary to fulfil the terms of the 
sale under consideration 756• 1t is, indeed, a restrictive interpretation. From an economie point 
definitively collectirig the amounts secured by way ofthe provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/1). 
753 With regard to the adjustments made for price discounts and reductions for certain quantity sales, the possibility has also to 
he envisaged that these price discounts and reduction were considered as ccdiscounts and rebates" in the sense of Artiele 2(3Xa) and 
(8Xa) basic ECSC Decision. In that case, such adjustments would not negate the exhaustive character of the list of adjustable 
selling expenses of Artiele 2(10Xc) basic ECSC Decision. 
754 Supra, 267-268. 
155 W AER, P. and VERMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?», Joumal of World 
Trade, 1994/2, (5), 13. Contra: Advocate General LENZ, whoheld that GATI anti-dumping law allows adjustments only for differences in 
selling expensea which are directly related tothesales (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Na/cajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 
1991, I, (2069), 2134 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ)). 
756 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 163/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 
1985, No L 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of 
certain import& of such product& originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O . .J., 
7 August 1986, No L 221116 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5 i Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain deep freezers originating in the 
USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep freezers originating in 
Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning 
import& of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14. See also : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1043/87 of 10 
April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of 
more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April1987, NoL 102/5; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, 
NoL 272/13; Council Regulation (EEC) No 611193 of 15 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs originating in the Republic of Korea and exported by companies 
not exempted from this duty, and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O . .T., 18 March 1993, NoL 66/1;. 
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of view, the distinction between fixed and variabie costs shouid be the crucial criterion. Indeed, 
variabie selling expenses are only incurred when the product is actualiy soid. European anti-
dumping case Iaw bas applied this criterion properly in conneetion with costs of distribution and 
marketing : adjustments are made for variabie costs of distribution 757, whereas fixed costs of 
distribution 758 and marketing 759 are considered as not hearing a direct reiationship. 
However, other variabie costs are not always considered to bear a direct reiationship760• 
Moreover, from an economie point of view, the European anti-dumping authorities do not always 
make a correct distinction between fixed and variabie costs. For costs incurred oniy on the 
For example, the salaries of salesleaders do not bear such a direct relationship since the sale leaders' role consiste essentially in 
carrying out general functions within the scope of management and direction, not in selling the product directly to the buyer 
(C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1598 (Report for the Hearing: 
conclusions of the Council), 1616-1617 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1629 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 
of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor 
vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 3418). 
Credit costs related to the financing of value added tax and special excise tax do not bear a direct relationship either (Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television 
receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 
1994, NoL 255/50). 
757 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2182/80 of 14 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! 
fertilizer originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 15 August 1980, NoL 212/43 i Council Regulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 
February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United States of America, 
O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4 ; Commission Decision 81135/EEC of 9 February 1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with 
the ·anti-dumping proceedings concerning certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 12 February 
1981, NoL 39/35; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 of 12 May 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate 
monomer originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 15 May 1981, No L 129/1 i Commission Decision 811406/EEC of 4 June 
1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hall and tapered roller 
hearings, originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 11 June 1981, No 
L 152/44 i Commission Decision 82/31/EEC of 14 January 1982 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing imparts of fluid craclting catalysts originating in the United Statee of America and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11125 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imparts of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 
80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building 
board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the 
proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181119; Commission Recommendation No 
2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, 
originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10; Commission Decision 831428/EEC of 26 August 1983 accepting an 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of caravans for camping and parts thereof 
originating in Yugoslavia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 August 1983, NoL 240/12. 
758 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2182/80 of 14 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain chemical 
fertilizer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 15 August 1980, NoL 212/43. 
759 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1101181 of 23 April 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on potato granules 
originating in Canada, O.J., 28 April1981, NoL 116/11. 
76° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5. 
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occasion of the sale of the like ·product are not always considered as hearing a direct 
relationship761 • Also costs related to selling expenses themselves bearing a direct relationship 
are not considered to bear a direct relationship to the sales in question 762. Nevertheless, 
because of their relationship with selling expenses hearing a direct relationship, such costs will 
· only be incurred if the product is sold. 
4.2.1.2. Level of trade 
4.2.1.2.1. The ex-factory level 
According to GA TI anti-dumping law, prices must be compared «at the same level of trade, 
normally at the ex-factory level» (Article 2.4. GATT Anti-dumping Code). According to the 
International Rules for the Interpretation of Trade Terms (so-called «lnco-Terms»), sales at the ex-
factory level imply that the seller' s only responsibility is to make the products available at bis 
premises and that the buyer bears the full cost and risk involved in transportlog the products from 
the seller's premises to the desired destination. Hence, prices at the ex-factory level do not 
oomprise transport costs, insurance costs and the like763• Thus, GA TT anti-dumping law 
requires transport cost, insurance costs and the like to be equally allocated to sales on the 
761 A fust example concerns excise duties. The financing of excise duties invoiced to customers is considered as being directly 
related to the sales of the like product, whereas the financing of the value added tax (V AT) is not. 
The differential traatm.ent is due tothefact that, in principle, the am.ount of excise duties included insales invoices to cuetomers 
are payable as such to the tax authorities. The amount of VAT, which has finally to he paid over to the tax authorities, on the 
other hand, is determined by the balance between the VAT charged to the company on its supplies and the VAT which the 
·company colleCte from its customers. In the balance of VAT to he financed there is no amount for the like products which is 
identifiable separately. 
As a result, the financing cost of the VAT is considered as a general, overhead, expense (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 
of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisionftl anti-dumping duty on imparts of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1). 
However, this oost will he incurred only ü the company sells its products. As long as it does not sell its products, the balance will 
he negative and the company does not bear any financing cost for the VAT. lndeed, ü the balance is negative, it does nat have to 
pay any VAT over to the tax authorities. 
A second example concerns the transport costs incurred by the producer on sales to his associated sales company : since these costs 
correspond to the internal transfer of products between associated companies and are incurred in a stage prior to the sales to the 
fust independent buyer, they are considered not to bear a direct relationship (C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Inc. v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1274 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1294). Transport costs from the factory to the 
sales offices or warehouses of the dumping exporter are neither considered to bear a direct relationship (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts into the Community of certain large 
electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No 
L 163127)). 
762 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2193/83 of 29 July 1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
review proceeding on imparts of urea ammonium nitrate salution fertilizer (UAN) originating in the United Statee of Am.erica and 
terminating the proceeding, O.J., 3 August 1983, No L 211/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 
impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings 
and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imparts of sU:ch products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No 
L 275/5. . 
763 Contra: C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolla Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1591 (Report for the 
Hearing: conclusions ofthe Council) and 1607 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO). 
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dornestic market and to export sales. By reeommending the ex-factory level, GATT anti-dumping 
law also excludes the determination of dumping to be influenced by differences in these costs. 
Indeed, as transport costs and the like vary on the basis of the distance between seller and buyer, 
it is best to stick to prices at the ex-factory level for price comparison. 
European anti-dumping law allows adjustments for differences in selling expenses resulting from 
sales made at different levels of trade. It provides that normal value and export price must be 
reduced by the directly related costs incurred for conveying the product concerned from the 
premises of the exporter to the first independent buyer ; those costs camprise transport, insurance, 
~andling, loading and ancillary costs (such as overtime in loading764) (Article 2(10)(e) basic 
EC Regulation ; .Article 2(10)(c)(i) basic ECSC Decision). As the ex-factory level precisely 
excludes those costs from the price, European anti-dumping law does not merely recommend, but 
in fact imposes the ex-factory levet165• This is more appropriate. The obligation to use the 
ex-factory level increases legal certainty and decreases the probability of unequal treatment 
between exporters. In tigure 1 of Chapter II766 it was demonstrated that the choice of the level 
of trade on which prices are compared is not without consequences : if prices are compared at the 
ex-factory level, dumping will be found767 ; if prices are compared at the cif level (i.e., if they 
include all costs for conveying the product to the buyer), no dumping proper will be found768• 
764 Commission Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of wire 
rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O . .J., 13 November 1985, NoL 299/18; 
765 According to the European anti-dumping authorities, it is not always legally required to compare prices at the ex-factory level, as they have 
held that «the normal value and export price should nonnally be compared on an ex-factory level• (Council Regulation (EC) No 486/94 of 4 March 
.1994 impoaing detinitivc anti-dumping duties on importa of fluorspar originating in the People'a Republic of China and collecting definitively the 
provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 5 March 1994, NoL 6211) (emphasis added). 
766 . 
Supra, 27-29. 
767 This effect of using the ex-factory level may explain why the importer of silicon carbide from the USSR criticized the making 
of comparisons on the ex-factory level. He observed that he bought at a price which included the costs of transport over a long 
distance from the USSR to hls premises. Those costs, he underscored, are important in the case of the product concerned, which is 
of relatively low value in relation to its weight and volume (Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting 
undertakings gi.ven in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding iniports of that product 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 10 October 1986, 
No L 287/25). The importer's objections can give the impreesion that the Soviet exporter was practising freight absorption; 
otherwise the importer would have no reason for hls critique. 
768 Though figure 1 may gi.ve that impreBBion, oomparing normal value and export price at the ex-factory level will not 
necessarily increase the number of dumping cases nor the dumping margin. lndeed, spatial price discrimination does not always 
result in dumping ; reverse dumping is also possible. Whether dumping or reverse dumping is being practised, depends on the 
convexity of the demand curve and on the relative degree of competitiveness on the exporting and importing mar ket. See : supra, 
27-30. 
Moreover, also normal value has to be determined on the ex-factory level. It is possible that the allegedly dumping exporter is 
practising freight absorption on his dornestic market. By calculating hls dornestic prices at the ex-factory level, normal value will 
be lowered. As a consequence, the probability of finding dumping or the margin of dumping will be less. See : Commission 
Recommendation No 259/83/ECSC of 27 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on broad-flanged beams originating 
in Spain, 0 . .1., 1 February 1983, No L 30/61 (corrigendum, O . .J., 8 February 1983, No L 36/10), where the Commission took into 
account the fact tcthat in some instances transportation costs on the dornestic market incurred by the companies were higher than 
the conesponding amount billed to the customer». 
~~ 
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Moreover, the choice of the level of trade is also crucial for determining whether selling expenses 
are directly related to the sales in question, thus, whether adjustments are allowed for769• As a 
consequence, the ex-factory level should always be used, unless the necessary information is not 
available (see : Artiele 18 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). European 
anti-dumping law, however, is not always respected. Prices have been compared at the «cif» 
(cost, insurnnee and freight), «fob» (free on board, franco border) or «ex warehouse» level instead 
of the «ex factory» level. Only exceptionally, those other levels of trade have been used as the 
best in formation available 770• 
4.2.1.2.2. Differences on the demand side 
Under European anti-dumping law prevailing before August 1988, the concept «level of trade>> was 
put forward as basis for adjustments because of differences in the categones of buyers 
(distributors, original equipments manufacturers (so-called OEMs), dealers, end-users) which 
result in cost differences for the exporters771 • Thus, the Court of Justice bas ruled that the 
769 In chemical fertilizera from the USA normal value and export price were compared at the level ccex terminal•• because 
deliveries to almost all customers on the dornestic market of the exporting country were made ccex terminal». As a consequence, 
the oparating casts of the terminal were considered as general selling expenses hearing no direct relationship with the sales of the 
product in question ; no adjustments were made for these oparating coats, though an adjustment was made for the coat of 
transportation from the factory to the terminal (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 290/83 of 2 February 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution fertilizer originating in the United Statee of America, 
O.J., 4 February 1988, No L 3319; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2193/83 of 29 July 1983 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping review proceeding on importsof urea ammonium nitrate solution fertilizer (UAN) originating in 
the United Statas of America and terminating the proceeding, O . .J., 3 August 1983, NoL 21111). 
770 The only legally valid basis for using other levels of trade is that the other levels of trade are used as best information · · 
available (Article 18 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). See e.g. : Commission Decision 84/408/EEC of 16 
August 1984 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review proceeding concerning imports of copper 
sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and terminating that proceeding, O . .J., 22 August 1984, No L 225/22. In the majority of 
anti-dumping cases, however, no motivation is given why the ex-factory level is not used. 
771 C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1393; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 
March 1992, Matsu.hita Electric ln.dustrial Co. Ltd an.d Matsushila Electric Trcul.in.g Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 
1477; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Min.olta Camera Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1591 (Report for the 
Hearing: conclusions of the Council) and 1607 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1630; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O . .J., 22 
June 1985, NoL 16311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports 
of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, NoL 167/3; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2865/85 of 1-' October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic scales originating 
in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in 
Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5 .. 
In other cases, acljustments for different selling expenses rasuiting from differences among buyers have been rejected not because 
they would be illegal, but merely because of lack of proof, see : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O . .J., 26 August 1986, No 
L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the Geman Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, 
the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O . .J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact 
dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12. 
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normal value and the export price are compared at the same level of trade, if they are both 
established at the level of the first sale to an independent purchaser772• 
Present ECSC anti-dumping law does notprovide adjustments for such differences on the demand 
side 773 • If the list of adjustments provided under European anti-dumping law, is exhaustive, 
adjustments for differences on the demand side are legally prohibited. Perhaps, to that end, the 
European anti-dumping authorities use the selective normal value determination, if prices are a 
function of the channel of sale774 : for each category of buyers a specific normal value is 
determined775 or sales to specific categoties of buyers (especially dealers and end-users) are 
excluded for the determination of the normal value when these categoties of buyers are not 
772 C.J.E.C., joincd cases 277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon Inc. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 5805; C.J.E.C., joined cases 
260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electtic Company Lld (IEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5920; C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 
May 1991, Naklljima AU Precision Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2188; C.J.E.C., c111e C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Inc. v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1288 and 1293; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. LJd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 
1393 ; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushila Eleclric Induslrial Co. i.td and Matsushila Eleclric Trading Co. LJd v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1477; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1630; 
C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1675. 
773 Perhaps, thcrefore, the Court of Justice refers not to present European anti-dumping law, but only to GAlT and former European anti-
dumping law for its interpretation of the notion of «ex-factory level» as requiring normal value and export price to be compared at the level of the 
fint Ale to an independent purchaser (see: C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Naklljima AU Precision Co. LJd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, 
(2069), 2188). 
774 Council Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" .. 
microdisk:s) originating in Hoog Kong and the Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 
1994, No L 236/2. 
775 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2093 (Report for the 
Hearing: conclusions of the Council); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain compactdisc players .originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 
(corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 
October 1989, NoL 31411; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain compactdisc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional 
duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, No L 13121; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of small-eereen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting defmitively 
the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133192); Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps 
originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, No L 321/19) ; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps 
originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 1411; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small-eereen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14131; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the 
provisional duty and terminating the procedure concerning HongKong, O.J., 14 May 1991, NoL 119/35. 
See also : Council Regulation (EC) No 2819194 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
potassium permanganate orginating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32, where no distinction 
was made between sales to distributors and sales to end-users since there was no differentiation in terms of prices. 
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oomparabie with buyers within the Community776• The Court of Justice considers this metbod 
even to be legally obligatory when marketing to one type of buyers involves other costs than sales 
to another type of buyers 777• The Court, though, along with the European anti-dumping 
authorities, seems not to regard this metbod as to prevent adjustments for differences on the 
demand side. According to the Court, the European anti-dumping authorities, in excercising the 
power of appraisal they have when evaluating complex economie situations, are entitled to make 
adjustments for differences in the level of trade778• Hence, the Court does not consider the list 
of adjustments to be exhaustive. Indeed, it bas held that European anti-dumping law is not to be 
interpreted as entitling the European anti-dumping authorities to refuse to make allowances for 
differences in the level of trade as required by GA TT anti.;.dumping law779• As it has approved 
776 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
compactdisc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, 
NoL 257/27); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on i.mports of certain compactdisc players 
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, No 
L 13/21 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-braadcast receivers of a 
kind used in motor vehicles, originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 
1993, No L 13/20); Council Regulation (EEC) No 993/93 of 26 April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April1993, NoL 10414. 
The ·selective normal value determination already existed under prior Europaan anti-dumping law, see : Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 349/81 of 9 February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United 
Statee of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, NoL 39/4; Commission Decision 81/35/EEC of 9 February 1981 accepting undertak.ings 
in conneetion witb the anti-dumping proceedings concerning certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/35 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on importsof certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April1986, NoL 97/1. 
The selective normal value determination is, in fact, a sampling technique : only certain sales are taken into account. In Europaan 
anti-dumping law sampling is allowed. Under EC anti-dumping law, it is allowed if the samples are statistically valid or 
encompaBB the ·Iargeet representative volume of production, sales or exports (Article 17 basic EC Regulation) ; under ECSC anti-
dumping law, it is allowed if the most frequently occurring or representative prices are used (Article 2(13) basic ECSC Decision). 
Thus, sampling sbould have no impact on the height of the dumping margin. It must not have an effect of adjustments in the 
sense of Artiele 2(10) basic EC Regulation or Artiele 2(9) and (10) basic ECSC Decision. However, the selective normal value 
determination seems to substitute adjustments for differences in level of trade. Therefore, it may he argued that it is illegal. 
Nevertheleu, the idea underlying the selected normal value determination is in conformity with GATr anti-dumping law. lndeed, 
the GATr Group of Experts, in its 1959 Report, held that the concept «level of trade» was aimed at cca comparison of prices at the 
samelevel of trade- e.g., wholesale» (B.LS.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GATr, 1960, 149, consideration 8). Only the metbod 
used for arriving at the same level of trade is not allo wed. 
777 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2189-2190. 
778 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2189-2190. 
779 C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushila Electrlc lndustrlal Co. Lid and Matsushila Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1409), 1478. 
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European anti-dumping case .law780 in which adjustments for differences among buyers have 
been rejected because of lack of evidence, the Court, moreover, implicitly held that adjustments 
for differences on the demand side are legally allowed as soon as there is sufficient evidence 
available781• Since the Court's approval, the European anti-dumping authorities have taken 
account of cost differences depending on differences on the demand side782 and, at the occasion 
of its renewal, EC anti-dumping legislation has explicitly incorporated the interpretation of the 
notion «level of trade» as referring to differences on the demand side (Article 2(10)(d) basic EC 
Regulation). 
4.2.1.2.3. Associations 
Contrary to differences on the demand side, differences on the supply side have always been 
refused as basis for adjustments to reconstruct the same «level of trade>>. The European anti-
dumping authorities always reject the claim of exporters that all costs and profits of the associated 
sales companies have to be subtracted from normal value because of a difference in level of trade. 
Nevertheless, there is good ground forthem to make such adjustments, because normal value and 
export price are determined differently when selling parties are associated. If exporter and 
importer are associated, the price at which the imported product is first resold to an independent 
buyer is used as export price standard. That price has to be adjusted ex officio for all costs 
incurred between importation and resale and for a reasonable profit margin (Article 2(9)(a) basic 
EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision). However, when manufacturer and sales 
company in the country of origin or in the exporting country are associated, normal value is based 
on the price at which the product is resold to an independent buyer on the dornestic market Not 
any adjustment can legally be made for the .costs incurred between the sale between the associated 
78° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain i.mports of 
video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 601/89 of 27 February 1989 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain video cassette recorders 
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, No 
L 57/65; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
compactdisc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, 
NoL 257/27); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 
September 1993, NoL 228/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty i.mposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4. 
781 CJ.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Na/cajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2189-2190; C.J.E.C., case C-
175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushila Electric lndustrial Co. Lid and Matsushila Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1478; 
CJ.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolla Olmera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1630. 
782 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour tclevision 
receiven originating in Malaysia, the Peoplc's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., I October 1994, No 
L 255/50. 
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parties and the resale to an independent buyer783 • Hence, normal value and export price are 
not determined on the same level of trade. Therefore, an exporter who actually does not dump, 
will be found to dump at a margin equal to the costs incurred between the sale between the 
associated parties and the resale to independent buyers on the dornestic market of the ex porter. 
As to the Court of Justice, however, a fair comparison between normal value and export price 
does not imply identical adjustments to normal value and export price 784, nor determination of 
normal value and export price on the basis of identical methods785• Indeed, European anti-
dumping law does not require normal value and export price to be determined on the samebasis 
in order to calculate the dumping margin. The purpose of the different normal value and export 
price standards (Article 2(1) up to (9) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(3) up to (8) basic ECSC 
Decision), is to determine a normal value and an export price corresponding to conditions of 
ordinary course of trade786• The purpose of the adjustments is to ensure a «fair comparison» 
783 See: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, 
O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings 
originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, NoL 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting U.ndertakings and 
terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058186 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports ·of certain electronic 
scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April1986, NoL 9711; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, No L 221/16; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; ·commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, 
No L 130/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
serial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional witi-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in 
Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27). See also: C.J.E.C., 
case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2097 (Report for the Hearing: plea in 
law of the applicant) and 2187. 
784 C.J.E.C., case 265/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1891-1893 ; C.J.E.C., case 258/84, 7 
May 1987, Nippon Seiko KK v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1967-1970; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea Company Limited v 
Council, E.C.R., 1987, 2009-2011. lndeed, if e.g., transport costs are included in the export price but not in the normal value, 
transportation coats will have to either deducted from the export price or added to the normal value in order to make a fair 
comparison. See also : C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima. All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2188-
2189. 
785 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo Bea.ring Company Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1852-1854; C.J.E.C., 
case 255/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1888-1893; C.J.E.C., case 258/84, 7 May 1987, 
Nippon Seiko KK v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 1963-1970; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea. Company Limited v Council, 
E.C.R., 1987, 2003-2011; C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon Inc. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5731}, 
5804; C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Company Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 
(5855), 5897-5898 and 5920; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Bilver Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 
1988, (5927), 5979 ; C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E. C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2181 and 
2188-2189; C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon Inc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1288-1289 and 1293; C.J.E.C., 
case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1392; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, 
Mi.nolta Camera Co. Ltd v Counci.l, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1625. · 
786 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalcajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2187. 
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between normal value and export price (Article 2(10) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(9) and (10) 
basic ECSC Decision) 787• 
As is done by the Court of Justice, a distinction must be made between normal value and export 
price determination and the fair comparison of normal value and export price. However, this 
does not explain why normal value must include certain costs which. the export price must not 
include. The European anti-dumping authorities788 and the Court of Justice789 argue that 
normal value cannot be adjusted for the costs and profits of an associated sales company, as the 
sales company is independent only from a legal point of view, but constitutes an economie unit 
wi~h the manufacturing company. They argue that adjusting normal value for costs and profits of 
an associated sales company would sanction smaller exporters who do not have the financial 
means to set up a · sales agencies network. Th ere would be discrimination if expenses necessaril y 
included in the selling price of a product when it was sold by a sales department being part of the 
manufacturer's organlzation, were not included when that product was sold by a company which, 
though fmancially controlled by the manufacturer, was a legally distin ct entity. European anti-
787 See also : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with re gard to N akajima All 
Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, NoL 335/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 163/1; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importe of certain hall hearings and tapered roller 
hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings 
and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such product& originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No 
L 275/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, NoL 97/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of houeed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, No · 
L 221116; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 
May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eerial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 
May 1988, No L 130112 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players 
originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27); 
Answer ofthe Commission to written question No 313185, O.J., 7 October 1985, No C 255/38. 
788 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 
1985, No L 167/3 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of 
certain imports of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of houeed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 
7 August 1986, No L 221116. 
789 C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Company Lid (IEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5919; 
C.J.E.C., joined casea 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Silver Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5975; C.J.E.C., case C-
171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon Inc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1288. 
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dumping authorities, further, hold that such adjustments would encourage exporters to adopt such 
structures which would make European anti-dumping law ineffective790• 
It seems, however, that European anti-dumping law, by imposing an adjustment to the export 
price for the costs and profits of associated importers, sanctions big exporters who do have the 
necessary means to set up a sales agencies network for their exports. Exporters and associated 
importers, like producers and associated sales companies, do also constitute an economie unit. De 
lege ferenda, there, accordingly, is no reason why the economie unit on the dornestic market and 
the economie unit between exporter and importer should be treated differently. It cannot be 
explained why the resale price metbod is applied to determine the export price, whereas the 
economie unit theory is applied to determine the normal value. This unequal treatment may result 
in finding dumping where no actual dumping is being practised : if only the export price is 
adjusted to take account of the costs and profits of the associated sales company, the dumping 
margin will be inflated. Admittedly, multidivisional enterprises may misuse the resale price 
method. By re-allocating costs and profits, through different transfer pricing techniques, they may 
manipulate resale prices and, thus, the dumping margin. Not only normal value, but also the 
export price may be subject to such misuse. In order to prevent such misuse in respect of the 
export price, European anti-dumping law provides that allowance should be only made for the real 
costs and profits which are normally bome by the sales company ( Artiele 2(9)(b) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision). The same provision should be applied to 
normal value determination791 • 
The new GA IT Anti-dumping Code seems to have chosen this solution. However, the way this 
solution bas been laid down in the GA TT Anti-dumping Code offers the European anti-dumping 
authorities ample opportunity to rnaintaio their case law. In deed, in order to address this aspect of 
European anti-dumping case law792, the Code stipulates that, where the export price has been 
constructed and «price comparability has been affected, the authorities shall establish the normal 
value at a .level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the constructed export price» ( Artiele 
79° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of housed 
hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, No L 221116. 
791 It cannot be agreed with P. DIDIER that the selective normal value determination (supra, p .... )bas resolved the problem of 
associations. Even if normal value is exclusively based on prices charged to distributors, the coats incurred between the sale 
between the associated parties and the reaale to independent buyers on the dornestic market of the exporter remain included in 
normal value. It may only be agreed that the dumping margin may be lower due to the selective normal value determination, if 
selling expenses are lower for sales to distributors than for sales to dealers and end-users. However, the different way of 
. determining normal value and export price subsists. It may only be solved by determining normal value and export price in 
identically the same way, including the provision of Artiele 2(8) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 2(8Xa) basic ECSC Decision so 
that all expenses are allocated in the same way. See: DIDIER, P., ccEEC Antidumping: The Level of Trade Issue After the 
Defmitive CD Player Regulation. Japanese Proposalto GAT!' on the Level ofTrade Issue•, Joumal of World Trade, 1990/2, (103), 
103-109. 
792 WAER., P., and VERMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practicc after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?•, Joumal of 
World Trade, 1994/2, (5), 12. 
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2.4.). The new GATI requirement of equivalent levels of trade will not hinder the European 
anti-dumping authorities. Along with the Court of Justice, they have already taken the «level-of-
trade obstacle» by holding that the level-of-trade-requirement does not imply that normal value and 
export price be determined or adjusted in the same way. Moreover, the new EC anti-dumping 
legislation, though it seemingly transposes the new GA TI requirement of equivalent levels of 
trade, severely restricts the application of that requirement : it allows adjustments for differences 
in level of trade if those differences affect price comparability which must be demonstrated by 
consistent and distinct differences in functions and prices of the seller for the different levels of 
tradein the dornestic market of the exporting country (Article 2(10)(d) basic EC Regulation). The 
problem in respect of associations, however, is not caused by differences in functions and prices 
of the seller for the different levels of trade in the dornestic market of the exporting country. On 
the contrary, the functions of the seller in the dornestic market of the exporting country are 
exactly identical to the function of the seller in the Community (assuming that there are no 
differences in the level of trade on the demand side). In fact, EC anti-dumping law only 
addresses the problem of differences on the demand side, which are clearly different from the 
unequal treatment of associations in- and outside the Community. Hence, EC anti-dumping law 
bas not transposed GA TI anti-dumping law on price comparison in respect of associations. There 
could be no clearer sign of the refusal of the Community to alter its treatment of associations 
under its anti-dumping law. 
4.2.1.3. Quantity 
Under EC anti-dumping law, an adjustment must be made for differences in discounts and rebates 
given for differences in quantities, if these are properly quantified and are directly linked to the .. 
sales under consideration (Article 2(10)(c) basic EC Regulation). ~ecause of the required direct 
conneetion between sales and quantity discounts, it seems that EC anti-dumping law only allows 
adjustments for price discounts for quantity sales and not for savings in the cost of producing 
different quantities. Such savings will probably not be considered to bear a direct relationship 
with the sales 793 • 
ECSC anti-dumping law recognizes that differences in selling expenses may be caused by 
differences in quantity (Article 2(9)(a)(iii), second indent, basic ECSC Decision), but does not 
provide adjustments for certain differences in quantity, such as price discounts for quantity sales 
and economies made in the cost of producing different quantities. Hence, in view of the 
exhaustive character of the list of adjustmehts allowed under ECSC anti-dumping law (Article 
793 The regime on quantity diacounta andrebatesis identical to that on discounts andrebatesin general (see : injra, 294-297). 
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2(10)(c) basic ECSC Decision), such adjustments would be impossible794• Nevertheless, 
European anti-dumping authorities have made adjustments for price discounts under ECSC anti-
dumping law. They have also refused adjustments for savings in the co st of producing different 
quantities, not because they are oot allowed, but because of lack of proor?95• 
It will now be investigated whether, from an economie point of view, adjustments for such 
differences in quantity should be allowed~ 
4.2.1.3.1. Price discounts for quantity sales 
In tigure 2 of Chapter 11796 second-degree price discrimination is possible because the monopolist may he 
considered as heing faced with three different finitely limited, perfectly inelastic individual demand curves, i.e., aq1, lxJJ and cq/97• A monopolist may also he confronted with different elastic demand curves, as illustrated in tigure 
9. The two demand curves, D1 and D2, represent the demand of two different types of consumers. The difference 
between these two types of consumers is assumed to he caused by differences in preferenee concerning quantity. 
Indeed, the high-demand consumers (with demand D~ are willing to pay a higher price for the same quantity in 
comparison to the low-demand consumers (with demand D1). If the monopolist can identify each consumer as high-
demand or low-demand consumer, he would appropriate total consumer surplus of both types of consumers. The 
producer could extract consumer surplus by means of a two-part tariff, i.e., he would charge a uniform price OP per 
unitand demand a differentiated tixed premium equal to each consumer's net surplus at price OP. In this case, low-
demand and high-demand consumers would buy respectively a quantity Oq1 and Oq2• The producer eams as total 
revenue Obdq1 and Oaeq2 from respectively selling quantity Oq1 and Oq2 to low-demand and high-demand consumers. 
If, however, the monopolist bas only knowledge of the fact that there are two different consumer types, but is not able 
to identify consumers as either of these two types, high-demand consumers would have the incentive to claim that they 
are low-demand consumers for, if they are treated as low-demand consumers, only the surplus of low-demand 
consumers would he extracted from them. This would give them a positive consumer surplus because their surplus 
for a given quantity is higher than the surplus of low-demand consumers. Indeed, if high-demand consumers in 
tigure 9 would buy only a quantity Oq1 instead of quantity Oq2, they would pay all in all the surplus of low-demand 
consumers, i.e., bPd in tigure 9, and, because of the unit price OP, 0Pdq1• However, at a quantity Oq1, high-demand 
consumer's surplus is Pacd of which only Pbd is extracted by the producer. They, thus, have a net consumer surplus 
of bacd if they buy a quantity Oq1, whereas their consumer surplus would he zero if they buy a quantity Oq2• 
lt may he shown that in this case it is protitable for the producer to resort to second-degree price discrimination 798• 
When resorting to second-degree price discrimination, the producer might charge a uniform price OP per unit and a 
tixed premium equal to the lowest-demand consumer's surplus, which is Pbd in tigure 9. The low-demand consumers 
will buy a quantity Oql and pay globally 0Pdq1 + Pbd, whereas high-demand consumers will buy a quantity Oq2 and 
794 Sce: BELLJS, J.-F., «The EEC Antidumping System», in Antidumping Law and Practice. A Comparative Study, JACKSON, J.H., and 
VERMULST, E.A. (eds.), New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 83. 
795 Supra, 270-271. 
796 Supra, 31-32. 
797 GREENHUT, ML., and OHTA, H., Theory of Spatial Pricing an.d Market Areas, Durham, Duke University Press, 1975, 32-35. 
798 See TIROLE, J., The Theory of lndustrial Organ.ization, Cambridge Mass., MlT Press, 1988, 145-146. For a more elaborated 
approach of price discrimination and quantity, see : MASKIN, E., and RILEY, J., t«Monopoly with incomplete information», Rand 
Journal of Economics, 1984, (171), 171-196 ; TIROLE, J., The Theory of InduBtrial Organ.ization, Cambridge Mass., MlT Press, 
1988, 148-149. 
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pay globally OP~ + Pbd. Consumer's net surplus is zero for low-demand consumers and baed for high-demand 
consumers. Moreover, average price per unit is lower for high-demand consumers than for low-demand consumers. 
Indeed, average price for low-demand consumers amounts toOP + Pbd/Oq1, whereas average price for high-demand 
consumers equals OP +. Pbd/O<Q ; because Oq1 < Oq2, OP + Pbd/Oq1 > OP + Pbd/Oq2• 
The resulting two-part tariff is in fact the practice of quantity discounts : consumers buying a 
large quantity pay a lower average price per unit than consumers buying a smaller quantity and 
may, therefore, be considered as being offered a quantity discount. Quantity discounts, thus, are 
a form of second-degree price discrimination. Not only quantity discounts, but also quantity 
premia are possible. It depends on the shape and dis tribution of consumers' preferences whether 
quantity discounts or quantity premia are offered799 • 
799 TIROLE, J., The Theory of InduBtrial Organ.ization, Cambridge Mass., MlT PreBB, 1988, 158. 
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Adjustments for quantity discounts and premia apparently should be allowed because they are 
second-degree price discrimination. However, allowing adjustments would neutralise the effect of 
such discounts and premia and the second-degree price discrimination resulting from quantity 
discounts and premia would not be detected under anti-dumping law. If GA TT anti-dumping law 
is intended to detect all types of real price discrimination, no adjustments should be allowed for 
quantity discounts and premia. 
4.2.1.3.2. Savings in the cost of producing different quantities 
Pr~uction may be characteristized by increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale, i.e., 
output will proportionally increase by more than, as much as or by less than the increase in 
inputs. If there are, for instance, increasing returns to scale, the average cost of producing one 
unit will decline if the scale of production increases. There may be several production methods 
available to produce · one and the same product. For some of them, returns to scale may be 
always increasing, constant or decreasing. Others are characterized by increasing returns to scale, 
but once the optimal production scale is reached, returns to scale start to decrease. Clearly, the 
type of production method, as well as the scale of production, will affect the price level of the 
product concerned. 
This is shown in tigure 10, D representing the demand curve. MR represents the corresponding marginal revenue 
curve. There are two · production methods available. The first one is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. 
Thus, its average casts are always increasing. AC1 is the average cost curve of this production method, whereas MC1 
is tbe corresponding marginal cost curve. A~ is tbe average cost curve corresponding to the second production 
metbod with increasing returns to scale up to q* and decreasing returns to scale beyond q*. Indeed, average casts 
decline between 0 en q* and start to increase beyond q*. M~ is the marginal cost curve of this second production 
method. Interestingly, marginal costs are always strictly rising when there are decreasing returns to scale. 
Depending ·on the relevant production metbod and; thus, the marginal cost curve the price charged will he different : 
under M~ a larger quantity (Oq~ is affered at a lower price (OP:z) than under MC1• Because the starting point of 
both marginal cost curves is the same, this difference, in the case illustrated in tigure 10, is caused by the increasing 
returns to scale of the production function corresponding to M ~. 
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Thus, differences in production functions may cause price differentials. Different production 
technologies may be used for the dornestic market and the export market or the prices of inputs 
may be different depending on whether they are used for producing products sold on the dornestic 
market or the export market800• 
If the sameproduction process is applied for manufacturing both the products sold on the dornestic 
market and the exported products, price differences may be caused by increasing or decreasing 
returns to scale. 
In tigure ll(a) two markets with different elasticities of demand are assumed. Those markets are represented by the 
demand curves D1 and D2• MR1 and MR2 are their corresponding marginal revenue curves. A production with 
decreasing returns toscaleis assumed and, accordingly, marginal costs (MC) are strictly rising. 
If the producer considers those two markets separately, he will sell at quantity Oqs at a price OP2 to the first market, 
and a quantity Ü'b at a price OP5 to the second market. The price differential P2P5 is caused partly by the differences 
in elasticity of demand and partly by the decreasing returns to scale. 
In order to determine the part of the price differential caused by the decreasing returns to scale, assume that there are 
constant returns to scale. This implies that marginal costs arealso constant, as represented by the curve MCc. Under 
that assumption, the producer will sell the same quantity <ktJ at the same price OP 5 to the second market. In the first 
market, though, he will increase bis sales up to O<J6 and decrease bis price to OP 3• There is still a price differential 
amounting to P3P5• As there are now constant marginal costs, tbis price differential is entirely due to the differences 
in the elasticity of demand. 
The other part, P2P3, of the price differential when marginal costs are rising, is, thus, caused by the increasing 
returns to scale. As it should not be the object of anti-dumping law to sanction producers for having production 
processes characterized by decreasing returns to scale, an adjustment for tbis part of the price differential (P2P3) 
should he allowed for. Otherwise, the producer would he sanctioned for the costs dissavings he incurs because of the 
decreasing returns to scale. 
If the production process was characterized by increasing returns to scale, the producer would have enjoyed a cost 
saving, rather than a cost dissaving, for wbich too an adjustment should he made. Indeed, otherwise, the producer 
might practise price discrimination without being sanctioned for it under anti-dumping law. 
SOO Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United States of America, O.J., 23 February 1983, No L 50/1. 
0 
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Price differentials due to cost (dis)savings do not constitute price discrimination in the sense of a 
price policy by which the producer treats different consumers differently in order to extract as 
much as possible their consumer surplus. Adjustments for (dis)savings in the cost of production 
are, therefore, meant only to ensure a fair comparison, i.e., to prevent the dumping finding from 
being biased by differences on the production side. 
However, before allowing for such cost (dis)savings, it should be examined whether the different 
consumers are treated separately or not by the producer, when making bis decisions on production 
and prices. It is, indeed, possible that both consumers are treated together as one market801 • 
In such a case, cost (dis)savings will be proportionaly distributed between both markets and will 
not be the cause of the possible price differential. As a conseqtience, no adjustments for cost 
(dis)savings should be allowed for. 
In terms of tigure 11, the producer will take into account demand D, being the sum of D1 and D2, if he considers 
both markets simultaneously. Corresponding marginal revenueis represented by MR. The producer will manufacture 
a quantity Oq*. Here, he can choose to sell this quantity at a uniform price OP* to both consumers 1 and 2 or at a 
differentiated price OP 1 to consumer 1 and OP 4 to consumer 2. Wbether or not the producer cbooses to practise price 
discrimination, it cannot be argued that there are (dis)savings in the cost of production because of the different 
quantities sold to the different consumers. lndeed, on the production side, the sum of all the quantities sold is taken 
in its entirety. Therefore, the possible cost (dis)savings are proportionally attributable to the quantities sold to each 
consumer. 
4.2.1.4. Conditions and terms of sale 
Under prior European anti-dumping law, the concept «conditions and terms of sale>> bas been 
defined by the European anti-dumping authorities as <<a teehoical concept with a relatively limited 
scope : it concerns the obligations inherent in. a sales contract, fixed either in the contract itself or 
in the general conditions of sale established by the seller»802• Whereas present EC anti-
dumping law does not treat anymore of differences in conditions and terms of sale, it remains to 
be seen whether this definition holds some practical relevancy under present ECSC anti-dumping 
801 Sce : radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in mo10r vehicles jrom Soulh Korea, wherc the European anti-dumping authorities stated that 
the construction of nonnal value on the basis of the production costs of the exported models took full account of the economies of scale securcd 
with the exported produels which werc necessarily grcater than those securcd through the sales on the Korcan dornestic market, since the quantities 
sold for export werc aignificantly grcater than those sold on the Korcan dornestic market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South 
Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8). 
802 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698186 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1986, NoL 163/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86 of 24 June 1986 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 
1985, No L 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/86 of 14 O$ber 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of 
certain imports of auch products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1986, No L 275/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 
7 August 1986, No L 221/16 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5. 
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law. Since, under ECSC anti-dumping law, the list of «selling expenses» (Article 2(10)(c) basic 
ECSC Decision) is probably exhaustive803 , the European anti-dumping authorities seem only to 
have to inquire whether a claimed adjustment may be subsumed under one of the categones of 
selling expenses. However, under ECSC anti-dumping law, adjustment may be made for 
differences in selling expenses, if they result from inter alia different conditions and terros of sale 
(Article 2(9)(a)(iii), third indent, basic ECSC Decision). As a consequence, the definition of the 
concept «conditions and terms of sale» is still relevant. 
From an economie point of view, adjustment for such differences in conditions and terros of sale 
~ust be made if anti-dumping law aims at detecting each form of price discrimination. Indeed, 
the concept of «eonditions and terms of sale» refers to the practice of package selling, which is 
called «eommodity bundling» : the seller offers the basic product in combination with special 
packing devices, credit terms, warranties, guarantees, teehoical assistance, after-sales 
services804• The seller may choose either to offer the basic product and these different devices 
separately and, thus, to practise simple monopoly pricing ; he mayalso only offer the combination 
of the basic product with (some of) these devices, in which case he is practising pure bundling ; if 
he offers the product and devices separately as well as in packages, he bas adopted a mixed 
bundling strategy805• 
Each of these pricing strategies is illustrated in tigure 12 in which ft and r2 represent the reservation prices of the 
consumers, i.e., the prices the consumers are willing to pay for respectively product 1 and 2. Figure 12(a) represents 
single monopoly pricing : the producer offers product 1 and 2 at respectively the price of OP*t and OP*2. In this case 
the consumers situated in area A buy both products, those situated in area C buy neither product, those situated in 
areas B and D buy respectively product 2 and 1. If the producer resorts topure bundling, consumers are divided into 
two groups. The consumers whose reservation price for both products ( = Ort + Orv is at least equal to the price of 
the bundie (=. OP**t + OP**v, are situated in area E in tigure 12(b) and buy the bundie ; the other consumers which 
are situated in area F in tigure 12(b), do not buy the bundle. If the producer adopts a mixed bundling strategy, the 
consumers. are again divided into four groups, as illustrated in tigure 12(c) : those situated in area OP*2abP*t buy 
nothing ; those situated southeast of P*1 bd and those situated northwest of P*2ac purebase respectively product 1 and 
2 ; the other consumers, situated northeast of cabd buy the bundle. This mixed bundling strategy constitutes in fact a 
price discriminating pricing strategy. Indeed, it permits the producer to extract consumer surplus from those who 
value one of the products extremely high as well as from those with a lower varianee in their reservation prices. 
Therefore, the bundie price P*b is lower than the sum of the simple monopoly prices P*t and P*2 ; thus, 
P*b < P*t + P*2· 
803 Supra, 269-271. 
804 This approach of the combination of the basic product and a guarantee is, for instance, set forth in: KUBO, Y., ccQuality 
Uncertainty and Guarantee. A Case of Strategie Market Segmentation by a Monopolist», European Economie Review, 1986, (1083), 
1063-1079. 
805 Commodity bundies may include devices which cannot be sold separately (ADAMS, W.J., and YELLEN, JL., ccCommodity 
Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly,,, Quarterly Journalof Economics, 1976, (475), 475). 
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As a consequence; P*1 > P*b- P*2 ; in other words, the consumer buying the bundie pays a lower price for product 
1 than the consumer buying only this single producfl06• 
Without any adjustment being provided, mixed commodity bundling would be a means to avoid 
the application of anti-dumping law807• Therefore, European anti-dumping legislation correctly 
allows adjustments. However, mixed commodity bundling is seemingly not applicable to the 
situations envisaged by ECSC anti-dumping law. The commodity bundies for which adjustments 
may be made, are combinations of the like product with devices such ·as credit, warranties, 
guarantees, teehoical assistance and other after-sales services (see : Artiele 2(10)(c) basic ECSC 
Decision), which cannot be sold separately. However, the opposite is the case. Mixed 
commodity bundling also applies to combinations of a product with devices which cannot be sold 
separately. 
Indeed, if product 2 with which the basic product is combined is not sold separately, there would be no separate price 
P*2 for that product 2. In tigure 12(c) this would imply that the area OP*2abP*1 of consumers buying nothing is 
enlarged with the area P*2aP**2 and the consumers buying the bundie are those situated northeast of P**2bd. 
ECSC anti-dumping law envisages only cases of bundling a product with devices which cannot be 
sold separately, except for · the case of the bundling of homogeneous products. Indeed, the 
bundling of homogenous products amounts to selling the like products in different quantities808. 
On the other hand, the bundling of heterogenous products, of which each of them may be sold 
separately, is not provided for. Typical cases of the bundling of heterogenous products are tie-in 
sales and metering. The classica! example of tie-in sales was the practice of IBM in the United 
· States of America before 1936 : IBM rented its tabulating equipment at a very low price but 
required its customers to buy IBM punch cards ; by charging a price for its cards well in excess 
of costs, ffiM was able to discriminate against costomers using relatively more cards. In the early .. 
1960s Xerox practised meterlog : it leased its copying machines at a .very low price and then 
metered their usage by charging a price per copy well in excess of costs809• European anti-
dumping law does not allow adjustments for the bundling of heterogenous products. Therefore, 
806 See: ADAMS, W.J., and YELLEN, JL., «Commodity Bundling and the Burden ofMonopolyn, Quarterly Journalof Ecooomics, 
1976, (475), 477-488 ; GREENHUT, ML., NORMAN, G., and CHUNG, C.-S., The ecooomics of imperfect competition. A spatial 
approach, Cambridge, Cambridge Univarsity Press, 1987, 229-234; PHLIPS, L., La formation des prix, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabay, 
1983, 259-272. 
807 ADAMS, W.J., and YELLEN, JL., ccCommodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly .. , Quarterly Journalof Ecooomics, 
1976, (475), 490. 
808 ADAMS, W.J., and YELLEN, JL., tcCommodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly .. , Quarterly Journalof Ecooomics, 
1976, (475), 488-489 ; TIROLE, J., The Theory of InduBtrial Organizatwn, Cambridge, MlT Press, 1988, 160. 
809 DORWARD, N., The pricing Deciswn: Ecooomic Theory and Business Practice, London, Harper & Row, 1987, 143; TIROLE, 
J., The Theory of lncllutrial Organizatwn, Cambridge (Mass.), The MlT Press, 1988, 146-147. 
295 
either no price discrimination will be found in cases where it is being practised, or price 
discrimination will be found in cases where it is not being practised810• 
4.2.1.5. Discounts and rebates 
Under EC anti-dumping law, adjustments must be made for differences in discounts and rebates if 
these are properly quantified and are directly linked to the sales under consideration (Article 
2(10)(c) basic EC Regulation). Under ECSC anti-dumping law, the dornestic market price and the 
actual export price must be net of all discounts and rebates directly linked to the sales under 
consideration (Article 2(3)(a) and 2(8)(a) basic ECSC Decision). There is a twofold difference 
between EC and ECSC anti-dumping law. First, EC anti-dumping law only allows adjustments 
for dijferences in discounts and rebates. Thus, if the discounts and rebates on normal value and 
export price are identical, no adjustment will be made. Under ECSC anti-dumping, however, the 
dornestic market price and the actual export price must always be adjusted since they must always 
be net of all discounts and rebates. Second, EC anti-dumping law on discounts and rebates 
applies to all normal value standards and export price standards, whereas ECSC anti-dumping law 
only applies to the dornestic market price and the actual export price. Admittedly, under ECSC 
anti-dumping law, the constructed export price will be adjusted in order to exclude discounts and 
rebates in application of the provision that the constructed export price must include all costs 
normally borne by an importer811 • Nevertheless, there is no reason why the other standards, 
such as the export price to third countries, should not benetof all discounts and rebates. For that 
reason, as well as for the fact that it reduces the required adjustments to the cases in which 
discounts and rebates are different, EC anti-dumping law should be preferred. 
810 See: C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1402-1403; C.J.E.C., case C-
175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric InduBtrial Co. Ltd and Matsushita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, 
(1409), 1485-1486; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 
of 23 February 1987 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
February 1987, No L 54/12. In this anti-dumping case the Japanese exporters claimed to practise tie-in sales on their dornestic 
market by requiring the buyers of their photocopiers to buy also their copying paper and toner. By selling the photocopiers at a 
very low price (even below cost) and by charging a price well above costs for copying paper and toner, the exporters were able to 
realise profits on their total sales of copiers, paper and toner, and to discriminate against buyers using much copying paper and 
toner. In its provisional assessment, the Commission, therefore, adjusted the profit margin for the determination of the constructed 
value (which was the normal value standard used). In the definitive assessment, the Council agreed with the Commission to revise 
this position : in determining the constructed value - normal value was based on the constructed value for the sales in question 
were made at aloss-attention was paid only to the sales of photocopiers. Moreover, the question of the practice of tie-insales was 
not treated within the frameworkof allowances for differences in conditions and terms of sales. On the contrary, an adjustment 
was made on the basis of differences in physical characteristics. Indeed, the European anti-dumping authorities had establised that 
the tie-in sales consisted of the sale of the photocopier and a tied-in maintenance or service contract which included the supply of 
reprograpbic drums a.a wella.a consumables such as toner and developer. On the other hand, the comparable photocopiers sold for 
export included reprograpbic drums. In order to remove the effect on prices of these differences in physical characteristics, the 
costs of producing these reprograpbic drums (including a reasonable profit margin) was added to the constructed (normal) value, 
whereas the actual export price was taken into consideration. By disregarding tie-in sales European anti-dumping authorities 
constructed a too high normal value and, as a consequence, determined an artificially high dumping margin ranging from 7,2 up to 
60%. 
811 Supra, 247-249, oote 700. 
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Not only pecuniary rebates, but also rebates-in-kind are deducted. Rebates-in-kind are, for 
example, compact discs given at the occasion of the sale of a compactdisc playerB12. 
Discounts include deferred discounts if they are also directly linked with the sales under 
consideration. Under EC anti-dumping law, they must, moreover, be based on consistent practice 
in prior periods (Article 2(10)(c) basic EC Regulation). Under ECSC anti-dumping law, discounts 
and rebates on the dornestic market price must also be based on a consistent practice or on an 
undertaking to comply with the conditions required to qualify for the deferred discount (Article 
2(3)(a) basic ECSC Decision) ; with regard to the actual export price, deferred discounts and 
rebates must only be actually granted (Article 2(8)(a) basic ECSC Decision). Since, under ECSC 
anti-dumping law, it must not be shown that the discounts and rebates on the actual export price 
are based on a consistent practice, it will be easier to make adjustments for deferred discounts and 
rebates on the actual export price than on the dornestic market price. This difference in treatment 
will enhance the finding of dumping as, in the absence of such a consistent practice, the same 
deferred discount must be deducted from the export price, but must not be subtracted from the 
dornestic market price. No reason can be discemed for this different treatment. As it treats 
discounts and rebates on normal value and export price equally, EC anti-dumping law should 
therefore be preferred. 
Rebates granted by the exporters to their dornestic customers which are paid when the latter resell 
the like product on instalment terms to final customers, may constitute deferred discounts, if they 
are dealt with in contracts, concluded between the producer and his customers and if they are 
applied over a considerable period of time813 • The reimbursement of certain advertising 
expenses is also a deferred discount, if the exporter and the importer are not associated814• 
Discounts and rebates are directly linked if they effectively reduce the price of the like product for 
the exporter's customer815• Therefore, free items and products sold together with the like 
812 Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitiveiy the provisional duty, O.J., 17 
January 1990, No L 13121. 
813 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048/90 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen 
coiour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitiveiy the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, 
NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 24 May 1990, NoL 133/92). 
814 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen 
colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, 
No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133/92). 
815 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen 
colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, 
No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133192). In the provisional assessment the Commission did not share this 
point of view (Com.mission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1). · 
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product as an incentive for the consumer to purchase, are not considered to be a rebate as they do 
not reduce the price of the like product. Instead they are regarded as a promotional expense for 
which European anti-dumping law does not allow any adjustmen~16 • Also discounts and 
rebates granted on accessarles will not be deducted for they are not directly linked817• Rebates 
granted to costomers to whom running account facilities for their sales are made available, will 
not be directly related if the rebate is granted not on the basis of the value of the sales, but on the 
level of the overall outstanding balance818• Trade-in payments bear · neither a direct 
relationship since the product may be sold without any trade-in. They correspond to the benefit 
the producers obtain from the removal of the traded-in products from the market and there being 
no second-hand market. Since the lack of a second-hand market increases the demand for and, 
consequently, the price of new products, trade-in payments increase the price of the produc~19 • 
Rebates which are conditional on a sale being made by the retailer to an end-user, are not directly 
related either since that sale is subsequent to, and independent of the allegedly dumping exporter's 
816 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262/90 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof audio 
tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, 0 . .1., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, 
0 . .1., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on importsof audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty 
and terminating the procedure concerning HongKong, 0 . .1., 14 May 1991, NoL 119/35; Council Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 
September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in 
Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, No 
L 23612. 
817 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33. 
818 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1103/93 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
eertaio electrooie weighing ICales originating in Singapore and the Republie of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, NoL 112/20; Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 534/94 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imporu of eertaio magnetie disks (3 ,5" mierodisks) originating in 
Hong Kong and the Republie of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5. 
819 C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon Inc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1272-1273 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO) and 1293-1294; C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1371-1372 
(Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO), 1392 and 1394 ; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushila Electric IndUBtrial Co. 
Ltd and MataUBhita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1473-1474 ; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, 
Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Counci.l, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1615-1616 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1628-1629; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 24 February 1987, No L 54112; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 April 1993 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, 
No L 10414. Contra : VERMULST, E.A., and HOOIJER, J.J., «Annotation on Case C-170/89, Bureau Européen des Unions de 
CoMommateurs v. Commi.ssion, Judgment of 28 November 1991; Case C-105190, Goldstar Co. Ltd. v. Council, Judgment of 13 
February 1992; Case C-188/88, NMB (Deutschland) GmbH, NMB Itali.cJ Srl, NMB (UK) Ltd. v. Commission of the Europea.n 
Communiliea, Judgment of 10 March 1992; Case 171187, Canon lnc. v. Counci.l; Case 172/87, Mita IndUBtrial Co. Ltd. v. Council; 
Case 174187, Ricoh Compan.y Ltd. v. Council; Case 175/87, Matsushila Electric IndUBtrial Co. Ltd cmd Matsushila Electrio Trading 
Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 176/87, Koni.shi.roky Photo IndUBtry Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 177/87, Sa.nyo Electrio Co. Ltd. v. Council; 
Case 178/87, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 179/87, Sharp Corporation v. Cou".cil, Judgments of 10 March 1992; Case 
C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Judgment of 11 June 1992n, Common Market Law Review, 1993, (115), 178. · 
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sale to the retailer820• With regard to discounts granted at the end of the year, it is not yet 
clear whether they will be found to be directly linked with the sales under consideration821 . 
Seemingly , the interpretation of the required direct conneetion is logical. For instance, it is true 
· that sales may be made without trade-in payments. It is equally true that trade-in payments may 
increase the price of the product. Customers will value the product higher if they can obtain a 
resale value. Moreover, as there is no second-hand market, demand for the (new) product will he 
increased and, if there are positive economies of scale, the per unit production costs will, 
consequently, decrease. On balance, the producer may earn more profits if the effects on price 
and on production costs outweigh the trade-in payment costs822• However, there is more at 
stake than it would seem to be the case at first sight. In fact, the producer applying a trade-in 
scheme, discriminates between his customers : customers who may and do indeed claim a trade-in 
payment, must pay a lower price for the product than customers who do not823 830. Even more 
so, if the producer applies a trade-in scheme in his home market, but not in his export market, he 
may be price-discriminating between national markets and, thus, may be practising dumping. By 
disregarding trade-in payments, this instanee of price discrimination will not be detected. Or, 
even worse, if the producer only applies trade-in payments on his dornestic market, he may 
erroneously be found to practise dumping, since disregarding bis dornestic trade-in payments 
increases bis normal value. Hence, the examination of the direct conneetion of discounts and 
rebates should not be confined to what appears to be true,. but requires a m·ore economie 
approach. That economie approach implies that discounts and rebates should be analysed as a 
type of commodity bundling. Indeed, a commodity bundie may, for instance, be the combination 
of the sale öf a new product at a high price and the. trade-in of an old product at a high trade-in 
price. It may also be the sale of a product, in combination with a discount on accessories. 
82° Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television 
receivers originating in Malayaia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No 
L 255/50. 
821 Under prior Europaan anti-dumping law, adjustments have been made for end of year bonuses (Commission Decision 
80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imparts of fibre 
building board originating in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, the Boviet Union and Sweden and 
determining those proceedings, O.J., 11 June 1980, No L 145/39) and for annual discounts (Commission Recommendation No 
259/83/ECSC of 27 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on broad-flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 1 
February 1983, No L 30/61 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1983, No L 36/10)). It was not made clear whether they were considered 
to be adjustments for differences in the conditions and terms of sale. Europaan anti-dumping law requires only for differences in 
the conditions and terms of sales a direct link with the sales under consideration. Therefore, it is questionable whether such 
discounts will be considered to be directly linked with the sales under consideration as required by European anti-dumping law 
(Article 2(10)(c) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(3)(a) and S(a) basic ECSC Decision). 
822 ANDERSON, S.P., and GINSBURGH, V.A., ~Price discrimination via second-hand markets», European Economie Review, 1994, (23), 23-
44. 
823 Trade-in paymenta are an example of so-called product bundling (infra, 291-294): the bundie consists of the (new) product and the trade-in 
payment. See also: ANDERSON, S.P., and GINSBURGH, V.A., ~Price discrimination via aecond--hand markets•, European Economie Review, 
1994, (23), 23-44. 
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4. 2. 2. Normal value and export price compared at the same time 
4.2.2.1. Changing market conditions 
Normal value and export price must be compared at as nearly as possible the same time (Article 
2.4. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 2(10) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(9)(a) basic ECSC 
Decision). Probably market conditions changing in time are being considered824• lndeed, an 
exporter should not held liable for practices caused by changing market conditions which he does 
not control or is unable to foresee or to respond to, such as intlation and changes in exchange 
rates. 
Though the wording «at as nearly as possible the same time» may seem to grant the anti-dumping 
authorities some room for discretion in order to take account of all relevant economie 
elements825, GATI .anti-dumping law imposes adjustments for all differences affecting price 
comparability (Article VI(l) GATI ; Artiele 2.4. GATI Anti-dumping Code) and contains special 
provisions in respect of changes in exchange rates (Article 2.4.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code). It 
will be shown hereinafter that European anti-dumping law does not fully comply with GATI 
antidumping law, as it does not sufficiently neutralise the effects of changing market conditions, 
such as intlation and changes in exchange rates, and that the GA TI provisions on exchange rates 
are not able to tackle the problem of exchange dumping. 
In European anti-dumping case law no real adjustments are made to neutralise the effect of 
changing market conditions on the dumping finding. Indeed, in the majority of cases, the 
European anti-dumping authorities consider the requirement of comparing normal value and export 
price at _the same time to be met if on_ly sales during the investigation period are taken into 
account826• Sometimes, normal value and export price for sales during the investigation period 
824 See e.g., oxalic acid from Brazil where it was underscored that the comparison of normal value and export price at as nearly as 
possible the same time was particularly relevant in view of the extremely high rate of inflation in Brazil and the frequent 
devaluations of the Cruzeiros uis-à-uis the US dollar in which currency the export transactions were made (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2553184 of " September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, 
accepting an undertaking oft'ered by the exporter in the German Demoeratic Republic of oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding 
regarding imports of oxalic acid from the German Demoeratic Republic and Spain, O.J., 7 September 1984, No L 239/8). 
825 C.J.E.C., case C-216/91, 7 December 1993, Rima Electrometalurgia SA v Council, recital 101 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ) (not yet 
reported). 
826 C.J.E.C., joined cases 273185 and 107/86, 6 October 1988, Siluer Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5964 and 
6979; BRYAN, G., and BOURSEREAU, D.G., ccAntidumping Law in the Europaan Communities and the United Statea: A 
Comparative AnalysiSM, George Washington Journalof International Law and Economie•, 1984-1985, (631), 647. ,· 
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are compared on a (three-)monthly basis827, or pnces of deliveries made at as nearly as 
possible the same time are compared828• The investigation period bas sometimes been 
extended in order to take account of price movements on the marketB29• 
For exports, the date taken into account is the day when the exported products are sold in the. 
Community, but not the day on which they are sold for expon to the Community. Wh en there is 
a non-negligible Iapse of time between these two moments, the export price, which is by definition 
the price at which the product is sold for export830, can hardly be said to have been compared 
with the normal value at the same time, although only sales during the investigation period are 
827 See e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 of 12 May 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate 
monomer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 15 May 1981, NoL 129/1; Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 
December 1982 accepting undertakings affered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statea of America and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371/47; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 163/83 of 21 January 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, 
No L 2319 ; Council Decision 831162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of 
acrylonitrile originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101129; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of artificial corundum originating in the 
People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of artificial corundum 
'originating in Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 September 1984, NoL 255/9; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 June 
1988 · imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/58); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of barium chloride originating in the People's 
Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, NoL 227/24; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 
5 February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in 
lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose 
undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1; Commission Decision 90/421/EEC of 6 August 1990 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of denim fabric originating in Turkey, Indonesia, Hong Kong and 
Macao, O.J., 17 August 1990, No L 222/50; Council Regulation (EEC) No 541191 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imparts of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, NoL 60/1. 
See also: DRAMs from Japan and EPROMs from Japan, where a dumping exporter proposed to campare normal value and export 
price on a quarterly basis because of the unusual situation of the DRAM indUBtry in which products become rapidly outdated and 
casts of production decline sharply over a short period due to the learning curve effect. The Commission requested the submission 
of data on a quarterly basis. However, because of the volatility of casts, the absence of oost data and the difficulties in relating 
actual casts to individual sales transactions, the Commission found it more reasanabie to determine normal value on an annual 
basis. Export.prices were determined on a transaction-by-transaction basis (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic 
random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings affered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imparts of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 
1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No 
L 65/1). See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imparts of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272/13. 
828 Commission Decision 82/122/EEC of 18 February 1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concering imparts of 
polyester/ootton sheets and pillowcases from the USA, O.J., 20 February 1982, No. L 48/30. 
829 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the farm of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the 
Soviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, NoL 286/29. 
830 Supra, 240-241. 
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taken into account831 • Moreover, the date taken into account for exports is at varianee with 
European anti-dumping law, since the export price is the price paid for the product sold for export 
(Article 2(8) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8)(a) basic ECSC Decision)832• 
By taking the date of delivery as reference point, European anti-dumping case law will only 
neutralise intlation if the prices as actually paid are determined also on the same date. However, 
even when deliveries are made at the same time, the dornestic sales contract, including the price 
determination, may have been concluded later than the export contract. If there is intlation in the 
exporting country during that period and if the date of delivery is relevant, then, ceteris paribus, 
dumping will be found ; if, on the other hand, the date of the conclusion of the contract and, thus, 
of the determination of the price are considered, then, ceteris paribus, no dumping will be found. 
Hence, in order to avoid any bias in the examination of dumping, the date of the actual price 
determination should be used833 or, if the date of delivery is used, prices should be adjusted 
for intlation. If, for example in the first case, the sales contract involves a combination of a fixed 
basic price and an indexation clause, the date of the actual price determination is the day on which 
the indexation clause, is actually applied834• It may be argued that the new GATI. Anti-
dumping Code and, in pursuance thereof, the new EC anti-dumping legislation share this point of 
view. Indeed, in respect of the problem of exchange rate tluctuations, they impose. the u se of the 
exchange rate on the date of sale. That date of sale is, according to them the date of contract, 
purebase order, order con tirmation or invoice, whichever establishes the material terms of sale 
(Note (3) at Artiele 2.4.1. GATI' Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 2(10)0) ba~ic EC Regulation). 
Admittedly, GATI' and EC anti-dumping law do contain a simHar provision in respect of the 
831 For example, in compact dJsc players from the Repubüc of Korea, the investigation period covered the. period from 1 June 1986 to 31 May 
1987. Production of eertaio models of compact disc players ceased in 1985 and the quantitiea of those models which were sold in the Community 
durlog the invelltigation period had been exported to the Community before 1 June 1986 (C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. 
Lid v Council, E. C.R., 1992, I, (677), 683 (Report for the Hearing : Facta and procedure). To the objection of a Korean exporter on this point, 
the Court of Julltice replied off the point by staling that the date of production does oot as a rule have any hearing on the calculation of the normal 
value (C.J.E.C., case C-105/90, 13 February 1992, Goldstar Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (677), 722-723; see also: ibidem, 688-689 
(Report for tbc Hearing : conclusions of the Council) and 705 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN). 
832 C.J.E.C., case C-216/91, 7 December 1993, Rima Electrometalurgia SA v Council, recital 82 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ) (not yct 
reported). 
833 C.J.E.C., case C-216/91, 7 December 1993, Rima Electrometalurgia SA v Council, recitals 86-89 (Opinion of Advoc~te General LENZ) (oot 
yet reported). 
834 The question concerning the relevant moment of time has also been treated in the conclusions of Advocate-General J.P. 
W ARNER in the first .Japanese roller bearings case. Advocate-General J.P. W ARNER did not agree with the exporters who 
claimed that the relevant date was the date of exportation instead of the date on which the product was resold to the fust 
independent buyer in the European Community. He held that the date of exportation guaranteed that the sales considered were 
made at as nearly as possible the same moment of time (C.J.E.C., joined cases 113 and 118-121/77, March 29, 1979, NTN Toyo 
Bearing Company Ltd a.o. v Counci.l, E.C.R., 1979, 1256-1257.). He did not base his opinion on any criterion concerning the 
moment of the effective price determination. But, if this criterion had been used, the conclusion would have been the same : the 
moment of the reaale to the fust independent buyer is nearer to the effective price determination than the moment of exportation ; 
indeed, in the case of an association between exporter and importer, the export price is, according to Artiele 2(9) basic EC 
Regulation and Artiele 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision, determined on the basis of the price at which the product is resold to the f1rst 
independent buyer. 
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effect of intlation on prices, but it would be illogical oot to adopt the same attitude in respect of 
intlation as in respect of exchange rate fluctuations. However, it is oot yet clear whether the 
European anti-dumping authorities will accept this point of view. Until now, European anti-
dumping authorities have adopted the date of delivery as reference, but have compared prices 
actually paid. They have always refused to make adjustments for inflation between the date of 
delivery and the date of payment when allowances are made for conditions of payments. In their 
view, the rate of inflation affects the conditions of paymentB35• However, they do oot explain 
how the conditions of payment are affected by inflation. Logically, however, adjustments for 
SJS Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio deep freezers 
originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of imports of eertaio deep freezers originating in 
Yugoslavia or in the Gennan Demoeratic Republic and terininating the investigation, and tenninating the proceeding concerning imports of eertaio 
deep freezera, O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1043/87 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-
. dumping duty on importa of standardized multi-phase electtic motors having an output of more than 0, 75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating 
in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, NoL 102/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/87 of 5 August 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0, 75 kW but oot more than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, 
O.J., 7 August 1987, NoL 218/2. 
In respect of these cases, it must be pointed out that they treat of the «date of sale» and nol of the «date of delivery». Perhaps, there is a difference 
between them ; but, if ao, then the problem aubsiats aince the price was not detennined on the date of sale, as it was intluenced by the rate of 
intlation between the date of sale and the date of payment. 
The only adjustments whicb the European anti-dumping authorities have allowed for, have nothing to do with the effect of intlation on prices when 
delivery and determination of the price do not coincide. They only cope with the administrative inconvenience to detennine the dumping margin 
when there is a high variability in prices. Indeed, in several cases nonnal value was cstablished on a monthly basis in view of the (high) 
inflationary situation on the dornestic market of the exporting countries (or, in case of NME exporting countries, of the reference country) 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of welded tubes originating 
in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No L 294/10; Commission Decision 90/421/EEC of 6 August 1990 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of denim fabric originating in Turkey, lndonesia, Hong Kong and Macao, O.J., 17 August 1990, No 
L 222/50; Commission Decision 91/392/EEC of 21 June· 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing imports of eertaio asbestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, No L 209/37 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yam originating 
in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of couon yam originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 
September 1991, NoL 271117; Çouncil Regulation (EEC) No 2899/91 of 1 October 1991 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 and repealing 
the definitive anti-dumping duty impoaed on importa into the Community of polyester yam originating in Mexico, O.J., 2 October 1991, No 
L 275/21 ; Commission Decision 911512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping 
measurea conceming importa of artificial corundum originating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of 
China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding conceming imports of artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and 
tenninating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 275/27; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People'a 
Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importa of these yams originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276/7). If data on a monthly basis are nol available, nonnal values may be determined on a quarterly basis 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio polyester yams 
(man-made staple tibrea) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 27617 ; Commission Decision No 
891192/ECSC of 30 Marcb 1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio aemi-finished produels of alloy steel, originating in 
Turkey .and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 95/26 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping 
measures on importl of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 
December 1993, NoL 302/1; Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa into 
the Community of hcmatite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, NoL 12/5; Commission Decision 
94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding conceming imports of gum rosin originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 12 February 1994, NoL 41150; Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of fcrro-ailico-manganeae originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15). 
In another case, the European anti-dumping authoritiea have used an index for intlation adjustement to assess the impact on intlation on the 
production coats of the dumping exporter used for the construction of nonnal value (Commission Decision No 1775/92/ECSC of 30 June 1992 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio semi-ftnisbed products of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, definitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports and accepting an undertaking ofTered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding conceming import& of these products, O.J., 2 July 1992, NoL 182/23). This index seema nol to have been intended to neutralise the 
effect of intlation on pricea determined at different moment of time, but to have been used in order to calculate which the actual production costs of 
the dumping cxporter were. 
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intlation seem necessary precisely when intlation affects the conditions of payment : either an 
indexation clause applies, or the sales contract involves higher prices as they would prevail, after 
intlation, at the date of payment. In both cases, the price actually paid will lie above the price 
prevalling at the date of delivery, so that, without adjustment, dumping will be found. 
Moreover, even when the date of payment is being used as reference or adjustments for intlation 
are made, changes in the exchange rates must be taken into account. Indeed, exchange dumping 
may be sanctioned under anti-dumping law, although it does not imply price discrimination. 
Exchange dumping is usually described as being caused by a continua! devaluation of the currency 
of the exporting country ahead of the intlation rate on its dornestic market836• In fact, the 
problem is that, at a given date, the evolution in the exchange rate and the intlation rate do not 
match. Empirical evidence, indeed, shows that purchasing power parity, i.e., the proposition that 
the depreciation of a country's currency equals the excess of dornestic intlation over foreign 
intlation, does not hold, especially not in the short run837• In view of the relatively short 
investigation periods, purchasing power parity will frequently not hold. As a consequence, 
exchange dumping will be sanctioned if the exporter has- usually unintentionally- failed to 
respond quickly or adequately to the incongruous evolution in the exchange rate and the inflation 
rate838• If there is such a incongruous evolution, the probability of such a failure is much 
higher. Indeed, if exchange rate and inflation rate evolve concordantly, the exporter will only 
have to adjust his dornestic market price to the inflation rate ; if he charges the same export price 
as before, he will not be found to practise dumping. If, however, there is a discordant evolution 
in exchange rate and inflation rate, he will have to adjust both his dornestic market price and his 
export price. For instance, if, at a given date, there is a devaluation, but no intlation, he will 
have to lower his export price ; but, if, afterwards, intlation occurs and if he adjusts his dornestic 
market price, dumping will be found if he did · not immediately adjust his export price too. Such a 
delay in the adjustment of the export price probably occurs frequently in cases of continuous 
changes in exchange rate and inflation rate ; in such cases, the exporter does not immediately 
adjust his prices for reasoos of practicability or for reasons of inaccurate and not up-to-date 
information839• In such cases, the exporter will be found to practise dumping, unless 
adjustments are allowed for. European anti-dumping case law, however, is rather vague as to 
836 WARES, W .A., The Theory of Dumping an.d American. Commercial Policy, Lexington, Lex.ington Books, 1977, 7. 
837 ETinER, W., Modern International Economica, New York, Norton, 1983, 354-357. 
838 DIDIER, P., ecEEC Antidumping Rules and Practicesn, Common Market Law Review, 1980, (349), 358-359 ; DIDIER, P., ccDeux 
années d'application du nouveau règlement antidumping de la CEEn, Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1982, (21), 37-38. 
839 Another example of a case of exchange dumping may be found in shovels jrom Brazil. In thia case, the exporter said lhat he bad increased bis 
dornestic marleet pricea in advance to take account of the intlation wbicb occurs between manufacture and sale, but lhat he bad not increased bis 
export prices because of the frequent devaluations of the Brazilian currency (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2464/84 of 24 August 1984 
imposing a proviaionalanti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio shovels originating in Brazil, O.J., 29 August 1984, NoL 231/29). 
m 
1 
304 
whether adjustments necessary to avoid the sanctioning of exchange dumping, are actually always 
made. European anti-dumping case law looks very casuistic. For this very reason it should be 
criticizeet But, it must be criticized even more, as it seems to sanction certain instances of 
exchange dumping840• Even worse, the Court of Justice is not to be expected to alter this case 
840 Exchange dumping has probably also been sanctioned in shovels from Brazü where the exporter claimed that Brazilian 
dornestic market prices should be adjusted becaUse they were increased in advance to take account of the inflation which occurs 
between manufacture and sale ; on the other hand, he claimed that such an increaae is not necessary for export sales because of the 
frequent devaluationa of the Brazilian currency. His claim was rejected on the ground that the comparison between dornestic and 
export prices must be made on the basis of the prices actually paid or payable in respect of transactions which took place at the 
sametime (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2464/84 of 24 August 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain shovels originating in Brazil, 0 . .1., 29 August 1984, NoL 231/29). 
It is highly probable that exchange dumping bas been sanctioned in ootton yarn from Brazil and Turkey. In the provisional anti-
dumping determination the Commission refused to use exchange rates adjusted for inflation, not as a matter of principle, but 
merely because the allegedly dumping exporters were not able to · produce argument& that the official exchange rate did not 
correspond to a realistic economie situation (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ootton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, 0 . .1., 27 September 1991, No L 271117). However, 
in the definitive anti-dumping determination the Council and the Commission, when confronted with strong evidence that the 
exchange rate of the Brazilian cruzado did reflect the Brazilian dornestic inflation rate, answered, as matter of principle, that : 
«(t)he establishment, by the competent authorities, of the exchange rate of a third country's currency is a decision which cannot be 
the subject of appreciation by the Community institutiona in the framewerk of an anti-dumping proceeding. It is, therefore, the 
Commisaion's constant practice, conf1rmed in the case-law of the Court of Justice, to use the official exchange rate applied to 
international commercial tranaactions. To adjust this exchange rate for the purposes of dumping calculations would be 
inappropriate and contrary to the principle of neutrality as regards the monetary aspects of an anti-dumping case» (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yarn originating in 
Brazil and Turkey, 0 . .1., 27 March 1992, NoL 82/1. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2305192 of 4 August 1992 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in Brazil and definitively collecting the amounts secured by 
way ofthe provisional anti-dumping duty, 0 . .1., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/1). 
The case law of the Court of Justice to which the European anti-dumping authorities refer, however, does not involve that official 
exchange rates must always be used without any adjustment for inflation and that the problem of exchange dumping may be 
disregarded. lndeed, the case in question concerning standardized multi-phase electric motors from Bulgaria, Czechoswvakia, tlu! 
German Democratie Republic, Hungary, POland and the USSR did not require such adjustments since the rate of devaluation 
corresponded to the rate of inflation; so no exchange dumping could have arisen (C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 
July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 2965 (Report for the Hearing: 
conclusiona of the Council and the Commission), 2980 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 3002-3003). 
In other cases, it was not clear whether the adjustments were apt or, at least, intended to prevent exchange dumping from being 
sanctioned : 
in sodium carbonale from Bulgaria, tlu! German Democratie Republic, Poland and RomanicJ prices were calculated in US 
dollars in order to neutralize the inflationary effect of the Mexican currency, Mexico being selected as raferenee country 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium 
carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, No L 13114) ; 
in ferro-chrome from Kazakhstan, Ru.sia and Ukraine, separate normal values were determined for shipments effected in 
different periods. since the currency of Zimbabwe, which is the raferenee country, had been devalued significantly (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2717193 of 28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-chrome with 
a carbon content by weight of maximum 0,5% Oow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, 
0 . .1., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/1); 
in ferro-silicon from Brazil normal values and export prices were compared in US dollars given Brazil's high and continued 
inflation. Moreover, normal values were expressedon a monthly basis in US dollars and according to the monthly average 
exchange rate to offset the inflationary effect of dornestic prices in Brazil (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115191 of 29 April 
1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of 
ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, 0 . .1., 3 May 1991, No L 11111; Commission Decision 911240/EEC of 29 April 1991 
accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
importsof ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and terminating the investigation as regards those exporters, 0 . .1., 3 May 1991, 
NoL 111147); 
in ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and cotton yarn from Brazil and Turkey monthly average exchange rates were used in 
order to offset the inflationary effects on the damestic market of the exporting country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115191 
of 29 April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 11111; Commission Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 April 
1991 accepting undertakings affered by certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and terminating the investig~tion as regards those exporters, 0 . .1., 3 May 1991, 
NoL 111147; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
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law as it considers the European anti-dumping authorities to enjoy a margin of diseretien · to 
choose the method appropriate to take account of complex economie situations, such as the 
interconnection between intlation and exchange rates841 • 
Not much improvement is to be expected from the new GA TI Anti-dumping Code and, in 
pursuance thereof, the new EC anti-dumping legislation, which, for the first time, tackle the 
question of exchange rate fluctuations. As the new Code and the new EC anti-dumping legislation 
prescribe the use of the exchange rate on the date of sale and forbid the consideration of 
fluctuations in exchange rates (Article 2.4.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 2(10)0) basic 
EC Regulation), they explicitly allow to sanction exchange dumping. The rule that exchange rate 
imports of ootton yam originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, NoL 271117); 
in ball bearings from japon and aucUo tapes from Japan., the Republic of Korea an.d HongKong monthly average currency 
ràtes were used in order to take account of significant fluctuations in the exchange rate of the exporting country (C.J.E.C, 
case 255/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujüwshi Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1861), 1896; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating 
in Japan, the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 13 November 1990, NoL 31315 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, 
No L9/36)); 
artifici.al corundum from Brazil an.d Yugoslavia a prolonged investigation period of 16 months was chosen in order to be in a 
better position to take account of the effects of extremely high intlation rates in these countries (Commission Decision 
91/512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures 
coneerDing importsof artificial corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's 
Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of artificial corundum originating 
in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, NoL 275/27). 
In other cases, acijustments made to exchange rates did not relate to exchange dumping. Although the adjustments were not 
e:xplicitly e:xplained, they seemingly were necessary because the exchange rate originally used by the European anti-dumping 
authorities did not correspond to the exchange rates actually used by the exporters (Commission Recommendation No 
2976/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, 
originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10; Commission Decision 83176/EEC of 16 February 1983 accepting 
u:i:t.dertak.ings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain fibre building board originating 
in Brazil, O.J., 19 February 1983, NoL 47/30; ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importsof polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, 
NoL 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statee of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 
17 December 1988, No L 348/49 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of ootton yarn originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1). lt is consistent case law of the 
European anti-dumping authorities, along with that of the Court of Justice, that such actual exchange rates must be applied. 
Indeed, in several cases the exporters claimed that the real value of their country's currency should be used and not the official 
exchange rate. The European anti-dumping authorities, as well as the Court of Justice, answered that the exchange rates actually 
used by the exporters in their export transactions had to be preferred. As the exporters used the official exchange rates, those 
rates had to be applied without any acijustment (C.J.E.C., case 255/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fuji.koshi Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 
1987, (1861), 1896; C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission an.d 
Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 2960 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council), 2979-2980 (Opinion of Advocate General 
VAN GERVEN) and SOOS ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation 
of imports of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the 
investigation, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing importsof certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof standardized 
multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 
April 1987, No L 102/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/87 of 5 August 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,76 kW but notmore than 76 kW, originating 
in Yugoslavia, O.J., 7 August 1987, NoL 218/2. See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1479/83 of 7 June 1983 imposinga 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 9 June 1983, No 
L 15l.rl4). 
841 C.J.E.C., joined casea C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R.; 1990, I, 
(2945), 3002. 
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fluctuations must be ignored, seems to imply. that an exporter, whodoes notalter his export prices 
when exchange rates fluctuate, will not be sanctioned for exchange dumping. However, an 
exporter who tries to follow the exchange rate fluctuations, may be found to practise dumping, as 
exchange rate fluctuations will always be ignored. Therefore, it would seem to be better that the 
exchange rate fluctuations should not be ignored blindly. The fact that the date of sale is defined 
as the date on which the material terms of sale are established (Note (3) at Artiele 2.4.1. GA TT 
Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 2(1 O)(j) basic EC Regulation), does not alter the condusion that, 
. under the new GA TT and EC rules, exchange dumping may still be. sanctioned. The problem is 
that GA TT and EC anti-dumping law do not take account of the possible unability of the exporter 
to respond in time and to the exact extent to the incongruous evolution in exchange rate and 
intlation rate. On account of GATT and EC anti-dumping law, there are only two marginal 
improvements to be mentioned which are, in part, a remedy for the ex porter's unability to take 
account of the interplay between exchange rate and inflation. First, GA TI and EC anti-dumping 
law oblige the anti-dumping authorities to allow exporters sixty days842 for adjusting their 
export prices to reflect sustained movements in exchange rates (Article 2.4.1. GATT Anti-
dumping Code ; Artiele 2(10)0) basic EC Regulation). Here, the question arises what the 
difference is between exchange rate fluctuations, which must be ignored, and sustained movements 
in exchange rates, to which the exporters must adjust their export prices. It seems that exporters 
must be able, within a period of sixty days, to discern the trend in the daily exchange rate 
fluctuations and to adapt their export prices to that trend. Needless to say, that exporters are 
required to have a firm knowied ge of capital mar kets. Moreover, if they do not want to be 
sanctioned for exchange dumping, they should also know exactly the evolution in inflation and 
combine that information with the trend in exchange rate movements. The only impravement this 
new rule implies is that it does not require the exporters to adapt their export prices daily to 
exchange rate fluctuations. Second, GATT and · EC anti-dumping law allow adjustments for 
bedging (i.e., transactions for avoiding losses from possible exchange ra te fluctuations) ( Artiele 
2.4.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 2(10)0) basic EC Regulation), which the European 
anti-dumping authorities have always refused to make adjustments for843 . This improvement, 
though, does not tackle the problem of exchange dumping fundamentally. It only recognizes that 
exporters are unable to predict exchange rate movements and try to reduce the risks of exchange 
rate movements by means of hedging. De lege ferenda, the assumption about the unability of 
842 Under GAlT anti-dumping law, the period of 60 days is a minimum (see the wording «at least» in Artiele 2.4.1. GAlT Anti-dumping Code). 
843 The Europcan anti-dumping authorities have refused adjustments for hedging, which they consider to be a financial device extraneous to the 
commercial transaction for which European anti-dumping law does provide for adjustmentll (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 June 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yam originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 
June 1988, NoL 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, NoL 152/58); Commission Rcgulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of 
Alnerica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151147; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of polyester yam originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J:, 16 December 1988, NoL 347/10; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesten 
originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the Uniled Stales of AmeÎica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, NoL 348/49). 
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exporters to respond exactly to the movements in exchange rates and in inflation, which underlies 
the second improvement, should be the general starting point for the comparison between normal 
value and export price: exporters should be granted the opportunity to show why and to what 
extent they were unable to adapt their prices correctly to the interplay between exchange rates and 
in flati on. 
4~2.2.2. Intertemporal price discrimination 
It has been argued that normal value and export price should be compared at the date of effective 
price determination in order to neutralise the effects of changing market conditions on the 
dumping finding. However, even if market conditions do not change, prices may differ in time. 
Economie theory distinguishes two types of intertemporal price discrimination. The first type 
takes the form of second-degree price discrimination. Here, there are two types of consumers : 
consumers with a high valuation of the product, and low-valuation consumers. The high-valuation 
consumers are willing to pay a higher price than the low-valuation consumers. As consumers 
know that there will be future price reductions, they will postpone buying at high prices. 
However, if the producer is able to commit to a limited production capacity, consumers will also 
kn~w that they run the risk of being rationed at the low price.. If there is but a small chance of 
obtaining the product at the future low price, the high-valuation consumers will buy today at the 
higher price. Thus, by committing to a limited production capacity, the producer is able to 
distinguish high-valuation consumers from low-valuation consumers and to capture (part of) the 
high-valuation consumers' surplus844• Clearly, for this type of price discrimination, no 
adjustments should be allowed. This type of price discrimination has probably only a limited 
scope since the producer must be able to commit to a limited production capacity. It only applies 
to durable products, such as electrooie products (e.g., photocopiers, compact disc players), the 
technology of which is rapidly outdated. Indeed, this type of products is characterized by the 
permanent development of new models which are quickly outdated, causing their prices to drop in 
the future. 
The second type of intertemporal price discrimination is analyzed within the framework of spatial 
price discrimination845• Converting spatial price theory into intertemporal price theory makes 
that «di stance» is translated into «time», that «transport costs» are now «storage costs» and that the 
net demand curve is the updated value of the gross demand curve. 
844 VAN CAYSEELE, P., «Consumer rationing and the possibility of intertemporal price discrimination», European Economie Review, 1991, 
(1473), 1473-1484. 
845 See: GREENHUT, ML., NORMAN, G., and CHUNG, C.-S., The economie• of imperfect competition. A spatial approach, 
Cambridge, Cambridge Univarsity Press, 1987, 209-215; PHLIPS, L., cclntertemporal Price Discrimination and Sticky Prices .. , 
Quarterly .Tourn.al of Economics, 1980, (525), 525~42 ; PHLIPS, ·L., La formation des pri:t, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabay, 1983, 117-163. 
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Figure 13(a) represents current demand D1, with corresponding marginal revenue curve MR1, and current marginal 
costs MC1 ; in tigure 13(b) gross future demand is represented by the curve~' the corresponding marginal revenue 
curve being MR2, and future marginal costs are represented by the curve M<;. lf the producer determines the price 
in both periods independently of each other, he would choose the points a and b in respectively tigure 13(a) and 13(b) 
as optimal solutions. lf this is not the case, he will horizontally sum the current demand curve D1 and the updated 
future demand curve D2' into the curve D in tigure 13(c). He will also do the same with marginal costs : in tigure 
13(c) MC is the horizontal sum of the current marginal cost curve Me; and the updated future marginal cost curve 
M~'. By equalizing this MC curve with MR, which is the marginal cost curve corresponding toD in tigure 13(c), 
the producer will produce a quantity Ox1 and sell a quantity Oq1 at a price OP1 in the tirst period, whereas he will 
produce a quantity Ox2 and sell a quantity ~ at a price OP2 in the second period. lt follows from tigure 13 that 
intertemporal price discrimination is practised : the change in price from the first · period to the second is smaller than 
the marginal cost of storage. Thus, by analogy with «freight absorption», the producer may be said to practise 
cstorage cost absorption». 
In order to detect this type of price discrimination, adjustments must be allowed for possible 
«storage cost absorption» if normal value and export price do not date from the same moment. 
This type of price discrimination has a wide scope as it applies to all storable products (e.g., ores, 
chemica! products). 
However, European anti-dumping law does not allow adjustments for differences in time as they 
are not included in the exhaustive list of allowed adjustments (see : Artiele 2(10) basic EC 
legislation). As a number of instances of intertemporal price discrimination cannot be detected, 
European anti-dumping law violates GA TI anti-dumping law, under which all dumping practices 
should be detected. In order to be in conformity with GATT anti-dumping law, prices should be 
reduced by inventory costs846 • 
846 Under prior Europaan anti-dumping law dilTerences hi inventory costs or starage expenses were allowed for if they bore a 
direct relationship to the sales of the product under consideration, see: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 163/83 of 21 January 
1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 26 
January 1983, NoL 2319; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681/84 of 18 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& ofpentaerythritol originating in Canada and accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of pentaerythritol originating in Sweden and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 September 1984, 
No L 254/5; Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of binder 
and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating_the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, NoL 34155; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the 
United Statas of America and terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, NoL 258/20; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia 
and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, 
NoL 317/1. 
Conversely, no adjustment was made for inventory costs and starage expenses which did not bear a direct relationship tothesales 
of the product in question, see: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2182/80 of 14 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 15 August 1980, NoL 212/43; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 909/85 of 2 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain kinds of polystyrene 
sheet originating in Spain, O.J., 4 April1985, NoL 97/30; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 997/85 of 18 April1985 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April 1985, No L 107/8; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2322/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 15 
August 1985, No L 218/1 ; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings antered into in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categoriesof glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51173; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep 
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4. 2. 3. Vijferences in physical characteristics 
In European anti-dumping law, adjustments for differences in physical characteristics which affect 
price comparability, must be made (Article 2(10)(a) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(9) and (10) 
basic ECSC Decision). Although it does not provide a defmition of the concept «differences in 
physical characteristics», European anti-dumping law indicates that this concept does not concern 
differences in basic physical characteristics which are essential to the definition of the like product 
category. Indeed, the scope of an anti-dumping proceeding only concerns like products, i.e., 
products which are identical or similar in terms of their basic physical characteristics847• 
Hence, the required adjustments pertain only to differences in other, non-basic physical 
characteristics which do not affect the definition of the like product category848• As bas been 
shown, consumer perception plays an important role -in determining which physical characteristics 
are basic : if consumers perceive a product as not to be simHar because of a given difference in 
physical characteristics, that product will not be considered to be a like product, though it shows 
many resemblances in terms of other physical characteristics849• In the same way, consumer 
perception is decisive as to adjustments for differences in (non-basic) physical characteristics. 
Indeed, adjustments will only be allowed for such differences if they have a hearing on consumer 
perception850• For example, differences in regard to quality have no effect on the definition of 
the like product and must, if necessary, be taken into account when normal value and export price 
freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the 
proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No· 864/87 
of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output 
of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, 
No L 83/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1043/87 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Ytigoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, NoL 102/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Commission Decision No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 
July 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, 
O.J., 29 July 1987, NoL 207121; Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, NoL 18/31. 
847 lnjra, 377-380. 
848 C.J.E.C., joir1ed cases C-304/86 and C-185/87, 11 July 1990, Enilal SpA v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2939), 2940; 
C.J.E.C., case C-157/87, 11 July 1990, Electroimpex a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3021), 3023. 
849 lnjra, 382-385. 
85° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof bicycles originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 58/12. 
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are compared851• A second and last indication about the concept «differences in physical 
characteristics» is provided by European anti-dumping case law, according to which this co~cept 
does not cover differences caused by a different use852• 
In economics, a distinction is made between two kinds of product differentiation, i.e. , vertical 
differentlation and horizontal differentiation. Vertical differentlation refers to quality differences : 
all consumers prefer higher quality to lower, but there is a difference in their willigness to pay for 
increments in quality. Horizontal differentlation refers to different varieties of a product, but, 
851 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 
of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of eertaio polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, 
Indonesia, India, the People's Repoblie of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No L 88/1 
(corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153/16); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa of bicyclea öriginating in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's 
Repoblie of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1. 
Adjustments for differencea in physical characteristics have also been made in, inser aüa : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on eertaio imports of video cassette reeorden originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 
31 August 1988, No L 240/5 (differences coneerDing video coloor standards, remote control, recording speed, picture quality, sound recording, 
number of video heada, and accessories included in the price of the VCR (cables, computer, video tapes, etc.)) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Repoblie of 
China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1 (differences in potency of 
dihydrostreptomycin) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Repoblie of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/15 and Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of magnesium oxide originating in the People's 
Repoblie of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/23 (the different MgO grades) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 of 23 October 1992 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 24 October 1992, No 
L 308/41 (differenccs in terms of crystal sizc, as well as in consumers' image) ; Commission Rcgulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-chrome) 
originating in Kazakhstan, Rusaia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8 (differcnces in the net chromium content; crosbed versus non-
·crushed ferro-chrome); Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio 
magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and tlle People's Repoblie of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 95/5 (differences in 
the degree of certification, i.e., the teating of the performance of the diskette which influenccs its market value) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& Qf fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3 (differcnce between fluorspar in wet form (filter cake form) and dry form (powder)); Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating 
in Japan, Taiwan and tbc Peoplc's Repoblie of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4 
( ditTerences in the degree of ccrtification, i.e., the testing of the performance of the diskette which influences its market value) ; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on importa of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, Ice1and, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1 (differences in screening, croshing and weighing); 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on importa of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in 
Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 Ju~ 1994, NoL 162/16 (differences in the N-content); Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 
1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazit and South Africa, O.J., 
21 December 1994, No L 330/15 (differences in the content of phosphorus and differences in formats). 
In dead-bumed (sinte~d) magnesia jrom the People 's RepubUc of China, adjustments were made for the fact that the importers of the Chinese 
product had to carry out themselves operationa such as analysis of the product and removal of foreign substances, since those operationa are 
normally done by the producers themselves in thc rcfercnce country (the People's Repoblie of China is a NME country) (Council Regulation (EC) 
No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's 
Repoblie of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, NoL 306/16). lt seems that those operationa determine the quality of the product, namely the degree 
of its purity. lf this is oot the case, then these adjustments deviate from consistent European anti-dumping case law which rejects to take account of 
production costs in NME countries, unless those adjustments were made for so-called «natural advantagea» of the NME country (see : injra, 61-64). 
852 Differences in playing time of video cassttes are no differences in physical characteristics if they are caused by the different 
recording systems of the video cassette recorder (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of video c~settes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the 
provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the import& of video tape reels originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, NoL 17411). 
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contrary to vertical differentiation, consumers do not agree on the ranking of the different product 
varieties853• Both horizontal and vertical product differentlation may be applied for price 
discrimination. In European anti-dumping case law, adjustments have been made for both types 
of product differentlation and both types of price discrimination will be found. Therefore, 
European anti-dumping law is in conformity with GA TT anti-dumping law, which requires that all 
practices of dumping are found. 
The theory of spatial price discrimination may be applied in order to analyse horizontal differentiation854• Indeed, 
the model of spatial price discrimination illustrated in tigure 1 in Chapter n855 may easily be adapted to the pricing 
of horizontally differentiated products. The spatial distance between producer and consumer bas to he interpreted as 
the difference between the basic product variety, as manufactured by the producer and the product variety preferred 
by the consumer ; transport costs are now the costs of modifying the basic product to the variety preferred by the 
consumer. The comparison between spatial pricing and the pricing of product varieties holds true. Therefore, it may 
be concluded that price discrimination may be practised by horizontal product differentiation if the producer controts 
the moditication of the basic product into the desired product variety856 • 
The application of the spatial model to product differentiation holds only true if the producer can to abserve the 
consumer's most preferred product characteristics857• In many cases, this condition will not he fulfilled. 
Therefore, a more realistic approach of horizontal differentiation consists of consiclering horizontal differentiation as a 
type of commodity bundling858 : offering different varieties of a product is offering single and mixed bundies of 
different characteristics8S9. 
Vertical differentiation could also be analyzed as a fonn of commodity bundling: the product of higher quality may 
be seen as the bundling of higher quality with the product of lower quality. In this respect, quality differences show 
great resemblance to differences in quantity. As a higher quantity is strictly preferred to a lower quantity, there is a 
strict preferenee of higher quality to lower quality. In view of this parallelism, the approach of differences in 
quantities as illustrated in tigure 9 in this Chapter860, may also he applied to vertical differentiation861• Thus, 
853 PHLIPS, L., La formation des prix, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabay, 1983, 298-301; SCHMALENSEE, R., cclndustrial Economics: An 
Overview», Economie Journal, 1988, (643), 671. 
86
" SCHMALENSEE, R., tclndustrial Economics : An Overview», Eco~mie Journal, 1988, (643), 671. 
855 Supra, 27-29. 
856 A Clear example is that of a car manufacturer offering a basic model A which may he upgraded, at an extra cost, with several 
features, and an identical modelBon which all the extra features are standard; it often happens that the extracostof upgrading 
the basic model A is higher than the price difference between model B and A (GREENHUT, M.L., NORMAN, G., and HUNG, C.S., 
The economie• of imperfect competition.. A spatial approach, Cambridge, Cambridge Univarsity Prees, 1987, 111-112 ; PHLIPS, L., 
La formation des prix, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabay, 1983, 307-311). 
867 GREENHUT, M.L., NORMAN, G., and HUNG, C.S., The economics of imperfect competition.. A spatial approach, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Pres&, 1987, 111. 
858 In conneetion with commodity bundling, see: supra, 291-294. 
859 PHLIPS, L., La formation des prix, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabay, 1983, 311-314 ; TIROLE, J., The Theory of lndustrial 
Organization, Cambridge, MlT Press, 1988, 159-160. 
860 Supra, 283-285. 
861 For such an analysis of vertical differentiation, see :.MUSSA, M., and ROSEN, S., ccMonopoly and Product Quality», Journalof 
Economie Theory, 1978/18, (301), 301-317 ; PHLIPS, L., ·La formation. des prix, Louvain-la-Neuve, Cabya, 1983, 314-344 ; TIROLE, 
J., The Theory of lnclu.trial Organization, Cambridge, MlT Press, 1988, 149-152. 
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the producer will appropriate all consumer's surplus of the low-quality-preferring consumers, while leaving some net 
surplus for the high-quality-preferring consumers. 
For both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, the product differences must correspond 
to differences in the preferences of the different groups of consumers. In European anti-dumping 
case law, the differences in preferences play a crucial role. For adjustments were refused for 
differences which did not influence the choice of the consumers862• Conversely, adjustments 
were allowed for differences in physical characteristics which influenced the choice of the 
consumers863 or could have influenced the choice of the consumers if the two types of the 
product would enter in direct competition864• Adjustments were also made for products which 
show no differences in physical characteristics, but the quality of which is perceived differently by 
the consumers865• Of course, only insofar as these differences in physical characteristics affect 
the market values, adjustments will be allowed866• The amount of the adjustments should oot 
solely be based on the production costs. Instead, it must be based on either the dornestic market 
price or the constructed value (i.e. , production costs including general expenses and a reasonable 
profit margin), because physical differences generally correspond to marketing features for which 
the difference in price actually paid is much higher than the difference in production costs actually 
incurred 867• 
862 Council Decision 82/423/EEC of 21 June 1982 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
refrigerators originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 29 June 1982, No L 184123; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093191 of 15 July 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof smali-screen colour televison receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China 
and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 18 July 1991, No L 195/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 
October 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes originating in the :People's Republic of · 
China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 24 October 1991, NoL 29312. 
863 Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 ·March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized 
multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but notmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts securedas 
provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093/91 of 15 July 1991 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour televison receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of 
China and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 18 July 1991, NoL 195/1. 
864 Council Regulation (EEC) No 501/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain video 
cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 
February 1989, No L 57/55. 
865 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video 
tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April1991; NoL 106/15. 
866 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
compactdisc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, 
NoL 257/27); Commission Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5. 
867 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048/90 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen 
colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, 
NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192). 
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4. 2. 4. Differences in import charges and indirect taxes 
Under GA'IT anti-dumping law due allowance must be made for differences in taxation (Article 
VI(l) GA'IT ; Artiele 2.4. GA'IT Anti-dumping Code). lt is, moreover, forbidden to subject 
exported products to an anti-dumping duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties 
or taxes home by the like product when intended for consumption in the country of origin or 
export or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes (Article VI(4) GATT). GATT anti-
dumping law is rendered in European anti-dumping law by the provision that normal value must 
be reduced by an amount corresponding to any import charges or indirect taxes home by the like 
product and by matenals physically incorporated therein, when intended for consumption in the 
country of origin or export and not collected or refunded in respect of the product exported to the 
Community (Article 2(10)(b) basic EC legislation). However, the European version of GATT 
. anti-dumping law breaks down in two respects : the limitation of the adjustment to indirect taxes 
and import charges, and the form of the adjustment. 
4.2.4.1. Indirect taxes and import charges versus direct direct taxes 
Theoretically, a country may choose to apply either the «destination principle» or the «origin 
principle» to the taxes it imposes. Under the «destination principle», all products used in the same 
place should be taxed in the same way, irrespective of where they are produced. Therefore, the 
same dornestic taxes of the importing country are imposed on both imported products and on 
domestically used products, and exported goods are exempted from those dornestic taxes. On the 
other hand, under the «origin principle>>, all products produced in the same place should be taxed 
in the same way, irrespective of whère they are consumed. Therefore, exported goods should be 
taxed in the same way as products consumed in the producing country and imported goods are not · 
subject to these dornestic direct taxes. Thus, the choice between «origin principle>> and 
«destination principle» determines whether the dornestic tax. is a production tax or a consumption 
tax.. 
Figure 14 
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U nder GA TI· law, however, the choice between the «destination principle» and the «origin 
principle» is free as to indirect taxes ; for direct taxes the «origin principle» must be applied 
(Article ill(2) GA 'IT)868 • This is probably why European anti-dumping law allows adjustments 
only for indirect taxes and import charges in order to leave the choice between the «destination 
principle» and the «origin principle» to the exporting country. 
The distinction made between direct and indirect taxes is inspired by the idea that direct taxes are 
fully absorbed by producers, whereas indirect taxes are fully reflected in the prices of the products 
taxed869• This idea, however, does not hold. There is some evidence that also direct taxes are 
r~flected in prices870• The fact that direct taxes are usually only partly reflected in prices, 
poses some administrative problems as to determining the exact amount of the part of the tax 
reflected in the price871 • Indirect taxes and import charges, however, raise the same 
administrative problems as they too are not always fully reflected in the price. 
In tigure 14, the case of a large open economy is illustrated. The supply of the dornestic producers is represented by 
the curve Sd and world supply is represented by the curve ~ ; the curve D represents dornestic demand. If no tax 
nor duty is levied, dornestic and world price are equal to OP w· At this price consumers buy a quantity Oq4 of which 
Oq1 and q1 q4 are supplied respectively by dornestic producers and foreign producers. Assume that the importing 
country imposes an ad valorem import duty t. As a consequence world supply Sw is shifted by a factor (1 + t) to 
Sw(l + t), and dornestic price raises from OP w to OPt whereas world price drops to OP' w· At this price consumers 
buy only a quantity Ü'IJ. of which dornestic producers and foreign producers supply respectively 0'12 and q2(jJ. As a 
quantiy q2'b is imported, an amount equal to the area acdf is paid as import duty. However, only the area abef is 
home by the dornestic consumers ; because of the fall of the world price OP w to OP' w' the remaining area bede is 
home by the foreign producers. Thus, the import duty t is only partly reflected in the price paid by the consumers. 
There is, thus, no reason why, under European anti-dumping law, the adjustment for differences 
in taxation should be restricted to indirect taxes. It may even be argued that adjustments for 
direct taxes must likewise be allowed, because GATI anti-dumping law imposes adjustments for 
868 KRAUSS, M.B., ccBorder-Tax Adjustments: A Potential Trans-Atlantic Trade Dispute», Joumal of World Trade Law, 1976, 
(145), 145-148; McGOVERN, E., International Trade Regulation. GATT, the United Statea and the Europeon Community, Exeter, 
Globefield Press, 1982, 191-193 and 253-258. For more on the distinction between the destination principle and the origin 
principle, see: BALDWIN, R.E., Nontariff Distortiona of International Trade, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1970, 
84-109; GROSSMAN, G.M., ccAlternative Border Tax Policies", Journol of World Trade Law, 1978, (452), 452-460; GROSSMAN, 
G.M., ccBorder tax adjustments. Do they distort trade ?", Journal of International Economi.ca, 1980/10, (117), 117-128 ; JOHNSON, 
H., and KRAUSS, M., ccBorder Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments, Comparative Advantage, and the Balance of Payments,,, Canadian. 
Journal of Economics, 1970, (595), 595-602. 
869 BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The Europeon Communities, London, .Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 109. 
870 KRAUSS, M.B., tcBorder-Tax Adjustments : A Potential Trans-Atlantic Trade Dispute .. , Joumal of World Trade Law, 1976, 
(145), 152-153 ; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United Statea and the Europeon Communities. A 
Comparatwe Analyaia, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 453. 
871 BALDWIN, R.E., Nontariff Distortiona of International Trade, Washington D.C.,. The Brookings Institution, 1970, 109; 
KRAUSS, M.B., ccBorder-Tax Adjustments: A Potential Trans-Atlantic Trade Dispute", Journalof World Trade Law, 1976, (145), 
153-154. 
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differences in taxation, without making any distinction between direct and indirect taxes (Article 
VI(l) GATI ; Artiele 2.4. GATI Anti-dumping Code)872• 
4.2.4.2. Farm of adjustment 
For the application of European anti-dumping law, the part of the tax reflected in the price has not 
to be identified. The adjustment for import charges and indirect taxes results in a reduction of 
normal value by an amount corresponding to the import charges or indirect taxes borne by the 
product and its inputs when destined for consumption on the dornestic market of the country of 
ot1gin or export (Article 2(10)(a) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(10)(b) basic ECSC Decision). 
Under prior European anti-dumping law, however, adjustments for such differences resulted either 
in reducing the normal value873 or increasing the export price874 by the refunded amount of 
the tax. At first sight, the new rule of European anti-dumping law seems more logica! : normal 
value and export priees are compared at a level net of indirect taxes and import charges, just as 
they are also compared net of transportation costs. As taxes, like transportation costs, may be 
872 It might, however, he argued that adjustments for differences in taxation should he restricted to indirect taxes and import 
charges. lndeed, Artiele Vl(4) GATr stipulates that ccno product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall he subject to anti-dumping or countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such 
product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by 
reason of the refund of such duties or taxes.. It, thus, deals with taxes levied on product& and, therefore, aims at indirect taxes and 
import charges. Artiele Vl(4) GATr, however, seems to be an application of the general provision which requires to make 
adjustments for the purpose of ensuring a fair comparison between normal value and export price and which does not impose such 
restrietion in respect of adjustments for differences in taxation. 
873 Commission Decision 82/543/EEC of 6 August 1982 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning paracetamol (1NN) crystals or powder originating in China and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 
1982, No L 236123; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2936/82 of 28 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 4 November 1982, NoL sosn; Commission Recommendation No 2975/82/ECSC of 
8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 
9 November 1982, NoL 312/10; Commission Decision 83175/EEC of 15 February 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof certain fibre building board originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 February 1983, 
NoL 47/30; Council Regulation (EEC) No 486/83 of 28 February 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on copper sulphate 
originating in Yugoslavia and definitively collecting the amounts secured by way of provisional duty, O.J., 2 March 1983, No 
L 55/4; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 909/85 of 2 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
kinds ofpolystyrene sheet originating in Spain, O.J., 4 April1985, NoL 97/30. 
874 Commission Decision 81/430/EEC of 15 June 1981 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
seamless tubes or non-alloy steels originating in Spain, O.J., 23 June 1981, No L 165/27; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2127/82 of 28 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene originating in the German Democratie 
Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Spain and the United Statee of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No L 223176; Commission Recommendation No 
2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, 
originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10; Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting 
undertakings ofTered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of perchlorethylene originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statesof America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, No 
L 371/47; Commission Recommendation No 259/83/ECSC of 27 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on broad-
flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 1 February 1983, No L 30/61 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1983, No L 36/10); 
Commission Decision 83175/EEC of 15 February 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneciion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of certain fibre building board originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 February 1983, No L 47/30; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 909/85 of 2 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain kinds of 
polystyrene sheet originating in Spain, O.J., 4 April 1985, No L 97/30; Commission Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1985, NoL 299/18. 
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different according to the destination of the product, the comparison between normal value and 
export price at a level net of indirect taxes and import charges, will not be distorted by differences 
in taxa ti on. 
Though in most cases, the choice between either reduction of normal value or increase of the 
export price by the amount of the tax, is neutral, the new rule poses a problem, when 
domestically produced matenals are used to manufacture the fmal product consumed in the 
· dornestic market of the exporting country, but when imported matericils, subject to import charges, 
are used to manufacture the exported product. Even if these import duties were refunded on 
exports, no adjustment can be made under European anti-dumping law because no import charges 
are bome by the materials physically incorporated in the product consumed in the exporting 
country875. 
European anti-dumping law does not explicitly conneet taxes with refunds. The amount refunded 
in respect of the product exported to the Community may be either smaller or higher than the 
amount of taxes collected on the product exported. In the first case, the reduction of normal value 
by the full amount of the tax collected on the products and inputs sold on the dornestic market of 
the country of origin or export, results in a dumping margin which is lower than the real dumping 
margin. This case, however, does notpose any legal problem as GATT anti-dumping law does 
not require that all instances of dumping be sanctioned. 
In the second case, if the refund is higher than the amount of the tax, an export subsidy will be 
sanctioned under anti-dumping law876. There may be a problem, here since, under GATI law, 
export subsidies may be sanctioned only by countervailing duty law, whereas ant-dumping law 
must ·be aimed exclusively at sanctioning (injurious) dumping877. European anti-dumping 
authorities cannot solve this problem, even when they eosure that the amount of the adjustment 
875 Coinmission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain jmports of 
video cassette recordere origi.nating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour 
telavision receivers origi.nating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1 ; BELLIS, J.-F., VERMULST, E., and 
WAER, P., tcFurther Changes in the EEC Anti-Dumping Regulation: A Codification of Controversial Methodólogies''• Journ.al of 
World Trcuk Law, 1989, (21), 28. 
876 UGONIS, M., and PUIFFERRAT, J., ecLa nouvelle législation anti-dumping de la Com.munauté Européenne", Reuue du 
Marché Commun., 1982, (117), 118. 
877 Commission Decision 84/512/EEC of 23 October 1984 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of paraformaldehyde originating in Spain and terminating the investigation, O.J., 26 October 1984, 
NoL 282/58. 
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does not exceed the amount of the refund878• Under prior European anti-dumping law, though, 
they could avoid the sanction of export subsidies by means of anti-dumping law. For, in making 
adjustments for import charges and indirect taxes, they could add the refunded tax amount to the 
export price. If they chose to adjust the export price, adjustment had to be made for the amount 
refunded or for the amount which would have been collected if exports were not tax -exempted. 
Thus, if a too large amount was refunded and added to the export price, the export subsidy would 
not influence the dumping finding and anti-dumping law would not sanction any export subsidy. 
Under prior European anti-dumping law, European anti-dumping authorities, therefore, considered 
the question of possible export subsidization irrelevant in their dumping investigation879• 
5. DUMPING MARGIN 
5.1. DEFINITION 
European anti-dumping law defines the dumping margin as the amount by which normal value 
exceeds the export price (Article 2(12) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(14)(a) basic ECSC 
Decision). Instances of reverse dumping, i.e., when normal value does not exceed the export 
price, should not be taken into account. The definition of the dumping margin is neutral in cases 
where the exporter's normal value always exceeds his export price, as well as in cases where bis 
normal value never _exceeds bis export price. However, this is not so, in cases where the normal . 
value of an exporter at times exceeds bis export price, but then again does not exceed his export 
price. lndeed, when dumping margins vary, a weighted average dumping margin may be 
878 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio polyester 
yams (man-made stapte fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-
dumping procceding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 27617; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio polyester yams (man-made staple 
fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 
April 1992, No L 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, No L 153/16); Council Regulation (EEC) No 54/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a 
defmitive duty on imporu of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9/2. 
879 Commission Decision 81/430/EEC of 16 June 1981 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
seamless tubes or non-alloy steels originating in Spain, O.J., 23 June 1981, No L 166/27; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2127/82 of 28 July 1982 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Spain and the United States of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No L 223/76; Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 
December 1982 accepting undertak.ings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Romania, Spain and the United States of America and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371147 ; Commission Decision 84/612/EEC of 23 October 1984 accepting an undertaking 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning im.ports of paraformaldehyde originating in Spain and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 26 October 1984, No L 282/68. 
J 
320 
established (Article 2(12) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(14)(b) basic ECSC Decision)880. 
Disregarding the cases of reverse dumping increases the weigthed average dumping margin, as 
will be demonstrated881 because these cases caooot compensate the cases where normal value 
exceeds the export price. 
Moreover, not only cases of reverse dumping, but also cases of low dumping may be disregardecl. 
If in the majority of cases specific dumping margins are low, the weighted average dumping 
margin will also be low. · The few cases with high dumping margins will then have only a 
marginal effect on the weighted average dumping margin. But even if a low weighted average 
dumping margin is established, the exporters may still be sanctioned. European anti-dumping 
authorities are not obliged to look only at the weighted average dumping margin. For European 
anti-dumping law states that «(w)here . dumping margins vary, weighted averages may be 
established» (Article 2(12) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(14)(b) basic ECSC Decision) (emphasis 
added). Thus, they cao look at specific dumping margins. If some of these specific dumping 
margins are rather high, it is possible that anti-dumping relief will be granted882• 
5.2. A VERAGING TECHNIQUE 
TRANSACTION BASIS 
VERSUS TRANSACTION-BY-
Under GATI and EC anti-dumping law, the dumping margin must be calculated by means of a 
comparison of a weighted average normal value with weighted average export price, or of a 
comparison of individual normal values and individual export prices on a transaction~by­
transaction basis. A ·weighted average normal value may only be compared with individual export 
prices if there is «a pattem of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, 
880 See e.g. : chemical fertilizer from lhe Uniled Stales of America, where 4(for brokers who may buy the product from various Uniled State&' 
producen for export to the EEC ( ... ), the dumping margin was detennined as being the weighted average dumping margin of those companies 
investigated which were found to have been dumping• (Council Regulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 February 1981 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on eertaio chemical fertilizer originating in the United Stales of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, NoL 39/4). 
881 lnjra, 323-324. 
882 For example, in •ilicon. carbide from Norway (Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October-1986 ~ccepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 287/25) the 
average weighted dumping margin for one of the three Norvegian exporters amounted only· to 1.7 %, a dumping margin which 
usually is considered to be a de minimis dumping margin not causing any injury to the Community industry (infra, 563-567). The 
Commission, nevertheleBB, considered the Norvegian exporter in question to be causing injury to the Community induBtry and, 
thus, deemed anti-dumping relief necessary because "while overall dumping levels may have been found to be modest, this could 
not be said of certain speci.fic level&». In particular, specific dumping margins amounting to 40.6% and 14.6% had been 
established in respect of two special categorie& of silicon carbide repreaenting 35 % of total Norvegian exports of silicon carbide to 
the Community. See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertak.ings and terminating the proceeding in respect 
of certain imports of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5. 
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regions or time-periods». Under GA TI anti-dumping law an explanation must be provided why 
such differences cannot be taken into account by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted 
average or transaction-to-transaction comparison. Pursuant to EC-anti-dumping law, that 
explanation should always be the fact that the normal methods of comparison do not reflect the 
full degree of dumping being practised (Article 2.4.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 2(11) 
basic EC Regulation). It is not yet clear whether the exception will not be abused. It is, indeed, 
the question whether the European anti-dumping authorities will consider · that the weighted 
average-to-weighted average comparison will reflect the full degree of dumping if there are 
individual instances ·of reverse dumping. Moreover, it seems that if the transaction-to-transaction 
comparison is applied, the instances of reverse dumping will be ignored because of the definition 
of the dumping margin, though there is no evidence that the exporter is practising reverse 
dumping merely to circumvent the application of anti-dumping law. 
Nevertheless, the new GA TI and EC provisions on the use of averaging techniques and the 
transaction-to-transaction comparison are a welcome development compared to prior EC anti-
dumping and present ECSC anti-dumping law, which is at varianee with GA TI anti-dumping law 
anèl enhances the finding of high dumping margins. With regard to normal value, ECSC anti-
dumping law provides that, when prices vary, normal value should «normally be established on a 
weighted average basis» ( Artiele 2(13) basic ECSC Decision). When prices vary, export prices 
should, however, normally be compared with the normal value on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis except where the use of weighted averages would not materially affect the results of the 
investigation ( Artiele 2(13) basic ECSC Decision)883 • 
883 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of· woven 
polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 
1990, No L 256/38) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685/90 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, 
No L 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38); Commission Decision 91/256/EEC of 14 May 1991 accepting 
undertakings. ofTered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of welded wire-mesh originating in 
Yugoslavia and tèrminating the investigation, O.J., 18 May 1991, No L 123/54; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 
September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the 
People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and ~ailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50. 
However, in some anti-dumping cases weighted average export prices have been used- which may possibly include export prices 
above normal value - without it having been shown that their use did not affect the results of the investigation (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1321181 of 15 May 1981 amending Regulation (EEC) No 384/81 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
styrene monomer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 19 May 1981, No L 132/17 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of roller ebains for cycles originating in the USSR 
and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, No L 217n; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 
accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports into Greece of certain 
categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51n3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but 
notmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors ha ving an output of more than 0, 75 kW but not more than 75 
kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and. the Soviet Union, and 
definitively collecting the amounts secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 1043/87 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors 
having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, NoL 102/5; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassiuin 
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ECSC anti-dumping law, thus, does not require that the methods chosen for calculating the normal 
value and the export priee should be similar or identical884• On the contrary, it expresses a 
strong preferenee for an asymmetrie approach : when prices vary, weighted average normal value 
should be compared to the export prices on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Notwithstanding 
this preference, the European anti-dumping authorities are free to choose the most appropriate 
method for calculating the dumping margin and that choiee requires an appraisal of complex 
economie situations885• 
The preferenee for this asymmetrie approach results from the definition of the dumping margin, 
according to which the dumping margin is the amount by which normal value exceeds the export 
priee (Article 2(14)(a) basic ECSC Decision). Indeed, in ball hearings from Japan and 
Singapore886 the European anti-dumping authorities noted that : 
«( ••• ) it (bas been) argued that 'negative' dumping margins should compensate for positive margins 
which, as a result, would have allowed for dumping to continue on a substantial scale. In order to 
clarify the situation, the Council, by Regulation (EEC) No. 1681179, modified the then existing 
legislation by laying down that the dumping margin was the amount by which the normal value 
exceeded the export price, thus ruling out the concept of a 'negative' dumping margin. 
A comparison of the normal value with a weighted average export price, comprising dumped and non-
dumped sales, would be in contradiction with the Council's amendment of the Community's anti-
dumping legislation. Therefore, it bas been a consistent practice of the Commission not to use 
weighted average export prices for the determination of the dumping margin, except in cases where, 
for administrative reasons, it was not considered feasible to employ the transaction-by-transaction 
permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9). 
In one anti-dumping case the use of weighted average export prices was motivated hy the fact that the volume of transactions was 
80 large that a transaction-hy-transaction analysis would have unduly delayed the talring of a provisional decision (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nak~ima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, 
No L 335/43). In another anti-dumping case weighted average export prices ware used in 80 far as their use did not affect the 
results of the investigation (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685/90 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 
September 1990, No L 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38)). In a third anti-dumping case, monthly average 
export prices were used in view of the neceBBity of using the official Community statistica for the determination of the export prices 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537/90 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium 
permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9). 
884 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo Bearlng Company Umited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1809), 1854; C.J.E.C., case 
255/84,7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Corporadon v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1861), 1889; C.J.E.C, case 258/84, 7 may 1987, Mppon Seiko KK v 
Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1932), 1963-1964; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea Company Umited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1975), 
2003-2004; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1631. 
885 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo Bearing Company limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1809), 1854-1855; C.J.E.C., caae 
255/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Corporadon v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1861), 1890-1891; C.J.E.C, case 258/84,7 May 1987, Mppon Seiko 
KK v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1932), 1964-1965; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea Company Umited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 
(1975), 2006; C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1618 (Opinion of Advocate 
General MISCHO) and 1631. 
886 Council· Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, NoL 193/1. 
metbod or where tbe averaging of export prices would have had no effect on the overall outcome of 
the proceedings.:.887• 
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The European anti-dumping authorities' considerations were confrrmed by the Court of Justice in 
the second J apanese hall hearings cases888 where it stated : 
cThe transaction-by-transaction metbod is tbe only metbod capable of dealing witb certain manoeuvres 
in which dumping is disguised by charging different prices, some above tbe normal value, and some 
below it. The application of the weighted average metbod in such a situation would not meet the 
purpose of the anti-dumping proceeding, since tbat metbod would in essence mask sales at dumping 
prices by those at what are known as "negative" dumping prices, and would thus in no way eliminale 
the injury suffered by the Community industry concemed.». 
The Court of Justice, however, did oot confine the asymmetrie approach to cases where the 
exporter bas been guilty of manoeuvres aimed at disguising dumping889• 
The Court of Justice and the European anti-dumping authorities are legally correct in the light of 
the defmition of the dumping margin provided under ECSC anti-dumping law. Still, it is true that 
the asymmetrie approach disadvantages the exporters : it may intlate the dumping margin, for no 
credit is given for export sales above normal value890• It may even result in a finding of 
dumping, although the exporter actually does oot dump. A numerical example shows how this 
happens. Assume an exporter who has made three sales operations on his dornestic market ; at 
the same time, he has also exported three times to the Community : 
887 See also: C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992; Minolta Camera (À). Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1601 (Report for 
the Hearing: conclusions of the Council) i Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, 
Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding import& of that product originating in the People's 
Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287/25 i Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 374/87 of 6 February 1987 definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty and imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 6 February 1987, No L 36/32. 
888 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo Bearing Compan.y Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1809), 1855 i C.J.E.C., 
case 256/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1861), 1891 i C.J.E.C., case 258/84, 7 May 1987, 
Nippon Seiko KK v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1923), 1965 i C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea Compan.y Limited v Council, 
E.C.R., 1987, (1976), 2006. 
889 C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minaha Camera Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1577), 1619 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO) and 1631. 
890 PETERSMANN, E.-U., «Need for Reforming Antidumping Rules and Practices. The Messy World of Fourth-Best Policie&», 
Aussenwirtach.aft, 1990, (179), 189 i VAN BAEL, 1., ccEEC Anti-Dumping Law and Procedure Revisitedn, Journol of World Trade, 
199012, (6), 7 i VAN BAEL, I., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH 
Editions, 1990, 110-111 i VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., ccA. Decade of Europaan Community Anti-Dumping Law and 
Practice Applicahle to Imports from China», Journol of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 26 ; VERMULST, E.A., and W AER, P., •Noot 
onder Hof van Justitie der Europese Gemeenschappen, zaken 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Company Ltd. i 265/84 Nachi Fujikoshi 
Corporation; 216/s.t Koyo Seiko i 268/84 Nippon Seiko KK en 260/84 Minebea Company Ltd. vs Raad EQ,,, S.E. W., 1988, (106), 
113. 
/ 
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date of sale normal value export price 
tl 10 10 
~ 8 8 
1J 12 12 
When both normal value and export price- are compared on a transaction-by-transaction basis, no 
dumping will be found. If, however, the weighted average norm~ value, which equals 10, is 
compared to the export prices on a transaction-by-transaction basis, the exporter will be found not 
to practise dumping at time t1, to practise dumping, at a dumping margin of 2, at time t2, and to 
practise reverse dumping, at a dumping margin of -2, at time '3· If all those instances are taken 
into account, the weighted average dumping margin equals zero (=[0+2+(-2)]/3). However, 
under European anti-dumping law, the dumping margin for instances of reverse dumping 
necessarily equals zero. As a consequence, the weighted average dumping margin equals 2/3 
(=[0+2+0]/3), though the exporter does not actually practise dumping. 
Clearly, it should oot be the purpose, nor the result of ECSC anti-dumping law to find dumping 
where it is not being practised. Hence, the asymmetrie approach, along with the disregard of 
reverse dumping, should be repealed : in principle, the methods for calculating the normal value 
and the export price should be identical and all export transactions should be taken into account, 
including the instances of reverse dumping, unless there is conclusive evidence that the exporter 
practices reverse dumping merely in order to circumvent the application of anti-dumping law. 
Moreover, since this suggestion is precisely the content of the GATT Anti-dumping Code (Article 
2.4.2.), ECSC anti-dumping law will have to amended in this sense. 
5.3. SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 
When a large number of complainants, exporters or importers, types of product or transactions is 
involved, the European anti-dumping authorities may, in EC anti-dumping proceedings, limit their 
examination to a reasonable number of parties, products or transactions by using samples which 
are statistically valid on the basis of the information available at the time of the selection, or to 
the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports which cao reasonably be 
investigated within the time available (Article 17(1) basic EC Regulation). In this respect, EC 
anti-dumping law is an exact copy of GATT anti-dumping law (Article 6(10) GATI Anti-dumping 
Code). In ECSC anti-dumping proceedings, the European anti-dumping authorities may, when 
prices vary, resort to sampling techniques, e.g., the use of the most frequently occurring or 
representative prices may be applied to establish normal value and export prices in cases in which 
a significant volume of transactloos is involved (Article 2(13) basic ECSC Decision). 
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EC and ECSC sampling differ in that, under ECSC anti-dumping law, sampling may be resorted 
if two conditloos are met : there must be a significant volume of transactions and prices must also 
vary. EC anti-dumping law does oot require price variability, but rather a large number of 
parties. EC anti-dumping law seems more practicabie as it does oot oblige the European anti-
dumping authorities to examine and show whether prices vary. Though, ECSC anti-dumping law 
refers to «the most occurring or representative prices», its representativeness requirement applies 
also to a sample of parties or transactloos : samples of, for instance, exporters must also be 
representative891 • Indeed, as EC anti-dumping law, ECSC anti-dumping law also allows 
sampling of products and interested parties892 since it holds up price sampling as an 
example893 • 
The representativeness requirement indicates that sampling techniques should not affect the 
magnitude of the dumping margin. If the latter is correct, they should oot be used as an 
alternative metbod for · adjustments required to eosure a fair comparison between normal value and 
export price. Probably, therefore, the European anti-dumping authorities have refused to make 
restricted samples of transactions taking place on the dornestic market of the exporting country, 
which, in terms of quantity, resembie export transactions894, and, in so doing, have rejected 
sampling as a substitute for adjustments for differences in quantity. 
891 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of colton yam 
originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of colton yam originating in India and Thailand, 
O.J., 27 September 1991, NoL 271117; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import.l of eertaio polyester yams (man-made stapte fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import.l of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 
1991, No L 276n; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof coUon yam 
originating in Brazit and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1 ; Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 · · 
January 1994, NoL 12/5. 
892 For an application, see : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of couon yam originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of colton yam originating in 
India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271/17; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-'dumping duty on imports of eertaio polyester yams (man-made stapte fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People'a 
Republic of China and Turkey and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, NoL 276n; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importa of cotton yam originating in Brazit and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 
1992 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio polyester yams (man-made stapte fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, 
India, the People'a Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No L 88/1 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 5 June 1992, No L 153/16); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importa of bicyclea originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 58/12; Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 
January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia 
and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, NoL 12/5. 
893 See the wordinga «e.g.» in Artiele 2(13) basic ECSC Decision. 
894 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 997/85 of 18 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine 
originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April 1985, No L 107/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 15 August 1985, No L 218/1; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3339/87 of<& November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in Libya and Saudi 
Arabia and accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 
November 1987, NoL 317/1. 
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However; there are anti-dumping cases in which sampling techniques have been used instead of 
adjustments. Thus, a number of product types sold on the dornestic market of the exporting 
country with features that were sufficiently akin to those of the exported product types, have been 
chosen. The European anti-dumping authorities made this sample in order to determine the 
normal value, so as to allow a valid price comparison to be made, without it being necessary to 
make adjustments that were that great or that complex that it would be impossible to make a 
reasonable estimate of the value of any differences in their physical features895• Also selective 
normal value determination, which is in fact a sampling technique, has been applied in order to 
adjust prices because of differences in the level of trade due to differences on the demand 
side896• Though such sampling should, as a matter of principle, be rejected, it, admittedly, 
renders European anti-dumping law more in conformity with GA TT anti-dumping law. Indeed, in 
the first case, it leads to a more accurate determination of the dumping margin since the value of 
. differences in physical characteristics will not have to be assessed - at least insofar as the selected 
product types are representative. In the second case, ECSC anti-dumping law does not allow 
adjustments for differences in quantities nor for differences in the level of trade due to differences 
on the demand side (i.e., different kinds of buyers : distributors, OEMs, retailers, end-users). In 
this respect, ECSC anti-dumping law goes against GA TT anti-dumping law which requires that 
adjustments are made for all differences which affect price comparability897• 
ECSC anti-dumping law does not lay down how the results from sampling should be used. 1t 
seems, however, to be consistent case law to use the weighted average dumping margin 
established in respect of the selected exporters as the dumping margin of the not selected 
895 Conunission Regulation. (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 · February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8. 
896 Supra, 276-279. 
897 Supra, 276-279 and 283. 
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( cooperating) exporters898 and to use the dumping margin established in respect of the sample 
of products as dumping margin for the whole range of products899• 
GATI and EC anti-dumping law, on the other hand, specify how the results of the sampling must 
be used. Pursuant to them, the exporters included in the sample will get their individual dumping 
margin, whereas the weighted average dumping margin of the sampled exporters, excluding the 
weight of exporters with zero or de minimis dumping margins and excluding the dumping margins 
established in respect of uncooperating exporters (see : Artiele 6.8. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; 
Artiele 18 basic EC Regulation), will be applied to the other exporters (Article 9.4. GATI Anti-
dumping Code ; Artiele 9(6) basic EC Regulation)). The latter specification increases the 
dumping margin for non-sampled exporters when compared with -ECSC anti-dumping case law 
which takes account oLzero and de minimis dumping margins in assessing the weighted average 
dumping margin and which apparently bas not included the dumping margin established in respect 
898 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818/91 of 23 Septembe~ 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yam 
originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in reapeet of cotton yam originating in India and Thailand, 
O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271/17; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of eertaio polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarna originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 
1991, No L 276n ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yam 
originating in Brazit and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 8211 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imporb of eertaio polyester yarna (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of 
China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153116); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the 
Pcople's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12. 
899 C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March .1992, Canon lnc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1290. See e.g. : Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1739/86 of 24 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller 
hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2686/90 of 17 September 1990 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in 
Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, NoL 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, NoL 7/38); Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2685190 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 
January 1991, NoL 7/38); Commission Decision No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain semi-finished product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 95/26; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956192 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres 
of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, No L 197/26; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3482192 of 30 November 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain large electrolytic aluminium 
capacitors originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 3 December 1992, No L 353/1 
(corrigendum, O.J., 28 January 1993, NoL 19/34). · 
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of uncooperating exporters900• Irrespective of its negative effect on non-sampled exporters, 
this specification should be repealed because there is no reason why zero and de minimis dumping 
margins should not be taken into account in respect of cooperating non-sampled exporters, 
especially since sampling is already unfavourable to non-sampled exporters which do not or only 
marginally practise dumping. 
5.4. FACTS.AVAILABLE 
Sometimes, the European anti-dumping authorities do not have the necessary information to 
establish the dumping margin, either because the exporters did not cooperate or because they 
remained unknown. Then they must determine the dumping margin .on the basis of the 
information available (Article 6.8. and Annex 11 GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 18 basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). In most anti-dumping cases, the highest 
dumping margin established by the European anti-dumping authorities in respect of cooperating 
exporters901 is used as the best information available. This is considered to be the most 
900 Co~asion Regulation (EEC) No 2818/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impotts of cotton yam 
originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yam originating in India and Thailand, 
O.J., 27 September 1991, NoL 271117; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa of eertaio polyester yams (man-made stapte fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 
1991, No L 276n; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof cotton yam 
originating in Brazit and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, NoL 82/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of 
China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153/16); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the 
Peop1e 's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12. 
Accot'ding to P. W AER. and E. VERMULST, 10metimes zero and de minimis dumping margins are disregarded in order to establish the weighted 
average dumping margin for non-sampled exporten. However, they do nol provide information of aucb cases (WAER, P., and VERMULST, E., 
«EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?-., Joumal oJWorld Trade, 1994/2, (5), 17). 
901 In principle, the dumping margin used for non-cooperating or unknown exportera equals the dumping margin established in respect of the 
cooperating exporten. Sometimes, however, there may be a difference. For example, when adjustments necessary fora fair comparison between 
normal value and export price (see Artiele 2(1 0) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(9) and (1 0) basic ECSC Decision) were carried out as claimed and 
proved by the cooperative exporten, which lower the dumping margin, these adjustments will not be allowed for with regard to non-cooperating 
and unknown exporten and a higher dumping margin will be established intheir respect (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3836/91 of 19 December 
1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin originating in lhe People's Republic of China and definitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1). Their disregard complies with European anti-dumping law 
wbicb provides for sucb adjustments only when an interested party claims them and proves its claim is justified ( Artiele 2(1 0) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 2(9) basic ECSC Decision). Obviously, exporters who do not cooperate or do nol make themselves known, can hardly be said to have 
claimed and justified any such adjustment. 
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appropriate method, as any lower dumping margin would constitute a bonus for non-cooperation 
or create an opportunity for circumvention902• 
Exceptionally, European anti-dumping authorities have adopted another approach for non-
cooperating or unknown exporters. In some instances, the dumping margin for these exporters 
was deemed equal to the highest dumping margin in the complaint903 (if necessary, adjusted on 
the basis of studies by international organizations or data submitted by other producers established 
in the exporting country than those investigated904), or another dumping margin is calculated 
on the basis of the product types most sold for export by the cooperating exporters905 . In 
review proceedings, the dumping margin established during the original proceeding bas also been 
u~906 • The dumping margin thus used, is always higher than the highest dumping margin 
established by the European anti-dumping authorities with regard to cooperating exporters. There 
902 See e.g. : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into 
the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152/22 
(corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127); Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional 
duties on importsof urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16. See 
also : BOURGEOIS, Jll.J., .cEC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generations Issues,,, in Antitrust and Trade Policy in 
the United State• an.d the European Community, HA WK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 595-596. 
90J Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial 
impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, NoL 177/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 34/89 of 
5 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed (SIFF) character printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No L 5/23; Council Regulation (EEC) No 501/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and 
defmitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, N~ L 57/55; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2805/91 of 23 
September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain thermal paper originating in 
Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, NoL 270/15; Commission Regulation (EC) No 5S4/94 of 9 March 1994 imposing a pro~sional 
anti-dumpbag duty on imports of certain magnetic disk& (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5. . 
904 Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertsin polyester yams (man-
made stapJe fibres) origioating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional 
duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153/16). 
905 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind uaed in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2306/92 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 1993, NoL 13/20). 
906 Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 23 February 1983, NoL 50/1; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 485/83 of 28 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 2 March 1983, No L 55/1; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 905/83 of 18 April 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2940/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
p-xylene (paraxylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United Statea of America and the United Statee Virgin lslands, O.J., 20 April 
1983, No L 10111 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 906/83 of 18 April 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2761/81 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on o-xylene (orthoxylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the United Statee of America, O.J., 20 April 
1983, No L 10114; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2275/84 of 1 August 1984 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres originating in the Unitèd Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1984, No 
L 209/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2585/85 of 12 September 1985 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importsof certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 13 September 1985, No 
L 246/57. 
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is,· though, an ex ception where the dumping margin of unknown exporters was determined as 
being the average weighted dumping margin of the dumping exporters907• 
In spite of the scarce information provided in European anti-dumping case law908, the ex tent of 
907 Council Rcgulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 Fcbruary 1981 imposing a defirûtivc anti-dumpÏJll duty on eertaio chemica) fertilizer originating in 
the Uniled States of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4. · 
908 Only in the following cases it has been explained why the highest poBBible dumping inargin is preferred : 
in video CCI8Bette recorders from Japan., the use of the highest dumping margin mentioned in the complaint was grounded on 
the consideration that the exporters, by choosing not to cooperate, may he presumed to have accepted the allegations made in 
the complaint and therefore cannot ask to he treated in the same way as a company which cooperated fully in the proceeding 
and demonstrated that its dumping margin was lower than that calculated on the basis of the complaint (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 601/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain video cassette recorders 
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and defmitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, No 
L 67/66); 
in small screen oolour televisi.on receivers from the Republic of Korea, the gravity of non-collaboration (explicit refusal by a 
large Korean exporter to cooperate though approached by the CommiBBion during its on-the-spot investigations, underpinned 
by a oorreeponding failure to cooperate on the part of large Community importers known to have purebaeed considerable 
quantities of the exporter in question) was decisive for the Commission to use neither the dumping margins established 
during the investigation by the Commission nor the dumping margins alleged in the complaint. Here, the dumping margin 
was equated with the amount by which the average dornestic Korean sales prices of the collaborating exporters exceeded the 
average export price for imports into the Community from Korea, as shown by the Community Eurostat statistica. The 
reeuiting dumping margin was higher than the highest dumping margin established by the Commission with regard to the 
cooperating Korean exporters and the highest dumping margin alleged in the complaint (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour television receivers 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, NoL 314/1. Upheld in: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 
26 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof smali-screen colour television receivers originating in 
the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 
May 1990, No L 133192)). As soon as the originally non-cooperating Korean exporter did not export anymore to the 
Community and had converled his production facilities to the manufacture of other electronic products, the dumping margin 
in respect ofthe other non-cooperating exporters, whose exports to the Community were very small, was lowered at the level 
of the highest dumping margin established in respect of the cooperating exporters (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2900/91 of 1 
October 1991 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 with regard to the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 2 October 1991, NoL 276/24); 
in audio tapes in CCI8Bettes from Hong Kong, the majority of the Hong Kong exporters did not cooperate. In view of the 
gravity of the non-collaboration, the Commission considered th"at it might he contemplated to base the finding of dumping in 
respect of the non-collaborating exporters either on the amount by which the average Hong Kong normal value exceeds the 
average export price as shown by the Community Eurostat statistica, or on the information contained in the cómplaint. In 
this anti-dumping case, however, the Commission found it adequate to use the highest dumping margin established with 
regard to the cooperating HongKong eX}>orters, owing to the relatively small amount ofHong Kong exportsof audio cassettes 
to the Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on importsof audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 13 November 1990, 
No L 81316 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36)) ; · 
in magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) from Hong Kong, the European anti-dumping authorities referred to the seriousness of the 
non-cooperation on the part of the Hong Kong producers in order to use the dumping margin mentioned in the anti-dumping 
complaint which was considerably higher than the dumping margin of the cooperating HongKong producers (Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 634194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain magnatie disks 
(3,6" microdiaks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/6 ; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2199194 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic ·disks (8,6" 
microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, 
O.J., 10 September 1994, NoL 23612). 
lf the exporters are willing to cooperate, but if it is not possible to individually assess their dumping margins, the weighted 
average dumping found in respect of the other cooperating exporters will he used as their dumping margin. Clearly, this dumping 
margin is below the highest dumping margin found in respect of the cooperating exporters : 
in video CCI8Bettes from Hong Kong, the Council took the view that, given the fact that some exporters were willing to 
cooperate even though they were unable to provide the necessary information, it would he inappropriate to apply to those 
exporters the highest dumping margin established with regard to the cooperating Hong Kong exporters and considered it 
proper to apply the weighted average dumping margins found for the cooperating Hong Kong exporters (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the 
Republic of Korea and HongKong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
with regard to the importsof video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, NoL 174/1); 
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the non-cooperation seems to be the reason for this pattem : the greater the unwilligness to 
cooperate, the higher the probability is that the highest possible dumping margin will be used. 
Also reasons of representativeness may be decisive : if the exports of the cooperating exporters 
reach a relatively high (low) level in comparison with the total exports from the exporting country 
involved to the Community, the dumping margins established are considered to be (not) 
representative and are, therefore, (not) used as dumping margin in respect of the non-cooperating 
exporters909• 
909 
in radio-braadcast receivers of a kind used in. motor vehicles from South Korea, the Commission appeared willing to accept 
that many of the Korean exporters were not of a size sufficient to he able to reply to the Commisaion's questionaire or to 
make representations to the Commission. Therefore, the Commission was prepared to take a representative sample on the 
basis of a list of all the Korean exporters. As the information requested to this end did not reach the Commission in time 
and the Commission had &erious doubts about the representativeness of the cooperating exporters, a dtimping margin specific 
to the non-cooperating ana unknown exporters was calculated. This dumping margin was higher than that of the cooperating 
exporters. It is yet unclear whether the Commission deliherately aimed at such a higher dumping margin in order to 
sanction the non-cooperating and unknown exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports ofradio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South 
Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8); 
in ferro-silicon. from Brazil, it was impossible todetermine the individual dumping margin in respect of cooperating producers 
who did not export to the Community. The weighted average dumping margin found for cooperating exporters who did 
export, was used as their dumping margin (Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-
dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, No L 302/1). 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
cotton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yarn 
originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 
September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) 
originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276n i Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple 
fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153/16); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain large electrolytic 
aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163/27) ; · 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres 
of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197125; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1994192 of 14 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of outer rings of tapered roller 
hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 18 July 1992, No L 199/8 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2305/92 of 4 August 1992 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in Brazil and defmitively collecting the amounts secured by 
way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/1 i Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306/92 of 4 August 
1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating 
in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 1993, NoL 13/20); Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2849/92 of 28 September 1992 modifying the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a graatest 
external diameter exceeding 30 mm originating in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85, O.J., 1 October 1992, No 
L 28612 (corrigendum, O.J., 25 March 1993, No L 72/36); Council Regulation (EEC) No 54/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a 
defmitive duty on importsof synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, 
No L 9/2 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of outer rings 
of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9n; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 16 
April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 95/5; Commission Regulation (EC) No 534/94 of 9 March 
1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in HongKong 
and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of 
Korea, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, NoL 236/2. 
See also : 
small screen. colour television. receivers from the Republic of Korea, where the cessation of exporis and production of the like 
product by the originally largest non-cooparating exporter resulted in a lower dumping margin equal to the highest dumping 
margin established in respect of the cooperating exporters. For this modification of the dumping margin, the Council noted 
that the other non-cooparating exporters exported only very small quantities to the Community (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2900/91 of 1 October 1991 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1048/90 with regard to the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping 
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Uncooperative and unknown exporters are, thus, assumed to dump on the Community market or, 
rather, they are assumed to conceal that they are dumping. Such an assumption may be criticized 
for its «<ne-way flexibility», because it increases the instances of dumping. Moreover, everyone 
should, as a matter of principle, be innocent until proven guilty. Nevertheless, the assumption 
made by the European anti-dumping authorities is acceptable. Indeed, as GATI and EC anti-
dumping law explicitly state, the result of an anti-dumping investigation may be less favourable to 
the party, which does not cooperate or only cooperates partially and thus withholds relevant 
information, than if that party had cooperated (Paragraph 7 of Annex II GATI Anti-dumping 
Code; Artiele 18(6) basic EC Regulation). An accurate determination of the dumping margin 
requires the cooperation of the allegedly dumping exporter. Only the exporter involved bas an 
accurate and full knowledge of bis costs and prices. An exporter who does not react against an 
anti-dumping complaint must findit rewarding to remain silent, and will probably only react if he 
does not dump or if the allegations against him are exaggerated. Moreover, the assumption made 
by the European anti-dumping authorities enables them to make accurate determinations of the 
dumping margin as it stimulates the dumping exporters to cooperate910. Of course, exporters 
may be unable to provide all the information required on account of their size and because of 
inadequate financial and human resources. Such exporters should not be assumed to conceal their 
dumping. European anti-dumping case law seems to share this point of view as there is evidence 
that the European anti-dumping authorities are prepared to take account of the unability of small 
exporters to cooperate, and to adopt another approach such as the sampling of a number of 
representative small exporters911 • This attitude camplies with GA TT anti-dumping. law 
according to which, the anti-dumping authorities must take due account of any difficulties 
experienced by interested parties, in particular small companies, in supplying information 
requested, and must provide any assistance ( Artiele 6.13. GA TT Anti-dumping Code). 
The provisions of GA TT and EC anti-dumping law on the way the results of the sampling of 
exporters must be applied912, might give the impression that European anti-dumping case law 
duty on imports of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 2 October 1991, No 
L 275/24). The dumping margin could also have been reduced because the gravity of the non-cooperation of the other 
exporters was lower than that of the originally largest non-eooparating exporter. The latter had refused to cooperate though 
approached by the Commission during its on-the-spot investigations (see: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 
October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and 
collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192)) 
racüo-broadccut receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea (supra, 331, note 908). 
910 BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., .cEC Antidumping Enforcement- Selected Second Generation Issues~, in Antitrust and Trade Policy in 
the United Stede• and the European Community, HA WK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 595-596. 
911 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8. 
912 Supra, 326-327. 
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applying the highest dumping margin possible to non-cooperating exporters is no longer 
allowed913 • However, that impression is false. In respect of non-cooperating exporters, 
sampling is simply not applied. Indeed, non-cooperating exporters are not investigated, not 
because it would be impracticable (because of the large number of exporters) (see : Artiele 6.10. 
GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 17(1) basic EC Regulation)), but rather because it is simply 
impossible (because of their uncooperative behaviour). Consequently, as no sampling is applied, 
the provisions as to the results of the sampling do not apply either. This is, moreover, explicitly 
pointed out by EC anti-dumping law which limits the rules on the results of sampling to «imports 
from exporters or producers which have made themselves known ( ... ) but were not included in the 
(sampling)» (Article 9(6) basic EC Regulation). 
6. CONCLUSION 
For exporters to the Community, it is quite difficult to ascertain in advance whether or not they 
will be found dumping. If they are sure not to have been practising dumping, dumping may be 
found in their respect (lack of legal certainty). Dumping may even be found in cases where they 
actually do not dump at all (so-called «one-way flexibility» ). lndeed, European anti-dumping law 
is conceived in very broad terms, but is nevertheless biased - either in its conception or in its 
interpretation and implementation- in favour of finding dumping. For reasons of this «one-way 
flexibility», several legal provisions concerning the determination of dumping cannot be justified 
from an economie point of view. By way of ·conclusion, a survey is provided of the most striking 
instances of lack of legal certainty and «one-way flexibility» as demonstrated in the present 
Chapter. 
6.1. DOMESTIC MARKET PRICE AS NORMAL VALUE STANDARD: THE 
PRINCIPLE BY WAY OF EXCEPTION 
By imposing the exporter' s dornestic market price of the like product as first normal value 
standard to be used, GATI and European anti-dumping law, at first sight, seem to guarantee legal 
certainty. As the exporter may be expected to know his own dornestic market price, he should 
913 W AER, P. and VERMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after tbc Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?-., Joumal of World 
Trade, 1994/2, (5), 17. 
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have the opportunity of knowing in advance whether or not he is dumping (i.e., «knowledge of 
dumping»). 
That dornestic market price is normally the price charged on the market of the country of origin .. 
Products may, however, be exported to a third country (the exporting country) from where they. 
are re-exported to the Community. ~au se the interpretation of the concept «origin» does not 
exclude price changes in the exporting country unknown to the producer/exporter, «knowledge of 
dumping» will be non-existent. 
Moreover, in many instances, the dornestic market price used is not the price charged by the 
exporter for the like product on his dornestic mar ket. In deed, there is a clear preferenee to u se 
any dornestic market price, such as the exporter' s dornestic market price of other, though similar 
products and even the dornestic market price of other producers/exporters. As these prices are 
seldom identical to the exporter' s dornestic market price of the like product, the use of these 
prices alters the outcome of the dumping investigation and may result in finding dumping where it 
is not being practised. Moreover, the exporter will seldom have any accurate knowledge of the 
prices of his competitors on his dornestic market, so that he cannot know in advance whether, on 
his account, dumping will be found. 
Furthermore, GATTand European anti-dumping law do not allow the exporter's dornestic market 
price to be used, when no comparable sales are made in the ordinary course of trade. GATTand 
European anti-dumping law have placed a restrictive interpretation on the concept of «comparable 
sales in the ordinary course of trade». Under European anti-dumping law, there are four instances 
of no oomparabie sales in the ordinary course of trade ( sales between associated parties ; sales at a 
loss ; sales of insufficient quantities ; and sales not intended for consumption) which are given a 
large application. For example, the assumption that sales between associated parties are not in the 
ordinary course of trade is practically unrebuttable. Also the concept «Sales at a loss» is 
extensively interpreted. European anti-dumping law considers sales at a l~ss not to be in the 
ordinary course of trade, if such sales are made in substantial quantities during a period of 
minimum six months and do notpermit the recovery of total costs within that minimum period. 
It, thus, offers the possibilty to encompass only those instances of sales at a loss which are not the 
result of ordinary profit maximization. European anti-dumping authorities, though, have declined 
that possibility by employing the minimum periods during which it is impossible to reeover total 
costs, rather than longer periods coinciding with a business cycle. 
European anti-dumping does not pay special regard to sales on the dornestic market of developing 
countries, though GA TI anti-dumping law leaves the door open for consirlering them as not being 
made in the ordinary course of trade. This is probably no mere accident, as the dornestic market 
prices in developing countries are likely to be high, due to the usual high proteetion of their 
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dornestic markets, whereas sales between associated parties, sales at a loss, sales of insufficient 
quantities and sales not intended for consumption are all assumed to be made at unusually .low 
prices. That assumption is not always borneout by the facts. For example, sales of insufficient 
quantities may imply reverse dumping (i.e., a dornestic market price higher than the export price) 
if low, insufficient quantities are sold on the exporter' s dornestic mar ket, only because demand is 
low. 
Moreover, even if that assumption proves to be right, the concept «comparable sales in the 
ordinary course of trade>>, seems to be used to guarantee findings of ( excessive margins of) 
dumping. First, when the exporter and his sales company are associated, normal value is 
determined on the basis . of the price charged by the sales company to the first independent buyer. 
As no adjustments are .. · made for the costs and profits of the associated sales company, normal 
value is increased. Second, in the case of sales not intended for consumption, there is no reason 
why the prices of such sales are disregarded for normal value determination, whereas they are not 
for export price determination. This differentlal treatment results in relatively high normal values 
and relatively low export prices and, consequently, holds a bias towards finding (higher margins 
of) dumping. Third, when sales are made at a loss, the constructed value is used as normal value 
standard. That constructed value must always contain a margin for profit, regardless of whether, 
from an economie point of view, profits are feasible under the prevailing economie circumstances 
of the case. 
6.2. CONSTRUCTED VALUE AS NORMAL VALUE STANDARD: A 
FURTHER REJECTION OF SALES AT A LOSS 
In the absence of comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade, either the constructed value or 
the export price to third countries must be used as normal value standard. European anti-dumping 
case law reveals a strong preferenee for the constructed value. Export prices to third countries 
are seldom used because of the possibility of them being dumped prices. Thus, European anti-
dumping authorities prefer that normal value standard which, they think, produces the highest 
normal value and, consequently, the highest dumping margin. 
As the constructed value is the sum of all production costs, including general expenses, and a 
reasonable profit margin, producers are assumed to practise full-cost pricing and the conviction 
that sales at a loss are not in the ordinary course of trade is further confirmed. Both that 
assumption and that belief are only a means to increase the height of the normal value. They are, 
however, economically not justified. Producers do no practise full-cost pricing. They do not 
determine their prices solely on the basis of an addition of production costs and a profit margin. 
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They also take into account other factors, such as market demand and competition, and, thus, give 
evidence of practising marginal pricing. As a consequence, ordinary profit maximizing prices will 
not always yield a profit nor will they always cover all production costs. 
The height of the normal value is further increased by the requirement that the production costs 
must be incurred in the ordinary course of trade. Thus, production costs are not valued on the 
basis of prices charged for inputs between associated companies. Instead, the production costs, 
including general expenses, of the associated · company are added to those of the allegedly dumping 
exporter, resulting in a higher normal value. The requirement that production costs must be 
incurred in the ordinary course of trade bas one positive aspect, namely that it prevents exporters 
from being sanctioned for input and social dumping. In a start-up or an expansion phase, in 
which producers are normally not able to cover all their production costs, it could also prevent 
exporters from being found dumping. However, the European anti-dumping authorities did not, 
of their own free will, accept such an interpretation of the concept «ordinary course of trade», 
undoubtedly because such an interpretation would clash with the overall effort in European anti-
dumping law to find (high margins of) dumping. Only under pressure of the new GA TT Anti-
dumping Code, according to which account must be taken of the fact that usually during a start-up 
period not all production costs are covered. But, bere, the Community, when transposing that 
GA TT provision in European anti-dumping law, clearly tries to reduce the scope of that provision 
to the minimum. 
The constructed value also reduces legal certainty on the part of the ex porter. For it must include 
a «reasonable amount» for general expenses and profit. As European anti-dumping law does not 
give any precise definition of the vague concept «reasonable amount», it cannot be predicted which 
amount will . be added . for general expenses and- pro fits. Moreover, whereas, in principle, 
production costs are allocated on a turnover basis, another allocation may be accepted if it is 
«more appropriate» or «reasonable». Again the vague concepts «appropriate>> and «reasonable» 
make every prediction impossible. In regard to both the reasonable amount for general expenses 
and profits and the cost allocation, European anti-dumping case law contains some general 
guidelines : in most cases, actually incurred general expenses and actually realized profits are 
taken into account, whereas, in only a small number of cases, costs were not allocated on a 
turnover basis. However, exceptions are made to those guidelines, though it cannot be. predicted 
when. Finaly, precisely because it bas to be constructed, the determination of the coristructed 
may be inflicted with calculation errors which are, by definition, unpredictable. 
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6.3. NON-MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES 
European anti-dumping law considers prices and costs of NME countries not to constitute · a 
reliable basis for normal value determination because they are not the result of the market 
mecanism. Therefore, it forbids to take account of them and imposes to determine normal value 
with reference to the pricès and costs of a ME country, the so-called reference country. 
The determination of normal value on the basis of a reference country has two major ·flaws. 
First, the possibility that NME countries may be ·more efficient than the reference country, which 
may even be the most efficient ME country, is disregarded. As a consequence, NME countries 
may be found dumping. merely because they are more efficient. Second, as the reference 
countries, because they also manufacture the like product, are in competition with the NME 
countries, they may find it to their interest to give false information by declarlog higher prices in 
order to increase the probability that the NME countries will be found dumping. 
NME countries are also denied any degree of legal certainty as they have practically no 
knowledge about the prices · and costs of their competitors in the reference country. Moreover, 
they cannot possibly predict which reference country will be selected and how normal value 
(domestic market price, constructed value, export price to third countries) will be determined. 
For European anti-dumping law only requires the reference country and the type of normal value 
to be selected in an appropriate and not unreasonable manoer. Though several criteria relevant 
for selecting the reference country may deduced from European anti-dumping case law, none of 
them are conclusive, as they may offset each other. The choice of normal value standard is 
usually identical to that for ME countries : dornestic market price may only be used if it concerns 
oomparabie sales made in the ordinary course of trade ; otherwise, either the constructed value or, 
exceptionally, the export price to third countries is used. Therefore, it may be concluded that the 
choice of the normal value standard, is characterized by the same «one-way flexibility» as for ME 
countries. Moreover, European anti-dumping law even provides less legal certainty to NME 
countries as in a number of cases another normal value has been adopted than the one applied for 
the reference country. Thus, the concept «comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade» 
provides little guidance, as it may be interpreted differently in respect of the same transactions on 
the dornestic market of one and the same country. It may sametimes even be disregarded as there 
are cases in which dornestic market prices have been used as normal value standard for NME 
countries, even though there were no comparable sales on the dornestic market of the reference 
country. 
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6.4. EXPORT PRICES 
The export price is determined on the basis of the actual export price, or, if ex porter and importer 
are associated, on the basis of the constructed export price, i.e., the price paid by the first 
independent buyer. 
In one of its characteristics, export price determination is the opposite of normal value 
determination : export price determination is a search for an export price which is as low as 
possible. First, products exported to the Community under the inward processing regime are used 
for determining the export prices, whereas similar processing arrangements on the exporter's 
dornestic market are disregarded for normal value determination. Second, when exporter and 
importer are associated, the export price is· determined on the basis of the price paid by the first 
independent buyer, after deducting all the costs incurred and all the profits realized by the 
associated importers. This contrasts with normal value determination for which associated parties 
are considered to constitute an economie unit and, consequently, the price paid by the first 
independent buyer is used as normal value, without any deduction for costs or profits of the 
associated sales company. 
The other characteristic is identical to that of normal value determination : legal certainty is not 
guaranteed. First, the price paid by trading firms to the producer/exporter is taken into account 
even if the producer/exporter does not know the destination. Second, for determining the export 
price of an exporter associated with the importer, costs normally borne by the importer and a 
reasonable profit margin must bè determined. Not even in the light of European anti-dumping 
case law, can it be predicted what such costs and such a profit margin are. 
6.5. ADJUSTMENTS · 
Normal value and export price will seldom be comparable to each other. For example, transport 
costs on the exporter' s dornestic market are usually smaller than for exports to the Community. If 
both normal value and export price comprise these transport costs, the dumping finding will not 
be accurate. Even if dumping is actually practised, no dumping can be found merely because of 
the difference in transport cost. Of course, for other differences between normal value and export 
price, also dumping may be found where it does not exist. 
GA TT anti-dumping law is aimed at finding all instances of actual dumping, without confounding 
them with cases of apparent dumping. It allows all adjustments which are necessary to that end. 
European anti-dumping law, however, seems to allow only a limited number of adjustments. As a 
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consequence, findings of dumping may be made in cases of no-dumping. The most conspicuous 
example concerns the category of selling expenses in combination with normal value and export 
price determination for associated parties. European anti-dumping law allows adjustments for 
selling expenses only if they are directly related to the sales taken into account. Normal value and 
export price as determined for associated parties are not comparable, because normal value 
oomprises all the costs and profits of the associated sales company whereas the costs and profits of 
the associated importer are excluded from the export price. In order to make them comparable, 
one might expect that normal . value would be adjusted for these costs and profits. However, 
normal value value will be adjusted only for the directly related selling expenses because of the 
required direct relationship between selling expenses and sales. As a result, normal value, 
contrary to the export price, comprises all indirectly related selling expenses of the associated 
sales company. Consequently, the dumping margin is inflated by the amount of the indirectly 
related selling expenses. The new GA TT Anti-dumping Code has made a first, moderate attempt 
to stop the unequal treatment of associations by requiring tbat, wbere tbe export price has been 
constructed and price comparability has been affected, the anti-dumping authorities establish tbe 
normal value at a level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the constructed export price. 
European anti-dumping law, bowever, bas restricted the scope of tbe new GA TT rule so that it 
will nothave any effect on tbe problem of price comparability in respect of associations. 
6.6. DUMPING MARGIN 
The dumping margin is tbe amount by wbich normal value exceeds tbe export price. Like all the 
other elements of the dumping investigation, tbe determination of the dumping margin contributes 
to the finding of dumping, even in cases where no dumping is being practised. To that end, 
European anti-dumping law bas developed two mecanisms : the comparison between a weighted 
average normal value and export prices on a transaction-by-transaction basis and the disregard of 
reverse dumping (i.e., the cases where the export price exceeds normal value). As such a 
misrepresentation of reality is unacceptable, both methods should be repealed or should, at least, 
be restricted to cases in whicb it is clearly proven that the exporter deliberately practises reverse 
dumping in order to offset his dumping practices and, accordingly, to circumvent anti-dumping 
law. The new GA TT Anti-dumping Code puts a limit to this practice. It requires that a 
comparison is made either between weighted average normal value and weighted average export 
price or between individual normal values and individual export prices on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. A comparison of weighted average normal value and individual export prices is 
only allowed if there is a pattem of export prices which differ significantly among different 
purcbasers, regions or time periods and if sucb differences cannot be taken into account 
appropriately by the use of a weigbted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction 
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comparison. EC anti-dumping law bas already been adapted to this new GA TI law. The 
question, however, is whether the European anti-dumping authorities will not abuse the exception 
by applying it as the general rule. 
PART 11 
ANTI-DUMPING RELlEF 

CHAPTER IV 
THE WELF ARE EFFECTS 
OF ANTI-DUMPING RELlEF 
1. INTRODUCTION 
343 
Though dumping is generally held to b(!_~_!l~~[aJLtrade~, the mere existence of dumping is 
not sufficient for anti-dumping rellef to be granted. GA TI and European anti-dumping law 
require that the dumped imports cause injury to the dornestic industry of the importing country 
(Article VI(1) and (6)(a) GA'IT; Articles 7.1.(ii), 8.1., 9.2. and 11.1. GA'IT Anti-dumping 
Code ; Artiele 7(1), 8(1) and 9(4) basic EC Regulation ; Articles 10(2){b), 11(1) and 12(1) basic 
ECSC Decision). European anti-dumping law f\u:ther_req.uires that the anti-dumping rellef be in ) 
tb~ interests of the CÖmmunity (Articles 7(1), 9(4) and 21 basic EC Regulation ; Articles 11(1) 
and 12(1) basic ECSC Decision). 
Economie trade theory traditionally points out that free trade maximizes both global and country 
welfare and, accordingly, does not suggest any trade restrictions as the first-best policy. Sin~ 
antl-!lump~relief is trade-restrictive, thi_s Chapter ~~het: .. anti~ 
dum in rellef reduce welfare. The importing country enforcing anti-dumping law will 
probably only look at its own welfare. Indeed, under European anti-dumping law, the European 
anti-dumping authorities must examine whether the interests of the Community call for anti-
dumping relief. Under the heading of «Community interests», they will probably only pay 
attention to the effects of anti-dumping relief on the Community welfare. Therefore, this Chapter 
will only pay attention to the effects of anti-dumping relief on the welfare of the itnporting 
· country914• For answering the question about the welfare effects of anti-dumping relief, no 
-,-
distinction wil!_ be made between competitive pricing and predatory pricing. Anti-dumping reli~f 
may, perhaps, even increase lïatioruil welfare·-irr-cases~-wherrlhe~dumping is not predatory. 
Clearly, in case of predatory dumping, those welfare-increasing effects of anti-dumping relief will 
· 
914 This work does oot iovestigate the effects which the mere existeoce of anti-dumping law may have on trade pattems. However, it seems that 
the threat of anti-dumping enforcement affects trade in the same way as anti-dumping relief, in particular, undertakings (as the threat of anti-
dumping enforcement, unlike anti-dumping duties, does nol generate iocome for the importing couaîtry's authorities) (sec e.g. : HERANDER, 
M.G., and SCHWARTZ, J.B., «An Empircal Test of the Impact of the Threat of U.S. Trade Policy: 'rhe Case of Antidumping Dutie&», SoUlhem 
Economie Jounud, 1984-1985, (59), 59-79; MESSER.LIN, P., «The EC Antidumping Regulaûons: A First Economie Appraisal, 1980-85», 
Weltwinscha.ftliches Archiv, 1989, (563), 563-587.). Hence, it may be concluded that the welfare effects of threatening toenforce anti-dumping law 
are similar to thosc ofundertakings. ~---·---~- --~-~--~ --- -- - -------------
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have to be added to its welfare-increasing effects resulting from the prevention of the 
monopollzation of the Community market. · 
The present Chapter focuses on the two main types of anti-dumping relief: anti-dumping duties 
and undertakings (Articles 7 up to 9 GATT Anti-dumping Code; Articles 7 up to 9 basic EC 
Regulation ; Articles 10 up to 12 basic ECSC Decision). Under European anti-dumping law, 
there is, though, a third type of anti-dumping rellef: so-called special measures, being defined as 
measures which do not run counter to obllgations under GA IT. ( Artiele 22(üi) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 17(3) basic ECSC Decision). This Chapter doés not pay attention to this 
third type of anti-dumping rellef because it is applled but very rarely and, if imposed, closely 
resembles one of the main types of anti-dumping rellef or, at least, have similar trade-restrictive. 
effects915• 
In section 2 of this Chapter, the welfare effects of anti-dumping duties will be examined. Section 
2.1. will provide a brief descriptio_!l: ___ gf___tlle_Jegal ____ ch_é!facteristics of anti-dumping duties under 
~ -·----_,_ ---- ~--- --------~--"~·---------------------~-~· 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law. In view of those characteristics, the next section will 
examine the welfare effects of anti-dumping duties, from an economie point of view. Finally, 
915 In o~y three Europaan anti-dumping cases, such special measures may have been applied: , 
after having established that the undertaking had been violated, the European anti-dumping authorities, in nuts of iron or _ 
steel from Taiwan, imposed a duty additional to the normal customs duty (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2464/77 of 7 
November 1977 adopting special measures in respect of imports of certain nuts of iron or steel originating in Taiwan, O.J., 10 
November 1977, NoL 286f7). This additional duty must be a special measure because no new anti-dumping proceeding in 
respect of nut• of iron or steel from Taiwan was initiated, whereas the then prevailing Europaan anti-dumping legislation 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 459/68) did notprovide the possibility of imposing anti-dumping duties without the opening of 
a new anti-dumping proceeding, not even if the originally accepted undertaking had been violated ; 
in aluminium from Norway, Surinam, the Souiet Union and Yugoslauia, it was considered that, due to the price increases 
worldwide and on the . Community market, the interesta of the Community did not call for anti-dumping protection. 
Nevertheless, i~ was pointed out that future developments would be closely foliowed so that a decision might he taken 
rapidly, should the Community industry deem it necessary to requestareopening of the proceeding in the light of changed 
circumstances, (Commission Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Boviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 
February 1984, No L 67/19) ; 
when the Norwegian Government adopted a series of measures aimed at restricting the volume of Norwegian salmon 
supplied to the market and expressed the wish to contribute to the balanced development of fresh salmon exports to the 
Community, while respecting traditional trade flows, the Commission considered that it W83 unnecessary to impose 
antidumping measures on Atlan.tic salmon from Norway. Instead, it announced it would closely follow the market trend fo:r 
farmed salmon and the export of Norwegian farmed salmon to Community. lf necessary, or by request of any Memher State, 
it would initiate talks with the Norwegian Government. Should those discussions not lead to a satisfactory solution, the 
Commission would consider as a matter of urgency - upon request from the Community industry - whether to initiate new 
anti-dumping proceedings (Commission Decision 911142/EEC of 15 March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning importsof Atlantic salmon originating in Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, NoL 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 
1991, No L 76164) ; Answer of the Commission to written question No 3066190, O.J., 13 December 1991, No C 323/3). 
The additional duty imposed in nuts of iron or steel from Taiwan will have the same effects as an anti-dumping duty, because it is 
also a selective customs duty. The follow-up set up in alu~inium from Norway, Surinam, the Souiet Union and Yugoslauia and 
Atlan.tic salmon from Norway, on the other hand, may have a chilling effect on imports of aluminium from those countries. It 
increases the probability of being caught dumping, and, as a consequence, it may have an increasing effect on the prices of the 
imported product. The price-increasing effect will he further reinforeed by the increase in costs due to the administrative burden 
imposed on the exporters. Hence, the possible effect of the follow-up is identical to the effect of a selective customs duty, namely 
increasing the prices of the imported products originating in certain countries. The difference with a customs duty is that the 
follow-up does not generate income for the government of the importing country. In this respect the follow-up is identical to 
undertakings. Therefore, the results of the subsequent analysis of the effects of undertak.ings will also hold for the follow-up. 
For the conformity ofthe special measures with GATr, see: infra, 763-766. 
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section 2. 3. will comp~~Jegal~charac1eristics--oLanti~dumping_~QJJ_t!f?~-~-!~~--t_h~_f!!!~!~~s of the 
economie analY.si~jn_.s..~.-tion 2.2. --------~ 
-=----- J· 
Section 3 will focus on unde~n 3.1. will provide an overview of the legal 
characteristics of undertakings. ~~~· ill point out the economie diff~n 
undertakings and anti-d~J11ping d~~~ in rms of national welfare. Section 3.3. will then examine 
wh'ëther GÁ TI and ___ ~u_ropean anti-dumping law ~those-econo~e-differences_into account, 
when choosing between anti-dumping duties and unàertakings. Finally, ~ will conclude 
the present Chapter by providing a summary of the fmdings of the comparison between the legal 
and the economie analysis. 
2. ANTI-DUMPING DUTlES 
2.1. LEGAL DEFINITION 
GATT and European anti-dumping law do not define the notion of «anti-dumping duty». They 
only require that the amount of the anti-dumping duties must not exceed the dumping margin 
(Article VI(2) GATT ; Articles 7.2., 9.1. and 9.~.)GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Articles 7.2. and 
9_.4. basic EC Regulation ; Artic~e .13(3) bas~c ~CSC Decisi~n). UJlder European ~ti:~~mpi~g) 
law, they must not exceed the tnJury margin 1f the latter ts lo:we.J.:-..t~the....dumpt~ 
.-:--- . . 
(Articles 7.2. and 9.4. basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(3) basic ECSC Decision)916• GATT _ 
European anti-dumping law further provide that anti-dumping duties apply to the product covered 
by the anti-dumping proceeding and to the country which that product originates in or which it is 
exported from ( Artiele 12.2.1. and 12.2.2. GA TT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 14(2) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 13(2) basic ECSC Decision). ECSC anti-dumping law specifies also that 
there are different types of duty (Article 13(2) basic ECSC Decision). Therefore, the notion of 
anti-dumping duty should be interpreted in its usual meaning, taking into account the few 
specifications provided by GA TI and European anti-dumping law : it is a selective customs duty, 
i.e. , a duty levied on the imports of dumped products originating in or being exported from 
certain specific countries subject to the anti-dumping proceeding. There are different types of 
916 C.J.E.C., caac 53/83, 23 May 1985, AUied Corporatlon a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1985, (1621), 1659. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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customs duties, namely ad valorem duties, specific duties and variabie duties or a combination of 
them917• 
Under GA TI and European anti-dumping law, such duties may only be imposed, if the dumping 
inflicts in jury upon the industry established in the importing country, casu quo the Community, 
producing a product similar to the dumped product (i.e. , the SQ:Called «Community industry») 
I -----
(Article VI(1) GATT ; Articles 3 aild 4 GATT Anti-dumping Code; Articles 3 and 4 basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4 basic ECSC Decision). The injury suffered by the Community industry is 
measured by means of relevant economie factors, such as production, sales, prices, profits, return 
on investment (Article 3.4. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(5) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision). 
If both dumping and injury are found, the granting of anti-dumping relief is not obligatory under 
GA TT anti-dumping law. GA TT ~ti-dumping law only expresses the desire that the imposition 
of anti-dumping duties be permissive in cases where injurious dumping is found ( Artiele 9 .1. 
GATT Anti-dumping Code). This wish .bas been rendered in European anti-dumping law by 
granting the European anti-dumping authorities the power to decide not to take any anti-dumping 
action if the interests of the Community do not call for such an action (Articles 7(1), 9(4) and 21 
basic EC Regulation ; Articles 11(1) and 12(1) basic ECSC Decision). The European anti-
dumping authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in implementing the notion «Community 
interests», subject to only a marginal judicia! contro1918• Indeed, whereas ECSC anti-dumping 
does not clarify the notion, EC anti-dumping law describes it in general terms as comprising «all 
the various interests taken as_ a whole, including the interests of the dornestic industry and users 
and consumers» (Article 21(1) basic EC Regulation). In compliance with that definition, the 
European anti-dumping authorities have implemented this notion by su~Q!,Ïng under it all the 
components of the Community having an interest in the imports of the dumped products: the 
Community industry, the users of the like product (consumers and processing industries), the 
mployees in the Community industry and the processing industries, and the Community 
a ~rities in pursuing different policies (antitrust policy, trade policy, national security). 
917 l'ffra, 660. 
918 C.J.E.C., case 191/82, 4 October 1983, Fédération de l'industrie de l'h.uilerie de la CEE (FEDIOL) v Commission, E.C.R., 1983, 
(2913), 2934-2935; C.J.E.C., case 188185, 14 July 1988, EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation (Fediol) v Commission., 
E.C.R., 1988, (4193). 4231; C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holding• plc v Coun.cil an.d Commission, E.C.R., 1990, 
I, (781), 824 and 843. 
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2.2. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
2. 2.1. Anti-dwnping duties under perfect competition without market imperfections 
Traditional trade theory assumes perfect competition and absence of any market distortions. 
Under those assumptions, freetrade maximizes the welfare of each country. Indeed, under such 
conditions, production will be located where its efficiency is highest, as each country will produce 
the products for which it is relatively best qualified, i.e., in which it bas a comparative advaotage. 
Such an efficient pattem of production implies that each country produces the maximum output 
attainable at the lowest cost possible. Free trade enables each country to trade the products it 
produces for other products which its consumers prefer. As a consequence, free trade maximizes 
the welfare of each country and, accordingly, traditional trade theory rejects each type of traJ!e 
-------. ··"-~----re~. An anti-dumping duty, being a selective customs duty, is a type of trade restriction. 
It redu~s the ~ntry's we!_!"are becau~~~~_deterioration of the con~~~ers'_~elfare is nO!Jll}tirely 
com~nSa.ted by the imprQYementjn tl_!e Community industry's welfare and t)y~ilïe"revenue gained 
by the Community_a.uthorities out of tb;i;~=~of~the,~àiiii:dillirpïngJiûty·:-r-Ac~~rdh;g}y~~~ht~se~,,of 
perfect competition and no market imperfections, anti-dumping duties should be banned. 
\ 
Figure 15 showshow an anti-dumping duty reduces a country's welfare. lt is assumed that only one country imports 
the products in the Community. Accordingly, that country's supply, Sc in tigure 15, represents world supply. Sd 
represents the supply of the Community industry and D represents Community demand. As there is perfect 
competition, the intersection between world supply and Community demand determines the price and quantity 
consumed on the C.ommunity market. At that intersection, the price charged will be OP1 and a quantity of Oq4 will be 
consumed in the Community under free trade. It is assumed that the Community consumers will first buy the 
products manufactured by the Community industry and then resort to the foreign products. Accordingly, given the 
price OP1, the Community industry will offer a quantity Oq1 and the remaining quantity q1q4 will be offered by the 
exporting country. 
If an anti-dumping duty t is imposed on those imports, the world supply curve will shift upwards to Sc(l +t). As a 
consequence, the price on the Community market increases up to OP2 and the total quantity consumed on the 
Commlmity market drops to Û<IJ· Because of the price increase, the Community industry will increase its output and 
offer a quantity Oq2, whereas the Community will import a lower quantity of q2'13. 
Clearly, the anti-dumping t is beneficial to the Community _industry. Without anti-dumping duty, their producers' 
~l\U:}!lus amounted to the area acP1• Due to the ~nti-dumping duty resulting in higher sales by the Community 
industry, it increases by an amount ~1ual to the area P1cdP2• 
However, the anti--dumping duty also affects the Community consumers. Whereas initially their consumer surplus 
amounted to tb,~ area P1hi, the anti-dumping duty causes it to drop to the area P2gi. The Community consumers, 
tlt.us, lose an amount of consumer surplus equal to the area P1hgP2. 
l";inally, the anti-dumping duty generates revenue for the Community authorities, equal to the area defg. 
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If the gaverrunent values the welfare of producers and the welfare of consumers to he equally important, the anti-
dumping duty causes the welfare of the Community, equal to producers' surplus, consumer surplus and gaveroment's 
revenue, to drop. Indeed, the lossin consumer surplus is not completely offset by the increase in producers' surplus 
and the revenue of the Community authorities. The redistribution of consumer surplus favouring both the Community 
industry (area P1cdPv and the Community authorities (area defg) does not cover overall loss in consumer surplus. 
The area's eed and fhg of lost consumer surplus are not compensated, the area fhg representing the loss due to the 
drop in overall Community consumption and the area eed representing the loss in efficiency of production because the 
Community ind·. ustry is cannot offer the same amount as the exporting country at a eertaio price. Therefore, it may be9 
concluded that an anti-dumping duty causes the Community welfare to decrease and causes a net cost of proteetion 
equal to the areas eed and fhg. 
2.2. 2. Anti-dumping duties under imperfect competition and market imperfections 
2.2.2.1. The «optimum-tariff» argument 
Traditional trade theory only provides one case in which a country may increase its welfare by 
restricting trade. In that case, it relaxes its assumptions about perfect competition, as it allows for 
the importing country to enjoy market power on the international market. The importing country 
"' ---~-------is assumed to have the opportunity of influencing the international price of the product it imports 
by restricting its demand for that product. This opportunity is called «price-makership». The 
importing country may restriet its demand by imposing a tariff. If that tariff increases the 
im~ng country's welf~~,__!h-~t tariff is _called «PP!!c!!!llffi tariff». 
Figure 16 showshow an coptimal tariff» increases a country's welfare. lts assumptions are identical to those in tigure 
15, but for the price-makership held by the Community. This difference accounts for world supply to be less than 
petfe;~~tly elastic. · Ut-~ ~ · 
In tigure 16(a) and (c) the supply curve of the Community industry is represented by the curve Sd. Sc in tigure 16(b) 
represents world supply. As competition on the Community market is assumed-~Ff~e price of the product 
on the Community market unoer free tnu:le is determined by the intersection between the curve represeuting 
{~mmunity demand (curve D in tigure 16(c)) and the curve representing the aggregate 'supply curve (curve Sd+Sc in 
fi~..1.re 16(c)). The price OP1 corresponds to this intersection, i.e., at point h in tigure 16(c). At the price OP1, a 
quantity <Kw will be consumed on the Community market. Assuming that Community consumers tirst buy the 
produels supplied by the Community industry, Oq1 is supplied by the Community industry and ~q4 is supplied by the 
exporting country. Under free trade conditions, the consumer surplus is equal to the area P1 and the Community 
producers' surplus is equal to the area acP1 in tigure 16(c). · 
Now assume that the Community imposes a tariff t on all produels imported. As a consequence, the supply curve of 
the exporting country shifts upwards to the curve Sc(l +t) in tigure 16(b), which also implies a shift of the aggregated 
supply to the curve abSc +Sd(l +t). The new aggregated supply curve intersects the demand curve at pointgin tigure 
16(c), implying a price increase from OP1 to OP2• At the new price OP2 the quantity supplied by the CommuLity 
industry increases by q1q2 to Oq2. 
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As a consequence, Community producers' surplus increases by an amount equal to the area P1cdP2, consumer surplus 
drops by an amount equal to the area P1bgP2 and the Community authorities gain revenue from tb7 .. anti~uny>ing 
duty, amounting to the area defg. In case of price-takership, the areas eed and fhg are will not he compe-nsatedl\ d 
will represent the net cost of tbe anti-dumping duty, as sbown in tigure tSJ19• · ( . 1 
'J_.....' \ 
\ 
However, in case of price-makership, whicb is assumed bere, the areas eed and fhg will at ~t partjalJ he 
compensated, due to the impravement in the terms of trade of the Community caused by tbe ta · ff. -Th~ tefins of 
trade are impro'Ved because the exporters cannot shift tb~_ full burden of the tariff to tlieeömm consumers. At 
the price OP2 the exporting country offers a quantity .. · 1ID gure 16(b) (whicb is equal _ to in tigure 16(c)). 
However, for this quantity Oq'3 the exporters would c arge a price OP3 tno tarlff was impo ·. Thus, th~Jo 
burden of the ~riff(Y whicb the exporting coq!ltry. bas to pay to the Community authority, equals tbe area 3.1. '1~2• 
Part of the burden, coinciding with the &n11r(P1kl~~ in tigure 16(b) (whicb is equal to tbe area efgd in tigure 
corresponds to the price increase of plp2 on''tbe·;éommunity market and is, thus, home by the Community consumers. 
~e other part of the burdetn· repi;J~~ ted by the area 11Çj~1 in tigure 16(b), is~~~ by 'tbe exporters; it ~incides 
wtth tbe decrease of the ~ ce from P1 to OP3 at \;}llcb the exporters are wtllmg to offer the quanbty Oq' 3• 
Depending on wbether the a ~~:!!J · equal, w~J,jdt or inferior to the sum of the areas eed + fhg, the netcostof 
the anti-dumping duty t to the 'ty is respectively zero, negative or positive. In otber words, tbe Community 
wel~are ~tiv,ely remains the_saze ~~e[lor decreases. If the Community welfare increases, tbe tariff t is a 
«optimum tanff». - · (\ 
r 
The «optimum tariff,. argull) nt is the only argument under tradional trade theory in favour of 
trade 'restrictions. The «Optimal tariff»-argument, though, bas only a limited application : it holds 
only in the case of price-makership. Thus, if the .. Community is a price-take~20 in a certain 
, I .. 
product market, the , «Optimal tariff,.~argl}ment cannot be invoked. In general, though, it seems 
quifu- realistiç_ ~---~~~~~-~-th~--Community h~ldi~g price-mélkership in view of the size of the 
Community market on world level921 • 
If it is true that the Community generally holds price-makership, then there is still the problem of 
the rather low practicability of «optimum tariffs». For the determination of «optimum tariffs» 
presopposes a close knowledge of the supply and demand of foreign dumping firmst Community 
-------~--- ~ producers and ~Community. __ consumers and their respective elasticities, ·a knowlèdge seldom · · 
co~able toa country's authorities922• -
··-·--··-------------------------------------
919 Supra, 347-349. 
920 Price-takership implies that the Community cannot affect the world price level. For an analysis of the effects of a tariff in 
case of price-takership - which, in a two-country model (i.e., a model with one importing country (in this case the European 
Community) and one exporting country (in this case a dumping country)), are identical to the effects of an anti-dumping duty -, see 
e.g. : GREENAWAY, D., International Trade Policy. From Torifis to the New Protectionism, London, MacMillan, 1983, 47-49. 
921 See: BALDWIN, R.E., «Are Economista' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid ?-., Joumal of Economie Uterature, 1992, (804), 809-
810. 
· 
922 BALDWIN, R.E., «Are Economists' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid ?-., Joumal of Economie Uterature, 1992, (804), 809-810. 
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2.2.2.2. Strategic-trade theory 
As traditional trade theory assumes perfect competition and no market imperfections, it might not 
seem quite realistic. Monopolies and oligopolies _ actually exist and there are many market 
imperfections, such as economies of scale. Moreover, traditional trade theory could not explain 
intra-industry trade, i.e. , reciprocal trade between countries in the same product. · Such trade was 
not based on comparative advantages~ as the countries trading with each other, were all producing 
the same product and, therefore, enjoyed the same comparative advantages. !11~order to ~~plain 
~eeonomies"ofscalehave-beeJLalblanced. When an indust;f is chara:;b;rized~ 
by ':positive external economies of scale, it will try to increase its production output, as this will 
result in lower production costs per unit. In order to attain increased output levels, it will have to 
expand its market and it can do this by exporting its products to foreign markets. In a world 
~'characterized by extemal economies of scale, countries will gain from trade provided that the world scale of increasing returns industries is larger than the national scale of those industries would have been in the absence of trade923 • 
Durlog the last decade, traditional trade theory has been completed by the so-called strategic-trade 
theory. Under that recent theory, models are elaborated, characterized by imperfect competition 
and market imperfections. As in many of those models, ~_!!mQ!ng_d_t_tt!~-~--~cl_othel'o_trade 
restrictions ba-ve--b~n shown __ to_b_e welfare-impr_o__ring for the importing country, the strategie-
~ ~- . ----········· ----
trade theory ~ms--tO---suggest--countries-to employ trade--restrictions ás-- a .strategie tooi- and-,-thus, 
------------
to ~~~ipate in the strategie games played by monopolists and oligopolists. 
2.2.2.2.1. Imperfect competition 
Strategie trade theory bas shown that tariffs in general may improve the welfare of the importing 
country, if there is no perfect competition on that country's market. If the Community is the 
importing country and if there is imperfect competition on the Community market ( oligopoly, 
monopolistic competition), foreign exporters as well as Community producers may earn pure 
profits. Under such conditions, the Community may increase its overall welfare, by shifting some 
of the pure profits from the foreign exporters to the Community producers924• 
With regard to anti-dumping duties, however, the argument as to the shifting of pure profits 
usually does not hold. This is quite obvious as, in order for dumping in the sense of price 
923 ETHIER, W., Modem International Economics, New York, Norton, 1983, 42-44; KRUGMAN, P. and OBSTFELD, M., lntemalional 
Economics, Glenview (Ul.), Scott, Foresman and Company, 1988, 126-133. 
924 See e.g. : BRANDER, J., and SPENCER, B., «Tariff Proteetion and Imperfect Competitionn, in Morwpolistic Competition and 
International Trade, KIERZKOWSKI, H. (ed.), Oxford, Ciarendon Press, 1984, (194), 194-206. 
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discriminatien to occur, the Community market usually must be more competitive than the 
exporting country's market925• The more competitive the Community market is, the more elastic 
Community demand will be, and, thus, the higher both the margin of dumping and the anti-
dumping duty will be. However, the more competitive the Community market is, the smaller the 
pure profits the foreign, exporters earn on the Community market will be. Accordingly, the pure 
profits to be shifted towards the Community producers will equally be smalle~26 • Nevertheless, 
there may be instances in which anti-dumping duties enhance the Community welfare. However, 
strategie trade theory explicitly admits that it could be ambiguous for anti-dumping duties to be 
actually beneficia! to the Community, for their welfare effects depend on quite detailed 
specificatien of the type of strategie behaviour of the oligopolistic competitors, the specific 
demand function, production costs and the probability of the detection of dumpini27. 
2.2.2.2.2. Market imperfectio~ 
2.2.2.2.2.1. Economies of scale 
As bas already been pointed out, external economies of scale may result in international trade and 
may increase a country' s welfare, if the world scale of production under trade is higher than the 
national scale without trade. Beonornies of scale are a type of market imperfection. Strategie 
trade theory focuses on external economies of scale, when demonstrating that ~ade restriction@ 
m~ sometim~! imJ!roy~ a country'..s__~e. By restricting foreign competition on its dornestic 
market, an importing country may help its dornestic industry to expand its dornestic sales and 
production and, thus, to reach a higher level of productivity. This increase in productivity may 
fully offset the traditional net costof proteetion (loss in consumption and in production efficiency) 
and, thus, result in an increase in the importing country's overall welfare. 
Strategie trade theory bas paid special attention to the combination of economiesof scale and anti-
dumping duties. Thus, it bas demonstrated that an importing country may improve its national 
welfare by imposing an anti-dumping duty, if its import-competing industry faces p<)sitive 
t~onomies of scale and if the producers show Couroot behaviour (i.e. , each producer considers 
the output of bis competitors as given and decides, upon that basis, the quantity he will produce). 
In that case, the anti-dumping duty will be welfare-improving if there is competition between the 
import-competing and foreign producers only on the market of the importing country, or if there 
is competition between the import -competing and foreign producers on both the markets of the 
925 Supra, 21. 
926 DIXIT, A., tc.Anti-dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly», Europeon Economie Review, 1988/32, (66), 66-68. 
927 FISCHER, R.D., «Endogenousprobability of proteetion and finn behavion, Joumal of ln~enullional Economics, 1992, (149), 159 and 161-
163. ~·\ . 
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importing country and the exporting countries and only the importing country enforces anti-
dumping law. Indeed, in both cases, the foreign producers will have less access to the importing 
country's market because of the anti-dumping duty. Subsequently, the import-competing 
producers of the importing country will sell more on their dornestic market and, in view of their 
positive external economies of scale, their efficiency will increase with the size of their 
production. As they will become more competitive vis-à-vis the foreign producers, the sales of 
the import-competing producers on the importing country's market will further increase . 
. Moreover, in the second case, they will also be able to export to · the home market of foreign 
producers for that market is assumed not to be protected by anti-dumping law928• If, however, 
the foreign producers' country also enforces anti-dumping law, the importing country will 
decrease its national welfare by enforcing its anti-dumping law. In such case, the benefits of the 
positive economies of scale are significantly reduced. Indeed, bilateral anti-dumping enforcement 
divides the global market into national spheres of influence and, thus, binders producers in 
enlarging their scale of production beyond the national onèl29• 
The conclusions of this strategic-trade-policy research into the welfare effects of anti-dumping 
duties, however, substantially change if the producers adopt another strategie behaviour than 
Couroot behaviour. It bas been shown that, under Stackleber~, leadership (i.e., a producer does 
not consider bis competitors' output as given, but correctly· perceives any change in their planned 
response to bis actions and, on the basis of that knowledge, determines bis output), anti-dumping 
enforcement exclusively by the importing country will not always improve its national welfare, 
even if there is only competition on the importing country's market between the import-competing 
and foreign producers930• 
2.2.2.2.2.2. Umited market entry and transporl costs 
Strategic-trade theory has confirmed that transport costs may cause price discrimination. In 
particular, it bas demonstrated that «reciprocal dumping», i.e. , each producer exports to hls 
foreign competitors' market at prices below bis dornestic prices, may result from the strategie 
interaction of two oligopolists baving identical production costs and a Couroot perception, but 
located in two spatially separated markets. Strategic-trade theory has further shown that, under 
free en try, free trade increases the welfare of both countries in which the oligopolists are located. 
928 GRUENSPECHT, H.K., ccDurnping and Dynamic Competition», Journ.al of International Economics, 1988/25, (225), 237-244; 
WEBB, M., •The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Laws», Economie Inquiry, 1992, (437), 440-443. 
929 GRUENSPECHT, H.K., ccDurnping and Dynamic Competition», Journol of International Economics, 1988/25, (225), 237-244. 
930 WEBB, M., «The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Law~», Economie lnquiry, 1992, (437), 444-447. 
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Without free en try, however, free trade increases the welfare of both countries only if transport 
costs are not too high for neutralizing the pro-competitive effect of free trad~31 • 
Strategic-trade theory has not yet examined the welfare of anti-dumping duties under such 
circumstances. At frrst sight, though, it seems, that anti-dumping duties might be welfare-
improving when there is no free entry and transport costs are too high. 
2.3. LEGAL DEFINITION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS COMPARED 
As bas been pointed out in the analysis of tbe welfare effects of duties in figures 15 and 16, 
economie trade theory considers the importing country's welfare to be a conglomerate of the 
interests of ~omestic consumers (consumer surplus), of the dornestic producers (producers' 
surplus) and of the importing country's authorities (govemmentrevenue generated by the duty) of 
the importing country. The legal concept of the injury suffered by the Community industry only 
refers to the interests of the dornestic producers. As the European anti-dumping authorities 
~-- . . .. . . . .. .. .. -----
US,!!&IY do not pay attention to the welfare of other countries, · thelegarConceptOf;communi,ty 
interests» may be said to coincide, to a large ex tent, wi~ the. notioll-0Lnational--w0Uare (in 
pà'rtfuular, th~w~dfare of the Co;munity) as used in trade, theory. The legal concept, though, 
~ --0"'--~'"~~=~~--~---~~ 
takes also account of e~~~nom!~-~' such as the various policies pursued by the 
importing country's authorities. Therefore, economie trade theory does noLp.nnl-ide-~a-cotllplete 
ans'Yer to the question wheth~~-wl!en anti-d~mping"~~uti~~~wil_l be !.1! ~~e ~~~~.~-~~~t~.-~~~ts. 
Nevertheless, the fmdings of economie trade theory on the welfare effects of anti-dumping duties 
may be quite helpful in assessing the impact of those duties on the Community interests. For 
instance, . if economie trade theory -pro~ed that, under the specific circumstances of an anti-
dumping case, an anti-dumping duty would improve the Community's welfare, the European anti-
duinping authorities would only have to examine whether the other elements of the Community 
interests do not oppose the imposition of such a duty. Some conclusions drawn by economie trade 
theöry, moreover, make it possible to assess some of those other elements of the Community 
interests. For example, strategic-trade theory may be relevant in respect of the Community's 
antitrust policy, since it has shown that reciprocal dumping under free trade has pro-competitive 
effects improving the welfare of the importing country. And, if economie trade theory proved 
that the Community's welfare is enhanced by free trade rather than by trade restrictions such as 
anti-dumping duties~_the__E_uropean anti:IDlmping_authQ.Ij!j~!_-~~o~ld b~--~~~~!!'l~ly __ metic_ulous in 
holding that anti-dumping duties are completely-in-line-with_Jh~-~~-J2-o1.ic_y_the.y_pursue. For, 
sneb an argument implies tbat the Community trade policy is protectionist and that pursuing tha 
931 BRANDER, J., and KRUGMAN, P., ccA. 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade,,, Journal of International 
Economics, 1983/16, (3l3), 313-321. 
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trade policy requires an increasing number of trade restrictions. Indeed, this argument implies 
that the protectionist Community trade policy should be complemented by as much trade-
restricting anti-dumping measures as possible. Such argument clearly contradiets economie trade 
theory which shows that the Community welfare requires a minimum of trade restrictions. 
With regard to the elements of the legal notion of . «injury» and «Community interests» which 
economie trade theory takes explicitly into account, the comparison between legal definition and 
economie trade theory provides further important conclusions. Under economie trade theory, the 
.!_ongest case in favour of anti-dumping duties seems to be the ;óptimum-tarlff;-a.rg~me~t._ The 
Eu~anti:èmpin~~es, ~haveDëVer -USëdO!J;Yêii--ffi!iQtï,Qned . the -~J;timal­
tariff» argument. The absence o tfïis arg~t, though~,-sho~id~ot come as a su~ri~;, even if it 
is ~ctuall~ that the Community generally upholds price-makership. First, there is the 
"~- problem, inherent in all kinds of «Optimum tariffs» - the «optimal tariff»-argument is not specific 
/. to~s'---~~~ is -~~!~~-~o~~~a!~~-~~ds __ ~~!tOrrt§ dllties :' of it~. rather low 
j practicabili~-~~~-Qf the Pl!é:es_~_- _I?:t~_t __ rr_ eq _____ uently unavailable information about demand and 
\ supply-·conditions on the CommunitY- _(lJld \V_o:rld .. market. 
\ -
'"---~~' 
Second, there are a number of problems specific to anti-dumping duties. Probably, the European 
anti-dumping authorities do not rely on the «optimum-tariff» argument because European anti-
du}tjping law goes against this argument. Indeed, the «optimal-tariff» argument implies that the 
96m}>ing producer bears part of the burden of the anti-dumping duty. European anti-dumping 
/law, however, stipulates that, where the dumping producer bears partly or entirely the burden of 
I 
\ r the anti-dumping duty, the anti~dumping duty may be amended in order to compensate for the 
\; 
: amount bome by the dumping producer (Article 12 basic EC Regulation), or an additional dtity 
"+may be imposed to that end (Article 13(ll)(a) basic ECSC Decision). · 
Moreover, the applicability of the «optimum-tariff» argument is limited within the framework of 
anti-dumping law, because the amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the magnitude of 
the dumping margin and it is quite possible that the optimal tariff is higher than the dumping 
margin. 
A further complication of the «optimum-tariff» argument in respect of anti-dumping duties is that 
in most cases not the same general anti-dumping duty on all exporting countries will be imposed. 
First, there is no obligation to initiate anti-dumping proceedings against all countries dumping on 
the Community market Second, not all exporting countries will nece~sarily be found dumping, 
or, if they do, they will notall be found to cause injury to the Community industry, nor will the 
Community interests always be found to call for anti-dumping duties. Third, the dumping 
margins of the dumping exporting countries will not always be identical. Herice, it is quite 
probable that in many cases different or selective anti-dumping duties will be imposed in respect 
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of the various exporting countries found to be dumping and that no anti-dumping duties are 
. imposed on other exporting countries. Selective anti-dumping duties will cause trade diversion not 
only in favour of the Community industry, but also in favour of the exporting countries subject to 
no or lower anti-dumping duties932• If there is such trade diversion, the Community producers 
will not be able to increase their sales to the same extent as under a general anti-dumping duty. 
As a consequence, the rise in Community producers' surplus will be lower than in case of a 
general anti-dumping duty (i.e., smaller .than area P1cdP2 in tigure 16(c)). Therefore, a bigger 
part of the loss in consumer surplus caused by the price rise following the imposition of the anti-
dumping duties, will not be compensated. As a result, the net cost of anti-dumping proteetion 
will be higher when selective anti-dumping duties are imposed, whereas the probability that it will 
be compensated by the terms-of-trade effect of the «optimal tariff,. declines. · The negative effect 
of trade diversion in favour of third exporting countries on the welfare of the Community has 
been taken into consideration in some anti-dumping cases, but has only exceptionally been held to 
be a convincing argument for rejecting anti-dumping reliet933·• 
As the «optimum-tariff,. argument is of marginal relevanee to anti-dumping law, only strategic-
trade theory provides some arguments in favour of anti-dumping duties. The problem, however, 
is that strategic-trade theory does not allow to draw genera!, straightforward conclusions. lts 
conclusions depend entirely on the assumptions made, such as the existence of imperfect 
competition and of extemal economies of scale, whether or not there is· free en try and whether or 
not the pro-competitive -effects of free trade are neutralized by too high transport costs. 
Moreover, strategic-trade theory has shown its conclusions may be completely altered if the 
producers employ another kind of strategie behaviour (e.g., Stackleberg leadership instead of 
Couroot behaviour934). Further, strategie trade interventions by an importing country which 
improve that country's welfare, will normally provoke retaliatory actions by the other countries · 
who perceive the importing country's interventions reducing their welfare or are perhaps not 
aware that their welfare is not affected negatively. Retaliation will usually undo the welfare 
ffi f h • • ' d . . Th h . h ~d JV11v~~~·' e ects o tl,e tmportin.g country s tra e tnterventton. oug 1t seems t at anti- umptng outies 
932 Trade diversion in favour of exporting countries not subjected to anti-dumping relief is considerably higher than trade 
diversion in favour of the Community producers. As a result of anti-dumping relief granted in the period 1980-1985 the imports 
1i·om exporting countries not subjected to anti-dumping relief increased by 98.6% over a five-year period after the imposition ofthe 
anti-dumping relief. lntra-Community trade increased with only 24.0% over the same period. See: MESSERLIN, P., tcThe EC 
Antidumping Regulations : A First Economie Appraisal, 1980-85», Weltwirtschaftliches Archw, 1989, (563), 573-575. 
933 See : infra, 632-636. 
934 See also e.g., EATON, J., and GROSSMAN, G.M., ccOptimal Trade and lndustrial Policy under Oligopoly••, Quarterly Journ.al 
of Economics,1986, (383), 383-394. In the model of J. EATON and G.M. GROSSMAN it is examined wbich is the optima! policy for 
ohifting pure profits .from foreign to dornestic producers. Under Cournot behaviour the o.ptimal policy is an export subsidi, but, 
under Bertrand behaviour (i.e., a producer conaiders the prices of bis competitors as given and, on the basis of their prices, 
determines the prices he will charge for bis products), the optim,!!)._PQliç~~~xport tax. 
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will not provoke any retaliation, as they are allowed under GA ~35, the exporting country 
still may retaliate by enforcing their national anti-dumping laws. Such kind of anti-dumping 
retaliation bas already been shown to prevent the importing country from improving its national 
welfare by imposing anti-dumping duties. All ~se assum_ptions,_includin~ge 
whether or not the exporting countries will, by · ay of~t:etaliati<>.n, __ r~sofLJP anti-dumping 
t··~-~~ . . -·•·····, """·--- _ ··.-•cv"···.---~·-•~-~--~••·-~-•---·- ~-- ·-·--- -~•- -•' ___ ____ 
measures, r~e informati.Q!l_~~~h~!he }~~g~ countcy4-authorities cannot .. be __ e_x~ be 
in~iti.QtL.t9.."9ll1ain9~6 • Moreover, strategic-trade theory only compares the use of (positive 
and negative) tariffs (or anti-dumping duties) with free trade. It bas not yet been examined 
systematically whether such trade restrictions are tirst-best policies937• Probably, trade 
restrictions are not frrst-best policies because, in the majority of the strategic-trade models, market 
imperfections are distortions on the dornestic market of the importing countries. As a 
consequence, «internal» intervention, which directly remedies the dornestic distortion, will 
generally be superior to trade restrictions, which usually adjust one distartion at the cost of 
introducing another. For example, if the dornestic scale of production is too low to enjoy the 
economies of scale, the optima! intervention would be a production subsidy, which, contrary to an 
anti-dumping duty, does not involve any loss in consumer surplus938• 
/"~view of the high sensitivity of the welfare effects of strategie trade interventions depending on a 
/ n\Imber of quite specific assumptions which are hard to verify by the authorities of a country, it 
~ms safe to adopt as general policy guideline the rule that anti-dumping duties usually do not 
raise the welfare of importing countries. Only if there is strong evidence that the conditions under 
which strategie trade interventions may improve the importing country' s welfare, are met, the 
imposition of anti-dumping relief should be considered. 
935 PETERSMANN, E.-U., «Need for Refonning Antidumping Rules and Practices. Thc Messy World of Fourth-Best Policies-, 
Aussenwinscluift, 1990, (179), 188. 
936 BALDWIN, R.E., ccAre Economists' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid ?,., Joumal of Economie Literature, 1992, (804), 
824; BHAGWATI, J., Protectionism, Cambridge (Mass.), MlT Press, 1988, 106-107. 
937 DIXlT, A., tclnternational Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industrie&», Economie Journal - Supplement, 1984, (1), 4. 
938 BALDWIN, R.E., tc.Are Economiste' Traditional Trade Policy Views Still Valid ?•, Joumal of Economie Literature, 1992, (804), 
821-822; GREENAWAY, D., and THARAKAN, P.K.M., «Imperfect Competition, Adjustment Policy, and Commercial Policy••, in 
Imperfect Competition an.d International Trade. 7'he Policy Aspectsof Intra-Industry Trade, GREENAWAY, D., and THARAKAN, 
P.K.M. (eds.), Sussex, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, (7), 27-28 and 30. 
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3. UNDERT AKINGS 
3.1. LEGAL DEFINITION 
Undertakings are agreements between the dumping exporter and the European anti-dumping 
authorities under which prices are revised or exports cease to the extent that. the European anti-
dumping authorities are satisfied that either the dumping margin or the injurious effect of the 
dumping are eliminated (Article 8.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 8(1) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 10(2)(b) basic ECSC Decision). Though the heading of Artiele 8 of the 
GA TI Anti-dumping Code treats of price undertakings, price undertakings (setting minimum 
import prices) as well as quantity undertakings (setting maximum export quantities) are allowed. 
European anti-dumping authorities have a wide margin of discretion in choosing between anti-
dumping duties and undertakings939• The only limit to their discretionary powers seems to be 
the principle of non-discrimination940• GATI and EC anti-dumping law explicitly underscore 
the anti.:.dumping authorities's discretionary powers as they hold that the latter may reject 
undertakings because of, inter alia, reasons of general policy (Article 8.3. GATT Anti-dumping 
Code; Artiele 8(3) basic EC Regulation). Perhaps, due to the ~anti-dumping authorities' 
discretionary power, European anti-dumping case law has p_~d littl~ __ at/ention to an active choice 
~·~- ·----~----· -~-~ 
between the different types of anti-dumping relief. The European anti-dumping authorities seem 
to accept undertakings, whenever undertakings are offered by the dumping exporters941 , unless 
939 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo Bearing Compan.y Limited o.a. v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1809), 1858; C.J.E.C., 
case· 255/84, 7 May 1987, Nachi Fujikoshi Compan.y v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1861), 1894; C.J.E.C., case 256/84, 7 May 1987, Koyo 
Seiko Limited v Coulicil, E.C.R., 1987, (1899), 1918; C.J.E.C., case 258/84, 7 May 1987, Nippon Seiko KK v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 
(1923), 1971; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea Company Limited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1975), 2011; C.J.E.C., joined 
cases 294/86 and 77/87, 5 October 1988, Technointorg v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6105 and 6117; C.J.E.C., 
joined cases 133/87 and 150/87, 14 March 1990, Nashua Corporation v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (719), 763 (Opinion 
of Advocate-General MISCHO) ; C.J.E.C., case C-323188, 11 July 1990, SA Sermes v Directeur des. services des douanes de 
Strasbourg, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3027), 3041 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN). 
940 In the Boviet deep free:zers case, the Court of Justice appli~d the principle of non-discrimination to the rejection of the 
undertaking offered by the Soviet exporter. In deep free:zers from the USSR, Yugoslavia and the German Democratie Republic, the 
Commission hu accepted undertakings offered by the exporters from Yugoslavia and the German Demoeratic Republic, but hu 
foUD.d the undertaking. offered by the Soviet exporter unacceptable ; as a result, an anti-dumping duty was imposed on imports of 
deep freezers from the USSR (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation 
of imports of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the 
investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning importsof certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep 
freezers originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 8 January 1987, NoL 6/1). The fact that, contrary to the undertakings giv~n by the 
Yugoslav and German exporters, the undertaking of the Soviet exporter was not sufficient to remedy the injury caused by the 
Boviet imports of deep freezers to the Com.munity industry involved that the principle of non-discrimination was not violated 
(C.J.E.C.,joined cases 294/86 and 77/87,5 October 1988, Technointorg v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6118). 
941 See, e.g., siUcon carbük jrom Poland, where an anti-dumping duty was imposed bccauae the e:xporter did nol offer an undertaking, despite 
ha-ving been granted the opportunity by the Comnûsaion to do so (Council Regtdation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a detinitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof Bilicon carbide, originating in the People'a Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Pederation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 
April 1994, NoL 94/21). 
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they consider the undertakings offered to be insufficient to remedy either the dumping or the 
injury942• Indeed, the rejection of undertakings is usually not grounded on a preferenee for anti-
dumping duties to undertakings, but rather on deficiencies of the undertakings themselves943 • 
942 BOUDANT, J., L'anli-dumping communautaire, Paria, Economica, 1991, 188, 190 and 272 (according to whom European anti-dumping law 
favoun tbc acccptancc of undcrtakings); STEGEMANN, K., «EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Are Pricc Undertakings a Legal Substitute for Diegal 
Price Fixing., Weltwirtscluiftliches Archiv, 1990, (268), 268-269; THARAKAN, P.K.M., «Thc political cconomy of anti-dumping undertakings in 
the European Communitica», Europeon Economie Review, 1991, (1341), 1342-1344; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade of 
European Community Ant-Dumping Law and Pncticc Applicable to lmports from China•, Joumal of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 12. 
943 Indeed, undertakings have been refused because : 
the undertakings put forward were not appropriate to the case in question (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2109/85 of 25 July 
1985 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain kinds of palystyrene sheet originating in Spain, O.J., 30 
July 1985, No L 19811) ; 
the propased price levels were unlikely to eliminate either the dumping margin or the injurious effects of the dumping 
(C.J.E.C., joined cases 294186 and 77/87, 6 October 1988, Technointorg v Commia•ion and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6104 
and 6117 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 724182 of 30 March 1982 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts 
of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Ge!'Dlan Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating the proceeding 
in respect of imparts of said products originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, NoL 85/9; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the 
People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1); 
the undertaking was not sufficient to remove the injury (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3540/83 of 14 December 1983 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 16 December 1983, No L 364116 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2866/85 of 14 October 
1985 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting 
undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imparts of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 
October 1985, No L 276/5), since the price of the dumped imparts would not be inereased to the appropriate level within an 
acceptable period of time (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2127/82 of 28 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on. trichloroethylene originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 31 July 1982, No L 223n6; C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea Compcmy Limited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, 
(1976), 2012; C.J.E.C., joined cases 294186 and 77/87, 6 October 1988, Technointorg v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1988, 
(6Ó77), 6104 and 6117) ; 
undertakings offered by importers would have the effect of eneauraging them to continue to obtain supplies from outside the 
Community at dumped prices; in other words, because such undertakings do not result intrade diversion in favour of the 
Community producers and, thus, do not remedy the injury suffered by the Community industry (C.J.E.C., joined cases 133/87 
and 160/87, 14 March 1990, Na8hua Corporation v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (719), 779; C.J.E.C., case 
166/87, 14 March 1990, Getitetner Holdings plc v Council and Coinmission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 826 and 845); 
the undertaking to increase prices immediately did notcover all sales (C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, Minebea Company 
Limited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1976), 2012); 
the undertaking does not imply a uniform sales price on all markets of the Community (C.J.E.C., case 260/84, 7 May 1987, 
Minebea Compan.y Limited v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1976), 2012); 
the maximum price inerease depends on a condition beyond the control of the Commission (C.J.E.C., joined cases 294186 and 
77/87,6 October 1988, Technointorg v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6106 and 6117); 
the extension of the existing undertaking would not give the Community industry sufficient proteetion (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1746/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of paracetamol 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, NoL 166/29); 
the features ofthe Community market ofthe product in question and the risk ofcircumvention had to he considered (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2024183 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol 
originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, NoL 199/4); 
there was a risk that the undertaking would not he respected since the exporter, whowas located in a NME country, was not 
fully autonomous in setting his export prices (Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the 
People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No L 8811 
(corrigendum, O.J., 6 June 1992, No L 163/16) ; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imparts of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of .China, Poland, the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94121) ; 
given the general high level of mobility of production factors within the industry concerned, the undertakings were unlikely 
to contribute to the restoration of fair competitive conditions in the Community market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of IJIIlall-screen colour telavision receivers 
originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/66 
(corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of IJIIlall-screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong Kong and the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14131 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 
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imposing a d.efinitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ce:rtain magnetic diaka (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan 
and the People's Republic of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, No 
L 262/4); 
the fact that eft"ective monitoring of the adherence of companies to the undertaking would not he practicabie (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ootton yarn originating 
in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 8211) ; 
the monitoring and control of the undertaking would he difficult (Commiuion Decision No 1751194/ECSC of 15 July 1994 
imposing a· definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig-iron, originating in Brazil, Po land, 
Ruasia and Ukraine, O.J., 16 July 1994, NoL 182/37); 
in view of the number of exporters, the number of models exported by them, the number of possible features of the product 
concerned and the frequent renewal of models, the undertakings oft"ered would he difficult to implement and would require 
extenaive resources to be monitored (Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting 
defmitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, NoL 13121; Commi&Bion Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong 
Kong and the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/31) ; 
in view of the large number of importers, the undertakings oft"ered by them would pose particwar difficulties in the eft"ective 
monitoring of compliance with such undertakings (C.J.E.C., joined cases 133/87 and 150/87, 14 March 1990, Nashua 
Corporation v Commission an.d Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1990, I, (719), 765 and 779; C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner 
Holdings plc v Coun.cil cuul Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 827 and 845); 
the degree of non-collaboration during the anti-dumping investigation and the rapidity with which model changes were 
introduced in the induBtry concerned, would make the observance of the undertakings difficult to verify, while their 
monitoring would he very costly (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of smali-screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, NoL 107/66 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133/92); Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2861193 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, 
O.J., 21 October 1993, No L 262/4) ; 
in view of the undertaking's special features (not further specified), its implementation could not have been satisfactorily 
monitored and could have led to controversy (Council Regulation (EEC) ·No 3306/80 of 18 December 1980 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! alarm clocks (other than travel alarms) originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic and the USSR, O.J., 19 December 1980, NoL 344/34; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2253/84 of 31 July 1984 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of certain sodium carbonate originating in the United States of 
America and accepting undertakings in respect of other import& of the same product, O.J., 2 August 1984, No L 206/15; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hydraulic 
excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, NoL 176/1); 
monitoring of price undertakings had been shown in previous cases to be very complex and difficult for the product involved 
which is imported in forma having different degrees of impurity which should he reflected in different price levels (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 621194 of 17 March 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating 
in South Africa and in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 March 1994, NoL 77/48); 
past experience had shown that, even if generally respected, undertakings did not constitute a satisfactory solution, but 
seemed likely to cause controversy and were difficult to monitor, thereby requiring a considerable amount of time and 
expense (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, NoL 19311); 
the prices cited in the previoua undertakings had all systematically been undercut (Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 
December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1); 
despite previous undertakings, the dumping exporters continued to dump, contributing to the injury suffered by the 
Community induBtry and nullifying the measures taken to defend it (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1472/91 of 29 May 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62) ; 
given the breach of the previoua undertaking, a renewal of the undertaking would not aft'ord the Community induBtry 
sufticient proteetion (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1531/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of potassium permanganate originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional 
anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 3 June 1988, No L 13811; Council Regulation (EC) No 2556/94 of 19 
October 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2552/93 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of artificial 
corundum originating in the People's Republic of China, the Russian Faderation and Ukraine, with the exception of those 
import& sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings have. been accepted, and definitively collecting 
the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1418194, O.J., 
21 October 1994, No L 270/24) ; 
it was neceBBar)' to avoid a situation where an exporter who bas violated his undertaking was placed in a more favourable 
position than those exporters who had fully respected theit obligations (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3648/83 of 19 December 
1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hardboard originating in Czechoslovakia and Poland and 
defmitively collecting the amounts secured by way of a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of hardboard 
originating in Sweden, O.J., 24 December 1983, NoL 361/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1825/84 of 28 June 1984 imposing 
a defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof hardboard originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 29 June 1984, NoL 170/68; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 385/90 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof potassium 
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permanganate originating in Czechoslovak.ia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those 
importa, O.J., 16 February 1990, NoL 4211); 
the fact that the undertaking did notoorraspond to European anti-dumping law, and in particwar the possibility of imposing 
an anti-dumping duty in the case of violation or withdrawal of the undertaking (Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 
March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ootton yam originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 
March 1992, No L 8211). 
Conversely, undertakings have been accepted because : 
the undertaking would remedy the injury (see e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian 
Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94121); 
the undertaking would prevent the recurrence of injury (Commission Deciaion 82f710/EEC of 18 October 1982 accepting an 
undertaking in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of thiophen originating in the United States 
of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 October 1982, No L 296/35) ; 
undertakings incorporated the necessary conditions to provide the required fle:z:ibility (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of certain types of electronic microcircuits 
known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain 
exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping · proceeding coneerDing import& of these products and terminating the 
investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 · January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9 ; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44)) ; 
it appeared that ·correct oparation of the undertaking can be effectively monitored (Commission Decision 83/649/EEC of 19 
December 1983 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure in respect of certain imports of 
hardboard originating in Sweden and terminating that procedure, O.J., 24 December 1983, No L 361/47; Commission 
Decision 86/209/EEC of 26 March 1986 accepting the undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation 
concerning import& of plasterboard of Spanish origin into Ireland and Northern Iraland and terminating that investigation, 
O.J., 29 March 1986, No L 89/65 ; Commission Decision 85/443/EEC of 23 September 1985 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of container corner fittings of worked cast steel 
originating in Austria and terminating that investigation, O.J., 27 September 1985, No L 256/44; Commission Decision 
86/35/EEC of 21 February 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
imports of fibre building board from Finland and Sweden and terminating the investigation, O.J., 25 February 1986, No 
L 46123; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, NoL 51n3; 
Commission Decision 86/232/EEC of 9 June 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning imports of hardboard originating in Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 12 June 1986, No 167/61; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of ~rtain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in 
conneetion with the investigation of importsof certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic 
Republic and terminating the investigation, im.d terminating the proceeding coneerDing importsof certain deep freezers, O.J., 
11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; Commission Decision 86/589/EEC of 26 November 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, 
the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 December 
1986, NoL 339132; Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating in the People's 
Republic of China, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, NoL 46/45; Commission Decision 87/210/EEC 
of 23 March 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of 
outboard motors originating in Japan and terminating the investigation, O.J., 26 March 1987, No L 82/36; CommisGion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings ofTered by Italmagnesio BA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-Import of the 
USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, No L 219/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random 
access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding coneerDing importsof these products and terminating the investigation intheir respect, O.J., 25 January 
1990, No L 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February. 1990, No L 38144); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 547190 of 2 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
glutamic acid and its salts originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, and accepting undertakings 
in conneetion with imports of certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in these countries, O.J., 3 March 1990, No 
L 56/23; CommiBSion Decision 90/138/EEC of 16 March 1990 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding coneerning imports of certain diesel enginas originating in Finland im.d Sweden, and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 22 March 1990, NoL 76/28; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of photo albums originating in South Korea and 
HongKong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1937/90 
of 4 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of pure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics originating in the 
People's Republic of China, and accepting an undertaking ofTered by the exporter, O.J., 7 July 1990, No L 174/27; 
Commission Decision 90/4 78/EEC of 24 September 1990 accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic 
of China and terminating the investigation with regard to these exporters, O.J., 27 September 1990, No L 264/56; 
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GATT and EC anti-dumping law seem to codify this aspect of European anti-dumping case law, 
as they hold that undertakings offered need oot be accepted if the anti-dumping authorities 
consider their acceptance impractical, for example, if the number of actual or potentlal exporters 
is too great, or for other reasons, including reasoos of general policy (Article 8.3. GATT Anti-
dumping Code; Artiele 8(3) basic EC Regulation). 
Indeed, exceptionally, though, the European anti-dumping authorities have made a more active 
choice between anti-dumping duties and undertakings for reasoos of general policy. They have 
Commission ~cision 90/479/EEC of 24 September 1990 accepting undertakings given by certain exporters in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of 
China and terminating the investigation with regard to the exporters in question, O.J., 27 September 1990, No L 264/57; 
Commission Decision 90/480/EEC of 24 September 1990 accepting undertakings given by certain exporters in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People1s 
Republic of China and terminating the investigation with regard to the exporters in question, O.J., 27 September 1990, No 
L 264/59; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3433191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
gas-fuelled, non-reflllable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand and definitively colleeting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 November 1991, No L 326/1; Commission 
Decision 92/177/EEC of 16 March 1992 accepting an undertaking given by a Japanase producer in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, and terminating the investigation 
with regard to the producer in question, O.J., 26 March 1992, NoL 81122; Commission Decision 93/521/EEC of 3 September 
1993 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review in respect of imports of binder and haler 
twine originating in Brazil, terminating the anti-subsidy review proceeding with regard to these imports and terminating the 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy review in respect of importsof binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 
1993, No L 251/28 ; Commission Deelsion 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the 
investigation with regard to these countries; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 
129/24 ; Commiuion Decision 94/825/EC of 12 December 1994 accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 31 
December 1994, No L 350/115) ; 
the government of the country of origin had offered its assistance in the monitoring of the price undertaking (Commission 
Decision 83/649/EEC of 19 December 1983 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure in respect 
of certain importsof hardboard originating inSweden and terminating that procedure, O.J., 24 December 1983, No L 361147 ; · 
Commission Decision 89/376/EEC of 19 June 1989 accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of video cassettes and video-tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong 
and terminating the investigation, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 174/30; Commiuion Decision 94/202/EC of 9 March 1994 
aëCepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the former USSR and terminating the proceeding against 
importa originating in Norway and several republics previously part of the former USSR, O.J., 13 April 1994, NoL 94/32; 
Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation 
with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate 
originating in Belarua, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24) ; 
only a amall number of companies existed (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3121/89 of 16 October 1989 modifying the anti-
dumping measures applicable to importsof certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico by introducing an anti-dumping duty 
on auch imports, other than those from exporters to the Community whose undertakings are accepted, O.J., 19 October 1989, 
NoL 301/1)- a reason undoubtedly closely related totheneed for effeetive monitoring ofundertakings; 
the anti-dumping investigation against imports of the like product of other producers located in the same country was also 
terminated by the acceptance of identical undertakings (Commission Deciaion 93/538/EEC of 18 October 1993 accepting an 
undertaking in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain types of electronic micro-circuits 
known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 21 October 1993, No L 262/64) ; 
the anti-dumping investigation against import& of the like product originating in third countries was also terminated by the 
acceptance of undertakings (Commission Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and 
the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 23 September 1986, No L 271126) ; 
no violations of the previoua undertakings were observed (Commission Decision 86/35/EEC of 21 February 1986 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of fibre building board from Finland 
and Sweden and terminating t.he investigation, O.J., 25 February 1986, NoL 46123; Commission Decision 87/210/EEC of 23 
March 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of outboard 
motorB originating in Japan and terminating the investigation, O.J., 26 March 1987, NoL 82/36). 
364 
subsumed these reasoos of general policy under the notion of «Community interests». For 
instance, they have refused to accept undertakings because «their acceptance would not offer a 
solution which was as appropriate as the imposition of a defmitive anti-dumping duty in the 
prevention of unfair business practices». No explanation was offered, pointing out why anti-
dumping duties were more appropriate944• The European anti-dumping authorities, though, when 
they switch to making an active choice, usually provide more arguments, which concern either 
trade policy or antitrust policy. 
3 .1.1. Trade policy 
The European anti-dumping authorities have only in very few cases relied upon reasoos of trade 
policy to make a choice between anti-dumping duties and undertakings. 
In hydraulic excavators from Japan945, tbe Council held that, in the light of cthe then prevailing trade relations 
with Japan•, it was not in the interest of the Community to have recourse to price undertakings as an appropriate 
remedy for the uuury resulting from the dumped imports. Instead, the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping 
duty. Probably, the wording cthe then prevailing trade relations with Japan• refer to the trade deficit of the 
Community in its trade with Japan. 
Though in previous anti-dumping cases concerning Canada, undertakings had been accepted946, the Commission, in 
vinyl acelate monomer from Canada941, refused to accept the undertakings offered, merely because Canadian 
legislation did notprovide the possibility of suspending or terminating anti-dumping proceedings by way of accepting 
an undertaking given by dumping exporters. 
Since then, no undertakings of Canadian exporters have been accepted. Nevertheless, at the end of the same year in 
which anti-dumping duties were imposed on vinyl acetate monomer from Canada, the possibility of terminating anti-
dumping proceedings by accepting undertakings was incorporated into Canadian anti-dumping la~48 • Indeed, 
944 Council Regulation (EEC) No 34/89 of 5 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact 
fully formed (SIFF) character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, NoL 5/23. 
945 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hydraulic 
excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, NoL 176/1. 
946 See : Commission Decision 81/663/EEC of 24 August 1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dum~ing procea-
dings concerning potato granules originating in Canada, O.J., 26 August 1981, NoL 243116; Council Regulation (EEC) No 551/83 
of 8 March 1983 im.posing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on kraftUner paper and board originating in the United States of 
America and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of the anti-dumping proceeding on kraftUner paper and 
board originating in Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the Soviet Union and Sweden, O.J., 10 March 1983, No L 64125; 
Commission Decision No 702/83/ECSC of 24 March 1983 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on certain iron or steel coils for 
re-rolling originating in Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela and accepting price undertakings from two. Canadian e:xporters, 
O.J., 29 March 1983, No L 8219 ; Commission Decision No 2182/83/ECSC of 27 July 1983 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties 
on importsof certain iron or steel coils originating in Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela, O.J., 2 August 1983, NoL 210/5. 
947 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 512/84 of 27 February 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of vinyl 
acetate monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 February 1984, NoL 58/17. 
~ See : STEGEMANN, K., .S.ttlement of Anti-Dumping Cases by Price Undertaking : Ia the E.C. More Liberal than Canada ?•, ~~ficy Implicatioru of Antidumping Measures, THARAKAN1 P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (219), 219-233. 
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pentaerythritol from ctllllld.tP49, dating a year after vinyl acetate monomer from Canada, may give the impression 
that, if offered by the Canadian exporter, the undertaking might have been accepted. For the Council held that it 
could not be decided whether or not such an undertaking would have been accepted merely because the Cariadian 
exporter did not offer any undertaking. Instead, the Council imposed a variabie anti-dumping duty because the 
economie effect of that type of anti-dumping duty is the same as that of a price undertaking. 
In roller chains for cycles from the People's Republic of ChintP50, the Council imposed a variabie anti-dumping 
duty on certain imports from the People's Republic of China, in view of the undertakings already accepted in respect 
of the other imports of roller ebains for cycles from the People's Republic of China and from the Soviet Union, 
subject to the same anti-dumping proceeding. Thereby, the Council aimed at ensuring an equitable treatment of 
imports at different prices. 
In urea from Trinidad and Tobago951 and acrylic fibres from Mexico952, the acceptance of undertakings, in 
pursuance of Artiele 15 of the GATI Anti-dumping Code (which allows a more favourable treatment of developing 
countries subject to anti-dumping proceedings), was supported by the fact that Trinidad and Tobago as wellas Mexico 
were developing countries. On the other hand, in standardized multi-phase electric motors from Romania953 , the 
fact that the proposed price levels were unlikely to eliminate either the dumping margin or the injurious effect of the 
dumping outweighed the application of Artiele 15 of the GATI Anti-dumping Code and, as a result, prevented the 
acceptance of the undertaking offered by the Romanian ex porter. 
Finally, in ammonium nitratefrom Lithuania and Russia954, the Community was divided into two regional markets. 
Therefore, the European anti-dumping authorities had to choose between either an anti-dumping duty applicable to the 
Community as a whole, or an undertaking applicable to the imports into the Memher State constituting a regional 
market (see : Artiele 4.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 4(3) basic EC Regulation ; Articles 4(5) and 13(6) 
basic ECSC Decision). Though admitting that such a regional undertaking might cause some trade deflection towards 
other Memher States, the European anti-dumping authorities preferred the regional undertaking because a Community-
wide anti-dumping duty would be a disproportionate remedy that would grant proteetion not only to the regional 
industry, but to the rest of the Community industry, which had not requested such measures. They, moreover, 
pointed out that such a duty would have to be paid on a large volume of imports for which no injurious dumping had 
been alleged or established. 
949 Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 impasing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of pentaerythritol 
origfuating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, No L 20/46). 
95° Council Regulation (EEC) No 338/86 of 14 February 1986 imposi.lg a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of roller ebains for cycles 
originating in tbc Pcoplc'a Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., IS 
February 1986, No L 40/25. 
951 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 .impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of urea 
originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imparts of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demo~atic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these 
investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 31'1/1. 
952 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3121/89 of 16 October 1989 modifying the anti-dumping measures applicable to imparts of 
certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico by introducing an anti-dumping duty on such imparts, other than those from exporters 
to the Community whose undertakings are accepted, O.J., 19 October 1989, No L 301/1. 
953 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 724182 of 30 March 1982 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of imparts of said products originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, NoL 8519. 
954 Commisaion Deciaion 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the inveatigation with regard to these countries ; as well as 
terminating tbc anti-dumping procceding concerning imports of ammonium nitratc originating in Bclarus, Gcorgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbckistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129124. 
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3.1.2. Antitrust policy 
There is but one anti-dumping case in which the European anti-dumping authorities have grounded 
their choice between anti-dumping duties and undertakingy6n ~easons-of--an-t-it_B!~~!icy. 
In glycine from Japan955 , the Council refused to accept the undertakings offered by the two Japanese dumping 
exporters and instead imposed the same ad valorem anti-dumping duty on both exporters though their dumping 
margins were different, because : 
«(i)n a market where only a limited number of companies are competing with each other an alignment of 
prices resulting from undertakings of the kind offered by the Japanese companies, i.e. to respect the same 
minimum price, would reduce competition. This effect, it is considered would be less likely to occur as a 
result of the imposition of the same anti-dumping duty, because existing differences in prices charged in 
different transactions by the two companies ( due among other things to variations resulting from exchange 
rates, commissions and transport costs) could continue. Furthermore, information with regard to the future 
role of other Community producers, new entrants or substitute produels which could possibly have led to a 
different conclusion was oot available.». 
In view of European anti-dumping case law, it m~y __ safely be concluded that the European anti-
" -- ----- -·- -- ---- ---- ------· ----·- ) 
dumping(authorities prefer~n_aertakings to anti-dumping /äuties, unless the undertakings do not 
provide a waterproof ~~medy against inj~rious dumping. Exceptionally, they prefer anti-dumping 
duties to undertakings, when undertakings would reduce competition on the Community market or 
when the country of origin of the dumped products is pursuing a trade policy which does not 
benefit the Community exporters (trade deficit or non-acceptance of undertakings). Otherwise, 
they prefer undertakings, especially regional undertakings, as well as undertakings affered by 
exporters from developing countries insofar as those undertakings are liable to remedy either the 
dumping or the in jury. Empirica! research, though, does not confirm those conclusions entirely. 
First, that research shows that the European anti-dumping authorities pursue an active and 
consistent policy in choosing between anti-dumping duties and undertakings. Second, it shows 
that deficiencies of undertakings are a less prominènt reason for refusing undertakings than has 
been pointed out by European anti-dumping case law. Third, European anti-dumping authorities 
do not favour developing countries to the extent they claim : th~~ep.t only __ exc__eptionally 
undertakings o_ffered by e__!p.orters--ef-developing- countnes. The empirica! research only confirms 
~ ---~------------
the tmportance of the trade relations with the dumping country : short~term trade deficits 
/ signifiGantl-y-influep~ __ th_~ -~ef~sal of undertakings956• On the basis of this research, it may be 
- -----~~~~=~------·----. --~--
concJuded_that-Eurepean .. anti::dumping_law __ i~JI11\Y_use~t-.~~~~jnstrumenLot:.the~--C0mmunity~trade 
poucy/. 
i 
955 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine 
originating in Japan, O.J., 16 August 1985, NoL 218/1. 
956 THARAKAN, P.K.M., «The politica! economy of anti-dumping undertakings in the European Communitiea., European Economie Review,. 
1991, (1341), 1341-1359. 
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3.2. ECONOMIC THEORY 
From an economie point of view, there is an important difference between anti-dumping duties 
and undertakings. In figures 15 and 1~57, it was shown that the loss in consumer surplus caused 
by the imposition of an anti-dumping duty was partly compensated by the revenue gained by the 
Community authorities out of the levy of the anti-dumping duty. If, however, they had accepted a 
~g, they had not gained any such revenue ; the revenue generated by the price 
,_ / 
incrWê''--Cà.Ûseet by the undertaking would have entirely accrueet to the dumping exporters. 
Therefore, the loss in consumer surplus which, under the imposition of an anti-dumping duty is 
~mpensated by the revenue gaineet by the Community authorities, must be added to the net cost 
of anti-dumping protection, when a price undertaking is accepted. As a result, the net cost of 
anti-dumping proteetion is higher when price undertakings are accepteet and, from the point of 
view of Community welfare, anti-dumping duties should be preferred to undertakings. On the 
other hand, the dumping exporters will be better off with price undertakings than with anti-
dumping duties for they, rather than the Community authorities, will benefit from the price 
mcrease. 
In terms of Community welfare, the European anti-dumping authorities should be indifferent to 
price and quantity undertakings, since quantity undertakings also result in an increase of the 
dumping exporters' prices. Indeed, as to quantity undertakings, the dumping exporters, by 
restricting the quantity they are allowed to export to the Community, will increase their export 
prices. As a consequence, the net cost of anti-dumping proteetion of quantity undertakings is 
identical to that of price undertakings, but~ than that of anti-dumping duties. 
- - - ~~ -
-However, one ex ception must be made to. this ·general rule : from a point of view of welfare, the 
Cornmunity authorities should be indifferent to variabie anti-dutnping duties and undertakings. 
Indeed, their economie effect is identical. A variabie duty implies that the dumping exporter must 
pay the difference between a minimum price set by the anti-dumping authorities and the price he 
actually charges. Obviously, an exporter may avoid the payment of a variabie duty by increasing 
bis pric.e up to the level of the minimum price. In such case, the Community authorities will not 
gain any revenue out of the variabie duty and the net cost of such an anti-dumping duty will be 
identical to that of an undertaking. 
957 Supra, 349-361. 
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Besides their welfare effects, undertakings may also be a device for restricting competition on the 
Community market by collusion958• lndeed, for price undertakings to be workable, it bas to be 
made sure that the price increases agreed upon by the dumping exporters, are more or less in line, 
and that the Community industry will also increase or at least rnaintaio its current price levels 
rather than undercutting the prices agreed upon by the exporters959 • Similarly, quantity 
undertakings imply that markets are segmented between the exporters and the Community 
industry, thereby reducing competition between them960• The possible anti-compe!itive _ ~ff~ 
~--~-~-~--~-~~--------
of undertakings does oot im ~~~~g \~u!)'~e b~tt~::~ Indeed, variabie 
àlrti-dumping duti.es are in this respect alike for they incorporate the serious risk that a price 
alignment will take place at or around the minimum price fixed for the application of the variabie 
anti-dumping duty961• Moreover, as empirical research bas pointed out, ad valorem anti-
dumping duti.es make Community producers, dumping and non-dumping exporters align their 
_ prices. Thereby, they also reduce competition, though their price alignment effect is oot as 
pronounced as that of undertakings962• :::·n bas even been argued that anti-dumping duties may __ 
have more anti-competitive effects than ~ndertakings. Exporters wili- be less likely to leave the ) 
'---=-----~- . - -~·- . 
Communii}>,market WfihlmdertilaiJg-s;smce-unäertakings permit them to collect more revenue' 
958 Indeed, it has been shown that undertakings hav~he /effe~_ of stahilizing the prices charged by the Community producers on 
the Community market. On the other hand, undertakings make the export prices of the dumping exporters go up to the same 
extent as the prices of the Community producers. Furthermore, the non-dumping exporters were originally obliged to decrease 
their export prices to the Community, because of the competition of the dumping exporters. However, as from the moment that 
undertakings offered by the dumping exporters are accepted, the non-dumping exporters may increase their prices. As a 
consequence, Community producers, dumping and non-dumping exporters align their prices aftar undertakings have been accepted. 
Such a price alignment points strongly in the direction of a cartelization process. See: MESSERLIN, P., ccThe EC Antidumping 
Regulations : A First Economie Appraisal, 1980-1985», Weltwirtschaftliches Archw, 1989, (563), 578. See also : P.K.M. 
TilARAKAN and J. WAELBROECK (ccA.ntidumping and countervailing duty decision8 in the E.C. and in the U.S. An experiment · 
in comparative political economy», European Eèonomic Review, 1994, (171), 187), who hold there is cause for concern about the anZi/_ ·
competitive effects of anti-dumping law, because especially Community industries with high concentration and cohesion ~ 
successful in obtaining anti-dumping relief. -
959 STEGEMANN, K., «EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Are Price Undertakings a Legal Substitute for Diegal Price Fixing», 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archw, 1990, (268), 274 and 276-279 ; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J:F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade 
Proteetion Laws oft.\e EEC, Bicester, CCH Ed.itions, 1990, 171. 
960 See : KRISHNA, K., ccTrade Restrictions as Facilitating Practices,,, Journal of International Economics, 1989/26, (251), 251-
270. 
961 MESSERLIN, P., ccThe EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economie Appraisal, 1980-85", Weltwirtschaftliches Archw, 
1989, (563), 578 ; V ANDOREN, P., ccThe interface between anti-dumping and competition law and policy in the European 
Community., Legallssues of European lntegration, 1986/2, (1), 9. Therefore, not without reason variabie anti-dumping duties have 
been preferred toother types of anti-dumpingdutyin European anti-dumping case law because they had the same effect as the 
undertakings given by other dumping exporters (Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985,. No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 
January 1985, NoL 20/46); see also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 338/86 of 14- February 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on importsof roller ebains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional 
anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 15 February 1986, NoL 40/25). For more on variabie anti-dumping duties, see: 
infra, 659-670. 
962 MESSERLIN, P., .cThe EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economie Appraisal, 1980-1985", Weltwirtschaftliches Archw, 
1989, (563), 578. 
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their remaining exports963 • Empirical research seems to confmn this point of view. lndeed, it 
shows that Q!!~~tlakings , areJOO~Jes&.~likely=--t<L~be~pr~f~rr~CJQ.". AA-tkdum.ping-duties when t~ 
Community industry displays a high degree of concentration and, thus, bas the cohesion necessary 
to 'inount effective lobbying activities. This result rriay point to the fact that the Community 
industry, if it has the opportunity, will lobby in favour of the imposition of anti-dumping duties in 
order to prevent the dumping exporters from using their gains from undertakings to develop better 
-----~--~~~ ..... 
varietles of the product to gain a larger market share in the. Community or m third markets964• 
~-- ........... -----------·--------------------- --·"------'------ --· ----·---"---~ "- ---~- _, ~.~-~--~~--=---
Hence, · tnere-1s-empirical evidence that the Community industry will try to prevent as much as 
possible competition from the dumping exporters. Conversely, underta:lçings .. -seem---only.. to -~e 
accepted if the Community ind~~!!l--~~-~---~?! __ ~obby suffcien~Jo:r anti-dumping duties. Henc~,---"\1 
the Com~unityinaiistij ipparently regards undertàidngs and their inherent possibility of collusion I 
only ~ ä second-best remedy against foreign competition. 
3.3. LEGAL DEFINITION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS COMPARED 
GATT nor European anti-dumping law provide any order of preferenee between anti-dumping 
duties and undertakings. European anti-dumping law only stipulates that the anti-dumping duties 
imposed and the undertakings accepted must be in the Community interests. The European anti-
dumping authorities, however, only exceptionally have relied upon the notion of «Community 
interests». In their case law, they are consistently preferring undertakings insofar as those 
;:::::ti:u:;~~e:: 1::::: !~:::::::~!~g;~-~;m;:; ~u::s s~:: ::::~i: 1-
~~- .... =-------,-::.._-r --- "-•~ "-·-·- -. • - ' ,_ .. • • • ~~~--~-~·~-"-"·~-:>.":;-">~-~ - -- r" • - - .... ----~~ 
the 1ower net welfare -ooSfOTäflU-diimping duties when compared with undertakings. This sharp 
contrast is probably caused by the fact that J?~~rop~!tJmti:.IDLrnplng ____ ç_~~~-.~~~ never takes into 
COJ}!ideration the net cost ()f anti-dumRing proteetion when confronted w~th_ th~--~~~f?lce1Jêtwëën 
anti-dumping duties and undertakings. Nevertheless, European anti-dumping law and, in)_ 
particular' the notion~~o:f:comm~miY interests» allows to take account of the welfare effects in 
makinga choice between the different types of anti-dumping relief. 
Exceptionally, though, the European anti-dumping authorities have used this opportunity. Then, 
they generally prefer anti-dumping duties to undertakings, but this occasional preferenee for anti-
dumping duties is seldom grounded on the less negative effects of duties on Cotnmunity welfare. 
Indeed, the European anti-dumping authorities consider anti~dumping duties as a retaliation against 
963 STEGEMANN, K., «EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Are Price Undertakings a Legal SubtJ'dtutc for Diegal Price Fixing•, Weltwinschaftüches 
Archiv, 1990, (268), 294. 
964 THARAKAN, P.K.M., «The political economy of anti-dumping undeJ!akings in the European Communities-, Europeon Economie Review, 
1991, (1341), 1349-1350and 1355. 
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protectionist trade policies pursued by the dumping countries. Thus, in fact, the European anti-
dumping authorities ground their choice of the form of anti-dumping relief on what is harming the 
interests of the dumping country, whereas, in view of European anti-dumping law, they should 
ground their choice on what is in the Community interests. In other words, anti-dumping duti~es 
should be preferred to undertakings, because the net cost of anti-dumping duties is lower for th!! 
Community than the netcostof undertakings, and not because the net cost of anti-dumping duties 
is higher for the dumping country than the net cost of undertakings. 
The non-acceptance of undertakings for reasons of trade policy (in particular, trade deficit or non-
acceptance of undertakings) should also be criticized, because it implies that the more 
advantageous form of anti-dumping relief for exporters, i.e., undertakings, is r~fused for 
circumstances beyond their control965• Even worse, exporters may be punished for the 
protectionist trade policy which their home country pursues (e.g., the trade surplus of their home 
country may result from the proteetion of their dornestic market against foreign producers) and 
which they do not benefit from. Indeed, a protectionist trade policy pursued by their home 
country reduces their export opportunities. 
Only when the European anti-dumping authorities take account of the anti-competitive effects of 
undertakings, their case law seems economically to be correct. Indeed, undertakings may result in 
collusion between the Community industry and the dumping exporters, but so do anti-dumping 
duties. Therefore, when making a choice between anti-dumping duties and undertakings, the 
European anti-dumping authorities, from an economie point of view, should examine, for each 
type of anti-dumping relief, not only whether it will increase Community welfare (e.g., by J 
remedying market imperfections as suggested by strategie-teade theory), but equally. whether it 
will not distort competition and whether those effects on welfare and competition will, on balance, 
be beneficia! to the Community966• The European anti-dumping authorities, ho wever, do not 
completely nor systematically carry out such investigation. Indee4t_ there is but ~-=-dumping 
----------= case~hi~ th~y_:eaid att~on to .the anti-competitive-effec!S-QÎ::Un~d~-in~der-to-ex_plain 
th~t:efeii~nceforänti-dumping_~ but they did not consider · the welfare ~ffects--of- those 
undèrtud~gs.--Moroover, theyhave but onc~967 paid any -attention to lhe -ariti-competitive effects 
~dumping duties, though duties too may reduce competition between dumping exporters and- -
Community producers. In that isolated case, the European anti-dumping authorities decided to 
965 vmiMuurr, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d Practice in the United StaJes an.d the Europeon Communities, Amsterdam, North-
Holland, 1987, 222 and 321. 
966 KRISHNA, K., eeTrade Restrictions as Facilitating Practices», Journol of International Economics, 1989/26, (251), 268. 
967 See also : VERMULST, E., and W AER, P ., «The Calculation of lnjury Margins in EC Anti-Dumping Proceedings-, Joumal of World Trade, 
1991/6, (5), 30, who argue that there are two other cases in which the need to prevent price alignments influenced the detennination of the amount 
of the anti-dumping dutiea. However, the statement of reasoos to those. anti-dumping deeisi~n do not show that the European anti-dumping 
authorities actually paid any attention to the possible effects of price alignment. · 
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impose a uniform ad valorem duty on both dumping exporters. Since each exporter was charging 
different dumping prices, individual dutles calculated on the basis of the difference between the 
price the Community industry needs to be profitable and the actual dumping prices, would have 
resulted in a price alignment, which the European anti-dumping authorities considered not 
appropriate in view of the low number of competitors968• However, in all other cases, the 
European anti-dumping authorities have imposed individual dutles calculated on the basis of the 
amount the prices of each dutnping exporter must increase in order to guarantee the Community 
industry prices which cover its production costs plus a reasonable profit margin. They did not 
pay any attention to the fact that such dutles no~~~y ~~~u!t m pr.ice~alignmenJs. 
~--
f!!9 
4. CONCLUSION 
The sanctions provided under GA TT and European anti-dumping law against injurious dumping 
are anti-dumping dutles and undertakings. Anti-dumping dutles are specific customs duties, 
whereas undertakings are agreements between the dumping exporters and the anti-dumpfii~ 
authorities which increase the price of the dumped product or restriet the quantity of the dumped \ 
imports. GA TI and European anti-dumping law, thus, have opted for trade restrictive measures 
in order to sanction injurious dumping. They do not provide that either anti-dumping dutles be 
---------------------------------------imposed or undertakings be accepted, whenever there is dumping causing injury to the im~n:._ 
~~----=---~~----=-,-----------,.-----,...--:--o-"'·--.------···---------~~, •. o<--_-C...__-, ,, __ .-. _.--
competing industry of the importing country. Indeed, GA TT anti-dumping law considers it 
desirabie !h~t _injurious d~_mping does not ·automatically r~~~ltJn=:~JFd.liiii~ëiifQi§e~nt. 
~ .- •• '• -- • •••--·--'- "• 7'•-,:_·r- .. ~·~'"----L•.T."'-"•-.-<.-7-.•.~=·.=t.:'"'•'-7'~~··---~··-\-"'--"Tf......,_•,7~-,. - -
Euro~ ~ti-du~ping ~~~' ~n ~he ot~~r hand, allows anti-duQ1ping .~Qforcementjn~Qf~~-~s the 
Community interests call for ei~her the impo~ition çf ~~..:~11!!1.1!!'!~-~~-~~~- oE. t~_e ___ ~~~ep~~--érof , 
undertakings. As European anti-dumping law defines the concept of «Community interests» at t~ 
most in general terms, the ~J~~~~R-_anti:-d~mping_ authorities ... have. _ implemented _ it as 
encompassing the interests of the Community industry, . the interests of Jhe Community CQnst~mers 
of-the~-dumpedproduct. (including the processing industries using the dumped product) and the 
inteJ-Cst.L_<?f the Com~uuity _(lUt~C?-~_t_i_~~- !~-J~!:lrSl!!!lg __ pQliçie_s_on~yarious ar~s (antitrust, trade 
policy, national security). In view of the many anti-dumping duties imposed and the many 
undet1akings accepted, the European anti-dumping authorities have, thus, on ~nany occasions, 
considered anti-dumping relief to be in the Coromunity interests. 
968 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/85 of 12 August 1985 Îlnposing a definitive a~ti-dumping duty on importsof glycine originating in Japan, 
O.J., 15 Auguilt 1985, NoL 218/1 
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Economie trade. th~ shows_!l!t!tJb_ere-.may~.be_YariQJJS.instances"jn_whiGb-an~ duties 
increase the importing countcy's national welfare. An importing country, holding price-> 
...::-..... -~----- ,,,,•--·--- -'-~~""'---'~-~-~.~~·..;.-· ~~-__.__,_..:...........~· ~· ~--. ., . 
makersniP,~ may; by means of an anti-dumping duty, improve its terms of trade. It may also 
extract (part of) the pure profits gained by foreign monopolists or oligopolists and redistribute 
them to its dornestic import-competing producers. When an industry is characterized by positive 
external economies of scale, anti-dumping duties may also shelter the import-competing industries 
from foreign competition on their dornestic market and, thus, enable them to increase their 
. production output, in order to attain a higher degree of productivity. Moreover, anti-dumping 
duties seem to be appropriate to prevent the waste of transport costs inherent in reciprocal 
dumping cases and, thus, may improve the importing country's welfare, unless the pro-
competitive effects of free trade outweigh the prevention of unnecessary transport costs. 
Trade theory, thus, seems to provide the European anti-dumping authorities with many reasoos to 
fmd the Community interests calling for the imposition of anti-dumping duties. This, however, 
may give a false impression. The European anti-dumping authorities have not yet relied on any of 
the hypotheses advanced by trade theory as instances involving welfare-improving anti-dumping 
duties. Nevertheless, the circumstances under whicb. __ anti~dumping_.o_Q.!J!!~~ may improve an 
/ importing co~~try's nati'onal welfare are quite r~isti_c : the Community, being -~~~g;trndê; on-
( the, world markets, will frequëntly--hüfirpnce-makership, . competition will seldom be perfect and 
\ various industries will be characterized by positive external economies of scale. The problem 
YJ~J:' with trade theory, however, is the low practicability of its conclusions : for anti-dumping duties to 
be welfare-improving, several, quite specific conditions must be fulfilled and the anti-dumping 
authorities will/ seldom be able to assess whether those conditions are actually met. If one or 
more cond~ons is not met, anti-dumping duties will decrease the national welfare of the 
importing courttry. As the anti-dumping authorities; in many cases, will probably not be able to 
assess correctly whether -t@ necessary conditions for welfare-improving anti-dumping duties are 
present, ~seems wise to adopt as a gen~ral gui.d.elin.e.Jhat..ant!_:_QYIDPing_!l.!!.Y~"~~-Q~Q. not increase the 
nmi.on.al_~~~t['!!~ .. -~[~~~porting .~untry. Only if it can be demonstrated, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that all the conditions necessary for anti-dumpingoutles to improve the importing country's 
welfare, an anti-dumping duty should be legally allowed, a!~east insofar as the economie notion of 
~~~ers exactly the legal notion of «Community intere~- -·-·~·· -
\ . ' - -·--------·-----· ·-· ... .. ' --~--~~ . 
l:e same guideline should apply to undertakings. Indeed, trade theory shows that undeitakings use the national welfare of the importing country to decrease to a larger extent than an anti-mping duty. Thus, from an economie point of view, anti-dumping duties should be preferred to 
undertakings. GA'IT and European anti-dumping law, though, do not provide any order of 
preferenee between anti-dumping duties and undertakings. The European anti-dumping 
authorities, having broad discretionary powers in this area, seem to prefer undertakings to anti-
dumping duties, as they accept undertakings whenever they are offered and are sufficient to 
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remedy the injurious dumping. They have never explained why they_baY._e.._.acc.epted undertakings, 
rather than imposing anti-dumping duties whieh are equally liable to remedy the injuri.ous 
dumping. However, if they impose anti-dumping duties though undertakings have been offered, 
they explain the imposition of anti-dumping duties by the need to sanction the dumping country 
more severely than is usually _ the ~' because of:'its protectionist trade policy. Exceptionally, 
Jfîey have advanced the prevention of the dumping exporters and the Community producers 
entering into collusion, which the undertakings would render possible, as reason for imposing 
anti-dumping duties rather than accepting the undertakings offered. E,q.m~mpin.g-case 
law, thus, does exactly the opposite of what ~~~JP.~JYI~mm~~s. 
-==-.:----- -=~·~•~"""'~~~~~~~··q~~E=~~~~~~m~=~~··~-~~=·· .. · . . .. -, 
This contradietien perhaps results from the legal notion of «Community interests» being broader 
than the economie notion of «national welfare». lndeed, the economie notion only refers to the 
----c~-"-~·•-----•·•-•-~•:-~---•~~----•- ·---~•~'-•••··- -~ .• -·-• 
interests of producers and eonsumers, as well as to the revenues of the importing country's 
authorities generated ·by the anti-dumping measures, whereas the legal notion, as implemented by 
the European anti-dumping authorities, enco_!!lpasses .alt~tb~ "aspeçts"'pfJh~ ~q_nQJ!li~ __ p~!!~n,_ as 
we~ ~~ ~~-~~lll)>er ft""o~hef~~s~~.s, such as the pol~eie~J?~~s~~ ~Y _ t.~e Commun~t~ on v~~us 
areas. Those othe,r aspecj_s_..,m({y overrule the conclus1ons of trade theory as to the welfare effects 
---- ...."._____ / ---~-~;.L_~--------------=:__--------
of anti-dumping relief, and, P~!~~Q~-=~f9_!._Jh,êLLeason, the Europ_~~~!k·~!!_~ing _ authorities 
generally prefer undertakings to anti-dumping duties. The European anti-dumping authorities 
may~-,for ~exan1'J)i~,~-~~;th~i;-~ii;~~~ti~~~;llh~--regaxc(to the ehoice of the type of anti-dumping rellef 
in order to reward or sanction the exporting country's trade poliey : by imposing anti-dumping 
duties, rather than by accepting undertakings, the European anti-dumping authorities may exert 
pressure on the exporting country's govemment in order to break through that country's (too) 
protectionist trade policy. Similarlr!_..tb~e(fec.ts:4- hotlulllJ!ll!il!g_.lll!~-~ti~JiuJ!lpi.ng .relief on) 
competition should be carefully taKen into considertltion. However, when evaluating those other 
asPects ~ot ineluded in the econ~~i~ noti~n of «national welfare» ~ European anti-dumping 
authorities should oot ignore the conclusions of trade _ th.ËQ!Y.~ fTrade theory points · o~t that 
~----~~~---:~~-. <rw'~~-.~--~!Ji<~~-i~--. ·_ .. ,~,....,_..,...,~.'~-... ~~. •·--·-- _._.P,Y -..........___"''-......._ 
retaliation against--another countiy's protectionism will make all countries worse off and that fr:ee 
trade · may have pro-competitive effects. Tqe following...cllap.ter~~will,Jnu~rj:llia,, _ _e~amine~.LilJ!~ 
w~~~~~-th~e ·:EJ!rQ~_ anti,-dl!!!!P~,~g-c_3.1l~È<~!i!!,~~S.Jtlli~-Jmf{i~ntly~~ççg\!nt ~Q[ the con~~ons _of tr~~~ 
th~cy, in d~iding,_t_~-~~~~!!:..ill!mlling relief. -
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Under GA TI and European anti-dumping law, dumping must cause in jury to the Community 
industry for anti-dumping relief to be granted (Article Vl(l) and (6)(a) GATI ; Artiele 3 GATI 
Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4 basic EC legislation)969 . 
969 Under European anti-dumping law, the evidence of dumping and Ïl\jury is considered simultaneously in all stages of the 
investigation CArtiele 6(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(1Xc) basic ECSC Decision). 
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to term.inate anti-dumping proceedings on a finding of no injury without any investigation into 
dumping (C.J.E.C., case 121186, 28 November 1989, Anonymos Etaireia Epicheirï.eon Metalleftikon Viomichanikon kai Naftiliakon 
AE a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1989, (3919), 3936 and 3950-3951). Thus, anti-dumping proceedings have been term.inated on a finding 
of no injury without any attempt to establish whether dumping has occurred (Commission Decision 81/1012/EEC of 17 December 
1981 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain monochrome portable television sets originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 19 December 1981, No L 364/49 ; Commission Decision 82/808/EEC of 25 November 1982 term.inating the 
anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of aluminium foil for household and catering use originating in Austria, the Germ.an 
Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and Israel, O.J., 1 December 1982, No L 339/58 ; Commission Decision 83/493/EEC of 28 September 
1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof xanthan gum originating in the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 30 September 1983, No L 268/60; Commission Decision 83/626/EEC of 12 December 1983 term.inating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning im.ports of saccharin and its salts originating in China, the Republic of Korea and the United States of 
America, O.J., 15 December 1983, No L 352/49 ; Commission Decision 86/20/EEC of 31 January 1986 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of hamroers originating 
0 
in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 4 February 1986, No 
L 29/36 ; Council Decision 86/59/EEC of 6 March 1986 term.inating the anti-dumping pri>ceeding concerning im.ports of dead-burned 0 
(sintered) natural magnesite originating in the People's Republic of China ando North Korea, O.J., 13 March 1986, No L 70/41; 
Commission Decision 88/651/EEC of 23 December 1988 term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
cellular mobile radio telephones originating in Canada, HongKong and Japan, O.J., 30 December 1988, NoL 362/59; Commission 
Decision 89/511/EEC of 22 August 1989 term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hydraulic excavators 
originating in Japan, O.J., 25 August 1989, No L 249n1 ; Commission Decision 89/560/EEC of 17 October 1989 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyester film originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 21 October 1989, No 
L 305/31 ; Commission Decision 90/155/EEC of 26 March 1990 term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning im.ports of 
tungsten metal powder originating in the People's Republic of China or the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83/124 ; 
Commission Deciaion 90/240/EEC of 22 may 1990 term.inating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping 
measures regarding import& of fibre building-board (hardboard) originating in Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and 
repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 86/232/EEC accepting the undertakings given by the exporters concerned, O.J., 31 May 1990, 
No L 138/44; Commission Decision 90/383/EEC of 13 July 1990 term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning im.ports of 
NPK fertilizers originating in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 July 1990, NoL 188/63; Commission Decision 
90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 term.inating an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain single phase, two-speed electric 
motors originating in Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 31 July 1990, NoL 202/47; Commission Decision 91/303/EEC 
of 12 June 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of thin polyester film originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 15 June 1991, No L 151/89; Commission Decision 931325/EEC of 18 May 1993 term.inating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports ofpaint, distemper, varnishand simHar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
25 May 1993, NoL 127/15; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amendedanti-dumping measures on 
imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 
December 1993, NoL 302/1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No 
L 330/15; BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 147; VERMULST, EA., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United States and the European 
Communitie•. A Comparative Analysia, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 627; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A 
Decade of European Comm.unity Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to lmports from China», Journal of World Trade, 
199213, (5), 28). 
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The in jury determination camprises three elements which are being examined in this chapter. 
First, in section 2, the concept «Community industry» is set forth, i.e., the range of producers 
established in the Community who suffer in jury. Second, that injury bas a three-fold content 
which is being pointed out in section 3 : actual material injury, threat of material in jury and 
material retardation of the establishment of the Community industry. Third, the required causa! 
relationship between dumping and injury which is being scrutinized section 4. 
This present chapter is not confined toa mere legal analysis of the way the injury determination is 
regulated and its application. First, it also inquires whether either the reglementation or its 
implementation are conceived to reach findingsof injury in cases where the Community industry 
is not injured by the dumping (i.e., the inquiry into «one-way flexibility»). Second, it is examined 
whether the dumping exporters can predict whether or· not their dumped exports cause in jury (i.e., 
the inquiry into legal certainty). Third, the injury determination is economically analysed in order 
to ascertain whether its reglementation and implementation are conceived so as to make the right 
in jury determination in the most efficient, effective and transparent way. 
2. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY 
The dumping should cause in jury to a Community industry. A Community industry is defined by 
two criteria : the product concemed (section 2.1.) and the firms manufacturing that product 
(section 2.2.). 
2.1. PRODUCT COVERAGE 
2.1.1. The standard case : the like product 
2 .1.1.1. The concept «like product» 
2.1.1.1.1. Legal approach 
Artiele VI GATI does not define the concept «like product». Originally it meant the same 
product970• In its 1959 report, the GATT Group of Experts suggested a less stringent 
definition. They «agreed that this term should be interpreted as a product which is identical in 
970 Analyticallndex of GA 'IT. 
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physical characteristics subject, however, to such variations in the presentation which are · due to 
the need to adapt the product to special conditions in the market of the importing country (i.e., to 
accommodate different tastes or to meet specific legal or statutory requirements)»971 • In 
conneetion with this definition, the GA TI Group of Experts «p<>inted out that the meaning of "like 
product" as agreed by them should not be interpreted either too broadly so as to coverproductsof 
a different kind with higher prices on the intemal market, nor too stringently so as to elude the 
application of paragraph 1 (a) of Artiele VI»972• 
A further step to broaden the concept was taken in the GA TI Anti-dumping Code according to 
which «the term "like product" ("produit similaire") shall be interpreted to mean a product which 
is identical, i.e. , alike in all respects to the product under consideration or, in the absence of such 
a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely 
resembling those of the product under consideration» (Article 2.6.). The explicit reference to the 
vaguer French concept «produit similaire» implies that the broader interpretation implied by the 
French version of Artiele VI GA TI is adopted973 • 
Though no reference is being made to the French concept «produit similaire», a similar definition 
can be found in European anti-dumping law which defines the concept «like product» as <<a product 
which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects, to the product under consideration, or, in the absence 
of such a product, another product which bas the characteristics closely resembling those of the 
product under consideration» (Article 1(4) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(12) basic ECSC 
Decision). 
Contrary to the 1959 report of the GATT Group of Experts, the GATT Anti-dumping Code nor in 
European anti-dumping law do not specify that the characteristics which are decisive for the like 
product determination, must be of physical nature. In European anti-dumping case law, therefore, 
other elements may be974 and indeed are taken into account. In serlal impact dot matrix 
printers from Japan, a complete synthesis is given of all the elements which are taken into 
account: 
«In order to delermine the like product in these proceedings, ( ... ) the Commission had first to exam.ine the 
physical and technical characteristics of the printers. Secondly, when assessing the closeness to and 
971 B.I.S.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GA1T, 1960, 149, consideration 12. 
972 B.I.S.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GA1T, 1960, 149, consideration 13. 
973 BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy Law. TM European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 87. 
974 Contra.: VERMULST, E.A., ccDurnping in the United States and the Europaan Community: A Comparative Analysisn, Lega.l 
Issues of European lntegration, 198412, (103), 112. 
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resemblance of the different products, it had also to take into account. their application and use. Thirdly, 
the Commission took the view that in these proceedings the like product determination cannot he separated 
from the particuiarities of the printer market in question and the consumers' perceptions of these products. 
Finally, with regard to the different types of printer models, the Commission thought it should also consider 
other factors in order to find whether a clear dividing line exists»975• 
Thus, four different elements will be taken into account : (i) physical and technica! 
characteristics ; (ü) application and use of· the product ; (ili) particularities of the product market 
and consumer's perceptions ; and (iv) other factors. Nevertheless, the the physical and technica! 
characteristics prevail. Por in serlal impact dot matrix printers from Japan : 
«the Commission took the view that differences in physical and technical characteristics should not he 
interpreted in such a narrow way as to render products not like each other unless these differences have the 
effect that the application, use or customer's perception of the products in question are fundamentally 
different» 976• 
It is but logica! that priority is given to the physical and technica! characteristics : if products 
physically and technically are completely identical, the other elements will also coincide, but 
differences in physical and technica! characteristics do not always render the products different 
from each other. Therefore, the three other elements (application and use of the product, 
particularities of the product market and consumer's perceptions, and other factors) help to 
975 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serlal-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12. 
Seealso: 
C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 6 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Company Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 
(5856), 6904 and 6923, where, hesidee the physical charactistics (weight), the use and application were accepted as an element 
determining the like product category ; 
C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon lnc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1296-1297, where, notwithstanding 
differences in_physical characteristics (speed and copy volume), the products were considered to be alike because they have 
identical functions, satisfy the same needs and, in view of the consumers' perception, compete with each other (in the same 
sense: C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1336), 1397; C.J.E.C., case C-
175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric IndUBtrial Co. Ltd and MatsU8hita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1409), 1480; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo lndustry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, 
(1493), 1523-1624 ; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1636), 1666-
1666; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1677-1678). 
976 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serlal-
impact dot-matrix printers orlginating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12. See also: C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, 
Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2185; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in 
Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
import& of these yams orlginating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276n ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1966/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India 
and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197125. 
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determine whether the differences in physical and teehoical characteristics are essential for 
rendering the products not alike977• 
977 There are, nevertheleBS, anti-dumping cases in which product& having different physical and technical characteristics are 
considered to be llke product&, though it wasnotmade clear why, e.g., on the basis of one of the other three elements used in the 
llke product determination, those differences in physical and technical characteristics were not considered to prevent the products 
from being considered to be alike : 
in sensitized paper for colour photographs from Japan., rolls of different width were considered to be like products (Commission 
Decision 841259/EEC of 10 May 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain sensitized paper for colour photographs originating in Japan and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 11 May 1984, No L 124/45) ; 
in 4,4'-lsopropylûknediphenol from the United Statea of America and caustic-burned notural magnesite from the · People's 
Republic of China, differences in technical characteristics and commercial specifications did not prevent the products from 
being considered to be alike because they had «at least 'characteristics closely resembling' one another.• (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natural 
magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371121; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natural 
magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., 30 December 1982, 
No L 371125 ; CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 163/83 of 21 January 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, No L 23/9; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol originating in 
the United States of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, No L 199/4 ; Commission Decision 84/129/EEC of 6 March 1984 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof caustic-burned natural magnesite originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 8 March 1984, No L 66/32) ; 
in ball bearings from Japan. and Singapore, miniature and instrument hearings and standard hearings were considered to be 
like product& merely because ccthey have the samebasic physical characteristic&» (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685190 of 17 
September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, NoL 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No 
L 7/38)); 
in electronic typewriter• from Japan the inclusion of a calculating mechanism into electronic typewriters. did not alter the 
. essential character of the machines (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698185 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 163/1); 
in small-1creen colour television receivers from HongKong and the People'• Republic of China, physical differences, such as the 
incorporation within the housing of the telavision receiver of a radio broadcast receiver or a clock, did not materially affect 
the defmition of the like product category (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong Kong and the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/31) ; 
in electronic weighin.g scales from Japan. and from Singapore and the Republic of Korea, the potential use of the product could 
vary because of differences in physical characteristics. Nevertheless, the products were found to belong to the same like 
product category because there was no significant differènce in basic physical characteristics (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
993193.of 26 April1993 imposing a definitive anti.:c:lumping duty on importsof certain electronic weighing scales originating 
in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, No L 104/4 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, NoL 112/20); 
in serial impact dot matrix printers from Japan., the mere fact that printers are exclusively designed and manufactured fora 
computer system, without constituting an integral part of and being imported together with such a computer, was not 
sufficient to render these printers unlike products (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No 
L 130/12 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33). 
Moreover, without reference being made to the application, use or other factors, the ex.istence of certain differences in physical and 
technical characteristics was sufficient for the products to he found not alike : 
in the same anti-dumping case concerning serial impact dot matrix printers from Japan. as mentioned above, printers which 
constitute an integral part of, and are exclusively dedicated to, a computer system supplied by the manufacturer and/or the 
exporter of the printer in question, and which are imported and sold ;within such a computer system, were not considered as 
being like product& (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33); 
similarly, in uûko caautte recordere from Japan. and the Republic of Korea, the Council considered the combination of a video 
C888ette recorder and a telavision monitor in one housing not to be alike to a video cassette recorder. According to the 
Council the video cassette recorder does not necessarily determ.ine the character of the whole product for such combinations 
contain specific elements which impart an additional quality to them (Council Regulation (EEC) No 501/89 of 27 February 
1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain video C888ette recorders originating in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, No L 57/55). The Commission, 
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however, did notshare the opinion of the Council. For the Commission the combination of a video cassette recorder and a 
telavision monitor in one housing does not alter the identity of the video cassette recorder incorporated therein ; according to 
the Commiuion, auch combinations contain a complete video cassette recorder which generally has to he regarded as its 
major part (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5. 
The Commission bas expreseed a similar opinion in respect of small screen colour telavision receivers which incorporate 
further element& within the housing of the telavision receiver, such as a radio broadcast receiver or a clock (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 impasing a provisîonal anti-dumping duty on imparts of small screen colour 
telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411)) ; 
in linear tungsten. halogen lamps from Japan., so-called JD lamps were considered not to he a like product because they lacked 
the linear form of LTH lamps, their single cap was not of the type R7s and their wattage was in most cases below 100 watts 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 1411); 
in gCJB-fuelled, n.on.-refillable pocket flint lighters from Japan, the People'• Republic of China, the Republic of Korea an.d 
Thailand, piezo lighters were not considered to he like products because their technica! characteristics are quite different 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133120) ; 
in glCIBs from Czechoslovakia, ·the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, Poland, Roman.ia, the USSR an.d Yugoslavia, 
ccHorticast. glass was not considered to he a like product because it is float glass with a rippled effect obtained by passing the 
glass trough special rollers and, as a result, it is no longer completely transparant, unlike the horticultural glass produced by 
the other producers (Commission Decision 841406/EEC of 10 August 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of horticultural glass and certain drawn glass originating in Czechoslovakia, 
the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 
August 1984, NoL 224126); 
in mechan.ical wrist-watches from the USSR, quartz watches were not considered to he like products because they use a 
completely different movement technology in comparison to mechanica! watches (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2686/90 of 17 
September 1990 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-
watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/10) ; 
in radW-broadcCIBt receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles from South Korea, car radios which are also capable of receiving 
radio-telephony or radio-telegraphy, were excluded since they possess different basic features (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of radio-braadcast receivers of a kind 
used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 3418); 
in outer ring• of tapered roller bearings from Japan., complete tapered roller hearings were considered to he a different product 
to outer rings of tapered roller hearings since they have a considerable value added and comprise saveral more parts than 
outer rings of tapered roller hearings (Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imparts of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 9n) ; 
in n.ickel from the Souiet Union, ferro-nickel, a nickel compound, did not constitute a like product in respect of nickel having. a 
purity of 99% plus (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imparts of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into 
squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, NoL 286129); 
in refined an.timony trioxide from the People's Republic of China, RAT in masterbatch form, i.e., RAT powder mixed with 
product& such as plastic, was considered not to he a like product because, after the compounding process, the RAT takes on 
the essential characteristics of the compound (Commission Decision 94/389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding regarding imparts of refined antimony trioxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, 
NoL 176/41) 
in photo albums from the People's Republic of China, the non-hook hound albums were said to have characteristics sufficiently 
different which distinguishes them from hook hound albums (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16). 
As those anti-dumping cases do not explain why identical or similar differences in physical characteristics are not always essential, 
Europaan anti-dumping case law looks very casuistic. In order to show this, it is sufficient to make a comparison between : 
n.iclcel from the Boviet Un.ion and caustic-burned n.atural magnesite from the People's Republic of China : 
in n.iclr.el from the Soviet Union., a nickel compound was not considered to he a like product because it did not have the 
same degree of purity as nickel (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either 
uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, NoL 286/29); 
in caustic-burned n.atural magnesite from the People's Republic of China, the different chemica! composition due to the 
presence of impurities did notlead to the conclusion that the product& were not like products. On the contrary, the 
product& were considered to he alike because they had «at least 'characteristics closely resembling' one another» 
((Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts 
of natural magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 December 1982, No 
L 371121 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of natural magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, 
O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371125; Commission Decision 84/129/EEC of 6 March 1984 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of caustic-burned natura! magnesite originating in the People's Republic of 
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The application and use of the product may be seen as the objective criterion : it indicates the 
purposes for which the product can be used978• The particularities of the product market and 
the consumer' s perception introduce the subjective criterion into the like product determination : 
this refers to the question how the product is viewed by the consumers and for which purposes 
they are willing and able to use it. U sually, the objective and subjective criterion coincide979• 
Nevertheless, products may objectively be used for identical purposes, but the consumers may 
have a different perception of them. In such cases, the products will not be considered to be 
alike, unless the costs the consumers have to bear for substituting the products is not too 
high980• Consumer's perception, thus, is decisive. Therefore, different product types which 
China, O.J., 8 March 1984, No L 66/32) ; 
photo album• from South Korea. a.nd Hong Kong and photo albums from tM People'• Republic of China. : 
in photo album• from South Korea. cmd Hong Kong, hook bound and non-hook bound photo albums were found to form 
one and the same like product category hecause they were said to have the same basic physical characteristics and have 
all but one single use (CommiBBion Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48); 
in photo album• from the People's Republic of China., hook bound and non-hook bound photo albums were said to he 
different product& (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 impasing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imparts of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/16). 
978 A broad interpretation is placed on the application and use of the product. Thus, a part or component having physical and 
technica! characteristics distinguishing the product from other products, is considered to be a like product, if it is dedicated to the 
single use of part or component of that product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access 
memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the · anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No 
L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 .ranuary 1990, NoL 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44); Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing ·a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits 
known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 25 
July 1990, No L 19311 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts 
of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, .. 
O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 65/1). 
979 See e.g., video caBBette recorders from Japan. cmd the Republic of Korea., where video cassette players were not considered to be 
a like product: because the absence of a tunerand the recording facility limits the poBBible uses of a video cassette player, they are 
not likely to be a substitute for the normal private buyer of a video cassette recorder (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 
26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imparts of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5). 
980 See: 
DRAMS from Japan and EPROMs from Japan., where different densities of DRAMa and EPROMs were considered to be like 
product& because end-use products were redesigned or conceived to aceomadate higher density DRAMa and EPROMs; 
nevertheleBB, it was recognized that different densities of DRAMa and EPROMs are not necessarily interchangeable from a 
practical point of view (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 impasing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating 
in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22!79 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 
of 4 .March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as 
EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1) ; 
4,4'-iaopropylidenediphenol from the Uniled StaJes of America., where a certain commercial specification was considered to be 
a like product because it could be used for a substantial range of applications without pasing difficulties for the end-users, 
though implying a using coat which varies according to the application and the impurities (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, No L 199/4) ; 
calcium meta.l from the People'• Republic of China. cmd Russia., where the two types of the product, having a different degree 
of purity, were considered to he like products; nevertheless, as the Community producer admitted, the proceBBing industry 
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had encountered serious difficulties in carrying out the processing of the Comm.unity producer's like product ; the European 
anti-dumping authorities, however, did not agree that there were such difficultiea (Commission Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 
21 April1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of 
China and Rusaia, O.J., 23 April1994, NoL 10415), or considered those difficultiea to he marginal since but one processing 
producer encountered them (Council Regulation (EC) No 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imparts of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Rusaia, O.J., 21 October 1994, NoL 270/27. 
See also: C.J.E.C., case C-358/89, 11 June 1992, Extramet Industrie SA v CouncU, E.C.R., 1992, I, (3813), 3831 (opinion of 
Advocate General JACOBS)) ; 
silicon carbide from in the People's RepubliC of China, Polan.d, the Russian. Federation an.d Ukraine, where differences in the 
use of the various qualities of silicon carbide occurred, but where both the main grades and their different qualities were 
considered aa being one product because one of those grades could technically be replaced by the other (Council Regulation 
(EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of silicon carbide, originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/21) ; 
audio tapes in ca.settes from Japan, the Republic of Korea an.d HongKong, where differences in quality, tape length, coating 
or design were considered to he outweighed by the similarity of characteristics and functions which gavethema high dagree 
of interchangeability from the consumer's point of view (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of audio tapes in caasettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and HongKong, O.J., 13 November 1990, NoL 313/5 (corrigendum; O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36)); 
caustic-burned natural magnesite from the People's Republic of China and photo albums from South Korea and Hong Kong, 
where the interchangeability was decisive, notwithstanding the preferenee of some users for certain product specifications 
(Commission Decision 84/129/EEC of 6 March 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of caustic-
burned natura! magnesite originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 March 1984, No L 66/32. See also: 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
natura! magnesite, caustic"burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371121; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of 
natura! magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., 30 
December 1982, No L 371125 ; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/48) ; 
roller chains for cycles from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, where qualitatively different product& were 
oonsidered to he alike because the quality difference was not significant for the purpose for which the product is normally 
sold (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
roller ebains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, No L 217n) ; 
tungsten carbide an.d fused tungsten carbide from the People's Republic of China, where the Chinese and Community product 
were, despita some quality differences, considered to be like products because they were generally interchangeable and, 
therefore, competed in a large part of the market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2737/90 of 24 September 1990 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic 
of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, NoL 264n (corrigendum, O.J., 24 October 
1990, No L292/30)) ; 
artificial corundum from . the Soviet Union, Hunga.ry, Polan.d, Czechoslovakia, the People's Republic of China, Brazil an.d 
Yugoslavia, where cc(m)ere quality differences between products which have the same basic physical characteristics and use 
(were not oonsidered) such as to render these products unlike .. (Commission Decision 91/512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures ooncerning imparts of artificial corundum 
originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion with 
'the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of artificial corundum originating in BraziJ and Yugoslavia, and terminating 
the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 275/27) ; 
compact disc plo.yers from Japan and South Korea, where the differences in features, appearance and quality of musical 
reproduetion were found to he outweighed by the common basic physical characteristics and functions which give to all 
. models of stand-alone CDPs a high dagree of interchangeability from the consumer's point of view (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players 
originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27)). 
Conversely, in small-screen colour television receivers from the Republic of Korea, 6-inch models and 14- and 16-inch models were 
considered not to he like products because, as there were no price differences between them, the consumer's decision to buy the 
smaller set is clearly conditioned by the radically different usage for which it is intended (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 
25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in the 
Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 
1990, NoL 133192). See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 
January 1991, No L 14/31). 
However, in deep freezers from the German Democratie Republic, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the cost of substitution was not 
taken into account. lndeed, upright freezers and chest freezers were not considered to be like product& merely because of the fact 
that the choice of the consumer was influenced by visible physical characteristics. Probably the costs of subsititution between 
upright freezers and chest freezers are not high (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in 
conneetion with the investigation of importa of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic 
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are produced for different applications will still be found to be alike if the consumers use the same 
product type for all those different applications981 • Of course, if different products do oot find 
Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 
September 1986, No L 259/14). 
981 In small screen colour television receivers from the Republic of Korea and from HongKong and the People's Republic of China, 
a distinction was made between small-eereen colour telavision receivers and other colour telavision receivers, hecause the fll'st ones 
were generally WJed a •second set» and, therefore, did not have to satisfy highly sophisticated technica! requirements (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3232189 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour 
telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, NoL 314/1; ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour telavision receivers 
originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14131). In colour television receivers 
from Malaysio, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore an.d Thailan.d, however, the like product category 
included the whole range of colour telavision receivers because of a development in consumer hehaviour, namely the fact that in an 
increasing number of householde small screen colour televisions had beoome their tefirst settt and had beoome more sophisticated 
with regard to their featuring ; moreover, consumers' perception was found to he not clearly defined as sametimes low. priced, 
larger screen sizes appeared to he preferred to relatively higher priced, small screen sets (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 
of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, 
the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50). 
In seried-impact dot-matrix printers from Japan and serial impact fully formed character printers from Japan, it was found that 
there are two main applications, either personal or business. However, the then prevailing trend among end-users to use printers 
destined for business use for their private application was a positive element in the like product determination (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serlal impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, 
NoL 17711). 
In the JapanetJe electronic typewriter case, the Court of Justice had no prohlem in finding •compact» and ccprofessional» electronic 
typewriters to he like product& merely •in view of the trend towards the construction of electronic typewriters broadly capahle of 
catering the same neec:Is. (C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tolcyo Electric Company Ltd (TEC) a.o. v 
Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5923). 
In bicycles from the People'• Republic of China, the Europaan anti-dumping authorities pointed out that the different categorie& of 
bicycles were, in principle, intended to meet different end-user requirements, hut that end-users regularly put a bicycle in a 
particwar category to a variety of uses and applications (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and 
collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/1). 
In cleadburned (sintered) magnesia from the People's Republic of China and magne•ium oxide from the People's Republic of China, 
all product types were considered to he alike since consumers used the product of different grades and from different sourees of 
supply for identical purposes (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Repuhlic of China, O.J., 26 September .1992, No 
L 282115 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/23). 
See, however : thermal paper from Japan, where the like product category was restricted to thermal paper destined to he used in 
telefax machines. Nevertheless, the investigation had shown that other thermal paper is also capable of being used in such 
machines since the basic physical characteristics of this paper are identical to thermal paper destined for telefax machines 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2805/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, No L 270/15). · 
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identical applications, they will not be considered to be alike, whatever the consumer's perception 
may be982• 
The «Other factors» criterion is usually put forward to enforce the criteria concerning physical and 
teehoical characteristics, application and use, and consumer's perception983 . Such other factors 
are· 
the fact that the products co me under the same tariff subheading984• Ho wever, customs 
classifications cannot overrule the other three criteria985• Therefore, like products may 
982 For that reason, attention was only paid to the application and use of the product in gla.ss from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Roman.ia, 
Bulgaria, Hungary an.d Czech.oslovakia. In that case, drawn glass and float glass were not considered to be like products because, 
contrary to float glass, drawn glass cannot be used for most modern industrial outlets, such as double glazing, mirrors, motor 
vehicle glass, technica! glass etc. (Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No 
L 51/73). 
Similarly, in serial impact dot matrix printers from Japan. and in serial impact fully formed character printers from Japan., special 
purpose printers designed for a single application such as printing automated teller machine receipts, bank books, cash-registers 
receipts, were not covered by the anti-dumping proceeding (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No 
L 130/12.; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial 
impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, NoL 177/1). 
Conversely, if the impossibility of using different product types for the same application cannot be shown, these products types will 
be considered to be like products. See :glycine from Japan., where all glycine (pyrogene-free and other) was considered to be a like 
product . because it was not shown that it had to be pyrogene-free only for pharmaceutical uses, and not for other applications 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) ·No 997/85 of 18 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine 
originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April 1985, No L 107/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 15 August 1985, No L 218/1). 
983 The «other factol'S» criterion bas nol yet overruled the other criteria (sec e.g. : C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lid v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1397). 
984 Commission Decision 84/129/EEC of 6 March 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of caustic-
burned natural magnesite originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 March 1984, No L 66/32; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3308190 of 16 November 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyolefin sacks originating 
in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 17 November 
1990, NoL 31812. 
Conversely, product& falling within different tariff subheadings can be considered to be unlike each other (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1812191 of 24 June 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of espadrilles originating in the People's 
Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 June 1991, No L 166/1; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television 
receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 
1994, NoL 266/60). 
985 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9 ; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44). 
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come under different tariff subheadings986 and, conversely, different products may come 
under the same tariff subheading987 ; 
the absence of a clear dividing line between the different product types making each · 
classification complex, arbitrary, open to circumvention and probably unworkable988 · 
986 In electron.ic typewriter• from Japan., the product coverage was extended to another tari1f subheading because it was not clear 
whether a certain type of the product, which was considered to he a like product, come under the subheading mentioned in the 
notice of initiation of the anti-dumping proceeding and the provisional assessment (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 
June 1985 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, 
No L 16311). See also : C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 6 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Company Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Coun.cil, 
E.C.R., 1988, (6856), 6904 (Opinion of Advocate-General Sir G. SLYNN). 
987 In titanium mUl products from Japan and the Uniled Statea of America, the Japanese and American products feil within the 
sam.e subheading. Nevertheless, they were not considered like products because the Japanese product was destined for chemical 
applications, whereas the American product was destined for use in the aerspace induBtry (Commission Decision 85/262/EEC of 23 
April 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain titanium mill products originating in Japan and 
the United Statea of America, O.J., 26 April1985, NoL 113/30). 
988 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2102-2103 (Report for 
the Hearing: conclusions of the Council), 2185 and 2191; C.J.E.C., case C-171/87, 10 March 1992, Canon. In.c.. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1237), 1296; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1397; C.J.E.C., case 
C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric IndUBtrial Co. Ltd an.d Matsushita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, 
I, (1409), 1479-1480; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Kon.ishiroku Photo IndUBtry Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 
1623-1624; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1565-1566; C.J.E.C., 
case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1677; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 
19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 
1985, No L 163/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti,.dumping duty on 
imports of plBin paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 17711; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact 
dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 
January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs 
(dynam.ic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 
January 1990, No L 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22!19 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44) ; 
Council Regwation (EEC) No 677/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of. certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 
1991, No L 65/1 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imparts of radio-braadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No 
L 34/8 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of synthetic 
fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, No L 197/25 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2799192 of 26 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of deadburned (sintered) magnesia 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282116; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 
25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282123; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017192 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-
dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imparts of synthetic polyester fibres originating in 
Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
terminating the said review in respect of imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statea of 
America, O.J., 22 October 1992, NoL 30611 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, NoL 30/68); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
550/93 of 6 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 68/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 April1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imparts of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, No L 104/4; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1189193 of 14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on importsof certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron 
or non-alloy steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and definitively collecting provisional anti-dumping 
duties, O.J., 16 May 1993, No L 120/34 ; Commission Decision 93/325/EEC of 18 May 1993 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
26 May 1993, NoL 127/16; Commission Decision 93/376/EEC of 16 June 1993 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures 
adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/85 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, No L 167n6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and 
collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
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the price equivalence between different product types989 , though the existence of price 
differences is not sufficient to prove that the products are not alike990 ; 
the fact that the products, which introduce qualitative technical changes, are still at a 
development stage and are not available to the public, may result in those products being 
excluded from the like product category991 • 
2.1.1.1.2. Economie approach 
2.1.1.1.2.1. Demand and supply substitutability 
In European anti-dumping case law, the like product determination relies u pon demand 
substitutability, i.e., whether consumers consider products to be fairly (i.e., without too high 
2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in 
Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50. 
Conversely, when a clear distinction may be made, the distinct products will not be considered to be alike (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of outer rings of tapered roller hearings 
originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 9n). 
989 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/8~ of 5 August 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof standardized 
multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 7 
August 1987, NoL 21812; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and 
terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1. 
990 In plain paper photocopiers from Japcui., the Commission rejected on the basis of the rapid technological evolution, a dividing 
line based on the purebase price, besides technica! features of the product, such as copy speed and copy volume (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5). 
In deep freezers from the Boviet Union the existence of different categorie& of buyers with different purchasing power and, thus, able 
and willing to pay different prices, was not considered to prove the existence of two markets, a luxury market and a market for 
ordinary product& (Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain deep freezers originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 8 Januaryl987, NoL 6/1). 
In brushes from the People's Republic of China, it was held that a new market (and thus a different product) is not created by 
simply selling an established product at less than half the price at which it is normally sold in the market (Council Decision 
87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of paint, distemper, varnish and simHar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, No L 46/45). 
In ferro-chrome from Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, the Commision established that the different grades the product were 
sufficiently alike to constitute one single product in view of their interchangeability irrespective of the price differences. 
NevertheleBB, the CommiBBion admitted that the price difference was not caused by a difference in the cost of production, but 
represents a premium for the producer's know-how and reflects the cost savings for the consumer of the product, since the use of 
ferro-chrome with a higher carbon content requires further treatment of the product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 
March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % 
aowcarbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April1993, NoL 80/8; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-chrome with a carbon content by 
weight of maximum 0,5% Oow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, RUBSia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, No 
L 246/1). 
991 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour tclevision 
receivers originating in Malayaia, the Pcople's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No 
L 255/50. 
387 
transaction costs of switching from one product to another) interchangeable. · Indeed, if there is no 
identity of physical and teehoical characteristics, the consumer's perception is decisive. In this 
388 
respect, the interchangeability992 and the competition between products993 are positive 
992 In several anti-dumping cases the fact that the products were (al.m.ost) interchangeable, was a decisive element in the like 
product determination (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into 
squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, NoL 286/29; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/87 of 5 August 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty mi imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more 
than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 7 August 1987, NoL 218/2; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia 
and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, 
No L 31711 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 58112; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797193 
of SO March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 
0,5% Oow carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 April1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain magnetic disks (3,5" 
microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof fluorspar originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China 
and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2477193 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain photo albums originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 
imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on importsof ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 22 September 1993, No L 237/2; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717193 of 28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of maximum 0,5 % Oow carbon ferro-chrome), originating 
in Kazakhstan, Ruesia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/1; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 
1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 
1993, No L 246/12 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports 
of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 
1993, No L 302/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386193 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, No L 306/16; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 229194 of 1 February 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports into the Community of 
ethanolamine originating in the United States of America, and collecting defmitively the provisional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 2 
February 1994, No L 28/40; Commission Decision 94182/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of gum rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41/50; Council 
Regulation (EC) No -'86/94 of 4 March 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of fluorspar originating in the 
People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 5 March 1994, No L 62/1; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain watch 
movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3 ; Commission Decision 94f389/EC of 6 June 1994 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refined antimony trioxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41 ; Commission Decision No 1751194/ECSC of 15 July 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& into the Community of hematite pig-iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 16 July 1994, 
No L 182/37 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11; Council Regulation (EC) No 2557194 
of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of 
China and Russia, O.J., 21 October 1994, NoL 270/27). 
Likewise, in cau.tic-burned natural magnesite from the People's Republic of China, the interchangeability was decisive, 
notwithstanding the preferenee of some users for certain product specifications (Commission Decision 84/129/EEC of 6 March 1984 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of caustic-burned natura! magnesite originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 8 March 1984, No L 66/32. See also : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natural magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 30 December 1982, No L 371121; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natural magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of 
China and in North Korea, O.J., SO December 1982, No L 371125). 
Products which are not interchangeable, will not be considered to be like products. For example, in video cassette recorders from 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, video cassette players were not considered to be a like product because the absence of a tuner and 
the recording facility limits the possible uses of a video cassette player and, therefore, video cassette players are not likely to be a 
substitute for the normal private buyer of a video cassette recorder (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5). See also: Commission Decision No 67194/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and 
Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, NoL 12/5. 
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elements in the like product determination. 
The like product determination shows great resemblance to the determination of the relevant 
product market in antitrust law994 : they both delineate the scope of the proceeding in product 
terms. In European antitrust law the determination of the relevant product market is based not 
only on demand substitutability, but also on supply substitutabilicy995, i.e. , whether producers 
can readily switch their resources to the production of demand-substitutable products. 
As in antitrust law996, both demand and supply substitutability should be taken into account 
within the framework of the injury determination997• If supply substitutability is disregarded, 
993 In several anti-dumping cases, different product types were held to he like products because they competed with each other 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 24 February 1987, No 
L 54112 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 11 March 1993, NoL 58/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 
September 1993 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's 
Republic of China and collecting defmitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2477193 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain photo albums 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16). 
In the same way, the degree of competition, together with the similarity concerning the physical characteristics, was decisive in the 
like product determination concerning polyester yarntJ from Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Mexico, synthetic fibres of polyesters 
originating in Yugo•lavia, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turlcey and the United State• of America and urea from Hunga.ry, Malaysia, 
Austria, Romania, Venezuela and the United Stales of America (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 June 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, 
O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/58) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 
June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, 
Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151147; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, 
Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O . .T., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5). 
Conversely, the. absence of competition made two qualitatively different product& unlike each other in ball hearings and tapered 
roller hearings from Polancl, Romania and the Soviet Union (Commission Decision 86/100/EEC of 15 April 1986 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Poland, Romania and the 
Soviet Union, O.J., 18 April1986, NoL 102/31). 
994 A relevant product market must he determined under antitrust law, in order to lay down whether a company holds a 
dominant position in that market, see: BADEN FULLER, C.W., ecArtiele 86 EEC: Economie Analysis of the Ex.istence of a 
Dominant Position•, Europeon Law Review, 1979, (423), 425 ; BELLAMY, C., and CHILD, G.D., Common Marleet Law of 
Competition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, 391, §§ S.005; VAN GERVEN, W., MARESCEAU, M., en STUYCK, J., Handels- en 
mededingsrecht. Deel 2. Mededingsrecht & Kartelrecht (Belgisch en Europeea), in Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht, 
DJLLEMANS, R., en VAN GERVEN, W. (eds.), XDI, Gent, Story-Scientia, 1985, 309-311, No 272, and 311, No 275. 
995 BELLAMY, C., and CHILD, G.D., Common Market Law of Competition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, 391-397, §§ 8-006-
8-016; GYSELEN, L., and NICHOLAS, K., ecArtiele 86 EEC: The Monopoly Power Maasurement Issue Revisited.,, Europeon Law 
Review, 1986, (134), 138-140. 
996 POSNER, R.A., Antitrust Law. An Economie Perspectwe, Chicago, The Univarsity of Chicago Press, 1976, 124-128. See also : 
LANDES, W .M., and POSNER, R.A., ccMarket Power in Antitrust CaseiJ)•, Harvard Law Review, 1980-1981, (937), 962-963. 
997 Supply substitutability is irrelevant for the determination of the dumping. For it is impossible to determine whether 
producers who are able to switch to the production of demand-substitutable product&, will practise dumping if they start to produce 
and export those products. Moreover, if they start to produce and export a product subject to anti-dumping relief, the anti-dumping 
measures will normally also apply to their exports. lndeed, ü anti-dumping relief is granted, usually a residual anti-dumping duty 
is imposed on all export& of the like product originating in the dumping country which are not subject to either an individual anti-
dumping duty or an undertaking. See : infra, 684-686. 
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the injury caused by the dumping to producers who, due to the dumping practices, are driven out 
of the market and who would re-enter the market if the dumping stopped, will not be taken into 
account. 
As the definition of «Community industry» refers to the Community producers as a whole of the 
like product or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major 
proportion of the total Community production (Artiele 4.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; 4(1) basic 
. EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision), the concept seems only to refer to 
Community producers who actually manufacture the like product. Potential producers of the like 
product thus, seem to be excluded. Therefore, one could have the impression that it is legally 
impossible to take into account supply substitutability. However, the injury requirement is met 
not only if actual in jury ( or a threat to that effect) is inflicted upon the Community industry 
actually producing the like product, but also if the establishment of a Community industry which 
will produce the like product as soon as it is established, is retarded as a result of the dumping 
(Article Vl(1) and (6)(a) GATT ; Note 1 ad Artiele 3 GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(1) 
basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). Accordingly, the Community industry 
may only encompass potential producers of the like product insofar as they do notproduce the like 
products (anymore) because of the dumping998• 
Even in an actual injury finding, supply substitutability may play a part. An actual injury finding 
may be based on the evolution in the production of the Community industry (Article 3.4. GATT 
Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(5) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision). 
998 
· See : outboard motor& from Japan,, where certain imported products were excluded not only because there had been no 
Community production of those products, but also hecause there was no suffi.ciently convincing factual evidence that the 
eiJtàblishment of such an industry was envisaged. In this anti-dumping case, the Community producers had argued that those 
products were not manufactured in the Community hecause of the dumping (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1500/83 of 9 June 
1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of outboard motors originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, No 
L 152/18). 
The complainants successfully raised the same argument in : 
polyester yarn from the Uniled Statea of America, where the Commission replied that it ccwas satisfied by information supplied 
bythe Community producers that the yarns concerned were currently being produced by, had been produced by or could be 
produeed by a Community producer• (Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United· Statee of 
America, O.J., 23 February 1983, NoL 50/1); 
DRAM• from Japan, the Commission answered ccthat, on the one hand, it could he reasonably argued that an industry which 
has the neceuary production facilities, equipment and technological know-how and which has produced DRAMs alheit not on 
a commercial basis, should he regarded as heing established. · ( ... ) On the other hand, ü commercial production is to he a 
condition •ine qU4 non for determining establishment, the Commission would have to consider whether the complainant 
companies constituted a nascent industry ... Though the Commission did notmake clear whether commercial production is 
the dividing line, it is not required for a Community industry to he established ; it may be a nascent industry (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of these product& and 
terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January ·1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 · January 1990, No 
L 22n9 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44)). 
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Through a broad interpretation, that factor holds the complete999 or potentia11000 
abandonment of production and the shutdown of plants1001• The decision not to set up a new 
plant has also been taken into account1002• As the fact that the product is not produced 
anymore or is not yet produced in the Community ,, has proved to play a decisive role in actual 
injury findings, the Community industry may include potentlal producers, even in an actual injury 
fmding. 
999 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial 
impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, NoL 177/1; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 
May 1990 accepting undertakings. given in conneetion with the anti-dUmping proceeding concerning imports of photo albums 
originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/48. 
1000 Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof paint, distemper, varnishand similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, No L 46/45 (the diversification into manufacturing related products); 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 5 February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the 
Community by companies whose undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/1 (the specialization in certain 
products). 
1001 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 511/78 of 7 March 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and 
board originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 11 March 1978, NoL 69/9; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2133n8 of 8 
September 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and ·board originating in the United States of 
America, O.J., 9 September 1978, No L 247/22; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 of 29 August 1980 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 2 September 
1980, No L 231/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts 
of certain textured polyester fabrics originating in the United States of America, O.J., 20 May 1981, No L 133/17; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 171182 of 25 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of oxalic acid originating in 
China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19~6 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No L 34/11); Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 250/82 of 29 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain welded iron or steel tubes 
originating in Romania, O.J., 3 February 1982, No L 26/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one Japanase exporter and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of imports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia· and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 
18 June 1983, No L 160/18 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681/84 of 18 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imparts of pentaerythritol originating in Canada and accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof pentaerythritol originating inSweden and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 September 1984, 
NoL 25415; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 March 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1985, No L 68/13; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 
February 1986 accepting undertakings antered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece 
of certain categoriesof glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating 
the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51n3 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1244186 of 28 April 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 113/4; Council 
Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of binder and haler twine 
originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, NoL 34/55; Commission Decision 
88/305/EEC of 27 May 1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation concerning imparts of 
inner tubes and new tyre cases for bicycles originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and terminating the investigation, 
O.J., 31 May 1988, No L 134/61 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 23 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on importsof copper sulphate originating in Buigaria or the Boviet Union, O.J., 27 January 1989, No L 23/1; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnishand simil~ 
brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, 
O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24. 
1002 Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January ·1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, No L 20/46). 
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2.1.1.1.2.2. Cross elasticity of demand and supply 
European anti-dumping case law does not provide information as to the metbod used to determine 
the interchangeability or the degree of competition between products. Only the result, i.e., 
whether or not the products are substitutes, is published. Therefore, it is difficult or even 
impossible to examine whether the like product determination is made on the basis of 
economically relevant considerations, i.e., whether the like products are truly substitutes. 
In economics, the cross elasticity of demand (or supply) is used for measuring demand (and 
respectively supply) substitutability1003• The cross elasticity of demand (or supply) (eij) 
measures the effect of a price change of a product j (Ij) on the quantity demanded (or supplied) of 
another product i ( qi) : 
(1) 
Any pair of goods for which eij < 0, are called complements and any pair of goods for which 
eij > 0, are called substitutes1004• As a consequence, for like products, at least eu > 0 must 
hold. 
However, the use of the cross elasticity of demand poses some problems. First, if only a positive 
elasticity of demand is required, the like product category will probably be too wide. For it will 
cover also inferior substitutes, i_. e. , products with a very low cross elasticity. Moreover, even 
high values of cross elasticities may be misleading. Indeed, if the price of product j is high 
enough, consomers ~d potential producers will be more willing to switch from product j to 
product i. As a consequence, the cross elasticity of product i increases as the price of product j 
1003 POSNER, R.A., Antitrust Law. An. Economie Perspective, Chicago, The Univarsity of Chicago Press, 1976, 124-128. See 
also : LANDES, W .M., and POSNER, R.A., ccMarket Power in Antitrust Cases», Harvard Law Review, 1980-1981, (937), 960-963. 
Be_cause there may be practical prohlems for determining cross elasticity, the similarity of price movements has been proposedas 
alternative meaeure. That maasure is based on the assumption that the prices of substitute products show the same development 
in time. lf the price of a product increases, consumers will switch to another, substitute product. Consequently, demand for and,. 
thus, the price of that substitute product will rise. The higher price of the fust product will also induce other producers to enter 
the market with a substitute product. That substitute product will also be sold at a higher price because the demand for that 
product will also also go up ae a re sult of the price rise of the fust product. Ho wever, also the m~thod based on parallel movements 
is not without practical problems. It is, for example, possible that a parallel price movement of different products is caused by the 
same, but external cause (e.g., inflation). See: AREEDA, P., ccMarket Definition and Horimntal Restraints,,, Antitrust Law 
.Tourn.al, 1983, (553), 566-576 ; HOROwri'Z, 1., ccMarket Definition in Antitrust Analysis : A Regression-Based Approach», Southern. 
Economie .Journ.al, 1981-1982, (1), 1-16 ; STIGLER, G.J., and SHERWIN, RA., «The Extent of the Marketn, Journ.al of Law an.d 
Economics, 1985, (555), 555-585. 
1004 KOHLER, H., Intermediale Microeconomics. Theory an.d Applications, Glenview, Scott, Foresman and Company, 1986, 81-
96; LA YARD, P.R.G., and WALTERS, A.A., MicrtrEconomic Theory, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978, 141. 
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gets higher100S. In the end, all other products may become substitutes with rather high values 
for their cross elasticity with respect to product j. Conversely, if the price of product j is 
extremely low, it will have hardly any substitutes. 
A second problem regarding the use of cross elasticity pertains to the cross elasticities of· all 
products i being spread over a sliding scale, in which there are seldom marked gaps1006• As a 
consequenee, the determination of a eertaio value of cross elasticity as dividing line between 
substitute and non-substitute products may only be drawn on a purely discretionary basis. 
Therefore, no general threshold value of cross elasticity can be determined above which products 
are considered to be substitutes and below which products are not considered to be like products. 
Notwithstanding those problems, the cross elasticity of demand (and of supply if GA TT and 
European anti-dumping law allow for supply substitutability) should be used for the like product 
determination because it would render it more transparent lndeed, in each anti-dumping case, the 
European anti-dumping authorities will have to put forth why a eertaio value of cross elasticity is 
being chosen as the threshold above which the products are not considered to be substitutes (e.g., 
the priee of the product is very low so that a high tresholdis being chosen). As a consequence, it 
would beoome harder to determine the like product category without providing a sufficient 
explanation and, thus, without any means of controL 
2.1.1.2. Like product and Community industry 
In GA TT and European anti-dumping law, the concept «like product» plays a crucial role in the 
injury determination : dumping may only be sanctioned, if it causes material injury to the 
Community industry manufacturing the like product ( Artiele 3.1. GA TT Anti-dumping Code ; 
Artiele 3(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision). Therefore, if the like (type 
of) product is not produced in the Community, the in jury requirement can never be met, as there 
is then no Community industry1007• Moreover, the like product category limits the scope of 
the injury determination. Only the injury inflicted upon Community producers manufacturing the 
lOOS The relationship between high Uow) prices and high Uow) rates of cross elasticity also turns up in European anti-dumping 
case law. See : compact disc players from Japan an.d South Korea, where it was held that the attraction a model holds for the 
consumer, is based essentially on bis evaluation of price/brandlfeatures, in whatever order, but that a drastic price decrease fora 
specific model could still profoundly alter its attraction compared with another directly competitive model (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain compactdisc players originating 
in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27)). 
l006 SCHMALENSEE, R., ccAnother Look at Market Power.,, Harvard Law Review, 1981-1982, (1789), 1799. 
1007 BOUDANT, J., L'and-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 144. 
When Community production of the like product is discontinued, the anti-dumping proceeding will be tenninated without anti-dumping relief 
(Commission Decisi.on 93/519/EEC of 28 September 1993 tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of unwrought mangancse 
contai.ning more than 96 ~ by weight ofmangancsc originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 September 1993, NoL 244/32). 
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like product may be taken into account. Thus, the Community industry must be confined to the 
producers or to their producing facilities manufacturing the like product. In view of the 
importance of the like product determination, «one-way flexibility» may erop up, i.e., the like 
product category may be determined so as to find an injured Community industry. 
At frrst sight, it seems right to argue that, if the product coverage is defined too restrictively, it 
will be easier to demonstrate that the Community industry suffers in jury, and that, conversely, if 
the product coverage is defined too broadly, it becomes quite difficult to establish that the 
Community industry bas been injured 1008• 
For example, in outboard motors from Japan 1009, a complaint was lodged against the whole assortment of 
outboard motors. After having determined that there had been no European production of outboard motors above 85 
hp, but without having investigated wh~ther outboard motors below and those above 85 hp are like products, the 
Commission restricted the anti-dumping proceeding to outboard motors below 85 hp. However, both the dumping 
exporters and the Community producers considered outboard motors like produels independent of their output. 
Moreover, they thought that, if there is no Community production of the whole assortment of the Iike product, no 
Community industry exists1010• · 
In photo albums from the People 's Republic of China, the proceeding was restricted to hook bound photo albums not 
only because they were said to form a specific category of product within the general photo album product range, but 
also because the market supply of the Community industry of these albums was insufficient1011 . Compared to 
photo albums from South Korea and Rong Kong, only the latter reason was decisive as, in this case, the general range 
of photo albums ·was considered to form the like product category. In photo albums from South Korea and Hong 
Kong, anti-dumping relief was granted only in respect of hook bound photo albums, since the Community industry 
was not able tomeet the Community demand for the other types of photo albums1012• 
1008 BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti--Dumping and Antï,.Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell,-1986, 150; VAN BAEL, I., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti--Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Laws ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH 
Editions, 1990, 114. 
1009 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1500/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof outboard 
motors originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, No L 152/18. 
1010 In the same aense: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 16311; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 
February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts into Greece 
of certain categorie& of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating 
the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, NoL 51/73; Commission Decision 87/210/EEC of 23 March 1987 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of outboard motors originating in Japan and terminating 
the investigation, O.J., 26 March 1987, NoL 82/36; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1305/87 of 11 May 1987 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on certain imports of outboard motors originating in Japan, O.J., 13 May 1987, No L 124/l; Commission 
Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 September 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of mica originating in 
Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, NoL 284/45; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 547190 of 2 March 1990 impasing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imparts of certain glutamic acid and its salta originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand, and accepting undertakings in conneetion with imports of certain glutamic acid and its aalts originating in these 
countries, O.J., 3 March 1990, NoL 56123. 
1011 Commiuion Rcgulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio photo 
albums originaûng in tbc Pcoplc'a Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16. 
1012 Commiuion Deciaion 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion witb tbe anti-dumping proceeding conceming 
imports ofphoto albu011 originating in South Korea and Hoog Koog, and tenninating tbc invcstigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48. 
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Thus, by restricting the like product category, a Community industry which suffers in jury may .he 
established. Indeed, the like product category is confined to the like product types manufactured 
within the Community, whereas the like product category should define the scope of the in jury 
determination. 
In order to seek anti-dumping relief, it is often safe to restriet the like product category to those 
products for which it is eertaio that their Community production is injured if one wants to obtain 
anti-dumping relief1013• For there being a Community industry, the like product category 
may have to be extended, though, by including the products manufactured by Community 
producers which are not exported by the dumping exporters to the Community1014• 
In plain paper photocopiers from Japan1015 , an injury finding seemed to require an enlarged like product 
category. On the basis of the classification, publisbed by a research agency, Dataquest, the market of plain paper 
photocopiers was divided into 7 segments (personal copiers and segments 1 up to 6). The Japanese nor the 
Community producers manufactured produels of segment 6. The Japanese producers/exporters were mainly active in 
the segment of personal copiers and the segments 1, 2, 3 and 4. Fora large part of their production, the Community 
producers were active in segment 5. Therefore, if product coverage of the anti-dumping proceeding would have been 
confined to the segments 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the segment of personal copiers, it was very likely that no (significant) 
Community industry would have been found to exist. Such an outcome was prevenled by including the photocopiers 
of segment 5 in the anti-dumping proceeding. The inclusion of segment 5 was explained by there being cross-segment 
competition so that a clear dividing line between the different segments did not exist. Thus far, this anti-dumping case 
seems to he in line with GAIT anti-dumping law which does not allow the possibility of granting anti-dumping relief 
to individual lines of production of a particular industry1016• Nevertheless, it is difficult to undo the impression 
that segment 5 was included in the like product category so that a Community industry could he established1017• 
1013 lnfra, 578-586. 
1 O 14 VAN BAEL, I., and BELLIS, J.-F ., Ant~Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 
114. 
1015 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, 
No L 54112; C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon ln.c. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1295-1297; C.J.E.C., case C-
174187, 10 March 1992, Riooh Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1395-1397; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, 
Matsushite~ Electric ln.dustriCJl Co. Ltd CJnd Matsushite~ Electric TrCJding Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1478-1481 ; 
C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Koniahiroku Ph.oto ln.dustry· Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1523-1525 and 1527-
1528; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, SCJn.yo Electric Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1565-1566 and 1569; 
C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Shwp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1677-1678 and 1681. 
1016 . See : B.I.S.D., Thirty-second Supplement, Geneva, GATr, 1986, 68. 
1 O 17 When a J'apanese exporter of plain paper photocopiers claimed that the like product category he limited to the low segment 
photocopiers, Advocate General MISCHO had the impreesion that the raasons bebind this claim only derived from the finding that 
it was only in the market for large photocopiers that any significant Community industry existed and that Japanase photocopiers 
predominated only in the market of small photocopiers (C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1335), 1374 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO)). 
See also : smCJl~screen colour television receiver• from Hong Kong CJn.d the People'• Republic of China, where the higher range of 
SCTVs produced and sold in the Community, having such features as flat square screens, teletext modules, and digital chassis, 
came under the lik.e product category, though they were not exported from HongKong and the People's Republic of China to the 
Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, N~ 
L 14131). 
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This impression is all the more stronger, since market segmentation was possible in respect of the examination of 
iqjury : the good economie performance of the Community producers in segment 5 being left out of consideration 
(there could not be any injury as there were no such im.ports from Japan), it could not compensate their bad economie 
performance in the lower segments. Needless to say that such considerations must not prevail in determining the like 
product category1018 and that they infringe upon GATT anti-dumping law1019• 
An anti-dumping proceeding may also be initiateel against a product which the dumping country 
does not export. Then, the proceeding will be broadened by including the product exported by the 
dumping country. Yet, the product which the dumping exporter does not export, will still be 
· included and will be considered to be akin to the product exported by the dumping country. As 
the dumping country was a NME country, this product was probably included in order to find a 
reference country. 
In fluorspar from the People 's Republic of China, the anti-dumping proceeding covered at the start only fluorspar in 
powder form1020• During the proceeding, the scope was extended to fluorspar in filter cake form1021 • Tbey 
were said to be like produels as the only difference between them is the moisture content which for reasoos of 
transport is not fully eliminaled in the filter cake form1022• Finally, the European anti-dumping authorities stated 
that the dumping country exports only fluorspar in filter cake form and that the reference country sells only fluorspar 
in powder form on its dornestic market1023• 
The .like product category is also extended so as to encompass products exported by dumping 
exporters to the Community which are not manufactured by Community producers, and by future 
products which are not produced by dumping exporters nor by Community producers. As a 
consequence, Community producers may be found to suffer injury from products which they do 
notproduce and which are even not imported. 
1018 C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1374 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO). 
1019 . See : B.LS.D., Thirty-second Supplement, Geneva, GA'IT, 1986, 68. 
1020 N ' f . • . . f An "-d . eed" ' • f f1 ' • • • th P I ' R bi' f Ch' . 25 otlce o arutiation o an tl umpmg proc mg concenung amports o uorspar ongmatmg m e eop e s epu 1c o ma, O.J., 
April 1992, No C 105123. 
1021 N . 1 • th "-d ' d" ' ' f f1 ' ' ' ' th P I ' bi' f h' 4 otice re ating to c anti umpmg procee mg concenung 1mports o uorspar ongmating m e eop e s Repu IC o C ma, O.J., August 
1993, No C 210/6. 
1022 Comrniuion Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar 
originating in the Peoplc'a Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3. 
1023 Commiuion Rcgulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a · provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar 
originating in the Pcoplc '• Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3. 
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Thus, in DRAMs from Japan1024 and EPROMs from Japan1025 , the like product category included DRAMs 
and EPROMs having a density of more than one megabit as well. The Community producers did not produce such 
high-density DRAMs and EPROMs, whereas the dumping exporters did not produce all kinds of them. High-density 
DRAMs and EPROMs were probably included because increasingly higher densities are the result of a continuous 
learning process and refinements in technology. Moreover, the introduetion of higher densities of DRAMs and 
EPROMs depresses the prices of lower densities. Anti-dumping rellef granted against all densities will probably 
enable the Community producers to switch to the category of higher densities. lt is that very category which 
generales higher prices and, probably, higher protitsl026• 
Once the like product category is determined, injury will be examined in respect of tbe 
Community industry' s production of the wbole range of like products, provided tbat tbe dumping 
exporters export all the product types and irrespective of wbether or not the Community industry 
suffers in jury in respect of a specific product type1027• However, if tbe dumping exporters do 
not export a specific- product type, a separate examinatien of in jury for eacb product type will 
sometimes be made. Evidently, no injury will be found in respect of tbe product type wbicb is 
not exported to tbe Çommunity, tbougb tbere may be injury witb regard to tbe rest of tbe like 
product category1028• Apparently, tbe like product category will only be divided if it does not 
affect tbe factual scope of the anti-dumping relief to be granted : granting anti-dumping relief 
against a product type wbicb is not exported bas actually tbe same effect as not granting sucb anti-
dumping relief. Conversely, the like product category will be split up if it may result in an 
extension of the scope of tbe anti-dumping relief eventually granted : if tbe Community industry's 
production of a specific product type does not suffer injury, anti-dumping relief . will still be 
granted against imports of tbat product type as tbe like product category bas been considered as a 
wbole. Moreover, the degree of injury found may also be depressed by taking into account the 
1024 Commission Regulation (EEC)·No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9 ; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 25 July 1990, NoL 19311. 
1025 Council Regulation (EEC) No 541/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, NoL 60/1. 
1026 See also: Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio 
types of electrooie microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 
1992, No L 272/13 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 611/93 of 15 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of eertaio electrooie microcircuits known as DRAMa originating in the Republic of Korea and exported by companies nol exempted 
from this duty, and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 March 1993, NoL 66/1. 
1027 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of magnesium oxide originating 
in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of dead-bumed (sintered) magnesia originating in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, 
NoL 306/16. 
1028 Commission Regulation (EEC} No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, 
NoL 54112. 
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whole range of like products : a product which is not dumped on the Community market, will not 
injure the Community industry ; if the Community industry is doing well in the field of that 
product type, its good economie performance in this field will wholly or partly neutralise the 
injury it suffers from the dumping. 
Sometimes, however, the like product category is not manipulated in order to obtain a positive 
injury finding. lnstead, the injury inflicted upon Community producers manufacturing a non-like 
product is taken into account. 
In caravans for camping and parts thereof from Yugoslavia1029, an anti-dumping proceeding was initiated against 
two separate like product categones : caravans for camping, on the one hand, and partsof such caravans, on the other 
hand1030• The relevant Community industry was defined as «the Community manufacturing industry producing 
rigid caravans for camping», without any reference being made to the production of parts of such caravans. The 
injury investigation did only pay attention to the imports of caravans. The figures as to the volume of those imports, 
. however, included the volume of caravans, assembied by a Yugoslav subsidiary established in the Community which 
used a substantial quantity of dumped parts in its assembly operations. Consequently, caravans, as well as parts 
thereof, were found to have been inflicting in jury u pon the Community industry. 
The assembly of caravans in the Community in which a substantial quantity of dumped parts was being used, was 
probably1031 considered to be a good measure for the imparts of parts of caravans. If such is the case, the 
European anti-dumping authorities accepted that a Community industry of a specific product (caravans) may be injured 
by imparts of a different product (parts of caravans). It is, indeed, rather unlikely that caravans and parts thereof are 
like products1032• The European anti-dumping authorities did not even investigate whether they actually were like 
products, but treated them separately in the dumping investigation. 
In hall hearings and tapered roller hearings from Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union1033 , the European anti-
dumping authorities clearly suggested that the dumping of a product may injure the Community industry of another, 
not a li.ke product. lndeed, lower-quality ball hearings and tapered roller hearings were found not to be part of the 
li.ke product category of higher-quality·ball hearings and tapered roller hearings. No Com.munity producer was found 
1029 CommiBBion Decision 83/428/EEC of 26 August 1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of caravans for camping and parts thereof originating in Yugoslavia and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 30 August 1983, NoL 240/12. 
1030 See, however: EPROMs from Japan, where parts were considered to he like products in respect to the finished product 
because the parts had all physical and technical characteristics which distinguish the finished product from other products and the 
only use of which was their function in the finished product (Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuit. k.nown as EPROMs (erasable programmabie 
read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1). 
1031 Though it was not pointed out explicitly, it is quite likely that the assembly of caravans in the Community, using a 
substantial quantity of dumped parts, was applied as a maasure for the imports of dumped parts of caravans. The assembly of 
caravans in the Community was probably not considered to he equivalent to the imports of caravans. lndeed, Europaan anti-
dumping law requires the injury suffered by the Community induBtry to he caused by dumped imports (Article 3 basic EC 
Regulation; Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). Not the caravans assemblad in the Community, but most of their parts were being 
imported and dumped. Moreover, ü the caravans assemblad in the Community had been considered identical to the caravans 
imported and dumped on the Community market, the Europaan antidumping authorities would·not have investigated whether the 
dumping of the partsof caravans had caused injury to the Community induBtry and, consequently, could nothave granted anti-
dumping relief against the dumping of those parts~ 
1032 Perhaps, there is supply substitutability, but it is quite unlikely that there is demand substitutability between them. 
1033 Commission Decision 86/100/EEC of 15 April1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of hall 
hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 18 April 1986, No L 102/31. 
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to he active in the market of lower-quality hall hearings and tapered roller hearings. Nevertheless, it was concluded 
that «even if these imparts (of lower-quality hall hearings and tapered roller hearings) have caused injury, this injury 
cannot he regarded as significant under the current market conditions for the product in question•. 
In polyester yams from Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's RepubUc of China, Turkey and the Republic of Korea 
sewing thread was found not to he a like product. However, the proceeding against imports of sewing thread was 
terminaled not because it was not a like product, but because the complainant Community producers represented only 
a minimal share of total Com.munity output of sewing thread 1034• It might he wondered bow the proceeding 
would have evolved should the complainant Com.munity producers have represented a major proportion of total 
Com.munity output. 
The injury caused by the importsof a like product to Community producers of a non-like product 
is not the in jury required by GA IT and European anti-dumping law. GA TI and European anti-
dumping law are straightforward : only the in jury inflicted upon the Community in dustry, i.e., the 
Community producers manufacturing the like product, may be taken into account (Article VI(1) 
and (6)(a) GA TI ; Articles 3.1. and 4.1. GA IT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 4(1) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(1) and (5) basic ECSC Decision)1035• Thus, in order to find injurious 
dumping, a double «one-way flexibility» is incorporated into European anti-dumping case law : 
frrst, the like product category is defined to measure the Community industry, and, second, injury 
1034 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 3 October 1991, NoL 276fT. With regard to the requirement that the complainant Community producers must repreeent a 
m{\jor part of the total Community output of the like product, see : in.fra, 403-409. 
1035 VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d Practice in. the Uniled Statea an.d the European. Commun.ities. A Comparatwe 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,660, note 17. 
GATI' and European anti-dumping law has been correctly applied in: 
leraftlin.er paper an.d board from the Un.ited States of America, Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the Boviet Un.ion. an.d 
Sweden., where the complainant claimed that the Community producers of kraftUner paper and board as well of testliner had 
suffered injury. The i~ury investigation was, however, confined to the production in the Community of the like product 
being only kraftliner paper and board (Council Regulation (EEC) No 551/83 of 8 March 1983 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on kraftUner paper and board originating in the United Statee of America and accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the review of the anti-dumping proeeeding on kraftUner paper and board originating in Austria, Canada, 
Finland, Portugal, the Soviet Union and Sweden, O.J., 10 March 1983, No L 64125) ; 
serial-impact dot-matrix printers from Japan., where it was noted that i~ury should only be assessed in relation to the 
Comm.unity production of the Uke product - being in this case serial-impact dot-matrix printers. Therefore, it was refused to 
determine injury with regard to the larger companies of which the manufacturing and sales operations concerning sarial-
impact dot-matrix printers were only part of (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No 
L 130/12); 
hardboard from Czechoslovakia, Polan.d, the USSR, Roman.ia, Brazil an.d Sweden., where no injury was found with regard to 
certain variaties because there was hardly any European production of these varieties (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1786/89 
of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of 
fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, confll'ID.ing the expiry of the definitive 
anti-dumping dutiea imposed on imports from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty 
imposed on import& from the USSR, O.J., 23 June 1989, No L 176/1; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 19 June 1989 
terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board 
(hardboard) originating in Romania, Brazil and Sweden, confll'llling the expiry of the undertakings given by Romanian, 
Brazilian and certain Swedish exporters, and repealing the undertaking given by another Swedish exporter, O.J., 23 June 
1989, No L 176/51). 
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to the Community industry is enlarged in order to comprise injury to Community producers 
manufacturing a non-like product. 
2.1. 2. The exception : product lines 
In cases where the Community production of the like product bas no separate identity, the effect 
of the dumped imports must be assessed in relation to the production of the narrowest group or 
range of production which includes the like product - so-called «product lines» - for which the 
necessary information may be found (Article 3.6. GATI' Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(8) basic 
EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(4) basic ECSC Decision). Product lines have been taken into 
consideration in several anti-dumping cases1036• 
inherenttotheuse of product lines was underscored. 
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In many of these cases the inaccuracy 
Nevertheless, in other anti-dumping cases, the injurious effect of the dumping is assessed on the 
basis of the facts available (Article 6.8. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 18 basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision), as there were separate data for the like 
1°36 Product lines are used in order to determine : 
consumption on the Community market and, subsequently, market shares of the various sellers (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2464/84 of 24 August 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain shovels originating in 
Brazil, O.J., 29 August 1984, NoL 231.129); 
the volume of dumped imports (Commission Decision aon83/EEC of 27 August 19Bo accepting undertakings in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceedings C(mcerning imports of studded welded-Unk chain, originating in Spain and Sweden and 
terminating those proceedings, O.J., 2 September 1980, No L 231/10; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3669/84 of 21 
December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ball hearings and tapered roller hearings 
originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, NoL 340/37); 
the rate of capacity utilization (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076/94 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3) ; 
employment (Commission Recommendation No 112n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling, originating in Czechoslovakia and South Korea, O.J., 21 January 1978, No 
L 17/27; Commission Recommendation No 11Bn8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain galvanized steel sheets and plates originating in Poland and Spain, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19/3; Commission 
Recommendation: No 119n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on wire rod originating in 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19/6; Commission Recommendation No 120n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 
imposing a provisional duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 
1978, NoL 19n; Commission Recommendation No 12ln8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovak.ia and Japan, O.J., 24 January 1978, 
No L 19/9 ; Commission Recommendation No 159n8/ECSC of 27 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron and steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Spain, 
O.J., 28 January 1978, No L 23/31; Commission Recommendation No 160n8/ECSC of 27 January 1978 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or Bteel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Romania and Spain, O.J., 28 January 1978, No L 23i33_; Commission Recommendation No 16ln8/ECSC of 27 January 1978 
· imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Japan, O.J., 28 
January 1978, NoL 23/36; Commission Recommendation No 246n8/ECSC of 2 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Japan and Bulgaria, O.J., 7 February 1978, No 
L 37/13; Commission Recommendation No 262n8/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originatiD.g in Poland, O.J., 9 February 1978, No L 39/13; Commission 
Recommendation No 263178/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes 
and sections, of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Japan, O.J., 9 February 1978, No 
L 39/15; Commission Recommendation No 307n8/ECSC of 14 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Áustralia, O.J., 16 February 1978, No L 45/17 ; Commission 
Recommendation No 790n8/ECSC of 19 April 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-
rolling originating in South Korea, O.J., 20 April 1978, No L 106/21 ; Commission Recommen:dation No 811n8/ECSC of 21 
April 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Bulgaria, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 22 April 1978, No L 108/26; Commission Recommendation No 
1006178/ECSC of 18 May 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain galvanized sheets and plates originating in 
the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 19 May 1978, No L 13118 ; Commission Recommendation No 1704n8/ECSC of 19 July 
1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, 
Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 July 1978, No L 195/17 ; Commission Recommendation No 1715n8/ECSC of 20 July 1978 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain galvanized sheets and plates originating in Japan, O.J., 22 July 1978, No 
L 19811 ; Commission Recommendation No 175Bn8/ECSC of 26 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
angles, shapes and sections of iron or steel, originating in Spain, O.J., 27 July 1978, No L 203128; Commission 
Recommendation No 269/83/ECSC of 27 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on broad-flanged beams 
originating in Spain, O.J., 1 February 1983, No L 30/61 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1983, No L 36/10) ; Commission 
Recommendation No 376/83/ECSC of 14 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 17 February 1983, No L 45/14; Commission Decision No 
702/83/ECSC of 24 March 1983 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on certain iron or steel coils for re-rolling 
originating in Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela and accepting price undertakings from two Canadian exporters, O.J., 
29 March 1983, No L 8219). 
402 
product1037• It is argued that these cases are a breach of GATI and European anti-dumping 
law1038, since, if available data do oot permit separate identification, European anti-dumping 
authorities must consider the information regarding the product line. European anti-dumping 
authorities do not have the discretionary power to choose freely between either products lines 
(Article 3.6. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(8) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(4) basic 
ECSC Decision) or facts available which permit separate identification (Article 6.8. GATI Anti-
dumping Code; Artiele 18 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(7)(b) basic ECSC Decision). 
This is not a conclusive argument. The provisions regarding product lines and facts available are 
complementary. The provision as to product lines determines a hierarchy between the facts 
available. As it stipulates «(t)he effect of the dumped ( ... ) imports shall be assessed in relation to 
the Community production of the like product when available data permit its separate 
identification» (Artiele 3.6. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(8) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(4) basic ECSC Decision) (emphasis added), it obliges to exhaust all data available which 
allowing a separate identification. Only if no such data are available, it imposes the use of the 
data available on product lines. Consequently, the cases in which separate data are used on the 
basis of the facts available, are not necessarily illegal. On the contrary, if they had relied on 
1037 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 451/80 of 22 February 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in the 
USSR, O.J., 27 February 1980, NoL 53115; Commission Decision 80/252/EEC of 22 February 1980 accepting undertakings given 
by exporters in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW 
but not more than 75 kW, originating in those countries, and terminating the procedure in respect of them, O.J., 27 February 
1980, No L 53121; Commission Decision 80/410/EEC of 10 April 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceedinga e<>ncerning certain filament lamps for lighting exceeding 28 volts, originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 15 April 1980, No L 97/59; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1560/80 of 20 June 1980 concerning the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on 
imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating 
in the USSR, O.J., 21 June 1980, No L 153145; CommiBBion Decision 80/599/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakings in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having .an output of 
more than 0.76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in the USSR and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 Junè 1980, No 
L 153148; Commission Decision 81/366/EEC of 18 May 1981 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping .. 
proceedings concerning Iouvre doors originating in Malaysia and Singapore and terminating the proceedings, O.J., 22 May 1981, 
NoL 135/33; Commission Decision 82/398/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
procedure concerning cylinder vacuum cleaners originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and 
terminating the procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No L 172/47; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of roller ebains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, No L 217n ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 
(corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, NoL 321/19). 
1038 VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in. the Un.i.ted Statea and the European. Commun.ities. A Comparatiue 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 638-639. 
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product lines when separate data were available, they would have been illegal1039• 
Accordingly, GA TI and European anti-dumping law, in many cases, are biased in favour of 
positive findings of in jury. Taking into account product lines instead of the like product indeed 
broadens the scope of the injury investigation and may often diminish the probability of finding 
injury, as it dilutes the impact of the dumping1040• 
2.2. PRODUCER COVERAGE 
2.2.1. The standard case : the Community producers as a whole or a major 
proportion of total Community production 
The concept «Community industry» refers to «the Community producers as a whole of the like 
product or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of 
the total Community production of those products» (Article 4(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 
4(5) basic ECSC Decision). It coincides with the definition of the concept «domestic industry» in 
GATT anti-dumping law (Article 4.1. GATT Anti-dumping Code), which, in its turn, goesback 
to the interpretation placed by the GA TT Group of Experts, in its 1959 report, on the concept 
«domestic industry» which is used but not defined in Artiele Vl(l) GATT. Indeed, the Group 
«agreed that, even though individual cases would obviously give rise to particular problems, as a general 
guiding principle judgements of material injury should be related to total national output of the like 
commodity concemed or a significant part thereof. The Group agreed that the use of anti-dumping duties to 
1039 See: serial-impact dot-matrix printers from Japan, where the provision about product lines (Article 3(8) basic EC Regulation; 
Artiele 4(4) basic ECSC Dacision) was advanced as the legal basis for determining i}\jury with regard to the manufacturing and 
sales operations concerning serlal-impact dot-matrix printers and not with regard to the larger companies which these like product 
operations were part of (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12). 
See also : deep freezers from the Boviet Union, where the Council held that it was not shown that the dumped products and those of 
the Community industry were not like products. Subsequently, the Council concluded that tcin accordance withArtiele 4(4) of (the 
former basic EC Regulation (now : Artiele 3(8) basic EC Regulation)), the effect of the imports covered by the investigation (had) to 
be assessed in relation to production of deep freezers in the Community» (Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain deep freezers originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 8 January 1987, 
NoL 6/1). 
1040 lnfro., 578-586. 
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offset injury to a single firm within a large industry (unless that firm were an important or significant part 
of the industry1041) would he protectionist in character»1042• 
«One-way flexibility» will be introduced into the defmition of the Community industry either by 
placing a restrictive interpretation on the concept «Community production» or by placing a broad 
interpretation on the concept «major proportion». lndeed, if, by providing a restrictive 
interpretation, the concept «Community production» were not to oomprise all production of the 
like product in the Community or if less than half of the overall Community production might 
represent a major proportion, the complainant Community producers would more rapidly represent 
a major proportion of it. 
1041 Thus, the Community industry may consist of only one producer (see: Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 
1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United States of America and the Boviet 
Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, No L 23119 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, No L 31/23) ; Commission Decision 80/1116/EEC of 
4 December 1980 accepting undertakings offered by the exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the United 
States of America and terminating the proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the United 
Statesof America, O.J., 9 December 1980, NoL 331/41; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on machanical wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11114; 
Commission Decision 901154/EEC of 26 ~eh 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium 
paratungstate originating in the People's Republic ·of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83/117; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064191 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports ·of 
dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187/23; Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 1648194 of 6 July 1994 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of furazolidone originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, NoL 17414; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, NoL 186111). 
Only the condition that this sole producer represents a major proportion of Community production must be fulfilled (Contra. : 
EHLE, D., teBasic Aspects of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the Common Market., International Lawyer, 1968-1969, (490), 498. 
D. EHLE holcis that the producer with the largestoutput can constitute a Community industry, but he does not require that the 
output of such a producer must repreaent a m~or proportion of total Community production. However, there is a vast difference 
between producing a m*r proportion of total Community production and being the producer with the largest output. For 
example, if all the other Community producers produce each of them only 6 % of total Community production, the Community 
producer producing 10% will be the producer with the largest output. However, it is quite doubtful whether he will also repreaent 
a m~r proportion of total Community production). 
On the other hand, if severai Community producers are active, the Community induBtry must notoomprise the main producer; it 
is .sufticient for the remaining producers to constitute a major proportion of the Community production (Commission Decision 
82/398/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure· concerning cylinder 
vacuum cleanera originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the procedure, O.J., 
18 June 1982, No L 172/47 ; Commission Decision 82/543/EEC of 6 August 1982 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning paracetamol (INN) crystals or powder originating in China and terminating the 
proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1982, NoL 236123). 
See also : aerial impact fully formed cha.racter printers from .Japan in which it was noted that only two Community producers 
existed. Because one of them was particularly affected by circumstances outside the Community, the Commission restricted the 
injury · determination to the other Community producer, without enquiring whether the latter represented a major proportion of 
Comm.unity production (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 6 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof serial impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, NoL 177/1). 
1042 B.l.S.D., Eight Supplement, Geneva, GATI', 1960, 160, consideration 18. 
405 
As no restrictive interpretation is placed on the concept «Community production», «one-way 
flexibility» is oot present. It camprises total actual and potentlal production 1043 of the like 
product, in principle, originating in the Community1044 during the investigation 
1043 Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 23 February 1983, No L 60/1 ; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1600/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of outboard motors 
originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, No L 162118 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access 
memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imparts of these product& and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 26 January 1990, No 
L 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, NoL 22/79; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44); Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 677/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain types of electronic microcircuits 
known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 66/1. 
Potential producers are producerswhohave committed themselves insome way to future production of the like product. lt is not 
sufficient that they are technically capable of producing the like product (Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable 
programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 66/1; see also: supra, 389-391). 
By considering both actual and potential production, the evolution in the composition of the Community industry is also taken into 
account. Thus, it is poBBible todetermine the i~urious effects of dumping over a period in which the actual Community producers 
do not yet exist, but in which other firms established within the Community produce the like product. Thereby, it is necessary to 
show that the former Community producers are no longer able to produce the like product because of the dumping. European anti-
dumping law, indeed, takes into account the i~urious effects of the dumping caused in a period before the present Community 
producers were established, but it does not investigate why the former Community producers are not active anymore. lndeed, in 
glycine from Japan., the dumping investigation concerned the period from 1 April 1984 to 30 September 1984. During this period, 
the Community industry consiBted of one producer who had only started producing glycine in January 1984. The exporters argued 
that their teexports prior to 1984 were irrelevant because Artiele 4(1) (former basic EC legislation (now : Artiele 3(1) basic EC 
Regulation and Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision)) requires that ~ury determinations be made in relation to an established 
Community industry•. The Commission did not agree and determined the i~urious effect of the dumped imports during the period 
from 1980 to September 1984 because it was established "that a Community indUBtry has been in existence since 1970 at least» 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 997/86 of 18 April 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine 
originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April 1986, No L 107/8). However, in this anti-dumping case, no further explanation was given, nor 
was it noted why the other Community producers were obliged to close down their glycine production plants, an observation which 
is frequently made in European anti-dumping case law (infra, 391 and 478-479). On the other hand, in ammonium paratungstate 
from the Peopk's Republic of China ancl the Republic of Korea, the Commission held that a Community producer who had closed 
down his shop, should be excluded from the Community industry, but that his particwar situation could be regarded as part of the 
economie context relevant to the i~ury assessment, as long as he was willing to be used as a "referencen (Commission Decision 
90/164/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of ammonium paratungstate 
originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/117). 
1044 It is not necessary for the product to be manufactured for 100% within the Community. lt is only required that the product 
is of Community origin, as defmed by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1600/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of outboard motors 
originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, NoL 152/18; BESELER, J.F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti.-Subsidy 
Law. The European Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 160). Thus, the producer must. carry out a major part of the 
total production in the Community, e.g., that part during which all essential technical characteristics of the finished product are 
incorporated (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as ·DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272/13). Independent assemblers may also be considered to be part of total 
Community production, and will be included in the Community industry if they support the anti-dumping complaint (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof audio tapes in cassettes 
originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 13 November 1990, NoL 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 
1991, No L9/36)). 
Seealso: 
DRAM• from Japan, ball bearings from Japcur. and Singapore and EPROM• from Japan, where the question whether 
companies performing only assembly and testing operations belong to the Community industry, was raised, but not resolved 
because the company performing only assembly and testing operations could not be part of the Community industry on 
account of its relationship with the dumping exporters, see: infra, 410-416) (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 
1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa 
(dynamic random acceBB memories) originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 26 July 1990, 
No L 19311 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2686190 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 
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period1045, regardless of the nationality of the ownership of, or the control .over the 
1990, NoL 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38); Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 
impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable 
programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 65/1); 
plain paper ph.otocopiera from Japan, where the question whether a company assembling certain types of the like product 
from part& imparted from the dumping country, was raised, but not resolved mainly because the other types of the like 
product it produced were of Community origin (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No 
L 54112). 
Nevertheless, as the concept ccorigin» is flexible (see: supra, 115-120 ), a restrictive interpretation may he placed on the concept 
ccCommunity production» through a ccone-way flexibleu interpretation of the concept ccorigin». Although no evidence can he found of 
such an interpretation in European anti-dumping case law, the door may have been been left opened. For Europaan anti-dumping 
authorities have stated that ccno threshold has been specified in either Community legislation or in previous (anti-dumping) cases 
for the minimum value added [i.e., the criterion in European anti-dumping case law to determine the origin of products, see : supra, 
118-120] that must be respected in order for a producer to qualify as part of Community industryu (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
535/87 of 23 February 1987 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, 
O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12). Though this statement supports an broad interpretation as it concerns a complainant 
producer whose assembly oparations created only a low value added (20 to 35 %), it may result in a restrictive interpretation when 
it . concerns a non-complainant producer : as no general minimum value added is determined, the Europaan anti-dumping 
authorities may implament it on a case-by-case basis. 
In respect ofthe definition of the Community industry, the European anti-dumping authorities will retain their full discretion as to 
the implementation of the notion of origin under the new GATr Agreement on Rules of Origin drafted in 1994 which explicitly 
excludes from its scope the definition of the dornestic induBtry (Note ad Artiele 1.2.). Thus, under GA TI' law, it will be possible to 
include assemblers generating only a low value added in the Community induBtry. 
l04S In wouen polyolefin bags from the People's Republic of China, cc(t)he Commission observed that the producers on whose behalf 
the complaint had been made, who had cooperated with the Commission and produced the (bags) in question during the 
irwestigation period, manufactured a m~or share of the Community's total output of like products during the period,, (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imparts of woven palyolefin bags 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No 
L 256/38)) (emphasis added). 
Exceptionally, however, the Community induBtry also refers production befare or aftar the investigation pariod: 
in .eritd-impact dot-matrix printers from Japan the sales figures of two undertakings which ceased activity prior to the 
investigation period, were taken into account. The Court of Justice found this interpretation acceptable because, even 
without taking account of these figures, the remaining Community producers lost market share (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 
May 1991, Nalcqjimo. All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2193). For the Council, the cessation of activity 
by those two undertakings could be taken into account for the purpose of determining the los& of market of the Community 
industry (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjimo. All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2104 (Report 
for the Hearing : conclusions of the Council). See also : ibidem, 2159-2160 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ) ; 
in Portland cement from the Germo.n Democratie Republic, Polo.nd o.nd Yugoslavi.o. the investigation period with regard to 
dumping and price undercutting (the latter being an element of the injury determination) was 1 OctOber 1984 to 31 March 
1985, while, with regard to injury and threat of injury, facts which occurred after 31 March 1985 were generally nottaken 
into account. However, with regard to the situation ofthe Community industry, the Commission referred to ccthe situation of 
the producers in the Community as constituted on. 31 December 1985» (Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43). Consequently, the injury determination was not limited 
to the Community industry, as it was constituted during the investigation period, with regard to dumping and price 
undercutting. 
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production facilities established in the Community1046• 
Nevertheless, foreign-owned or foreign-controlled production facilities do not carry as much 
weight in determining whether the complainant Community producers constitute a major 
proportion of Community production. Indeed, in small screen colour relevision receivers from the 
Republic of Korea1041, in which 50 % of total Community production, including the output of 
1046 The production by production facilities established in the Community, but controlled by non-dumping foreigners is included 
in total Community production (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of BJD.all screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O . .J., 28 October 1989, NoL 31411; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 26 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour 
telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No 
L 107/66 (corrigendum, O . .J., 24 May 1990, No L 133192) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14131 ; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and 
Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 
1994, No L 129/24). 
See also : video cCI8.ette recorders from Japan cuul the Republic of Korea, where the anti-dumping proceeding was initiated against 
all Korean ezports, but only against two Japanese exporters. The other Japanese exporters had built up their own production or 
assembly facilities within the Community. For assessing the impact of the dumping on the Community industry, the Japanese 
production and assembly within the Community were included in the overall development of production and assembly in the 
Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 31 August 1988, No L 240/6). 
With regard to production facilities controlled by dumping exporters, see : infra, 408-416 
P. MESSERLIN holds that European anti-dumping case law is inconsistent as to foreign owned plants located in the Community 
(MESSERLIN, P., .Anti-Dumping Regulations or Pro-Cartel Law? The EC Chemica! Case&»•, Worlel Economy, 1990, (466), 477). 
European anti-dumping case law, though, is rather straightforward : plants owned by foreign producers not subject to the anti-
dumping proceeding, are included in the Community industry, whereas (non-complainant) plants owned by the dumping exporters 
are excluded. 
Conversely, the output of Community controlled production facilities established outside the Community is excluded (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 113186 of 20 January 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O • .J., 23 January 1986, No L 17/2; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of small screen colour telavision receivers 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O . .J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 16 April 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnatie disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and 
the People's Republic of China, O . .J., 21 April1993, NoL 96/6). See also: 
un.wrought n.iclcel from the Boviet Union, where the claim of the dumping ezporter that there was no substantial Community 
induBtry and that extra-Community production had been taken into account, was rejected because ccthe assessment of injury 
was based on production of the established Community induBtry in the Community .. (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 
17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of 
catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Soviet Union, O . .J., 19 October 1983, No 
L 286129); 
small-screen. colour television receivers from Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, where total Community induBtry 
sales (i.e., soureed from both Community and extra-Community production capacities) were taken into account, in order to 
ascertain whether the Community induBtry did not replace its sales soureed from Community production facilities by sales 
soureed from its extra-Community facilities. This investigation sought to establish to what extent the dumped imports were 
accounted for the decline in the Community sales soureed from Community production facilities. Thus, the sales soureed 
from extra-Community production faeilities were taken into account as another factor which, besides the dumped import&, 
might have eaueed injury to the Community production facilities (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 
· 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of small-8creen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong 
Kong and the People'a Republic of China, O . .J., 19 January 1991, No L 14131). 
1047 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small 
screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, NoL 31411. See also: Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 .of 11 January 1991· imposing a provisional anti.:ciumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour 
telavision receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O . .J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/31. 
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foreign-owned and foreign-controlled production facilities established in the Community was found 
to constitute a major proportion of total Community production, it was noted that : 
c(i)n the first place, the cooperating complainant companies still represented, as recently as 1985, some 
68 % of total Community output. Second, the proportion of 50 % calculated in 1987 takes account of the 
rapid change in the com.position of Com.munity scrv production capacity which took place between 1985 
and 1987- under pressure originating mainly from non-Community competition. Without this change, the 
cooperating producers would still have represented approximately the same share of Community output in 
1987 as in 1985. The rapid reduction in the percentage between 1985 and 1987 can he explained by the 
higher proportion of non-Community, mainly Japanese, controlled production which bas moved into the 
Community, as well as by the Community controlled production which bas been relocated outside the 
Community ( ... )». 
Thus, 50 % of total Community production may constitute a major proportion. However, the 
Community authorities were apparently not that sure, for they found it necessary to qualify the 
different components of total Community production by providing that foreign-owned or foreign-
controlled production facilities carried less weight. However, by doing so, they made way for an 
extremely large interpretation of the concept «major proportion». However, when, in a particular 
case, the Community industry represented only 40 % of total Community production, the 
European anti-dumping authorities contacted other Community producers in order to widen the 
basis of the injury investigation1048• European anti-dumping authorities, thus, seem hesitatant 
about accepting a representativeness below 50 %. Hence,- insofar as numerical information about 
the proportion of the complainant Community producers· to the overall Community production is 
given - there bas been no anti-dumping case in which the Community industry represented less 
than 50 % of total Community output1049, but it is still conceivable that amounts of less than 
50 % may be considered as a major proportion. Within GA TT it is, indeed, recognized that the 
complainant producers should not necessarily represent 50 % of total production1050• Also 
Community officials have stated ex officio that the threshold would seem to be 25 % 1051 . 
This threshold of 25 % of overall production bas been adopted in the new GA TT Anti~dumping 
Code (Article 5.4.) and in the new EC anti-dumping legislation (Article 5(4)), in combination with 
1048 Council Rcgulaûon (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitivc anû-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
bicycles originating in thc Peoplc's Republic of China and collccting definitively the provisional anû-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/1. 
1049 In household cooking ware from South Korea Community producers representing only 16% of total Community production 
were not · considered to constitute a Community induBtry ( Commission Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 term.inating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imparts of stainless steel household coolring ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, 
NoL 74/33). 
1050 GA'IT Doe. No. COM.AD/W/83, 17 November 1978. 
1051 VAN BAEL, I., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Lawa ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 
118 ; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d Practice in the Uniled States an.d the European Communities. A Comparatiue 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 631. 
Contra: BOUDANT, J., L'anti-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 145, according to whom cca major proportioiDt 
rafers to 50 % or more of overall Community production. 
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a threshold of 50 % of the production of Community producers expressing their support for or 
their opposition to the anti-dumping complaint. It might be agreed that 25 % is still a maj.or 
proportion, but it should be wondered why GA TT and European anti-dumping law require only a 
major proportion instead of the majority (more than 50 %) of total production. The question 
might, indeed, be raised why the rest of the Community producers, constituting a much larger 
proportion of 75 %, does not complain about the dumping. 
2. 2. 2. The exceptions 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law allow that, under certain conditions, eertaio producers 
established in the Community are not included in the Community industry. Hence, the 
Community industry does not include Community producers related to dumping exporters, nor 
Community producers who import the dumped product. The Community industry may also be 
divided into several regional markets ; the Community producers exclusively active in one of 
these markets may constitute the Community industry, whereas the other Community producers 
are disregarded. European anti-dumping case law also disregards integrated Community 
producers. European anti-dumping authorities do not accept other reasoos for excluding 
Community producers1052• 
The interpretation of these conditions is important because it determines whether or not the 
complainant producers represent a major proportion of overall Community production. The 
exclusion of a non-complainant producer will reduce total Community production1053 and, 
thus, increase the share of the complainant producers in overall Community production. Thus, 
the exclusion of a non-complainant producer will increase the probability that the complainant 
producers represent a major part of total Community production1054• Conversely, the 
ioclusion of a non-complainant producer will reduce the probability of the complainant producers 
constituting a major proportion of Community production. On the other hand, the ioclusion or 
1052 For example, 1he capital holding by 1he State is irrelevant to the definition of the Cornmunity industry ( Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and thc Pcople's Rcpublic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 95/5). 
1053 Sce : Council Rcgulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 October 1993 imposing a dcfinitivc anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio magnctic 
disks (3,5• microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and thc People's Republic of China, and collccting definitively the provisional duty imposed, 
O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4. 
1054 The Court of Justice ignores the importance of the definition of the Community industry in arguing that the possibly illegal 
inclusion of a Community producer in the Community industry is of no importance when that producer is not taken into 
consideration either in as.sessing the injury sufferedor in determining the rate of the anti-dumping duty (C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 
March 1990, Geatetner Holding• plc v Council an.d Commis a ion, E. C.R., 1990, I, (781), 824 and 840). The Court thereby ignores 
that the upholding of the anti-dumping proceedings depends on there being a Community industry or not. If the complainant 
Community producers do no repreaent a mf\ior proportion of overall Community production, the anti-dumping proceeding must he 
terminated without any anti-dumping relief being granted. However, the unlawful inclusion of complainant Community producers 
increases the proportion of the complainant. Community producers jn overall Community output and, thus, the probability of 
finding a Community industry. 
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exclusion of a complainant producer will increase, respectively reduce the probability that a major 
proportion of overall Community production will have filed the anti-dumping complaint. Indeed, 
if a complainant producer is included (excluded), the absolute quantity produced by the 
complainant producers increases (decreases) relatively more than overall Community production. 
This section investigates whether the exceptions to the general definition of the concept 
«Community industry» are biased through «one-way flexibility», i.e. , whether complainant 
. producers are included rather than excluded and whether non-compläinant producers are excluded 
rather than included. 
2.2.2.1. Community producers related to dumping exporters 
In principle, the Community industry camprises all Community producers, including those related 
to the dumping exporters or importers, unless the European anti-dumping authorities decide to 
exclude them (Article 4.1.(i) GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 4(1)(i) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision). Producers are only held to be related to the exporters or 
importers, if one of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or if both of them are directly 
or indirectly controlled by a third party, or if, together, they directly or indirectly control a third 
party, provided that there are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship 
is such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers (Note 
2 ad Artiele 4.1.(i) GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 4(2) basic EC Regulation). This 
definition only sets a limit to the interpretation of the· concept «related», but does not impose that 
such a related producer should automatically be excluded. 
Hence, GA TT and European anti-dumping law grant the European anti-dumping authorities a 
braad margin of discretion as to exclude related producers1055• In the exercice. of their 
discretionary powers, the European anti-dumping authorities claim to have adopted the constant 
practice to decide the exclusion of such Community producers on a case-by-case basis, on 
reasonable and equitable grounds, and by taking into consideration all the legal and economie 
aspects involved 1056• 1t is, they claim, their general practice to exclude related producers 
when the lattereither participated in the dumping practices, are shielded from their effects, benefit 
1055 C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 820 and 839; 
C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1377 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO) and 1400 ; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric InduBtrial Co. Ltd and Matsushita Electric 
Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1483; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo Industry Co. 
Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1527; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1535), 1569 ; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E. C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1681. 
1056 Comnûaaion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anii-dumping duty on importsof certain magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdisb) originating in Japan, Taiwan and tbc People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5 ; Commission Decision 
93/376/EEC of 16 Junc 1993 tcnninating the review of anti-dumping mcasures adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/85 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof electrooie typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, NoL 157176. 
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unduly from them, or where they cannot be considered any longer as being committed to 
production in the Community1057• They also admit that, in respect of complainant producers, 
there must be good reasoos showing that the relationship necessitates an exclusion because such 
producers, by supporting the anti-dumping complaint, consider themselves entitled to anti-dumping 
protection1058• This may be a rather convincing explanation, though, to cover a «one-way 
flexible» case law, securing that the complainant producers represent a major proportion of total 
Community production, as it announces to exclude less complainant than non-complainant 
producers from the Community industry. 
2.2.2.1.1. Complainant related producers 
The definition of the concept «related» is applied correctly in European anti-dumping case law 
with regard to complainant Community producers1059• In several anti-dumping cases, the 
1057 Commission R.egulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's R.epublic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Commission Decision 
93/376/EEC of 16 June 1993 tenninating the review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/85 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof electrooie typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, NoL 157176. 
1058 C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1351 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of 
the Council); CJ.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric Jndustrial Co. Lld ond Matsushita Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, 
E. C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1434 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the Council) ; C .J .E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo 
Jndustry Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1501 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council); C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 
March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1543 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council); C.J.E.C., 
case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporadon v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1649 (Report for the Hearing: conclusionsofthe Council). 
1059 In plain. paper photocopiers from Japan a minority share of 19% and an option to purchase an additional 30% of the 
oompany's stock, was considered not to affect the Community producer's position (Council Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 of 23 
February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty. o~ imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
February 1987, No L 54112). 
Similarly, in urea from Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trin.idcul an.d 
Tobago an.d Yugoslcwia certain Community producers related to an importer of the dumped products were not excluded merely 
because they held aubstantially less than 60% of the shares of this importer (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 
1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111). It was not 
explained whether the relationship had any hearing on the beha~our of the Community producer. In view of the anti-dumping 
case concerning plain. paper photocopiera from Japan mentioned above, the underlying reasoning may he that a minority share-
holding relationship is assumed not to affect the behaviour of the Community producer. 
In several anti-dumping cases, the existence of a relationship between producers established within the Community and dumping 
exporters did not rule out the decision to consider those producers being part of the Community industey, because the European 
anti-dumping authorities held them to act as autonomous economie entities (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 161/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/68); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of Am.erica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/47; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3906/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yam 
originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, No L 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of Am.erica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact 
disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 206/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 267/27); Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain 
seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and definitively 
collecting proviaional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 16 May 1993, NoL 120/34}. · 
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concept «related» is being interpreted more restrictively. Indeed, only related producers showinga 
substantially different behaviour than non-related producers are excluded1060, whereas the 
defmition of the concept «related» does not require that the difference in the related producers' 
behaviour is substantial. Moreover, indirect links carry less weight than direct links and the fact 
that related Community producers are not protected against the dumping of other exporters might 
account for including related Community producers in the Community industry1061 • Hence, 
only in very rare cases, producers related to the dumping exporters are excluded1062• 
1060 In compact cli&c players from Japan., a Comm~ty producer having a 50 '11 share in a dumping company, whereas the 
remaining 50 '11 was spread over several ooropanies established in the dumping country, has been included within the Community 
. industry, because no indication was found that the existence of the dumping exporter had any substantial influence on the general 
industrial and commercial behaviour of the Community producer (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players ori~nating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 
18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27)). 
See also : polyester yarn from Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey and synthetic fibres of polyesters from Mexico, Romania, 
Taiwan, Turkey, the Uniled States of America and Yugoslavia, where certain Community producers were included in the 
Community industry because they ccbehave toa great extent as autonomous economie agents~ (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1695/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/58); Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No _1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters 
originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof Am.erica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151/47). 
1061 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof polyester 
yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, NoL 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3946/88 ·of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the Uni~d States of Am.erica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49. 
1062 Nevertheless, in several anti-dumping cases producers have been excluded because : 
they are related to the dumping exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 AuguSt 1986, No 
L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 25 July 1990, No L 19311) ; 
they have links with the dumping exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 163183 of 21 January 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United States of Am.erica, O.J., 26 January 
1983, NoL 2319; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 757/84 of 22 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imparts of certain e.lectronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 24 March 1984, No L 80/9 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 April 1984, 
NoL 104126); Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April1986, NoL 97/1); 
they are subsidiaries of the dumping exporters (Commission Decision 831428/EEC of 26 August 1983 accepting an 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of caravans f~r camping and parts 
thereof originating in Yugoslavia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 August 1983, No L 240/12; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 744/84 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain baH hearings 
originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, No L 79/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, No L 86/31) ; 
Commi88ion Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Commission'Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 
November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 31315 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36)). 
However, the above-mentioned anti-dumping cases provide no further information about the relationship between the Community 
producers and the dumping exporters. It is possible that only the result of the investigation is mentioned. Thus, it is not clear 
which interpretation was placed on the concept ccrelated~ nor whether the 1981 understanding has been respected. As a result, 
there are no clear examples in European anti-dumping law of cases in which a broad interpretation is placed on the concept 
ccrelatedu in respect of complainant producers. 
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Such a restrictive interpretation of the concept «related» cannot be challenged from a legal point of 
view. Indeed, as a general rule, exceptions should be interpreteel strictly. Through this legal 
interpretation, European anti-dumping authorities though increase the probability that the 
complainant producers constitute a major proportion of Community production. 
2.2.2.1.2. Non-complainant related producers 
In respect of non-complainant producers, the European anti-dumping authorities do not apply the 
exception to exclude related producers in the same restrictive way as with regard to complainant 
producers. In some instances, their case law may even be said to be at varianee with GA TT and 
European anti-dumping law. 
In a limited number of cases, the European anti-dumping authorities had good reasoos to exclude 
non-complainant producers from the Community industry. In these cases, the related Community 
producer clearly participated in the dumping practices : he and bis dumping parent company sold 
their products through the same corporate sales channels in the Community, and the prices of the 
Community-produced products were aligned to those of the dumped products as the dumping 
parent company controlled the price behaviour on the Community market for both products ; 
through a policy of transfer prices, the related Community producer was, moreover, not only 
shielded from the effects of the dumping, but even benefited from them1063 • · Although the 
exclusion of the non-complainant related producers seems quite reasonable, those cases, however, 
contrast with the inclusion of the main complainant Community producer in another casewhohad 
concluded a pluri-annual contract for supplying the like product to the importer of the dumpeet 
product1064• Indeed, like the non-complainant producers, this Community producer might also 
be said to be benefiting from the dumping. 
However, in most cases, the European anti-dumping authorities have excluded non-complainant 
producers for less decisive reasons. First, non-complainant producers are excluded when they are 
wholly-owned or majority-owned by the dumping exporters. These producers are said to benefit 
1063 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/90 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imp01ts of ball hearings with a 
greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 152/24; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 
of 4 March 1991 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio types of electrooie microcircuits known as EPROMa (erasable 
programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 65/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 
1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5• microdiska) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 9515. 
1064 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 imposing a proVisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of barium 
chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 April 1983, NoL 110/11; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of"barium chloride 
originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, 0 . .1., 20 August 1983, NoL 228128. 
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from the dumping of their parent companies, without any further explanation1065 . However, 
even if they did benefit from the dumping, this is not an indication that they actually behaved 
differently from non-related Community producers. Perhaps, the fact that they did not support the 
anti-dumping complaint was seen as a behaviour different from that of the complainant, though 
unrelated Community producers. Indeed, the evidence of a joint venture between a non-
complainant Community producer and a dumping exporter, along with their refusal to cooperate 
with the European anti-dumping authorities, was advanced to exclude the Community producer 
from the Community industry1066• However, it was not investigated whether the related 
producer refused to cooperate because of bis relationship with a dumping exporter nor whether 
such a refusal is considered a behaviour sufficiently relevant to exclude a Community producer 
from the Community industry. 
Second, the European anti-dumping authorities exclude non-complainant related producers when 
the complainant producers already represent a major proportion of overall Community production, 
regardless of the non-complainant producers being included or not, and irrespective of the 
exclusion of non-complainant producers affecting the outcome of the injury examination or 
not1067• Even if their exclusion does not actually affect the outcome of the injury 
investigation in a particular anti-dumping case- and in some cases the effect of their exclusion on 
the outcome of the injury investigation is not at all examined -, this case law indicates that in 
respect of non-complainant producers a broad interpretation is placed on the exception which 
allows to exclude related producers. For it does not investigate whether, because of their 
relationship with the dumping exporters, the related producers behave differently from non-related 
producers. As exceptions should be interpreted restrictively, such a broad interpretation goes 
against GA TI and European anti-dumping law. A restrictive interpretation, at least, requires that 
Community producers must be included, unless it is shown that they fulfill all conditions for 
1065 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2849/92 of 28 September 1992 modifying the definitivc anti-dumping duty on importsof hall hearings with a 
g~test cxtemal diameter cxcceding 30 mm originating in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85, O.J., 1 October 1992, No L 286/2 
(corrigendum, O.J., 25 March 1993, NoL 72/36). 
1066 Commission Rcgulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
eertaio large elcctrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No 
L 163/27). 
1067 Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12. 
In the sam.e anti-dumping case, a complaining producer with a 50 % share-holding in one of the dumping foreign fmns was 
included merely because injury was found whether or not that Community producer was included (Co:m:mission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mporta of plain paper photocopiers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Geatetner Holding• plc v Council an.d Commis•ion., 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 842), while a Community producer which withdrew bis support to the anti-dumping complaint after having 
been taken over by a Japanase dumping exporter, was excluded without further explanation (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 
of 23 February 1987 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
February 1987, NoL 54/12): 
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exclusion. One of the said conditions is the possible influence the relationship might have on the 
behaviour of related Community producers. 
Third, non-complainant producers are excluded, if they are related to a dumping exporter who is 
not involved in the anti-dumping proceeding1068• This exclusion is undoubtedly legal as 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law require that the exporter to whom the Community 
producer is related, is subject to the anti-dumping proceeding1069• 
Finally, probably in view of the case law as described above, the European anti-dumping 
authorities consider it their consistent practice to exclude non-complainant related producers. 
Indeed, they have excluded the manufacturing subsidiaries of the dumping exporters established in 
the Community, merely because their exclusion was in accordance with their consistent 
practice1070• Whether their claim that this exclusion did also comply with European anti-
dumping law1071, is correct, may be doubted as their consistent practices sametimes involves 
breaches of European, as well as of GA TT anti-dumping law. 
The difference in treatment between complainant and non-complainant related producers is clear 
evidence of a «one-way flexible» case law aimed at securing that the complainant producers 
represent a major proportion of total Community production. As, in many cases, this case law 
involves a violatien of GA TT and European anti-dumping law, the argument of the European anti-
dumping authorities that the support of the anti-dumping complaint shows that the complainant 
producers do notbenefit from the dumping, though tempting, cannot, from a legal point of view, 
be accepted. Moreover, also from an economie point of view, it should be rejected since, as each 
instanee of «one-way flexibility», it increases the probability of anti-dumping relief and, thus, of 
trade restrictions. 
1068 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hall 
hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 152124; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 
1991, No L 65/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Ho~g Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5. 
1069 Sec : Artiele 4.1.(i) GAIT Anti-dumping Code, Artiele 4(1)(i) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 4(5), first indent, basic ECSC Decision 
(«producers related to tbc exporters or importers ( ... )of the allegedly dumped ( ... )product» (emphasis added)). 
Compare with : electronlc typewriters from Japan, where a Community producer importing the product of a producer established in the dumping 
country, was not excluded because that foreign producer wasnotsubject to the anti-dumping proceeding (Commission Decision 93/376/EEC of 16 
June 1993 tcrminating the review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/85 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& ofelectronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, NoL 1S7n6). 
107° Council Regulation (EEC) No 2347/93 of 24 August 1993 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 imposing anti-dumping measurea 
coneerDing import& of eertaio compactdisc players originating in Japan and the Repoblie of Korea, O.J., 25 August 1993, No L 215/4. 
l 071 Council Regulation (EEC) . No . 2347/93 of 24 August 1993 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 imposing anti-dumping measures 
coneerDing import& of eertaio compactdisc players originating in Japan and the Repoblie of Korea, O.J., 25 August 1993, No L 215/4. 
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2.2.2.2. Community producers importing the dumped product 
In principle, Community producers importing the allegedly dumped product are included into the 
Community industry, unless the European anti-dumping authorities decide otherwise ( Artiele 
4.l.(i) GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 4(l)(i) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC 
Decision)1072• As GATI and European. anti-dumping law do not provide many criteria for 
such exclusion, European anti-dumping authorities have a broad discretionary power1073• 
They have made ample use of that discretionary power in defming the concept «allegedly dumped 
product» and in elaborating the conditions onder which Community producers importing the 
dumped product are excluded. 
2.2.2.2.1. The concept ((allegedly dumped product>~ 
European anti-dumping law does not define the concept «allegedly dumped product». At first 
sight, the concept only pertains to the product subject to the anti-dumping proceeding. According 
to the European anti-dumping authorities, it also comprises parts of the dumped product, the 
assembly of which into the like product only involves a low value added1074• If the parts 
imported only represent a minor part of all the components of the like product, their imports will 
not be considered as being identical to the imports of the dumped product1075• This 
1072 Community producers importing the dumped products are not automatically excluded from the Community industry 
(Commission Decision 85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
boots with fitted ice skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, NoL 52/48; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact 
dot-matrix printers originating i~ Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 13Q/12). 
1073 C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council cmd Commission., E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 820 and 839; 
C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 Mayl991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2190-2191; C.J.E.C., case C-
16190, 22 October 1991, Eugen. Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen.-Freihafen., E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5193-5194 (Opinion of Advocate 
General VAN GERVEN); C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1377 (Opinion 
of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1400; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric ln.dustrial Co. Ltd cmd 
Matsushita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1483 ; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Kon.ishirolcu 
Photo InduBtry Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1527; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San.yo Electric Co. Ltd v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1569; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 
1681 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12. 
1074 Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12. 
See also : caravaru for camping an.d part• thereof from Yugoslavia, where the production by the Yugoslavian subsidiary established 
in the Community of caravans with a substantial quantity of dumped parts from Yugoslavia was added to the dumped import& 
(Commission Decision 83/428/EEC of 26 August 1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of caravans for camping and parts thereof originating in Yugoslavia and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., SO August 1983, No L 240/12). As a consequence, the assembly of caravans by the Yugoslavian subsidiary is not 
considered as Community production. 
1075 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/1. 
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interpretation can be accepted because it recognizes that producers also use foreign components, 
but, at the same time, prevents Community producers from benefiting from the dumping by 
importing and assembling cheap parts, while complaining about the dumping. 
2.2.2.2.2. The conditions for excluding producers importing the dumped product 
The European anti-dumping authorities have applied their discretionary power with regard to the 
exclusion of producers importing the dumped product in the same way as with regard to related 
producers. Indeed, they decide on the exclusion of producers importing the dumped product on a 
case-by-case basis, on reasonable and equitable grounds and in the light of all relevant 
facts1076 and it is their general practice to exclude such importers only when the latter have 
either participated in the dumping practices, are shielded from the effect of the dumped imports, 
draw undue benefits from them or import such quantities in relation to their own production that 
they no longer can be considered as being committed to production in the Community1077• 
They also require strong evidence of this in order to exclude complainant producers importing the 
dumped product because they hold that such producers, by supporting the anti-dumping 
1076 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors 
originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 162/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163/27) ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic .of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Commission Decision 
93/376/EEC of 16 June 1993 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/Só 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, No 
L 157n6; Council Regulation (EC) No 643194 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive 
anti-dumping duties on imports of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1. 
See also: C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council an.d Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 839; 
C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2190-2191 ; C.J.E.C., case C-
16190, 22 October 1991, Eugen Nölle v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5195 (Opinion of Advocate General 
VAN GERVEN). 
1077 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3482/92 of 30 November 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio large electrolytic 
aluminium capaciton originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 3 December 1992, No L 353/1 
(corrigendum, O.J., 28 January 1993, No L 19/34); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importa of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" microdiska) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 
April 1993, No L 95/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing detinitive anti-dumping duties on imports of eertaio 
seamleaa pipe1 and tubea, of iron or non-alloy atccl, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and definitively collecting 
provisional anti-dumping dutiea, O.J., 15 May 1993, NoL 120/34; Commission Decision 93/376/EEC of 16 June 1993 terminating the review of 
anti-dumping meaaurca adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/85 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electrooie 
typewriten originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, NoL 157176; Council Regulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 3068/92 in reapeet of definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 
24 March 1994, NoL 80/1. 
Conversely, they will include a Community producer in the Community industry, when bis imports of the dumped products are part of nonnal and 
sound businesa practice (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of &erial-
impact dot-matrix printen originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio compactdisc playen originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No 
L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257n7)). 
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complainant, consider themselves entitled to anti-dumping relief1078 • Hence, they also 
announce a «<ne-way flexible» case law in which complainant producers importing the dumped 
product are seldom excluded. 
2.2.2.2.2.1. Complainant producers importing the dumped product 
European anti-dumping case law is indeed «one-way flexible» as the European anti-dumping 
authorities have found many reasoos why complainant Community producers should not be 
excluded from the Community industry. Indeed, producers importing the dumped product will be 
included if : 
their imports of the dumped product do not have a detrimental effect on the other Community 
producers1079 ; 
lO?S Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
eertaio large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No 
L 163/27); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3482/92 of 30 November 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio large 
electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 3 December 1992, No 
L 353/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 28 January 1993, NoL 19/34). 
If the dumping exporten do not substantiate their request for excluding Community producers from the Community industry because of their 
importing the dumped product, their request will be rejected (Council Regulation (EC) No 229/94 of 1 February 1994 imposing definitive anti-
dumping duties on imports into the Community of ethanolamine originating in the United States of America, and collecting definitively the 
pJ;Ovisionalanti-dumping dutiea, O.J., 2 February 1994, NoL 28/40). 
1079 C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Company Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, 
(5855), 5906 and 5923; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Bilver Seiko Limited a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, 
(5927), 5980; C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdinga plc v Coun.cil an.d Commi&sion, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 822 
and 839-840; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitiv~ anti-dumping duty on imports of 
plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 
June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium 
capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, NoL 152/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, NoL 163/27). 
Conversely, ifthe imports ofthe dumped product have a negative impact on other Community producers, the Community producers 
importing the dumped product will he excluded (Com.mission Regulation . (EEC) No 2812/85 of 7 October 1985 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic·typewriters manufactured by Nakajima All Co. Ltd. originating in Japan, 
O.J., 9 October 1985, No L 266/5). 
------.- - --------~-. 
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the Community producer resells the dumped product at a price not lower than the price 
charged for his own product1080 ; 
the Community producer does not unduly benefit from the resale of the dumped product by 
charging too high a price for the dumped product1081 ; 
the Community producer's imports of the dumped product do not contribute to the fall of the 
overall price level on the Community market, as the resale price charged by the Community 
producer for the dumped product is undercut by the prices charged by the dumping exporters 
or importers1082 ; 
108° C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E. C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1398-1399 ; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 
10 March 1992, MatswhittJ Electric InduBtrial Co. Ltd cmd Matsushila Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 
1482; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo IndUBtry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1526; 
C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electria Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1567; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 
March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1679; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 
1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, 
No L 239/5; Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imparts of binder 
and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, NoL 34/55; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain paper photocopiers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J.; 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Council Regulation (EEC)·No 
. 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia 
and accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion with imparts of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, 
NoL 317/1; Comm.iuion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No 
L 95/5. 
1081 CommiBBÎon Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of serial-
impaet dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 
March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of paint, distemper, varnish and similor brushes orginating in the 
People's Republic of China and definitively colleeting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, No 
L 79/24 ; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imparts of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and terminating the investigation, 
O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/48. 
Conversely, ü the Community producer is one of the i.m.porters buying a significantly increasing volume at the lowest prices, he 
will not be included in the Community industry (Commission Decision 85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imparts of certain boots with fitted ice skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania 
and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, NoL 62/48). 
1082 C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1400; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 
March 1992, Matsushila Electric InduBtrial Co. Ltd and Matsushila Electria Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 
1483; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo InduBtry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1527; 
C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electria Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1568; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 
March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Councîl, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1680; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 
1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, 
NoL 239/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 of 23 February 1987 i.mposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12. 
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the volume of the dumped product imported by the Community producer is relatively sma111083 · 
lOSJ C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, October 6, 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y (TEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 6906 
and 6923; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273186 and 107/86, 6 October 1988, Siluer Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 6980; 
C.J.E.C., case 166/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commi .. ion, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 842; C.J.E.C., case 
C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Ahlubail Fertilizer Compan.y and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Compan.y v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3216 
(Opinion of Advocate General DARMON); C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Riooh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1336), 
1398-1399; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Matsuahila Electric Industrial Co. Ltd and Matsushila Electric Trading Co. Ltd 
v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409}, 1482; C.J.E.d., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo InduBtry Co. Ltd v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1626; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San.yo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1536), 
1667; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1636), 1679; Commission Regulation 
(EEC} No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating 
in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 636/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 64/12; Commission 
Regulation (EEC} No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, 
O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of 
urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia 
and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1; Council Regulation (EEC} No 3906/88 of 12 December 
1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, NoL 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importsof synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States 
of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof paint, distemper, varnishand similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of 
China and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such import&, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact 
disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 206/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 257/27); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3482192 of 30 November 1992 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, 
O.J., 3 December 1992, NoL 36311 (corrigendum, O.J., 28 January 1993, NoL 19/34}; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 650/93 of 
6 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
11 March 1993, NoL 68/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 16 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on importsof certain magnatie disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 
April 1993, NoL 96/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports 
of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and 
definitively collecting provisional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 15 May 1993, No L 120/34; Council Regulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 
March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties on importsof potassium chloride 
originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April1994 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the 
Russian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/21; Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 
21 May 1994, NoL 129/24; Commission Regulation (EC} No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50. 
Conversely, the Community producer will not he included in the Community industry, he is the largest importer of the dumped 
product& in the Community (Commission Decision 85/143/EEC of 18 February 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain boots with fitted ice skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 
22 February 1986, NoL 62/48). 
The defmition of a tcrelatively small volume» is, however, relativa. As a «relatively small volume" have, therefore, been 
considered, import& of the dumped product repreaenting : 
leas than 26 % of the Community producer's production sold in the Community (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 
27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour telavision receivers originating in 
Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No 
L 266/60); 
7 % of the total sales and rentals of the Community producer importing the dumped product and less than 1 % of the total 
sales and rentals on the Community market by all Community producers (C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. 
Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335}, 1398-1399; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushila Electric InduBtrial Co. 
Ltd and Matsushila Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1482; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, 
Konishiroku Photo Industry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), $1526; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San.yo 
Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1636), 1567; Council Regulation (EEC) No 636/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a 
421 
the imports of the dumped product are necessary for the survival of the Community producer 
(so-called self-defence strategy)1084 ; 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No 
L 54112); 
between O.SS% and 5.34% of totalsales of all Community producers (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 
1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the. German Demoeratic 
Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating 
these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1); 
up to 7 (,f, of the total sales on the Community market by the Community producers importing the dumped product 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No 
L 95/5); 
2 % of the total sales on the Community market by the Community producer importing the dumped product (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc 
players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September.1989, No 
L 257127)); 
1.2 % of the sales on the Community market by the Community producers importing the dumped product, and up to 2 % of 
the total dumped import& (Council Regulation (EC) No 229/94 of 1 February 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on 
import& into the Community of ethanolamine originating in the United Statea of America, and collecting definitively the 
provisional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 2 February 1994, No L 28/40) ; 
leas than 0.5 % of the Community market (Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertak.ings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia 
and terminating the investigation with regard to these · countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 
May 1994, No L 129/24) ; 
only 3 % of total dumped imports (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5). 
Thus, if the right explanation can be found, a larger volume of imported dumped produets can be considered to repreeent only a 
ccrelatively small volume ... · .. 
lOS4 C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2102-2103 (Report for 
the Hearing : conclusions of the Council) and 2191 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2936/82 of 28 October 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 4 November 1982, No L 30817; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 997/85 of 18 April1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof glycine originating in Japan, 
O.J., 19 April 1985, NoL 107/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2221185 of 29 July 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dlimping 
duty on import& of basic chromium sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 August 1985, No L 205/12; Council Decision 
87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion with imports of binder and haler twine originating in 
BraziJ and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, No L 34155; Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 
February 1987 accepting an undertak.ing given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of paint, 
distemper, varnishand similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 
February 1987, No L 46/45 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 of 23 November 1988 imposing a defiilitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of eerlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar 
brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, 
O.J., 22 March 1989, NoL 79124; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 
(corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27); Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 a,ccepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong 
Kong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/48 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating 
in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No 
L 58/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 Octc;>ber 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic 
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the Community producer must offer a full range of modelsof the like product and, therefore, 
imports only certain moelels of the dumped product1085, for the European anti-dumping 
disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and collecting definitively the provisional 
duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, No L 262/4 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 584194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating 
the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of 
ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan; O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129124. 
The self-defence strategy argument is not accepted unconditionally: 
according to Advocate General LENZ, the Europaan anti-dumping authorities are entitled to treat imports of the dumped 
product as measures of self-defence on the part of the importers, if the size and growth of the share of the market to which 
the imported products belong, could not be treated ad insignificant (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All 
Precision Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2158 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ)); 
according to Advocate General VAN GERVEN, the high share (two thirds) of the dumped products imported by the 
Community producers in total dumped imports raises doubts about the credibility of the self-defence strategy argument ; 
the Europaan anti-dumping authorities have rejected the self-defence strategy argument because the market share held by 
the importing Community producer's own production had increased, as the Community producer was importing the dumped 
product. Moreover, the Community producer in question was the largest importer of the dumped product in the Community 
and was one of the importers buying a significantly increasing volume at the lowest prices (Commission Decision 85/143/EEC 
of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain boots with fitted ice skates 
originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, No L 52/48). Conversely, a 
Community producer whose purebases of the dumped product were accompanied by a proportional drop in the rate of 
utilization of his production capacity, has been included (Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing importsof ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/117); 
the self-defence strategy argument also fails to convince either when the Community producer is able to produce an identical 
product type, even when the ability to supply a product more quickly than by waiting for Community production to come on-
stream enables the Community producer to better defend his overall position (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 
February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
February 1987, NoL 54/12). 
lOBS C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, October 6, 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y (TEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 5906 
and 5923; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273/85 and 107/86, 6 October 1988, Bilver Seiko Limited a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5980; 
C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, GeBtetn.er HoldingB plc v Coun.cil an.d CommiBBion, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 839-840; C.J.E.C., 
case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalcqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E. C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2191 ; C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 June 
1991, Al-.Jubail Fertilizer Compan.y an.d Saudi Arabian. Fertilizer Compan.y v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3216 (Opinion of 
Advocate Genera!· DARMON); C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March Ü~92, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C;R., 1992, I, (1335), 1400; 
C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, MatBushila Electric InduBtrial Co. Ltd and MatBushila Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1483; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo Industry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, 
I, (1493), 1527 ; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San.yo Electric Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E. C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1568 ; C.J.E.C., 
case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1680; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, 
O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 
1989, No L 205/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27) ; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of photo albums originating in South Korea 
and HongKong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 
February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, 
originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 5 March 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 
1993, NoL 58112. 
In this respect, it is sometimes pointed out that, because of the effect of the dumping on their profitability, the Community 
producers do not manufacture the models which they import (C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1400; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, MatsUBhila Electric Industrial Co. Ltd an.d MatBUBhila 
Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1483; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo 
InduBtry Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1527; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San.yo Electric Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1568; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1680; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 
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authorities consider it absolutely normal that big companies engaged in international business 
buy part of their range of models from other producers1086 and do so on a permanent 
basis1087 . , 
a company which is part of the same economie group as the Community producer, imports 
the dumped products which it uses as component in its production process, in order to enjoy 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No 
L 54/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 
November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 
24 November 1988, No L 317/33 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 
(corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27)). 
Moreover, the fact that the gains from import&, needed to fill up the range of models, are short-lived and limited. in scope has 
supported the inclusion of the Community producer within the Community industry (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 
February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
February 1987, NoL 54112). 
The fact that the dumped products imported by a Community producer are similar to or compete with the Community producer's 
own manufactured product does not prevent this Community producer from being considered part of the Community induBtry 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of photo albums originating in South Korea 
and HongKong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48). 
Community producers are also allowed to import dumped products in anticipation of their own production (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 997/85 of 18 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 19 
April 1985, No L 107/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
. impt>rts ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54112). 
On the other hand, Community producerswhohave practically stopped all production activities and have replaced it by importsof 
the dumped product, are not included in the Community indUBtry (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May .1987 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in Libya and Saudi 
Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago änd Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 
November 1987, No L 317/1; Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing imports of ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 
March 1990, NoL 831117). 
1086 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 
1988, No L 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No 
L 3418. 
1087 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12. 
Compare with the opinion of. the Council dat the need to produce a full range of models is no excuse for allegedly dumping 
exporters to sell some oftheir models at a loss (C.J.E.C., case C-178/87, 10 March 1992, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1577), 1593-1594 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the Council) and 1614 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO)). · 
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the same competitive advantages as its competitors which have free access to the low-priced 
dumped exports1088• 
If only one of those conditions is fulfilled, a producer importing the dumped product may be 
included in the Community industry, even if, on the basis of the other conditions, he should be 
excluded 1089• Moreover, this list is not exhaustive and does not rule out other grounds for 
1088 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1451/92 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
eertaio large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No 
L 163127); Conuniaaion Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisionalanti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio types 
of electrooie microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acccu memories) originating in tbe Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, 
NoL 272/13. 
1089 Community producers importing the like product have been included : 
because the detrimental effect, on the other Community producers, of importing dumped products was outweighted by the fact 
that the Comm.unity producer in question imported only a low volume of dumped products (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12 ; C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Coun.cil and 
Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 842); 
because the Community producer imported only a low volume of dumped products, though no evidence could he produced that 
bis decision to import the dumped products was based on grounds of self-protection (C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, 
Gestetner Holdings plc v Coun.cil and Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 842); 
because their resale transactions at low prices are of limited importance, notwithstanding the fact that their too low rasale 
prices were on their own an obstacle for including the Community producers in question (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 
1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia 
and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1) ; 
because the effect of their imports contributing to a lowering of the overall price level in the Community was substantially 
outweighted by the effects on prices resulting from the massive volume of imports on the Community market by the dumping· 
exporters and importers (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5); 
because the dumped product was imported in order to complete the range of products for distribution, notwithstanding the 
relatively high volume of imported dumped products (25 % of total sales of the Community producer in question) (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc 
players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 257/27)); 
because the models imported belong to the most important segment of the market which had recently grown significantly 
faster than the total market and because the Community producers in question wanted to regain their original market 
shares, notwithatanding the relatively high volume of imported dumped product& (10.68 %, 28.9% and 47.4% of the total 
production of the Community producer importing the dumped product) (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 of 23 November 
1988 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
November 1988, NoL 317/33); 
because the substantial volume of dumped products (one third of the total sales on the Community market of the Community 
producers importing the dumped product) was imported by the Community producers as an act of self-defence (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdisb) originating in Japan, Tai~an and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April1993, NoL 95/6); 
because the dumped product was imported in order to complete the range of products for distribution and because the low 
volume of the dumped product was imported, though the self-defence strategy argument was not accepted (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12). 
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justifying the inclusion of Community producers importing the dumped product in the Community 
industry1090• 
As a consequence, a producer will but very rarely be excluded for importing the dumped product. 
The exception to the general rule under which the Community industry should be determined with 
reference to all Community producers, is, thus, being interpreteel restrictively with regard to 
complainant producers importing the dumped product. Accordingly, the restrictive interpretatiori 
of the exception to exclude producers importing the dumped product results in «one-way 
flexibility» since the probability that the complainant producers will represent a major proportion 
of overall Community production increases, as more complainant producers are included into the 
Community industry. Of course, as always, such «one-way flexibility», from an economie point 
of view, is not warranted, as it increases the probability of trade restrictive anti-dumping relief, 
though, from a legal point of view, it cannot be challenged for being illegal. 
2.2.2.2.2.2. Non-complainant producers importing the dumped product 
European anti-dumping case law appears to be less «one-way flexible» in respect of non-
complainant producers whoimport the dumped product. In two out of the three cases, though, in 
which the possible exclusion of a non-complainant producers had to be investigated, the producer 
was excluded. But, in one of those cases in which non-complainant producers were excluded, 
they had imported a rather high volume of dumped imports1091 • 
However, appearances may be deceptive. First, in the other of those two cases, the exclusion of 
the non-complainant producer was hardly explained : the European anti-dumping authorities only 
relied on the fact that the producer «would be potentially shielded from renewed dumped 
imports»1092• In sharp contrast with their case law in respect of complainant producers, the 
European anti-dumping authorities did noteven explain why he would be shielded. 
If a Community producer causing injury to the other Community producers because of his importing the dumped product, is 
included in the Community indUBtry for other reasons, his imports are taken into account in assessing the injurious effects of the 
dumping on the other Community producers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24: February 1987, NoL 54/12). 
109° C.J.B.C., caae C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail FeT1ilizer Company and Saudi Arabian FeT1ilizer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, 
(3187), 3216 (Opinion of Advocate General DARMON). 
1091 In particular, thc import quantities exceeded the producers' Community production aold in the Community and, thus, it could rightly be 
argued that thc corc of their buainess activities took pl~ce outside the Community (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50). 
1092 Commiuion Decision 93/376/EEC of 16 June 1993 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation 
(BBC) 1698/85 imposing a dcfinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electrooie typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, No 
L 157176. 
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Second, the inclusion of the non-complainant producer in the third case cannot be considered to be 
the exception to the rule that non-complainant producers are always excluded. Indeed, the 
exporter the product of whom was imported by the non-complainant Community producer, was 
not subject to the anti.;.dumping proceeding1093• Accordingly, bis products could not be 
alleged to have been dumped (Article 4.l.(i) GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 4(l)(i) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(5), frrst indent, basic ECSC Decision) and, consequently, the importsof bis 
products could not constitute a reasoil for excluding the non-complainant Commlinity producer. 
Nevertheless, the second case shows that there is less «<ne-way flexibility» in respect of non-
complainant producers who import the dumped product, when compared to the «one-way 
flexibility» applied in respect of non-complainant producers who are related to the dumping 
exporters. For the latter are excluded because the exporters to whom they are related were not 
involved in the anti-dumping proceeding1094• As this exclusion was illegal, it can be 
concluded that European anti-dumping case law is less «one-way flexible>> with regard to non-
complainant exporters who import the dumped product, in that it does not exclude them on illegal 
grounds. 
2.2.2.3. Integrated Community producers 
Some anti-dumping cases limit the Community industry to non-integrated Community producers, 
i.e., producers who do not transfer their products to integrated producers for further processing 
(i.e. , . on the so-called captive mar ket), but who sell them on the open mar ket. The integrated 
Community producers manufacturing the product for their captive market are, thus, implicitly, 
excluded from the Community in dustry. However, no explicit provision in GA TI or European 
anti-dumping law provides the exclusion of integrated Community producers. It bas been argued 
that this exclusion, though, is not contrary to GATI nor European anti-dumping law, when the 
non-integrated Community producers represent a major proportion of overall Community 
production1095• However, European anti-dumping case law usually does not pay any attention 
to the question whether the non-integrated Community producers by themselves represent a major 
1093 Commission Decision 93/376/EEC of 16 June 1993 tenninating the review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation 
(EEC) 1698/85 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electrooie typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 Junc 1993, No 
L 157176. 
1094 Supra, 415. 
1095 VERMULST, EA., Antidumping Law and Practice in the Uniled State• and the European .Communities. A Comparative 
Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 633. 
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proportion of total Community production1096• In only one anti-dumping case, it was 
observed that the sole Community producer active on the open market accounted for some 20 % 
of total Community production1097, which is clearly less than the 25 % threshold retained as 
the minimum for constituting a major proportion of overall Community production ( Artiele 5 .4. 
GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 5(4) basic EC Regulation)1098• Thus, the exclusion of 
integrated Community producers cannot be based on the requirement that the Community industry 
should represent a major proportion of overall Community production. 
As a consequence, the question whether the exclusion of integrated Community producers is 
illegal, subsists. The opinions are divided on this issue : some think it illegal for lack of any legal 
basis1099 ; others hold that no legal basis is required1100• Neither of those arguments can 
be up held : a legal basis is required and provided by the concept .clike product», as European anti-
dumping law specifies that the Community producers who constitute the Community industry 
should produce the like product. Indeed, the captive market does not form part of the relevant 
like product market, unless there is competition or, in more accurate economie terms, a sufficient 
degree of substitutability between the two markets1101 • Substitutability seems only to be 
possible if prices on the open market are so extremely low that it becomes more profitable for the 
integrated Community producer to stop (or to reduce) bis own production and to buy on the open 
market A new situation may then emerge : he may become a Community producer importing the 
dumped products, a case which is explicitly regulated under GA TI and European anti-dumping 
law (Article 4.l.(i) GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 4(l)(i) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(5) 
1096 In stereo CtiBsette tape heads from Japan and hermetic compressors from Brazi~ Spain, Hungary, Japan and Singapore no 
trace can he found regarding the share of non-integrated Community producers in total Community production (Commission 
Decision 80/316/EEC of 14 March 1980 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning stereo cassette tape heads originating · 
in Japan, O.J., 16 March 1980, No L 69/64; Commission Decision 81/247/EEC of 16 April 1981 terminating the anti-dumping 
procedure concerning imparts of hermetic compressors originating in Brazil, Spain, Hungary, Japan and Singapore, O.J., 26 April 
1981, NoL 113163). 
1097 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 163183 of 21 January 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, NoL 23/9. 
1098 VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F ., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Proteetion La.ws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 
118; VERMULST, EA., Antidumping La.w and Practice in the United States and the European Communities. A Comparative 
Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,631. See supra, 408-409. 
1099 DIDIER, P., ecDeux années d'application du nouveau règlement antidumping de la CEEn, Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1982, 
(21), 44. 
llOO BESELER, J.-F., Die Abweh.r uon Dumping und Subventionen durch. die Europäische Gemeinsch.aften, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1980, 106. 
1101 C.J.E.C., case C-316/90, 27 November 1991, Groupement des Industries de Matériels d'Equipement Electrique et de 
l'Electronique lnustrielle Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5589), 5618. 
Campare with: C.J.E.C., case 322/81, 9 November 1983, NV Nederlandsche Banden-lndustrie-Michelin v Commission, E.C.R., 1983, 
(3461), 3603-3610, where products with identical physical and technica! characteristics were considered to belong to different 
product markets because of a different demand structure in these markets. Undoubtedly, the demand structure in the captive 
market differa from that in the free market. 
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basic ECSC Decision) ; or he may become part of a Community processing industry buying the 
(dumped or non-dumped) product, whose interests in the anti-dumping proceeding are being 
considered in the assessment of the so-called «Community interests»1102, rather than in the 
injury investigation. On the other hand, if there is no sufficient degree of substitutability, the 
products sold on the captive market are not like products sold on the open market. As a result, 
the output of the integrated Community . producers must not be included in total Community 
production, nor should integrated Community producers be included in the Community 
industry1103• If it is correct that products on the captive market are not like products, imports 
of those products coming from the dumping country should equally be disregarded1104• On 
the other hand, the complainant non-integrated Community producers' output must represent a 
major proportion of overall Community production in the free market1105• 
2.2.2.4. Regional industries 
In some exceptional circumstances, the Community, for the production of the like product, may 
be divided into two or more competitive markets, whereas the producers within each market may 
be regarded as a Community industry. This is the case, 
(a) if the producers within such market sell all or almost all their production of the product in 
question in that market, and 
(b) if the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the 
product in question located elsewhere in the Community. 
If those conditions are fulfilled cumulatively1106, in jury may be found to exist even where a 
major proportion of the total Community industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration 
of dumped imports into such an isolated market and provided. further that the dumped imports are 
causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such market (Article 
1102 lnfra, 606-617. 
11 OJ Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of I September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 
1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/12. 
1104 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783/94 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of. fu.rfuraldehyde 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11. 
11 OS lt is not clear whether the European anti-dumping authorities share this point of view. However, it seems that they do not as they have held 
that the «separation (between free and caplive market) only concerns the assessment of injury and does not infer a reduction of the size of the 
Community industry for purposes of its qualification under Artiele 4(5) (former basic EC legislation (now : Artiele 4(1) basic EC Regulation and 
Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision))• (Council Regulation (EC) No 486/94 of 4 March 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imporlil of 
fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 5 March 1994, No 
L 62/1). 
ll06 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16. 
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4.1.(ii) GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 4(1)(ii) basic EC Regulation · Artiele 4(5) basic 
ECSC Decision). 
In accordance with GA TI and European anti-dumping law, the European anti-dumping authorities 
only very rarely have divided the Community into regional markets. In many cases, there was no 
need to do so, because the production in such regional markets constituted a major proportion of 
overall Community production so that the Community producers on that regional market by 
themselves could be considered a Community industry for the whole Community market1107. 
Only in nine anti-dumping cases, it was explicitly investigated whether a regional market 
existed1108• It follows from those cases : 
1107 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 261f17 of 4 February 1977 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on hall hearings, 
tapered roller hearings and parts thereof originating in Japan, O.J., 5 February 1977, No L 34/60; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
177Bn7 of 26 July 1977 coneerDing the application of the anti-dumping duty on hall hearings and tapered roller hearings, 
originating in Japan, O.J., 3 August 1977, NoL 196/1; Commission Recommendation No 496179/ECSC of 13 March 1979 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Greece, O.J., 15 March 1979, No L 65/16; 
Commission Decision 80/531/EEC of 23 May 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings 
concerning certain stainless steel bars originating in Brazil and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 28 May 1980, NoL 131/18; 
Conncil Regulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 February 1981 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on certain chem.ical fertilizer 
originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 12 February 1981, NoL 39/4; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1101/81 of 23 
April1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on potato granules originating in Canada, O.J., 28 April 1981, No L 116/11; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1590/81 of 10 June 1981 repealing a national anti-dumping duty on louvre doors, originating in 
Taiwan, imposed under the transitional provisions of the 1972 Act of AcceBBion, O.J., 16 June 1981, No L 158/5 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating 
in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11114 ; Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing imports of codeïne and its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 
January 1983, No L 16/30; CommiBBion Recommendation No 376/83/ECSC of 14 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 17 February 1983, No L 45/14 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of outer rings of tapered 
roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9n. 
HOS Commission Decision 83/626/EEC of 12 December 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of 
saccharin and its aalts originating in China, the Republic of Korea and the United Statesof America, O.J., 15 December 1983, No 
L 352/49 ; Commission Decision 85/209/EEC of 26 March 1985 a~epting the undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping inveBtigation coneerDing imports of plasterboard of Spanish origin into Ireland and Northern Ireland and terminating 
that inveBtigation, O.J., 29 March 1985, No L 89/65 ; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings 
entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports into Greece of certain categorie& of glaBB 
originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 
February 1986, No L 51f13 ; CommiBBion Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning importsof Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, 
NoL 202/43; Commiasion Decision 871236/EEC of 10 April1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on importsof aynthetic 
fibres of polyestere originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No 
L 103/38 ; Commission Decision 91/29/EEC of 11 January 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
Portland cement originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1991, NoL 16/34; Commission Decision 91/256/EEC of 14 May 1991 
accepting undertakings ofTered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of welded wire-mesh originating 
in Yugoslavia and terminating the inveBtigation, O.J., 18 May 1991, No L 123154 ; Commission Decision 91/392/EEC) of 21 June 
1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain asbestos cement 
pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, NoL 209/37; Commission Decision 941293/EC 
of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of ammonium 
nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129124. 
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a Memher State does not constitute a regional market if the Community producers established 
outside that Memher State, for one year, hold a share of 30 % in the market of this Memher 
State1109 ; 
a Memher State constitutes a regional market if the Community producers established in that 
Memher State sell almost all their production (between 93 and 99 %) in that market and if the 
Community producers established elsewhere in the Community hold no substantial share 
(between 0.19 and 5.5 %) in that market1110• 
GA TI and European anti-dumping law, thus, impose a shipment test. The test is based on two 
criteria : «little in from the outside» (LIFO) and «little out from the inside>> (LOFI)1111• It is 
assumed that two areas constitute the same goograpbic market if substantial shipments take place 
between these two areas. Such assumption is, indeed, right. However, the reverse does not 
. always hold. lndeed, the fact that, at a certain moment in time, there are no substantial shipments 
between two areas, does not prove that those areas are not in the same geographic market1112• 
Even a small price increase in one area may result in imports from the other areas1113• In 
other words, the fact that, at a certain moment in time, no shipments take place between two 
1109 Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April1987, NoL 103/38. 
1110 Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings antered into in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51/73; èommission 
Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Portland cement originating 
in the Germ.an Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43; Commission Decision 91129/EEC of 
11 January 1991 term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof Portland cement originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 
22. January 1991, NoL 16/34; Commission Decision 91/392/EEC) of 21 June 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain asbestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, NoL 209/37. 
1111 ELZINGA, K.G., and HOGARTY, T .F., .cThe Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits", Antitrut 
Bulletin, 1973, (4ó), 45-81. 
1112 AREEDA, P., ccMarket Definition and Horizontal Restraints,,, Antitruat Law Journal, 1983, (553), 572-573. 
1113 It is recognized that the LIFO-LOFI shipment test does not maasure potential competition. It only takes account of actual 
competition, see: ELZINGA, K.G., and HOGARTY, T.F., .cThe Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of 
Coal», Antitru.t Bulletin, 1978, (1), 9. 
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areas, does not mean that there is no substitutability between the products sold in those 
areas1114• The assumption that two areas are not in the same goograpbic market if no 
shipments take place between those two areas, will only hold if a sufficiently long period is taken 
into account. It is impossible to ascertain whether European anti-dumping case law pays enough 
attention to the period taken into account. For only one anti-dumping case in which a regional 
market was found indicates, without further explanation, that a perioei of four years was taken into 
account1115• It depends of course on the characteristics of the product (e.g., the frequency of 
price fluctuations and the responsiveness of the market to price fluctuations) whether such a period 
of four years is sufficient. Clearly, the choice of the period allows a «one-way flexible» 
application of the shipment test : by choosing a short period in which no shipments take place 
between two areas, it is possible to show that the Community market can be divided in regional 
markets, though, over a langer period of time, the Community market would proveto constitute 
but one geographic market. This could be explicitly desired, if only Community producers 
established within a ·certain goograpbic area suffer from the dumping. European anti-dumping law 
should require to considera sufficiently long period of time into account in order to exclude such 
«one-way flexibility». 
-
1114 The substitutability of products sold in different areas should he measured by means of cross-elasticity of demand and supply. 
In fact, product& sold in different markets are products differ~ntiated on a geographical basis. They are, thus, differentiated in the 
same way as product& with different physical and technical characteristics. . 
Because there is a parallelism between geographically differentiated products and physically or technically differentiated products, 
it has been suggested to determine the relevant geographic market by mea.ns of the similarity of price movements. However, the 
use of the similarity of price movements imposes the same practical difficulties for geographically differentiated products as for 
physically or technically differentiated products. See : AREEDA, P., ccMarket Definition and Horizontal Restraints,,, Antitrust La.w 
Journal, 1983, (553), 566-576 ; HOROWITZ, 1., ccMarket Definition in Antitrust Analysis : A Regression-Based Approaclu,, Southern 
Economie Journal, 1981-1982, (1), 1-16; SCHEFFMAN, D.T., and SPILLER, P.T., ccGeographic Market Definition under the U.S. 
Department of Justice Merger Guideline&», Journal of Law an.d Economics, 1987, (123), 129 ; STIGLER, G.J., and SHERWIN, R.A., 
ccThe Extent of the Mar ket., Joumal of Law and Economics, 1985, (555), 555-585 ; supra, 392, note 1003 
Another metbod proposed for defining the relevant geographical market consiste of a combination of a shipment and a price test. 
The price teat is baeed on the assumption that within a regional market only one price prevails. Therefore, a regreesion model is 
elaborated in order to acljust prices for all differences which may affect prices (differences in transport coats, physical differences, 
etc.). The shipment test is based on the assumption that two areas with simHar supply patterne are within the same geograhic 
market. See : SHRIEVES, R.E., ccGeographic Market Areas and Market Structure in the Bituminous Coal lndustry,,, Antitrust 
Bulletin, 1978, (589), 589-625. This metbod cannot he accepted either. First, as it is difficult to make accurate price acljustments, 
unity of acljusted prices does not necessarily indicate that two areas are in the same market, nor do different acljusted prices 
necessarily indicate that there are separate regional markets. Second, the proposed shipment test is not complete. lndeed, it may 
result in the finding of a regional mar ket, if that market is self-sufficient. It then ignores the exports out of that market to other 
areas. See : ELZINGA, K.G., and HOGARTY, T .F., ccThe Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited : The Case of Coal .. , 
Antitrust Bulletin., 1978, (1), 5-7. 
1115 Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings antered into in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, NoL 51173. 
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Another «<ne-way flexible» aspect of the definition of a regional market concerns the fact that 
imports from non-Memher States are disregarded1116• Thus, a regional market may be found, 
though the dumped product is also imported into the rest of the Community1117• However, 
imports from non-Memher States, such as the dumped imports, may be a reason for not dividing 
the Community into separate regional markets. Indeed, if a country imports a product in different 
regional markets of the Community, each regional market will be affected by the other. If, for 
example, the price of a product goes· up in one regional market, the importer of that product will 
supply more of his product in that regional market. This will cause his sales in the other regional 
markets to drop, if he is unable to increase bis production. As a result, overall supply in these 
1116 GATrand European anti-dumping law, nevertheless, require that there must he a concentration of dumped i.mports in the 
regional market for. injury to a regional induBtry to he found (Article 4.1.(ii) GATr Anti-dumping Code i Artiele 4(1Xii) basic EC 
Regulation i Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision). This requirement, however, does not concern the determination of a regional 
industry. It only pertains tothe finding of injury caused to a regional industry. lndeed, in the two European anti-dumping cases in 
which a regional induBtry was found, no attention was paid to any kind of i.mports from outside the Community for determining 
whether there was a regional industry, see: Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings antered 
into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in 
Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, 
No L 51/73 ; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing i.mports of 
Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43. 
1117 In glass from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Roman.ia, Bulgaria, Hungary an.d Cze~hoslouakia the Greek producers were found to 
reprasent a regional industry. Nevertheless, dumping was also practised in the other Memher States. The dumping exporters 
there held a market share of 25 % while in Greece the dumping exporters' market share amounted to 55 % (Commission Decision 
86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings antered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
i.mports into Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and term.inating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51!73). 
In Portland cement from the German. Democratie Republic, Polan.d an.d Yugoslavia the volume of the dumped imports and their 
market share were specified not only for the regional markets, but also for the entire Community market : 
volume market share 
(tonnes) (%) 
Denmark 25 145 1.86 
Iraland 18 038 1.32 
United Kingdom 116 019 0.78 
Community 552 101 0.47 
(Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of Portland cement 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43). 
On the basis of the data about volume and market share of the dumped i.mports, the volume of consumption on each mar ket, the 
relativa share of each market in total Community consumption and the share of dumped i.mports into each market in respect of 
total dumped imports in the Community can he calculated : 
consumption share in total Community share in total dumped 
consumption i.mports 
(tonnes) {%) (%) 
Denmark 1351882 1.15 4.55 
Iraland 1 366 515 1.16 21.01 
United Kingdom 1487 423 1.27 3.27 
Other Memher States 113 262 478 96.42 71.17 
Community 117 468 298 100.00 100.00 
The dumped product is, thus, i.mported in the whole of the Community. However, the dumped imports are more concentrated in 
Denmark, lreland and the United Kingdom, especially in view of their respective share in total Community consumption. 
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other regional markets will fall and, consequently, the prices in these markets will nse. 
Moreover, imports, including the dumped imports, can prevent intra-Community trade. They can 
have such a depressive effect on prices in the entire Community market that Community 
producers can only supply their local market at a profit. Nevertheless, all Community producers 
are potentlal competitors and, therefore, are in the same geographic market Thus, by 
disregarding imports, separate regional markets may be easier to fmd. 
3. INJURYSTANDARDS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The present section examines the requirement that the Community industry must suffer in jury. 
The injury must be material (section 3.2.). Under GATT and European anti-dumping law three 
injury standards are being distinguished : actual injury (section 3.3.), threat of injury (section 
3.4.) and retardation of the establishment of a Community industry (section 3.5.) (Article VI(1) 
and (6)(a) GATI ; Note 1 ad Artiele 3 GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(1) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). 
The present section shows how the vagueness of the injury requirement would allow to always 
find injury («one-way flexibility»). lndeed, any negative factor concerning the status of the. 
Community industry may be decisive for a finding of in jury, even if other factors are positive. If 
need be, injury may be found even if the Community industry doesnotsuffer injury. Because of 
its complexity, economie reality, of course, is difficult to be laid down in precise rules. . 
However, as is shown in this section, the European anti-dumping authorities do noteven bother to 
explain why a certain factor is decisive in one case but is not in another. This lack of motivation 
does not enhance legal certainty, though it might, of course, be argued that, to a great extent, 
there is legal certainty, since injury will usually be found. 
3.2. MATERIAL INJURY 
The injury the Community industry suffers, must be material (Article VI(1) and (6)(a) GATT ; 
Note 1 ad Artiele 3 GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(1) and (6) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). However, neither GATI nor European anti-dumping law 
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indicate when injury is materiaL They only indicate that immaterial injury must be disregarded. 
However, injury which is oot immaterlal, is oot necessarily material1118. Some European 
anti-dumping cases have been terminated because the injury suffered by the Community industry 
was oot materia11119• I~ is, however, impossible to draw general conclusions. For European 
anti-dumping authorities have broad discretionary powers subject to but a marginal judicia! 
contro11120, since in jury determinations necessarily imply the assessment of economie realities 
which, by definition, are complex. 
1118 BESELER, J.-F., «EEC Proteetion against Dumping and Subsidies from Third Countriesn, Common Market Law Review, 
1968-1969, (327), 337; BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr von Dumping und Subventionen durch die Europäische Gemeinscha{ten, 
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980, 93-94; BUHART, J., ccLe régime communautaire de l'antidumping: vingt ans d'expérience••, Revue 
Trimestriel de Droit Européen, 1988, (253), 274 ; STANBROOK, C., Dumping. A Man.ual on the EEC Anti-Dumping Law and 
Procedure, Chequers, European Business Publications, 1980, 28. 
11 19 Injury bas been held not to be material because : 
it was not inflicted upon the Community industry as a whole ( Commission Decision 85/4 70/EEC of 7 October 1986 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of standard wood partiele board originating in Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Boviet Union, Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 268/22; Commission 
Decision 86120/EEC of 31 January 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hammers originating 
in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 4 February 1986, No L 29/36; Co:inm.ission Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of stainless steel household cooking ware originating in South 
Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, No L 74133 ; Commission Decision 89/111/EEC of 9 February 1989 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof wheeled loaders originating in Japan, O.J., 11 February 1989, NoL 39/35); 
the overall situation of the injured Community producers was improving, notwithstanding a slight deterioration in capacity 
utilization, lilales and mar)tet share of the Community producers (Commission Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 September 1989 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of mica originating in Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, No 
L 284145); 
the market share of the dumped import& on the Community market was low and stable, in contrast with a high and stabie 
market share of the Community industry and an increasing market share of imports originating in other countries, though 
the degree of price undercutting by the dumped imports was sufficiently high to find material injury (Commission Decision 
86/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of wire rod originating in 
Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1986, NoL 299/18); 
the substantial rise in the market share of the dumped products on the Community market, the serious price.cJ.epressive 
effects of their price undercutting and the sharp decline in weighted average return of the Community industry were 
outweighed by the impravement of the situation of the Community industry in terms of in capacity, production, employment, 
sales on the Community market and export& to the dumping country (Commission Decision 89/560/EEC of 17 October 1989 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof polyester film originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 21 
October 1989, No L 305/31) ; 
the exports were of an incidental and tempórary nature (Commission Decision 92/423/ECSC of 7 August 1992 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports ofpig-iron, originating in Turkey, O.J., 13 August 1992, NoL 230/30). 
112° C.J.E.C., joined cases 113 and 118-121177, 29 March 1979, NTN Toyo Bearing Compan.y Ltd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1979, 
(1186), 1266 (Advocate-Genera! J.P. WARNER); C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, 
(1335), 1378 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO) and 1402; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita Electric 
IndUBtrial Co. Ltd an.d Mataushita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1484-1485; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 
10 March 1992, Koniahirolcu Photo IndUBtry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1529; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 
1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1570; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1682; BOUDANT, J., L'an.ti-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, l33. 
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3.3. ACTUAL INJURY 
3. 3 .1. Causes of actual injury 
3.3.1.1. Dumping or dumped imports as causes of injury ? 
As the injury suffered by the Community industry may have different causes, it is important to 
know to what ex tent each of those causes has contributed to the in jury. Those causes may boil 
down to either the actual dumping or the imports of dumped products. Though both causes may 
look very similar, their effects do not always coincide. 
This is illustrated in · tigure 17. The traditional dumping case of third-degree price discrimination is assumed : the 
Community market (tigure 17(a)) and the dornestic market of the exporting country (figure 17(b)) are separated, their 
demand curves (respectively D1 and D~ have different price elasticities, and the exporter bas market power in both 
markets. lt is assumed that a Community industry exists ; its supply curve is represented by S in tigure 17(a). If 
there are no imports and the total demand being D'D1, the Community industry supplies a quantity Û<ls at a price 
OP13 • If the ex porter decides to export to the Community and to price discriminate, he will offer a quantity Oq4• 
Indeed, the demand curve of the Community market for the ex porter is the residual demand curve, i.e. , overall 
demand minus overall supply of the Community industry, illustrated by the curve P13AD1• Because of the exporter's 
market power on the Community market, the price drops to OP11• At this price the Community industry is willing to 
sell a quantity Oq1• Thus, the Community industry's salesdrop by q1Cis, while the price level decreases by P13P11• 
This decline in quantity and price cannot be considered to be the injury caused by the dumping. lt is the injury 
caused by the imports of dumped products. In order to show the pure effects of dumping, assume that the exporter 
exports, but does not price discriminate. In this case he exports a quantity ~, which causes the price to decline to 
OP12 and the Community industry to supply a quantity Oq2• The injury to the Community industry amounts to a 
decline in quantity of ~Cis and a fall in price of P13P12• This injury is caused by the decision of the exporter to 
export to the Community. If the ex porter decides to dump his products, the in jury is worsened by a drop in quantity 
of q1q2 and a drop in price of P12P11• The amounts by which the injury is enhanced are the pure effects of dumping. 
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Thus, the effects of the imports of dumped products are the sum of the effects of imports and the 
effects of dumping. Only if there would be no imports if no dumping were to take place, the 
effects of the dumping and the imports of dumped products coincide. 
Consequently, the choice between the dumping and the imports of dumped products has important 
consequences. According to GA TI, it should be examined whether the dumping is the cause óf 
the injury (Article VI(l) and (6)(a) GATT}. The GATI Anti-dumping Code and ECSC anti-
dumping law do not put it that clearly. In their wording, «dumped imports ( ... ), through the 
effects of dumping», must be the cause of the injury (Article 3.5. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; 
Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). Moreover, on several occasion, the GATI Anti-dumping 
Code refers to the effects of the dumped imports, rather than to the effects of the dumping 
(Articles 3.2., 3.5. and 3.6.). As the GATI Anti-dumping Code is merely an implementation of 
GA TI and as European anti-dumping law must comply with GA TT anti-dumping law, the clear 
wording of GATI should prevail and, consequently, the dumping must be the cause of the injury. 
However, EC anti-dumping law goes a step further and stipulates that «(i)t must be demonstrated 
( ... ) that the dumped imports are causing injury» (Article 3(6) basic EC Regulation). In this 
respect, it may be argued that EC anti-dumping law does not comply with GA TT anti-dumping 
law. The legislative history starting from GA TT and en ding with EC anti-dumping law shows 
how anti-dumping law becomes gradually more «one-way flexible» over time. 
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3.3.1.2. Criteria establishing the cause of injury 
Under GATTand European anti-dumping law, two criteria establishing the cause of the injury are 
being distinguished : the volume and the prices of dumped imports (Articles 3.1. and 3.2. GATT 
Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(2), (3) and (6) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(a) and (b) basic 
ECSC Decision). Under GATT and ECSC anti-dumping law, this does not contradiet the 
requirement that the dumping must· be the cause of the in jury. Both factors are but evidence of 
the dumping as the cause of the in jury, since they are defined as «factors» which an examination 
of injury may involve (Article 3.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 4(2)(a) and (b) basic 
ECSC Decision). However, the representation of the volume and prices of the dumped imports as 
«factors» to be taken into account, may be deceptive. Indeed, EC anti-dumping law also considers 
them to be such «factors» (Article 3(3) basic EC Regulation), but considers the dumped imports, 
rather than the dumping, as the cause of the injury (Article 3(6) basic EC Regulation). It, 
therefore, is quite possible that European anti-dumping case law will not make the distinction 
between the dumping and the dumped imports and will not consider the volume and prices of the 
dumped imports but as factors indicating the effect of the dumping on the state of the Community 
industry. 
As none of these factors can provide necessarily decisive guidance (Article 3.2. GATT Anti-
dumping Code ; Artiele 3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(a) and (b) basic ECSC 
Decision)1121 , the European anti-dumping authorities have discretionary powers in assessing 
them1122. 
Pursuant to GA TT and EC anti-dumping law, a determination of in jury must be based on positive 
evidence and involve an objective examination of the volume of the dumped imports and the effect 
of the dumped imports on prices in the Community market (Article 3.1. GATT Anti-dumping 
Code ; Artiele 3(2) basic EC Regulation). Thus, the European anti-dumping authorities must not 
rely on the assumption that, for instance, the volume of dumped imports has increased or that 
there is price undercutting by the dumped imports, unless there is proof to contrary. In each case, 
they must investigate what volume of dumped products has actually been imported and whether 
those dumped imports actually undercut the Community producers' prices. The fact that ECSC 
anti-dumping law does not impose the same obligation, poses no problem in respect of GA TT 
anti-dumping law as the European anti-dumping authorities have always relied on positive 
evidence and made an objective examination of the volume and prices of the dumped imports. 
The problem, however, is that economie real life is complex and allows several objective 
interpretations, depending on the accents put on each different aspect of economie real life. For 
1121 For the inteprctation of the sentence «non~ which can give necessarily decisive guidance•, sec : supra, 486. 
1122 C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1402. 
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example, a market share which increases from 1 % to 2 %, can be said to have doubled and, 
thus, to have increased considerably ; however, it can also be said that such a market share is 
negligible. Both representations of this evolution in market share are certainly objective. 
However, the frrst one may result in finding injurious dumping, whereas the second may not. 
The problem in European anti-dumping case law is that the European anti-dumping authorities 
pratically always prefer the «one-way flexible» interpretation. 
3.3.1.2.1. Volume of dumped imports 
3.3.1.2.1.1. The concept «dumped imports» 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law adopt a trend analysis, as it is stipulated that it should be 
examined whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports (Article 
3.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(a) basic ECSC 
Decision). As European anti-dumping law does notprovide any guideline as to the period during 
which the development of the dumped imports should be examined, it grants the European anti-
dumping authorities large discretionary powers 1123• The period taken into account1124 
usually covers the entire investigation period, i.e., the period in which dumping is 
established 1125, plus a eertaio period prior to the investigation period 1126• The ratio 
1123 C.J.E.C., case 121/86, 28 November 1989, Anon.ymos Etaireia Epicheiriseon. Metalleftikon. Viomichan.ikon. kai Naftiliakon. AE 
a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1989, (3919), 3952; C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakojima All Precision Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 
1991, I, (2069), 2192. 
1124 In most European anti-dumping cases this period ranges from two to four years, but also periods of only six months 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 250/82 of 29 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain welded iron or 
steel tubes originating in Romania, O.J., 3 February 1982, No L 26/6) and even of eight years (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1600/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of outboard motors originating in Japan, O.J., 10 
June 1983, No L 162118) have been taken into consideration. 
1125 According to Advocate-General TESAURO, the period taken into account for the injury determination must cover the 
investigation period (C.J.E.C., case 121186, 28 November 1989, Anon.ymos Etaireia Epicheiriseon. Metalleftikon. Viomichan.ikon. lcai 
Naftiliakon. AE a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1989, (3919), 3939). It can, however, be agreed with the Court of Justice that European anti-
dumping law does not oontain such an obligation_ (ibidem, 3952). 
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1126 The investigation perioei may not entirely be included or subsequent periode may alao he taken into consideration. 
Before 1987 projected imports and, thus, future periode were also taken into account in several anti-dumping cases (Commission 
Decision 80/603/EEC of 23 June 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning 
mounted piezo-electric quartz crystal units, originating in Japan, South Korea and the United Statee of America, and terminating 
the proceedings, O.J'., 27 June 1980, No L 162/62; Commission Decision 81/366/EEC of 18 May 1981 accepting an undertaking 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning Iouvre doora ·. originating in Malaysia and Singapore and 
terminating the proceedinga, O.J'., 22 May 1981, No L 135/33; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1590/81 of 10 June 1981 
repealing a national anti-dumping duty on Iouvre doors, originating in Taiwan, imposed under the transitional provisiona of the 
1972 Act of Accession, O.J'., 16 June 1981, No L 168/5; Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-
dumping procedure concerning imports of furfural originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 11 July 1981, No L 189/57 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 250/82 of 29 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on certain welded iron or steel tubes originating in Romania, O.J'., 3 February 1982, No L 26/6 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3018/82 of 11 November 1982 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the United Statea of America and accepting certain undertakinga concerning the importsof certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 13 November 1982, NoL 317/5; Commission Decision 82/808/EEC of 
25 November 1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning · imports of aluminium foil for household and catering use 
originating in Austria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and Israel, O.J., 1 December 1982, NoL 339/58; Commission 
Decision No 2767/86/ECSC of 6 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain sheets and plates, 
of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 6 September 1986, NoL 254/18). 
Those projected imports were taken into account in order to determine not only threat of injury, but also actual injury (VAN BAEL, 
1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Laws ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1990, 126-127). 
In 1987, however, the European anti-dumping authorities, in pursuance of Artiele 7(1)(c) of the then prevailing basic EC legislation, 
adopted the general principle about the illegality of taking into account developmente occuring alter the investigation perioei 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating 
in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 
7 November 1987, NoL 317/1). Moreover, with regard to the aasesament ofthe volume of the dumped imports, they held, in the 
same year, that thia aspect of European anti-dumping case law was illegal, because European anti-dumping law requires only to 
establish ccwhether there bas been a significant increase» (Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain deep freezers originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 8 January 1987, NoL 6/1). 
Ever since, projected imports have no longer been taken into account, except in aodium carbonate from Bulgaria, the German 
Democratie Republic, Polcmd and Roman.ia, where transactions under the inward processing arrangements were included, because 
they too may affect the Community industry (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and 
Romania, O.J'., 13 May 1989, No L 131/4). Moreover, EC anti-dumping law haa codified the case law pursuant to which 
developments occliring alter the · investigation are ignored (Article 6(1) basic EC Regulation). 
Compare the latter case with barium chloride from the People'a Republic of China and in the German. Democratie Republic, where, 
notwithstanding the fact that only a determination of actual hijury was made, the gooda held in the Community under the Tl 
regime (i.e., the regime for inward processing), were held to constitute «at least a threat of injury, as they may he cleared at the 
cuetoma and put into free circulation in the Community at very short notice• (emphaais added) (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of barium chloride originating in the People'a 
Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republië, O.J., 20 August 1983, NoL 228/28. See also: Commission Decision 
90/540/EEC of 29 October 1990 terminating the anti-dumping review proceeding concerning imports of propanlol originating in the 
United Statea of Ameria, O.J., 6 November 1990, NoL 306/23, where products imported under the Tl regime were taken into 
consideration in the actual injury investigation). Thus, for a determination of actual injury via a threat of injury, a possibility ia 
aufficient, whereaa European anti-dumping law requires more than a possibility to establiah a threat of injury (Article 3.7. GATr 
Anti-dumping Code and Artiele 3(9) basic EC Regulation, which stipulate that a determination of threat of injury shall not he 
based «merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility»; see also: Artiele 4(3) basic ECSC Decision; see further, ·infra, 495-
607). Taking into account projected imports in an examination of actual injury is, thus, not only illegal, but may also distort an 
actual injury determination (VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in the United Stales and the European. 
Communities. A Comparatwe Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 642). 
It may, however, he argued that it ia not illegal to take into account tranaactiona under the inward processing arrangement& 
because the poBBibility of re-exporting exists also for other importa. The fact that products imported from the dumping coU:O.try are 
or will he aold on the Community market would seem decisive. lndeed, the volume of dumped imports is sometimes adjusted to 
take account of re-exports (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186/11). Moreover, in cases 
where re-exporting ia highly probable, the aalea and rentals on the · Community market have been used for analyzing the trends in 
dumped imports (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
.plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12), or the European anti-dumping authoritiea may 
only have obaerved that some of the imported product& are re-exported but that the great majority of the dumped products are 
441 
underlying the practice of taking into account preceding periods could be the assumption that 
dumping is only practised during the investigation period : by oomparing the volume of imports 
durlog the investigation period with the volume of imports durlog the preceding period, it is 
possible to assess the effect of dumping1127• However, it is, only exceptionally examined 
whether this assumption holds1128• Therefore, the evolution of the volume of the dumped 
imports is no exact measure of the effect of dumping. It underestimates the effect of dumping : 
if, during the preceding period, dumping is practised, the fluctuations in the volume of dumped 
imports will, ceteris paribus, be the result of a change in the dumping margin, but not of the 
entire dumping margin 1129• Sometimes, reasoos other than the assumption that there bas been 
any dumping durlog the preceding period, play a crucial role. For example, in one case, the 
European anti-dumping authorities had selected a period which started in the year preceding the 
one in which the exclusive rights of an exporter to manufacture one of the most widespread types 
of the dumped product had phased out. They selected that year because it typified the situation 
consumed within the Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping 
duty on imports of woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 
(corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, NoL 256/38)), or that the definitive imports alone caused injury (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating 
in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 31315 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, 
No L9/36)). Conversely, total dumped import& are taken into account when there is no information confirming that re-exports 
might have taken place (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3434/91 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof oxalic acid originating in India or the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 1991, NoL 326/6). 
1127 Contra: VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade of European Conununity Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to 
lmporta from China•, Joumal of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 28; VERMULST, E., and WAER., P., « The Calculation of lnjury Margins in EC 
Anti-Dumping Proceedinga-, Joumal ofWorld Trade, 199116, (5), 10. 
1128 There were no dumped imports during the preceding period in : Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating 
the anti-dumping procedure concerning importsof furfural originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, NoL 189/67; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 290/83 of 2 February 1983 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 4 
February 1983, No L 3319; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof Bmall screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, NoL 314/1; 
Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to 
these countries ; u well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24. 
Review proceedings in which the period for examining injury starts from the year in which the anti-dumping measures under 
review were imposed, rely on a similar assumption. In these proceedings, such a period is chosen in order to check whether the 
anti-dumping measures under review continue to he sufficient to eliminate the injury caused by the dumped imports (C.J.E.C., 
joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2946), 2986 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 3006 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 
1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more 
than 0,76 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, 
Polarid, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68). Hence, they assume that the anti-dumping measures under 
review were originally able to remedy the injurious effects of the dumping, i.e., to make injurious dumping to disappear. As a 
consequence, they compare a period without injurious dumping to a period with allegedly injurious dumping and are able to assen 
exactly the injurious effects ofthis new stance of dumping. 
Dumping during the entire period, i.e., the preceding period and the investigation period, was found in: Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 171182 of 26 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof oxalic acid originating in China and 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19/26 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No L 34/11). 
1129 DIDIER, P., dleux années d'application du nouveau règlement antidumping de la CEE,,, Cahiers de Droit Européen, 1982, 
(21), 42-43. 
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which existed prior to the opening of a substantial share of the market in the wake of the expiry of 
these exporter's exclusive rights1130• It should hardly be pointed out that, after the opening of 
the market for all producers, their market share will substantially increase regardless of whether 
they dump and that the investigation will result in an overestimation of the effects of the 
dumping1131• Nevertheless, the Court of Justice found that the European anti-dumping 
authorities did not exceed their diseretien in basing their choice on that ground 1132 0 Hence, in 
the opinion of the Court, European anti-dumping law does not require a comparison between a 
period without dumping and one with dumping. From a legal point of view,· the Court is, indeed, 
right, but the subsequent underestimation or overestimation of the effects of the dumping will 
make it difficult to assess them exactly. 
On the other hand, under GA TI and European anti-dumping law, only the volume of dumped 
imports is relevant (Articles 3ol. and 302. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(2) and (3) basic 
EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(a) basic ECSC Decision)1133 0 Hence, European anti-dumping 
case law is illegal, because it generally focusses on the evolution of total imports, since, even 
113° CJ.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2104 (Report for the Hearing: 
conc1usiona of the Council), 2159 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ) and 2192. 
1131 The choice of the period preceding the investigation period may also affect the other factors indicating the cause of injury, such as the · 
margin of price undercuuing between the dumping prices and the Community industry's prices (aee : injra, 456-461). For example, taking as 
starting point the year preceding the one in which the exclusive rights of a Japanese exporter to manufacture printers compatible with mM personal 
computers had phascd out, al10 affected the margin of price undercutting. Indced, as the Court of Justicc bas pointed out, the margin of price 
undercuuing would have been lower if the year in which those exc1usive rights had phased out, had been taken as starting point (C.J.E.C., case C-
69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2193; see also: ibidem : 2104 (Report for the Hearing: 
conclusiona of the Council) and 2161 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ)). Hence, also bere, the choice of the period to investigate the injury 
favoura the tinding of injury. 
1132 C.J.E.Co, case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima AU Precision Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2192. See also: ibidem, 2159 
(Opinion of Advocate General LENZ). 
1133 BELLIS, J.-F., ecThe EEC Antidumping System», in Antidumping Law cmd Practice. A Comparative S~udy, JACKSON, J.H., 
and VERMULST, EA. (eds.), New York, Harvaster Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 89; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti--Dumping 
and other Trt~M Proteetion Law11 of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1990, 126 ; VERMULST, EA., Antidumping Law cmd 
Practice in. the Uniled State• an.d the European. Commun.itie11. A Comparative An.aly•ÏII, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 641. 
For Advocate General LENZ, only the volume of the dumped imports may he taken into· account, hut the prices and price 
undercutting tcean he established without restrietion»» (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v 
Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2164 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ)). This point of view is, however, notconsistent: the rule 
of Europaan anti-dumping law to which he refers in conneetion with the factors on prices and price undercutting (i.e., Artiele 3(3) 
basic EC Regulation and Artiele 4(2)(b) basic ECSC Decision), treats of ccthe prices of dumped imports" or of the ccprice undercutting 
by the dumped importB», justas the ruleon the factor volume treats of ccthe volume of dumped importen (i.e., Artiele 3(3) basic EC 
Regulation and Artiele 4(2Xa) basic ECSC Decision) to which he refers in order to restriet this factor to the dumped product&. 
Therefore, contrary to the opinion of Advocate General LENZ, · the factors on price and price · undercutting, just as the factor on 
volume, have to he restricted to the dumped imports. 
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during the investigation period, some products may be imported without dumping1134• 
Moreover, if the volume of non-dumped imports increases or decreases, this practice . will 
overestimate, respectively, underestimate the effect of dumping : if it is taken into account, an 
increase (a decrease) in the volume of non-dumped imports will reinforce (weaken) the increase in 
the volume of dumped imports or it will weaken (reinforce) the decrease in it. In static terms, it 
always overestimates the effect of dumping, as the volume of total imports can never be smaller 
than the volume of dumped imports. 
According to the Court of Justice, the European anti-dumping authorities must only take account 
of the dumped imports actually sold on the Commuility market, unless the volume of the dumped 
imports is not significantly exceeding of the volume of sales of those imports1135• In this 
respect, the Court disregards that European, as well as GA TI anti-dumping law treat only of 
dumped imports and do not at all refer to sales of the dumped products on the Community 
market, not ev~n to ·assess their evolution relative to Community consumption (Article 3.2. GATT 
Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3.3. basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(a) basic ECSC Decision). 
1134 As J. BUHART (ccLe régime communautaire de l'antidumping: vingt ans d'expérience,,, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit 
Européen, 1988, (263), 274) puts it, it is sufficient that the products are suspected of being the object of dumping (ccproduits 
soupçonnés de faire l'objet d'un dumping»). 
Only in a minority of cases specific raferences are made to the volume of dumped imports: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2999/80 of 20 November 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United Statea 
of America, 0 . .1., 21 November 1980, No L 311/13 ; Commission Decision 80/1176/EEC of 15 December 1980 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports ofpressure sensitive paper masking tape originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 
19 December 1980, No L 344/57 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 of 22 December 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statea of America, 0 . .1., 31 December 1980, No L 358191; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 349/81 of 9 February 1981 imposing a. definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! fertilizer 
originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L 39/4; Commission Decision 81/35/EEC of 9 February 
"1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning certain chemica! fertilizer originating in 
the United Statea of America, O.J., 12 February 1981, No L .39/36 ; Commission Decision 81/366/EEC of 18 May 1981 accepting an 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning Iouvre doors originating in Malaysia and Singapore 
and terminating the proceedings, O.J., 22 May 1981, No L 135/33 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1411/81 of 25 May 1981 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on orthoxylene (o-Xylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 27 May 1981, No L 141129 ; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 1591/81 of 10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on paraxylene (p-xylene} originating in Puerto Rico, the United Statea of America and the US Virgin lslands, O.J., 16 June 
1981, NoL 15817; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC} No 2017/81 of 15 July 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol 
originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 18 July 1981, No L 195/22 ; Council Regulation (EEC} No 2761/81 of 22 
September 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on o-xylene (orthoxylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 26 September 1981, No L 270/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2940/81 of 14 October 1981 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on ~xylene (paraxylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United States of Am.erica and the United 
Statea Virgin lslands, O.J., 16 October 1981, No L 296/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United Statee of America, O • .J., 18 January 1982, No L 12/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC} No 171182 of 26 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid 
originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19/26 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 9 February 1982, No L 34111); 
Commission Regulation (EEC} No 250/82 of 29 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain welded iron or 
steel tubes originating in Romania, O.J., 3 February 1982, NoL 26/6; Council Decision 82/423/EEC of 21 June 1982 terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain refrigerators originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 29 June 1982, NoL 184/23; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 290/83 of 2 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping d"!lty on imports of urea ammonium nitrate salution 
fertilizer originating in the United Statea of Am.erica, O . .J., 4 February 1983, NoL 3319; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 
September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United Statee of America and 
terminating the investigation, 0 . .1., 8 September 1987, NoL 258120; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping an.d other 
Trade Proteetion Lo.ws ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1990, 126. 
1135 C.J.E.C., joioed cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport amb~ v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945), 2985 (Opinion of Advocate GeneralVAN GER.VEN) and 3006. 
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Although the Court's case law seems reasonable, in particular when the evolution of the volume 
of the dumped imports is assessed in proportion to Community consumption, it is illegal whether 
or not imports and sales actually coincide : the volume of the imports should always be used. 
3.3.1.2.1.2. The volume of dumped imports as evidence of injury 
The only specification about the volume of dumped imports as evidence of injury is that the 
examination of any injury raises the question whether there bas been a significant increase, either 
in absolute terms or regarding the production or consumption in the Community (Article 3.2. 
GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(a) basic ECSC 
Decision). Most anti-dumping cases pay attention to both absolute volume and market share in 
terms of consumption1136• An simultaneous increase in absolute volume and in market share 
is strong proof of injury1137• However, as none of those factors give necessarily decisive 
guidance (Article 3.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2) 
basic ECSC Decision), no strict guidelines can be found in European anti-dumping case law in 
which: 
1136 BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 156. 
Usually, consumption is seen in terros of total sales realised on the Community market. Exceptionally, the market share in terms 
of placement& (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 iinposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on iinports 
of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5) or total iinports (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 1695/88 of 14 June 1988 iinposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on iinports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 152/58); Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 ii:nposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on iinports of synthetic fihres of polyesters 
originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151147) is 
taken into consideration. However, in plain paper photocopiers from Japan the determination of the market share in terros of the 
copy volume was rejected because this would involve the investigation of other products such as paper and other supplies insteadof 
photocopiers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 Fehruary 1987 iinposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iinports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12). 
1137 BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy ~. The European Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 156; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., International Trade Law and Practice ofthe European Community. EEC 
Anti-Dumping an.d other Trade Proteetion Laws, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1985, 74; VERMULST, EA., Antidumping Law and 
Practice in the United Stateli and the European. Communities. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,641. 
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no mJury is found in cases where dumped imports increased both in absolute volume and in 
terms of market share1138 ; 
injury is found in cases where only the market share increased, whereas the absolute volume 
remained constant or even decreased 1139 ; 
1138 CommiBBion Decision 80/1175/EEC of 15 December 1980 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof 
preBBure sensitive paper masking tape originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 19 .December 1980, No L 344/57; 
Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of furfural 
originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, NoL 189/67; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 16 June 1983 imposing a provisional.anti-dumping duty on importsof certain glass textile fibres 
(rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one 
Japanase exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in 
Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, NoL 160/18; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 
July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 26 July 1986, No L 202/43; CommiBBion Decision 90/164/EEC of 26 March 1990 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of 
China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/117. 
See also : C.J.E.C., case C-316190, 27 November 1991, Groupement de11 lndlutrie11 de Matériels d'Equipement Electrique et de 
l'Electronique lndulltrielle Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commi1111ion, E. C.R., 1991, I, (6689), 6695 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions 
of the Commission), where the Commission stated in general «that an inerease in the market share of the (dumped) imports is not a 
condition sine qUG non for a determination of injury», a point of view also shared by Advocate General VAN GERVEN (C.J.E.C., 
case C-316190, 27 November 1991, Groupement des Industries de Matériels d'Equipement Electrique et de l'Electronique lndustrielle 
Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v CommiBsion, E.C.R., 1991, I, (6689), 6606 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN). 
Sometimes, it is underscored that, during the last part of the period taken into account, dumped iinports have decreaeed in absolute 
volume and market share, in order to explain a finding of no injury in cases where the absolute volume and the market share of 
the dumped imparts increased (Commission Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the anti;.dumping proceeding 
concerning imparts of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1986, No 
L 299/18 ; CommiBBion Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
stainleBB steel household cooking ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, No L 74/33; Commission Decision 
86/100/EEC of 16 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hall hearings and tapered roller 
hearings originating in Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 18 April1986, No L 102/31). 
1139 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1101/81 of 23 April 1981 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on potato granules 
originating in Canada, O.J., 28 April1981, NoL 116/11; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission 
Decision No 80/664/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imparts of fibre 
building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the 
proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 26 June 1982, NoL 181/19; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1882/82 of 
12 July 1982 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 July 1982, 
No L 207/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1968/82 of 16 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
photographic enlargers originating in Poland and the USSR, accepting an undertaking and terminating the proceeding in respect 
of imparts of photographic enlargers originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 21 July 1982, No L 212/32; Commission Decision 
83/428/EEC of 26 August 1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts 
of caravans for camping and parts thereof originating in Yugoslavia and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 August 1983, No 
L 240/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
tungsten orea and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports 
originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No 
L 186/11. 
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injury is found in cases where the market share did oot increase and where the absolute 
volume, at the most, foliowed the evolution of the Community consumption 1140. 
With regard to the extent of the increases and decreases in absolute volume and market share, no 
guidelines have been provided either. In table 4, it is shown that the same change in absolute 
volume and market share can lead to either a finding of injury or one of no in jury. 
l140 C.J.E.C., joined cases C-304/86 and C-185/87, 11 july 1990, Enital SpA v Commi&sion and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2939), 
2941 i C.J.E.C., joined .cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Tech.maahexport GmbH v Commission and Counci~ 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 3005-3006 i C.J.E.C., joined cases C-320/86 and C-188/87, 11 July 1990, Stan.ko France v Commission and 
Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3013), 3015 i C.J.E.C., case C-157/87, 11 July 1990, Electroimpex a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3021), 
3023 i C.J.E.C., case C-323188, 11 July 1990, SA Sermes v Directeur des services des do~UU&eB de Strasbourg, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3027), 
3053 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633182 of 23 June 1982 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 J\me 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imparts of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181119 i Commission Decision 83/360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imparts of certain pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic 
of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, NoL 196/22 i Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 191/80 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statee of ·America and 
the Boviet Union, O.J., 26 October 1983, NoL 294/3 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 impasing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of roller chains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 14 August 1985, No L 217n; Commission Decision 86/35/EEC of 21 February 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of fibre building board from Finland and Sweden and terminating 
the investigation, O.J., 25 February 1986, No L 46/23 i Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imparts of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and 
_accepting undertakings affered in conneetion with the proceeding concerning imparts of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 April1990,No L 104/14 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3262190 of 5 November 1990 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36). See 
also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of audio tapes in 
cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure 
concerning Hong Kong, O.J., 14 May 1991, No L 119/35. 
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Table 4 - Evolution in the absolute volume and market share of the dumped imports -
minimum and maximum average increase/decrease on one-year basis 
In jury No injury 
Evolution from up to from up to 
in : 
Absolute 
volume -25.1 %a +13236.7 %b -60.3 %c +6830.2 %d 
Market 
share -24.2 %e +931.5 %f -45.3 %g +123.0 %h 
Souree : Official Joumal of the European Communities ; own calculationJ141 • 
Moreover, the evolution in the volume of dumped imports does not have to be taken into account. 
Also, the absolute height of absolute volume and/or market share may be decisive, since in 
European anti-dumping law : 
no injury is found because of the low volume of (dumped) imports1142 · 
1141 In porticwar : 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
b 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1958/82 of 16 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
photographic enlargers originating in Poland and the USSR, accepting an undertaking and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of imports of photographic enlargers originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 21 July 1982, No L 212/32 ; 
Commiuion Recommendation No 2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil; O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10 ; 
Commission Decision 82/808/EEC of 25 November 1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of 
aluminium foil for household and catering use originating in Austria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and Israel, 
O.J., 1 December 1982, No L 339/58 ; 
Commiuion Decision 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
seamleu tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Austria, O.J., 28 January 1989, No L 25/87 ; 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of roller 
chains for cyclea originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, No L 217n ; 
Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 699/88 of 15 March 1988 -imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic 
acid originating in Taiwan and South Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72/12 ; · 
Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with importsof binder and haler 
twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, NoL 34/55; 
Commiaaion Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of stainless 
steel household cooking ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, No L 74/33. 
1142 Commiaaion Decision 80/1175/EEC of 15 December 1980 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof 
preBBure sensitive paper masking tape originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 19 December 1980, No L 344157; 
Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of furfural 
originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, NoL 189/57; Commission 
Decision 81/1012/EEC of 17 December 1981 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain monochrome 
portable telavision sets originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 19 December 1981, NoL 364/49; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 171182 of 26 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in China and 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19/26 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No L 34/11). See also: Commiesion 
Regulation (EEC) No 260/82 of 29 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain welded iron or steel tubes 
originating in Romania, O.J., 3 February 1982, NoL 26/5; Commission Recom.m.endation No 2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, 
NoL 312/10. 
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no injury is found because of the low market shares (on average below 1 % )1143 , 
1143 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633182 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repaaiing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and teni:rlnating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, NoL 181119 (Bulgaria: between 0.2% and 0.7 %) ; Commission Decision 82/808/EEC of 25 November 
1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of aluminium foil for household and. catering use originating in 
Austria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and Israel, O.J., 1 December 1982, NoL 339/58 (lsrael: 1.1 %) ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain glass textile fibres 
(rovings) originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one 
Japanase exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in 
Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, No L 160118 (mats from CZ8choslovakia and the German 
Demoeratic Republic: between 1.5% and 3 %) ; Commission Decision 85/252/EEC of 23 April 1985 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof certain titanium mill produets originating in Japan and the United Statesof America, O.J., 26 
April1985, NoL 113/30 (market share of the sole dUm.ping exporter: 1.8 %) ; Commission Decision 85/470/EEC of 7 October 1985 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding c<mcerning imports of standard wood partiele board originating in Bulgaria, 
. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, the Boviet Union, Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1985, NoL 268/22 (market shares held 
byeach country individually: between 0.2 and 1.4 %) ; Commission Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Tl-inidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 
13 November 1985, No L 299/18 (all dumping countries cumulated: 0.9 %) ; Commission Decision 86/100/EEC of 15 April 1986 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Poland, 
Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 18 April 1986, NoL 102/31 (market shares heldbyeach country individually: between 0.7 
and 1.5 %) ; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43 (all 
dumping countries cumulated: between 0.13% and 0.47 %) ; Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with imports of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the 
investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, No L 34155 (Mexico: 1.6 %) ; Commission Decision 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain seamleBB tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in 
Austria, O.J., 28 January 1989, NoL 25/87 (market share leas than 1.0 %) ; Commission Decision No 1056/89/ECSC of 19 April 
1989 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of certain iron or steel coils, hot-rolled, originating in 
Argentina and Canada and confirming the expiry of those measures, O.J., 25 April 1989, No L 112/5 (cumulated market share less 
than 1.0 %) ; Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof 
methenamine (bexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings affered in conneetion 
with the proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovak.ia, Poland 
and Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, No L 104/14 (Hungary: 0.3%; Yugoslavia: 0.1 %) ; Commission Decision 90/240/EEC of.22 
may 1990 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures regarding imports of fibre building-
board (hardboard) originating in Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 
86/232/EEC accepting the undertakings given by the exporters concerned, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/44 (Argentina: below 1 %) ; 
Commission Decision 90/383/EEC of 13 July 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of NPK fertilizers 
originating in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/63 (Hungary: 0.58%; Poland: 0.25%; 
Romania: 0.15%; Yugoslavia: 1.94 %) ; Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the 
anti-dumping measurea concerning dense sodium carbonate originating in the UD.ited Statea of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, No 
L 283138 (United Statea of America : 1.4 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imporb of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the 
provisional duty and terminating the procedure concerning Hong Kong, O.J., 14 May 1991, No L 119/35 (Hong Kong : 1.6 %) ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof ootton 
yarn. originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yarn originating in 
India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117 (rhailand : 0.1 % ; India : 0.7 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple 
fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No .L 276n (the Republic 
of Korea/: 0.5 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2553/93 of 13 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 18 September 1993, No 
L 235/3 (Singapore : 0.6 %) ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 
December 1993, No L 302/1 (the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
tagether: leas than 1.2 %) ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People'a Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50 ('l'urkey : 1.5 %) ; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in 
the United Stales and the European Communities. A Comparative Analysi&, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 641. 
See also: B.I.S.D., Thirty-second Supplement, Geneva, GATr, 1986, 69, where, in a particwar case under the GATr dispute 
settiement procedure, a market share of 1.5 % was held to constitute an almost insignificant part in the overall sales of the like 
product. 
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probably because such low market shares indicate that the dumping exporter lacks market 
power on the Community market1144 ; 
injury is found, notwithstanding low market shares (around 2 %)1145 • in such cases, the 
low market shares are usually upgraded by data about higher market shares in parts of the 
1144 See: 
wheeled loaders from .Japan, where the price undercutting was considered not to be material in view of the market share 
amounting to only 8.8 % (Commission Decision, 89/111/EEC of 9 February 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing import& of wheeled loaders originating in Japan, O.J., 11 February 1989, No L 39/35) ; 
sodium CCII"bonate from the Un.ited State• of America, where, in the light of the limited volume of the dumped imports (mar ket 
share of 1.4 %), the price undercutting was found to have practically no effect on general price levels (Commission Decision 
90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-dumping measures coneerDing dense sodium carbonate 
originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 16 October 1990, NoL 283138). 
Conversely, proof of market power has beenbasedon large market shares: 
in electron.ic scales from Japan., where a market share of 85% in Greece, of 77.% in the Netherlands, of 58% in Belgium and 
of 30% in the United Kingdom, held by the dumped imports, was found to be sufficient todetermine that the price level of 
those Community markets was particularly affected (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, NoL 97/1); 
in housed beCU"in.g units from Japan, where it was noted that «(t)his situation [that the sales prices charged by the 
Community producers were below those required to cover their production costs and to provide a reasonable profit margin] is 
obviously due to the level of price undercutting on housed hearing units originating in Japan and to the market share of such 
units as compared with that of housed hearing unit& originating in the Community (40:60}tt (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of housed hearing units originating in 
Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, No L 221/16) ; 
in stan.dardized multi-phase electrio motors from BulgCU"io, Czechoslouakio, the German. Democratie Republic, Hun.gary, Polan.d 
and the Souiet Un.ion., where a market share of 20.3 % was considered to be more than sufficient to determine the price level 
in the Community (Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and 
definitively collecting the amounts .secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311); 
in DRAM• from Japan, where a market share of between 70 and 85 % was considered to reprasent a dominant market 
position (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, 
accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in . conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of 
these. products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 
January 1990, No L 22!79 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44)) ; 
in polyolefin. bags from the People'• Republic of China, where it was stated that «(b)ecause of their large market share, 
Chinese export& have greatly influenced the price of bags in the Community• (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 
17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/38)) (market share of 
the dumped import& : 35.2 % ; market share of Community producers : 26.6 % ; market share of non-dumped import& 
originating in 30 different countries : 26.9 %. Remarkably, the sum of these three market shares amounts only to 88.7 % and 
not 100.0 %. The anti-dumping decision does not explain who holds the spare market share of 11.3 %) ; 
where the dumping exporters, in view of the size of their market shares and the fact that their prices were low, were said to 
exert heavy downward pressure on the price level in the Community and consequently on the level of the Community 
producers' prices (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2054191 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, No L 187123; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping 
duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 36211) (figures on market share were not provided). 
However, high market shares, such as a market share of 60% in housed beCU"in.g units from Japan. or market shares of between 
30% and 85% in electron.ic scales from Japan., are not required to find that the dumping exporters have market power on the 
Community market. In cylinder uacuum cleaners from Czechoslouakio, the German. Democratie Republic and Poland, the market 
share held by the dumped imports rose from 5.4 % in 1979 up to 7 % in 1981. This was considered ccsufficient to disrupt the 
Community market for cylinder vacuum cleaner&» (Commission Decision 82/398/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings given 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure coneerDing cylinder vacuum cleaners originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, NoL 172/47). 
1145 See, however: BOUDANT, J., L'anli-dumping communautaire, Pari~, Eèonomica, 1991, 138-139. 
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1146 
Community market1146 
' 
by referring to the substantial increase in these low market 
Beferenee bas been made to : 
tbe non-captive Community market, see: 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol from the United Stales of America, where a market 
share of only 2 % was found to cause injury. The finding of injury was supported by the fact that practically all American 
imports were destined for tbe non-captive market, on which they held a market share of 16.60% (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol originating in the 
United Statee of America, O.J., 22 July 1983, NoL 199/4); 
regional markets within the Community, see: sheets and plates, of iron or atee~ from Yugoslavia, where dumping was found 
to cause injury, though the dumped import& held a market share of only 2.1 %. In certain regional markets in Germany and 
ltaly, however, the dumped products held a market share of up to 18% (CommiBBion Decision No 2767/86/ECSC of 6 
September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating 
in Yugoslavia, O.J., 6 September 1986, NoL 264/18). 
· See also : iron or steel coils for re-rolling from Czechoslouakia and South Korea, where only the market share held by the 
Czech and Korean dumped imports on the market of the United Kingdom was mentioned. This market share amounted to 
3 %. Nowhere the market share of the dumped imports on the entire Community market is referred to. In view of the fact 
that total import& into the Community, in absolute volume, amounted in the fust half of 1977 to 1 015 000 tonnes, i.e., a 
market share of 16 %, total consumption within the Community must equal 6 343 760 tonnes; consequently, the dumped 
import& originating in Czechoslovakia and South Korea, which, over the same period, in absolute volume, amounted to 92 000 
tonnes, must hold a market share of only 1.6% on the whole Community market (Commission Recommendation No 
112/78/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling, 
originating in Czechoslovakia and South Korea, O.J., 21 January 1978, NoL 17/27). 
The concentration of dumped import& on the market of some Memher Statea is considered to be an instanee of aggravating 
circumstances. lndeed, in sodium cCU'bonate from the United Stales of America the Commission held that eethese import& 
[originating in other countries than the United Statesof America], unlike those originating in the United Statesof America, 
are evenly spread over the whole Community market and their impact is thereby feit to a lesser extent» (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2263/84 of 31 July 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the United States of America and accepting undertakings in respect of other imports of the same 
product, O.J., 2 August 1984, No L 206/15). 
However, dumped imports concentrated on the market of some Memher Statea may affect the Community producers 
established in the other Memher States. It is possible that the Community producers established in the other Memher Statee 
export their products to the markets of the Memher Statea particularly affected by the dumped imports and, thus, on these 
markets face the competition of the dumped imports (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2712n9 of 30 November 1979 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres originating in the United States of America, O.J., 4 
December 1979, No L 308/11 ; CommiBBion Decision 80/488/EEC of 6 May 1980 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion 
with tbe anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing certain acrylic fibres originating in Japan and terminating this proceeding, 
O.J., 9 May 1980, No L 118/60; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and. Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111). The dumped imports may also 
force the producers established in the Memher States particularly affected by the dumped imports, to attempt to export 
increasing quantities of the product concerned to the markets of the other Memher States, which may result in an increased 
dagree of competition between the producers established in different Memher Statee (Commission Decision 841404/EEC of 26 
July 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of copper 
sulpbate originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, NoL 215/16; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1244186 of 28 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 113/4). European anti-dumping authorities take into account both indirect effects of 
dumping. 
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shares1147, to the usual height of the dumping exporter's market share1148, to the 
volatile nature of the trade pattem in the products as shown by the sudden increase of the 
dumped products1149, by cumulating dumped imports of various countries1150 or 
1147 See: 
sheets ~· plates, of iron or stee~ from Yugoslavia, where the dumped imports held a market share of only 2.1 %. 
Nevertheless, injury was found not only because of a market share of up to 18 % in certain regional markets in Germany and 
ltaly, but also because the market shares held on the Community market, the German market and the Italian market had 
risen respectively by 83.8 %, 74.1% and 110.2% on a one-year basis (Commission Decision No 2767/86/ECSC of 6 September 
1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in 
Yugoslavia, O . .T., 6 September 1986, NoL 264118); 
asbestos-cement corrugated sheets from Czechoslovaki.a and the German Democratie Republic, where a finding of injury was 
arrived at though the dumped imports represented a market share of only 2.3 %. In this case it was emphasized that the 
market share had increased from 1.4 % in 1980 up to 2.3 % in 1983, which represents a rise of 64.3 % between 1980 and 1983 
(or a rise of 18.0 % on a one-year basis). Moreover, it was added that the share of the Benelux market held by these import& 
had increased from 6.8% in 1980 up to 20.4% in 1983, reprasenting a rise of 261.7% (or a rise of 62.1% on a one-year basis) 
(Commission Decision 84/465/EEC of 26 September 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of asbestos-cement corrugated sheets originating in Czechoslovakia and the German 
Demoeratic Republic and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 28 September 1984, NoL 259/48); 
mounted p~lectri.c quartz crystal units from Japan. South Korea and the Uni.ted States of America, where the dumped 
import& held a market share of 2.47% on the whole Community market and a market share of notmore than 3.6% on the .. 
market of the Faderal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, a fmding of injury was arrived at because, over the period 
between 1977 and 1979, the market share on the whole Community market rose with 109.3% (or 44.7% on a one-year basis), 
whereas it rose with 167.1 % (or 60.4 % on a one-year basis) on the German market ( Commission Decision 80/603/EEC of 23 
June 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning mounted piezo-eleetric 
quartz crystal units, originating in Japan, South Korea and the United Statesof America, and terminating the proceedings, 
O . .T., 27 June 1980, No L 162/62) ; 
gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters from the People's Republic of China, where the Chinese imports represented only 
a market share of 1.4 % ; they were cumulated with the dumped imports coming from other countries because they were 
found to he •still significant especially in view of the faet that they were increasing rapidly•• (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint 
lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No 
L 13312Q). 
1148 The most striking anti-dumping case in this respect is hardboardfrom Romania, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden and the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, where the question was raised whether the dumped imports originating in Romania and Buigaria had to 
be taken into account, in view of their low market shares. The answer to thia question was negative in respect of Buigaria because during the 
investigaûon period ita market share amounted to only 0.2 ~ and before it had never exceeded 0.7 ~. On the other hand, the Commission was of 
the opinion that the imports from Romania contributed to the injury because during the inveatigation period they held a market share of 0.8 ~ and 
this market share bad been tradiûonally higher (Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and 
accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, 
Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and tenninating the proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 
1982, NoL 181/19). 
1149 Commission Decision No 891/92/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio semi-tinisbed 
produelS of alloy steel, originaûng in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, NoL 95/26. 
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1150 Injury was found in cases where the individual market shares by country of origin were extremely low (below 2 %) : 
sheets ancl plates, of iron or steel, from Czechoslovakia ancl Spain. : 
market share held by dumped imports from Spain, cumulated with dumped imports from Japan, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic and Australia, which were not subjected to the 
present anti-dumping proceeding but were already subjected to anti-dumping measures, and with imports originating 
from Sweden, Austria and Finland, which were not subjected to the present anti-dumping proceeding but were subject 
to steel arrangement& between the ECSC and their respective governments : 16.1 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Czechoslovakia : 1.2 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Spain : 1 % ; 
(Commission Recommendation No 120n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional duty on certain sheets and plates, 
of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19n; Commission Recommendation No 
433179/ECSC of 27 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates of iron or steel 
originating in Spain and repealing certain suspended anti-dumping duties, O.J., S March 1979, No L 53121; Commission 
Recommendation No 1083179/ECSC of SO May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain plates of iron or steel 
originating in Spain but imported from soma other non-memher country, O.J., 1 June 1979, NoL 136/54); 
stcmdardized electric multirphase motors having an output of more than 0. 76 Ie W but nat more than 76 kW, from the USSR : 
market share held by dumped imports from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, 
Czechoslovak.ia and the USSR : 6.25 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from the USSR: 1.47%; 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 451/80 of 22 February 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in the 
USSR, O.J., 27 February 1980, NoL 53/15; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1660/80 of 20 June 1980 concerning the defmitive 
collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on imports of standardized electric multi-phase motors having an 
output of more than 0.75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in the USSR, O.J., 21 June 1980, No L 153145; 
Commission Decision 80/599/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning importsof standardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 
kW, originating in the USSR and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 163/48); 
acrylic fibres from Japan: 
market share held by dumped imports from Japan, cumulated with dumped imports from the United Statee of America 
and Spain, which were not subjected to the present anti-dumping proceeding but were already subjected to anti-
dumping measures : 7.6 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Japan : 1.6 % ; 
(Commission Decision 80/488/EEC of 6 May 1980 accepting an undertak.ing given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning certain acrylic fibres originating in Japan and terminating this proceeding, O.J., 9 May 1980, No 
L 118/60); 
methylcunine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine from the German Democratie Republic and Romania : 
cumulated market share : 26 % ; 
market share held by dmnped imports from Romania : 1.8 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from the German Demoeratic Republic : 24.2 % ; 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2243/82 of 12 August 19B2 imposing a provisional anti~dumping duty on imports of 
methylamine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and accepting an · 
undertak.ing and .terminating the procedure in respect of imports of methylamine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine 
originating in Romania, O.J., 13 August 1982, NoL 238/35); 
kraft liner paper ancl board from Spain: 
market share held by dumped imports from Spain, cumulated with dumped imports from Canada, Finland, Austria, 
Portugal, Sweden, the United Statea of America and the USSR, which were not subjected to the present anti-dumping 
proceeding but were already subjected to anti-dumping measures : 73 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Spain: 1.7%; 
(Commission Decision 84/407/EEC of 10 August 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerning imports of certain kraft liner paper and board originating in Spain and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 21 August 1984, No L 224/30) ; 
hardboard from Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia : 
cumulated market share: 7.5%; 
market share held by dumped imports from Argentina : 1.0 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Switzerland : 1.5 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Yugoslavia : 4.9 % ; 
(Commission Decision 86/232/EEC of 9 June 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
ding coneerDing imports of hardboard originating in Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 12 June 1986, No 167/61); 
artificial oorundum from Hungary, Polancl an.d the USSR: 
cumulated market share : 8.1 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Hungary : 1.6 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Poland : 2.4 % ; 
market share held by dumped import• from the USSR : 3 % ; 
(Commission Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing imports of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the 
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investigation, O.J., 23 September 1986, NoL 271126); 
urea from Czecho•lovakia, the German. Democratie Republi.c, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugo•lavia: 
cumulated market share : 20.28 % ; 
market share held by dumped import& from Czechoslovakia : 0.9 ~ ; 
market share held by dumped import& from the Germand Demoeratic Republic : 2.0 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Kuwait : 1.3 % ; 
market share held by dumped import& from Libya : 6.1 ~ ; 
market share held by dumped import& from Saudi Arabia : 3.1 % ; 
market share held by dumped import& from the Soviet Union : 4.3 ~ ; 
market share held by dumped import& from Trinidad and Tobago : 2. 7 % ; 
market share held by dumped import& from Yugoslavia: 0.8 ~; 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating 
these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1); 
iron or •teel oom, from Algeria, Mexico an.d Yugoslavia: 
cumulated market share : 6.9 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Algeria : 2.0 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Yugoslavia : 2.1 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Mexico : 1.8 % ; 
(CommiBBion Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 22 January 1988, NoL 18/31); 
iron or •tul uction. from Yugoslavia an.d Turkey: 
cumulated market share : 3.9 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Yugoslavia: 3.7%; 
market share held by dumped import& from Turkey : 0.2 ~ ; 
(CommiBBion Decision No 2168/88/ECSC of 20 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain iron 
or steel sections originating in Yugoslavia or Turkey, O.J., 21 July 1988, NoL 190/6); 
urea from Arutria, Hungary, Malaysia, Roman.ia, the USA and Venezuela: 
market share held by dumped import& from Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, cumulated 
with dumped imports from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, which were not subjected to the present anti-dumping proceeding but were 
already subjected to anti-dumping measures : 20 % ; 
cumulated market share held by dumped imparts from Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela: 
11.6; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Austria : 1.8 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Hungary : 0.9 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from MBlaysia : 1.2 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Romruua : 2.8 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from the USA : 3. 7 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Venezuela : 1.0 % ; 
(CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof urea 
originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5); 
audio tape• in call8ette• from Japan, the Republic of Korea an.d Hong Kong : 
cumulated market share : 48.6 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Hong Kong : 1.6 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from the Republic of Korea : 12 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Japan : 35 % ; 
(CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio 
tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/6 
(corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36)) ; 
welded tube• of iron or non-cdloy Btee~ from Turkey an.d Venezuela: 
cumulated market share: 6.8%; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Venezuela: 1.9%; 
market share held by dumped imports from Turkey : 3.9 ~ ; 
(CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings ofTered in 
conneetion with such imports, O.J., 16 December 1990, NoL 351/17); 
gC18-{uelled, Mn-refillable pocket flint lighters from Jcqxm, the People's Republi.c of China, the Republi.c of Korea an.d 
Thailand: 
cumulated market share : 35 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Japan: 12.7 ~; 
market share held by dumped imparts from the People's Republic of China : 1.4 % ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from the Republic of Korea : 14.0 ~ ; 
market share held by dumped imparts from Thailand : 6.8 % ; 
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exporters1151 , or even by referring to inaccuracies in the data about the market 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133120) ; 
semi-fmiihed proci.uct. of alloy steel, from Turkey and Brazil : 
cumulated market share: 8.7%; 
market share held by dumped imports from Turkey : 2.4 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Brazil : 6.3 % ; 
(Commission Decision No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
semi-frnisbed product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April1992, NoL 95/26) 
synthetic fibres of polyesters from In.cli.a and the Republic of Korea : 
cumulated market share : 6.2 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from India : 2.1 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from the Republic of Korea : 4.1 % ; 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof synthetic 
fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, No L 197/25; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 54193 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India 
and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9/2); . 
seamleaa pipea and tubea, of iron or non-alloy steel, from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Polan.d and the Republic of Croatia : 
cumulated market share : 13.7 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Poland : 1.5 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Hungary : 3.1 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Czechoslovakia : 4.6 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Croatia : 4.6 % ; 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296192 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic 
of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping· proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 
1992, No L 328/15) ; 
ferro-•ilicon from Rus•ia, Kazakhstan, Ukrain.e~ Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil : 
cumulated market share : 69.5 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Venezuela : 2 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Sweden : 2 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from leeland : 4 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Brazil : 5.5 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Russia, Kazak.hstan and Ukraine : 16 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Norway: 40%; 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-
silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, 
NoL 302/1); 
ailicon clJI'bide from the People's Republic of China, Poland, the RuBBian Federation and Ukraine 
cumulated market share : 24.2 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from Poland: 1.9%; 
market share held by dumped imports from the Russian Faderation and Ukraine : 7 % ; 
market share held by dumped imports from the People's Republic of China : 15.3 % ; 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon carbide, 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Federatio!l and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94121). 
llSl Europaan anti-dumping case law held that cc(u)nder (basic EC legislation) bijury may sti~l he caused even if the volume of 
each individual exporter is very small,. (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, No 
L 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 
17 December 1988, NoL 348/49). 
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shares1152 ; sometimes, however, such low market shares are, without any further excuse, 
considered not to be de minimis1153• 
As similar situations may lead to opposite injury fmdings, the outcome of injury investigations on 
the basis of the factor «volume of dumped imports» cannot be predicted. Though such arbitrary 
case law does not enhance legal certainty, it broadly paves the way for «one-way flexibility». 
The new GA TT Anti-dumping Code tries to limit this «one-way flexibility» in respect of de 
minimis quantities as, under that Code, «the volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded 
as negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for 
less than 3 percent of imports of the like product in the importing country unless countries which 
individually account for less than 3 percent of the imports of the like product in the importing 
country collectively account for more than 7 percent of imports of the like product in the 
importing country» (Article 5.8.) (emphasis added). However, in view of the wording 
«normally», the anti-dumping authorities may deviate from the. Code rule on negligible quantities 
whenever they can show that the case is <<abnormal». It may even not be necessary to deviate 
from that rule : the ruleon negligible cumulated quantities is easy to circumvent by initiating anti-
dumping proceedings against as many · countries as possible1154. Moreover, this new rule is 
different from European anti-dumping case law on de minimis market shares, as it does not refer 
to the share on the Community market, but to the share in overall Community imports of the like 
product. Even more, EC anti-dumping law, though being amended in order to incorporate the 
new GA IT Anti-dumping Code, bas not copied this provision on negligible volumes of dumped 
imports. Instead, it bas adopted another definition of such negligible volumes, i.e. , imports 
representing a market share of below 1 % unless . the dumped imports coming from several 
countries collectively account for 3 %, or more, of Community consumption ( Artiele 5(7) basic 
EC Regulation). By means of that definition; EC anti-dumping law has codified European anti-
dumping case law on market shares beiow 1 %, leaving all the room for the European anti-
dumping authorities to maintain their «one-way flexible» case law on market shares lying just 
above the de minimis market shares of less than 1 %. 
1152 See : bari.~m chloride from the People's Republi.c of China and the German Demoeratic Republi.c, where injury was found 
though the market share amounted to only 2 %. This low market share was found to be injurious because the market shares were 
underestimated since the figures for import& from the German Demoeratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany were not 
available (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, No 
L 227/24). This is, however, an invalid argument because, under anti-dumping law, intra-German trade was not considered as 
foreign trade and could, therefore, not be taken into account. 
1153 Commission Regulation (EC) No 634194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertam 
magnetic disks (3,5• microdisks) originating in HongKong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5. 
1154 WAER., P., and VERMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?», Joumal of 
World Trade, 199412, (5), 16. 
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3.3.1.2.2. Prices of dumped imports 
3.3.1.2.2.1. Prices of dumped importsas evidence ofinjury 
The prices of dumped imports are indicated as a relevant factor for the examinatien of in jury. 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law specify that a significant price · undercutting as compared 
with the price of a like product in· the Community may be particularly relevant (Article 3.2. 
GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(b) basic ECSC 
Decision). However, the prices of dumped products in general, and the price undercutting in 
partienlar are not necessarily decisive under GA TT and European anti-dumping law. As a 
consequence, price undercutting is no necessary indication of injury1155, though no price 
undercutting may be conclusive proof that the Community industry is not injured by the 
dumpingl156. 
It is impossible to derive the relevant threshold for price undercutting which implies injury from 
European anti-dumping case law. Indeed, a weighted average margin of price undercutting of 
43 % was mentioned in a finding of no injury1157, whereas a margin of price undercutting of 
only 2 % did not preclude a finding of injury1158. It might be argued that a margin of 2 % is 
not significant. In fact, though, no threshold can be determined, because the effect of price 
undercutting depends not only on the margin of price undercutting, but also on the market 
structure. In an oligopolistic market, i.e., a market consisting of a few producers manufacturing a 
fully identical product, a small margin of price undercutting causes enormous shifts in demand 
1155 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, No L 97/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, 
NoL14/1. 
1156 Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of furfural 
originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, No L 189/57; Commission 
Decision 82/808/EEC of 25 November 1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of aluminium foil for 
household and catering use originating in Austria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and lsrael, O.J., 1 December 1982, 
No L 339/58 ; Commission Decision 83/493/EEC of 28 September 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports 
of xanthan gum originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 30 September 1983, No L 268/60; Commission Decision 
85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain boots with fitted ice 
skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, NoL 52/48; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomar originating in the United 
Statesof America and terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, NoL 258120; Commission Decision 88/651/EEC of23 
December 1988 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain cellular mobile radio telephones originating 
in Canada, Hong Kong and Japan, O.J., 30 December 1988, No L 362/59. 
1157 Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and 
its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16/30. 
1158 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 163/83 of 21 January 1983. imposing-. a provisional anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, NoL 2319. 
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from one producer to the other1159• In a monopolistic market, i.e. , a market with a large 
1159 In European anti-dumping case law, se ver al, though not explicit, raferences to an oligopolietic market structure may be 
discerned in conneetion with price undercutting : 
the fact that the product was very price-sensitive (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3339/87 of -4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in Libya and 
Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, 
O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 31711; Council Regulation (EEC) No 385190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional 
anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 16 February 1990, NoL -4211; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 
of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, 
O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 14519; Commission Decision 911256/EEC of 14 May 1991 accepting undertakings ofTered in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof welded wire-mesh originating in Yugoslavia and termi-
nating the investigation, O.J., 18 May 1991, NoL 123154; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No 
L 271117 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 October 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China and defmitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 24 
October 1991, NoL 29312; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 
1992, NoL 34/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830192 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports 
of certain polyellter yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China 
and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, 
No L 153116) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956192 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, No L 197125; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/8 
(corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 1993, No L 13/20); Council Regulation (EEC) No 54193 of 8 January 1993 imposing a 
defmitive duty on importsof synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 
1993, No L 9/2 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2455193 of 2 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1798190 in 
respect of the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia, the Republic of 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, No L 225/1; Commission Decision 93/479/EEC of 30 July 1993 
accepting undertakings ofTered in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures applicable to certain imports of 
monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, No 
L 225/35 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119194 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No · 
L 330/15); 
the fact that the consumer is predominantly sensitive to price (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour television receivers originating in Hong Kong and the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/31) ; 
the fact that, in the highly price-sensitive market, the Community producers had little choice but to follow the prices set by 
the dumping exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating 
in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272/13) ; 
the price sensitivity of the market, along with the fact that there is little scope for product differentiation, leaving the 
Community producers little choice but to match the dumping prices in order to keep their position in the market (Commission 
Regulatioil (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16); 
the fact that in a highly price-sensitive market, important price undercutting is extremely detrimental (Commission Decision 
No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain semi-tinisbed products of 
alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April1992, NoL 95/26); 
the fact .that prices play a very important role in the market .. , along with the fact that "price undercutting due to dumping 
has therefore an immediate negative effect on the prices practised by the Community industry .. (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2093191 of 15 July 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers 
origiriating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China and collecting defmitively the provisional duty, O.J., 18 July 
1991, No L 19511. See also : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 365/25) ; 
the transparency and price sensitivity of the market, which explain why sales at low prices inevitably have substitution 
effects as customers choose to be supplied at the lowest price ofTered (Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, O.J.,.13 April 1994, No L 94/21) ; 
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the transparency of the market, along with the fact that purebase decisiona are eBBentially made on the basis of prices 
(Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 58/12); 
the transparency of the market, along with the fact that the market is extremely sensitive to price changes (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1031192 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium chloride 
(potash) originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 28 April 1992, No L 110/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2305192 of 
4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in Brazil and definitively 
collecting the am.ounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/1; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 of 23 October 1992 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping. duty on imports of potassium chloride 
originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 24 October 1992, NoL 308/•U; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2477193 of 
6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain photo albums originating in the People 's 
Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 
imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on import& of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 22 September 1993, NoL 237/2; Commission Decision 931521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review in respect of import& of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil, 
terminating the anti-subsidy review proceeding with regard to these import& and terminating the anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy review in respect of imports of binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, No L 251128; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon 
origi.nating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, No 
L 302/1 ; Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50); 
the fact that the effect of price undercutting is augmented by the transparency of the market, along with the fact that the 
price constitutes the main competitive factor (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 906192 of 30 March 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in Brazil, O.J., 10 April 1992, No L 96/17 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, NoL 152/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 
June 1992, No L 163127)) ; 
the transparancy of the market, along with the fact that price is the most important factor in marketing the product 
(Commiuion Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of gum 
rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, NoL 41/50); 
the transparency of the mar ket, in which there is a limited number of operators (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 
30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 
0,5% Oow carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-chrome with 
a carbon content by weight of maximum 0,5 % Qow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, 
O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/1); 
the transparency and price elasticity of the market, along with the fact that the price was the most important factor for 
customers in determining their souree of supply (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fluorspar origi.nating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, 
No L 226/3) ; . 
the high price elasticity of the market, as well asthefact that the market is transparentand price-sensitive, which explaina 
why the price undercutting by the dumping exporters was injurious to the Community producers (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1034/91 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April1991, NoL 106/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 
15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in 
Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 
·April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, 
O.J., 29 April 1993, No L 10414) ; 
the fact that competition is mainly based on prices (Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings 
gi.ven in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and 
Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and UzbekiStan, O.J., 21 
May 1994, No L 129/24) ; 
the fact that competition was based mainly on prices as there were no perceptible quality ditTerences and the market was 
transparant (Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 1994/92 of 14 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
into tbe Community of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 18 July 1992, No L 199/8) ; 
the transparency and price sensitivity of the market, on which competition, to a large extent, wasbasedon price alone, along 
with the fact that products were of comparatively standard technology and did not have significant differences in. features 
and quality (Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April1993 i,m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 
1993, No L 112120) ; 
the fact that competition is, to a large extent, based on price alone in the segment of basic products which are of a 
comparative standard technology and do not show significant ditTerences in features and quality (Commission Regulation 
· (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of· certain compact disc players 
originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27)) ; 
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number of producers manufacturing diversified, though still similar products, such shifts in 
demand may require large margins of price undercutting, as competition in such a market depends 
the fact that, because of the homogeneous nature of the product, the dumping prices, which undercut the Community 
producers' prices with a margin of up to 14 %, exerted a sharp downward pressure on the Community producers' prices 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 384/81 of 13 February 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer 
originating in the United Btates of America, O.J., 14 February 1981, NoL 42114); 
the fact that the wide standardization of the products accentuated the price-depressive effect of the dumping prices 
(Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional·anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, NoL 18/31 i Commission Decision 
90/196/EEC of 10 April ·1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetram.ine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the 
proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, No L 104114) ; 
thé fact that the price was the main consideration in sourcing supply as there were no real differences in quality, particularly 
in the case of standard types (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 
June 1990, No L 152124 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685190 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, 
O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 266/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38)) ; 
the fact that, at the bottom end of the market, producers compete to a very large extent on price alone, their products being 
of comparative standard technology and having no significant differences in features and quality (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes 
originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 
January 1991, No L9/36)) ; 
the high price competitiveness of the market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133120 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of 
iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Blovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15) i 
the fact that the price is the most important faCtor for cuetomers in determining their souree of supply (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 26 September 1992 hnposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of deadburned 
(sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/16; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 26 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282123) i 
the fact that the dumped product has homogenuous characteristics and that, in a very competitive market, prices are the 
decisive factor as to each operator's position (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No 
L 186/11); 
the fact that, in a market where the price level was a decisiv"e factor in the decision to buy, the dumping exporters, owing to 
the size of their market shares and the fact that their prices were low, placed heavy downward preesure on the price level in 
the Community and consequently on the level of the Community producers' prices ( Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2054191 
of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187123; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1); 
the fact that the dumping exporters have a dominant position on the highly price-eompetitive market of the Community 
which e:xplaina why their price undercutting had such an appreciable effect on the condition of the Community induBtry 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2006/88 
of 6 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed character printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of 
Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 366/47); 
the fact that the dumping exporter was the major world supplier of the product and, for that reason, had a considerable 
influence on selling prices (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the 
proceeding concerning imports originating in HongKong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83123). 
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not only on prices, but also on product differentiation1160• The existence of prices of 
differentiated products distorts the inquiry into price undercutting, since price adjustments must be 
made in order to determine exactly the margin of price undercutting1161 • Such adjustments 
1160 An excellent example of monopolistic competition may he found in audio tape• in cuuttes from Japan. Only a relatively low 
weighted average margin of price undercutting of 6 % was establisheci. Nevertheless, injury was found probably because the 
Japanese exporters were active on the high-quality segment& of the market, where competition is based more on non-price 
element&, mainly brand name, marketing, features and styling, than on prices (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 
November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic 
of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 Janumj 1991, No L9/36)). 
See also : compact dï.c players from Japan an.cl South Korea, where it was noted that the attractiveness, for the consumer, of a 
model is based essentially on his evalustion of pricelbrandlfeatures, in whichever order, but that a drastic price decrease for a 
specific model could still profoundly alter its attractiveness compared with another directly competitive model (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players 
originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27)). 
1161 C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1379 (Opinion of Advocate General 
MISCHO). 
Price adjustments have been made for : 
d.ifferences in physical characteristics (see e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 3664/93 of 22 December 1993 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of photo albums in bookbound form originating in the People's 
Republic of China and collecting defmitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1993, NoL 333/67); 
d.ifferences in quality (see e.g., Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April1994 accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and 
terminating the investigation with regard to these countries i as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
importsof ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbek.istan, O.J., 21 May 1994, 
No L 129/24) i 
d.ifferences in security of supply (Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia 
and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries i as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning importsof ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 
May 1994, No L 129/24) i 
d.ifferences in quantity (see e.g., Coinmission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a grestest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, 
O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 152/24) i 
import duties and taxes (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No 
L 120/3); 
the costs of importing the dumped product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2243/82 of 12 August 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of methylamine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in the German 
Demoeratic Republic and accepting an undertaking and terminating the procedure in respect of imparts of methylamine, 
dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in Romania, O.J., 13 August 1982, No L 238/35) i 
d.ifferences in conditions and terms of sale (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No 
L 130/12), euch as : 
transport costs (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EC) No 1648/94 of 6 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& offurazolidone originating in the People's Republic of China, O . .J., 8 July 1994, NoL 17414); 
inaurance costs (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272/13) i 
handling costs (see e.g., Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 
January 1994, NoL 12/5); 
ancillary costs (see e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imparts of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the provisional 
duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the import& of video tape reels originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, NoL 174/1) i 
storage costs (see e.g., Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 
January 1994, No L 12/5) ; 
distribution channels (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, 
the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133120 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 
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are frequently inaccurate so that the determination of the margin of price undercutting is not fully 
July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197125); 
credit terms (see e.g., CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 724/82 of 30 March 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 
75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demooratie Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and 
terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of said producte originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, No 
L 8519 (comparison at the level of cash payment) ; Commission Decision 861344/.EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43 (extended payment terms)); 
financing costs (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imporb of certain seamlesa pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia 
and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic 
of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, NoL 328/15; Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, 
RUBBia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 1215) ; 
commiBBions (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia 
and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic 
of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15) ; 
discounts and rebates (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2805/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 
1991, No L 270/15) ; 
differences in the level of trade (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ootton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L. 271117) 
(comparison of the ex-works prices charged by the Community industry with the cif Community frontier prices charged by the 
exporters); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of certain compactdisc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 
September 1989, No L 257/27) (end-user prices versus dealer prices); Commission Decision 911512/EEC of 25 July 1991 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of artificial 
corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovak.ia and the People's Republic of China and in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, 
and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 275/27 (oomparison of the Community producers' ex-works 
prices with the dumping exporters' prices cif Community border)). Accor.Uag to the Court of Justice, the same interpretation 
is placed on tcdifferences in the level of trade•• with regard to the determination of the margin of price undercutting, as in 
respeCt of the determination of the dumping margin (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd V 
Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2193-2194) (for their interpretation in respect of the dumping margin, see : supra, 274-283). 
However, the export prices of the dumped product which serve as basis for the determination of the dumping margin (see: 
Artiele 2(8) and (9) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 2(8) basic ECSC Decision), are not used for the determination of the margin 
of price undercutting. Instead the resale prices charged for the dumped product& on the Community market are taken into 
account. 1f the European anti-dumping authorities do not know these resale prices, they calculate them on the basis of the 
facta available, i.e., export prices plus import duties, a reasonable profit margin fortheimporter and other cost (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to 
the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15) ; 
differences on the demand side (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 
(corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, NoL 321119); Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No 
L 14/1 (comparison between the Community producers' prices to dealers and the dumped product's prices to manufacturers 
and distributors). 
Moreover, in order to prevent price manipulation, only prices paid by independent buyers on the Community market are taken into 
account (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof certain polyester yarns {man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China 
and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276!1). 
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accurate either1162• 
exact quantification 
undercutting1163• 
However, sufficiently substantial indications, without gtvtng, though, an 
of the margin of price undercutting, may prove the existence of price 
When the exporters dump a large number of product types, making it administratively extremely 
difficult to determine the price-linked effects of the dumping, the European anti-dumping 
authorities may use sampling techniques insofar as the sampling is representative for the dumped 
exports to the Community as a whole1164• 
Sometimes, the general price level and the price level of a specific product are compared, rather 
than the dumping price and the Community producers' price. Thus, injury may be found when 
the prices of the like product show an overall fall during a period in which prices are generally on 
the rise1165• Injury may also be found when the dumping exporters' prices on their dornestic 
1162 It may be impossible to properly make quantifi.cations of all the differences affecting price comparability and, thus, to make 
these adjustments : 
in plain. paper photocopiers from Japan. the Commission underscored the difficulty of mak.ing accurate quantifications and 
contended itself by mak.ing cca reasanabie comparisonn (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, 
· No·L 239/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 536/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 64112); 
in hydrau.lic excavators from Japan. the Council, when confronted with this difficulty, noted that, in view of the price-
depressive effect, a detailed examination of the price undercutting was not necessary ; therefore, no accurate adjustments 
were made (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/86 of 4 July 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1986, NoL 176/1); 
in serial-impact dot-matrix printers from Japan. no adjustments were made if no commonly accepted standards existed for 
measuring the differences and only limited adjustments were made if the formula for calculating these adjustments were 
based on asaumptions and estimations but not on precise, reliable and verifiable data (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3661188 
of 23 November 1988 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33) ; 
in · deep freezers from the USSR, Yugoslavia an.d the German. Democratie Republic no adjustment was made because the 
impact of consumer preferences is often a matter of subjective judgement and, thus, difficult to quantify (Commission 
Regulation ~EC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep 
freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep 
freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Democratie Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating 
the proceeding concerning importsof certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14). 
However, in electronic typewriters from Japan. the average of various subjective estimates was used (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 
June 1985, No L 16311). The Court of Justice did not forbid to use this average in view of the lack of an objective method (C.J.E.C., 
case 260/85, 5 October 1988, Brather ln.du.tries' Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6683), 6726; C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/86, 6 
October 1988, Can.onln.c. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6731), 6810). 
1163 C.J.E.C., casc C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1379 (Opinio.n of Advocate General 
MISCHO), and 1402 and 1406; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushila Electric Industrial Co. Lld and Matsushila Electric Trading 
Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1485 and 1489 ;C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Pholo lnduslry Co. Lld v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1529 and 1533; CJ.E.C., case C-177/87, lOMarch 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, 
(1535), 1570-1571 and 1574; CJ.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporalion v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1682-1683 and 
1686. 
1164 lt ia not necessary that the sample ia representative for the market of each Memher (C.J.E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA Sennes v 
Directeur des servlees des douanes de Strasbourg, E. C.R., 1990, I, (3027), 3043 (Opinion of Advocate GeneralVAN GERVEN) and 3053). 
1165 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of,21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/6. 
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market do not decrease to the same extent as their prices on the Community market1166• Both 
comparisons are meaningless. Indeed, an increase of the general price level does not imply that 
each individual price goes up1167 ; there may be a price difference between markets merely 
because of a different competitive situation in these markets1168• 
In other cases, the price trend of the dumped imports in the Community is examined. In those 
cases, the dumping prices are said to have decreased by more than might have been expected on 
the basis of economies of scale and the leaming-curve effect of the industry1169• Here, the 
European anti-dumping authorities fail to take· account of the effect of competition on the 
evolution of the price level, unless the leaming-curve effect is considered to refer not only to the 
accumulation of experience of the dumping exporters in producing the product, but also to the 
entry, of new competitors on the market, as the production know-how and technology become 
more accessible to an increasing number of (potential) competitors1170• 
The price-depressive or price-suppressive effects of the dumping may also be taken into account 
within the frameworkof the injury investigation (Article 3.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 
3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision1171) 1172. Those effects 
1166 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
compactdisc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, 
NoL 257/27). 
1167 In plain paper photocopiers from Japan (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importsof plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5), a drop in the 
price of plain paper photocopiers was not so extraordinary during the period taken into consideration (1976-1984)- a period of 
worldwide inflation. lndeed, the end of the world-wide monopoly position of the United Statea Xerox Corporation in 1976 made the .. 
teehnology for manufacturing plain paper photocopiers aeeessible to all interestad producers all over the world. As a consequence, 
competition among saveral producers grew and resulted in lower prices. · 
1168 Preeisely those different competitive situations may cause price discrimination, see :supra, 26-27. 
1169 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio types of 
electrooie microcircuitl known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by eertaio 
exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding conceming imports of these producta and tenninating the investigation in their respect, 
O.J., 25 January 1990, NoL 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, NoL 22179; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44) 
1170 In plain paper photocopiers jrom Japan (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importa of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5), reference was made to the end of the world-
wide monopoly position of the United States Xerox Corporation in 1976. This, undoubtedly, made the technology for manufacturing plain paper 
photocopiers acceuible to all interested producers all over the world. AB a consequence, competition among several producers grew and resulted in 
lower prices. 
1171 Contrary to Artiele 3.2. GAT!' Anti-dumping Code and Artiele 3(3) basic EC Regulation, Artiele 4(2)(b) basic ECSC Deeision 
does not refer to the possible price-depressive or price-suppressive effects of dumped import& (i.e., whether dumped imports have 
depressed prices or prevented price increases) with regard to the prices of dumped imports. Nevertheless, European anti-dumping 
case law is not illegal when price-depressive and price-suppressive effects are taken into account. By taking into account price-
depressive and price-suppressive effects, together with the margin of price undercutting, a combined application is given of Artiele 
4(2)(b) and (c) basic ECSC Deeision. Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Deeision mentions the Community producers' prices as a factor 
whieh may be taken into account for determining the degree of injury. In this respect, reference is made to possible price 
depreesion or suppression. Moreover, the list of factors in Artiele 4(2) basic ECSC Decision is not exhaustive and none of the 
factors enumerated necessarily gives decisive guidance. 
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may not accurately be deducted . from the margin of price undercutting1173 • Therefore, so-
called «target sal~ prices», i.e., the price level required for Community producers to cover their 
costs and to make a reasonable profit1174, are used instead of the actual Community 
1172 For example, in colour television. receivers from Malaysia, the Peopk'• Republi.c of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore 
an.d Thailand, there was simultaneously price depression, namely an overall price decrease of 3 %, and price suppresion, namely 
price should have had increased as aresult of improved quality and performance (Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 
September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the 
People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50). 
A direct price-depreuive or price-suppreuive effect on the prices charged by the Community producers is not required. lndeed, in 
copper sulphate from Yugoslavia the Commiuion held that tc(i)n the rest of the Community market (i.e., the Community market, 
ltaly excluded) Yugoslav prices have had a depressive effect both directly on those of the Community producers and indirectly 
where the Italian producer bas been forced to attempt to sell increasing quantities of the product concerned in areas other than its 
traditional markets where it can no longer compete with the dumped import&» (Commiuion Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of copper sulphate originating in 
Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, NoL 215/16. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1244/86 of 
28 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April 
1986, NoL 11314). 
1173 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 of 29 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
polyester yam originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 2 September 1980, NoL 23115; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain textured polyester fabrics originating in 
the United Statea of America, O.J., 20 May 1981, NoL 133117; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1570/81 of 11 June 1981 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 13 June 1981, NoL 154110; 
Commission Decision 82/757/EEC of 11 November 1982 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
procedure concerning decabromodiphenylether originating in the United Statea of America and terminating the procedure, O.J., 16 
November 1982, No 319/16 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 163183 of 21 January 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on 4,4'-lsopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 26 January 1983, No L 23/9; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2024183 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol 
originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 22 July 1983, NoL 199/4; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 16311; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hydraulic 
excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, NoL 176/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April 1986, No L 97/1; 
'CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mercury 
originating in the Union of Sc;>viet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, No L 227/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2684188 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain importsof video cassette recorders originating in 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5. 
1174 The production coats taken into account are all the Community producers' production costs of the like product, both fixed and 
variable, plus overhead& (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 
and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, 
Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those 
countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181119; CommiBBion Decision 83175/EEC of 15 February 1983 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain fibre building board originating 
in Brazil, O.J., 19 February 1983, NoL 47/30; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 163/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric 
motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an 
output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, 
NoL 83/1; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on inlports of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, No L 102/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No 
L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 18 September 1989 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and the Boviet Union and 
defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such import&, O.J., 20 September 1989, No L 27111). 
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producers' prices of the like product1175. As «target sales prices» rely on the costs and profits 
The determination of a reasonable profit margin is based on the product lüe cycle, the investments necessary to carry out research 
and development in order to keep pace with new developments, the fmancial risks of embark.ing on new research and development 
programmes, the need to provide sharebolders with an adequate return on their investment (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 
of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 
1985, No L 16311 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, No L 221116). 
1175 See e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 16311 (where the sum of the production costs, including 
overhead&, and a reasonable profit margin was called "target sales price•) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import&. of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 
kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Gennan Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the 
Soviet Union, and definitiveiy collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase 
electric motors baving an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, 
No L 102/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 
17 January 1990, No L 13121 (where the production costs were called ccreference coats.) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 
of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and 
South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27) (where the sum of the production 
costs, including overhead&, and a reasonable profit margin was called cctarget sales price•); Commission Decision 89/573/EEC of 30 
October 1989 terminating the investigation concerning imports of dicumyl peroxide originating in Taiwan and accepting an 
undertaking offered in the context of the review concerning importsof dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan and terminating the 
proceeding, O.J., 31 October 1989, No L 317/49. 
According to the Court of Justice the use of "target sales price&» is legal whenever the prices actually charged by the Community 
producers are not usefull when they have decreased due to the dumping. Thus, the Court of Justice allows the use of .. target sales 
prices- to maasure the price-suppressive effect of the dumping (C.J.E.C., case 250/85, 5 October 1988, Brotker Industries' Ltd v 
Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5683), 5726; C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon lnc. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 
(5731), 5809 ; C.J.E.C., joined cases 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y (TEC) a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, 
(5855), 5906-5908 and 5923-5924; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273185 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Bilver Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, 
E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5980-5981). Advocate-General P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT is, however, of the opinion that the use of 
cctarget sales price&at is incompatible with the wording, as well as with the market-economie background of. Artiele 3 basic EC 
Regulation and Artiele 4 basic ECSC Decision (C.J.E.C., case 53183, 23 May 1985, Allied Corporation a.o. v Council, E. C.R., 1985, 
(1621), 1631). Advocate-General P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT cannot be agreed with. The use of cctarget sales prices» for 
measuring tbe price-suppressive effect of dumping cannot be illegal, merely because the list of economie factors enumerated in 
European anti-dumping law (Article 3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(c) basic EC legislation) is not exhaustive. It is, 
moreover, not necessarily incompatible with the market-economie background of European anti-dumping law, in view of the fact 
that the use of tbe constructed value as normal value standard is allowed explicitly by Europaan and even GAT!' anti-dumping 
law. The only valid argument& against the use of cctarget sales prices» are the same as those which may he raised against the use 
of the constructed value : fust, the fact that full oost pricing is assumed, and, second, the fact that each price reconstruction allows 
for arbitrariness and, thus, •one-way flexibility» (see : supra, 161-180). 
The oomparieon between dumping prices and .the Community producers' production costs plus a reasonable profit margin is similar 
to the use of ..target sales price&» : the fact that dumping prices are lower than those production costs and a reasonable profit 
margin may he decisive in findingsof h\iury (BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The 
European. Communitie•, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 157-158 .; VAN BAEL, L, and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and otker 
Trade Proteetion Law• oftke EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1990, 129). In this respect it is sometimes underscored that: 
the dumping price level covers only a part of the Community producers' production costs (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
348/83 of 10 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of hexamethylenetetramine originating in 
the German Demoeratic Republic and the Soviet Union, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of import& of hexamethylenetetramine originating in Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, No 
L 40/24 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a 
price undertaking from one Japanese exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of certain glass textile 
fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, No L 160/18; 
CommiNion Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning import& of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, 
No L 215/16; Commission Decision 84/408/EEC of 16 August 1984 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping review proceeding concerning imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 22 August 1984, No L 225/22 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of artificial corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and 
Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of importsof artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugosla-
via, O.J., 25 September 1984, No L 25519 ; Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting an undertaking given 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes 
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of the Community producers, they do not measure the price-depressive or price-suppresive 
effects ; they measure only whether the dumping exporters are more efficient than the Community 
producers, unless they too charge prices below their own production costs1176• Price-
originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, No L 46/45; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, 
distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, NoL 79124); 
the dumping forces the Community producers to sell at prices which do not cover all their costs (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2317/86 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of roller ebains for cycles 
originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., U August 1986, No L 217n; Commission Decision 
86/536/EEC of 7 November 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain tube and pipe 
fittings originating in Brazil, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Japan, O.J., 8 November 1986, No L 313120) ; 
because of the pressure of the dumping on prices, the achievable price increaaes were insufficient for the Community 
producers to cover the rise in wage and raw material coat (Commission Decision No 891.192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain semi-finished products of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, 
O.J., 9 April1992, NoL 95/26); . 
the prices of the dumped product which is of a superior quality, are lower than the Community producers' costs of producing 
the like product of inferior quality, plus a reasanabie profit margin (Commission Decision 83n5/EEC of 15 February 1983 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain fibre building 
board originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 February 1983, NoL 47/30); 
the prices of dumped. imports cover total production costs, but do not provide a reasanabie profit margin for the Community 
indUBtry (Council · Decision 82/423/EEC of 21 June 1982 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
certain refrigerators originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 29 June 1982, NoL 184/23; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of artificial corundum originating in the People 's Republic of China and 
Czechoslovakia and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of artificial corundum originating in Spain and Yugosla-
via, O.J., 25 September 1984, No L 255/9 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, NoL 221116). 
lf, however, a price control system is established by a Memher State and the production costs of the Community producers selling 
on the market of this Memher State are higher than the prices they are oompelled to charge, attention is only paid to the 
differences between the priées fixed by the Memher State and the prices of the dumped imports ( Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 
26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into 
Greece of certain categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51n3). 
1176 8ee : barium chloride from the People'• Republic of China, where the Commission pointed out that the argument according to 
which the low export prices were caused by the oost of raw materials and Iabour, wasnotrelevant to the establishment of injury · 
and did not obviate the price undercutting established (Council Regulation (EEC) No 541.191 of 4 March 1991 im.posing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importsof barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, NoL 60/1). 
See, however : 
· EPROMB from Japan., where it was noted that the dumping prices were generally at levels below production costs (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on im.ports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 
March 1991, NoL 65/1); 
copper Bulphate from Bulgaria or the Souiet Union, where raferenee was made to the cost of the raw material on the world 
market instead of the oost to the Community producers. The fact that the prices of the dumped imports are lower than the 
world market price of the raw material which accounts for 70% of the total cost of production was, thus, put foward as 
evidence of the very low price level of the dumped imports (Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 23 January 1989 im.posing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Buigaria or the Soviet Union, O.J., 27 January 
1989, No L 2311). The fact that the prices of the dumped imports lie below the world market prices of the raw material is, 
indeed, an indication that the dumping prices do not reflect the efficiency of the dumping exporters. However, the dumping 
exporters may have bought the raw material at prices below the world market price. In such a case, the fact that their prices 
are lower than the world market price of the raw material is no evidence that they were charging extremely low prices. The 
Europaan anti-dumping authorities, however, did notmake clear at which price the dumping exporters had bought the raw 
material. Probably, they did not investigate it because it concerned dumping from NME countries. lndeed, under Europaan 
anti-dumping law it is refused to take account of the production costs in NME countries because the notion of comparative 
advantage ie strange to the economie system of NME countries (see : Bupra, 61-65). As a consequence, NME countries may be 
sanctioned for input dumping, whereas ME countries are not (see : Bupra, 167-169 and 172-173) ; 
magn.etic diBkB (3,6H microdisks) from Japan., where the production coats of a Community producer were found to be lower 
than those of the dumping exporters. As the dumping prices undercut the prices of the Community industry, the dumping 
exporters will have sold their exports.to the Community at a loss (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
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depressive and price-suppressive effects are advanced also to explain why no detailed examination 
of price undercutting is undertaken 1177 or why no significant and systematic price undercutting 
is found1178• 
GATI and European anti-dumping law, thus, vest broad discretionary powers in the European 
anti-dumping authorities, which enables the latter to fmd injury on the basis of the prices of the 
dumped imports whenever they want to. Indeed, a low margin of price undercutting may he 
sufficient. lf there is no price undercutting, they can compare the dumping prices with other, 
irrelevant prices, or rely on price-depressive or price-suppresive effects 1179, which it is hard, 
if not impossible, to measure ; «target sales prices», in particular, are no good measure in this 
respect. Moreover, the price adjustments necessary to determine the margin of price undercutting 
leaves also room for arbitrariness, be it only because of the difficulties of quantifying product 
differentiations. 
3.3.1.2.2.2. Technical dumping 
It is sometimes argued that so-called «technica! dumping», i.e. , the dumping exporters align their 
prices to the prices charged either by the Community industry or by other dumping or non-
dumping exporters, must not be held to cause injury because, with teehoical dumping, the dumped 
imports are priced competitively1180• 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5). 
1177 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 163/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, NoL 176/1. 
1178 Commission Decision 86/536/EEC of 7 November 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning im.ports of 
certain tube and pipe fittings originating in Brazil, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Japan, O.J., 8 November 1986, NoL 313/20; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54112. 
1179 See e.g. : eodium carbonale from the United States of America, where the Commission held that cc(w)hereas resale prices of 
im.ported sodium carbonate in general were below those prevailing in the markets concerned, al heit in part only marginally, ( ... ) 
they nevertheless prevented price increases ( ... ) and led to price depression•• (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3018/82 of 11 
November 1982 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain sodium carbonate originating in the United States 
of America and accepting certain undertakings concerning the importsof certain sodium carbonate originating in the United States 
of America, O.J., 13 November 1982, No L 317/5). 
118° C.J.E.C., case 53183, 23 May 1985, Allied Corporatwn a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1985, (1621), 1632 (Opinion of Advocate-General 
P. VERLOREN VAN THEMA.AT); BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The Europecm 
Communitiee, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 158 ; VERMULST, E.A.,· Antidumping Law and Practice in the United Statea cmd 
the Europecm Communitiea. A Comparative Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,655-657. 
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Only for price alignments to prices of non-dumped imports the «technical dumping» argument has 
been successful, when it is established that the low priced noo-durnpeel imparts are the 
sole1181 cause of the injury1182• 
For price alignments to low priced Community products, the «technical dumping» argument has 
oot yet been accepted, either because in fact the Community producers had to align their prices to 
the dumping prices and oot the other way around1183, because it was impossible or irrelevant 
1181 If the dumped i.mports also cause injury, anti-dumping relief is.granted (CommiBBion Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 
1982 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning i.mports of perchlorethylene 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United States of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 
December 1982, NoL 371147; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111), unless anti-dumping relief is considered not to be in the 
Community interest& because of the undercutting of the dumped imports by non-dumped imports. lndeed, in furfural from Spain 
and the People's Republic of China, nickel from the Boviet Union and tube a.nd pipe fittings from Brazil, Yugoslavia a.nd Japan. the. 
dumped i.mports were considered to cause injury. Nevertheless, anti-dumping relief was not granted because, in view of the fact 
that the prices of the dumped imports were undercut by non-dumped imports, it was not considered to be in the Community 
interesta (Co:mmission Decision 811493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of furfural 
originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, No L 189/57; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning i.mports of unwrought nickel, 
not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Boviet U nion, O.J., 
19 October 1983, No L 286/29; Commission Decision 86/536/EEC of 7 November 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning importsof certain tube and pipe fittings originating in Brazil, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Japan, O.J., 8 November 1986, 
NoL 313/20). 
1182 In sacch.arin cuu:l its salts from China, the Republic of Korea and the United Statesof America the anti-dumping proceeding 
was terminated because the non-dumped imports from other countries, which undercut the prices of the dumped imports, were 
considered to be the cause of the injury (Commission Decision 83/626/EEC of 12 December 1983 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of saccharin and its salts originating in China, the Republic of Korea and the United States of 
Am.erica, O.J., 15 December 1983, NoL 352/49). Thus, the proceeding was terminated because of the lack of a causal relationship 
between the dumping and the injury (as required by Artiele 3(6) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 4(1) basic.ECSC Decision). 
1183 In DRAMa from Japan and EPROMs from Japan, the technica! dumping argument was not accepted because there were 
strong grounds for regarding the dumping exporters collectively as price leaders (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 
January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertrun types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs 
(dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 
January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a defi.nitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 
1991, No L 65/1). By considering the dumping exporters as price leaders, it was implicitly said that the price cutting must have 
been started by the dumping exporters. 
In silicon carbi.de from Norway, the alignment defence was rejected on the basis that the Community industry had frequently and 
increasingly matebed the prices of the Norwegian imports (Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding importsof that product 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, 
NoL 287/25). 
See also: 4,4'-ï..opropyli.denediphenol from the United Statea of America, where the American exporter claimed that he had not 
influenced the market prices in the Community, as the company's policy had been to align itself to the prices established by 
competition between the Community producers. Nevertheless, the American imports were not considered to play a passive roleon 
the Community market because the drop in prices would not have occurred - at least not to the same extent - in the absence of the 
dum.ped i.mports (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 22 July 1983, NoL 199/4). 
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to determine who had starteel the price cutting1184, or because the dumped imports did not 
merely follow price decreases of the Community producers but were consistently made at lower 
levels1185• Moreover, even if the dumping exporters match their prices to the prices of the 
Community producers, injury will be found if the price policy of the dumping exporters 
contributes to the price fall on the Community market. 
For price alignments to low prices of dumped imports originating in third countries, it seems that 
the «technical dumping» argument will never be accepted1186, unless the low dumping prices 
are introduced by a Community producer who. imports the low-priced dumped products1187• 
Under European anti-dumping law, it is considered not essential which dumping ex porter bas 
1184 In calcium metal from the People's Republi.c of China an.d the Sovi.et Uni.on., the Council, aftar having reminded that it would 
be d.ifficult, ü not impossible to determine who had started the price cutting, considered it not relevant to the issue of price 
undercutting who had started the price cutting during the period in which injury is examined (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2808/89 of 18 September 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal originating in the People's 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports, 
O.J., 20 September 1989, NoL 27111). 
See also: silicon cGI'bi.de from Norway, where it was underscored that it is difficult to verify conclusively whohad starled the price 
cutting. Nevertheless, the alignment defence was rejected on the basis that the Community induBtry had frequently and 
increasingly matehad the prices of the Norwegian imports (Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, 
No L 287125). 
1185 Council Regulation (EC) No 3319/94 of 22 December 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof urea ammonium nitrate 
salution originating in Buigaria and Poland, exported by companies not exempted from tbc duty, and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed, O.J., 31 December 1994, No L 350/20. 
1186 In pentoerythri.tol from Canada it was considered not essential in an anti-dumping proceeding to determine which exporter · 
started to causa inj\n-y to the Community industry if it is established that all exporters contributed to the material injury suffered 
by the Community indUBtry (Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, No 
L 20/46)). 
See also : tung•ten ore• an.d concentrales from the People's Republic of China, where competition between dumping suppliers, 
established in the same country which eausas sharp price falls, was not accepted as a ground to conclude that the dumping was not 
injurious (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 761.190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports 
originating in HongKong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/23). 
Moreover, in pota .. ium permanganate from Czechoslovaki.a, the German Demoeratic Republic an.d the People's Republi.c of China it 
was established that the price decrease was initiated by Chinese exporters and that this trend was followed by the Czech and East 
German exporters. Nevertheless, an anti-dumping duty was imposed on exporis from all three countries concerned (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2495186 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, No 
L 217112). 
1187 In boot• wi.th fitted ice skates from Czechoslovaki.a, Yugoslavi.a, Romani.a an.d Hungary no material injury was found inter ali.a 
because the rasale prices ofthe dumped imports from Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary ware equal to or higher than the prices at 
which the dumped Czech product& were sold on the Community market. It was decisive that the complainant Community producer 
imported the dumped Czech products and determined the prices at which they ware offered on the Community market (Commission 
Decision 85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain boots with fitted 
ice skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, NoL 52/48). In fact, under 
Europaan anti-dumping law a Community producer is not allowed to use dumped imports from one country in order to undercut the 
prices of dumped import& originating in another country. 
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started to cause injury, if it is established that all dumping exporters have contributed to the in jury 
suffered 1188• 
European anti-dumping case law applies the «technical dumping» argument in a too restrictive 
way. First, it assumes that there is no technica! dumping unless proof to the contrary is being 
provided. As it is frequently difficult to prove who has started the price cutting, this assumption 
introduces a «one-way flexible» basis in favour of an injury fmding1189• Second, European 
anti-dumping case law also increases the nuinber of injury fmdings, since an investigation of the 
«technical dumping» argument is rejected when it is considered to be irrelevant for the injury 
determination. lndeed, if the «technical dumping» argument is not investigated, the dumping may 
be found to be injurious because of the low price level of the dumped products, even if the low 
dumping prices are the result of a price alignment toother low prices. 
European anti-dumping case law, moreover, is characterized by arbitrariness. First, no reason 
can be detected why in some cases the «technica! dumping» argument is considered irrelevant, 
whereas in other cases it is relevant, for it results in findings of no in jury. Second, there is no 
reason either why the «technical dumping» is outrightly rejected for price aligments to low-priced 
dumped imports, whereas price alignments by the Community producers to low-priced dumped 
imports are considered to be a normal ~usiness practice intended to meet competition. Indeed, as 
is the case for price alignments by the Community producers, price alignments applied by 
dumping exporters to other, low-priced dumped imports may also be a normal business practice. 
The argument that the illegal dumping practices of third parties are no excuse for exporters to 
start the same illegal practices, fails to convince, unless it also applies to Community producers. 
However, the fact that Community producers, in response to low-priced dumped imports, resort to 
practices which are illegal if engaged into by exporters, such as cutting their prices below their 
own production costs, does not preclude the application of anti-dumping law. 
3.3.1.2.2.3. Margins analysis 
In ·the margins analysis, the dumping margin is compared with the margin of price undercutting : 
if the dumping margin is lower than the margin of price undercutting, the dumping is considered 
not to cause the injury ; conversely, if the dumping margin is higher than the margin of price 
1188 lnfra, 514. 
1189 It may, nevertheless, he difficult to determ.ine which party has staried the price cutting either by reducing prices or by not 
carrying out normal price increases (C.J.E.C., case C-358/89, 11 June 1992, Extramet Industrie SA v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, 
(3813), 3839 (Opinion of Advocate General JACOBS). A chronological approach, i.e., investigating who has set the lowest price 
first, is not satisfactory since, for example, the Community induBtry may have decided to sell its products at low prices in 
anticipation of the effects of the imported products in order to maintain its market share (BESELER, J.F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., 
Anti-Dumping an.d Anti-Subsidy Law. The European. Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 158). Likewise, price cutting 
by importers may also he a defence resorted to as in anticipation of an aggressive pricing policy of the Community industry. 
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undercutting, the dumping is considered to cause the in jury. The ratio underlying this approach is 
that, if the dumping margin is smaller than the margin of price undercutting, the Community 
industry would still suffer injury, even if no dumping had occurred. For, even without dumping, 
the imported products would always be less expensive than the product of the Community 
industry. In fact, the Community industry suffers injury not from the dumping, but from the 
comparative advantage of the exporting country1190• 
The European anti-dumping authorities are not very consistent in applying the margins analysis. 
In several cases in which they found injurious dumping, they seem to accept the margins analysis, 
as they pointed out that the dumping margin exceeded the margin of price undercutting1191 • 
In other cases, they could not have applied the margins analysis, for they found injurious 
dumping, though they observed that the margin of price undercutting exceeded the dumping 
margin1192• In one of those cases, they even explicitly rejected the margins analysis1193• 
This inconsistent application of the margins analysis may be reduced to the simple «one-way 
1190 KAPLAN, 8., tclnjury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations : Five Recent Approaches••, in Policy 
lmplications of Antidumping Measures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 155-156. See also: 
DIDIER, P., tcDeux années d'application du nouveau règlement antidumping de la CEE,,, Cahiers de Droit Européen., 1982, (21), 41-
42; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d Practice in. the Un.ited States an.d the European. Commun.ities. A Comparatwe 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,648-651. 
1191 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 6 
October 1982, No L 28319; Council Regulation (EEC) No 273/83 of 1 February 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Soviet 
Union, O.J., 3 February 1983, NoL 32/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133/20 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 
imp6sing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the 
Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/16. 
1192 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 871/82 of 14 April 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on upright pianos 
originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 April 1982, No L 101/30 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 April 1982, No L 116/22); Council Decision 
82/220/EEC of 14 April 1982 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of upright pianos originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland, O.J., 16 April1982, NoL 101/45; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1968/82 of 16 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of photographic enlargers originating in Poland and 
the USSR, accepting an undertaking and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of photographic enlargers originating in 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 21 July 1982, No L 212/32; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2464/84 of 24 August 1984 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain shovels originating in Brazil, O.J., 29 August 1984, NoL 231/29; Commission 
Regulation <EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour 
television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October -1989, NoL 314/1; Commission Decision 90/138/EEC of 
16 March 1990 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
diesel engines originating in Finland and Sweden, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 22 March 1990, No L 76/28; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 26 April1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof smali-screen colour television 
receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/66 
(corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133/92). 
1193 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small 
screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour television receivers 
originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the. provioional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/66 
(corrigendum, O.J., 2• May 1990, No L 133192). · 
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flexible» device : apply the margins analysis only when it underbuilds a finding of injurious 
dumping ; otherwise, ignore it or even reject it. Obviously, such an inconsistent application bas 
to be rejected. 
As a matter of principle, the European anti-dumping authorities should never apply the margins 
analysis. First, the margins analysis assumes that the. price of the imported products, when there 
is no dumping, will increase by exactly the amount of the dumping margin1194• However, 
this will not necessarily be · the case, since the dumping margin may be · reduced to zero by 
increasing the export price, by lowering the normal value or by a combination of both (the latter 
being the case in tigure 17 in this Chapter1195) 1196• Second, the margins analysis 
mistakenly assumes dumping to cause in jury to the Community industry, only if the dumping 
prices undercut the Community prices~ However, dumping causes injury only by changing the 
. proportion of dumping prices to Community prices. If the dumped product is a more expensive 
product, a fall in its price makes it less expensive vis-à-vis the Community product, even if its 
price is still higher in absolute terms than the Community product's price1197• 
3. 3. 2. Criteria of actual injury 
An injury examinatien cannot be based only on the impact of the dumping on the volume and 
prices of the dumped imports. It should also be investigated whether the Community industry 
suffers injury (Articles 3.1. and 3.4. GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(2) and (5) basic EC 
Reglilatien ; Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision). 
In order to determine whether the · Community industry suffers injury, all relevant economie 
factors ha ving a hearing on the state of the in dustry must be assessed according to GA TT and EC · 
anti-dumping law (Article 3.4. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(5) basic EC Regulation). 
ECSC anti-dumping law does not hold such an explicit obligation. However, the provision of 
ECSC anti-dumping law, according to which «(a)n examinatien of in jury must involve ( ... ) the 
consequent impact on the Community industry» (Article 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision), imposes 
the same obligation. Indeed, the impact on the Community industry can only be evaluated, if all 
1194 The European anti-dumping authorities, though not being asked for an opinion on the margins analysis, held that, should 
there not be any dumping, the price of the i.m.porled product would be higher (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 
1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 
1991, NoL 14/1). 
1195 Supra, 43~35. 
1196 KAPLAN, 8., tclnjury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations : Five Recent Approaches», in Policy 
lmplications of Antidumping Measures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 155-156. 
1197 KAPLAN, 8., tclnjury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations : Five Recent ApproacheSJ•, in Policy 
lmplications of Antidumping Measures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 157. 
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the relevant economie factors having a hearing on the state of the industry are taken into 
consideration. 
Pursuant to GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, the determination of in jury must be based on 
positive evidence and involve an objective examination of the impact of the dumped imports on 
the Community industry ( Artiele 3.1. GA TT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(2) basic EC 
Regulation). As a consequence, the European anti-dumping authorities must not assume that, 
because of the Community industry's anti-dumping complaint, the state of the Community industry 
bas deteriorated. On the contrary, the European anti-dumping authorities must investigate whether 
the state of the Community industry has actually deteriorated. As the European anti-dumping 
authorities always ground their findings on actual data about the situation of the Community 
industry, the fact that ECSC anti-dumping law does not require that a determination of injury is 
based on positive evidence and an objective examination, does not pose a problem in respect of 
GA TI anti-dumping law. GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, however, do not guarantee that 
injury determinations will not be tainted by «one-way flexibility•. Indeed, economie realities are 
complex and allow several objective representations. Moreover, the findings on the situation of 
the Community industry will not always be univocal. As a consequence, depending on the 
representation chosen of economie real life and the selection of the different factors considered to 
be decisive, GA TI and EC anti-dumping leave much room for «one-way flexibility». 
As the effect on the dumped imports must be assessed in relation to the Community production of 
the like product (Article 3.6. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(8) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(4) basic ECSC Decision}, the overall situation of Community producers cannot be taken 
.into account. This requirement to take only account of the «Community production of the like 
product» increases the probability of finding. injury. For example, Community producers may 
import the dumped product. They may earn profits on those imports and may increase their 
overall market share in the Community. The resale of those dumped imports will, ho wever, be 
disregarded in assessing the effect of the dumped imports on the condition of the Community 
industry1198• As European anti-dumping case law only exceptionally excludes complainant 
Community producers from the Community industry1199 and the Community industry, thus, 
may include Community producers which make a profitable business importing the dumped 
product, this case of «One-way flexibility» is hard to defend. Another example concerns the 
1198
c.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1358-1359 (Report for the Hearing: 
conc1uaions of thc Council) and 1402-1403; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, MalSushila Electric Jndustrial Co. Lid and MalSushila 
Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1442 (Report for the Hearing: concluaions of the Council) and 1485-1486; C.J.E.C., 
case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo lndustry Co. Lld v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1508-1509 (Report for the Hearing: 
concluaions ofthc Council) and 1529-1530; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 
1551 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council- and 1571 ; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporanon v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1657 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council) and 1683. 
1199 Supra, 417-426. 
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bundling of heterogenons products, which the European anti-dumping authorities also diregard 
when assessing the state of the Community producers1200• Product bundling is a generally 
accepted business practice which consists in selling a related, but «unlike» product at a very high 
price in order to compensate for the losses incurred in selling the like product1201 . Clearly, 
by disregarding product bundling, the European anti-dumping authorities will find more injury 
than the Community producers actually suffer. 
EC anti-dumping law contains a list of examples of relevant economie factors : the fact that the 
Community industry is still in process of reeavering from the effects of past dumping or 
subsidization, the magnitude of the actual dumping margin, actual and potential decline in sales, 
profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, utilization off capacity ; factors 
affecting Community prices ; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, 
employment, wages growth, ability to raise capital or investments (Article 3(5) basic EC 
Regulation). ECSC anti-dumping law contains a smaller list : production, utilization of capacity, 
stocks, sales, market share, prices, profits, return on investment, cash flow and employment 
( Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision). Both lists are based on an analoguous list in GA TI anti-
dumping law (Article 3.5. GATT Anti-dumping Code). However, the ECSC list is smaller than 
the GA TI list, which is, on its turn, more restrictive than the EC list (i.e., the GA TI list does 
not refer to the fact that the Community industry is still in the process of reeoverlog from the 
effects of past dumping or subsidization). Those differences do oot really matter, as those lists 
are oot exhaustive (Article 3.4. GATI Anti-dumping Code1202 ; Artiele 3(5) basic EC 
Regulation1203 ; Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision1204). As a consequence, factors not 
1200 C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. LJd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1358-1359 (Report for the Hearing: 
conc1usions of the Council) and 1402-1403; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, MalSushila Electric Jndusrrial Co. LJd and Matsushita 
Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1442 (Report for the Hearing: conc1usions of the Council) and 1485-1486; C.J.E.C., 
case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo Jndustry Co. LJd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1508-1509 (Report for the Hearing: 
conc1usions of the Counci1) and 1529-1530; C.J .E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. LJd v Council, E. C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 
1551 (Report for the Hearing: conc1usions of tbc Council- and 1571 ; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporanon v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1657 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council) and 1683; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 
AugiJst 1986 impoaing a provisiona1 anti-dumping duty on imparts of plain paper photocopicrs originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No 
L 239/5 ; Counci1 Regu1ation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
photocopicrs originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12. 
1201 Supra, 291-294. 
1202 Artiele 3.4. GATI' Anti-dumping Code stipuiatea explicitly that cc(t)hislist is not exhaustive••· 
1203 Artiele 3(5) basic EC Regulation stipuiatea explicitly that cc(t)his list is not exhaustiveN. 
1204 Artiele 4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision is not exhaustive since it uses the words ccsuch asu before enumerating the relevant 
economie factors. See also: C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon lnc. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 
5808; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273/85 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Bilver Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5980; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-304/86 and C-185/87, 11 Juiy 1990, Enital SpA v CommiBBion and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2939), 2940; · 
Commission Decision 831360/EEC of 18 Juiy 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain pears in 
syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, NoL 196/22. 
enumerated 
turnover1206, 
in European anti-dumping law, 
return on sales 1207, the effect on 
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such as intra-community trade1205, 
the restructuring measures undertaken by 
1205 Intra-community trade is used as a relevant economie factQr in cases where the European anti-dumping authorities do not 
posseu full information on the whole Community industry. lt is also used in cases where their investigation was focused on the 
market of one particwar Memher State, because either the dumped import& were concentrated into that market, or because there 
were no precise data concerning the other Memher Statea available. Thus, the import& coming from other Memher Statea into a 
particwar Memher State are not merely taken into consideration to ascertain if and how they affect the Community producers 
established within that particwar Memher State, but als to investigate whether the producers established in these other Memher 
States do not suffer itüury from the dumping. 
lndeed, the fact that the imports from other Memher Statea compete with the dumped imports on the market of a particular 
Memher State has been held to prove that also the producers established in these other Memher Statea are il\iured by the dumping 
(Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2712n9 of 30 November 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres 
origi.nating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 December 1979, No L 308/11 ; Commission Decision 80/488/EEC of 6 May 1980 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning certain acrylic fibres originating in 
Japan and terminating this proceeding, O.J., 9 May 1980, NoL 118/60; Council Regulation (EEC) No 101183 of 17 January 1983 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 19 
January 1983, No L 15/1 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 290/83 of 2 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of urea ammonium nitrate solution fertilizer originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 4 February 1983, No 
L 33/9; Commiuion Recommendation No 376/83/ECSC of 14 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 17 February 1983, No L 45/14 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No 
L 121111 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
origi.nating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these 
investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1). 
However, the faet that the absolute volume and market share ofthe import& of Memher Statea inio another Memher State in which 
the dumped import& were concentrated, has increased and that their prices were significantly lower than those of the dumped 
products, has been only once held to he a reason for not finding il\iury (Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating . 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of codeïne and its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16130). Usually, increased low-priced Community imports into one Memher States do not 
prevent an iJ:Üury finding (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1882/82 of 12 July 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
mechanica! wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 15 July 1982, NoL 207/1; Commission Decision 84/259/EEC of 10 May 
1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof certain sensitized paper 
for colour photographs origi.nating in Japan and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 11 May 1984, No L 124145; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2464/84 of 24 August 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain shovels 
origi.nating in Brazil, O.J., 29 August 1984, No L 231/29; Commission Decision 841465/EEC of 26 September 1984 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of asbestos-cement corrugated sheets 
originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 28 September 1984, No 
L 259/48 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2221185 of 29 July 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of basic 
chromium swphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 August 1985, No L 205112; Council Regulation (EEC) No 264/86 of 4 
February 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain clogs originating in Sweden and definitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 February 1986, No L 32/1; Commission Decision 86/21/EEC of 4 February 
1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation concerning imports of certain clogs 
originating in Sweden, O.J., 7 February 1986, No L 32/28; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 
0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bwgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111). 
1206 Commiuion Decision 89/560/EEC of 17 October 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
polyester film originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 21 October 1989, NoL 305/31; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 
March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs 
(erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1. 
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the Community industry1208 or the effect on the structural adjustment policy undertaken by the 
Community1209, are used to examine the state of the Community industry. Since the lists are 
1207 Commiuion Decision 85/209/EEC of 26 March 1985 accepting the undertaki.ng given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
investigation concerning imports of plasterboard of Spanish origin into lreland and Northern lreland and terminating that 
investigation, O.J., 29 March 1985, No L 89/65; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; Commission Decision 
86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation 
regarding importsof that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287125; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, 
India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, NoL 27617. 
1208 If the Community indUBtry is faced with structural adjustment problems, dumping has been found to cause injury because : 
it undermines the process of recovery (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2712179 of 30 November 1979 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 4 December 1979, NoL 308/11; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 of 30 April 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres 
originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 3 May 1980, NoL 114/37; Commission Decision 80/488/EEC of 6 May 
1980 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning certain acrylic fibres 
originating in Japan and terminating this proceeding, O.J., 9 May 1980, No L 118/60; Commission Decision No 
2158/88/ECSC of 20 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel sections 
originating in Yugoslavia or Turkey, O.J., 21 July 1988, No L 190/5; Commiuion Decision 90/138/EEC of 16 March 1990 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain diesel enginas 
originating in Finland and Sweden, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 22 March 1990, No L 76/28; Commission 
Decision No 2297192/ECSC of 31 July 1992 amending Decision No 2131/88/ECSC, accepting undertakings offered in 
conneetion with imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Slovenia and the Yugoslav 
republics of Macedonia, Montenegro and Berbia, and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with re gard to the Republic of 
Croatia and the Republic ofBosnia-Herzegovina, O.J., 6 August 1992, NoL 221136); 
it jeopardizes the results of the restructuring measures taken by the Community industry (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof synthetic fibres of polyesters originating 
in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, NoL 348/49; 
CommiBSion Decision No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti~umping duty on imports of certain flat-
rolled product& of iron or non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 March 1989, No L 78/14; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., .3 October 1991, NoL 27617). 
1209 If a Europaan structural adjustment policy, such as production quotas, guidance price systems and even steel arrangement& 
with non-Memher States, is elaborated, the fact that the objectives of this policy are being jeopardized is considered as an indication 
of injury. This was the case in several ECSC anti-dumping cases concerning steel products, where it was underscored that the 
Community industry was in a state of crisis warranting a structural adjustment policy (Commission Recommendation No 
112178/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling, 
originating in Czechoslovakia and South Korea, O.J., 21 January 1978, No L 17127 ; Commission Recommendation No 
119n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on wire rod originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 
January 1978, No L 19/5; CommiBSion Recommendation No 120n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional duty on 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19n; Commission 
Recommendation No 121n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of 
iron or steel, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Japan, O.J., 24 January 1978, NoL 1919; Commission Recommendation 
No 1ó9n8/ECBC of 27 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron and 
steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Spain, O.J., 28 January 1978, No L 23/31; Commission 
Recommendation No 160n8/ECSC of 27 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of 
iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania and Spain, O.J., 28 January 1978, No L 23133; 
Commission Recommendation No 161178/ECSC of 27 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and 
plates, of iron or steel, originating in Japan, O.J., 28 January 1978, No L 23/35 ; Commission Recommendation No 245n8/ECSC of 
2 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of iron or &teel coils for re-rolling originating in J~pan and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 7 February 1978, No L 37/13; Commission Recommendation No 262f78/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Poland, O.J., 9 February 1978, No 
L 39/13 ; Commission Recommendation No 263178/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Japan, O.J., 9 February 
1978, NoL 39/15; Commiuion Recommendation No 307n8/ECSC of 14 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Australia, O.J., 16 February 1978, No L 45/17; Commission 
Recommendation No 811n8/ECSC of 21 April 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or 
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not exhaustive, the braad interpretation placed on the economie factors enumerated in European 
steel, originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 22 April 1978, No L 108/26; Commission 
Recommendation No 932178/ECSC of 2 May 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling 
originating in Bulgaria, O.J., 4 May 1978, NoL 120122; Commission Recommendation No 100Gn8/ECSC of 18 May 1978 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain galvanized sheets and plates originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 19 
May 1978, NoL 131/8; CommiBBion Recommendation No 1704/78/ECSC of 19 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 July 1978, No 
L 195/17 ; CommiBBion Recommendation No 1715n8/ECSC of 20 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
galvanized sheets and plates originating in Japan, O.J., 22 July 1978, No L 198/1; Commission Recommendation No 
1758n8/ECSC of 26 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and sections of iron or steel, 
originating in Spain, O.J., 27 July 1978, NoL 203128; Commission Recommendation No 267n9/ECSC of 9 February 1979 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, I or H section.a of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled 
or extruded, originating in Spain, O.J., 13 February 1979, No L 37121; Commission Recommendation No 294n9/ECSC of 13 
February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain hematite pig iron originating in Brazil, O.J., 16 February 
1979, NoL 41129; Commission Recommendation No 433179/ECSC of 27 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on certain sheets and plates of iron or steel originating in Spain and repealing certain suspended anti-dumping duties, O.J., 3 
March 1979, No L 53121 ; Commission Recommendation No 49Gn9/ECSC of 13 March 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Greece, O.J., 15 March 1979, NoL 65/16; Commission Recommendation No 
935n9/ECSC of 8 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, I or H sections of iron or 
steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Spain but imported from some other non-memher country, O.J., 
12 May 1979, No L 117/16; Commission Recommendation No 950n9/ECSC of 14 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on certain hematite pig iron originating in Brazil but imported from some other non-memher country, O.J., 16 May 1979, No 
L 120/11; CommiBBion Recommendation No 1083179/ECSC of 30 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
plates of iron or steel originating in Spain but imported from some other non-memher country, O.J., 1 June 1979, NoL 135/54; 
Commission Recommendation No 1104/82/ECSC of 6 May 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and 
plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 11 May 1982, No L 12819 ; CommiBBion Recommendation No 2242/82/ECSC of 10 
August 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on broad-flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 13 August ·1982, No 
L 238/32 ; Commission Recommendation No 2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10 ; Commission Recommendation No 
259/83/ECSC of 27 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on broad-flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 1 
February 1983, No L 30/61 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1983, No L 36/10) ; Commission Recommendation No 376/83/ECSC of 14 
February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in 
Brazil, O.J., 17 February 1983, No L 45/14 ; Commission .Decision No 702/83/ECSC of 24 March 1983 imposing provisional anti-
dumping duties on certain iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Venezuela and accepting 
price undertak.ings from two Canadian exporters, O.J., 29 March 1983, No L 8219; Commission Decision No 3113183/ECSC of 4 
November 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of concrete reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 5 
November 1983, No L 303/13 ; Commission Decision No 295/84/ECSC of 2 February 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on importsof concrete reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 4 February 1984, NoL 33/15 (corrigendum, O.J., 1 March 1984, 
No L 65/15) ; Commission Decision No 2767/86/ECSC of 5 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 6 September 1986, NoL 254/18; Commission Decision 
No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 imposing a provisional anti-d~ping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or 
steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 July 1987, NoL 207121; Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 
January 1988, No L 18/31). 
The fact that the dumped imports hamper the removal of those crisis measures towards liberalising of the steel market bas also 
been con.aidered as evidence for the il\iurious effect of the dumping (Commission Decision No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 
July 1987, NoL 207121; CommiBBion Decision No 163188/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31). 
Similarly, if the production aid granted to the Community industry, amounting to the ditTerenee between the Community 
producers' production coats and the import price of non-EEC product&, neutralizes the il\iurious effects of the dumped import& on 
the Community market, the increased burden on production aid caused by the dumped imports will be an indication of il\iury 
(CommiBBion Decision 83/360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain pears 
in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 20 July 1983, No 
L 196122). The fact that the dumped imports endanger the general minimum price system of the Council, is also evidence of injury 
(Commission Decision 84/407/EEC of 10 August 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning importsof certain kraft liner paper and board originating in Spain and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 August 
1984, No L 224130). . 
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anti-dumping law1210 cannot be criticized. If no broad interpretation should be applied, a non-
1210 Th fi cto d ct' . e a r •pro u lO!bt compr1ses : 
in findings of iDjury : 
the auppression of production (i.e., the fact that Community production would have been higher in the absence of the 
dumped imports) (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on importsof certain magnetic disks (3,5" mierodisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5) ; 
the temporary cessation or reduction of production (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1355n8 of 20 June 1978 impasing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on ferro-chromium originating in the Republic of South Africa and Sweden, O.J., 22 
June 1978, No 166/20 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 June 1978, No L 173131); Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 
1987 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paint, 
distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, NoL 46/45; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 547190 of 2 March 1990 impasing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in lndonesia, the Republic 
of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, and accepting undertakings in conneetion with imports of certain glutamic acid and its 
salts originating in these countries, O.J.~ 3 March 1990, NoL 56/23; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537/90 of 28 
May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, 
O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 145/9) ; 
the total suspension of production for several periods (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2495/86 of 1 August 1986 
impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, No L 217/12. See also: 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 348/83 of 10 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
hexamethylenetetramine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the Soviet Union, and accepting 
underta.kings and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of hexamethylenetetramine originating in 
Czechoslovakia and Romania, O.J., 12 February 1983, NoL 40/24; CommiBBion Decision 85/443/EEC of 23 September 
1985 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation concerning imparts of container 
corner fittings of worked cast steel originating in Austria and terminating that investigation, O.J., 27 September 1985, 
No L 256/44) ; 
the ciosure of several plants (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of catton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of catton yarn originating in India and· Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts 
of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of 
China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importsof these yarns originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, ?lro L 276n; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 impasing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yarn originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, :J:Ilo 
L 8211; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain polyester yfl!'ns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China 
and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No L 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 
1992, No L 153116)) ; 
the reduction in production capacity (Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting undertakings 
offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imparts of perchlorethylene originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statesof America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 
1982, No L 371/47; Commission Decision 831192/EEC of 19 April 1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain cellulose ester resins (cellulose-acetobutyrate and 
cellulose-acetopropionate) originating in the United States of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 23 April 
1983, No L 106124 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2253184 of 31 July 1984 · imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain imports of certain sodium carbonate originating in the United States of America and accepting 
undertakings in respect of other imparts of the same product, O.J., 2 August 1984, No L 206/15; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of paint, distemper, varnishand 
simHar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping 
duty on auch imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190. of 5 February 1990 
accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose 
undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 3811) ; 
the fact that the output of manufacturing and assembly facilities built in the Community and owned by non-dumping 
exporters, shows a rate of inerease lower than the rate of deerease of the imparts of the non-dumping exporters/owners 
into the Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain imparts of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 
1988, No L 240/5) ; 
the relocation of a considerable and inereasing proportion of the Community producers' production outside the 
Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No 
L 31411; Council Regulation <EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1) ; 
-------l 
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the fact that planned increases in production capacity are curtailed (Comm.iuion Regulation (EEC) No 165190 ·of 23 
January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits k.nown as 
DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertak.ings ofl'ered by certain exporters in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding ooncerning import& of these product& and terminating the investigation in 
their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, NoL 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, NoL 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 
10 February 1990, No L 38/44)). 
in findings of no ~ury : 
normal scheduled plant shut-downs for maintenance (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 
repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United States of America and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, NoL 258120); 
the fact that the heavy downturn of the markets bas led to several plant closures (Com.m.ission Decision 89/56/EEC of 
20 January 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain seamless tubes of iron or non-
alloy steel originating in Austria, O.J., 28 January 1989, NoL 25/87); 
the decision of the Community producers to halt or curb their production of the like product and to obtain supplies from 
the dumping country (Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
ooncerning import& of ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 831117). 
See also : supra, 389-391 
The factor ccstocks» oomprises the development in the duration of stock clearance (Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 
September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the 
People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50). 
The factor «saleS» oomprises : 
the suppression of sales (i.e., the fact that sales would have been higher in the absence of the dumped imports) (Com..mission 
Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5) ; 
the development in the volume of rentals (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54112); 
the shift of sales from one sub-market to another (Com.m.ission Regulation (EEC) No 2221185 of 29 July 1985 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of basic chromium sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 August 1985, No 
L 205/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April1986, NoL 9711; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 
August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of houeed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 
August 1986, NoL 221/16). 
The factor tCJDarket share• oomprises projected, but not obtained market shares (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 
January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs 
(dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofl'ered by certain exporters in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 
January 1990, NoL 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 Januaey 1990, NoL 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44)). 
The factor .cpriceB» oomprises : 
the fact that the prices started to climb in the Com.m.unity but also worldwide (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 
September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United Statea of America 
and terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, NoL 258120); 
the suspension of production by subsidiaries of the dumping exporters in the Community, as evidence of the stift' price 
competition on the Com.m.unity market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, NoL 221116). 
The factor ecprofitSit oomprises : 
the fact that producers are forced to use profits from other sectors to finance their operations in the sector of the like product 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof houeed 
hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, No L 221/16 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phaae electric motors having an output of more 
than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulg~ia, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts secured u provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No 
L 8311; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12); 
the fact that producers are not able to cross-subsidize between different sectors, because they produce only the like product 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2464/84 of 24 August 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certiün 
shovels originating in Brazil, O.J., 29 August 1984, NoL 231/29); 
the bankruptcy of a Community producer (Comniission Regulation (EEC) No 2464184 of 24 August 1984 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain shovels originating in Brazil, O.J., 29 August 1984, No L 231/29; 
Copunission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning imports of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and terminating the investigation, 
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O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48). 
The factor •employment. oomprises : 
the adoption of short-time working (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2757n6 of 12 November 1976 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on cycle ebains originating in Taiwan, O.J., 13 November 1976, No L 312/41; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 261n7 of 4 February 1977 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on ball hearings, tapered roller hearings and 
parts thereof originating in Japan, O.J., 5 February 1977, No L 34/60 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 177Bn7 of 26 July 1977 
concerning the application of the anti-dumping duty on hall hearings and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, O.J., 
3 August 1977, NoL 196/1; Commission Recommendation No 112178/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imparts of iron or steel coils for re-rolling, originating in Czechoslovakia and South Korea, O.J., 21 January 
1978, No L 17/27 ; Commission Recommendation No 11Bn8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain galvanized steel sheets and plates originating in Poland and Spain, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19/3; 
Commission Recommendation No 119n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on wire rod 
originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19/5; Commission Recommendation No 161n8/ECSC of 27 
January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Japan, 
O.J., 28 January 1978, No L 23185; Commission Recommendation No 245n8/ECSC of 2 February 1978 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Japan and Bulgaria, O.J., 7 
February 1978, NoL 37/13; Commission Recommendation No 262n8/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Poland, O.J., 9 February 1978, No L 39/13; 
Commission Recommendation No 263178/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 9 
February 1978, NoL 39/15; Commission Recommendation No 307n8/ECSC of 14 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imparts of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Australia, O.J., 16 February 1978, No L 45/17 ; 
Commission Recommendation No 359n8/ECSC of 20 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
galvanized sheets and plates originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, O.J., 22 February 1978, No 
L 50/13; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 511n8 of 7 March 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on kraft liner 
paper and board originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 11 March 1978, NoL 69/9; Commission Recommendation 
No 790n8/ECSC of 19 April 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in 
South Korea, O.J., 20 April 1978, No L 106/21 ; Commission Recommendation No 81ln8/ECSC of 21 April 1978 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic 
Republic and Romania, O.J., 22 April 1978, No L 108126; Commission Recommendation No 932n8/ECSC of 2 May 1978 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Bulgaria, O.J., 4 May 1978, No 
L 120/22; Commission Recommendation No 1006n8/ECSC of 18 May 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain galvanized sheets and plates originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 19 May 1978, No L 131/8; 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1355n8 of 20 June 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on ferro-chromium 
originating in the Republic of South Africa and Sweden, O.J., 22 June 1978, No 165/20 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 June 1978, No 
L 173131) ; Commission Recommendation No 1704n8/ECSC of 19 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 July 1978, No 
L 195/17 ; Commission Recommendation No 175Bn8/ECSC of 26 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti;.dumping duty on 
certain angles, shapes and sections of iron or steel, originating in Spain, 0 . .1., 27 July 1978, NoL 203/28; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2133178 of 8 September 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and board originating in 
the United Statea of America, O.J., 9 September 1978, No L 247/22; Commission Recommendation No 267n9/ECSC of 9 
February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, I or H sections of iron or steel, not 
further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in Spain, O.J., 13 February 1979, No L 37/21; Commission 
Recommendation No 294n9/ECSC of 13 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain hematite pig 
iron' originating in Brazil, O.J., 16 February 1979, No L 41129; Commission Recommendation No 433179/ECSC of 27 
February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates of iron or steel originating in Spain 
and repealing certain suspended anti-dumping duties, O.J., 3 March 1979, No L 53121; Commission Recommendation No 
496/79/ECSC of 13 March 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in 
Greece, O.J., 15 March 1979, No L 65/16; Commission Recommendation No 9S5n9/ECSC of 8 May 1979 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, I or H sections of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-
rolled or extruded, originating in Spain but imported from some other non-memher country, O.J., 12 May 1979, NoL 117/16; 
Commission Recommendation No 950n9/ECSC of 14 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain hematite 
pig iron originating in Brazil but imported from some other non-memher country, O.J., 16 May 1979, No L 120/11; 
Commission Recommendation No 1083179/ECSC of 30 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain plates of 
iron or steel originating in Spain but imported from some other non-memher country, O.J., 1 June 1979, No L 135/54; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1579/80 of 19 June 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica} alarm 
clocks (other than travel alarms) originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and the USSR, and repealing a national 
anti-dumping duty on mechanica! alarm clocks originating in China imposed under the transitional provisions of the Act of 
Accession, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 158/5; Commission Decision 80/600/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakings offered 
by the Chinese and Czechoslovak exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of mechanical 
alarm clocks (other than travel alarms) originating in China, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hong Kong 
and the USSR, terminating the proceeding in respect of China, Czechoslovakia and Hong Kong, and withdrawing acceptance 
of undertakings previously accepted by the United Kingdom Government from the exporters in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, 0 . .1., 25 June 1980, No L 158/18 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No · 2297/80 of 29 August 1980 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 2 
September 1980, No L 231/5 ; Commission Decision 80/1175/EEC of 15 December 1980 terminating the anti-dumping 
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proceeding concerning imports of pressure sensitive paper mask.ing tape originating in the United States of America, O.J., 19 
December 1980, No L 344167 ·; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain textured polyester fabrics originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 20 May 
1981, NoL 133117; Commission Decision 81/866/EEC of 18 May 1981 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceedings concerning louvre doors originating in Malaysia and Singapore and terminating the proceedings, 
O.J., 22 May 1981, No L 136/33; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1691/81 of 10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on paruylene (p-xylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United Statea of America and the US Virgin Islands, 
O.J., 16 June 1981, NoL 16817; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 260/82 of 29 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on certain welded iron or steel tubes originating in Romania, O.J., 3 February 1982, No L 26/6 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 871/82 of 14 April 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on upright pianos originating in the 
USSR, O.J., 16 April1982, NoL 101/30 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 April1982, NoL 116122); Council Decision 82/220/EEC of 14 
April 1982 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of upright pianos originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Poland, O.J., 16 April l982, No L 101/46 ; Commission Decision 82/398/EEC of 14 June 
1982 accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning cylinder vacuum cleaners 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the procedure, O.J., 18 June 
1982, NoL 172/47:; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/86 of 12 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of roller ebains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1986, No 
L 217n; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and 
the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding importsof that product originating in the People's Republic of China, 
Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 287/26; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1937190 of 4 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of pure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics 
originating in the People's Republic of China, and accepting an undertaking offered by the exporter, O.J., 7 July 1990, No 
L 174127; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798/90 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 366/25; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yarn 
originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yarn originating in 
India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328115 i Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 
of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate orginating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32) i 
technical lay-offs (Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping prooaeding concerning importsof silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland 
and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding importsof that product originating in the People's Republic of 
China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 287/25); 
temporary lay-offs (Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of potassium permanganate orginating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32) i 
the transfer of pereonnel to other production linea (internal redeployment) (Commission Decision 80/1176/EEC of 16 December 
1980 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of pressure sensitive paper masking tape originating in 
the United Statea of America, O.J., 19 December 1980, NoL 344/67; Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 744/84 of 19 March 
1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 
23 March 1984, NoL 79/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, NoL 86/31) i Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paint, distemper, 
varnish and simHar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 
February 1987, No L 46146; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing import& of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/6 
(corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22n9 i corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144) ; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 386190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate 
originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 
16 February 1990, No L 42/1 i Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537/90 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 146/9. See also: 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361187 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-
silico-calciumlcalcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 May 1987, No L 129/5, where the available figures on 
employment were not found to provide meaningful information because the Community producers manufactured a variety of 
product& for which their workroree would be equally available) i 
shift cancellations (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on i.Q:lports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of 
Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, 
O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328116) ; 
alternate production on two production units by the sameshift (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
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originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the form.er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328116) ; 
the fact that workers are paid out of social welfare funds (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 of 29 August 1980 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain polyester yam originating in the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 2 September 1980, NoL 23116); 
the retraining of staff pereonnel (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain types of electtonic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of these product& and term.inating the investigation intheir respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/6 
(corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, NoL 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44)). 
The factor .cability to raise capital or investmentB» oomprises : 
in findings of no injury : 
the continued inerease of the level of capital expenditure (Commission Decision 89/111/EEC of 9 February 1989 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof wheeled loaders originating in Japan, O.J., 11 February 
1989, No L 39/35) ; 
the inerease in production capacity (Commission Decision 89/511/EEC of 22 August 1989 term.inating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August .1989, No L 249n1 ; 
Commission Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 September 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof 
mica originating in Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, No L 284/46; Commission Decision 93/325/EEC of 18 May 1993 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 25 May 1993, NoL 127/16); 
the fact that investm.ents are made reeuiting in improved efficiency (Commission Decision 93/325/EEC of 18 May 1993 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 25 May 1993, NoL 127/15); 
the existence of ongoing or imminent investment programmes (Commission Decision 90/86/EEC of 1 March 1990 
terminating the review of anti-dumping measures applying to imports of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating 
in Czechoslovakia and the Germ.an Demoeratic Republic and confll'IIling the expiry of the said measures, O.J., 8 March 
1990, No L 69/46). 
in findings of injury : 
the downgrading of investments (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 imposing 
provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 22 September 1993, NoL 237/2); 
the reduction of investments necessary to eneure the Community indUBtry's viability (Commission Regulation (EC) No 
107619.( of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain watch movements originating in 
Malayaia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, NoL 120/3); 
the fact that the dumping has induced a low rate of depreciation because a low rate of depreciation discourages the 
investment in continued efficiency, especially in a capitai-intensive industry (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 
11 May 1989 imposh1g a definitive anti-dumping duty on i.mports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the 
Germ.an Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114); 
the drop in the average investments in buildings and machinery by the Community producers (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of natural magnesite, 
dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., 30 December 1982, No 
L 371/25); 
the ciosure of production plants (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1103/93 of 30 April 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, No L 112120) ; 
the fact that the Community industry incurred losses, though they had made investments in order to reduce coats 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2172193 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of 
ethanolamine originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, NoL 195/5; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3029193 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties on imports of telavision camera systems 
originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, NoL 27111); · 
the fact that investments did not bring gains in productivity or efficiency, but were aimed at substituting the loss of 
internal links caused by the separation of form.erly integrated chemical processas ; this separation was necessary to 
prepare for privatisation of plants in the eastern part of Germ.any (Council Regulation (EC) No 2819194 of 17 November 
1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium perm.anganate orginating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32). 
However, the capacity to make investments does notprevent the finding of injury (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 6 
March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 
March 1993, No L 68/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3029193 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties 
on imports oftelevision camera systems originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, NoL 27111). 
In findings of injury the inability to make investments has practically always been put forward in combination with either the 
profitability or the return on investment. Either the profitability or the return on investment were found to be at such a level that 
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enumerated factor might betaken into account. 
investments in research and development in facilities which are vital to the sector under consideration, were not envisaged or 
threatened (Commiseion Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, NoL 297/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 
18 February 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 22 
February 1980, No L 4811 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to 
Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings 
and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain import& of such products originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No 
L 275/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5; Council Regulation (EEC). No 535/87 of 23 
February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 
February 1987, NoL 64112; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361/87 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of ferro-silico-calcium/calcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 May 1987, No L 129/5; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 23 January 1989 imposing a 
deflnitive anti-dumping duty on importsof copper sulphate ~riginating in Buigaria or the Soviet Union, O.J., 27 January 1989, No 
L 23/1; Oommiseion Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 31315 
(corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1). 
Moreover, the Community producers have been found to sufferinjury when they incurred losses despite the investments they had 
made in order to increase their efficiency (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of cotton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
in respect of cotton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271/17 ; Commission Decision No 
891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain semi-finished products of alloy 
steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 95/26 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 16 April 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2172/93 of 30 July 1993 
imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ethanolamine originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 
1993, NoL 196/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2455/93 of 2 September 1993 amending Reguiation (EEC) No 1798/90 in respect of 
the definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, NoL 226/1; Commission Decision 931479/EEC of 30 July 1993 accepting undertakings offered in 
conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures applicable to certain imports of monosodium glutamate originating in 
lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, NoL 225/35; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa into the Community of large aluminium 
electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, No L 48110; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 534/94 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" 
microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 6816 ; Commission Decision 941293/EC 
of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of ammonium 
nitrate originating in Lithuania and Ruseia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24). 
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The non-exhaustive character does not make it illegal either to take account of the absolute value 
of relevant economie factors, as European anti-dumping case law does1211 , although GA TI 
and European anti-dumping law treat only of developments as to those factors. 
According to GA TT and European anti-dumping law, not only the actual, but also the potentlal 
development of relevant economie factors may be taken into consideration in an actual injury 
examination (Article 3.4. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(5) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 
4(2)(c) basic ECSC Decision). Thus, if a eertaio relevant economie. factor has not (yet) actually 
deteriorated (improved), the risk of a deterioration (the expectation of an împrovement) may 
support a fmding of (no) injury1212. 
1211 The Court of Juatice held, tbough, tbat tbe actual wording of fonner EC and present ECSC anti-dumping law (Article 4(2)(c) basic ECSC 
· Decision), according to which tbe impact of tbe imparts on tbe Community industry must be asaeued on tbe basis of the trends in the relevant 
economie facton, implies tbat «it is possible to draw valid conclusions on tbe impact of tbc import& only if tbe Community producers'( ... ) situation 
at the time of tbc investigation can be compared with that of preceding yeal'S» (C.J.E.C., case C-315/90, 27 November 1991, Groupemenl des 
Industries de Malbiels d'Equipement Electrique el de l'Electronique·JndustrieUe Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5589), 
5620). This statement of tbe Court, however, should not be understood as a general prohibition of the use of absolute data, as it was only a 
specitic answer to tbc complaint tbat tbe European anti-dumping authorities did not take account of tbc evaJution in eertaio economie factors. The 
Court, in particular, maintained tbat tbe Eu ropcao anti-dumping authorities cannot be blamcd for · not using trends when the Community producers 
concerned do nol provide tbc necessary data. However, Advocate General VAN GERVEN was more affinnative in stating that European anti-
dumping law implies «that tbe impact of imports must be assessed in terms of trends in tbe relevant economie factots» (C.J .E.C., case C-315/90, 27 
November 1991, Groupemenl des Industries de MatéTiels d'Equipemenl Electrique el de l'Ekctronique lndustrieUe Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v 
Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5589), 5609 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN). But, even ifthe interpretation that only trends in tbc 
relevant economie factora may be taken into account, was correct under fonner EC and present ECSC anti-dumping law, it certainly does not hold 
anymore under prevailing EC anti-dumping law which, pursuant to GATI anti-dumping law (see: Artiele 3.4. GAIT Anti-dumping Code), 
requires «BD cvaluation of all relevant economie factors and indices having a hearing on the state of tbe industry» (Article 3(5) basic EC 
Regulation). 
1212 The following elements have, for example, been raised in findings of injury : 
the fact that the ceuation of production is feared or envisaged (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2391/79 of 26 October 1979 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the U nited States of Am erica and the Soviet 
Union, O.J., Sl Octobe~: 1979, No L 274126; Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statesof Am.erica and the Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 
1980, No L 23119 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, No L 31/23); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2999/80 of 20 
November 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetata monomar originating in the United States of 
Am.erica, O.J., 21 November 1980, No L 311113 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1101/81 of 23 April 1981 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on potato granules originating in Canada, O.J., 28 April 1981, No L 116/11; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of barium chloride 
. originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, NoL 228/28; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191180 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statesof America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 26 October 1983, 
NoL 294/3; Commiuion Decision 831522/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the undertaking given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imparts of lithium hydroxide originating in the People's Republic of China and 
terminating that prooeeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 294129 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic 
of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47); 
the fact. that the Com.munity producers are threatened with complete ciosure (Commission Decision 80/603/EEC of 23 June 
1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning mounted piezo-electric quartz 
crystal units, originating in Japan, South Korea and the United Statesof America, and terminating the proceedings, O.J., 27 
June 1980, No L 162/62 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1391191 of 27 May 1991 imposing· a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import. of of aspartame originating in Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, No L 134/1) or with the 
ciosure of production facilities (CommissiOJi Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings ofTered by ltalmagnesio SA of 
Brazil and from Promsyrio-Import of the USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, No L 219/24) ; 
the potential sales of the Community producers, the ltalian producer excluded, in the markets in which the ltalian producer · 
was obliged, as reaction to the competition of the dumped import& on the ltalian mar ket, to seek to sell increasing quantities 
(Commission Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984. accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
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ding concerning import& of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August ·1984, 
No L 215116) ; 
element& which in the near future will have a negative hearing on the sales volume, such as : 
the near-absence of new orders (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 322179 of 16 February 1979 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 21 February 1979, No L 44/8; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 955n9 of 15 May 1979 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide originating 
in Romania, O.J., 17 May 1979, NoL 12115); 
the cancellation of contracts (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1411181 of 25 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on orthoxylene (o-Xylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the United States of America, O.J., 27 May 
1981, No L 141129 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1591181 of 10 June 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on paraxylene (p-xylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the United Statea of America and the US Virgin Islands, O.J., 
16 June 1981, No L 15Bn ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81 of 15 July 1981 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on phenol originating in the United Statesof America, 0 . .1., 18 July 1981, NoL 195/22); 
the failing of negotiations on a salescontract (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2812/85 of 7 October 1985 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof electronic typewriters manufactured by Nakajima All Co. Ltd. originating 
in Japan, 0.-1:, 9 October 1985, NoL 266/5); 
the fact that the new orders acquired are less than the orders obtained in a previous period (Commission Recommendation No 
2242/82/ECSC of 10 August. 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on broad-flanged beams originating in Spain, 
O.J., 13 August 1982, ·No L 238/32) ; 
the move from long-term contracts to spot purchases which increases the Community producers' uncertainty about future 
sales (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
mercury originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, NoL 227/8); 
projected losses or threatened losses (Council Regulation (EEC) No 551183 of 8 March 1983 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on kraftliner paper and board originating in the United Statea of America and accepting undertak.ings given in 
conneetion with the review of the anti-dumping proceeding on kraftliner paper and board originating in Austria, Canada, 
Finland, Portugal, the Soviet Union and Sweden, 0 . .1., 10 March 1983, NoL 64125); 
the outlook for strongly improving profit margins (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer originating in the United States of America and terminating the 
investigation, 0 . .1., 8 September 1987, NoL 258120); 
the threat of future lay-offs (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 322n9 of 16 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on a certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 21 February 1979, NoL 4418; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 955f19 of 15 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J.,-17 
May 1979, No L 12115 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2391!19 of 26 October 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United States of America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 31 October 1979, No 
L 274126; Council Regulation (EEC) No 191180 of 29 ·January 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium 
hydroXide originating in the United States of America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, No L 23/19 
(corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, NoL 31/23); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2999/80 of 20 November 1980 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 21 November 
1980, NoL 311/13; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1101181 of 23 April1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
potato granulee originating in Canada, 0 . .1., 28 April 1981, NoL 116/11; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2936/82 of 28 
October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 4 November 
1982, NoL sosn; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 April 
1983, NoL 110/11; Commission Decision 83/306/EEC of 16 June 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of low carbon ferro-chromium originating in South Africa, Sweden, Turkey and 
Zimbabwe, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1983, NoL 161115; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 
August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of 
China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, NoL 228128; Commission Decision 871210/EEC of 23 
March 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of outboard 
motors originating in Japan and terminating the investigation, O.J., 26 March 1987, NoL 82/36; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, 
the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 
1987, NoL 121111; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings ofTered by ltalmagnesio SA of Brazil and from 
Promsyrio-lmport of the USSR, 0 . .1., 8 August 1987, No L 219124 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 385/90 of 12 February 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those import&, O.J., 16 February 1990, NoL 42/1); 
the fact that total employment in the Community industry is seriously at stake (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 
17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, 
O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, NoL 321119)). · 
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Both GA TI and European anti-dumping law stipulate that none of the enlisted factors can 
necessarily give decisive guidance (Article 3.4. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(5) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(2) basic ECSC Decision)1213• Although there is no obligation to take 
into account all these factors1214, an examination of injury may not be based on a single 
factor, but must consider a whole series of factors1215• But, once they have taken into 
account various factors, it is only up the European anti-dumping authorities to decide which of 
these factors are essentia11216• All the factors which they consider essential, must be assessed 
correctly : if some of these factors are assessed inaccurately, it is impossible to claim that the 
examination of injury will be valid as regards the other factors taken into account1217• 
Thus, the European anti-dumping authorities enjoy a broad margin of discretion : they may take 
into account all the factors which they consider relevant1218, they are oot obliged to take · into 
account eertaio factors1219, and it is up to them to decide which factors are decisive1220 
Conversely, the outlook for further price increases has been raised in a finding of no injury (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 
of 4 September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monoroer originating in the United Statesof America and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, No L 258/20). 
1213 See e.g. : video tape• in cassettes from the People's Republic of China, where it was considered ccthat Artiele 4(2) (former basic 
EC Regulation (and present ECSC Decision)) does not require that all the factors listed therein show a negative trend (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 October 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes 
originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 24 October 1991, No L 29312. 
See also: Council Regulation (EC) No 3319194 of 22 December 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof urea 
ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, exported by companies not exempted from the duty, and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31 December 1994, NoL 350/20). Undoubtedly, the same holds for present GA'IT 
and EC anti-dumping law. 
1214 C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and ~/85, 6 October 1988, Canon lnc. a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6731), 6808; C.J.E.C., joined 
cases 273185 and 107/86, 5 October 1988, Siluer Seiko Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6927), 6980. 
1215 C.J.E.C., joincd cases C-304/86 and C-185/87, 11 July 1990, Enital SpA v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2939), 2940-2941; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexpof1 GmbH v Commis,ïon and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 
3005; CJ.E;C., joincd cases C-320/86 and C-188/87, 11 July 1990, Stanko France v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3013), 3015; 
C.J.E.C., case C-157/87, 11 July 1990, Electroimpex a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3021), 3023; C.J.E.C., case C-323/88, 11 July 1990, SA 
Sermes v Directeur des services des douanes de Strasbourg, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3027), 3052; C.J.E.C., case C-315/90, 27 November 1991, 
Groupemenl des Industries de Malériels d'Equipement Electrique et de l'Electronique Industrielle Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 
1991, I, (5589), 5617. 
1216 C.J.E.C., case C-315/90, 27 November 1991, Groupement des Industries de Matériels d'Equipement Electrique et de l'Electronique 
Industrielle Assoclée (Gimekc) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5589), 5604 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 5617. 
1217 C.J.E.C., case C-315/90, 27 November 1991, Groupement de,s Industries de Malériels d'Equipement Electrique et de l'Electronique 
Industrielle Assoclée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5589), 5604 (Opinionof Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 5615. 
1218 C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1402; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 
1992, MaJsushlta Electric lndustrial Co. Lid and Ma1sushita Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1485; C.J.E.C., case C-
176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishlroku Photo Intlustry Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1529; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, 
Sanyo Electric Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1570; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporadon v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1682. 
1219 . . . .· . . . . . . ' 
C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon Inc. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1277 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO). 
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and how they are to be interpreted1221 • The only thing they cannot do is base their decision 
on one single factor and disregard all the others. The risk for «one-way flexibility)) is clearly 
present, especially in cases where the various relevant economie factors show divergent 
developments1222• Indeed, in such cases it is entirely up to the European anti-dumping 
authorities to establish why a deterioration in some factors prevails over the impravement in other 
factors or vice versa. Since eertaio factors are decisive in some cases, whereas they are not in 
other cases, it is hard to discem· some critical thresholds in European anti-dumping case 
law1223• No threshold can be deduced, not even from cases where the various relevant factors 
show the same trend. In such cases an injury finding may be based solely on a sharp deterioration 
in one of the factors, thereby making it impossible to ascertain whether a slight deterioration in 
another factor was also decisive to reach this conclusion. Even when all factors have only slightly 
deteriorated, this is not conclusive to determine that a slight deterioration in a specific factor 
suffices, as the combination of several slight deterioriations may have been decisive. As a 
consequence, the same development in a relevant economie factor may result in an injury finding 
as wellas in a finding of no injury, as is being shown in table 5. 
122° C.J.E.C., case C-315/90, 27 November 1991, Groupemenl des Industries de Matériels d'Equipemenl Electrique et de l'Eleclronique 
Industrielle Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5589), 5605 and 5609 (Opinion of Advocate GeneralVAN GERVEN). 
1221 C.J.E.C., case C-315/90, 27 November 1991, Groupemenl des Industries de Matériels d'Equipemenl Electrique el de l'Elec1ronique 
Industrielle Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5589), 5609 (Opinion of Advocate GeneralVAN GERVEN). 
1222 See e.g.: 
housed bearing units from Japan., where it was noted that c«{a)lthough the information collected by the Commission on 
production, sales, stocks, employinent and market share trends for the whole of the Community industry concerned over the 
raferenee period is not in itself sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the volume of imports and the level of price 
undercutting in respect of housed hearing units originating in Japan have had a visible negative effect on the industry, the 
same cannot he said for the information on the other relevant factors, such as the selling prices of Community housed hearing 
units, the utilization of capacity, and profits andreturn on investment of Community producers in the housed hearing units 
sector» (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
houeed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, NoL 221116); 
video tape• in cusettes from the Peopk'• Republic of China, where it was considered eetbat Artiele 4(2) (former basic EC 
Regulation (and present ECSC Decision)) does not require that all the factors listed therein show a negative trend (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 October 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video tapes in 
cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 24 October 1991, 
NoL 29312) (und.oubtedly, the same holds for present GA'IT and EC anti-dumping law); 
cotton yarn from Brazil and Turkey, where it was stated that ccthe figures concerning the evolution of the Community 
producers' output as well as their market share were not substantially negative• and that eethese figures must be analyzed in 
close conjunction with those relating to other important factors such as profitability, investment, plant closure, employment, 
etc.• (Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1~2 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof cotton 
yarn originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, NoL 82/1). 
1223 The only guideline in European anti-dumping case law to which no exception has yet been made is that, in conneetion with 
the factor «utilization of capacity•, no injury will he found if the Community indUBtry ia producing at full capacity (Com.miBBion 
Decision 831493/EEC of 28 September 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of xanthan gum 
originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 30 September 1983, No L 268/60; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 
September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomar originating in the United Statea of America and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, No L 258/20) or if its total capacity cannot satisfy the entire Community 
consumption (Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning import& of 
furfural originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, NoL 189/57). 
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Table 5- Evolution in production; utilization of capacity, sales, market share and prices-
minimum and maximum average increase/decrease on one-year basis 
In jury No injury 
Evolution in : from up to from up to 
Production -59.0 %a +129.5 %b -18.1 %c +28.0 %d 
Utilization of 
capacity -40.0 %e +23.2 %f -40.0 %g +11.1 %h 
Sales -45.0 %i +42.1 %j -68.4 %k +77.3 %1 
Market share -44.2 %m +6.7 %n -8.8 %0 +33.7 %P 
Prices -22.3 %q +5.0 %r -36.0 %8 +22.6 %t 
Employment -29.3 %u -2.1 %V -29.3 %w +6.3 %x 
Souree : Official Joumal of the European Communities ; own calculational224• 
1224 In particular: 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
k 
m 
D 
CommiBSion Régulation (EEC) No 1613/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of cathodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating 
in the Boviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No L 159/43 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video 
cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47; 
CommiBSion Decision 85/143/EEC . of 18 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
certain boots with fi.tted ice skates originating in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 
1985, No L 52/.(8 ; . 
· Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Portland 
cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1570/81 of 11 June 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer 
originating in the United Statesof Am.erica, O.J., 13 June 1981, NoL 154110; 
CommiBSion Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of cathodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating 
in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, NoL 286/29; . 
CommiBBion Decision No 2158/88/ECSC of 20 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron 
or steel sections originating in Yugoslavia or Turkey, O.J., 21 July 1988, NoL 190/5; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 171182 of 25 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic 
acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, NoL 19/26 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No 
L 34111); 
CommiBBion Decision 911142/EEC of 15 March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Atlantic 
salmon originating in Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, No L 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 1991, NoL 75/64); 
Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and 
its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16/30; 
CommiBBion Decision 89/511/EEC of 22 August 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 25 August 1989, No L 249n1 ; 
CommiBBion Decision 80n83/EEC of 27 August 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings 
concerning imports of studded welded-link chain, originating in Spain and Sweden and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 2 
September 1980, No L 231110 ; 
CommiBBion Decision 831360/EEC of 18 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of certain 
pears in syrup, originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, O.J~, 20 July 1983, 
No L 196/22. See also: C.J.E.C., case C-171187, 10 March 1992, Canon In.c. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1237), 1277 (Opinion 
of Advocate General MISCHO), where Advocate General MISCHO stated that teeven an increase in the market share of 
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No critical thresholds can be deduced from European anti-dumping case law in respect of the 
absolute value of the relevant economie factors (see table 6). 
0 
p 
q 
u 
V 
w 
Community manufacturers does not neceBBarily exclude a finding of injury• ; 
Commission Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of stainlees 
steel household cooking ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, No L 74/33 (an even sharper decrease in 
market share of 47.7 '11 has been determined, hut this concerned the market share held hy the German producers on the 
Geim.an market, see : Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of codeïne and its Balts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No 
L 16/30); 
Commission Decision 89/511/EEC of 22 August 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 25 August 1989, NoL 249n1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
isohutanol originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/12 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on· imports of 
fluorspar originating in the People's Repuhlic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3 (in another anti-dumping case 
even a price increase of 4.6 '11 on a one-year basis was found, hut that increase had been caused hy the anti-dumping 
measures under review, see : CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1472191 of 29 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
import& of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, NoL 138/62); · 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced hy electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating 
in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, No L 286129 ; 
Commission Decision 88/126/EEC of 4 MBrch 1988 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of kraftUner 
paper and board originating in Brazil and the Repuhlic of South Africa, O.J., 8 March 1988, NoL 62/39 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 707/89 of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof calcium 
metal originating in the People's Repuhlic of China or the Boviet Union, O.J., 21 March 1989, NoL 78/10; 
Commission Decision 831669/EEC of 16 November 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of sanitary fixtures of porcelain or china originating in Czechoslovak.ia and Hungary and 
terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 November 1983, No L 326/18 (in another anti-dumping case an even lower decline in 
employment of 1.1 '11 on a one-year basis was ohserved, hut it was noted that automation was the principal cause . of this 
decline, see: CommiBBion Decision 80/410/EEC of 10 April 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceedings concerning certain filament lamps for lighting exceeding 28 volts, originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Repuhlic, Hungary and Poland, and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 16 April 1980, No L 97/69) ; 
Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and 
its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.,J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16/30; 
Council Decision 86/59/EEC of 6 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of dead-hurned 
(sintered) natura! magnesite originating in the People's Repuhlic of China and North Korea, O.J., 13 March 1986, No 
L 70/41. 
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Table 6- Maximum and minimum value of utilization of capacity and market share during 
the investigation period 
In jury No injury 
minimum maximum minurnurn maximum 
Utilization of 
capacity 0 %a 85 %b 50 %c 97 %d 
Market share 13.14 %e 92.6 %f 9.4 %g 99.4 %h 
Souree: Official Joumal of the European Communities ; own calculationJ225• 
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that overlapping values (or evolutions) in economie factors in 
findings of in jury and no in jury, as illustrated in tables 5 and 6, are not always proof of «one-way 
flexibility». First, an interconnection may exist between different economie factors, so that the 
1225 In art' ul p IC ar! 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting 
undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of these 
products and terminating the investigation intheir respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, NoL 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 
1990, No L 22/79; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/44), where it was mentioned that ccavailable production 
capacity was never utilized for commercial production» ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681184 of 18 September 1984 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
pentaerythritol originating in Canada and accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of pentaerythritol originating inSweden and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 September 1984, No 
L 254/5; 
Commission Decision 80/1175/EEC of 15 December 1980 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of 
pressure sensitive paper mask.ing tape originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 19 December 1980, NoL 344157; 
Commission Decision 90/240/EEC of 22 may 1990 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping 
measures regarding imparts of fibre building-board (hardboard) originating in Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and 
Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 86/232/EEC accepting the undertakings given by the exporters concerned, 
O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/44; 
Commission Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of gum rosin 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41/50 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2127/82 of 28 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Romania, Spain and the United Statee of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No 
L 223176; 
Commission Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of stainless 
steel household cooking ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, NoL 74/33 (an even lower market share of 
6.3 % has been determined, but this concerned the market share held by the German producers on the German market, see : 
Council Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of codeïne and 
its salts originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, NoL 16/30; a market share 
of only 2 % has also been mentioned, but this pertained to the share of the Community producers on the free market (thus 
the captive market excluded), see: Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imparts of ammonium paratungstate originating in th~ People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., SO March 1990, No L 83/117) ; 
Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of Portland 
cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43. 
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improvement in one factor reflects the deterioration in another1226• This might explain why 
injury is found in spite of substantial improvements in eertaio factors. In European anti-dumping 
case law, however, the improvement of factor x in combination with the deterioration of factor y, 
as well as the deterioration of factor x in combination with the improvement of factor y may lead 
1226 An interconnection may exist between : 
production capacity and the rate of capacity utilization : a reduction in production capacity may avoid a reduction in the rate 
of capacity utilization (CommiBSion Decision 83/192/EEC of 19 April1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain cellulose ester reains (cellulose-acetobutyrate and cellulose-
acetopropionate) originating in the United Statea of America and term.inating that proceeding, O.J., 23 April 1983, No 
L 106124 ; CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 1103/93 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
into the Community of certain electronic weigbing. scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 
1993, NoL 112/20; see further: infra, p. 492-493, note 1227); 
stocks and production : a reduction in production may result in a reduction of stocks (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2172193 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ethanolamine originating in the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, No L 195/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 September 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 
September 1993, No L 226/3 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive· anti-dumping 
duty on import& of potassium permanganate orginating in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No 
L 298/32) or stock may increase despite a decrease in production (Commiseion Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 
1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50) ; 
stocks and the rate of capacity utilization : a reduction in the rate of capacity utilization : a reduction in the rate of capacity 
utilization may result in lower production and eventually in lower stocks (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313/92 of 4 
February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor 
vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 3418); 
prices and the rate of capacity utilization : a reduction in prices may prevent a reduction in sales and, thus, in the rate of 
capacity utilization (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3669/84 of 21 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, No 
L 340137; CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 March 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain hydraulic excavators originating in J~pan, O.J., 8 March 1985, No L 68/13; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 
September 1986 accepting undertakings given in colmeetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and term.inating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, 
No L 272129 ; Commissi~>n Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of 
China and Turkey and term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, NoL 276fT; CommiBSion Regulation (EC) No 1076/94 of 6 May 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 
1994, No L 120/3; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1648194 of 6 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of furazolidone originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, NoL 174/4); 
stocks and prices : lower prices may result in higher sales and, thus, in lower stocks (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in 
motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 3418); 
prices and market share : by means of a reduction in prices, the market share may be preserved at a considerable level or a 
decrease in it prevented (CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 1500/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on im.ports of outboard motors originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, No L 152/18 ; Commission Decision 91/512/EEC of 26 
July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of 
artificial corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China and 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of artificial corundum originating in Brazil and 
Yugoslavia, and term.inating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, NoL 275/27; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 
of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarns (man-made · ataple 
fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and term.inating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1461192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on · im.ports into the 
Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 199!G, No L 152122 
(corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127) ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076/94 of 6 May 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 
1994, No L 120/3 ; Commission Regulation (EC). No 1648194 of 6 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& offurazolidone originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, NoL 17414; Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of furfuraldehyde originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11). 
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to the same result1227• In addition, it is never explained why in some cases factor x was 
1227 See e.g., the relationship between production capacity and its rate of utilization. Aa noted in saveral anti-dumping cases, a 
low rate of capacity utilization is economically not advantageous because it leads to high unit costs of production (Commission 
Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
importe of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, No L 215/16; 
Commi88ion Regulation (EEC) No 2553/84 of 4 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid 
originating in Brazil, accepting an undertaking offered by the exporter in the German Demoeratic Republic of oxalic acid and 
terminating the prooaeding regarding importe of oxalic acid from the German Demoeratic Republic and Spain, O.J., 7 September 
1984, No L 239/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof roller chains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, NoL 217n; 
Commi88ion Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting ondertakinga entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importe into Greece of certain categorie& of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Czecho•lovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 5ln3 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2512/87 of 18 August 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper 
sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 20 August 1987, NoL 235/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 1987, 
NoL 259m; Commission Decision 87/443/EEC of 30 July 1987 amending an ondertaking and accepting an undertak.ing given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping review investigation concerning imports of copper sulphate originating in Poland and the USSR 
respeetively, and terminating the investigation as it concerns these countries, O.J., 20 August 1987, No L 235/22; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes of 
iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting ondertakinga offered in conneetion with such imports, 
O.J., 15 December 1990, No L 351/17 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296192 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importe of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hongary, 
Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of 
Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, the Republic ofBosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 
November 1992, No L 328/15 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 9n ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 920193 of 15 April1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Council Regulation (EC) No 
3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1). This explains why 
Community producers want to avoid further reduetions of capacity utilization and, therefore, reduce their production capacity 
(Commission Decision 83/192/EEC of 19 April 1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of certain cellulose ester reains (cellulose-acetobutyrate and cellulose-acetopropionate) originating in 
the United Statea of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 23 April 1983, NoL 106/24; Council Regulation (EC) No 
643194 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of 
potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1; Commission Decision 94/293/EC 
of 13 April1ss.& accepting ondertakinga given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof ammonium 
nitrate originating in Lithuania and RU88ia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries; as well as 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing 
provisional duties on import& of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No 
L 162/16). 
As a consequence, in several findingsof injury the reduction in production capacity is advanced to explain why the rate of capacity 
utilization did not decline (Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the 
United Statea of America and terminating that proceeding; O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371/47; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2253/84 of 31 July 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain importsof certain sodium carbonate originating in 
the United Statea of America and accepting undertakings in respect of other import& of the same product, O.J., 2 August 1984, No 
L 206/15 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681/84 of 18 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
pentaerytbritol originating in Canada and accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of pentaerythritol originating in Sweden and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 September 1984, No 
L 25415; Commission Decision No 2158/88/ECSC of 20 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
iron or steel sections originating in Yugoalavia or Turkey, O.J., 21 July 1988, NoL 190/5; Cooncil Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 
11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, No L 131/4 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 720/90 of 22 March 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 27 
March 1990, No L 8019 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 1411 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ootton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt 
and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 
September 1991, No L 271/17) or declined by less (Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertak.ings given 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and 
terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating thè anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 
129/24); similarly, restrueturing measures allowing better, though not satisfactory capacity utilization have also been raised in 
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positive findings of injury (Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 5 February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except 
those sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1 ; 
Commiuion Decision No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain semi-
tinisbed product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 95/26 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain electronic weighing 
scales originating in Singapore and tbe Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, No L 112120 ; Commission Decision 93/521/EEC of 3 
September 1993 accepting undertakings given in conneetion witb tbe anti-dumping review in respect of imports of binder and haler 
twine originating in Brazil, terminating the anti~subsidy review proceeding with regard to these imports and terminating the anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy review in respect of imports of binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, No 
L 261128). 
Conversely, the increase in production capacity bas been advanced to explain why no injury was found though the rate of capacity 
utilization had decreaeed (Council Decision 83/162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
imports of acrylonitrile originating in the United States of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101129; Commission Decision 
86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of stainlees steel household cooking 
ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, No L 74133 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep frèezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings 
in conneetion with the investigation of imports of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic 
Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 
September 1986, No L 269/14 ; Commission Decision 90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain single phase, two-speed electric motors originating in Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 31 
July 1990, No L 202/47 ; Commission Decision 91129/EEC of 11 January 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of Portland cement originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1991, No L 16/M ; Commission Decision 931325/EEC of 18 
May 1993 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paint, distemper, varnish and simHar brushes 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 25 May 1993, NoL 127/15; Commission Decision 941389/EC of 6 June 1994 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refined antimony trioxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41). 
However, an increase in production capacity coinciding with a decline in the rate of capacity utilization does notprevent findingsof 
injury (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 707/89 of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China or the Boviet Union, O.J., 21 March 1989, NoL 78/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea 
and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating tbe anti-dumping proceeding with regard to tbe 
imports of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 17411 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan 
and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257/27); Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in 
Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively tbe provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, NoL 13/21; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungstic oxide and tungstic 
acid originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 Marcb 1990, NoL 83129; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/90 of 
13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not 
exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, NoL 152/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 
1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on importsof woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 19 July 1990, NoL 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, NoL 256/38); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 
of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36) ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034/91 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof video tapes in 
cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 1991, No L 106/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2805/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain thermal paper 
originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, NoL 270/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1031192 of 23 April1992 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium chloride (potash) originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 28 April 
1992, No L 110/5 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 
(corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1994/92 of 14 July 1992 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 18 July 
1992, NoL 199/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
outer ringsof tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 9n; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour telavision receivers originating in 
Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, tbe Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50). In 
only one anti-dumping case, it bas been explained wby sucb a combination of the factors ccproduction capacityn and ecrate of 
capacity utilization• resulted in a finding of injury. It was noted that the rate of capacity utilization would have drop}>ed even ü 
production capacity had not increased (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, tbe 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133120). 
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decisive and in other cases factor y1228• Moreover, an improvement (a deterioration) in both 
the interconnected factors bas not preventeel findings of (no) injury1229. Thus, the 
interconnection between economie factors is probably only advanced if it is useful to the envisaged 
result of theinjury examination. 
Second, the fact that the development of the relevant economie factors may have been caused by 
another factor than the dumping, might also explain why improvements (deteriorations) in an 
economie factor are compatible with findingsof (no) injury. Por European anti-dumping case law 
mentions only the overall evolution in the relevant economie factors, without any specification 
about the impact of dumping on them. Moreover, it usually establishes the evolution in a relevant 
economie factor by oomparing the value of that economie factor at the beginning of a certain 
period with the value reached at the end of that period. Fluctuations during that period are not 
given much attention. As a consequence, injury is found in cases where relevant economie factors 
have improved during the investigation period after a serious deterioration during the preceding 
period. This seems rather peculiar because the choice of the period of an injury examination, 
covering the investigation period and a preceding period, is undoubtedly based on the assumption 
that dumping bas been practised during the investigation period, but not during the preceding 
1228 One exception should be pointed out : in polyester yams jrom Taiwan, /ndonesia, India, lhe People 's Republic of China and Turkey the 
European anti-dumping authorities held that injury had to be assessed mainly on the basis of parameters such as prices, profitability and 
employment. Economie factors such as production, sales, stocks and market share did not clearly reileet the difficult market conditions in which 
the Community producers had to operate, since the Community producers had decided to rnaintaio capacity utilization as high as possible in an 
attempt to avoid grcatcr detcriontion of profitability (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importa of eertaio polyester yarna (man-made stapJe iibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of 
China and Turkey and tcrminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of thete yarna originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 
October 1991, NoL 276n; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a dcfinitive anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio 
polyester yarna (man-made stapJe fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, tbc Pcoplc'a Republic of China and Turkey and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153/16)). 
1229 For example, it might normally he expected that the decrease in both production capacity and rate of capacity utilization is 
conclusive evidence of ilijury (Commission Decision 84/465/EEC of 26 September 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of asbestos-cement corrugated sheets originating in Czechoslovakia and the 
German Demoeratic Republic and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 28 September 1984, NoL 259/48; Commission Decision No 
2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping_ duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, 
originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 July 1987, NoL 207/21), and that an increase in both factors is strong proof of no injury (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1786/89 of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures 
concerning import& of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, confiriD.ing the e:xpiry 
of the definitive anti-dumping duties imposed on imports from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive anti-
dumping duty impoaedon imports from the USSR, O.J., 23 June 1989, NoL 176/1; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 19 June 
1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board 
(hardboard) originating in Romania, Brazil and Sweden, confll"llling the expiry of the undertakings given by Romanian, Brazilian 
and certain Swedish exporters, and repealing the undertaking given by another Swedish exporter, O.J., 23 June 1989, No 
L 176/51 ; Commission Decision 89/511/EEC of 22 August 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 25 August 1989, NoL 249n1). 
Nevertheless, iDjury bas been found in cases where both the production capacity and the rate of capacity utilization increased 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 665190 of 16 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferroboron 
alloy originating in Japan, O.J., 20 March 1990, NoL 7316; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, NoL 188/10 
(corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, NoL 321/19)) or, at least, did not decline (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 
May 1988 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 
May 1988, NoL 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 6 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of serlal impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1). 
495 
period1230. However, if necessary, an explanation may always be put forward why injury is 
found, notwithstanding the improvement. Indeed, in such cases, the injury finding is based on the 
consideration that the dumping bas prevented the recovery of the relevant economie factor to its 
original level1231 , that the increase did not constitute a considerable improvement1232, that 
the increase was insufficient1233, or that it was the result of the levying of a provisional anti-
dumping duty on the dumped imports1234. 
3.4. THREAT OF INJURY 
The Community industry may not actually have suffered in jury, but there may be indications that 
injury will be suffered. In view of the fact that anti-dumping relief is, in principle, granted with 
an eye to the future, it is not very appropriate to terminate the anti-dumping proceeding because 
of lack of actual injury and later on. to start a new anti-dumping proceeding as soon as there is 
actual in jury. Moreover, a threat of in jury may also affect the actual performance and strategy of 
a producer (e.g., disinvestment and plant closures). Threat of injury too should, thus, be an 
injury standard. 
However, the standard «threat of injury» should not be used as an excuse for granting anti-
dumping relief when the Community industry does not suffer actual injury1235. In order to 
prevent such circumvention, GATI and EC anti-dumping law stipulate that «(a) determination of 
threat of injury (must) be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote 
possibility», whereby «(t)he change in circumstances ( ... ) must be clearly foreseen and imminent» 
1230 Supra, 439-442. 
1231 Commission Decision 84/229/EEC of 13 April 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning imports of propan-l-ol (propyl alcohol} originating in the United States of America, and terminating that 
proceeding, 0 . .1., 19 April 1984, No L 106/55 ; Commission Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland 
and the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 23 September 1986, No L 271126. 
1232 Commission Regulation (EEC} No 744/84 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, NoL 79/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, NoL 86/31}. 
It is interesting to mention in this respect is that in this anti-dumping case the production level at the end of the period taken into 
consideration was only 1.25 % below its originallevel. 
1233 Commiuion Regulation (EC} No 534/94 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdiaka) originating in Hoog Koog and tbc Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5. 
1234 Commission Regulation (EEC} No 744/84 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, NoL 79/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 March 1984, NoL 86/31}. 
1235 BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.dAnti-Subsidy Law. The Europeon Communities, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1986, 163; BOUDANT, J., L'anti-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 131. 
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(Article 3. 7. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(9) basic EC Regulation). In the same sense, 
ECSC anti-dumping law provides that «(a) determination of threat of injury may only be made 
where a particular situation is likely to develop into actual injury» (Article 4(3) basic ECSC 
Decision). In other words, the indications for a future injury must be reasonable and reliable 
(«clearly foreseen»), whereas the time at which the injury will actually materialize can not be too 
remote («imminent») 1236• 
Compared to the number of fmdings of actual injury, relatively few findings of threat of injury 
have been arrived at in European anti-dumping case law. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that 
in the majority of the anti-dumping cases no investigation into threat of injury is made when actual 
injury is found. Nevertheless, threat of injury is practically always found in cases where also 
1236 ' GA'IT Doe. No ADP/25, 31 October 1986. 
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actual injury is found1237, or in cases in which prevailing anti-dumping measures are under 
12J? There are only two exceptions : 
in barium chloride from the German. Demoeratic Republic the Council found threat of injury without investigating whether 
the dumping also caused actual injury (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/88 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, No L 228128) ; 
in ammonium mtrate from Belarut~, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukrain.e an.d Uzbeki.stan., the Commission found that, during the 
investigation period, there were no _ import& from those countries and investigated whether there was evidence of any 
imminent change in circumstances which could lead to an intlux of dumped imports from those countries (Commission 
Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard 
to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating 
in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbek.istan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24). 
See also : Commission Recommendation No 11Bn8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain galvanized steel sheets and plates originating in Poland and Spain, O.J., 24 January 1978, NoL 19/3; Commission 
Recom.m.endation No 119n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on wire rod originating in 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19/5; Commission Recommendation No 120n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 
imposing a provisional duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovak.ia, O.J., 24 January 
1978, No L 19n. In these three cases a fmding of threat of injury was made, though nothing is mentioned concerning 
possible actual Îl\jury. This conclusion may, however, not he warranted since these cases show careless usage. lndeed, the 
English version of wire rod from Czechoslovakia states that the price undercutting cccauses material Îl\juryn, whereas the 
Dutch version statea that the price undercutting ccQLJIIZienlijke schade dreigen. toe te brengen,.. (translated in English : 
ccthreatens to cause material injuryn ). 
All the other cases in which an investigation into threat of Îl\jury has been initiated after that the dumping was found not to cause 
aetual Îl\jury, were terminated by a finding of no threat of Îl\jury (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, 
NoL 297/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium 
carbonate originating in the Boviet Union, · O.J., 22 :February 1980, No L 4811 ; Commission Decision 82/808/EEC of 25 November 
1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning importsof aluminium foil for household and catering use originating in 
Austria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hu:ilgary and lsrael, O.J., 1 December 1982, No L 339/58; Commission Decision 
86/501/ECSC of 11 November. 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of wire rod originating in Brazil, 
Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1985, NoL 299118; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 
1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1786/89 of 19 June 1989 
terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board (hard-
board) originating in Czechoslovak.ia, Poland and the USSR, confli"IIling the expiry of the definitive anti-dumping duties imposed on 
imports from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty im.posed on imports from the USSR, O.J., 
23 June 1989, No L 17611; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a 
review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, Brazil and 
Sweden, confirming the e~iry of the undertakings given by Romanian, Brazilian and certain Swedish exporters, and repealing the 
undertaking given by another Swedish exporter, O.J., 23 June 1989, No L 176/51; Commission Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 
September 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof mica originating in Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, 
No L 284/45 ; Commiuion Decision 901155/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
tungsten metal powder originating in the People's Republic of China or the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 831124; 
Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertak.ings ofTered in conneetion with the 
proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, No L 104114; Commission Decision 90/240/EEC of 22 may 1990 terminating the proceeding in 
conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures regarding imports of fibre building-board (hardboard) originating in Finland, 
Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 861232/EEC aceeptbig the undertakings given by 
the exporters concerned, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/44; Commission Decision 90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 terminating an anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain single phase, two-speed electric motors originating in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 31 July 1990, NoL 202/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 641191 of • March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, No L 60/1 ; 
Commiuion Decision 911303/EEC of 12 June 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of thin polyester 
film originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 June 1991, No L 151/89; Commission Decision 94/389/EC of 6 June 1994 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refined antimony trioxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41). 
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review1238• 
Moreover, in several anti-dumping cases, findings of threat of injury are based on the same 
economie factors as findings of actual in jury, such as : the absolute volume, the market share and 
the prices of the dumped imports, and, in conneetion with the impact on the Community industry, 
production, utilization of capacity, stocks, sales, market share, profits, employment and structural 
adjustment1239• GA TT and EC anti-dumping law, however, enumerate other factors for a 
1238 See e.g. : Commiasion Decision 89/573/EEC of 30 October 1989 tenninating the investigation concerning import& of dicumyl peroxide 
originating in Taiwan and accepting an undertak.ing offered in the context of the review conceming importa of dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan 
and tenninating the proceeding, O.J., 31 October 1989, NoL 317/49; Council Regulation (BC) No 1318/94 of 6 June 1994 tenninating the review 
of anti-dumping measures concerning importa of eertaio acrylic tibres originating in Mexico and repealing the measures applying to such import&, 
O.J., 8 June 1994, NoL 143/1. 
1239 Commission Recommendation No 112/78/ECSC of 18 January 1978 i.m.posinga provisional anti-dumping duty on i.m.portsof 
iron or steel coils for re-rolling, originating in Czechoslovakia and South Korea, O.J., 21 January 1978, No L 17/27 ; Commission 
Recommendation No 118178/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain galvanized steel sheets 
and plates originating in Poland and Spain, O.J., 24 January 1978, NoL 19/3; Commission Recommendation No 119n8/ECSC of 
18 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on wire rod originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 1978, No 
L 19/5; Commission Recommendation No 120n8/ECSC of 18 January 1978 imposing a provisional duty on certain sheets and 
plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 24 January 1978, No L 19n; Commission Recommendation No 
245n8/ECSC of 2 February 1978 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling 
originating in Japan and Bulgaria, O.J., 7 February 1978, No L 37/13; Commission Recommendation No 262n8/ECSC of 7 
February 1978 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Poland, O.J., 
9 February 1978, No L 39/13 ; Commission Recommendation No 263n8/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in 
Japan, O.J., 9 February 1978, No L 39/15; Commission Recommendation No 307n8/ECSC of 14 February 1978 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Australia, O.J., 16 February 1978, No 
L 45/17 ; Commission Recommendation No 359n8/ECSC of 20 February 1978 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
galvanized sheets and plates originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, O.J., 22 February 1978, No L 50/13; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 511n8 of 7 March 1978 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and board 
originating in the United States of America, O.J., 11 March 1978, No L 69/9 ; Commission Recommendation No 811n8/ECSC of 21 
April 1978 i.m.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Bulgaria, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 22 April 1978, No L 108/26 ; Commission Recommendation No 932n8/ECSC of 2 
May 1978 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Bulgaria, O.J., 4 May 1978, No 
L 120/22 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1355n8 of 20 June 1978 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on ferro-chromium 
originating in the Republic of South Africa and Sweden, O.J., 22 June 1978, No 165/20 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 June 1978, No 
L 173/31) ; Oommiseion Recommendation No 1704n8/ECSC of 19 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 July 1978, No L 195/17 ; 
Commission Recommendation No 1758178/ECSC of 26 July 1978 i.m.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes 
and sections of iron or steel, originating in Spain, O.J., 27 July 1978, No L 203/28; Council Regulation (EEC) No 213sn8 of 8 
September 1978 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and board originating in the United States of 
America, O.J., 9 September 1978, No L 247122; Commission Recommendation No 267n91ECSC of 9 February 1979 i.m.posinga 
provisional anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and U, I or H sections of iron or ateel, not further worked than hot-rolled 
or extruded, originating in Spain, O.J., 13 February 1979, No L 37/21; Commission Recommendation No 294n9/ECSC of 13 
February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping' duty on certain hematite pig iron originating in Brazil, O.J., 16 February 
1979, No L 41129 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 322n9 of 16 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on a 
certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 21 February 1979, NoL 44/8; Commission Recommendation No 433n9/ECSC of 27 
February 1979 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates of iron or steel originating in Spain and 
repealing certain suspended anti-dumping duties, O.J., 3 March 1979, NoL 53121; Commission Recommendation No 496/79/ECSC 
of 13 March 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Greece, O.J., 15 
March 1979, No L 65/16; Council Regulation (EEC) No 955n9 of 15 May 1979 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on a 
certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 17 May 1979, No L 12115 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2294180 of 28 August 1980 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 i.m.posing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United 
Statesof America and the Boviet Union, O.J., 30 August 1980, NoL 228/59; Commission Recommendation No 1104/82/ECSC of 6 
May 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 11 
May 1982, No L 12819 ; Commission Recommendation No 2242/82/ECSC of 10 August 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on broad-flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 13 August 1982, No L 238/32; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 
September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning i.m.ports of certain acrylic 
fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation. O.J., 24 September 1986, No 
L 272129; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the· anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic 
fibres of polyesters originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1987, No 
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determination of threat of injury : the likelibood of substantially increased dumped imports into 
the Community as indicated by the rate of increase of dumped imports ; the likelibood of 
increased exports to the Community indicated by the freely disposable or imminently increasing 
capacity of the exporter and taking into account of the availability of other export markets to 
absorb any additional exports ; the likelibood of increasing demand. for further imports caused by 
imports at prices having price- depressive or price-surpressive effects ; and inventories of the 
product (Article 3. 7. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(9) basic EC Regulation). In ECSC 
anti-dumping law, the rate of increase in the dumped exports to the Community, the export 
capacity in the country of origin or export, already in existence or which will be operational in the 
foreseeable future, and the likelibood that the resulting exports will be directed to the Community, 
are set forth as evidence of threat of injury (Article 4(3) basic ECSC Decision). The factors 
mentioned in European anti-dumping law are not exclusive : they are not decisive and other 
factors may betaken into account (Article 3.7. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(9) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(3) basic ECSC Decision). As a consequence, no violation of European 
anti-dumping law is committed if other economie factors are used for showing a threat of in jury. 
The same high flexibility, therefore, characterizes an examination of actual injury as well as of 
threat of injury1240• In respect of the latter, the degree of flexibility may even be higher. 
L 103/38 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a definitive anti-dumping duty on styrene monomer 
originating in the United Statesof America and terminating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, NoL 258/20; Commission 
Decision 88/175/EEC of 22 March 1988 on the ciosure of anti-dumping proceedings in respect of Spanish · imports from France of 
refrigerating units for transport& (IV/AD/86/2- Reftrans), O.J., 24 March 1988, NoL 79/35; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 
of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the Gerinan 
Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, No L 13114; Commission Decision 90/378/EEC of 13 July 1990 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review coneerDing imports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil 
and terminating the investigation, O.J., 17 July 1990, No L 184/16 ; Commission Decision 91/303/EEC of 12 June 1991 terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of thin polyester film originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 June 1991, No 
L 151/89 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-
silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, No 
L 30211 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 1318194 of 6 June 1994 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures coneerDing import& 
of certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico and repealing the measures applying to such import&, O.J., 8 June 1994, NoL 14311; 
Commission Decision 94/389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding imports of refined antimony 
trioxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, NoL 176/41. 
1240 With regard to the economie factors which are taken into account in an examination of threat of injury, some guidelines or 
critica! thresholds can not he deducted. For example, with regard to the evolution in the volume of dumped imports, the following 
minimum and maximum average increases on a one-year basis are found in examinations of threat of injury : 
Threat of injury No threat of injury 
Evolution in : from upto from upto 
Volume of dum.ped 
export& +4.8 %a +202.6 %b -X %c +49.6 %d 
Souroe: Official Joumal of the Europaan Communities ; own calculations. In particular : 
a Commission Regulation (EEC) No 612/84 of 27 February 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
b 
duty on import& of vinyl acetate monomar originating in Canada, O.J., 29 February 1984, No L 58/17 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of smali-screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting 
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Indeed, besides the economie factors which are relevant in the examination of actual injury, other 
economie factors may also be taken into account. Thus, European anti-dumping case law 
considers and, moreover, places a broad interpretation oot only on the factors mentioned in 
European anti-dumping law, such as the export capacity in the dumping country1241 and the 
c 
d 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, 
No L 133192) ; 
A fall in the volume of the dumped exports, without any further numerical specifications being 
provided, has heen invoked in a finding of no threat of i.J:Vury in : Commission Decision 90/155/EEC of 
26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping prooaeding concerning imports of tungsten metal powder 
originating in the People's Republic of China or the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No 
L 831124 ; Commiuion Decision 90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain single phase, two-speed electric motors originating in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 31 July 1990, No L 202/47 ; . 
Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43. 
As in examinatioll8 of actual injury, a market share of 0.47 % held by the dumped exporte on the Community market is coll8idered 
too low to support a finding of threat of injury (Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 
25 July 1986, No L 202/43). A market share of 4.5 % held by the dumped export& on the Community market, however, is sufficient · 
to support a finding of threat of injury (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 512/84 of 27 February 1984 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 February 1984, No L 58/17). 
1241 In order to know the export capacity of the dumping country to the Community a thorough examination should he made of 
the production capacity of the producers in the dumping country, their spare production capacity, their exports to the Community 
and other countries, their export facilities and their import facilities within the Community. In only one anti-dumping case such a 
profound examination has actually heen made (Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 
25 July 1986, No L 202/43). 
The other anti-dumping cases consider at least one of these aspects to he sufficient to determine the export capacity : 
existing or projected production capacity (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, No 
L 297/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
sodium carbonate originating in the Boviet Union, 0.~, 22 February 1980, No L 48/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
· 2243182 of 12 August 1982 imposing a. provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of methylamine, dimethylamine and 
trimethylamine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and accepting an undertaking and terminating the procedure 
in respect of importe of methylamine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in Romania, O.J., 13 August 1982, No 
L 238/35 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 512/84 of 27 February 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 February 1984, No L 58/17 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on i.mports of electronic typewriters originating in 
Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nak~ima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, No 
L 335/43 ; Commiuion Decision 88/305/EEC of 27 May 198~ accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping investigation concerning imports of inner tubes and new tyre cases for bicycles originating in the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1988, No L 134/61 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 
of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof paracetamol originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 22 June 1988, No L 155/29; Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imports of oxalic acid originating in China or Czechoslovakia 
and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343/34; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, No L 13114 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 
July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of 
China or the _!lerman Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, NoL 227/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 
24 October 1989 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof small screen colour telavision receivers originating 
in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 5 February 1990 
accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importe of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings 
have heen accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048/90 of 25 April1990 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour telavision receiver• originating in the Republic of Korea and 
collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192); 
Commiuion Decision 90/240/EEC of 22 may 1990 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping 
measures regarding import& of fibre building-board (hardboard) originating in Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and 
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Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 861232/EEC accepting the undertakings given by the exporters concerned, 
O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/44; CommiBBion Decision 90/378/EEC of 13 July 1990 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning import& of oxalic acid originating in Brazil and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 17 July 1990, No L 184/16 ; CommiBBion Decision 91129/EEC of 11 January 1991 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of Portland cement originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1991, NoL 16/34; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in RUBBia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, No 
L 30211); 
the fact that the dumping exporter bas the capacity tomeet the entire demand in the Community (Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2819194 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& .of potassiu.m pennanganate orginating 
in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32) ; 
the recent expansion of the dumping exporters' production capacity (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2849192 of 28 September 
1992 modifying the defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ball hearings with a graatest external diameter exceeding 30 
mm originating in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85, O.J., 1 October 1992, NoL 286/2 (corrigendum, O.J., 25 
March 1993, No L 72/36) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, No L 10414) ; 
the .anticipation, by the dumping exporter, of a rise in bis production (Commiasion Decision 89/573/EEC of 30 October 1989 
terminating the investigation concerning imports of dicumyl peroxide originating in Taiwan and accepting an undertaking 
offered in the context of the review concerning imports of dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan and terminating the 
proceeding, O.J., 31 October 1989, No L 317/49) ; 
the absence of growth or the decline in production capacity (CommiBBion Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1985, NoL 299/18; CommiBBion Decision No 1056/89/ECSC of 19 April1989 terminating 
the review of anti-dumping measures concel'ning import& of certain iron or steel coils, hot-rolled, originating in Argentina and 
Canada and confirming the expiry of those measures, O.J., 25 April 1989, No L 11215 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1786/89 
of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of 
fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, confirm.ing the expiry of the definitive 
anti-dumping duties imposed on import& &om Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty 
imposed on import& from the USSR, O.J., 23 June 1989, No L 176/1; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 19 June 1989 
terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board 
(hardboard) orlginating in Romani a, Brazil and Sweden, conf1rming .the expiry of the undertakings gi ven by Romanian, 
Brazilian and certain Swedish exporters, and repealing the undertaking given by another Swedish exporter, O.J., 23 June 
1989, No L 176/51 ; Commission Decision No 3692191/ECSC of 12 December 1991 repealing Decision No 2132/88/ECSC 
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 19 December 1991, No L 350/11; CommiBBion Decision No 322192/ECSC of 7 February 1992 repealing 
Decision No M99/87/ECSC imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates; of iron or steel, 
originating in Mexico, O.J., 12 February 1992, NoL 3519; Commission Decision 93/325/EEC of 18 May 1993 tenninatlng the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 25 May 1993, No L 127/15; Commission Decision 931376/EEC of 16 June 1993 tenninating the 
review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/85 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, No L 157n6) ; 
the fact that the plant established in the exporter country bas been seriously damaged and will be out of oparation for a 
significant period . of time (Council Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping 
measures on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and 
Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1); 
the fact that no additional capacities (aic) were to be expected in the near future (Commission Decision 90/85/EEC of 1 March 
1990 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures applying to imports of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating 
in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic and confirming the expiry of the said measures, O.J., 8 March 1990, 
NoL 59/45); 
the availability of spare production capacity (Commission Decision 90/240/EEC of 22 may 1990 terminating the proceeding in 
conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures regarding import& of fibre building-board (hardboard) originating in 
Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 86/232/EEC accepting the 
undertak.ings given by the exporters concerned, O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/44 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115191 of 29 
April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
import& of ferro-sillcon originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 11111; Commission Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 April 
1991 accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and tenninating the investigation as regards those e:xporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, 
No L 111147; CommiBBion Decision 931521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping review in respect of import& of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil, terminating the anti~subsidy 
review proceeding with regard to these imports and tenninating the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy review in respect of 
import& of binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, NoL 251128); 
the absence of spare production capacity (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2553193 of 13 September 1993 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and 
Singapore, O.J., 18 September 1993, No L 235/3) ; 
underutillzation of capacity (CommiBBion Decision 88/47/EEC of 26 January 1988 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping review proceeding concerning import& of a herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 30 
January 1988, No L 261107) ; 
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likelibood of exports to the Community1242, but also on the possible recurrencies to 
the possibility of making greater use of the present facilities (Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 5 February 1990 
accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings 
have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/1) ; 
high rates of capacity utilization (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1786/89 of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in 
conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, confmning the expiry of the definitive anti-dumping duties imposed on import& from 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports from the USSR, O.J., 23 June 
1989, NoL 17611; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion withareview 
of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, Brazil and Sweden, 
confirming the expiry of the undertakings given by Romanian, Brazilian and certain Swedish exporters, and repealing the 
undertaking given by ·another Swedish exporter, O.J., 23 June 1989, No L 176/51 ; Commission Decision 90/540/EEC of 29 
October 1990 terminating the anti-dumping review proceeding concerning import& of propanlol originating in the United 
Statee of Ameria, 0 . .1., 6 November 1990, No L 306/23) ; 
the fact that output reaches capacity limits, together with the fact that output levels are limited by bottlenecks in the 
production of the raw material (Commission Decision No 1056/89/ECSC of 19 April 1989 terminating the review of anti-
dumping measures concerning import& of certain iron or steel coils, hot-rolled, originating in Argentina and Canada and 
confirm.ing the exj,iry ofthose measures, O.J., 25 Aprill989, NoL 112/5); 
the fact that the production of the like product is only taken up occasionally with a limited capacity attributed depending on 
the orders of non-like products (Commission Decision 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain seamless tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Austria, O.J., 28 January 1989, No 
L 25/87); 
the absence of representative production (Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and 
accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the proceeding concerning imports · of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 April1990, NoL 104114); 
the existence of newly built import facilities in the Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3018/82 of 11 November 
1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sodium carbonate originating in the United Statea of 
America and accepting certain undertakings coneerDing the imp<)rts of certain sodium carbonate originating in the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 13 November 1982, No L 317/5). 
None of these factors are conclusive. For example, recently builtand planned production facilities for the product do not preclude a 
finding of no threat of i:njury (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain IIOCÜum carbonate originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, No L 297/12; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the 
Boviet Union, O.J., 22 February 1980, No L 48/1). 
Some anti-dumping cases mention only the export capacity of the dumping country as such without any further explanation 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride 
originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, No L 228/28 ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2357/87 of 31 July 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1987, NoL 213/32). Moreover, in 
other anti-dumping cases, reference is made to the capacity of the dumping country, without providing any specification whether it 
concerns export or production capacity (Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania 
and Turkey and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, NoL 272129; Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 
1987 accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion with imports of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and 
terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, No L 34/55 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1786/89 of 19 June 1989 
terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measurea coneerDing imports of fibre building board (hard-
board) originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, confmning the expiry of the defmitive anti-dumping duties imposed on 
import& from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports from the USSR, O.J., 
23 June 1989, NoL 176/1; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a 
review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, Brazil aD.d 
Sweden, confirm.ing the expiry of the undertakings given by Romanian, Brazilian and certain Swedish exporters, and repealing the 
undertaking given by another Swedish exporter, O.J., 23 June 1989, NoL 176/51.; Commission Decision 90/85/EEC of 1 March 
1990 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures applying to imports of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in 
Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic and confmning. the expiry of the said measures, O.J., 8 March 1990, No 
L 59/45). 
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1242 It seems that in European anti-dumping case law the likelibood of export& to the Community is assumed to he zero, unless 
the contrary is proved (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on certain sodium carbonate origi.nating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, NoL 297/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on certain IOdium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, 
O.J., 22 Fehruary 1980, NoL 48/1; Commission Decision 86/S44/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, 
No L 202/43 ; Commission Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 September 1989 tei-minating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& 
of mica originating in Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, No L 284/45 ; Commission Deciaion 90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 terminating an 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain single phase, two-speed. electrio motors origi.nating in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 31 July 1990, No L 202/47; Commission Decision 911303/EEC of 12 June 1991 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of thin polyester film origi.nating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 June 1991, No 
L 151189; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings gi.ven in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Rusaia and terminating the investigation with 
regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate 
origi.nating in:..Belarus, Georgi.a, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1318194 of 6 June 1994 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of certain acrylic fihres 
origi.nating in Mexico and repealing the measures applying to such imports, O.J., 8 June 1994, No L 143/1 ; Commission Decision 
94/389/EC of 6 June 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding import& of refined antimony trioxide originating in 
. the People's Repuhlic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41). 
Thus, at fust sight a restrictive interpretation is placed on the factor eclikelihood of exports to the Community». However, in 
European anti-dumping case law, it is not so difficult to reverse the assum.ption of zero likelihood. For proof to the contrary may he 
based on a num.her of facts, such as : 
the fact that no special facilities are required for exporting larger quantities (Council Decision 87 /66/EEC of 19 January 1987 
accepting undertakings gi.ven in conneetion with imports of binder and haler twine origi.nating in Brazil and Mexico, and 
terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, NoL 34155); 
the fact that the existing price level of Community producers intheir market is attractive or considerahly higher than the 
price level in the other possible export markets of the dumping country (Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres 
originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No 
L 272/29 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of light 
sodium. carbonate origi.nating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, No 
L 13114; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 5 February 1990 accepting undertak.ings and imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold 
for export to the Community by companies whose undertak.ings have been accepted, O.J., 10 Fehruary 1990, No L 3811; 
Commission Decision 90/507 /EEC of· 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-dumping measures concerning 
dense sodium. carbonate origi.nating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, NoL 283/38); 
the attractiveness of the Community market by virtue of its price levels, its terms of payment and the strength of its 
currencies (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115/91 of 29 April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with 
the review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 11111 ; 
Commission Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the 
review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and terminating the investigation 
as regards those exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 111147); 
the substantial fall in the value of the currency of the dumping country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2357/87 of 31 July 
1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof vinyl acetate monomer 
origi.nating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 4 August 1987, NoL 213/32); 
the actual and prospeetive fall in the value of the currency of the country which is the main market for their sales to the rest 
of the world (Commiuion Decision 881305/EEC of 27 May 1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping investigation concerning imports of inner tubes and new tyre cases for hicycles originating in the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1988, No L 134/61) ; 
the fact that contracts for the supply of large quantities at dumping prices have been concluded or renewed (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride 
origi.nating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, NoL 228128; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 227/85 of 29 January 1985 repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of upright 
pianos originating in the Soviet Union, O.J. 31 January 1985, No L 26/5; Commission Decision 88/47/EEC of 26 January 
1988 accepting an undertaking gi.ven in conneetion with the anti-dumping review proceeding concerning imports of a 
herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 30 January 1988, No L 26/107), unless the Community producers are also party to 
these contract. on the basis of which they are able to control the import& of the duri:a.ped product, its distribution and 
marketing (Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43); 
the aggressive marketing tactics applied by the dumping exporter in the Community over the last few years (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of paracetamol 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, NoL 155/29); 
the fact that the dornestic market of the country of origin is limited and that the dornestic markets of third countries are 
more developed than the Community market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters origi.nating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping 
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proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, NoL 335/43); 
the fact that all the markets outside the Community are limited (Commiuion Decision 89/573/EEC of 30 October 1989 
terminating the investigation concerning imports of dicumyl peroxide originating in Taiwan and accepting an undertaking 
offered in the context of the review concerning imports of dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan and terminating the 
proceeding, O.J., 31 October 1989, No L 317/49) ; 
the fact that exports to other traditional markets of the dumping exporter are expected to decline as a result of new capacity 
developed thoae markets (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2357/87 of 31 .July 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United States of America, 
O.J., 4 August 1987, NoL 213132; Council Regulàtion (EEC) No 1306189 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, 
O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114; Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-
dumping measures concerning dense sodium carbonate originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, 
No L 283138) ; . 
the fact that the saturation point bas been reached in the other traditional markets of the dumping exporter (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour 
telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers 
originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/56 
(corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133192)) ; 
the strengthening of the competition on the dornestic market of the dumping country because of the entry of new competitors 
on that market (Commission Decision 90/378/EEC of 13 July 1990 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping review concerning imports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil and terminating the investigation, O.J., 17 July 
1990, No L 184116) ; 
the fact that dornestic demand is showing a downward tendency (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114); 
the fact that there is excess capacity with regard to dornestic demand (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 
1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or 
the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, NoL 227/24; Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 
terminating the review of the anti-dumping measures concerning dense sodium carbonate originating in the United States of 
America, O.J., 16 October 1990, No L 283138 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 28 October 1989, NoL 314/1); 
the fact that the technica! probieros which were the reason why in the past the exports to the Community had been stopped, 
are no longer there (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Democratie Republic, O.J., 20 
August 1983, NoL 228128); 
difficulties in transporting the product by aea which make it highly likely that the product will be exported to the 
Community where there is no such transport problem (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2243/82 of 12 August 1982 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of methylamine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in the German 
Demoeratic Republic and accepting an undertaking and terminating the procedure in respect of imports of methylamine, 
dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in Romania, O.J., 13 August 1982, NoL 238/35); 
the geographical proximity of the dumping exporter (Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imports of oxalic acid originating in China or 
Czechoslovakia and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, NoL 343134; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 
11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, NoL 13114; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 
5 February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-silicon originating 
in lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose 
undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38/1); 
the fact that the dumping country's exports have always been oriented towards the Community (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable 
to import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of 
Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of imports of 
synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United States of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, No L 306/1 
(corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, NoL 30/68)); 
the fact that substantial quantities are held in the Community under the Tl regime (i.e., the inward processing regime) 
because import& under the Tl regime may be cleared at the customs and put into free circulation in the Community at very 
short notice (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, 
No L 228128) ; 
the fact that dumped product& imported for free circulation on the Community market have been replaced by imports under 
the inward proceuing regime (Commiuion Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imports of oxalic acid originating in China or Czechoslovakia and 
terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, NoL 343134); 
the evasion of the anti-dumping measures by substituting the dumped product by another product which is interchangesbie 
with the dumped product, though it is not. subject to anti-dumping relief .. This was considered to be an indication of the 
---------~ 
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exporters' intention to maintain their position on the Community market for this category of products, especially because the 
other product was sold at the same price as the dumped product, though its production costs were higher (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1306189 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of light sodium carbonate originating 
in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 1989, No L 13114) ; 
the fact that the dumped import&, subject to anti-dumping measures, had maintained an important market share ; this 
enhanced the fear that, after the expiration of the anti-dumping measures, the dumped imports in question might inerease 
again (Commiseion Recommendation No 267n91ECSC of 9 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
certain angles, ahapee and U, I or H sections of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in 
Spain, O.J., 13 February 1979, NoL 37/21; Commission Recommendation No 294179/ECSC of 13 February 1979 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on certain hematite pig iron originating in Brazil, O.J., 16 February 1979, No L 41129; 
Commiseion Recommendation No 433179/ECSC of 27 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and plates of iron or steel originating in Spain and repealing certain IIUSp8nded anti-dumping duties, O.J., 3 March 
1979, No L 53121 ; Commission Recommendation No 496/79/ECSC of 13 March 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Greece, O.J., 15 March 1979, NoL 65/16; Council Decision 87/66/EEC 
of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil 
and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, No L 34155 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 
19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports 
of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of imports of synthetic polyester fibres 
originating in Mexico and the United Statea of Am.erica, O.J., 22 October 1992, NoL 30611 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 
1993, No L 30/68)) ; 
the fact that import and anti-dumping duties are_ or will he used by the Community against other e:xporting countries, which 
makes it very likely that the export& of the dumping country will he directed towards the Community (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof barium chloride originating in 
the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, NoL 228/28; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 512/84 of 27 February 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of vinyl acetate 
monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 February 1984, NoL 58/17; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685/90 of 17 September 
1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings 
originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 256/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38)) ; 
export subsidies of the dumping country, such as a concessionary financing system or income tax relief for exports, making it 
very likely that the dumped products will he exported to the Community (Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and 
terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, NoL 34/55 (the consideration concerning export subsidies islacking in 
the English version of the Decision, but can he found in the Dutch version)). 
There are also many reasons explaining why the assumption of zero likelibood is not reversed : 
the fact that, on the basis of the traditional distri bution of the exports of the dumping exporters between the Community and 
third markets, no inerease in the volume of the dumped exports to the Community may be predicted (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1786/89 of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures 
concerning imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, confmning the 
expiry of the definitive anti-dumping duties imposed on imports from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive 
anti-dumping duty imposed on imports from the USSR, O.J., 23 June 1989, No L 17611 ; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 
19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, Brazil and Sweden, confmning the expiry of the undertakings given by 
Romanian, Brazilian and certain Swedish exporters, and repealing the undertaking given by another Swedish e:xporter, O.J., 
23 June 1989, No L 176/51 ; Commiuion Decision 90/240/EEC of 22 may 1990 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with 
a review of anti-dumping measures regarding imports of fibre building-board (hardboard) originating in Finland, Argentina, 
Switzerland and Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 861232/EEC accepting the undertakings given by the 
exporters concerned, O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/44) ; 
the fact that the domestic market of the dumping country absorbs an inereasing amount of that country's production and that 
the rest of the output is sold to third countries (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2553193 of 13 September 1993 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in 
Japan and Singapore, O.J., 18 September 1993, NoL 235/3); 
the fact that the dumping exporters could not satisfy their growing dornestic demand, in combination with the fact that, 
following the lifting of price controle by their Government, price inereases on their dornestic market were expected to bring 
production coatandreturn better in line, which probably will result in higher dornestic sales and reduced export possibilities 
(Commiuion Decision No 3692191/ECSC of 12 December 1991 repealing Decision No 2132/88/ECSC imposing definitive anti-
dumping duties on importsof certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 19 December 
1991, No L 350/11 ; Commission Decision No 322/92/ECSC of 7 February 1992 repealing Decision No 3499/87/ECSC imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 12 
February 1992, No L 35/9) ; 
the absence of recent exports to the Community (Commission Decision No 322192/ECSC of 7 February 1992 repealing 
Decision No 3499/87/ECSC imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, 
originating in Mexico, O.J., 12 February 1992, No L 35/9) ; 
the fact that the current volume of exports of the dumping exporters is very low (Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 
September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-dumping measures concerning dense sodium carbonate originating in the 
United Statea of America, O.J.,, 16- October 1990, No L 283138; Council Regulation (EC) No 1318/94 of 6 June 1994 
I 
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terminating the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico and 
repealing the measures applying to such imports, O.J., 8 June 1994, No L 14311) ; 
the fact that the exporter located in the dumping country hadnotbeen eçorting to the Community, notwithstanding hls 
threat to retaliate against the complainant Community producer by eelling huge quantities at very low prices in the 
Community (Commission Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 September 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of mica originating in Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, No L 284/45) ; 
the fact that the dumping exporters do not have the kind of sales structure needeel to increase their sales significantly 
(Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-dumping measures concerning 
dense sodium carbonate originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, NoL 283/38); 
with regard toa multinational company having production plantsin the dumping country, the Community and another third 
country, the fact that its plant in the other third country has a competitive advantage over its plant in the dumping country, 
along with the need to run the Community plant at full capacity to make it profitable (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2553193 
of 13 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 18 September 1993, No L 235/3) ; 
the fact that the increase in demand on the dumping exporters' dornestic market and the growth of the market in third 
countries, in combination with the fact that the prices are higher in third countries than in the Community, reduce the 
possibility of a sharp increase of e:xports to the Community (Commission Decision 90/540/EEC of 29 October 1990 terminating 
the anti-dumping review proceeding concerning imports of propanlol originating in the United. Statea of Ameria, O.J., 6 
November 1990, NoL 306123); 
the fact that the dumping exporters could not satisfy their dornestic demand together with their export demand in non-EEC 
countries, in combination with the positive outlook for both markets and the fact that the prices on the dornestic market of 
the e:xporter are likely to rise (Commission Decision No 1056/89/ECSC of 19 April 1989 terminating the review of anti-
dumping measures concerning imports of certain iron or steel coils, hot-rolled, originating in Argentina and Canada and 
confirming the expiry of those measures, O.J., 25 April 1989, No L 112/5) ; 
the fact that certain aspects of the product& must he adapted in order to switch from one market to another (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour 
telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting detinitively the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, 
NoL 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192)); 
the fact that the dumping country's production is focused on high-cost product& intended for the dornestic market (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping 
measures applicable to imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of 
Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of 
imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statee of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, No 
L 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68)) ; 
the fact that the production capacity is mainly used for the production of a non-like product so that only the spare capacity is 
used for manufacturing the like product, together with the fact that there is a positi ve outlook for exports of the non-like 
product to non-EEC countries (Commission Decision 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of certain seamless tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Austria, O.J., 28 January 1989, No 
L 25/87); 
the importance . attached by the cuetomers of the lik~ product to have their needs met in a constant and regular fashion by 
. their traditional suppliers (Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-
. dumping measures concerning dense sodium carbonate originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 16 October 1990, 
No L 283/38) ; 
the depreciation of the dumping country's currency against the ECU, in conjunction with the Community producers' declining 
sales prices, leading to a situation where exports at the new exchange rate levels left the allegedly dumping producers with 
relatively uncompetitive import prices (Council Regulation (EC) No 1318/94 of 6 June 1994 terminating the review of anti-
dumping measures concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico and repealing the measures applying to 
such imports, O.J., 8 June 1994, No L 14311) ; 
the fact that the dumping country's production is mainly destined fora third country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 
of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to 
imports of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro 
and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of imports of synthetic polyester 
fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statea of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, No L 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 
February 1993, No L 30/68); Council Regulation (EC) No 1318/94 of 6 June 1994 terminating the review of anti-dumping 
measures concerning import& of certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico and repealing the measures applying to such 
imports, O.J., 8 June 1994, No L 143/1) ; 
the existence of afreetrade agreement between the dumping country and a third country, making trade diversion of the 
dumped product towards the market of this third country to he expected (Commission Decision No 1056/89/ECSC of 19 April 
1989 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of certain iron or steel coils, hot-rolled, originating 
in Argentina and Canada and confmning the expiry of those measures, O.J., 25 April 1989, No L 112/5; Commission 
Decision No 3692191/ECSC of 12 December 1991 repealing Decision No 2132/88/ECSC imposing definitive anti-dumping 
duties on importsof certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 19 December 1991, No 
L 350111; Commission Decision No 322/92/ECSC of 7 February 1992 repealing Decision No 3499/87/ECSC imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 12 February 
1992, No L 35/9 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 1318/94 of 6 · June 1994 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures 
concerning importsof certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico and repealing the measures applying to such imports, O.J., 
8 June 1994, No L 14311) ; · . 
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dumping1243• Further, other aspects of the economie factors applied in examinations of actual 
the fact that in the near future the dumped import& originating in a proapective Memher State of the Community will he 
subject to special rules agreed in the Act of AcceBBion (Commission Decision 86/5011ECSC of 11 Nóvember 1986 terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1986, No L 299/18) ; 
in respect of dumping from NME countries, the fact that the export goals of the national plan were not obtained, explaining 
why the plan could not he invoked as proof of threat of injury (CommiBBion Decision 861344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Po land 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43). 
Sometimes, similar reasons entail opposite conclusions. For example : 
trade diversion towards the Community due to trade restrictive measures taken by third countries against the imports of the 
exporting country has been accepted in some cases as proof of threat of injury (CollimiBBion Decision 88/47/EEC of 26 January 
1988 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review proceeding coneerDing imports of a 
herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 30 January 1988, NoL 26/107; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 
1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or 
the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, No L 227124 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2686/90 of 17 September 
1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings 
originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, NoL 25611 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, NoL 7/38); 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium 
permanganate orginating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, NoL 298/32), but has been refused in 
other cases (CommiBBion Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
import& of wire rod originating in Brazil,_ Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1986, No 
L 299/18 ; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of 
Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43; 
CommiBBion Decision 91/303/EEC of 12 June 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of thin 
polyester film originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 June 1991, NoL 151/89); 
the granting of import licences by the Community to the dumping exporter for large quantities, reprasenting a high market 
share on the Community market, wasproof of threat of injury (CommiBBion Recommendation No 1104/82/ECSC of 6 May 
1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 11 
May 1982, No L 12819 ; Commission Recommendation No 2242/82/ECSC of 10 August 1982 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on broad-flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 13 August 1982, No L 238/32), but the fact that the dumped 
import& are subject of quantitative restrictions or quotas is proof of the absence of threat of injury because it puts a ceiling on 
the potential rise of the dumped imports (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, NoL 11/14; Commission 
Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of Portland cement 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, NoL 202/43). 
Therefore, Europaan anti-dumping case law cannot be said to be free of arbitrarineBB. 
1243 Proof of recurrent dumping practices consiste of : 
the fact that there is a history of dumping of the product by a country, which nourishes the fear that this country would 
dump again as soon as it starts to export again to the Community (Commission Decision 88/47/EEC of 26 Jlinuary 1988 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review proceeding coneerDing imports of a herbicide 
originating in Romania, O.J., 30 January 1988, NoL 26/107), especially ü there is proof that the exporters concerned have 
continued dumping (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of light sod.ium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 
May 1989, No L 13114) ; 
the existence of substantial profits on the dornestic market of the dumping exporter which permit him to undercut 
Community prices and to continu to dump exports without risking major losses (Commission Decision 90/378/EEC of 13 July 
1990 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review coneerDing imports of oxalic acid 
originating in Brazil and terminating the investigation, O.J., 17 July 1990, No L 184/16) ; 
the existence of substantial profits of the dumping exporter, on which he can relyin in order to align his prices to the prices 
of other producers or even to undercut them (Commission Decision 89/573/EEC of 30 October 1989 terniinating the 
investigation concerning imports of dicumyl peroxide originating in Taiwan and accepting an undertaking offered in the 
context of the review coneerDing imports of dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 31 
October 1989, NoL 317/49). 
Evidence to the contrary as to recurrent dumping practices consiste of : 
the fact that the export prices of the allegedly dumping exporters exceeded the minimum price established within the 
framework of anti-dumping measures, tagether with the existence of overall shortages on the dornestic market of the dumping 
exporter (Commission Decision 90/86/EEC of 1 March 1990 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures applying to 
import& of certain glase textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovak.ia and the German Demoeratic Republic and 
coninming the expiry of the. said measures, O.J., 8 March 1990, No L 69/45 ; CommiBBion Decision 90/240/EEC of 22 may 
1990 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures regarding import& of fibre building-
board (hardboard) originating in Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 
861232/EEC accepting the undertakings given by the exporters concerned, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/44); 
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injury, to which no attention is paid in examinations of actual injury, are relevant for 
examinations of threat of injury1244• The more (aspects of) factors are taken into account, .the 
easier it will be to find sufficient indications of (no) threat of injury, because there will practically 
always be at least one factor showing (no) threat of injury. Thus, as is the case for examinations 
of actual in jury, examinations of threat of in jury also incorporate the danger of either arbitrariness 
or «one-way flexibility». 
3.5. MATERIAL RETARDATION 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law do not require the Community in dustry to suffer actual 
in jury or to be threatened with in jury. The in jury requirement is also fulfilled, when the 
establisment of a Community industry is being materially retarded (Article VI(l) and (6)(a) 
GA TT ; Note 1 ad Artiele 3 GA TT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3( 1) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). GATI and European anti-dumping law hold no further 
provisions on the material retardation standard. European anti-dumping authorities, thus, have 
much room for discretion, but they have applied the material retardation standard on but rare 
occassions. 
the faet that one exporter maintained a moderate price policy, supporting the presumption that all the exporters would base 
their export prices on their normal value in order to avoid anti-dumping proceedings (Commission Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 
September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-dumping measures coneerDing dense sodium carbonate originating in the 
United Statesof America, O.J., 16 October 1990, NoL 283/38); 
the past pricing behaviour of the producers which has led to prices being kept generally in line with those of Community 
producers, even at the expense of loBB of market share (Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian 
Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94/21). 
1244 
. Such other aspects are : 
with regard to the volume of dumped exports : 
the faet that, despite the anti-dumping measures, the volume of the dumped imparts has increased (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2357/87 of 31 July 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imparts of vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 4 August 1987, No L 213/32) ; 
the faet that, despite anti-dumping measures, the exports of the dumping country to the Community has shown a much 
greater volume increase than its exports to the United Statesof America (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 
21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of paracetamol originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, No L 155/29) ; 
the faet that, with the disappearance of anti-dumping relief, the volume of the dumped imparts would rise again, since 
the dumped imparts had decreased in volume due to anti-dumping measures (Commission Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 
December 1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imparts of oxalic 
acid originating in China or Czechoslovakia and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, NoL 343/34; see 
also : Council Regulation (EEC) No 641191 of 4 March 1991 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, No L 60/1) ; · 
with regard to the market share of the dumped imparts on the Community market : the faet that a stabie market share is no 
proof of absence of threat of injury if the dumped imparts are already subject of anti-dumping measures ( Commission Decision 
90/378/EEC of 13 July 1990 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review concerning imparts 
of oxalic acid originating in Brazil and terminating the investigation, O.J., 17 July 1990, No L 184/16). 
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This might be explained by the fact that a Community industry which is not yet established, will 
only infrequently lodge complaints or that it does not yet have sufficient influence on the 
European anti-dumping authorities to obtain anti-dumping relief. However, the scarse European 
anti-dumping case law shows that both reasoos do notprovide a full explanation. lt is wrong to 
presurne that a Community industry the establishment of which is being materially retarded does 
not exist at all. A restrictive interpretation is indeed . placed on the material retardation standard 
since there must be concrete plans or intentions as to the establishment of a Community industry. 
By analogy with the threat of injury standard, the material retardation standard must be 
determined on the basis of facts and not merely of allegation, conjecture or remote 
possibility1245• Such facts, inter alia, may be the existence of detailed plans on investment, 
production, costs, marketing and strict time schedules with a view to the commercial production 
of the like product in the Community, the availability of funds for the implementation of those 
. plans, the fact that the most ad vaneed technological know-how for the production of the like 
product is acquired, that very costly new facilities are builtand that the state-of-the-art machinery 
is acquired and installed. Also the delay incurred in starting of mass production - which implies 
that mass production is possible - is invoked as proof of material retardation1246• Moreover, 
1245 See : DRAM• from Japan, where the establishment of a Comm.unity induetry, consisting of companies revealing the serioue 
commitment to DRAM production in the Comm.unity, was found to he materially retarded (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known 
as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings oft'ered by certain exporters in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating the investigation in their 
respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, NoL 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, NoL 22/79; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, 
No L 38/44)). 
See also: BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping an.d Anti-Subaidy Law. The European. Communities, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 165 ; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practioe in the United Statea an.d the European 
Communities. A Comparatwe Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,645. 
1246 See : DRAM• from Japan, where mate~ial retardation was found because 110me of the oompanies had made detailed plans on 
investment, production, oosts, marketing and strict timing schedules with a view to commercial DRAM. production in the 
Community. In order to implament these plans huge amounts of funds were available, all these companies had acquired the most 
advanced technological know-how for DRAM production, very oostly new facilities were built and state-of-the art machinery was 
acquired and installed. In respect of the other oompanies also material retardation was found because they had either delayed the 
start of mass production or temporarily abandonned their DRAM project. The fact that all those ooropanies suffered heavy 
financial losses as a result of delayltemporary abandonment of their projects and had either no return on investment at all or a 
smaller return on investm.ent at a later time, together with a negative impact on staft' employm.ent, has been invoked to find that a 
Community induBtry was being materially retarded (Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access 
memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings oft'ered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding ooncerning import& of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No 
L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22/79 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44)). 
Seealso: 
outboard motor• from Japan, where the oomplainants argued that the low prices of Japanase motors above 85 hp prevented 
any production. Their claim of material retardation was rejected because it was not proven that any Comm.unity production 
would start in the foreseeable future. Instead the types of motors above 85 hp were excluded from the scope of the 
investigation (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1500/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of outboard motors originating in Japan, O.J., 10 June 1983, NoL 152/18); 
saccharin. an.d ita aalt• from China, the Republic of Korea an.d the United Stales of America, where the project of a Community 
producer to start up a new plant for the production of the like product was not considered to be a sufficient reason to justify 
anti-dumping relief. It wasnotmade clear why·that project did not qualify. The project may nothave been concrete enough. 
The establishment of a new plant by one of the Comm.unity producers manufacturing already the like product in the 
Comm.unity may also not meet the definition of ccestablishment of a Comm.unity industry» (Commission Decision 831626/EEC 
of 12 December 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding ooncerning import& of saccharin and its salts originating in 
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the fact that the like product is already being manufactured in the Community may seemingly not 
prevent a finding of material retardation 1247. 
The restrictive interpretation placed on the material retardation standard may be a two-edged 
sword. As actual production of the like product in the Community does not constitute an obstacle 
for finding material retardation, the material retardation standard may be used as a substitute for 
the standards of actual injury and threat of injury, if no actual injury nor threat of injury can be 
found. _ Indeed, the European anti-dumping authorities have already threatened to use the material 
retardation of a Community industry as injury standard if they had not found actual injury1248• 
However, because of the broad interpretation placed on both in jury standards, only exceptionally 
no actual injury or threat of injury will be found. As a consequence, there is little need to rely on 
the material retardation standard. 
China, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, O.J., 16 December 1983, No L 362/49) ; 
mechcmical wrï..t-watches from the USSR, where it was claimed that, in view of the revival of the demand for mechanica! 
watches, the repeal of the existing anti-dumping measures would cause a major problem in the event of a Community 
company wanting to start mechanica! watch production. The Council found that the revival indemand was limited to the 
medium and high-quality segment of the market. Given the virtual demise of the Community industry during the period 
when anti-dumping measures were effective, the Council found it unlikely that any new Co:mmunity production would focus 
on the low-quality end of the market where the dumped product was positioned (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2686190 of 17 
September 1990 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-
watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 266/10). In view of this anti-dumping case, it seems that a 
change in the market conditions is no sufficient evidence of the material retardation of a Community industry, especially not 
if its effects on the establishment of a Community induBtry are rather unlikely. 
1247 See : plain. paper photocopiers from Japan, where the Council considered it possible to grant anti-dumping relief because of 
material retardation with regard to the proces& of building up a Community producer's production of low-volume copiers. However, 
a Community indUBtry already existed and the like product category included all types of copiers, with the exception of the highest 
segment of the market, being high-volume copiers. It, thus, comprised low-volume copiers, which were already - though not 
generally - manufactured within the Community (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 64/12). 
See, however : •acchtvin cuu:l ita salta from China, the Republic of Korea cuul the Uniled States of America, where no explanation 
was offered for the project of a Community producer of &tarting up a new plant for the production of the like product not being 
considered to be a sufficient reaeon- to justify anti-dumping relief (Commission Decision 83/626/EEC of 12 December 1983 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of saccharin and its salts originating in China, the Republic of Korea 
and the United States of America, O.J., 16 December 1983, No L 352/49). Perhaps the establishment of a new plant by one of the 
Community producers manufacturing already the like product in the Community does not meet the definition of ccestablishment of 
a Community industry •. 
1248 In plain. paper photocopiers from Japan the Council underscored that if the anti-dumping relief could not have been granted 
for actual injury, it would have been granted for material retardation with regard to the process of building up a Community 
producer's production of }ow-volume copiers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/12). 
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4. CAUSALITY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The injury suffered by the Community industry will only trigger anti-dumping relief if it is caused 
by the dumping (Article 3.5. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(6) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). Injury caused by other factors must not be attributed to the 
dumped imports (Article 3.5. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(7) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). The causality test under GATI and European anti-dumping 
law, thus, camprises two elements : first, dumping must be distinguished from other possible 
injuriou's factors (section 4.2.) and, second, injury must be attributed to either the dumping or the 
other injurious factors (section 4.3.). 
This section will show that it is easy to _ find a causal relationship between dumping and in jury. 
First, ~ dumped-import-s-eom-ing~-from-tlîfferentsourcesaie~, i.e., they are considered 
as a who~ ntial cause of injury, even if th~umpêd imports, when considered 
separately, do not intliet any (material) inJury. -~n enhances the probability of finding 
injurious dumping since it boils down to the addin~ of separate instances of immaterial injury 
which may eventually result in material in jury. ~d, a coincidence in time of the dumping and 
the deterioration in the situation of the Community industry is sufficient proof of there being a 
causal relationship, even if the deterioration in the situation of the Community industry coincides 
also with other factors which may alsohave a negative hearing on the performance of the 
Community industry. 
4.2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN DUMPING AND OTHER CAUSES OF 
IN JURY 
4. 2.1. Cumulation 
Cumulation pertains to the question whether the dumped imports of another exporter located in the 
same country, as well as those from another country must be regarded as «other factors» in the 
sense of Artiele 3.5. GATI Anti-dumping Code, Artiele 3(7) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 
4(1) basic ECSC Decision. If dumped imports of different exporters or from different countries 
are no «other fact9rs», they will constitute o~ ... ~P~tb~,~sa~tentiaLcaJJ.~~q(~~njury and should 
/ . ,~·~,,-~-- -=-- ----
be cumulated/There are t~9--~types·of cumulation : exporter cumulation, i.e., the èûtn~lation of )~mports of differe;t exporters established in the same country, and country_cuÎnulation, 
'· i_.~., the cumulation of dumped imparts from different countries. _ - -- · · · . · -
=----=---~=-=-.....,.._,__ __________ _,._.. ... ______ ------....~-""-~--~ . .._ •-!_,__-k~- 4- --~~ _ _... __ ~ ~- ,__..___ ~- - ----~.;._---- .-~ ,. 
l 
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The following sections examine whether cumulation is mandatory (section 4.2.1.1.) and whether it 
is not applied in an arbitrary way (section 4.2.1.2.). 
4.2.1~1. Cumulation : mandatory or possible ? 
With regard to country cumulation, GA TI anti-dumping law stipulates that the anti-dumping 
authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of imports of a product from more than one 
country and simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations, only if they determine that (a) 
the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de 
minimis and the volume of imports from each country is negligible and (b) a cumulative 
assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in the light of the conditions of competition 
between the imported products and the conditions of competition between the imported products 
and the like Community product (Article 3.3. GATI Anti-dumping Code). 
EC anti-dumping law has transformed this possibility of country cumulation into alegal obligation 
(Article 3(4) basic EC Regulation : «the effects of such imports shall be cumulatively assessed»). 
ECSC anti-dumping legislation, however, does not (explicitly) regulate country cumulation. 
According to the Court of Justice, country cumulation is «in principle necessary» under ECSC 
anti-dumping1249• Hence, country cumulation will not be always necessary. The Court 
justified country cumulation by referring to the objectives of European anti-dumping law1250• 
In European anti-dumping law, no objective can be found that is connected with cumulation, 
y r~~/::::::h~!:~::·7~~::b::n::~::~::g~;~:~~::t;~~~:!d~s~-::!~u:~:~ 
~1~used,by the dumping increases, since the. cumulation of many instances of immateriat."l'njury eventually constitutes material in jury. This objective may very well have been envisaged by \the Court since Advocate-General Sir Gordon SL YNN has held that the object of European ahti-dUQl~ing law, i.e., the proteetion against dumping, can only be reached by the cumula~o6 of 
~--
1249 C.J.E.C., joined cases 294/86 ~d 77/87, 6 October 1988, Technointorg v Commis•ion and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6116; 
C.J.E.C., joined cases C-320/86 and C-188/87, 11 July 1990, Stanlr.o France v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3013), 
3016; C.J.E.C., case C-167/87, 11 July 1990, Electroimpex a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3021), 3023. See also: Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 660193 of 6 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of bicycles originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 68/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 October 1993 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's 
Republic of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4. 
1250 In respect of country cumwation the Court etated that: 
telt should also he borne in mind that where ( ... ) the dumped imports come from different countries, it is in principle 
necessary to assess the combined effects of such imports. It is consistent with the objectives of (basic EC legislation) 
that Community authorities should be able to examine the effect on Community industry of all such ·imports and 
consequently take appropriate action against all exporters, even if the volume of each individual exporter's exports is 
relatively small• 
(C.J.E.C., joined cases 294/86 and 77/87, 6 October 1988, Technointorg v Commi .. ion an.d Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6116). 
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exports coming from different countries1251• Also, the European anti-dumping authorities 
characterize individu-al injury determination as rendering European anti-dumping law 
unworkable1252• However, in view of it being rooted in GA TI, the finding of as much as 
possible injurious dumping should not be an objective of European anti-dumping law. Indeed, the 
more injuJiollS...dumping-""-is4au-nd-,the-more=an-ti_..dumping_..t:elief..wilL~gnmted and, consequently, 
-----~------
/tlîêlitore restricted free trade will be, _which is exactly the opposite of the OB]ecti:v~ .. of 
(iArrl~-----~-----------~----~-~--~-------"~-~---~~---------~~~~----~-~-~ 
If the finding of a maximum of injurious dumping would be an objective of European anti-
dumping law, the question would erop up why European anti-dumping law requires the in jury 
caused by the dumping to be material. Without that requirement, the objective of finding a 
maximum of injurious dumping would be met more readily, since small volumes of dumped 
exports will practically always cause some injury. Moreover, unlike cumulation (i.e., exporter 
cumulation1254 as well as country cumulation), it would not have a discriminatory effect, since 
the result of the injury examination _would not depend on there being dumped imports of other 
exporters or from other countries. Under the prevailing legal provisions, however, dumping 
e porters wh~-- .. 4~t.JlPt~.cause~-mateFial ... injury ."hy. ... lbemselv,es.~--because .. -of=rih~ir:~~mall,~olume __ nf ... 
__ ç,xpertsc"to-·the Community, will suffer disfortune, when dumping from other sourees is found and . -
,/ . when all dumped imports are cumulated. Then, indeed, the probability that their i~~_li&...wilt·~ 
hel · ble-for causing ort at I~!,~ contributing_JQ.Jh.Lini\leriaLinJury--in~ès:=~ If, however, 
there is no dumping from other sourees and cumulation, therefore, is impossible, the dumping 
exporters exporting a small volume to the Community will not be found to cause material injury. 
1251 C.J.E.C.,joined cases 294/86 and 77/87,5 October 1988, Technoi~rg v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6104. 
1252 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sarial-
impact dot-matriX printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 
19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong 
Kong, collecting defmitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video 
tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, NoL 174/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 
February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, 
originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 3418. 
1253 Supra, 68-76. 
1254 European anti-dumping case law admits, that merely through exporter cumulation, dumped imports may he found to cause 
material injury. 8ee: proptm-1-ol from the Uniled States of America, where it wu argued that it is appropriate to cumulate the 
factors of injury caused by se ver al exporters from one particwar exporting country, since the possible non-application of an anti-
dumping maasure to one exporter would grant the other exporters of the same country a competitive disadavantage for the futura, 
which is not the object of an anti-dumping proceeding (Commission Decision 841229/EEC of 13 April 1984 accepting unde~ak.ings 
given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof propan-l-ol (propyl alcohol) originating in the United 
Statas of America, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 19 April1984, NoL 106/55). 
See also : ferrochromium from Sweden, where it was noted that «the export& of the (Swedish) producer in question, even ü they had 
no major impact by themselves, when taken into conjunction withother export& by South African and Swedish exporters have 
contributed to material injury• (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1682178 of 17 July 1978 extending the provisional anti-dumping 
duty on ferrochromium originating in Sweden, O.J., 18 ,July 1978, No L 193114. See also : Council Regulation (EEC) No 2357/87 of 
31 July 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of vinyl acetata monomer 
originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1987, NoL 213/32). 
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The discrimination between dumping exporters is all the worse, because, in some exceptional 
cases125S, dumped i.:nports have been excluded from the cumulation in partienlar and . the 
injury finding in genera!, as by themselves they did not cause injury to the Community 
industry1256. In most cases, however, the fact that dumped imports themselves did not cause 
material injury was no reason for not cumulating them with other dumped imports1257. The 
1255 Colllrtl: magnetic disles (3,5" microdislcs) jrom Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of Oaina, where the European anti-dumping 
authorities recalled that «it bas been the consistent practicc of thc Community institutions, uphcld by tbc European Court of Justice, to examinc tbc 
effect of tbc dumped import& u a whole, cxcept whcre thc level of dumpcd importa from a givcn country is negligible or otherwise does not 
contributc to tbc injury (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 impoaing a dcfinitivc anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio 
magnctic disks (3,S" microdisb) originating in Japan, Taiwan and thc People's Repoblie of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty 
imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4). 
1256 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 171/82 of 25 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic 
acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19/26 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No 
L 34/11) ; Commission Decision 82/335/EEC of 18 May 1982 accepting an undertaking oft'ered by the Czechoslovakian producer and 
ter.m.inating the anti-dumping procedure concerning oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Germ.an 
Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 May 1982, No L 148/51; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633182 of 23 June 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission 
Decision No 80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre 
building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and ter.m.inating the 
proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, NoL 181/19; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 
December 1993 imposing am.ended anti-dumping mea8ures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 
19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-ailico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, 
Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15. 
See also: syntheti.c polyester fibres from Roman.ia, Taiwan., Turke;y, the Republics of Serbia an.d of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Ma.cedonia, Mexico an.d the United Statea of America, where it waa investigated whether each dumping country's 
exports were causing or threatening to cause injury. If they did not, they were not cumulated with the other dumped exports and 
the anti-dumping proceeding Wl18 terminated in their respect (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying 
the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-dumping meaaures applicable to imports of synthetic polyester fibres 
originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the form.er Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of importsof synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United 
Statas of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, No L 306/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68)). 
1257 Several anti-dumping cases recognize that a contributioli to the material injury caused by other dumped imports is sufficient 
to find dumping exporters causing injury, even ü their niere imports do not cause material injury : 
in ferrochromium from Bweden it was noted that «the exports of the (Swedish) producer in question, even ü they had no m&jor 
impact by themselves, when taken into conjunction with other exports by South African and Swedish exporters have 
contributed to material injury» (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1682!78 of 17 July 1978 extending the provisional anti-
dumping duty on ferrochromium originating in Sweden, O.J., 18 July 1978, NoL 193114); 
in ball hearings an.d tapered roller bearings from Polan.d, Roman.ia an.d the Boviet Union it was stated that cc{a)s a rule, 
significant il\iury which has already been established would be aggravated ü compounded by additional specific, even ü leu 
significant, i..JVury from dumped goods from another exporting country• (Com.mission Decision 86/100/EEC of 15 April 1986 
term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ball hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in 
Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 18 April 1986, No L 102/31) ; 
in aerial-impact dot-matrix printera from Japan. it was accepted that «dumped exports, which, looked at in isolation, did not 
cause material injury, would fall outside any anti-dumping proceeding, while their cumulative effect might well have 
considerable i..JVurious effect&» (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of sarial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in .Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33) ; 
in stcuulcu-dized multj..phase electric motora from Roman.ia it was even sufficient that the Romanian imports threatened to 
increase the elristing material injury caused by dumped imports originating in other third countries (Commission Decision 
87/215/EEC of 23 March 1987 accepting a price undertaking in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, 
originating in Romania, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 83153). 
See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain deep freezen originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the Ger.m.an Demoeratic Republic anci ter.m.inating the investigation, and term.inating 
the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14; Commission Decision 
86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof 
silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and term.inating the investigation 
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latter is all the more striking because sometimes the cumulation of dumpe<t imports bas been 
regarding imports of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287125 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864187 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0, 75 kW but not more than 76 
kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary~ Poland and the Soviet Union, and 
defmitively collecting the am.ounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 83/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 1043/87 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors 
having an output of more than 0,76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, No L 102/6; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating 
in Libya and Baudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 
7 November 1987, No L 317/1 ; Commission Regulation -(EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 161139 
. (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, NoL 152/68); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No 
L 205/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115191 of 29 April 1991 imposing 
defmitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of ferro-silicon origina-
ting in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 11111 ; Commission Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting undertakings offered by 
certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil 
and terminating the investigation as regards those exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 111147; Council Regulation (EEC) No 729192 
of 16 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain thermal paper originating in Japan and 
defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 26 March 1992, No L 8111 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 May 1992, No 
L 138/40)). 
The following anti-dumping cases are even worse : 
aluminium foil from Auatria, the German. Democratie Republic, Hungary cuullsrael, where, after that it had been established 
that the imports from each country taken in isolation did not cause material injury, it was added that even if cumulated they 
did not cause material injury ; thus, cumwation was taken into consideration though the imports taken in isolation did not 
cause, much less contribute to the injury suffered by the Community indUBtry (Commission Decision 82/808/EEC of 25 
November 1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of aluminium foil for household and catering use 
originating in Austria, the German Democratic.Republic, Hungary and lsrael, O.J., 1 December 1982, No L 339/58) ; 
binder an.cl baler twine from Brazil an.cl Mexico, where the Brazilian and Mexican exports were cumulated, though alterwarde 
the Meiican export& were not held to cali&e material injury in view of their decreaeed market share; thus, the injury 
attributed to the Brazilian exports was determined on the basis of a cumulation with exports which did not cause injury 
(Council Decision 87166/EEC.of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with importsof binder and haler 
twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 6 February 1987, NoL 34/56). 
Moreover, one may gain the impression that cumulation is precisely used in order to he able to attribute injury to dumped import& 
which do not cause injury by themselves : 
in the decision concerning sacch.arin. cuul its salts from China an.d the Uniled Stales of America, the dumped imports from 
China and the United Statea of America were not cumulated with the dumped imports from the Republic of Korea, though in 
a decision taken the same day concerning saccharin an.cl its salts from the Republic of Korea, all these imports were 
cumulated. The dichotomy in the saccharin-case is undoubtedly due to the fact that the Korean imports represented only 
1.1 % of the British market, whereas the Chinese and American import& had respectively a market share of 22.1 and 6.2 % 
on the British market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3171180 of 4 December 1980 repealing a national anti-dumping duty 
on saccharin and its salts originating in the Republic of Korea imposed under the transitional provisions of the Act of 
Accession, O.J., 9 December 1980, No L 331/26 ; Commission Decision 80/1116/EEC of 4 December 1980 accepting 
undertakings ofl'ered by the exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the United Statea of America and 
terminating the proceedings concerning import& of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the United Statea of 
America, O.J., 9 December 1980, No L 331141) ; 
in the decision concerning stan.dardized multj.ph.ase electric motors from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German. Democratie 
Republic, Hungary, Polan.d an.cl the Boviet Union, the dumped import& from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union were not cumulated with the dumped import& from Romania, 
though in a decision taken the same day concerning stan.dardized multj.phcue electric motors from Roman.ia, all these import& 
were cumulated (Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,76 kW but notmore than 76 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively 
collecting the amounts secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1 ; Commission Decision 87/216/EEC of 23 
March 1987 accepting a price undertaking in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in 
Romania, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 83163). 
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motivated by the fact that they all caused by themselves material injury1258• 
Notwithstanding the discriminatory effects of cumulation in European anti-dumping case law, it 
bas been argued that the principle of non-discrimination contained in Artiele 9.2. GATI Anti-
dumping Code, Artiele 9(5) basic EC Regulation and in Artiele 13(5) basic ECSC Decision makes 
cumulation (i.e. , country cumulation as well as exporter cumulation) mandatory1259• 
According to those Articles, anti-dumping duties must be imposed on all dumped imports on a 
non-discriminatory basis, even if they originate in more than one country. Those articles, 
however, relate only to the imposition of anti-dumping duties. They have no impact on the in jury 
examination in general and on the question of cumulation in particular. They only confine the 
non-discriminatory imposition of anti-dumping duties to dumped imports insofar as they are found 
to cause in jury. Moreover, both articles only pertain to imports from different countries and, 
therefore, do notprovide a basis for exporter cumulation. 
Even the general principle of non-discrimination is no ground for cumulation. lndeed, cumulation 
implies that all dumped imports, even if they are not identical (e.g., by volume), are treated 
equally, whereas the principle of non-discrimination implies that equals are treated equally and 
1258 Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/86 of 14 January 1985 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1986, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, No L 20/46); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/86 of 12 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of roller ebains 
for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1986, NoL 217n. 
1259 BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr uon. Dumping un.d Subuen.tion.en. durch die Europäi.sche Gemein.schaften., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1980, 95. 8ee however: BESELER, J:F., and wnLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and An.ti-Subsidy Law. The European. 
Commun.ities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 162-163. See also : CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 595/86 of 7 March 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1986, No · 
L 68/13 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating 
the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14; Commission Decision 
86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
imports of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 23 
September 1986, No L 271126 ; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey 
and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272/29; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 
September 1986 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase eleetric motors having an output 
of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in BUlgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68; CommiBBion Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in 
the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that 
product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 
1986, NoL 287125; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively colleeting the 
amounts secured u provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2357/87 of 31 July 1987 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of vinyl acetate monomer originating 
in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1987, NoL 213/32; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of photo albums originating in South Korea 
and HongKong, and terminating the investigation, O.J.., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48; CommiBBion Decision 91/512/EEC of 25 July 
1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of artificial 
corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating 
the investigation, O.J.., 2 October 1991, NoL 275/27. 
517 
unequals unequally1260• Nevertheless, the general principle of non-discrimination does not 
exclude cumulation. 
GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, at first sight, seem to preclude those discriminatory effects. 
They allow, respectively impose country cumulation if the dumping margin is more than de 
minimis and if the volume of imports is not negligible (Article 3.3. GATT Anti-dumping Code; 
Artiele 3(4) basic EC Regulation). ·As de minimis dumping margins and negligible volume of 
imports are assumed not to cause in jury, GA TI and EC anti-dumping law aim at preventing 
imports which are assumed not to cause injury, from being cumulated with other imports and, 
thus, from being held to cause in jury. This is a step into the right direction, but it does not 
preetude that imports made in not negligible quantities or with a more than de minimis dumping 
margin, are found to cause injury when cumulated with other imports, though individually they do 
no cause any (material) in jury. Moreover, whereas de minimis dumping margins are defined for 
each country separately (i.e., less than 2 % ( Artiele 5.8. 1994 GATT Anti-dumping Code ; 
Artiele 9(3) basic EC Regulation)), negligible imports are not. Under GA TT anti-dumping law, 
negligible imports are defined as imports accounting for less than 3 % of imports of the like 
product in the Community, unless countries which individually account for less than 3 % of the 
imports of the like product in the Community collectively account for more than 7 % of imports 
of the like product in the Community (Article 5.8. GATT Anti-dumping Code). Similarly, under 
EC anti-dumping law, imports of a particular country are considered to be negligible if they 
represent a market share of below 1 %, unless such countries collectively account for 3 %, or 
more, of Community consumption (Article 5(7) basic EC Regulation). Both GATT and EC anti-
dumping law are trapped in a petitio principii : negligible imports are not cumulated, but, through 
cumulation, they may beoome not negligible. Thus, they allow cumulation of negligible import 
volumes if their cumulation results in an import volume which is considered not to be negligible. 
It is, however, difficult to grasp why negligible import volumes are not assumed to eau se in jury if 
there are no other imports or if the other imports represent a more than negligible volume, 
whereas the same import volumes are assumed to cause injury if there is a sufficient number of 
negligible imports coming from other countries and resulting in a non-negligible cumulated import 
volume. 
With regard to exporter cumulation, GA TT and EC anti-dumping law may give rise to divergent 
interpretations. As they regulate country cumulation, but do notdeal with exporter cumulation, it 
rnay be argued that they do not allow ex porter cumulation. However, it may also be argued that, 
if, as under GATT anti-dumping law, country cumulation is allowed, exporter cumulation is a 
fortiori permitted ; and, similarly, that if, as under EC anti-dumping, country cumulation is 
1260 VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law cuul Practice in.. the. Un.ited Statea cuul the European Commun.ities. A Comparative 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,652-653. 
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mandatory, exporter cumulation is equally obligatory. The latter interpretation will probably be 
up held. 
Indeed, with regard to ECSC anti-dumping law, which is also silent as to exporter cumulation, the 
Court of Justice held that «(i)t is clear from Artiele 4 (former basic EC Regulation and present 
basic ECSC Decision)» that exporter cumulation is mandatory1261• No further explanation is 
provided by the Court. It is hard to see why the Courtrefers to Artiele 4 basic ECSC Decision. 
First, the provision of Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision, holding that the injury caused by other 
factors, such as the volume and prices of non-dumped imports, must not be attributed to the 
dumped imports, can only mean that non-dumped imports must not be cumulated with dumped 
imports1262• It would require a far-fetched interpretation for ·it to be also the basis for 
1261 . In respect of ecexporter cumulatlOD.Jt the Court stated that : 
«(i)t is clear from Artiele 4 (former basic EC Regulation (and present basic ECSC Decision)) that the injury eaueed to an 
established Community industry by dumped imports must be assessed as a whole, and it is not necessary (or, indeed, 
possible) to define separately the share in such injury which is attributable to each of the companies responsible» 
(C.J.E.C., case 255/84, 77 May 1987, Nachi Fuji.Jeosh.i Compan.y v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1987, (1861), 1895). 
The Europaan anti-dumping authorities have also held that cc(i)njury must be assessed on an overall basis. It is, accordingly, 
neither neceBBary nor possible to identify the proportion of injury attributable to each exporter involved» (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind 
used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 
729/92 of 16 March 1992 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain thermal paper originating in Japan and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 26 March 1992, No L 81/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 May 1992, No 
L 138/40) ; . Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acceu memories) originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, NoL 272/13; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12). 
1262 See : pentDerythritol from Canada, where cumwation with imports from third countries was refused because no Community 
producer had lodged an anti-dumping complaint and because the Commission had not opened anti-dumping proceedings against 
these other countries on its own initiative (Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 
January 1985, No L 20/46)). 
However, in saveral anti-dumping cases non-dumped imports have been cumulated with dumped imports: 
in the Commiuion'e decision of 7 March 1978 coneerDing Ieraft liner paper an.d boCJI'd from th.e United Stales of America, the 
American import& were cumulated with the imports ofthe Boviet Union (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 51l.f78 of 7 March 
1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and board originating in the United Statesof America, 
O.J., 11 March 1978, NoL 6919), though the notice of initiatio"n of the anti-dumping proceeding against Boviet import& dated 
from 3 May 1978 (O.J., 3 May 1978, No C 105/5) ; 
dumped imports have been cumulated with non-dumped imports from third countries subject to defensive measures in the 
Community or oovered by steel arrangement& concluded with the ECSC (Commission Recommendation No 790n8/ECSC of 19 
April 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in South Korea, O.J., 20 
April 1978, No L 106121 ; Commission Recommendation No 81ln8/ECSC of 21 April 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on certain aheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, 
O.J., 22 April 1978, NoL 108/26; Commission Recommendation No 93ln8/ECSC of 28 April1978 providing for suspension 
of provisional anti-dumping duties established in relation to imports of steel product& originating in Spain, O.J., 4 May 1978, 
NoL 1201'21; Commission Recommendation No 1006/78/ECSC of 18 May 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain galvanized sheets and plates originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 19 · May 1978, No L 13118 ; 
Commiuion Reoommendation No 1704/78/ECSC of 19 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets 
and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 July 1978, No L 196117; 
Commission Reoommendation No 1715n8/ECSC of 20 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
galvanized sheets and plates originating in Japan, O.J., 22 July 1978, No L 198/1; Commission Recommendation No 
175Bn81ECSC of 26 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and sections of iron or steel, 
originating in Spain, O.J., 27 July 1978, No L 203128; Commiuion Recommendation No 496n9/ECSC of 13 March 1979 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Greece, O.J., 15 March 1979, No 
L 65/16); . 
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mandatory exporter cumulation, namely that it is not specified in Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC 
Decision that the concept «dumped importS» must be interpreted as imports coming from the same 
exporter (or country1263) ; by means of that interpretation, the wording «dumped imports», 
however, is divorced from its context which opposes the dumped imports to the other factors 
possibly causing in jury to the Community industry. Second, the Court might have wanted to refer 
to the wording «the Community producers as a whole» in Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision ; for 
the Court found that «(i)t (was) clear from Artiele 4 (former basic EC Regulation and present 
. basic ECSC Decision) that the injury caused to an established Community industry by dumped 
imports must be assessed as a whole». However, Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision bas nothing to 
do with the causality test, nor with the definition of the cause of the injury. It only provides a 
defmition of. the injured party. The only thing which can rightfully be said about exporter 
cumulation (as well as about country cumulation) under ECSC anti-dumping law is that ECSC 
anti-dumping law does not deal with the question of cumulation. Consequently, it does not 
impose it nor does it prohibit it1264• Therefore, cumulation is only a possibility under ECSC 
anti-dumping law1265• Of course, . no arbitrary use should be made of that possibility, nor 
should its application result in unlawful discrimination. 
4.2.1.2. Cumulation arbitrary or discriminatory ? 
In order to assess the degree of arbitrariness in European anti-dumping case law on cumulation, it 
must be investigated whether the European anti-dumping authorities consistently apply the simple 
dumped import& have been cumulated with non-dumped imports from third countries of which its was notmade elear whether 
they were subject to trade policy measures (Commission Recommendation No 496n9/ECSC of 13 March 1979 imposing a 
provisional mti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Greece, O.J., 15 March 1979, No L 65/16); 
strikingly, in the same anti-dumping proceeding no cumwation was made with imports from another country against which 
anti-dumping relief had been granted (O.J., 11 May 1978, No C 110/8). · 
1263 In European anti-dumping case law, Artiele 4(1) former basic EC Regulation (and present basic ECSC Decision) has, indeed, 
been invoked as a basis for country cumulation. See: stcuulardized multi-ph.CJBe electric motors from Bulgarit4 Czech.oslovakit4 the 
German. Democratie Republic, Hungary1 Poland an.d th.e Boviet Un.ion., where the European anti-dumping authorities cumulated the 
dumped import& from all the countries under investigation because Artiele 4(1) former basic EC Regulation (and present basic EC 
Decision) ccexpressely provides that 'dumped import&' must be considered for the determination of il\iury" (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having 
an output of more than 0,76 kW but notmore than 76 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 
March 1987, NoL 83/1). In this instance, the words ccdumped imports» are divorced from their context. In fact, thei are used as 
against the words ecimports which are not dumpecL• in order to make clear that the il\iury caused by non-dumped imports must not 
be attributed to the dumping (see : supra, 518-519). 
1264 It may be agreed with European anti-dumping authorities that Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision cannot be intel-preted in 
such a narrow liiEmse that it imposes to assen the il\iurious effects of the &ales of each exporter, taken in isolation (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33). 
1265 VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law an.d Practice in. th.e Un.ited Statea an.d th.e European. Commun.ities. A Comparatiue 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 577-578. See also: Commission Decision 84/229/EEC of 13 April 1984 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of propan-l-ol (propyl alcohol) originating 
in the United States of America, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 19 April 1984, No L 106/55. 
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rules on cumulation. As tbe Court of Justice bas held tbat exporter cumulation is 
mandatory1266, exporter cumulation must simply be carried out without any explanation wby. 
Derogations are apparently excluded. Nevertbeless, exporter cumulation bas not been applied 
either because of differences in the pbysical cbaracteristics of the dumped product of tbe various 
exporters and because of there not being any competition between the product of some of tbose 
exporters and the product of the Community producers and the other dumping exporters1267. 
Here, the non-application of exporter cumulation seems warranted since the products do not 
belong to the same product market and, tbus, there is no opportunity for anti-competitive 
cooperation between the dumping exporters. However, in other cases, no exporter cumulation is 
applied for the mere reason that the different exporters established in the same country are subject 
to. different anti-dumping proceedings1268• That argument fails to convince because exporter 
cumulation1269, as well as country cumulation1270 are made in respect of imports subject 
to different proceedings. 
1266 According to the Council in compact disc players from Japan cmd the Republic of Korea, the case law of the Court of Justice 
does not jeopardize Europaan anti-dumping case law. For it considered that : 
.&veral Korean exporters continued to claim that the effects of Korean export& should not be considered cumulatively 
with the · effects of the Japanase export&. Since the Korean and Japanase CDPs compete with each other and with the 
Community production and since the volume and market shares of Korean export& are not negligible ( ... ), the Council 
confirma the Commission's conclusions on this issue. 
Saveral exporters continued to claim that the Commission failed to show the specific Ïl\jurious effect of dumped imports 
of the individual exporters. However, the Council cannot accept these argument&. In accordance with its position in 
previous cases and with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the Council conaiders that the injurious effects of the 
dumped importsof individual exporters concerned have to he assessed together» 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact 
disc players ori8inating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, 
NoL 13121). 
1267 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impor1B of synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originatiog in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151/47. 
1268 The anti-dumping proceeding against chemical fertilizer from the United State• of America was split in two : one proceeding 
against five American exporters of chemical fertilizer (Commission RegulB.tion (EEC) No 290/83 of 2 February 1983 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea ammonium nitrate salution fertilizer originating in the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 4 February 1983, No L 3319) and one against the other American exporters (Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/83 of 17 
January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 19 January 1983, NoL 15/1). Though they go back to the same period, in none of these two proceedings the importsof all the 
American exporten have been cumulated (with the exception of a cumulated market ahare which was recorded, as well as the 
individual market share of each of the five exporters subjected to the f~rst proceeding). Only in the second proceeding explicit 
raferenee was made to the f~rst proceeding and, consequently, it was underscored that the impact of the dumped import& of the 
companies concerned bas been isolated from that of the ( ... ) exports subject to the above review investigation, because the anti-
dumping proceeding was divided in two. 
1269 See : electronic typewriters from Japan, where a review proceeding was initiated against only one Japanese exporter, but the 
Ïl\jury determination completely copied the Ïl\jury findings made with regard to all the dumped imports from Japan, allowance 
being made for the increase in the Japanese exports to the Community eaueed by a change in the circumstances of the Japanese 
producer concerned (Commission Decision 86/490/EEC of 30 September 1986 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan manufactured by Tokyo Juki InduBtrial 
Co Ltd/JDK Corporation, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 4 October 1986, NoL 283125). 
1270 lnfra, 521-524. 
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Since, under ECSC anti-dumping law, country cumulation is in principle necessary, its 
renouncement must be explained, as is the case for its application when there are objections raised 
against it1271. Apparently, ECSC anti-dumping seems to apply the same approach as EC anti-
dumping law, which imposes country cumulation · provided that a number of conditions are 
fulfilled1272. 
A frrst condition of GA TI and EC anti-dumping law is that the imports coming from more than 
one country are simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations (Article 3.3. GAIT Anti-
dumping Code; Artiele 3(4) basic EC Regulation). Therefore, it might be argued that they do 
not allow country cumulation of imports subject to different anti-dumping proceedings1273. 
However, it might also be argued that they do not prevent cumulation of imports coming from 
countries subject to different anti-dumping proceedings, provided that the anti-dumping 
investigations are carried out simultaneously. Thus, it seems that GA TI and EC anti-dumping 
law will not provide more clarity than European anti-dumping case law. Indeed, in several cases, 
country-cumulation bas been made in respect of imports subject to different proceedings1274, 
1271 C.J.E.C.,joined cases 294/86 and 77/87, 5 October 1988, Technointerg v CommiBsion an.d Council, E.C.R., 1988, (6077), 6116. 
1272 VAN BAEL, I., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping an.d other Trade Proteetion Laws ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 
1990, 138 i VERMULST, EA., Antidumping Lc&w an.d Practice in the United States an.d the European. Communities. A Comparative 
An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,654. 
Only since 1983, dumped imports originating in different countries are not cumulated automatically. Originally, the European 
anti-dumping authorities simply cumulated dumped import& without providing any explanation for it. This may ereate the 
impreBBion that dumped import& were automatically cumwated, except sametimes for the application of a de minimis rwe with 
regard to a very 8111all volume of dumped imports which were considered not to ca\lse any injury (see : VERMULST, EA., 
An.tidumping Lc&w an.d Practice in the United Stales an.d the European. Communities. A Camparalive Analysis, Amsterdam, Norlh-
Holland, 1987, 654). The fact that the judgement of the Court of Justice about country cumwation dates from 1987 doesnotalter 
the conclUBion that original case law is illegal since this judgement is basedon the objectives of European anti-dumping law, in. 
particwar its workability (supra, 512-513), which have not changed since the enactment of European anti-dumping law in 1968. 
1273 WAER, P., and VERMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round. A New Lease of Life ?», Joumal of 
World Trade, 199412, (S), 15. 
1274 Commission Recomm.endation No 160n8/ECSC of 27 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania and Spain, O.J., 28 January 1978, No 
L 23/33 i CommiBBion Recomm.endation No 161n8/ECSC of 27 January 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets· and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Japan, O.J., 28 January 1978, No L 23135 i Commission Recommendation No 
245n8/ECSC of 2 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of iron or steel coils for re-rolling 
originating in Japan and Bwgaria, O.J., 7 February 1978, No L 37/13 i CommiBBion Recomm.endation No 262n8/ECSC of 7 
February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Poland, O • .T~, 
9 February 1978, No L 39/13 i CommiBBion Recommendation No 263n8/ECSC of 7 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and sections, of iron or steel, not further worked than hot-rolled or extruded, originating in 
Japan, 0 . .1., 9 February 1978, No L 39/16 i CommÎBBion Recommendation No 307n8/ECSC of 14 February 1978 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Australia, 0 . .1., 16 February 1978, No 
L 45/17 i Commission Recomm.endation No 359n8/ECSC of 20 February 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
galvanized sheets and plates originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, O.J., 22 February 1978, No L 50113; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 511178 of 7 March 1978 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and board 
originating in the United States of America, O.J., 11 March 1978, No L 6919 i CommiBBion Recommendation No 790n8/ECSC of 19 
April1978 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in South Korea, O.J., 20 April 
1978, No L 106/21 ; Commission Recommendation No 811178/ECSC of 21 April 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 22 April 
1978, No L 108126 ; CommiBBion Recommendation No 931n8/ECSC of 28 April 1978 providing for suspension of provisional anti-
dumping duties eatablished in relation to imports of steel product& originating in Spain, O.J., 4 May 1978, No L 120121; 
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Commission Recommendation No 1006178/ECSC of 18 May 1978 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on certain galvanized. 
sheets and plates originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 19 May 1978, No L 13118 ; Commission Recommendation 
No 1704/78/ECSC of 19 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating 
in Czechoslovakia, Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 July 1978, NoL 195/17; Commiuion Recommendation No 1715n8/ECSC of 
20 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain galvanized sheets and plates originating in Japan, O.J., 22 July 
1978, No L 19811 ; Commission Recommendation No 175Bn8/ECSC of 26 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain angles, ahapea and sections of iron or steel, originating in Spain, O.,J., 27 July 1978, No L 203/28; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2133178 of 8 September 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on kraft liner paper and board originating in the 
United Statea of America, O.,J., 9 September 1978, NoL 2471'22; Commission Recommendation No 496/79/ECSC of 13 March 1979 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Greece, O.J., 15 March 1979, No 
L 65/16 ; Commiseion Regulation (EEC) No 3171180 of 4 December 1980 repaaiing a national anti-dumping duty on saccharin and 
its salts originating in the Republic of Korea imposed under the transitional provisions of the Act of Accession, O.J., 9 December 
1980, No L 331126 ; Commission Decision 83175/EEC of 15 February 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain fibre building board originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 February 1983, No 
L 47/30; Comm.iBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1479/83 of 7 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of copper 
sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 9 June 1983, No L.151124; Commission Decision 84/407/EEC of 10 
August 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain kraft 
liner paper and board originating in Spain and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 August 1984, No L 224/30; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2681184 of 18 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of pentaerythritol 
originating in Canada and accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
pentaerythritol originating in Sweden and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 22 September 1984, No L 25415; Commission 
Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 
23 September 1986, NoL 271126; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, 
Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding import& of that product originating in the People's Republic of 
China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 287/25; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric 
motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, No 
L 102/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-
silicon originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings offered by Italmagnesio SA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-lmport of the 
USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, NoL 219/24; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 
August 1988, NoL 235/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 450/89 of 20 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof urea originating in the United Statee of America or Venezuela and adjusting the definitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi 
Arabia laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 24 February 1989, No L 52/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1786/89 of 19 
June 1989 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building 
board (hardboard) originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, conf1rming the expiry of the definitive anti-dumping duties 
imposed on import& from Czechoslovakia and Poland, and repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on imports from the 
USSR, O.J., 23 June 1989, No L 176/1; Commission Decision 89/377/EEC of 19 June 1989 terminating the proceeding in·· 
conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, 
Brazil and Sweden, confirming the expiry of the undertakings given by Romanian, Brazilian and certain Swedish exporters, and 
repealing the undertaking given by another Swedish exporter, O.J., 23 June 1989, NoL 176/51; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1537/90 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, 
O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 14519; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115191 of 29 April1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in 
conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning importsof ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, O.J., ,3 May 1991, 
NoL 11111; COmmission Decision 911240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion 
with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and terminating the investigati-
on as regarde those exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 111147. 
However, country cumwation between different proceedings is not always applied, see: Commission Decision 80/875/EEC of 17 
September 1980 accepting undertakings given by Romanian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
importsof certain tubes of iron or steel originating in that country, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 20 September 1980, No 
L 249/24 (corrigendum, O.,J., 7 October 1980, No L 26318); Commission Decision 80/1116/EEC of 4 December 1980 accepting 
undertakings offered by the exporters of saccharin and its salts originating in China and the U:nited Statea of America and 
terminating the proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the United States of America, 
O.J., 9 December 1980, NoL 331141; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
191180 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and the Boviet 
Union, O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 294/3 ; Commission Decision 83/522/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the undertaking given 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importsof lithium hydroxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 294/29; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 512/84 of 27 
February 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of vinyl acetata monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 
February 1984, No L 58/17 ; Commission Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of copper sulphate originating in Yugoalavia and terminating the proceeding, O.,J., 11 
August 1984, NoL 215/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2553184 of 4 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, accepting an undertaking offered by the exporter in the German Demoeratic 
Republic of oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding regarding imports of oxalic acid from the German Demoeratic Republic and 
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whereas, in other cases, no explanation is provided why dumped imports coming from different 
Spain, O.J., 7 September 1984, NoL 239/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2908/84 of 15 October 1984 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Poland, accepting undertakings given by the Bulgarian and 
Hungarian exporters of copper sulphate, terminating the investigation regarding exports of copper sulphate from Buigaria and 
Hungary and terminating the proceeding regarding those from Spain, O.J., 18 October 1984, No L 275/12; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 12«186 of 28 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April 1986, NoL 113/4; Commission Decision 86/232/EEC of 9 June 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of hardboard originating in Argentina, Switzerland and 
Yugoslavia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 12 June 1986, No 157/61; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 
accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres origina-
ting in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, NoL 272/29; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase 
electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts secured as 
provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1043/87 of 10 April 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but 
notmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, No L 102/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 
November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, 
the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 699/88 of 15 March 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid 
originating in Taiwan and South Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 m.m. 
originatiilg in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, NoL 152124; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 
July 1992, NoL 197125; Council Regulation (EEC) No 54193 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive duty on importsof synthetic 
fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 9/2 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
993/93 of 26 April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain eleetronic weighing scales originating in 
Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, NoL 104/4; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, No L 112/20 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-
dumping duties on imports of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, 
NoL 237/2; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on importsof 
ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazak.hstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, 
NoL 30211; Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into 
the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 
1994, No L 48110 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in HongKong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5. 
See also : sm~acreen. colour television. receivers from Hong Kong cuul the People'• Republic of China, where no straightforward 
cumwation was made with importsof smali-screen colour television receivers from the Republic of Korea (at the time of the anti-
dumping proceeding against Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, definitive anti-dumping duties were applicable to 
imports from the Republic of Korea (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 25 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of smali-screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133192)). Instead, mention was made 
from time to time of data concerning the Korean imports. Thus, information was provided about cumulated data for Hong Kong 
and the People's Republic of China, separate data for the Republic of Korea and cumulated data for HongKong, the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of Korea (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour television receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14/31). 
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countries subject to an anti-dumping proceeding, are not cumulated1275• 
The other two conditions under GATI and EC anti-dumping law are: (a) the margin of dumping 
established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis and the volume 
of imports from each country is negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects . of the 
imports is appropriate in the light of the conditions of competition between the imported products 
and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like Community product 
(Article 3.3. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(4) basic EC Regulation). Whereas condition 
(a) is a first, but moderate step into the right direction1276, condition (b) could be a 
codification of European anti-dumping case law applying ECSC anti-duJ11ping law. Indeed, in 
European anti-dumping case law, country cumulation bas only been applied if dumped imports 
from different countries were in some respect comparable. In order to determine their 
comparability, several factors have been taken into account : the comparability of the dumped 
products1277, the extent to which each of the dumped products competes in the Community 
1275 Commission Decision 80/1116/EEC of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings offered by the exporters of saccharin and its 
salts originating in China and the United States of America and terminating the proceedings concerning imports of saccharin and 
its salts from China, Japan and the United States of America, O.J., 9 December 1980, No L 331/41 ; Commission Decision 
81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning import. of furfural originating in the Dominican 
Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, No L 189/57; Commission Decision 82/808/EEC of 25 
November 1982 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of aluminium foil for household and catering use 
originating in Austria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary and lsrael, O.J., 1 December 1982, No L 339/58; Council 
Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and its salts 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No L 16/30; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 985/83 of 26 April 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the 
People's Republic of China and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 April1983, NoL 110/11; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's 
Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, No L 228/28 ; Commission Decision 86/35/EEC of 
21 February .1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of fibre 
building board from Finland and Sweden and terminating the investigation, O.J., 25 February 1986, No L 46/23; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 707/89 of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating 
in the .People's Republic of China or the Boviet Union, O.J., 21 March 1989, No L 78/10. 
1276 Supra, 511-518. 
1277 Usually a short raferenee to the comparability of the dumped products is made without any further explanation being 
provided (see e.g., Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5). 
Sometimes, the comparability of the dumped products is determined on the basis of: 
their phyaical characteristics (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties 
on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16) ; 
their technical characteristics (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 
August 1988, No L 235/5) ; 
their end uses (CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of 
China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in reapeet of imports of these · yarns originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia a.nd terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, NoL 328/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" mierodisks) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 95/5; Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in 
Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, No L 162/16) ; 
the limited dift'erènce in the user's perception of the product (Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, 
lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 
1992, No L 8811 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 June 1992, No L 163116)) ; 
the fact that they compete with each other (Commission Decision 901196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and 
accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the proceeding concerning imports · of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O . .J., 24 April 1990, NoL 104114; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio 
tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 31316 
(corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, NoL 9/36); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in 
Venezuela and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with such import&, O.J., 15 December 1990, No L 351/17 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey 
and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April1992, NoL 8811 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 June 1992, NoL 153116); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O . .J., 21 April 1993, No 
L 96/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into 
the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, 
NoL 112120; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, No L 237/2 ; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, No 
L 302/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
into the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 
February 1994, NoL 48/10; Commission Regulation (EC) No 634194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in HongKong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 
March 1994, No L 6816 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 621194 of 17 March 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 March 1994, NoL 77/48; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 643194 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-
dumping duties on imports of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, No 
L 80/1; Commssion Regulation (EC) No 1076/94 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3; Commission Decision 
941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these 
countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
3119/9.4 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in 
Russia, Ukr&ine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No L 330/16) ; 
the fact that the dumped products are destined for the same cuetomers (Commission Decision 90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 
terminating an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain single phase, two-speed electric motors originating in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 31 July 1990, NoL 202/47); 
the mutual interchangeability of the dumped products (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in 
Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect 
of import& of these yams originating in the Repuhlic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, NoL 276n; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 920193 of 16 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,6" 
microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 96/6; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, No L 112120; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., .19 February 
1994, No L 48/10 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 634194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 
1994, No L 68/6 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 643194 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 in respect of 
definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 Ma:rch 
1994, No L 8011 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 
1994, No L 94/21 ; Commssion Regulation (EC) No 1076/94 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour television 
receivera originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O . .J., 1 
October 191M, No L 266/60) ; 
the fact that importers easily and · frequently swap sourees of supply between the different dumping countries (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1386/91 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-
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with the Community industry's product1278, the degree of competition between the dumped 
imports and other products imported into the Community1279, the fact that the dumped 
products and the Community industry's product are sold to the same customers1280, the fact 
that the dumped products are sold or offered for sale in the same geographical markets1281 , 
refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China. the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 
28 May 1991, NoL 133120; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of SO March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic 
of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 
1992, No L 153116) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and 
of Montenegro, the farmer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Blo venia, 
O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15). ' 
Quality differences by themselves are nat sufficient to prevent cumwation (Commi&sion Decision No 163188/ECSC of 20 January 
1988 imposing a provision~ anti-dumping duty on imports. of certain iron or &teel coils, originating in Algeria. Mexico and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31). 
1278 Usually a short raferenee to the extent to which each of the dumped product& competes in the Community with the 
Community industry's product is made without any further explanation being provided (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EC) No 
3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, 
Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15). 
Sometimes, the extent to which each of the dumped product& competes with the Community industry's product on the Community 
market is determined on the basis of : 
the interchangeability of the imported products and the Community product&, notwithstanding some differences in physical 
characteristics (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but nat more than 75 kW, 
originating in Yugoslavia, O . .J., 14 April1987, NoL 102/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/87 of 5 August 1987 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW 
but nat more than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 7 August 1987, NoL 21812); 
the similarity between the dumped product& and the Community product& (Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in 
Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings affered in conneetion with the proceeding concerning imports of 
methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, 
No L 104114 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No .129/9l of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hang Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 
January 1991, NoL 14131; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on import& 
of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., SO June 1994, No L 162/16). 
1279 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 ~cember 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and Hang Kong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in 
cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea. collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure 
concerning HongKong, O.J., 14 Mayl991, NoL 119/35. 
128° Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof calcium metal originating 
in the People'a Republic of China and Ruasia, O.J., 23 April1994, NoL 104/5. 
1281 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in 
cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure 
concerning HongKong, O.J., 14 May 1991, No L 119/35; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea. O.J., 16 
July 1992, NoL 197125; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China. Poland, the Russian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 Apri11994, 
No L 94/21 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 892194 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April1994, NoL 104/5; Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour telavision receivers 
originating in Malaysia. the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No 
L 255/50. 
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the fact that they are simultaneously present in the market1282, the absolute volume of the 
dumped imports1283, the increase in the volume of the dumped imports1284, the market 
1282 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in 
cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting defmitively the provisional duty and term.inating the procedure 
coneerDing HongKong, 0 . .1., 14 May 1991, NoL 119/35; Commiuion.Regulation (EEC) No 1956192 of 7 July 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof synthetic fi.bres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 16 
July 1992, No L 197125 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 54193 of 8 January 1993 imposing a defi.nitive duty on imports of synthetic 
fi.bres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 912 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 920193 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of eertam magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 21 April1993, NoL 95/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain electronic 
weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 6 May 1993, No L 112/20 ; Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of large aluminium 
electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, 0 . .1., 19 February 1994, No L 48/10; Commiuion 
Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" 
microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic "of Korea, 0 . .1., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 
821194 of 12 April1994 imposing a defi.nitive anti-dumping duty on importsof silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic 
· of China, Poland, the RUBBian Faderation and Ukraine, 0 . .1., 13 April 1994, No L 94121 ; Commssion Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 
6 May 1994 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain watch movements originating in Malaysia and 
Thailand, 0 . .1., 11 May 1994, NoL 120/3; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importsof colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of 
Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 0 . .1., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50. 
1283 Usually a short reference to the absolute volume of dumped importsis made without any further explanation being provided 
(see e.g., Com.m.iuion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea, 
0 . .1., 3 October 1991, NoL 276fT). 
Sometimes, more inform.ation is given as to the absolute volume of the dumped imports, such as : 
the fact that all dumped imports attained a substantially similar level in volume (Council Regulation (EEC) No 450/89 of 20 
February 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in the United States of America or 
Venezuela and acljusting the definitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi Arabia laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, 0 . .1., 
24 February 1989, No L 52/1 ; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and RUBBia and 
term.inating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
importsof ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, 0 . .1., 21 May 1994, 
NoL 129/24); 
the fact that the volume of the dumped imports from each of the exporting countries, taken in isolation, was not negligible 
(Com.m.iuion Regulation (EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-
screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 19 January 1991, No 
L 14131 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830192 of 30 March 1992 imposing a defi.nitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and 
Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No L 88/1 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 5 June 1992, No 
L 153116) ; Com.m.iuion Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of ferro-ailicon originating in Poland and Egypt, 0 . .1., 3 July 1992, NoL 18318; Com.m.iuion Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 
7 July 1992 i.m.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the 
Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 16 July 1992, No L 197125; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamleu pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding 
with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, 0 . .1., 14 November 1992, No L 328/15 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 54193 
of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic 
of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 912 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 imposing 
provisional anti-dumping duties on importsof ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, 
0 . .1., 22 September 1993, No L 237/2; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-
dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in RUBBia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Venezuela and Brazil, 0 . .1., 9 December 1993, No L 302/1; Commission Decision No 67194/ECSC of 12 January 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil; Poland, 
RUBBia and Ukraine, 0 . .1., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5; Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors 
originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, 0 . .1., 19 February 1994, No L 48/10; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
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share of the dumped imports1285, the price level of the dumped imports1286, the different 
534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impo:rta of certain magnetic disks (3,5• microdisks) 
originating in HongKong and the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5; Council Regulation (EC) No 621194 of 
17 March 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of feJ.TO-silicon originating in South Africa and in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 March 1994, No L 77/48 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of potassium chloride originating in 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, No L 80/1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 
1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 0 . .1., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-
manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, 0 . .1., 21 December 1994, No L 330/15; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3319194 of 22 December 1994 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea ammonium 
nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, e:xported by companies not exempted from the duty, and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty imposed, 0 . .1., 31 December 1994, No L 350120). 
If the import& are negligible as such, they will not he cumulated with other dumped imports (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 
of 13 May 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, collecting defmitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure concerning Hong Kong, O.J., 14 May 
1991, NoL 119/35). 
1284 Frequently a short reference to the increase in the volume of the dumped import& is made without any further explanation 
being provided (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of 
Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133/20). 
SOmetimes, more information is given, but one will get none the wiser from it. In iron. or steel coils from Algeria, Mexico cmd 
Yugoslavia, the dumped imports were cumulated because their volume increase was of the same order of magnitude, namely going 
from 47.8% for Algerian imports over 59.2% for Yugoslav imports up to 87.4% for Mexican imports on a one-year basis 
(Commission Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or 
steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31. See also : small-acreen colour 
television receivers from Hong Kong cuul the People's Republic of China, where raferenee was made to a ccsimilarn rate of increase 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen 
colour television receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14131), and 
urea ammonium nitrate .alution from Buigaria and Polan.d, where reference was made to cca parallel trend in volumes.. (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3319194 of 22 December 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea ammonium nitrate 
solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, exported by companies not exempted from the duty, and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31 December 1994, No L 350/20). However, a quite flexible interpretation is given to what are 
increases of the same order of magnitude. For example, in urea from Libya, Saudi Arabia, C:zechoslovakia, the German Democratie 
Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidcul cmd Tobago and Yugoslavia, the Libyan imports increased by 12 893% whereas the · 
Czechoslovakian imports increased by only 24 % within the same two-year period ; together with the imports from the other 
countries, the growth rate of it varied between these two figures, they were cumulated (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 
November 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, 
the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1). 
1285 Cumulation hu been based on the fact that : 
the market share of the dumped imports of each country separately is significant enough to cause material izüury (see e.g., 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
compactdisc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 
January 1990, No L 13121) ; 
the market •hare of the dumping exporters was not negligible (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1472/91 of 29 May 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding in respect of imports of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ootton yarn 
originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, NoL 82/1), whereby it was said that the relatively low market share 
held by one of the dumping exporters had to he seen in the light of the anti-dumping measures already in force (Commission 
Decision 91/512/EEC of 25 Juiy 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures 
concerning importsof artificial corundum originating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's 
Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of artificial corundum originating 
in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 275/27 ; Commission Decision No 
891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain semi-tinisbed products of 
alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April1992, NoL 95/26; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 
April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales 
originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, No L 112120 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 
14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy 
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steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and defmitively collecting provisional anti-dumping duties, 
O.J., 15 May 1993, No L 120/34 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importa of eertam magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating.in JapAn, Taiwan and the People's Republic 
of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, No L 262/4 ; Commission Decision 
No 67194/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa into the Community of hematite pig 
iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukrame, O.J., 15 January 1994, NoL 12/5; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) 
originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
892194 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of calcium metal originating in the People's 
Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April1994, No L 104/5). 
Conversely, dumped importa repreeenting only a small market share (between 0.1 and 0.7 Cf~) havenotbeen cumulated withother 
dumped import. (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importa of ootton yam originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of ootton 
yam originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117), especially if their market share is distinctly lower 
ooropared to the other dumped imports (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of eertam polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the 
People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarns 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT). Moreover, dumped imports have notbeen cumulated 
because one of the dumping countries lost major shares of the Community market to the other dumping country (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2054/91 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187/23). 
1286 U sually a short reference to the price level of the dumped products is made without any further explanation being provided 
(see e.g., Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importa of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Ruesia and terminating the investigation with 
regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate 
originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129124). 
Sometimes, more information is provided. Thus, dumped imports have been cumulated because : 
there was no clear distinction in the price behaviour of the dumping exporters in the Community (Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" 
microdisks) origïnating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5 ; Council Regulation (EC) 
No 643194 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties on imports 
ofpotassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1); 
the price trends of the dumping exporters were similar (Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and 
South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15; Council Regulation (EC) No 3319/94 of 22 December 1994 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, exported by 
ooropanies not exempted from the duty, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31 December 1994, No 
L 350120); 
the dumping exporters aligned their prices to those of low-priced dumped imports originating in other countries (Commission 
Decision 83175/EEC of 15 February 1983 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain fibre building board originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 February 1983, NoL 47/30); 
the dumped product& originating in different countries are marketed in the Community at relatively similar prices (see e.g., 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
watch movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, NoL 120/3); 
the price level of the dumped products of one country hardly exceeded that of the other countries (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour telavision 
receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14131) ; 
the prices of the different dumped imports all significantly undercut the Community producers' prices (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof urea originating in 
Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty ·on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket 
flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, 
No L 133120 ; Commission Decision 911512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review 
of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoelovakia and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No 
L 275127 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May ·1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping dutiee on imports of 
certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and 
defmitively collecting provisional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 15 May 1993, No L 120/34). 
Conversely, dumped import& havenotbeen cumulated because the prices ofthe dumped imports coming from one country did not 
undercut the Community producers' prices, whereas. the prices of the dumped imports coming from another country did 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2054191 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
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interests of new and established exporters 1287, the sales strategy of the dumping 
exporters 1288 and the existence of a relationship or an association between the dumping 
dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 Jwy 1991, NoL 187/23). 
1287 The different interest& of new and established exporters have not yet been able to prevent cumwation because : 
the only thing that matters in anti-dumping proceedings is the effect of the dumped imports on the Community market and 
not the different interest& of producers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 
January 1985, No L 20/46)) ; 
the fact that no oomplaint was lodged before the entering on the market of the new exporter, cannot be considered as a 
sufficient ground to prevent Community producers from lodging a oomplaint at a later stage against the new and established 
exporters (Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, NoL 13/1 (conigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, NoL 20/46)); 
it is unimportant to know which exporter started causing injury ; it is only important to establish that all exporters 
contributed totheinjury (Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum,· O.J., 24 January 1985, No 
L 20/46)); 
the export& of the new exporter reached a level substantially similar to that of the other exporters covered by the proceeding 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 450/89 of 20. February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
originating in the United Statesof America or Venezuela and adjusting the definitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi Arabia 
laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 24 February 1989, NoL 5211; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 
24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of amall screen colour telavision receivers originating 
in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411). 
1288 Cumwation bas been based on : 
the fact that the dumped product& originating in different countries were marketed with a similar sales strategy (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes 
and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium 
permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 14519 ; COmmission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in 
Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133/20 (in particwar 
their pricing policy); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of ootton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in 
respect of ootton yam originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117 ; Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 371.194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community oflarge aluminium 
electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, NoL 48/10; Commission 
· Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdiska) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5) ; 
the fact that the behaviour on the Community market of all exporters was similar (Commission Decision No 891192/ECSC of 
30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain semi-finished products of alloy steel, 
originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 95/26 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 
1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ferro-silioon originating in South Africa and the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, NoL 23712; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359193 of 2 December 1993 imposing 
amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silioon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1; Commission Decision No 67194/ECSC of 12 January 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, 
Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 12/5 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 621194 of 17 March 1994 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 19 March 1994, NoL 77/48); 
the use of oomparabie sales channels for selling the dumped product& on the Community market (Commiuion Regulation 
(EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour television 
receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411 ; Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 
April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) 
originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the proceeding ooncerning 
imports of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bwgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 
April 1990, No L 104114; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3617190 of 11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and 
accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with such import&, O.J., 15 December 1990, No L 351117; Commisaion 
Regulation (EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour 
telavision receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/31; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive ai1ti-dumping duty on importsof audio tapes in 
cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the 
procedure ooncerning HongKong, O.J., 14 May 1991, No L 119/35; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1472191 of 29 May 
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exporters1289• Factors conceming the economie structures, tax systems, raw material 
subsidies and manufacturing procedures of the countries conring under the anti-dumping 
proceeding are not strictly relevant to the question of cumulation1290• All those factors on the 
basis of which the European anti-dumping authorities have applied country cumulation, may be 
advanced for examining the 4(conditions of competition» referred to by condition (b) of GA TT and 
EC anti-dumping law. For instance, the comparability of the dumped product, their simultaneous 
presence on the market, their presence in the same geographical market and their identical price 
. levels will all show that there is competition between the dumped prOducts. Thus, European anti-
dumping case law will probably remain unchanged. 
It should, however, be regretted that GATTand EC anti-dumping law have but codified European 
anti-dumping case law. Indeed, there are two problems with European anti-dumping case law. 
First, only exceptionally, the factors which are usually considered relevant to cumulation, prevent 
1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of importsof oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956192 of 7 July 1992 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic 
fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197/25; Commission Regulation 
-· (EEC) No 920193 of 15 April 1993 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain magnetic disks (3,5" 
microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April1994 impasing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of silicon carbide, originating 
in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94121; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 892194 of 21 April 1994 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium 
metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April 1994, No L 104/5 ; Commssio:ri Regulation (EC) 
No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain watch movements originating in 
Malaysia and Thailand. O.J., 11 May 1994, No L 120/3; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imparts of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan, 0 . .1., 21 May 1994, No L 129124 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1~94 impasing provisional 
duties on imparts of urea ammonium nitrate salution originathig in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of colour 
telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 
O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50) ; 
the fact that the majority of the imparts coming from the dumping countries under investigation are made through the same 
company which is jointly owned by the dumping exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 November 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 29 November 1990, No L 330/16; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1391191 of 27 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of of aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, No 
L 13411); 
the fact that the products are soldunder the samebrand name and identical conditions (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3421190 of 26 November 1990 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of aspartame originating in Japan and 
the United Statea of America, O.J., 29 November 1990, NoL 330/16). 
1289 The dumped importsof exporters located in different countries have been cumulated because: 
these exporters belonged to the same holding company (Commission Decision 90/138/EEC of 16 March 1990 accepting an 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imparts of certain diesel engines originating in 
Finland and Sweden, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 22 March 1990, No L 76/28) ; 
of the close relationship between the dumping exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 November 1990 
impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, 
O.J., 29 November 1990, No L 330/16 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1391191 of 27 May 1991 impasing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of of aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, No 
L 13411). 
129° Council Regulation (EEC) No 3434/91 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof oxa1ic acid originating 
in India or the Peoplc'a Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 1991, NoL 326/6. 
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country cumulation1291• Those exceptions are, however, unpredictable : either the factors 
taken into account result in contradictory conclusions regarding cumulation and the European anti-
1291 No country cumulation bas been made because: 
in respect of the factor ..comparability of the dumped products. : 
the dumped producta were showing different physical and quality characteriatics (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters 
originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statee of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No 
L 161147); 
direct competition with one another was lacking, because, on the basis of quality differences, they were aimed at 
different purchaser groups on the Community market (Commission Decision 86/100/EEC of 16 April 1986 terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Poland, 
Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 18 April1986, NoL 102/31); 
in respect of the factor ccincrease in the volume of the dumped imports .. : 
the oomparabie level of volume of the imports of the two dumping countries was the result of diametrically opposed 
progressions; in particular, the import& from one country had increased while the imports from the other country had 
declined in volume (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports· of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of China and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of those producta from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 
March 1990, No L 83136) ; 
the volume ofthe dumped importsof one country, contrary to the other dumped imports, bas declined (it bas to be noted 
that the decline in the volume of the dumped imports was only convincing for not cumulating within the framework of 
the threat of inju.ry examination but not within the framework of the actual injury examination) (Commission Decision 
87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, O.J., 16 April1987, NoL 103/38); 
in respect of the factor ccmarket share of the dumped imports» : 
the market shares are considered to be minimal and, therefore, not to cause injury, so that the dumped imports in 
question are excluded from the injury finding and, consequently, cannot be cumulated with the other dumped imports 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 171182 of 25 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
oxalic acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 January 1982, NoL 19/26 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 
1982, No L 34111); Commission Decision 82/336/EEC of 18 May 1982 accepting an undertaking offered by the 
Czechoslovakian producer and terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning oxalic acid originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and tbe German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 May 1982, No L 148/51; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fibre building 
board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 80/664/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, 
Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard 
to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 26 June 1982, NoL 181/19; Commission Decision 90/383/EEC of 13 July 1990 
terminating the anti-dumping prooaeding èoncerning imports of NPK fertilizers originating in Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/63; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1261191 of 13 May 1991 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of 
Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure concerning HongKong, O.J., 14 May 
1991, No L 119/36; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of ootton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271/17) ; 
the same level of market share held by the different dumping countries - a market share which is considered significant 
enough to cause material injury - is obtained by diametrically opposed progressions (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten 
carbide originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& 
ofthose producta from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83136); 
in respect of the fact ccprice level of the dumped importBit : 
some dumped products were imported at higher prices than those of the other dumped products (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters 
originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof Am.erica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No 
L 161147); 
the margin by which the dumped imports undercut the Community producers' prices is significantly different depending 
on the origin of the dumped imports (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of 
China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of those products from the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83136); 
the prices of certain dumped imports declined, while the prices of other dum.ped imports increased or remained stabie 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People'a Republic of China and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of those products from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83136). 
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dumping authorities may freely choose which of them will be decisive1292, or there is an 
explanation why, despite of factors pointing in the direction of no-cumulation, cumulation was 
necessary1293, at least if the European anti-dumping authorities take the trouble to provide an 
explanation 1294• 
The second and major problem with country cumulation, though, is not the unpredictability. It is 
the illegal discrimination between dumping exporters who are lucky not to have dumping 
competitors on the Community mar ket, and those who are not so lucky. The discrimination is 
illegal because practically all factors taken into account, are irrelevant to the question of country 
cumulation. Indeed, they do not prevent dumping exporters from being held liable for injury 
which they did not cause. Exporters should be held liable only for the injury they have caused 
themselves. lfthey only contribute to the. injury caused by other exporters, they should be held 
. liable only for their contribution to the in jury and not for the entire injury, unless it is proven that 
1292 Dumped import& have been cumwated notwithstanding the fact : 
that one dumping country was offering but a limited range of tbe product concentrated in tbe lower segment of tbe market ; 
the cumwation was based on the fact that the dumped product& of tbat country competed with the products from the 
Communinty and other dumping and non-dumping countries (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 Jwy 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, 
O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257127)) ; 
tbat tbe dumped im.ports of certain countries had stabilized or declined ; tbe cumwation was based on the comparability of 
tbe dumped product& (Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 Marcb 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors baving an output of more than 0,75 kW but notmore tban 75 kW, 
originating in Bwgaria, Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and 
definitively collecting the amounts aecured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311); 
tbat there was a fall in the volume of the dumped imports ; the cumwation was based on the fact that the absolute volume of 
the dumped imports lay notably higher than that achieved by other exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 
14 June 1988 imposing a provisional· anti-dumping duty on imports of syntbetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, 
Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statee of Am.erica or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151147; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in 
Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, tbe USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5). 
1293 Witb regard to tbe factor tcinerease in the volume of the dumped imports. : 
the decline in tbe volume of the dumped imports did not prevent cumwation because the decline was not continuous over the 
entire period taken into consideration ; instead the fact that the volume of the dumped imports fluctuated was decisive 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 1311 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 January 1985, No L 20/46)) ; 
dumped import& have been cumulated beèause during the last part of the reported period their volume had stabilized after a 
period of decline (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of roller ebains for cycles originating in the USSR and tbe People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 1985, No 
L217m; 
dumped import& have not been cumwated thougb their volumes were at a comparable level ; they were not cumwated 
because tbeir comparable level of volume was the reswt of diametrically opposed progressions, namely the imports from one 
country had increased while the import& from the other country bad declined in volume (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide 
originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of tbose 
product& from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83136). 
1294 Sametimes no explanation is provided. In this respect, synthetic fibres of polye•ter• front the German Democratie Republic, 
Romania, Turlcey an.d Yugoslcwia may he referred to, a case in which, within the framework of the actual injury examination, the 
imports from all tbe four dumping countries were cumwated. However, within the framework of the tbreat of injury examination, 
the imports from tbe German Demoeratic Republic were disregarded because, contrary to the other dumped imports, the volume of 
the East-German imports had declined ( Commission Decision 87 1236/EEC of 10 April 1987 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in tbe German Demoeratic Republic, Romania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 16 April1987, NoL 103138). No. explanation was offered to account forthefact that theEast German import&, 
despita tbe decline in tbeir volume, were cumwated with the other dumped imports within the framework of tbe actual injury 
examination. 
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they have cooperated with each other against the Community industry. Indeed, imports should be 
cumulated only if they have a collective injurious effect on the Community industry, i.e. whether 
the cooperation between the exporters results in injury additional to the injury each exporter 
caused individually. Only the factors «sales strategy of the dumping exporters» and «associated 
exporters» - which are but two of the factors the European anti-dumping authorities take into 
account as to cumulation and which the European anti-dumping authorities only rarely rely on -
may be upheld as conclusive proof of cooperation between the dumping exporters. All other 
factors, however, do not provide any information as to the question of whether the exporters 
cooperated with each other. Since, on their basis, it cannot be assessed whether the dumped 
imports have a collective injurious effect, they are irrelevant and result in illegal discrimination : 
dumping exporters who face competition from other dumping exporters on the Community 
mar ket, but who themselves do no not in jure the Community industry, will probably be found to 
cause injury when the other dumping exporters are causing injury ; the same dumping exporters 
will not be found to cause injury if they do not face such competition. The presence of other 
dumping exporters, however, is no lawful reason for the unequal treatment. 
Though it may be expected that GA TT and EC anti-dumping law will not result in a modification 
of European anti-dumping case law, they do not prevent it from being altered. Indeed, the 
concept «conditions of competition» may be interpreted as referring to the degree of collusion 
between the dumping exporters against the Community producers. On the other hand not much 
hope should vested in condition (a) on de minimis dumping margins and negligible imports. 
Though this conditions partly prevents imports which are assumed not to cause in jury, from being 
cumulated with other imports and, thus, from being held to cause injury, it does not guarantee that 
imports will be cumulated only if the dumping exporters cooperate against the Community 
producers. Indeed, the fact that imports are ·being dumped at a more than de minimis dumping 
margin and that their volume is more than negligible, does not prove that the dumping exporters 
collude against the Community industry. 
4. 2. 2. Other factors causing injury 
Injury caused by «other factors» must not be attributed to the dumping (Article 3.5. GATT Anti-
dumping Code; Artiele 3(7) basic EC Regulaiion ; Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). GATT 
and European anti-dumping law enumerate several «other factors» (the volume and prices of 
imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the pattem of 
consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between foreign and Community 
producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the 
Community industry). Since that enumeration is not exhaustive (Article 3.5. GATI Anti-dumping 
Code («inter alia») ; Artiele 3(7) basic EC Regulation («inter alia») ; Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC 
Decision («such as»)), European anti-dumping case law takes into account also not enumerated 
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factors (the volume and prices of imports sold at dumping prices, intra-community trade, the 
fierce competition of other products, the relocation of Community-owned production facilities to 
third countries, the purchasing policy of the economie group to which the Community producers 
beloog, over-capacity, lack of interest on the part of the Community industry, the coincidence of 
trade policy measures, the price policy of Memher States, intemal problems of the Community 
producers, the recovery in economie activity or economie recession, and the depreciation of the 
currency in which the sales of the like product are made). In general, «other factors» may be 
defined as each factor, except for the dumped imports subjected to the anti-dumping proceeding 
and the dumped imports cumulated with the dumped imports subjected to the anti-dumping 
proceeding. 
The majority of these factors (the prices of imports not sold at dumping prices1295, the volume 
1295 With regard to the prices of non-dumped import&; the only constant element in European anti-dumping case law is that there 
is always a reason why they are not a ground for not finding injurious dumping : 
the volume of the non-dumped imports overrule& the negative effect of their low prices (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2999/80 of 20 November 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 21 November 1980, NoL 311113; Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting 
undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of perchlorethylene originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United Statea of America and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, 
NoL 371147; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 
October 1986, No L 280/68 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and 
definitively collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311); 
the prices of the non-dumped import& are considered not to be too low because : 
they are higher than those of the dumped imports (see e.g., Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate 
originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24); 
they respect the minimum price levels set by the Commission within the framework of its structural adjustment policy 
for the European steel sector (see e.g., Commission Decision No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importe of certain flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating in 
Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 March 1989, No L 78/14) ; 
they are similar to (see e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping 
duty on phenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, NoL 12/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon 
content by weight of max. 0,6% (low carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 
1993, No L 80/8 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, 
O.J., 13 April1994, NoL 94121) or do not significantly undercut (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating 
in the People's Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof those products 
from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83136; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2737/90 of 24 September 
1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in 
the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, No L 26417 
(corrigendum, O.J., 24 October 1990, No L292/30); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2806/91 of 23 September 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain thermal paper originating in 
Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, No L 270116 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3836191 of 19 December 1991 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 362/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1461192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain 
large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 
June 1992, No L 163127) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 of 23 October 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 24 October 1992, No L 308/41 ; 
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and prices of imports sold at dumping prices1296, intra-community trade1297, the fierce 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 6 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, NoL 68/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 797193 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content 
by weight of max. 0,6 % Qow carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakh.stan, RUB&ia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, 
No L 80/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of maximum 0,6 % Qow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 24611) the prices obtained by the Community indUBtry 
(and are consequently undercut by the prices of the dumped import&) ; 
there is no indication that they are dumping prices (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 26 April 1990 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of amall-screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea 
and collecting definitively the proviaional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, NoL 107166 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No 
L 133192); Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting 
undertakings offered in conneetion with such imports, O.J., 16 December 1990, No L 361/17 ; Commission Decision 
91/392/EEC of 21 June 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of certain aabestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, 
No L 209/37 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import&. of cotton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in 
respect of cotton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, NoL 271117; Commiuion Decision 
91/612/EEC of 26 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping meaaures 
concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the 
People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of artificial 
corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, NoL 276/27; 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of 
China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yarna originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, 
origfuating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8; Commiaaion Decision No 891192/ËCSC of 30 March 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain semi-fmished products of alloy steel, originating in 
Turkey . and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 96/26 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the 
Rusaian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, No L 94121) ; 
they are distinctly higher than the dumpad prices (Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 November 1992 
impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain seamle88 pipas and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Czechoalovaltia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping 
proCeeding with regard to the Republica of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoalav Republic of Macedonia, the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/16) ; 
they have increaaed conaiderably (Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 612/84 of 27 February 1984 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of vinyl acetate monomar originating in Canada, O.J., 29 February 1984, No L 68/17) ; 
they remained relatively stabie while the dumpad prices droppad conaiderably (Commission Decision 91/142/EEC of 16 
March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of Atlantic salmon originating in Norway, 
O.J., 16 March 1991, NoL 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 1991, No.L 76/64)); 
they have increaaed while the dumped prices have decreased (Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 1472191 of 29 May 1991 
impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No 
L 138/62); 
the wide varlation in the level of prices, aa they appaar in the statistica, do not allow to draw any conclusion (Commssion 
Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain watch movemente 
originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, NoL 120/3). 
The fact that the non-dumping prices were aimilar to the prices charged by the Community producers precluded even a finding of 
no injury, notwithstanding a aubstantial increase in the volume of the non-dumpad import& (Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 
2017/81 of 16 July 1981 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 18 
July 1981, No L 196122 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
phenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, NoL 12/1). 
Even the fact that, aooording to the Europaan anti-dumping authorities, it is tcvirtually inconceivable• that Community producers 
would jeopardize their aales of producte manufactured in the Community by selling compating products manufact1lred in their 
production facilities located in third countries and imported by them at low prices, waa sufficient to show that the injury was not 
caused by the prices of these import& from third countries (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicle~, originating in South Korea, 
O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8). Such import& are a legitimate andjustified reaction of self-defence against dumpad import& in 
order to try to maintain their compatitivenesa on the Community market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 1992 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 1993, No L 13120)). 
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1296 If no cumwation is made, the dumped import& originating in other countries are taken into consideration as 4COther factol'll. 
Sometimes, the dumped import& from other countries are not explicitly taken into account ~ 4COther factol"lt, see e.g., : aaccharin 
and ita aalts from China and the Uniled Stille• of America, where no explicit reference is made to the dumped import& from the 
Republic of Korea (which are the object of another anti-dumping proceeding, eee: Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3171180 of 4 
December 1980 repealing a national anti-dumping duty on saccharin and ite ulte originating in the Republic of Korea imposed 
under the transitional provisions of the Act of Acceuion, O.J., 9 December 1980, No L 331125) (Commiuion Decision 80/1116/EEC 
of 4 December 1980 accepting undertakings ofTered by the exporters of saccharin and ita ults originating in China and the United 
Statee of America and tenninating the proceedings concerning import& of saccharin and its salts from China, Japan and the United 
Statee of America, O.J., 9 December 1980, NoL 331/41). It is, however, not excluded that the dumped import& from the Republic of 
Korea were subsumed under the factor tcthe volume and prices of other imports.. 
Cumwation usually increases the probability of a finding of hijury. However, even if no cumulation is made, the fact that other 
import& are also dumped on the Community market does usually not prevent a finding of hijurious dumping (Commission Decision 
80/875/EEC of 17 September 1980 accepting undertakings given by Romanian exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of certain tubes of iron or steel originating in that country, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 
20 September 1980, No L,249/24 (corrigendum, O.J., 7 October 1980, NoL 263/8); O.J., 9 December 1980, NoL 331125; O.J., 9 
December 1980, No L 331/41 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statee of America and the Boviet Union, 
O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 294/3; Commiuion Decision 83/522/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of lithium hydroxide originating in the People's Republic of 
China and tenninating that proceeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, No L 294129 ; O.J., 29 February 1984, No L 58117 ; CommiBBion 
Decision 84/404/EEC of 25 July 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of copper ewphate originating in Yugoelavia and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1984, NoL 215/16; O.J., 7 
September 1984, NoL 239/8; O.J., 18 October 1984, NoL 275/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1244186 of 28 April1986 imposing 
a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 11314; 
Commission Decision 861232/EEC of 9 June 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of hardboard originating in Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 12 
June 1986, No 157/61; O.J., 24 September 1986, No 272129; O.J., 14 April 1987, No L 102/5; O.J., 7.11.1987, L 317/1; O.J., 
18.3.1988, L 72112 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No 
L 152/24 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-
silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, No L 183/8). It is sufficient that the dumped import& under 
investigation themselves cause hijury (see : CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the 
People's- Republic of China and Turkey and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of these yarns 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2305/92 of 4 August 1992 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in BraziJ and definitively collecting the amounts 
secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 22211; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 
April 1993 impoaing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, O.,J., 29 
April 1993, No L 104/4 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 
1993, NoL 112120; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ferro-silicon originating 
in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, No L 237/2 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 
December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 30211; Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 
February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capaciton 
originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, No L 48/10 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 
March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong 
Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/5). 
See also : DRAM• from ,Japan, where iJ:ijurious dumping was found. Nevertheless, there were grounds for belleving that import& 
from third countries were also dumped. However, no anti-dumping proceeding was initiated against these other dmnped import& 
(Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types 
of electronic microcircuite known as DRAMa (dynamic random acceBB memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of these product& and tenninating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22!19 ; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38144)). One year later, though, an anti-dumping proceeding was initiated against one 
of those third countries (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain types of electronic micro-
circuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acceu memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 March 1991, No C 5719). 
Only in one anti-dumping case the dumped import& originating in other countries, as 4COther factol'll, prevented the dumping from 
being found to cause material hijury. lndeed, in fu.rfu.roJ from the Dominican. Republic, Spain and the People'• Republic of China, 
the Spanish dumped import& were not held to cause hijury because their volume was negligible compared to the quantity of the 
Chinese dumped import& and the Dominican non-dumped imports (Commission Decision 81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the 
anti-dumping procedure concerning import& of furfural originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of 
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China, O.J., 11 July 1981, No L 189/57). 
When the Community producers, in view of the low prices of the dumped products subject to the anti-dumping proceeding, are 
forced to purebase them, but do not resell them, the Community producers are not considered to cause ccself-inflicted• Ïl\jury to 
themselves and, consequently, these dumped imports do not constitute •other factora- (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 
16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as 
DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, NoL 272113). 
1297 lf, pursuant to Artiele 5(1Xii) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 4(6) basic ECSC Decision, the Community market is split into 
several regional markets, the import& from the rest of the Community into a regional market may be considered to be an ccother 
factor.. In view of the definition of a regional market, i.e., a market the demand of which is not to any substantial degree supplied 
by producers ofthe product located elsewhere in the Community, it is rather impossible to consider these intra-Community imports 
as cause of the Ïl\jury. As a consequence, intra-community trade bas not yet been a convincing ccother factor. on the basis of which 
it may be concluded that the dumping did not cause. the Ïl\jury (Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting 
undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& into Greece of certain categories of 
glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 
28 February 1986, No L 61!73). 
However, in a.Bbesto• cement pipes from Turkey, the market share on the regional market held by the producers located elsewhere 
in the Community amounted to 6.6 % and increased sharply by 98.2 %. These figures are high enough to find dumped imports to 
cause injury (•upra, 447). Nevertheless, the imports on the regional market by the producers located elsewhere in the Community 
were . not found to cause Ïl\jury. In order to reach that conclusion, it was underscored that the imports of the producers located 
elsewhere in the Community were made at higher prices than those charged by the Com.munity producers located on the regional 
market, and were concentrated in certain segment& of that market (CommiBBion Decision 91/392/EEC) of 21 June 1991 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain asbestos cement pipes 
originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, No L 209/37). 
lntra-com.munity tradeisalso taken into account in cases in which the Community market is not divided into regional ma,kets. 
This was the case when the Community indUBtry did not oomprise all the Community producers. In such a case, it is investigated : 
whether the Community indUBtry suffers Ïl\jury from the other Community producers not included in the Community 
industry. 
The competition from these other Community producers has not yet prevented the finding of Ïl\jurious dumping because : 
their &ales were declining and their prices were higher than the prices charged by the Community industry 
(CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1472191 of 29 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of oxalic 
acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62) ; 
there was no evidence suggesting that the trend of their sales and prices charged on the Community market was 
different from that of the complainant Community producers (Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February .. 
1~ imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community . of large aluminium electrolytic 
capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, NoL 48/10); 
the loss of market share of the complainant Community producers to the other Community producers was significantly 
lower than that to the dumping exporters and cannot, therefore, have a oomparabie effect on the complainant 
Community producers (Commission Decision No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain semi-tinisbed product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No 
L 96/26); 
the negative impact wbich the aales of products manufactured by companies related to the dumping exporters and 
established in the Com.munity, might have had (a market share of 10.7% which had increased by 5.4.% on a one-year 
basis) on the situation ofthe Community industry, was limited and could notaccount for the material Ïl\jury suffered by 
the Community indUBtry (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 21 April1993, NoL 96/6); 
the production of the like product by the other Community producers was only a marginal activity for them, one of 
them sells most of hls output to the other and the prices they charge are significantly higher than those of the 
complainant Community producers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3434191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in India or the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 
1991, No L 326/6). 
whether the remaining Com.munity producers were able to gain from the closures of other Community producers. Here, 
injury was found because the sales of the remainins Community producers still decreased despite these closures (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 impo•ing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-chrome with a 
carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % Oow carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 
April1993, NoL 80/8). 
In other cases, in which the Community market was not divided into regional markets, intra-community trade bas been used as 
either an economie factor measuring the impact of the dumping on the · Community induBtry in the sense of Artiele 3(6) basic EC 
Regulation and Artiele 4(2Xc) basic ECSC Decision (see : supra, p. . .. ), or as an •other factor., more specifically the factor 
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competition of other products1298, developments in technology1299 , the export 
tccompetition between foreign and dornestic producer&» (see : infra, 551-552). 
1298 The tieree competition from otber product& did DOt result in a finding of no injury because it already exillted before the Community producer 
entered the market aod, even if it bas caused a downward adjustment of the prices, the price drop observed at the time the Community producer 
decided to enter the market, was much more sub&tanlial. Moreover, such competition, admiucdly to a le88Cr degree, exillted also in one of the 
dumping countries where prices remained relatively lilabie at a very high level (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1391/91 of 27 May 1991 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof of upartame originating in Japan and the Uniled Statea of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, NoL 134/1). 
1299 In but one anti-dumping case, the dumping was not found to have caused material i.Jüury because of the factor tcdevelopments 
in technology•. In that case, no injurious dumping was found because the costa involved in important investments carried out by 
producers in aome of the Memher Statea linked to the conversion from oil to coal energy and new technology had a negative effect 
on the state of the Com.m.unity industry (Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.,J., 
25 July 1986, No L 202/43). 
In all other cases, the factor tcdevelopments in technology• has not prevented dumping from being found to cause material injury : 
the absence of an tcappreciable technology gap. between production in the exporting country and the Com.m.unity underbuilt a 
finding of iDjurious dumping (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of linear tungsten halogen lam.ps originating in Japan, O.,J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1) ; 
the argument according to which the Community producers eaueed themselves injury because they were too late in 
committing sufficient resources to develop and incorporate the new technology in their products or to develop the know-how of 
marketing the product, was not accepted either because they started as soon as poBBible the production of the product 
incorporating the new technology, or because they were the fll'st to develop the new technology (C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 
300/85, 5 October 1988, Canon. ln.c. a.o. v Coun.cU, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 5807; C.J.E.C., joined cases 273185 and 107/86, 5 
October 1988, Bilver Seüw Limited a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5981; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh 
Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1403; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushita. Electric ln.dustria.l Co. 
Ltd and Matau.hita. Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1486; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, 
Kon.ï.h.iroku Ph.oto ln.duatry Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1530; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sa.n.yo 
Electric Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1571; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation. v 
Coun.cil, E. C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1683-1684 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.,J., 26 August 1986, No 
L 239/5 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.,J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12) ; 
the argument that the absence of marketing support in the com.m.ercialization of the product by the Com.m.unity has forced 
the latter to concentrata on the low-priced,. unbranded segment, thus explaining the alleged precarious financial situation of 
the Com.m.unity induatry, was not accepted. lnstead, the sales of the Community induBtry were said to be evenly distributed 
between the branded aDd unbranded segments, and the pressure on priceB and the reauiting lack of profitability were found . 
to oblige the Com.m.unity induBtry to limit marketing expenditure (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnatie ·disks (3,5" ·microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.,J., 21 April1993, No L 95/5) ; 
injurious dumping was found as the dum.ped and the Community product& were of a high standard and the allegations about 
the poor marketing performance of the Com.m.unity induBtry and about its insufficient after-aales service were 
unsubstantiated (Com.m.ission Regulation (EEC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties on 
import& of telavision camera systems originating in Japan, O • .J., 30 October 1993, No L 27111) ; 
injurious dumping was found because the Com.m.unity industry was able to compete in terms of technology, provided the 
competition ia fair and not distorled by dumping (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the 
People's Republic of China, O.,J., 21 April1993, NoL 95/5); 
though the late market entry of the Community producers was recognized, injurious dumping was found because the 
Com.m.unity producers had well established sales relationships with a aignificant num.her of mY,r consumers of the lik.e 
product which suggests that performance, strategy and management and product quality met the expectations of these 
consum.era (Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in 
Japan, O.,J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1) ; 
notwithatanding the Com.m.unity producer's outdated technology, injurious dumping was found because the Community 
producer considered building a new plant, but decided not to do so, because of the depressed market prices of the product 
( Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681/S. ·of 18 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
pentaerythritol originating in Canada and. accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of pentaerythritol originating in Sweden and terminating that proceeding, O.,J., 22 September 1984, No 
L 254/5); 
notwithatanding the late-market entry of the Com.m.unity producers, the dumping was considered to cause the injury because 
there were no indications auggesting that the difficulties subsequently encountered. by the Com.m.unity producers should be 
attributed to their late-market entry rather than to the effect of the rapid increase in low-priced dumped import& (Commission 
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performance1300 and productivity1301 of the Community industry, over-capacity1302, 
Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynam.ic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and 
terminating the investigation intheir respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No· L 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No 
L 22n9 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144)) ; 
the argument that the Community producers made wrong commercial decisions in investing heavily in advanced technology 
to produce high-quality products, was not accepted because investments carried out to reduce production costs and to defend a 
high-quality brand image were not regarded by the European anti-dumping authorities as wrong business decisions (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes 
originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, 
NoL 17411); 
the investments of the Community producers in advanced technology were necessary to maintain a high level of 
competitiveness and the Community producers did not over-invest in advanced technology as compared to the higher rate of 
such investments in the United Statea of America (Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof ootton yam originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, NoL 8211); 
the Community producers were considered to have reacted rationally by concentrating their activity on the niche-market of a 
certain type of the like product where they e$yed reasonable profits, even if the bulk of Community demand was for 
another type of the like product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 13 
November 1990, No L 31316 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36)) ; 
the dumping bas been considered to cause the i.JVury because the losses incurred by the Community producers because of 
their unsuccesful development of a new technology, had already occurred before the dumping exporters materially entered the 
Community market (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on certain imports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No 
i., 240/6); 
a finding of i.JVurious dumping bas been made because the dumped imports thwarted the efforts of the Community producers 
to make investments in research and development (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, No L 176/1) ; 
the technology of the Community indUBtry resulted in temporary oost advantages which, however, could not overshadow the 
overall injmious effects of the dumping (Commission Decision No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof certain semi-finished productsof alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April1992, 
NoL 96/26). 
lJOO In only three anti-dumping cases, the export performance supported a finding of no injurious dumping : 
in stt.Un.le .. steel h.ouseh.old caoicing ware from South Korea, an increase in the Community producers' exports was established 
(Commission Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of stainless 
steel household cooking ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 March 1986, NoL 74/33); 
in propan.-1-ol from the Uniled Stales of America, the decrease in the Community producers' production and capacity 
utilization was found to be due mainly to the fall in their sales to third countries (Commission Decision 90/540/EEC of 29 
October 1990 terminating the anti-dumping review proceeding concerning import& of propan-l-ol originating in the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 6 November 1990, No L 306123) ; 
in acrylic fibre• from Mexico, the Community indUBtry will be faced with excess capacity, combined with falling prices and 
profits, because of the drastic reduction of the import requirements of a third country to which the Community industry 
exported 16 '11 of its total output (Council Regulation (EC) No 1318194 of 6 June 1994 terminating the review of anti-dumping 
measures concerning imports of certain acrylic fibres origiliating in Mexico and repealing the measures applying to such 
imports, O.J., 8 June 1994, NoL 14311). 
In all other cases, the development in the export performance of the Community indUBtry bas not prevented dumping from being 
found to cause material injury : 
the decline in the export performance of the Community indUBtry has not been accepted as the sole explanation for the 
decline in Community production, if the Community producers' sales on the Community market had declined as well (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hydraulic 
excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, No L 176/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm 
originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 162124) ; 
by increasing its export& the Community industry was considered to have reacted in an efficient manner to the effect of 
dumping by developing new markets which were not affected by unfair competition ; moreover, the increase in its eçorts did 
not fully compensate for the loss in the Community indUBtry's sales on the Community market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan 
and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure concerning Hong Kong, 
O.J., 14 May 1991, No L 119/36) ; 
the fact that the exports, which were increased in order to substitute the lost dornestic sales, were made at less attractive 
prices than those realized on the Community market contributed to the finding of i.JVurious dumping because they affected 
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the profitability of the Community producers (Comminion Regulation (EEC) No 2221/86 of 29 July 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of basic chromium sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 August 1986, No 
L 205112); 
the injury suffered by the Community producers on the Community market (in particular, the decline intheir sales) could not 
have been caused by their decision to export their product& at higher prices because their export sales did not increase, nor 
did the prices and the profitability of these sales (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2736190 of 24 September 1990 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& oftungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, No L 264/4 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 October 1990, No 
L 292/30)); 
the increased export performance made at low prices did not prove that the Community producers had decided to export their 
production at low prices and refused to face competition on the Community market ; for their exports concerned so-called 
aconversioJlJt contracts ; under such contracts the Community producers proceu the raw material belonging to a customer to 
produce the like product ; the like product is then exported to the customer at a low price in view of the considerable share 
taken by the raw material in the production oost& of the like product (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2737/90 of 24 September 
1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the 
People's Republic .of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, No L 26417 
(corrigendum, O.J., 24 October 1990, No L292/30)) ; 
because of the decline in export performance, the impact of the dumped imports has been even more strongly feit by the 
Community induBtry (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with import& of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia 
and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 31711); 
the export performance of the Community induBtry did not show any significant changes (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yarns (man-made 
staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No 
L 276fT); 
the negative effect of a decrease in the Community exports has been duly allowed for (Comminion Regulation (EEC) No 
2767n6 of 12 November 1976 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on cycle ebains originating in Taiwan, O.J., 13 
November 1976, No L 312/41 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 261n7 of 4 February 1977 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on hall hearings, tapered roller hearings and part& thereof originating in Japan, O.J., 6 February 1977, No 
L 34/60 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 322n9 of 16 February 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on a 
certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 21 February 1979, NoL 44/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 966n9 of 16 May 
1979 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on a certain herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 17 May 1979, NoL 121/6; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide 
originating in the United Statea of America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, No L 23119 (corrigendum,. O.J., 8 
February 1980, No L 31/23) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2294/80 of 28 August 1980 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and the Soviet 
Union, O.J., 30 August 1980, No L 228/69). Moreover, the decline in the Community producers' export& is found not to 
influence the injury investigation if these export& repreaent only a small proportion of the total Sales of the Community 
induBtry (Comminion Regulation (EEC) No 2908/84 of 16 October 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of copper sulphate originating in Poland, accepting undertakings given by the Bulgarian and Hungarian exporters of copper 
sulphate, terminating the investigation regarding exports of copper sulphate from Buigaria and Hungary and terminating 
the proceeding regarding those from Spain, O.J., 18 October 1984, No L 276/12) or if their decline did not affect the 
production coats which were used as the basis for the calculation of the anti-dumping duty (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 
1987, NoL 121111); 
the effects ofthe Community induBtry's salesperformances outside the Community market do not form part ofthe fmdings of 
injury (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2456193 of 2 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1798/90 in respect of the 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, NoL 226/1); 
the increase of the Community producers' export& could not have contributed to the injury suffered by the Community 
induBtry (Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 266/60); 
athe pattem of the Community producers' export& has not contributed to the injury• (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2054191 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, No L 187rl3). 
See also : serial impact fully formed chara.cter printer• from Japan, where the Community producer whose financial performance 
had been appreciably affected by circumstances outside the Community, wasleftout ofthe examination ofthe causallink between 
the dumping and the injury suffered by the Community induBtry (Comminion Regulation (EEC) No 2006/88 of 6 July 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serlal impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 
July 1988, NoL 17711). 
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1301 The allegedly low productivity of the Community industry has not resulted in a finding of no injurious dumping because.: 
there was no evidence to cast doubt on the efficiency of the Community induatry (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 
January 1991 imposing a defi.nitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, 
O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1) ; 
there was no evidence that the Community producers failed to respond to new developments (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits lmown as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 
1992, No L 272113) ; 
the Community producers' plante were oomparabie with those of the dumping exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
595/85 of 7 March 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hydraulic excavators originating in 
Japan, O.J., 8 March 1985, NoL 68/13); 
the cost of production of the Community producer with the highest capacity utilization were lower than that of the dumping 
exporters (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of 
certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 
1993, No L 95/5) ; 
the production costs of the Community industry did not rise, but remained stabie (Council Regulation (EC) No 3386193 of 6 
December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on im.ports of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, No L 306/16) ; 
the Community producers are notably efficient as a result of the rationalization and modernization of the industry 
(Commission Regulatlon (EEC) No 2799192 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/15); 
the Community induBtry incurred losses despite substantial reductions in costs achieved through the continued 
rationalization measures taken by the Community industry well before the dumping starled (Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour telavision receivers originating 
in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No 
L 255/50); . 
the differences in production methods between the Community producers and the dumping producers were not considered of 
liable to affect the conclusion that the injury had been caused by the dumping (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 171/82 of 25 
January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, 
O.J., 27 January 1982, No L 19126 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 February 1982, No L 34111) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1283/82 
of 17 May 1982 im.posing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on oxalic acid originating in China and definitively collecting the 
amounts secured by way of provisional duty on oxalic acid originating in China and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 27 May 1982, No 
L 148/37; Commission Decision 82/335/EEC of 18 May 1982 accepting an undertaking offered by the Czechoslovakian 
producer and terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the 
German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 27 May 1982, No L 148/51) ; 
the Community producers did not have old-fashioned production processes and the possible advantages of the dumping 
exporters as far as the costs of Iabour are concerned were reduced by the high standard of automation of the Community 
induBtry (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5) ; 
the possible oost advantage on the part of the dumping exporters, especially in Iabour costs, was lim.ited sincè the Iabour 
content of the production of the like product is small in modern plants such as those operated by the complainant Community 
producers (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
im.ports of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1) ; 
the cost advantages of the dumping exporters were not reflected without any discrim.ination in export and dornestic prices, 
and because they could obtain economies of scale only by dumping large quantities on the Community market (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten 
halogen lampe originating in Japan, O.,J., 20 July 1990, No L 188110 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, No L 321119) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 1411 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 
of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighten 
originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133120; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2805191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports into 
the Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, No L 270/15) ; 
the cost advantages resulted from economies of scale caused by the increased volume of the dumped exports a significant part 
of which was sold in the Community market at prices below their costs of production (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in 
Japan, the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, 
NoL 9/36)); 
the dumped import& prevented the Community producers from attaining the full rate of capacity utilization and, 
consequently, prevented them from benefiting from economiesof scale (Council Regulation (EEC) No 577191 of 4 March 1991 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (eruable 
programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 66/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1391191 of 27 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of of aspartame originating in Japan and the 
United Statea of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, No L 13411; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capaciton 
originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, NoL 152122 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, NoL 163127); Council Regulation 
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(EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind 
used in motor vehicles, originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 
1993, No L 13120)) ; 
the Community industry has reduced costs and has increased productivity before the dumping starled (Commission Decision 
941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard tothese 
countries; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129124) ; 
the question of cost advantages is irrelevant as the dumping exporters sold their export& to the Community below their cost 
of production (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3482192 of 30 November 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional 
anti-dumping duty, O.J., 3 December 1992, NoL 35311 (corrigendum, O.J., 28 January 1993, NoL 19/34)); 
a comparison between the Community producers' plants and the plants of NME countries was rejected for it makes no sense 
to consider comparative advantages with regard to NME countries (Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more 
than 0,76 kW but n.Ot more than 76 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No 
L 8311); 
the dumping prices were so low that the ditTerenee between these prices and the Community producers' cost of production 
could not be made up by means of any rationalization measures (Council Regulation (EEC) No 726/89 of 20 March 1989 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnish and simHar brushes orginating in the 
People's Republic of China and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 
1989, No L 79124). 
See also: linear tungsten. halogen kunps from Japan., where the steady downward pressure exerted by the Japanese export prices on 
LTH lamp prices in the Community was said to oblige the Community producers to sell at a loss and to prevent them from making 
the investment needed to improve productivity (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& oflinear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14/1). 
1302 In several anti-dumping cases, it has been recognized that over-capacity of the Community induBtry may have a negative 
effect (e.g., a price-depressive effect, or an increasing effect on unit production costs becauee of the low rate of capacity utilization). 
Nevertheless, in theae cases the dumping was found to cauee material injury (Commission Decision 80n831EEC of 27 August 1980 
accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of studded welded-link chain, 
originating in Spain and Sweden and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 2 September 1980, NoL 231/10; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2668/82 of 17 September 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyvinyl chloride resins and 
compound& originating in Czechoslovakia, and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of such 
product& originating in Romania, the German Demoeratic Republic and Hungary, O.J., 24 September 1982, No L 274116; 
Commission Decision 82/881/EEC of 23 December 1982 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning imports ·of perchlorethylene originating in ·Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United States of 
.Am.erica and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371/47 ; Commission Decision 831248/EEC of 24 May 1983 
accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene originating in 
the Soviet Union, the German Demoeratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 27 May 
1983, No L 138166 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 16 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, 
accepting a price undertaking from one ~apaneae exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of imports of certain glass 
textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovak:ia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 19831 No L 160/18 ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 66193 of 8 .January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of outer rings of tapered roller 
bearings originating in Japan, O.J., 16 J"anuary 1993, No L 9n ; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 
21 May 1994, No L 129124 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imparts of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 266/60; Council Regulation (EC) No 3319/94 of 22 December 1994 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, exported by 
companies not exempted from the duty, and oollecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31 December 1994, No 
L 350/20). 
In other anti-dumping cases, in which the dumping was also found to cauee iJVury, it was underscored that the investments ofthe 
Community industry, resulting in over-capacity, were made before the Community market was distorted by the dumping 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 J"uly 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact 
disc players originating in J"apan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 206/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 267127); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 18 Septem.her 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
calcium m.etal originating in the People's Republic of China and the Boviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-
dumping duty imposed on such import&, O.J., 20 September 1989, No L 271/1 ; Commission Decision 91/392/EEC) of 21 June 1991 
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accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain asbestos cement pipes 
originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, NoL 209/37). In other words, the over-capacity was 
considered to be a reeuit of the dumping. In such cases, the Europaan anti-dumping authorities, according to Advocate General 
JACOBS, are not required to examine the appropriateness of the Community producers' management decisions, unless those 
decisions are incontestably unreasonable (C.J.E.C., case C-358/89, 11 June 1992, Extramet Industrie SA v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, 
(3813), 3835 (Opinion of Advocate General JACOBS). 
New investments will not prevent a finding of i.J:Uury either when they were made at a time when Community consumption had 
risen substantially (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3434191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports 
of oxalic acid originating in India or the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 1991, No L 326/6) or when the new 
production capacity is not considered in assessing i.J:Uury as it did not begin production during the period of investigation (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3434191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in 
India or the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 1991, NoL 326/6; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 
1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" m.icrodisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan 
and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5). 
Finally, injurious dumping has been found as the dumping e:xporters, each having several production lines and even constructing 
new ones, were considered to have contributed more to worldwide over-capacity than the Community induBtry the capacity of which 
was at the lower level of an econom.ically feasible production with a single production line (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits 
known as DRAMa (dynamic random acceBS memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, NoL 272/13). 
1303 lnjurious dumping will be found when the decline in the Community's market share is nol caused by the Community's inability to supply the 
product in accordance with demand as the Community industry'a production capacity is able to meet Community demand (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 irnposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa into the Community of bicycles originating in the 
People's Repoblie of China and collecting definitively tbe provisionalanti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/1). 
1304 Though the Community producers did adapt to recent tluctuations in demand, injurious dumping was found. The European anti-dumping 
authorities were of the opinion that producers had to produce fairly continuously in order to maximize the use of their plant and keep unit costa 
down and, therefore, are Jeu able to adjust to tluctuations in demand than importers are (Commiuion Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 
accepting ondertakinga given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and 
Ruuia and terminating the inveatigation with regani to these countries ; as weU as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24). 
l30S lnjurious dumping was found, though the Community producers dealt only with a limited number of merchants and dealen, as there was no .. 
evidence 10ggeating that there was a general problem of obtaining the Community product (Commiuion Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 
accepting ondertakinga given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and 
Ruuia and terminating the investigation with regani to these countries ; as well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of 
ammonium nitrate originating in Belarua, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24). 
1306 The Community induBtry is assumed not to suffer injury from the dumping ü all Community producers either do not consider 
themselves to be injured, do not oooperate or withdraw the complaint (CommiBBion Decision 80/456/EEC of 24 April 1980 
terminating the anti-dumping/anti-subsidy procedure concerning canned peaches originating in Greece, O.J., 29 April 1980, No 
L 110/35 ; Commission Decision 8111012/EEC of 17 December 1981 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
certain monochrome portable telavision sets originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 19 December 1981, No L 364/49; 
CommiBBion Recommendation No 2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets 
and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312/10 ;Commission Decision 85/143/EEC of 18 
February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain boots with fitted ice skates originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1985, No L 52/48; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1015/87 of 8 April 1987 repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 2109/85 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain kinds of polystyrene sheet originating in Spain, O.J., 9 April 1987, NoL 95113; Commission Decision 88/622/EEC of 12 
December 1988 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on imports of microwave ovens originating in Japan, the Republic of 
Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 13 December 1988, No L 343/33 ; CommiBBion Decision 89/568/EEC of 25 October 1989 
terminating the review of anti-dumping measures applying to import& of certain synthetic fibre hand-knitting yam originating in 
Turkey and confirming the expiry of the said measures, O.J., 26 October 1989, No L 309/42 ; Commission Decision 90/85/EEC of 1 
March 1990 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures applying to imports of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) 
originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic and confirming the expiry of the said measures, O.J., 8 March 
1990, No L 59/45 ; CommiBBion Decision 90/383/EEC of 13 July 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports 
of NPK fertilizers originating in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/63; CommiBBion 
Decision 911182/EEC of 8 April 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of high carbon ferro-chrom.ium 
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coincidence of trade policy measures in regard to imparts from other countries than the dumping 
country1307, the price policy of Memher States1308, the intemal problems of the 
originating in Albania and the USSR, O.J., 11 April1991, NoL 90138). 
lf only a part of the Community industry cooperates and claims to be iDjured by the dumping, injury may be asseBBed if the 
cooperating and complainant Community producers repreeent a ml\ior proportion of the Community production (Comminion 
Decision 82/398/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning 
cylinder vacuum cleanere originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the 
procedure, O.J., 18 June '1982, No L 172/47 ; Commission Decision 82/643/EEC of 6 August 1982 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning paracetamol (INN) crystals or powder originating in China and 
terminating the proceeding, O.J., 11 August 1982, No L 236123 ; Commission Decision 86/86/EEC of 18 March 1986 terminating 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of stainless steel household cooking ware originating in South Korea, O.J., 19 
March 1986, No L 74/33 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1068/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
of certain electronic acales originating in Japan, O.,J., 12 April 1986, NoL 97/1; Commission Decision 89/611/EEC of 22 August 
1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 
1989, No L 249n1; Commission Decision 91/33/EEC of 18 January 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
importsof certain cotton terry-towelling articles (bathrobes, toilet and kitchen linen) originating in Turkey, O.J., 23 January 1991, 
No L 17/22; Commission Decision 91/69/EEC of 4 February 1991 terminating the review and confmning e:xpiry of the anti-
dumping measures applying to import& into the Community of self-propelled hydraulic excavators, track-laying or wheeled, of a 
total operating weight exceeding six tonnes but not exceeding 36 tonnes, equipped with a eingle bucket mounted on a boom capable 
of pivoting through 360°, or intended to be ao equipped, originating in Japan, O.J., 8 February 1991, No L 36126 ; Commission 
Decision 931672/EC of 9 December 1993 terminating an anti-dumping procedure and giving notice that anti-dumping measures 
concerning import& into the Community of outboard motors originating in Japan shalllapse, O.J., 14 December 1993, No L 310/42 ; 
Commission Decision 94/120/EC of 24 February 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain 
synthetic hand-knitting yarn, originating in Turkey, O.J., 26 February 1994, NoL 66/68). 
1307 Injurious dumping bas been found when import& from other countries subject to anti-dumping measures had declined and 
were replaced by the dumped imports after the imposition of the anti-dumping measures (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1966192 
of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping.duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197126; Oomminion Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of cert&in photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 
1993, NoL 228/16). 
Quantitative restrictions applicable to non-dumped import& originating in other countries than the dumping countries have been 
invoked in findings of injurious dumping (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3463181 of 2 December 1981 imposing a· provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain cotton yams originating in Turkey, O.J., 3 December 1981, No L 347/19; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 789/82 of 2 April 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain cotton yarns originating 
in Turkey, O.J., 3 March 1982, NoL 9011; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2464/84 of 24 August 1984 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain shovels originating in Brazil, O.J., 29 August 1984, No L 231129). 
1308 Injurious dumping bas been found notwithstanding : 
price controle enforced by the authorities of a Member State intended to restriet price increases (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain deep freezere 
originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain·deep freezers 
originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the 
proceeding concerning import& of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No L 269/14) ; · 
the Community indUBtry's written undertaking to fight inflation, which was approved by the authorities of a Member State, 
because it allowed to pass on the increases in the coats of the raw material entirely in the selling prices of the like product 
and could, therefore, not be the cause why the increases in the coats of the raw material were not passed on in full 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 909/86 of 2 April 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
kind& ofpolystyrene eheet originating in Spain, O.J., 4 April1986, NoL 97/30). 
However, the iDjury eaueed by the fact that the Community producers' production coats were higher than the prices they were 
obliged to charge within the framework of a price control system set up a Memher State, was not attributed to the dumping, but it 
did notprevent a finding of dumping causing material injury to the Community industry (Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 
February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& into Greece 
of certain categorie& of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria,.Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating 
the investigation, O.,J., 28 February 1986, No L 6ln3). 
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Community producers1309, the German unification1310, the economie recession1311 , the 
interest rates to be paid by the Community producers1312, the depreciation of the currency in 
which the sales of the like product take place1313, measures as to health care1314 or as to 
1309 The internal problems within a Community company have not yet precluded that dumping was considered to cause injury 
because: 
they had been resolved before the Community company began to suffer material injury (C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 
1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1336), 1403; C.J.E.C., cue C-176/87, 10 March 1992, MatsushiUJ Electric 
InduBtrial Co. Ltd and Mat•uahita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1486; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 
10 March 1992, Koni.Bhiroku Photo lnd.lutry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1530; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 
March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1571; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sh.Cirp 
Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1683; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O~J., 24 February 1987, No 
L 54/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 of 23 July 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on mechanical wrist-
watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 4 August 1987, NoL 213/5; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 
May 1988, No L 130/12) ; 
there was no evidence suggesting that the injury suffered by the Community induBtry could be attributed to internal 
management problems of the Community indUBtry (Council Regulation (EC) No 643194 of 21 March 1994 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of potassium chloride originating in 
Belarus, RUBBia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1). 
131 O lnjury waa found despite the increase in the prices of the Community producer establisbed in the eastern part of Germany because this 
Community producer had to adjust to market economy conditions and increased hia prices from a much lower base than on the rest of the 
Community market until pricea of the Community induBtry worker out on the same level (Council Regulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 
1994 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on importa of potassium pennanganate orginating in the People's Republic of China, O.I., 19 
November 1994, NoL 298/32). 
1311 Injurious dumping bas been found, despite of the fact that the market of the like product had been affected by the economie 
recession (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating 
the proceeding concerning import& of certain deep freezers; O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14). 
1312 Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of colton yam originating in 
Braziland Turkey, O.I., 27 March 1992, NoL 8211. 
1313 The effect on the Community indUBtry of a depreciation ofthe currency, in which the sales ofthe like product are made, bas 
been recognized and accounted for, but it bas not yet been a sufticient reaeon to find that the dumping did not cause material 
injury (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August ~987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
mercury originating in the Union of Boviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987~ NoL 227/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of mercury originating in the Boviet Union and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such import&, O.J., 10 December 1987, No L 346127; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 
September 1992, NoL 272/13). 
See also : upright piano• from the USSR, where the improvement in the export performance of the British industry bas been 
resorted to in order to explain why the rise in value of the pound sterling was not the cause of the difficulties of the British 
producers and, therefore, did not change the conclusion that the injury to the British induBtry was eaueed by the dumping 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 871/82 of 14 April 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on upright pianos originating 
in the USSR, O.J., 16 April 1982, No L 101130 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 April1982, No L 115122) ; Council Decision 82/220/EEC of 14 
April 1982 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of upright pianos originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Poland, O.J., 16 April1982, NoL 101/45). 
1314 lnjurioua dumping was found as the dumped product waa not one of 1he substancea wbose administration to food-producing animals waa 
prohibited in the Community (Commiasion Regulation (EC) No 1648/94 of 6 · July .1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of 
furazolidone originating in the People's Republic of China, O.I., 8 July 1994, NoL 174/4). 
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the proteetion of the environment1315) generally do not prevent dumping from being found to 
cause material injury to the Community industry. Sometimes those factors are invoked as 
aggravating circumstances1316 or as a factor explaining why the Community industry is doing 
1315 Injurious dumping will bc found whcn tbc measures for tbc proteetion of tbc cnvironment do not affect tbe demand for tbe like product 
substantially (Conunisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar 
originating in tbc Pcople'sRcpublic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3). 
1316 A t" . stan ggrava 1ng Cli"Cum ces 8l"e : 
the fact that the Community industry suffered severe losses despite its substantial investment needed in order to keep up 
with technical progreBB (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/86 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain electronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings. and terminating the proceeding 
in respect of certain import& of such product& originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, NoL 275/5); 
the fact that the Community export& of the like product to the. dumping country had fallen to zero, thus, the absence of 
reciprocal trade balances (Comm.iBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12); 
in the light of the deterioration of the Community's induBtry profitability, the fact that the Community industry has. 
substantially cut its production costs in order to improve its productivity (Comm.iBBion Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 
December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the 
Republic of Korea and Hóng Kong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47); 
the fact that investments by a Community producer to modernize his plant into one of the most effiCient worldwide, has not 
brought up results because of the increase in overhead& following the continua! drop in production or turnover (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1531/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate 
originating in the People's Republic of China and deflnitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those 
imports, O.J., 3 June 1988, NoL 138/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of p8l"acetamol originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, No 
L 155129); 
the fact that the import& subject to anti-dumping measures have decreased, but were replaced by dumped import& from 
elsewhere (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 512/84 of 27 February 1984 imposing a. provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 February 1984, No L 58/17 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) 
No 2908/84 of 15 October 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Poland, 
accepting undertakings given by the Bulg8l"ian and Hung8l"ian exporters of copper sulphate, terminating the investigation 
reg8l"ding export& of copper sulphate from Bulg8l"ia and Hungary and terminating the proceeding reg8l"ding those from Spain, 
O.J., 18 October 1984, NoL 275/12; Council Decision 86/468/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, 
Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272129 ; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 993193 of 26 April 1993 imposing a deflnitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic weighing acales 
originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, No L 104/4 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore 
and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 6 May 1993, No L 112120) ; 
the fact that the Community industry has beoome much more vulnerable because of the economie reeesaion (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2849/92 of 28 September 1992 modifying the deflnitive anti-dumping duty on import& of hall be8l"Ïngs 
with a greatest external diameter exceeding 30 mm originating in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85, O.J., 1 
October 1992, No L 28612 (corrigendum, O.J.; 25 March 19931 No L 72/36) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 April 
1993 imposing a definitive. anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic weighing acales originating in Japan, O.J., 29 
April 1993, No L 104/4) .. 
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well, in spite of the dumping1317• Exceptionally, those factors, under identical circumstances, 
1317 The following elements have been invoked to explain why, despite of the dumping, a substantial impravement in the overall 
situation of the Community industry has been taken place : 
a rise in Community exports (Commiuion Decision 84/512/EEC of 23 October 1984 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paraformaldehyde originating in Spain and terminating 
the investigation, O.J., 26 October 1984, No L 282/58 ; Commission Decision 86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof artificial corundum originating in 
Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 23 September 1986, No L 271126; Commission 
Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 287125; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
665/90 of 16 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferroboron alloy originating in Japan, O.J., 
20 March 1990, No L 7316) ; 
ration~tion and restructuring efforts undertaken by the Community industry (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3669/84 
of 21 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings and tapered roller 
hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, No L 340/37 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 
1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, 
No L 221116) ; 
anti-dumping action taken against dumped imports from other countries not subjected to the anti-dumping proceeding in 
question or not cumulated with the dumped imports subjected to the anti-dumping proceeding in question (Commission 
Decision 84/407/EEC of 10 August 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of certain kraft liner paper and board originating in Spain and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 
August 1984, No L 224/30 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2553184 of 4 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, accepting an undertaking offered by the e:xporter in the German 
Demoeratic Republic of oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding regarding imports of oxalic acid from the German 
Demoeratic Republic and Spain, O.J., 7 September 1984, No L 239/8) ; 
the recovery of the economie activity (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2516/86 of 4 August 1986 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importsof housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 7 August 1986, NoL 221116; Commiuion 
Decision No 2767/86/ECSC of 5 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain sheets and 
plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 6 September 1986, NoL 254/18; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864187 
of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an 
output of more than 0, 75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and defmitively collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 
27 March 1987, NoL 8311; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 
kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April1987, NoL 102/5). 
See also : ba.ic chromium sulph.ate from Yugoskwia, where it was noted that, without the improvement of the export performance 
of the Community producers, they would have been affected even more, (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2221185 of 29 July 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty: on imports of basic chromium sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 3 August 1985, 
NoL 205/12). 
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may result in findings of injurious dumping as well as in findings of no injurious dumping1318, 
without there being an apparent reason argumenting for it1319• 
1318 For example, in conneetion with the factor 4Cproductivity of the Community industry", improvements in productivity, 
including increaaed automation and rationalization measures, even if they have a negative effect on prices or employment, have 
not prevented the European anti-dumping authorities, in some cases, to conclude that the dumping had materially injured the 
Community indUstry (Commission Decision 80/410/EEC of 10 April 1980 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceedings concerning certain filament lamps for lighting exceeding 28 volts, originating in Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratie Republic, Hungary and Poland, and terminating those proceedings, O.J., 16 April 1980, No L 97/69; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1679/80 of 19 June 1980 Ï1ilposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! alarm clocks (other than 
travel alarms) originating in the German Democratie Republic and the USSR, and repealing a national anti-dumping duty on 
mechanica! alarm clocks originating in China imposed under the transitional provisions of the Act of Accession, O.J., 26 June 
1980, No L 168/6; CommiBBion Decision 80/600/EEC of 19 June 1980 accepting undertakings ofTered by the Chinese and 
Czechoslovak exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of mechanica! alarm clocks (other than 
travel alarms) originating in China, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Hong Kong and the USSR, terminating the 
proceeding in respect of China, Czechoslovakia and Hong Kong, and withdrawing acceptance of undertak.ings previously accepted 
by the United Kingdom Government from the exporters in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 25 June 1980, NoL 168/18; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain textured 
polyester fabrics originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 20 May 1981, NoL 133/17; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 
2865/86 of 14 October 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic scales originating in Japan 
and a~pting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain import& of such products originating in Japan, 
O.J., 16 October 1986, No L 276/6 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a defi.nitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of stand8l'dized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Gennan Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and defmitively 
collecting the amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 
26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on ce~ import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5), whereas they have in other cases (Commission Decision 86/501/ECSC of 
11 November 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1986, No L 299/18 ; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding conceming import& of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43 ; CommiBBion Decision 88/125/EEC of 4 March 1988 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of kraftliner paper and board originating in Brazil and the Republic of South Africa, O.J., 
8 March 1988, NoL 62139). 
Sometimes, an explanation is provided, pointing out why a situation does notprevent a finding of injurious dumping whereas it 
normally should. For example, in amall 1creen. colour televilion. receiver• from t'M Republic of Korea, the relocation of Community 
producers' production facilities outside the Community had a di8l'Uptive effect on employment within the Community. 
NevertheleBB, the dumping was held to cause injury, inter alia, to Community employment. The relocation was seen to be a 
consequence and a measure of injury rather than a cause because it was part of a series of rationalization measures (i.~., the factor 
«productivity of the Community industry,.) undertaken by the Community induBtry for improving profi.tability in order to counter 
the effects of competition of low-priced imparts (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) Nó 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of email BCI'een colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 
October 1989, No L 314/1). 
1319 See : amall •creen. colour televi8ion. receiver• from the Republic of Korea, where the relocation of Community producel'81 
production facilitiea outside the Community had a diBl'uptive effect on employment within the Community. NevertheleBB, the 
dumping was held to cause lnjlll'Y, inter alia, to Community employment. The relocation was seen as a consequence and a measure 
of injury rather than as a cause, since it was part of a series of rationalization measures (i.e., the factor 4Cproductivity of the 
Community industry•) unde:rtaken by the Community industry for improving profitability in order to counter the effects of 
competition of low-priced import& (Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of amall 8Cl'8en colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No 
L 314/1). 
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The remaining «other factorS» (the volume of imports not sold at dumping prices1320, 
1320 With regard to the volume of imports not sold at dumping priees, the following :figures can he found in European anti-
dumping case law : 
l:ojury No injury 
minimum maximum minumum maximum 
Share of non-dumped 
imports on the 
Community market 0.7 %a 52.7 %b 5.3 %c 87.0 %d 
Share of non-dumped 
imports in total 3.3 %e 95.1 %f 3.6 lp 93.9 %h 
imports 
Evolution in share of 
non-dumped imports -37.5 %i +82.7 %i -6.1 %k +59.0 %1 
in total imports 
Souree: Official Journal of the European Communities ; own calculations. In particwar : 
a Commission Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 March 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1985, No 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
h 
k 
L 68/13; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 720/90 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 27 March 
1990, No L 8019 ; 
Commission Decision 85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerning imports of wire rod originating in Brazil, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1985, NoL 299/18; 
Commission Decision 90/155/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing importsof tungsten metal powder originating in the People's Republic of China or 
the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/124; 
Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertak.ings entered into in .. 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports into Greeee of certain 
categories of glass originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Czechoslovak.ia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51173 ; 
Commission Recommendation No 932/78/ECSC of 2 May 1978 imposing a de:finitive anti-
dumping duty on iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Bulgaria, O.J., 4 May ·1978, No 
L 120/22; 
Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing importsof ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China 
and the Republic of Korea, O . .T., 30 March 1990, NoL 83/117; 
Commission Decision 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing imports of eertain seamless tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Austria, 
O.J., 28 January 1989, No L 25/87 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2495/86 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the German 
Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, NoL 217/12; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2017/81 of 15 July 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on phenol originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 18 July 1981, NoL 195/22; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a de:finitive anti-dumping duty 
on phenol originating in the United States of America, O.J., 18 January 1982, No L 12/1 ; 
Commission Decision 89/56/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing imports of certain seamleB8 tubes of iron or non-alloy steel originating in Austria, 
O.J., 28 January 1989, No L 25/87 ; · 
Commiuion Decision 81/1012/EEC of 17 December 1981 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing imports of certain monochrome portable television sets originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 19 December 1981, No L 364/49. 
Thus, with regard to the volume of non-dumped imports no thresholds can he deduced from European anti-dumping case law. 
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demand1321 and pattem of consumption1322, trade- restrictive practices of and competition 
1321 In most anti-dumping cases in which no ÏIÜW"Y was found and in which clemand was invoked as other factor, there was a 
contraction of clemand (Council Decision 831162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
import& of acrylonitrile originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101/29 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1631183 of 16 June 1983 imposiug a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain glass textile fi.bres (rovings) 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price undertaking from one Japanese 
exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of certain glass textile fibres (mats), originating in Czechoslovakia 
and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, NoL 160/18; Commission Decision 86/143/EEC of 18 February 1986 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain boots with fitteel ice. skates originating in Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1986, No L 62/48; Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 
terminatiug the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 26 July 1986, NoL 202/43; Council Regulation (EC) No 1318194 of 6 June 1994 terminatiug the 
review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico and repealing the measures 
applyiug to such import&, O.J., 8 June 1994, No L 14311). 
However, a contraction of demand does notprevent a fin~ ofiJ:Uurious dumping (see, e.g., in conneetion with a decline indemand 
due to a change in the pattem of consumption : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2699n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumpiug duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 24 November 1979, NoL 297/12; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4.07/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a defmitive anti-dumpiug duty on certain sodium carbonate 
originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 22 February 1980, No L 48/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanical wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No 
L 11114; Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 
6 October 1982, No L 28319 ; Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& into Greece of certain categorie& of glass originating in Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No 
L 6tn3 ; Commission Decision 86/232/EEC of 9 June 1986 accepting undertakiugs given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerni.ng import& of hardboard originating in Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 12 June 1986, No 167/61; Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with import& of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 6 
February 1987, NoL 34/66; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361187 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of ferro-ailico-calciumlcalcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 May 1987, NoL 129/6; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2347/87 of 23 July 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on mechanical wrist-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 4 
August 1987, NoL 213/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2006/88 of 6 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of serlal impact fully formed character printers originatiug in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 iinposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores and 
concentratee originating in the People'a Republic.of China, and terminating the proceediug concerning import& originating in Hong 
Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83123; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2736190 of 24 September 1990 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& oft\mgsten ores and concentrates·originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting · 
the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, NoL 264/1; Commission Decision 93/521/EEC of 3 September 1993 
accepting undertaki.ngs given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review in respect of import& of binder and haler twine 
originating in Brazil, terminating the anti-aubsidy review proceeding with regard to these import& and terminating the anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy review in respect of import& of binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, No 
L 261/28). 
Also increases in demand may result both in findings of no iJ:Uurious dumpiug (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1101181 of 23 
April 1981 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on potato granules originating in Canada, O.J., 28 April 1981, No L 116111) 
and in findings of iJVurious dumpiug (C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/86, 6 October 1988, Canon lnc. a.o. v Council, E.C.B., 
1988, (6731), 6808 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,76 kW but not more than 76 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and defmitively collectiug the 
amounts secured u proviaional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No L 83/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April1987 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an: output of more than 
0,76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, NoL 102/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of Bmall-screen colour television receiven 
originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 19 January 1991, NoL 14131; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
677191 of 4 March 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known u 
EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 66/1; Commission 
Decision 91/142/EEC of 16 March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceediug concerning import& of Atlantic salmon originating 
in Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, No L 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 1991, No L 76/64) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1116191 of 29 April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the revjew of anti-dumping measurea 
concerning import& of ferro-ailicon originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 11111 ; Commission Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 
April 1991 accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
import& of ferro-ailicon originating in Brazil and terminatiug the investigation as regarde thoae exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, No 
L 11114 7 ; Commission Decision 911256/EEC of .1.C: May 1991 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
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between foreign and Community producers1323 , the evolution in world prices1324, the 
proceeding concerning im.ports of welded wire-mesh originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 18 May 
1991, No L 128/64 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2806/91 of 23 September 1991 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
im.ports into the Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, NoL 270/16; Commission 
Decision 911612/EEC of 26 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures 
concerning im.ports of artificial corundum originating in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's 
Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning im.ports of artificial corundum originating in 
Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 276127 ; Commission Decision No 
891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of certain semi-finished products of alloy 
steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April1992, NoL 96/26; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 of 30 March 1992 
im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of silicon metal originating in Brazil, O.J., 10 April 1992, No L 96117; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1461192 of 2 June 1992 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, NoL 162122 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of feiT<H:hrome with a carbon content by weight of maximum 0,6% (low carbon ferro-chrome), originating in 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 
imposing provisional antidumping duties on im.ports of television camera systems originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No 
L 27111 ; Commission Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of gum 
rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41160). 
1322 Dum . ~ d to . . beca ping was .~oun cause IJVury use : 
the Community indUBtry responded fast enough to a change in the pattern of consumption and had a production capacity to 
satisfy the increased demand for a specific product type (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 550/93 of 6 March 1993 im.posing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No 
· L 68/12); 
the dumping exporters' argument that the Community producers had failed to adapt to changing consumer habits was not 
convincing ; instead the European anti-dumping authorities were of tbe opinion that no new market had been created and the 
product in question was already established on the Community market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 726/89 of 20 March 
1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the 
People's Republic of China and deflnitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 
1989, No L 79124) ; 
the claimed negative effect of the competition of certain substitute product& on the state of the Community indUBtry was not 
accepted in view of the increase in demand for the like product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798/90 of 21 December 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
28 December 1990, No L 366126) ; 
the replacement of the like product by alternative products in recent years was considered to repreaent mainly a threat to the 
future of the production of the like product and not to affect the il\iurious impact of the dumping (Commission Decision 
911392/EEC) of 21 June 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of certain asbestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, No 
L 209/37); 
the Community indUBtry was able to provide all types of the like product, including those which met the particwar 
requirements of specific categorie& of users (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473193 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on im.ports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 14611). 
No il\iury caused by the dumping was found because : 
the dumping exporter was able to offer a broader range of product&, some of which may have been more suited to customer 
requirements (Commission Decision 831493/EEC of 28 September 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
imports of llanthan gum originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 30 September 1983, No L 268/60) ; 
a price increase of the like product would depress demand and lead to substitution of the like product by other, less expensive 
product& (Commission Decision 811493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning im.ports of 
furfural originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, No L 189/67). · 
553 
1323 The dumping was found to cause material injury : 
notwithatanding the condemnation of certain aspects of the pricing policy of the French producers by French antitrust 
authorities (Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/88 of 17 January 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
chemical fertilizer originating in the United Statee of America, 0 . .1., 19 .January 1983, NoL 16/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 290/83 of 2 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
fertilizer originating in the United Statesof Am.erica, O . .J., 4 February 1988, NoL 3319); 
because there was no evidence that the Community producers distorled or restricted. competition on the Community market 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361/87 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of fe:rro-
silico-calciumlcalcium silicide originating in Bl"azil, O . .J., 19 May 1987, NoL 129/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3366/87 of 
9 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of fel'l'O-silico-calciumlcalcium silicide originating in 
Brazil, O . .J., 12 November 1987, 32211; see also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of mercury originating in the Boviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional 
anti-dumping duty imposed on such impo:rts, O . .J., 10 December 1987, NoL 346127; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 
18 September 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic 
of China and the Soviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such impo:rts, O . .J., 
20 September 1989, No L 27111) ; 
as the condemnation of the Community producer by French antitrust authorities for hindering the setting-up of a competitor 
in a doWI18tr8am indUBtry by refusing to supply that competitor, did not pertain to the Community producer's behaviour 
during the investigation period, and because there was evidence that, during the investigation period, the Community 
producer bas made considerable effo:rts in order to be able to supply hls competitor in the downstraam indUBtry (CommiBBion 
Regulation (EC) No 892194 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of calcium metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China and RUBSia, O . .T., 23 April 1994, No L 104/6; Council Regulation (EC) No 
2667194 of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of calcium metal originating in the People's 
Republic of China and Russia, O . .J., 21 October 1994, NoL 270/27); 
notwithstanding the price preBBure which the newly established Community producers might have exerted (CommiBBion 
Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.po:rts of colour television 
receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O . .J., 1 
October 1994, No L 256/60) ; 
notwithstanding that the market succeBS of a dumping exporter might be explained by the fact that he posseBBed the 
exclusive rights to manufacture a type of the like product for which a growing demand had existed (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers 
originating in Japan, O . .J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12); 
in view of the decline in the number of Community producers (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 of 29 August 1980 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of certain polyester yam originating in the United Statee of America, 
O . .J., 2 September 1980, NoL 23116; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on impo:rts of certain tenured polyester fabrics originating in the United States of Am.erica, O . .J., 20 May 
1981, No L 133/17 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3453/81 of 2 December 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on impo:rts of certain ootton yams originating in Turkey, O.J., 3 December 1981, NoL 347/19; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
789/82 of 2 April 1982 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of certain ootton yarns originating in Turkey, 
O . .T., 3 March 1982, No L 90/1). 
The European anti-dumping authorities must actually examine whether the Community producers did not intliet injury upon 
themselves by their allegedly trade-restrictive behaviour. They must not invoke the fact that the national or European antitrust 
authorities did not yet reach a verdict, as lack of evidence (C.J.E.C., case C-368/89, 11 June 1992, Extramet Industrie SA v Council, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (3813), 3836 and 3838 (Opinion of Avocate General JACOBS), and 3848-3849). 
In several anti-dumping cases, no finding of injurious dumping has been made because : 
of strong contractual ties between the Community indUBtry and its main customers (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the 
Boviet Union, O . .J., 24 November 1979, NoL 297/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O . .J., 22 February 1980, No 
L 48/1); 
the reduction in production capacity of the Community indUBtry was caused by an arrangement signed by the mY>rity of the 
Community producers (CommiBBion Decision 871236/EEC of 10 April 1987 tenninating the anti-dumping· proceeding on 
impo:rts of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the Gennan DemoCl'atic Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, 
O . .J., 16 April1987, NoL 103138); 
of the high clegree of competition reeuiting from intra-Community trade (CommiBBion Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning impo:rts of Portland cement originating in the Gennan DemOCl'atic 
Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O,.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 
1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of certain deep fl'eezers originating in the USSR, . accepting the 
undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep fl'eezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the 
Gennan DemOCl'atic Republic and terminating the investigation, and tenninating the proceeding concerning impo:rts of 
certain deep fl'eezers, O . .T., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14 (with regard to chest freezers)), unleBB it existed in a previous 
period (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and in the Gennan Demoeratic Republic, O . .T., 20 August 1988, 
NoL 2281'28). 
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relocation of Community-owned production facilities to third countries1325, the purchasing 
It m.ight be astonishing why the factor eetrade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreing and dornestic producers» 
has but infrequently resulted in findingsof no injury. However, recent economie research has shown that Community industries 
with high concentration and cohesion are quite successful in obtaining injury finding. This conneetion between fmdings of injury 
and the degree of concentration and cohesion in the Community indUBtry is a matter of concern, since anti-dumping rellef may 
favour collusion among the Comunity producers ('l'HARAKAN, P.K.M., and WAELBROECK, J., ccAntidumping and countervailing 
duty decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S. An experiment in comparative political economy .. , Europecm Economie Review, 1994, 
(171), 183 and 187). Therefore, trade restrictive practices should be more carefully scrutinized. 
In conneetion with the factor tctrade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and dornestic producers••, reference 
has also been made to the product life cycle (in conneetion with the product life cycle in gener al, see : DORW ARD, N ., The pricing 
decision: Economie theory cmd bruiness practice, London, Harper & Row, 1987, 127-128): 
in small 1creen colour television receivers from the Republie of Korea, HongKong cmd the People's Republie of China, it was 
considered normal for prices of consumer electronica items to fall over time, for reasons of increased volume and technical 
improvements in production. Because it was thought that these factors tend to be very limited when the product is positioned 
at a mature point on its current technology curve, the dumping was found to cause material injury (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour television 
receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 
of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour television receivers 
· originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14131) ; 
in radio-brotldcCJBt receivers of a kind rued in motor veh.iele• /rom South. Korea the European anti-dumping authorities were of 
the opinion tbat, as the product'& technological development curve is near to its maximum possible level, the price reductions 
found could not be explained by factors deriving from a normal competitive context, such as increased production volumes 
and improved manufacturing techniques (Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 im:posing a provisional 
witi-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 
11 February 1992, No L 3418) ; 
in compact di.ac players from Japan. an.d South. Korea it was noted that tc(f)ollowing the launeb of CPDs by a very limited 
number of manufacturers, prices fell rapidly as production expanded and new producers entered the market» and that 
cc(p)rices quickly bottomed out to a level barely above coats for basic models and competition switcbed to focus on more 
advanced features and styling.. (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in. Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No 
L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 257127)). 
The latter case provides a correct interpretation of tbe product life cycle. Indeed, intbat case it was stated that after having 
passed through the introductory and growth stage the basic models have entered the mature stage in which the price competition 
from substitutes is the most intense, resulting in prices barely covering production coats. The more advanced models, however, aN 
still in their growth stage in which the maintenance and even tbe impravement of their quality is emphasized. 
The other two cases, bowever, do not give a correct application of the product life cycle. Indeed, at the mature stage of a product, 
price decreases are not unusual because at this stage competition is the sharpest. Thus, at the mature stage price decreases are 
caused by competition and not by other factors such as technological progress. 
1324 In" • d . ~ nd ~unous umpang was aou : 
because the dumping producers had contributed to the decline in world prices of the like product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 
of 12 Auguil 1987 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of mercury originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republica, 
O.J., 14 Auguil 1987, NoL 227/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importa of mercury originating in the Soviet Union and definitively collecting the proviaional anti-dumping duty imposed on such importa, 
O.J., 10 December 1987, No L 346/27) ; 
deapite the worldwide underlying downward trend in the prices of the like product (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 
1987 impoaing a proviaionalanti-dumping duty on importa of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the Gennan Democratie Republic, Kuwait, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoalavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121/11 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and 
accepting undertakinga given in conneetion with importa of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the Gennan Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, 
the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoalavia and tcnninating these investigationa, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1). 
No injurioua dumping waa found because the prices had atarted to rise in the Community but also worldwide (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2702/87 of 4 September 1987 repealing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on styrene mononier originating in the United Statea of America and 
tenninating the investigation, O.J., 8 September 1987, NoL 258/20). 
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policy of the economie group to . which the Community producers belong1326, the coincidence 
of trade policy measures with regard to imports from the dumping country in question1327) 
1325 In smeUl-screen. colour television. receiver• from Hong Kong an.d the People'• Republic of China, the relocation of Community-
owned production facilities to third countries did not prevent a finding of injurioue dumping because the market share held by total 
Community &ales (i.e., soureed from both Community and ~xtra-Community production facilities) decreaaed (Commi&Sion Regulation 
(EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of amall-acreen colour telavision 
receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China. O.J., 19 January 199l, NoL 14131). 
In radio-broadctJBt · receiver• of a kind wed in. motor vehiclea from South Korea and in colour television. receivers from Malaysia, the 
People's Republic of Chin.G, the Republic of Korea, Singapore an.d Thailcuul., the relocation of Community-owned production 
facilities, dictated by the need to improve competitivene&S by reducing the coats of component& and labour, had ledtoa conaiderable 
increaae in import& into the Community of product& manufactured by the11e production facilities and, thue, bad enabled tbe 
Community industry to. better defend ite position on tbe Community market (Commi&Sion Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 
February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vebicles, 
originating in South Korea. O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8 ; Commi&Sion Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of 
China, the Republic of Korea. Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 265/50). 
Conversely, in a.udW tapes in. ctJBsettes from Japcua, the Republic of Korea cuul HongKong, a finding of injurious dumping was made 
because tbe rate of capacity utilization decreaeed and the increase in production capacity corresponded to the cessation of 
production by tbe Community indUBtry in produ~ion facilities located outside tbe Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, 
tbe Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 31315 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36)). 
No injury will be found when tbe Community producers started on a large scale to relocate their production facilities to third 
countries at the expense of their production in tbe Community after tbe imposition of the anti-dumping measures (Commission 
Decision 931376/EEC of 16 June 1993 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 
1698/85 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, No 
L 157n6). 
1326 Injurious dumping waa found because the purebases of the raw material by the Community producers from associated companies located 
outside th.e Community could oot have influenced their profit and lou, situation since the costs of their purebases in relation to the overall coat of 
the finished produels were generally in line with the ratios of raw material coat to finished cost of the duntping exporters (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 
15 January 1993, NoL 911). 
No injurious dumping was found because the financiallosses were caused by ~e group's purehasing policy, i.e., the fact that the transfer price for 
the like product witliin the group was too low to allow the group's producers to make a profit (C.J.E.C., case C-315/90, 27 November 1991, 
Groupemmt des Industries de Malériels d'Equipemenl EJectrique et de l'EJectronique lndustrieUe Associée (Gimelec) a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 
1991, I, (5589), 5598 (Report for the Hearing: plea in law of the applicants) and 5621-5622; Commission Decision 90/399/EEC of26 July 1990 
tenninating an anti-dumping proceeding conceming import& of eertaio single phase, two-speed electric motors originating in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Czechoalovakia, O.J., 31 July 1990, NoL 202/47). 
1327 lf tbe dumped import& are subject to quantitative restrictions or voluntary export rastraint agreements, tbe dumping may be 
found to causa iqjury (Commi&Sion Regulation (EEC) No 84/82 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
mechanica! wrist-watcbes originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11114), unless the quantitative restrictiona or 
voluntary export reatraint agreement& are not fully respected (Commi&Sion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 
imposing a provisional· anti-dumping duty on import& of small screen colour television receivers originating in tbe Republic of 
Korea. O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 314/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 2ó April 1990 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of smali-acreen colour television receivers originating in tbe Republic of Korea and collecting deflnitively 
the provisional duty, O.J., 27 April 1990, No L 107/56 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 May 1990, No L 133192)). Nevertbele&S, the 
observance of quantitative restrictiona and voluntary export rastraint agreements is no waterproof guarantee. for a finding of no 
injurious dumping. For ilijurioue dumping bas been found in respect of import& subjected to quantitative restrictiona of whicb it 
was not said whetber or not they were obeerved (Commi&Sion Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import. of small-acreen colour telavision receivers originating in HongKong and the People'e 
Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14/31; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imj)osing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of cotton yam originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating tbe anti-
dumping proceeding in reapeet of cotton yam originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia. India. tbe People's Republic of China and Turkey and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea. O.J., S October 
1991, No L 276!7 ; Council Regulation (EEC) -No ~38192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import. of 
cotton yam originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 Marcb 1992, No L 82/1). 
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may result in a finding either of injurious dumping or of no injurious dumping. Like the majority 
of «other factorS», but in a higher number of cases, those factors onder identical circumstances 
may result in opposite conclusions1328• Moreover, onder divergent circumstances, they may 
also result in identical conclusions1329• U sually no reason is provided, explaining why 
A system of minimum prices will not prevent a finding of injurious dumping either when that mechanism is suspended because it 
was ineffective and could easily be circumvented (Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of ootton yarn originating in Brazil and Turkey, 0 . .1., 27 March 1992, No L 8211). 
If the injury suffered by the Community industry is already remedied by countervailing duties, no anti-dumping rellef will be 
granted (Commission Decision 811430/EEC of 15 .June 1981 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain 
seamless tubes or non-alloy steels originating in Spain, 0 . .1., 23 June 1981, NoL 165/27; conversely, a countervalling duty will not 
be imposed in combination with an anti-dumping duty, see: CommiBBion Recommendation No 2129/83/ECSC of 27 July 1983 
imposing a definitive countervalling duty on import& of certain steel plates originating in Brazil and suspending the appllcation of 
this duty, O.J., 29 July 1983, L 205/29). It is expressly provided in European anti-dumping law that a product cannot be subject to 
both anti-dumping and countervailing duties for the purpose of dealing with one and the same situation arising from dumping or a 
subsidy (Article 1-&(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(9) basic ECSC Decision). According to the European anti-dumping 
authorities, the prohibition of cumulating anti-dumping and countervailing duties is only aimed at preventing double counting 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of hall hearings 
with a graatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, 0 . .1., 16 June 1990, No L 152124, upheld in 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2934190 of 9 October 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of hall hearings with 
graatest e:xternal diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 12 
October 1990, NoL 28111). Double counting may be caused by the fact that the countervailable subsidy, increases the dumping 
margin because it causes a decline in the export price or a rise in the normal value. If that effect of a subsidy on the dumping 
margin is nottaken into account, the injury caused by the subsidy would be twice countervailed, i.e., once by the countervalling 
duty and once by the anti-dumping duty. For preventing such double counting, the impact of the countervailable subsidy on the 
dumping margin must be examined. If the net dumping margin (i.e., the dumping margin less the effect of the countervailable 
subsidy) is positive, anti-dumping rellef may be granted. · 
1328 For example, in conneetion with the factor tctrade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and dornestic 
producer&», the existence of a high degree of competition between the Community producers has underbuilt a finding of no 
injurious dumping (Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& 
of Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep · 
freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the 
proceeding concerning import& of certain deep freezers, O . .T., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14 (with regard to chest freezers)). 
However, evidence that competition between Community producers affects the levèl of market prices does not always underbuilt a 
finding of no injurious dumping (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the 
investigation of import& of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating 
the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, No 
L 259/14 (with regard to upright freezers) ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore 
than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, 
O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68). 
1329 For example, in conneetion with the factor ..trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and dornestic 
producer&» findings of no injury have been based on the existence of a high dagree of competition between the Community 
producers (Commission Decision 86/344/EEC of 17 July 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
Portland cement originating in the German Demoeratic Republlc, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 25 July 1986, No L 202/43; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep 
freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republlc and terminating the investigation, and terminating the 
proceeding concerning import& of certain deep freezers, 0 . .1., 11 September 1986, No L 259/14 (with regard to chest freezers)) as 
well as on a restrietion of competition between them (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2599n9 of 22 November 1979 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate originating in the Boviet Union, 0 . .1., 24 November 1979, NoL 297112; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on certain sodium carbonate 
originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 22 February 1980, No L 48/1; Commission Decision 87/236/EEC of 10 April 1987 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia, 0 . .1.,.15 April1987, NoL 103/38). 
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identical circumstances result in opposite conclusions and why divergent circumstances result in 
identical conclusions1330• 
1330 With regard to the factor ecvolume of import& not aold at dumping pricea. an explanation is aometimes provided, explaining 
why, despite ofthe high volume ofnon-dumped import& or its increase, the dumping is found to cause material injury, namely: 
the fact that the volume of non-dumped import& has not shown ·the sudden increase as the volume of dumped import& 
(Comm.iBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2999/80 of 20 November 1980 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate 
monomer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 21 November 1980, NoL 311/13); 
the fact that the increase was mainly attributable to the fuller uae third countries made of the tonnages agreed under trade 
arrangement& with the Community, without exceeding them (aee e.g., Commiuion Decision No 3599/88/ECSC of 18 
November 1988 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of certain iron or &teel sectiona originating in Yugoslavia 
and Turkey, definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duties impoaed on thoae imports, accepting undertakings 
given in conneetion with import& of iron or steel sectiona originating in Yugoslavia and Turkey and terminating the 
investigation with regard to the exporters concerned, O.J., 19 November 1988, No L 313/18) ; 
the fact that the increase was limited to the quantitative maximum determined in trade arrangement& (CommiBBion Decision 
No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisjonal anti-dumping duty on import& of certain flat-rolled product& of iron 
or non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 March 1989, No L 78114). 
With regard to the faCtor tcdemand• an explanation is more frequently provided, pointing out why : 
findings of injurious dumping have been made : 
becauae the increase indemand benefited the dumped import& more than the Community induBtry (aee e.g., CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefm 
bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, NoL 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 
1990, NoL 256/38)); 
becauae the Community induBtry did notbenefit from the increased demand (Comm.iBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 
of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain large electrolytic 
aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No 
L 163127) ; Comm.iBBion Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of gum rosiJl originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41150) ; 
because the decline indemand affected the Community indUBtry more than the dumped imports (aee e.g., Commiuion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1994192 of 14 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community 
of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 18 July 1992, No L 199/8) ; 
becauae the Community producers' sales or market share did not run parallel to the evolution in demand, thereby 
generating a decrease in the market share of the Community induBtry (aee e.g., Commssion Regulation (EC) No 1076194 
of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain watch movements originating in 
Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994,-No L 12013); 
becauae the dumped import& increased-by more than the Community demand (see e.g., Commission Regulation (EEO) 
No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes 
originating in JapaÎl, the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 13 November 1990, NoL 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 
12 January 1991, No L9/36)), becauae they have increased while Community demand was falling (see e.g., CommiBSion 
Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten ores 
and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning import& 
originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123) or becauae they have decreased by leBS than the 
Community demand (aee e.g., CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1472191 of 29 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in 
respect of import& of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, NoL 138/62) (i.e., in all these cases 
an increase in the market share of the dumped imports) ; 
becauae the increase in the Community producers' sales reflected only the increase in conaumption and, therefore, the 
market share of the Community indUBtry remained constant (aee e.g., Comm.iBBion Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 
March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten ores and concentratee originating in the 
People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning import& originating in HongKong, O.J., 30 
March 1990, No L 83123) ; 
becauae the evolution in the volume of dumped import& coincided with the evolution in Comm.Unity demand (i.e., a 
stabie market share of the dumped import&) (Commission Decision 901240/EEC of 22 may 1990 terminating the 
proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures regarding import& of fibre building-board (hardboard) 
originating in Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 861232/EEC 
accepting the undertakings given by the exporters concerned, O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/44 ; Council Regulation (EC) 
No 64~ of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 in respect of defmitive anti-dumping duties on 
imports of potaBSium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, No L 80/1) ; 
. becauae the reduction in Community consumption took place in a period during which the Community producer did not 
suffer financial losses (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186111) ; 
findings of no injury have been made·: 
becauae the Community producers'· sales decreased in volume at a lower rate than demand, thereby generating an 
increase in the market share of the Community induBtry (CommiBBion Decision 85/143/EEC of 18 February 1985 
t-: 
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European anti-dumping case law, therefore, ·seems not to be very clear. The complexity of each 
case (e.g., the interrelationship between various factors, including dumping) does make European 
anti-dumping case law complex and, to some extent, vague. However, since only rarely the 
complexity of the case is invoked to explain why · identical circumstances result in opposite 
conclusions and vice versa, the vagueness may disguise «one-way flexibility». 
Indeed, only «one-way flexibility» may explain why the examination of «Other factors» usually 
does not result in findings of no injurious dumping. The presence of «one-way flexibility» may 
easily be shown by means of two examples. First, there seems to be no other explanation why 
factors, such as «developments in technology» and «aver-capacity», in cases concerning Japanese 
importsof technologically advanced products, such as photocopiers, printers, DRAMs, EPROMs, 
compact disc players and video cassette recorders, are not accepted as a cause of the injury 
suffered by the Community industry, for it is generally known that Japan is on the edge of 
technology and, especially of its application in the sector of consumer electric and electrooie 
products. Second, only «one-way flexibility» may explain why European anti-dumping case law is 
not consistent as to the problem of teehoical dumping and the problem of high unit costs during a 
start-upor expansion phase : 
. The factor cprices of imports not sold at dumping prices» bas not prevented a finding of no injurious dumping in 
cases where the non-dumping exporters were obliged to align their prices to those charged by the dumping 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain boots with fitted ice skates originating in 
Czeehoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Hungary, O.J., 22 February 1986, NoL 52/48); 
because the dumped import& have increased in volume at a lower rate than Community demand, thereby generating a 
smaller market share of the dumped imports (Commission Deeision 90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 terminating an anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain single phase, two-speed electric motors originating in Bulgaria, 
Romania and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 31 July 1990, NoL 202/47); 
because the evolution in the volume of dumped import& coincided with the evolution in Community demand (i.e., a 
stabie market share of the dumped imports) (Commission Decision 85/4 70/EEC of 7 October 1985 terminating the anti-
dumping p:roceeding concerning imports of standard wood partiele board originating in BUigaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Romania, the Boviet Union, Spain and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 268/22; Commission Decision 
90/240/EEC of 22 May 1990 terminating the proceeding in conneetion with a review of anti-dumping measures 
regarding imports of fibre building-board (hardboard) originating in Finland, Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia 
and repealing Decisions 86/35/EEC and 861232/EEC accepting the undertakings given by the exporters concerned, O.J., 
31 May 1990, No L 138/44). 
In conneetion with the factor tcdemand», European anti-dumping case law, thus, seems to be elear : an increase in the market share 
of the dumped imports results in a finding of i.JVurious dumping, an increase in the market share of. the Community industry 
results in a finding of no iJ:üury, and a conatant market share of either the dumped imports or the Community industry can have 
both results. 
However, if European anti-dumping case law in conneetion with the factor teJDarket share» (whieh is used as indication for the 
effect of the dumping on the state of the Community industry (Articles 3.2. and 3.4. GATr Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 3(3) and (5) 
basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2Xa) and (c) basic ECSC Decision)) is taken into account (see : supra, 44 7 and 488), such a clear 
conclusion cannot be made in conneetion with the factor tcdemand». Findings of no iJ:üury and findings of injury have been made 
regardless ofthe evolution in the market share ofthe dumped import& and the Community industry. It, therefore, seems, that the 
factor tcdemand.. is invoked in order to stress the factor «mar ket share• if that factor is decisive. 
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exporters in order to find a buyer1331 • This contrasts sharply with the attitude of the European anti-dumping 
authorities vis-à-vis technical dumping, not accepting a price alignment defence made by the dumping exporters 
with regard to dumped imports from third countries1332• Thus, in fact, price aligment to dumped prices is 
allowed in so far it does not result in dumping. 
Similarly, the factor cover-capacity» was not found to be convincing in a case where the dumping exporters' 
argument that the Community industry was suffering injury because its significant investment in over-capacity 
had entailed high unit costs, was rejected. Their argument was rejected because the European anti-dumping 
authorities considered that «it is a normal consequence of the early years of any industry that unit costs do not 
reach an optimum level»1333• In other cases, the European anti-dumping authorities accepted that financial 
losses may be expected at the start of production1334• This contrasts sharply with European anti-dumping 
case law, dating from before the 1994 GATI Anti-dumping Code, where the same idea vis-à-vis allegedly 
dumping exporters in a start-up or expansion phase was rejected 1335. The latter con tradietion is even more 
striking as the principle of non-discrimination bas been invoked explicitly as the reason why a differentiated 
treatment is · refused to allegedly dumping exporters in a start-up or expansion phase, whereas no explanation is 
given why a different treatment of Community producers in a start-up or expansion phase does not violate this 
principle with regard to the other Community producers as well as with regard to the allegedly dumping 
exporters in a start-up or expansion phase. As the 1994 GATI Anti-dumping Code explicitly requires to take 
account of the fact that production costs of the dumping exporters may be affected by start-up operations (Article 
2.2.1.1. ; see also : Artiele 2(S)(b) basic EC Regulation)1336, this unequal treatment between the dumping 
exporters and the Community producers should normally disappear in European anti-dumping case law. 
Both contradictions in European anti-dumping case law show a «<ne-way flexibility». Indeed, by 
refusing the teehoical dumping argument to the dumping exporters, the European anti-dumping 
1331 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof mercury 
originating in the Boviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such import&, 0 . .1., 10 
December 1987, NoL 346127; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain import& of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No 
L 240/6 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
tungsten ores and concentratee originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning import& 
originating in Hong Kong, 0 . .1., 30 March 1990, No L 83123. 
See also : vinyl acetGte monomer from the Uniled Stales of America, where the highly competitive nature of the Community market 
was invoked in order to explain why non-d.umped import&, which were sold at prices not substantially different from the dumped 
prices, did not prevent that the dumped import& were considered to cause injury to the Community induBtry (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2999/80 of 20 November 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on vinyl acetate monomer 
originating in the United Statee of America, O . .T., 21 November 1980, No L 311/13). 
1332 Supra, 469-470. 
1333 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2079/83 of 26 July 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of dicumyl 
peroxide originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 27 July 1983, No L 203/13. See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 28 
November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statee of 
America, 0 . .1., 29 November 1990, No L 330116. 
1334 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on impotts of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 irnposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio types of electrooie microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random accesa memoriea) 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, NoL 272/13. 
See also: Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa of certain magnetic 
disks (3,5" microdiaka) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 9515 ; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating 
in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, No L 236/2. 
1335 Supra, 164-166. 
1336 Supra, 165-166. 
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authorities deprive them of an excuse for their dumping ; but, by accepting price aligments by 
non-dumping exporters to low-priced dumped imports, they neutralise the factor «prices of imports 
not sold at dumping prices» which would otherwise have been a ground for not finding the 
dumping causing material injury. Similarly, by refusing a differentiated treatment to allegedly 
dumping exporters, they increase the chance of fmding dumping ; but, by accepting that 
Community producers are not able to cover all their production costs during a start-up or 
expansion phase, they neutralise the factor •over-capacity» which could otherwise have been 
invoked as a reason for not finding injurious dumping. The latter contradiction, however, is 
expected to disappear, but only because the new GAIT Anti-dumping Code restricts the room for 
manoevre of the European anti-dumping authorities by requiring special adjustments vis-à-vis 
dumping exporters whose production costs are affected by start-up operations (Article 2.2.1.1. 
GAIT Anti-dumping Code ; see also : Artiele 2(5)(b) basic EC Regulation). 
4.3. CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP 
4.3.1. Trendsanalysis : the European approach 
Under GA IT and European anti-dumping law, the in jury caused by other factors must not be 
attributed to the dumping (Article 3.5. GAIT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(7) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). Thus, the injury caused by the dumping must be 
separated from the injury caused by other factors. Contrary to initia! GA IT and European anti-
dumping law1337, it is no longer required that dumping is the principal cause of the in jury nor 
that the consequences of dumping are weighed against the effect of all other factors 
together1338• It must only be demonstrated that the dumping has caused ·some material in jury, 
1337 1968 GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 459/68. 
1338 C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 and 300/86, 6 October 1988, Can.on.In.c. a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6731), 6809; BESELER, J.-F., 
Die Abweh.r uon. Dumping un.d Subuentionen. durch die Europäiseh.e Gemein.seh.aften., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980, 96-99 ; BESELER, 
J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., An.ti-Dumping an.d An.ti-Subsidy Law. Th.e European. Commun.ities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 
166-167; BOUDANT, J., L'an.ti-dumping commun.cwtaire, Paria, Economica, 1991, 127-129; BRYAN, G., and BOURSEREAU, 
D.G., ccAntidumping Law in the European Communities and the United States: A Comparative Analysis••, George Wuh.ington. 
Joumal of Intern.ation.al Law an.d Econ.omics, 1984-1986, (631), 648 ; KRETSCHMER, H., D011 An.tidumping- un.d 
An.tisubuentiomrech.t der Europäischen. Gemein.sehaften., Frankfurt, VWV-Verlag, 1980, 66; LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime 
commun.autoi.re de proteetion con.tre Ie dumping et les subven.tion.s, Paria, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983, 101-102; STANBROOK, C., Dumping. 
A Man.ual on. th.e EEC Anti-Dumping Law an.d Procedure, Chequers, European BusineBB Publications, 1980, 32 ; VAN BAEL, L, 
and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping an.d oth.er Trade Proteetion Laws of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1990, 136; 
VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law cmd Practice in. th.e Un.ited States cmd the European. Commun.ities. A Comparative Analysis, 
Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 646. 
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irrespective of the in jury caused by other factors1339• The watering down of the causality test, 
however, did not have any discemable impact on European anti-dumping case law1340• 
As required by GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, the determination of in jury must be based on 
positive evidence and must involve an objective analysis of the impact of the dumped imports on 
the Community industry (Article 3.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(1) basic EC 
Regulation). Thus, the European anti-dumping authorities cannot fmd a causal relationship merely 
· because, for instance, the dumping exporters are unable to prove that their imports did oot intliet 
injury upon the Community industry. They must demonstrate that the dumping is responsible for 
the injury suffered by the Community industry (see: Artiele 3(6) basic EC Regulation). ECSC 
anti-dumping law does contain such explicit requirement. However, even in ECSC anti-dumping 
cases, the determination of the causal relationship on the basis of positive evidence, as well as an 
objective examination of the impact of the dumping on the Community industry should be made ; 
otherwise, those cases would be at varianee with GA TT anti-dumping law. 
The metbod the European anti-dumping authorities have always adopted, is the metbod of trends 
analysis. That metbod bifurcates the investigation into in jury and causality. First, the European 
anti-dumping authorities investigate whether the Community industry suffers in jury, regardless of 
whether this injury is caused by the dumping1341 • If the Community industry does not suffer 
1339 In se rial-impact dot-matrix printera from Japcm, tcthe Council (was) of the opiliion, in keeping with the case law. of the court 
(see Judgement of 5 October 1988, Canon v. Council, joint cases No 277/85 and No 300/85, not yet published) that findings of i.Jüury 
are not confined to cases where dumping is the principal cause and accordingly that responsability for injury is attributable to the 
exporters, even ü the losses resultant from dumping are justapart of a greater injury arising from other factors. Finally, the fact 
that a Community producer is facing difficulties attributable to causes other than dumping is nota reason to deprive that producer 
of all proteetion against the injury eaueed by dumping• (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No 
L 317/33; C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalcqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v CouncU, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2105 (Report for 
the Hearing : conclueions of the Council)). 
In the same sense : CommiBBion Decision 911392/EEC of 21 June 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain asbestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the inv~stigation, 
O.J., 31 July 1991, No L 209/37; CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China. the Republic of 
Korea. Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50. 
1340 VAN BAEL, L, and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trad~! Proteetion Law• ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editi~ns Ltd., 
1990, 140-141; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practi.ce in. the Un.ited State• and the European. Commun.i.tie•. A 
Comparatwe An.aly•iB, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987,647. 
1341 Advocate General LENZ bas argued that all the louea of the Community industry in reapeet of which the lack of relationahip with the 
dumped imporb ia not eatablilhed from the outaet, .may be included in the detennination of injury (C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, NalwjiiNI 
.AU lncision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2159 (Opinion of Advocate Genenl LENZ). 
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(material) in jury, the proceeding is terminated because of lack of injury1342 0 If the 
Community industry does suffer material in jury, causality is examinedo A direct causal 
relationship between dumping and injury is required1343 0 It is not sufficient to establish that 
the dumping is just one among various causes of injuryo Therefore, some anti-dumping cases 
have been terminated on the ground that the injury caused by the dumping could not be isolated 
from that caused by other factors1344o In most anti-dumping cases, however, the injury 
caused by the dumping could be distinguished from the injury caused by other factors1345 0 In 
those cases the dumping is usually found to cause injury if at the same time the volume of the 
dumped imports increases and the state of the Community industry, measured by factors such as 
volume of sales, production, profits, deteriorates1346, regardless of whether the other factors 
at the sametime show an improvement. 
From an economie point of view, the trends analysis is characterized by three fundamental 
flaws1347 0 First, because of the bifurcation between the investigation into in jury and causality, 
anti-dumping rellef may only be granted if the Community industry is not doing well. Indeed, the 
investigation into causality is initiated only when injury suffered by the Community industry has 
1342 Council Decision 86/59/EEC of 6 March 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of dead-burned 
(sintered) natural magnesite originating in the People's Republic of China and North Korea, O.J., 13 March 1986, NoL 70/41; 
CommiBBion Decision 88/651/EEC of 23 December 1988 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain 
cellular mobile radio telephones originating in Canada, Hong Kong and Japan, O.J., 30 December 1988, No L 362/59 ; Commission 
Decision 89/511/EEC of 22 August 1989 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hydraulic excavators 
originating in Japan, O.J., 25 August 1989, No L 249n1 ; Commission Decision 89/537/EEC of 27 September 1989 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of mica originating in Japan, O.J., 3 October 1989, No L 284/45. 
1343 KAPLAN, 8., cclnjury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations: Five Recent Approaches", in Policy 
lmplications of Antidumping MeCJBures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 147-149; 
1344 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the 
Boviet Union, 0 . .1., 19 October 1983, NoL 286/29; Commission Decision 83/626/EEC of 12 December 1983 terminating the anti-
dumping prooaeding concerning import& of saccharin and its salts originating in China, the Republic of Korea and the United 
Statas of America, 0 . .1., 15 December 1983, NoL 352/49; Commission Decision 86/536/EEC of 7 November 1986 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain tube and pipe fittings originating in Brazil, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Japan, 
O.J., 8 November 1986, No L 313120 ; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping an.d other Trade Proteetion Laws of the 
EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1990, 142-143. 
1345 See e.g., Commission Decision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
conceming import. of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and tenninating the investigation with regard to these countries ; u 
well as tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding conceming imports of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a proviaional anti-
dumping duty on import. of coloor television receiven originating in Malayaia, the People'a Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255150. 
1346 Usually, this coincidence in time is explicitly underscored, see e.g.: CommiBBion Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, 
Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, No L 1215. 
1347 See: KAPLAN, 8., eclnjury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations: Five Recent Approaches", in Policy 
lmplicatioru of Antidumping MeCJBures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 149-155; KNOLL, 
M.S., ccLegal and Economie Framework for the Analysis of Injury by the U.S. International Trade Commission••, .Tourn.al of World 
Trade Law, 1989, (96), 104-105. 
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been established. However, under European anti-dumping law, the state of the Community 
industry as such is not relevant. The issue is whether the Community industry would be doing 
better but for the practice of dumping. lndeed, a Community industry doing well may suffer from 
dumping because the dumping may have prevented the Community industry from doing even 
better than is actually the case. 
Second, because only a weak causation test is applied, · the state of the Community industry is 
more preponderant than the effect of the dumping on it. According to this test, it is usually 
sufficient that a deterioration in the state of the Community industry ooioeides in time with an 
increase in ( dumped) imports sold at prices which undercut the price charged by the Community 
industry on the Community mar ket. Such a coincidence, however, does not explain the 
relationship between the state of the Community industry and the effects of the dumping . 
. Coinciding factors do notprove a causal relationship between them. The state of the Community 
in dustry and the . dumping may depend both on a common, or even a different cause. The 
investigation into other factors which could also have a negative effect on the Community 
industry, is not a remedy. It is suffers from the same defect, i.e. , the assumption that a 
coincidence necessarily proves a causal relationship between those other factors and the state the 
Community industry is in. 
Third, the question most certainly arises whether it is possible to discem all the factors which 
could adversely affect the Community industry. If some factors are overlooked, the negative 
effects of dumping on the Community industry will be overestimated. Moreover, also the factors 
which might benefit the Community industry · should be taken into account. Indeed, by 
disregarding them, the negative effects of dumping on the Community industry will be 
underestimated. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the trends analysis, upheld, though, by the Court of 
Justice1348, poses a problem under GATI and · EC anti-dumping law whch require positive 
evidence and an objective examination of causality (Article 3.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; 
Artiele 3(2) basic EC Regulation). The trends analysis is, indeed, based on positive evidence : 
the practise of dumping and the existence of injury are demonstrated on the basis of facts (though 
tbe interpretation of those facts can be discussed). However, it may called in question whether 
the trends analysis involves an objective examination of the impact of the dumping on the 
Community industry. The determination that dumping and injury coincide in time, is, indeed, 
objective. However, the choice of the trends analysis as the metbod to determine causality is 
1348 Accordiog to the Court of Justice, the European anti-dumping authorities do nol exceed the bounds of their discretion by concluding that the 
loss of market share incurred by the Community induatry is attributable to the dumping when, over the same period, there ia an increaae in the 
market share ofthe dumping exportera (C.J.E.C., caae C-69/89, 7 May 1991, NalcajimD AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 
2195). 
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perhaps less objective since it is (or should be) generally known that coincidence in time is no 
proof of causality. It may even be said that the choice of this metbod is tainted by «<ne-way 
flexibility». For usually tbe Community industry will only complain about dumping if it is not 
doing well ; hence, if dumping is being practised, the trends analysis will «automatically» result in 
tbe finding of a causal conneetion between tbe dumping and tbe injury suffered by the Community 
industry. 
In European anti-dumping case law only tbe de minimis-rule interferes with tbe metbod of trends 
analysis. Under tbat rule1349, minimal dumping margins (usually below 1 %) are an 
indication tbat tbe dumping probably could not have caused (material) injury1350• However, 
1349 The de minimi.-rule should not be confused with the margins analysis (see: •upra, 470-472). Under the margins analysis, 
the injurious effect of dumping is evaluated on the basis of the relationship between the dumping margin and the margin of price 
undercutting. Under the de minimi.-rule, the probability that dumping causes material injury, depende merely on the am.ount of 
the dumping margin as such. 
135° CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2696/80 of 21 October 1980 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 imposing a provisionai 
anti-dumping duty on importsof certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 23 October 1980, No 
L 279/18 (Unifi lncorporated: 1.05 %) ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1337/81 of 18 May 1981 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof certain textured polyester fabrics originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 20 May 1981, No 
L 133/17 (Greenwood Mille: 0.7 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2664/81 of 14 September 1981 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain textured polyester fabrics originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 16 September 
1981, NoL 262/1 (conigendum, O.J., 4 May 1985, NoL 120/18) (fexfi: 0.61 'IJ; Burlington: 0.64 'IJ; Greenwood Mille: 0.7 %) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 of 22 December 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester 
yarn originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 31 December 1980, NoL 358191 (Burlington: 0.5 'IJ; Titan Textile: 1.1 %) ; 
CommiBBion Decision 811247/EEC of 15 April 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of hermetic 
compreBBOrs originating in Brazil, Spain,'Hungary, Japan and Singapore, O.J., 25 April1981, NoL 113/53 (Spain: 0.15 'IJ; Brazil: 
0.2 %) ; CommiBBion Decision 831305/EEC of 16 June 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of non-
alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Egypt, O.J., 21 June 1983, No L 161113 (0.3 %) ; Commission Decision 84/131/EEC of 
5 March 1984 accepting an undertaking in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain synthetic 
fibre hand-k.nitting yarn originating in Turkey and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 9 March 1984, No L 67/60 (Hasköy Yün 
lplik Fabrikasi AS : 0.9 %) ; CommiBBion Decision 84/334/EEC of 26 June 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of certain ceramic tiles originating in Spain, O.J., 28 June 1984, NoL 168/35 Gess than 0.5 %) ; Commission 
Decision 85/252/EEC of 23 April 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain titanium mill 
products originating in Japan and the United Statee of America, O.J., 26 April1985, NoL 113130 (Sumitomo Metallndustries and 
RMI Company : 0.2 'IJ ; Nippon Mining Co. Ltd : 0.4 'IJ ; Teledyne Allvac : 0.9 'IJ ; Oregon Metallurgical Corporation : 1.0 %)) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings 
and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3 (Matsuo Bearing: 0.98%; Minam.iguchi 
Bearing : 0.97 %) ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2823185 of 7 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 10 October 1985, NoL 268111 (Ugglebo Toffeln: 0.3 %) ; Commission Decision 
86/21/EEC of • February 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation concerning import. 
of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 7 February 1986, No L 32/28 (Ugglebo Toffeln : 0.3 %) ; CommiBBion Decision 
85/501/ECSC of 11 November 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of wire rod originating in Brazil, 
Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, O.J., 13 November 1985, No L 299/18 (Venezuela : 0.3 %) ; Commission Decision 
86/464/EEC of 17 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of artificial corundum originating in Hungary, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 23 
September 1986, No L 271126 <Poland : 0.1 %) ; CommiBBion Decision 86/536/EEC of 7 November 1986 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain tube and pipe fittings originating in Brazil, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Japan, O.J., 
8 November 1986, No L 313120 (faiwan : less than 1 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2253187 of 23 July 1987 terminating the 
review proceeding and repealing the anti-dumping measures concerning import. of urea and ammonium nitrate in liquid solution 
originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 30 July 1987, No L 208/1 Geu than 1 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1695/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import. of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, NoL 152/58) (Far Eastem Textile 
Ltd : 0.27 'IJ ; Tuntex Fibre Co. : 0.45 % ; Nan Ya Plastics Corp. : 0.53 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 
1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, NoL 347/10 (Kolon Industries lnc.: 0.02%; Far Eastern Textile Ltd: 0.09 'IJ; Tuntex Distinct 
Corp.: 0.31%; Nan Ya Plastics Corp.: 0.52 'IJ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the 
provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with re gard to the ·import& of video tape reels originating in the 
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the . de minimis-rule bas been applied in an arbitrary way : whereas a dumping margin of 
Republic of Korea, O.J., · 22 June 1989, No L 17411 (Swilynn Ltd. : 0.02 % ; Saehan Media Co. : 1.06 %) ; Commission Decision 
90/421/EEC of 6 August 1990 tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of denim fabric originating in Turkey, 
Indonesia, Hong Kong and Macao, O.J., 17 August 1990, No L 222/60 (remaining companies : leas than 1.0 %) ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes 
originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 13 November 1990, NoL 31316 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 
1991, NoL 9136) (Forward Electronics: 0.43%; Magnatie Enterprise: 0.60 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1472191 of 29 
May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in India or China and tenninating the 
anti-dumping p:roceeding in respect of import& of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62 
(Czechoslovakia : 0.01 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2899/91 of 1 October 1991 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3906/88 and 
repealing the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed on import& into the Community of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, O.J., 2 
October 1991, No L 276/21 (dumping margin of 0.63 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, 
India, the People's Bepublic of China and Turkey and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams 
originating in thé Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT (P.T. Kewaleam lndonesia : 0.26 % ; Guangying Spinning 
Co., Ltd. : 0.42 %) ; CoDllilission Decision No 3692191/ECSC of 12 December 1991 repealing Decision No 2132/88/ECSC imposing 
definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 19 
December 1991, No L 360111 (Algeria : 0.67 % ; Yugoslavia : 0.13 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in 
South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8 (Samsung Electrome Co. Ltd.: 0.26%; Haitai Electronica Co., Ltd.: 1.06 %) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 830192 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain polyester 
yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 June 1992, NoL 163/16) (Guangying Spinning 
Co. Ltd. : 0.2 % ; PI' Kawalram lndonesia : 0.2 %) ; Commission Decision No 1776192/ECSC of 30 June 1992 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of certain semi-tinisbed product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, defmitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports and accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping p:roceeding concerning import& of these product&, O.J., 2 July 1992, NoL 182/23 (Aços Finos Piratini SA: 1~7 %) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast 
receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/8 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 21 January 1993, No L 13120) (Haitai Electronics Co. Ltd. : 0.6 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3498192 of 30 November 
1992 amending Begulation (EEC) No 1768/69 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duty on certain import& of video cassettes 
originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 4 December 1992, No L 364/1 (Inter-Cassette : 1;4 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 650/93 of 
6 ~h 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
11 March 1993, No L 68/12 (l'aiwan: 1.06 %) ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3009194 of 8 December 1994 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 830/92 by repealing the ·anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yams originating in India, O.J., 13 December 
1994, No L 32011 (several exporters : between 0.01 and 1.97 %) ; VAN BAEL, L, and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade 
Proteetion Laws ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions Ltd., 1990, 140 and 143; VERMULST, E.A., Antidumping Law and Practice in. 
the Un.ited Stales and the European. Commun.ities. A CompGI'ative An.alysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1987, 660. 
Conversely, substantial dumping margins are considered to prove a eauaallink between the dumping and the injury (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 84182 of 14 January 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on mechanica! wrist-watches originating 
in the USSR, O.J., 16 January 1982, No L 11114; Commission Decision 82/397/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting underta.kings in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning import& of certain polypropylene film for capacitors originating in Japan 
and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, NoL 172/44; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2866/86 of 14 October 1986 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic scalee originating in Japan and accepting underta.kings 
and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain impo:rte of auch product& originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1986, No 
L 276/6). 
Substantially increasing dumping margins are also proof of a eauaal link between the dumping and the injury (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2866/86 of 14 October 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic scales 
originating in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain import& of such product& 
originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1986, No L 276/6). 
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2.29 % 1351 bas been found to be de mznzmzs, anti-dumping rellef bas been granted when the 
dumping margin amounted to only 1.21 %1352• Moreover, if necessary, the European anti-
1351 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
compactdisc playera originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, 
No L 257/27); Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain compactdisc players originating in Japan and the Repuhlic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 
17 January 1990, No L 13121 (Marantz Japan Inc. : 2.29 '11 ; see also : Lux Corporation : 1.64 '11). 
See also : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, 
O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43 (Nakajima All Co. Ltd: 1.2 '11); Commission Decision 851252/EEC of 23 April 1985 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain titanium :mill product& originating in Japan and the United 
Statee of America, O.J., 26 April 1985, No L 113/30 (Martin Marietta Aluminium Inc. and Titanium Metals Corporation of 
America : 1.3 '11) ; Commission Decision 86134/EEC of 12 Fehruary 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
import& of electronic typewriters manufactured hy Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd and originating in Japan, O.J., 15 February 
1986, No L .0/29 (1.48 '11) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape reels originating in the Repuhlic of Korea, O.J., 
22 June 1989, No L 17~1 (SKC Ltd: 1.40 '11); Council Regulation (EC) No 3009194 of 8 December 1994 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 830192 hy repealing the anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarns originating in India, O.J., 13 December 
1994, NoL 320/1 (Indo Rama Synthetics (India) Ltd: 1.97 '11). 
1352 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-d~ping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1985, No L 167/3 (FKC Bearing Co. Ltd : 1.21 '11 ; see 
also : Sapporo Precision Inc. : 1.86 '11 ; NTN Toyo Bearing Ltd : 2.09 %). 
See also: Commission Decision 82/397/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure 
coneerDing import& of certain polypropylene film for capacitors originating in Japan and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 
1982, No L 1721« (Mitsui : 1.3 '11) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633182 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Decision No 
80/564/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of imports of fihre building 
board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the 
proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, No L 181/19 (Enso Gutzeitand Schauman: 1.4%; 
Svaneholms: 1.7 '11); Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/83 of 21 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarn originating in the United Statas of America, O.J., 23 Fehruary 
1983, No L 50/1 (Unifi Inc. : 1.87 %) ; Council Regwation (EEC) No 906/83 of 18 April 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
2761/81 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on o-xylene (orthoxylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the United Statas of 
America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No L 101/4 (Sun Refining & Marketing Co. : 1.8 '11 ; Arco Chemical Co. 2 %) ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1500/83 of 9 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of outboard motors originating in Japan, 
O.J., 10 June 1983, NoL 152/18 (Honda Motor Company Ltd: 2 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2879/87 of 28 September 1987 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1826/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of vinyl acetata monomar originating 
in Canada, O.J., 29 September 1987, NoL 275/1 (Honda Motor Company Ltd: 2 '11); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3669/84 of 
21 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings 
originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1984, NoL 340137 (NTN Toyo Bearing: 2.01 (ball hearings) and 2.16% (tapered roller 
hearings)) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain electronic acales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain 
import& of such product& originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5 (Y amato : 1.0 % ; lshida : 1.5 % ; Teraoka : 
2.2 %) ; Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing import& of silicon carhide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding import& of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287125 (Orkla Exolon AIS & Co.: 1.7 %) ; CommiBBion 
Decision 88/623/EEC of 12 December 1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review coneerDing 
import& of oxalic acid originating in China or Czechoslovak.ia and terminating the review, O.J., 13 December 1988, NoL 343134 
(Chemapol : 1.87 '11) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, NoL 347/10 (Chung 
Shing Textile Company Ltd : 1.67 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 J'une 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of video cassettes originating in the Repuhlic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting defmitively the provisional duty 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the import& of video tape reels originating in the Repuhlic of Korea, 
O.J., 22 June 1989, No L 174/1 (Saehan Media Co. : 1.96 % ; Kolon Industries Inc. : 2.03 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
129/91 of 11 J'anuary 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour telavision receivers 
originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14/31 (Tai Wah Telavision Industries 
Ltd : 2.16 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093191 of 15 July 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-
screen colour. televiaon receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 18 July 1991, NoL 19511 (Tai Wah Telavision Industries Ltd.: 2.16 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
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dumping authorities always have found some reason to waive a straightforward application of the 
de minimis-ruie1353• Of course, this arbitrary application must be criticized. The new GA IT 
Anti-dumping Code and the new EC anti-dumping legislation should be welcomed as they put a 
stop to this arbitrary application by obliging the anti-dumping authorities to terminate immediately 
anti-dumping proceedings in cases where the dumping margin is less than 2 % (Article 5.8. 
GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 9(3) basic EC Regulation). The basic criticism of the de 
minimis-rule, though, pertains tothefact that the amount of the dumping margin is no evidence of 
· there being a causal relationship between dumping and in jury. Indeed, even if there is but a small 
dumping margin, dumping may cause injury. For a small decrease in the prices of the dumped 
products may cause large shifts on a highly price-sensitive and, thus, price-elastic market. 
2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester yams (man-made staple 
fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of imports of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT (Reliance 
Chemotex Industries Ltd. : 2.16 % ; Chung Shing Textile Company Ltd. : 2.24 %) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 
October 1991 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of 
China and definitively collecting the provisional auty, O.J., 24 October 1991, NoL 29312 (Song Gang Hang Sing Cassette Factory: 
1.3 %) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956192 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic 
fibres ofpolyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197/25 (Sunkyong Industries: 1.68 %) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 54193 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters 
originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9/2 (Sunkyong: 1.6%; Indian Organic Chemieals: 
2 % ; Reliance Industries : 2.1 %). 
1353 Europaan anti-dumping case law provides the following explanations : · 
a weighted average dumping margin of 1.3 % was not considered to he de minimis, because the dumping margins were 
divergent and amounted in some cases up to 27 % ; strikingly, in conneetion with the weighted average dumping margin of 
another exporter amounting up to 86.4 % no raferenee was made to specific dumping margins (Commission Decision 
82/397/EEC of 14 June 1982 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning importsof 
certain polypropylene film for capacitors originating in Japan and terminating that procedure, O.J., 18 June 1982, No 
L 172/44); 
a dumping margin of 1.7% was not considered to he de minimiB, because it was an tcOVerall margin (which did) not illustrate 
( ... ) an important feature ( ... ) - namely the concentration of more significant levels of dumping in two particwar categones 
which accounted for some 35 % of the total quantities exported to the EEC by Norway .. ; for all the Norwegian exporters the 
dumping margin for first mettalurgical grades ranged between 14.6 and 40.6 %, and the dumping margin for wiresawing 
grain mixes varied between 5.0 and 8.9 % (Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of 
China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product originating in the 
People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 287125) ; 
weighted average dumping margins of only 1.0 %, 1.5 and 2.2 % were not he considered to he de minimis, because the 
dumping margins varied considerably from one Memher State to another, ; these dumping margins ranged between 0% in 
Greece and 5.8% in the Netherlands, which can neither he said to he excessively high (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2865/85 of 14 October 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of cerlain electronic scales originating in 
Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain imports of such products originating 
in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5) ; 
a dumping margin of 1.40 % was considered to he de minimis, because it was low as such, but also because the dumped 
product& were exclusively exported tosmali and medium-sized assembly companiea in the Community for further processing 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of video C888etteB 
originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting defmitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding with regard to the imports of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, 
NoL 17411); 
dumping margins of 0.43 and 0.50 % were considered to he de mininia, because they were low as such, but also because only 
small quantities were exported to the Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong 
Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 31315 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36)). 
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Neither does a high dumping margin necessa.rily imply that the prices of the dumped imports on 
the Community market are extremely low. Since the height of the dumping margin is the 
difference between the prices charged by the dumping exporters in their dornestic market and the 
dumping prices, high dumping margins mayalso result from extremely high prices in the dornestic 
mar ket. 
4.3.2. Comparative analysis : an alternative approach 
4.3.2.1. General characteristics 
The flaws in the trends analysis may be remedied out by adopting the so-called comparative 
analysis. The comparative analysis is based on the analysis given in tigure 17 in this 
Chapter1354• It considers dumping as the cause of the possible in jury to the Community 
industry and focuses on the question whether and to what extent the dumping bas caused injury to 
the Community industry. In order to solve that question, the factual world is compared with a 
counterfactual world, which is totally identical to the factual world but for the dumping. No 
investigation into the effect of other factors than the dumping on the Community industry is, 
therefore, required merely because all other factors remaio unchanged. 
Since the other factors are the same in both the factual and the counterfactual world, the effect of 
dumping on the Community industry will not be overestimated or underestimated. Moreover, by 
oomparing factual and counterfactual world, the injury and causality test are carried out 
simultaneously : if the situatiQn of the Community industry is different in the counterfactual world 
and in the factual world, only the dumping may account for it. The comparative analysis may . 
also fmd injurious dumping, even if the Community industry is actually doing well. The only 
thing that matters is that the Community industry is doing better in the counterfactual world than 
in the factual world in order to lead to the conclusion that the dumping causes injury to the 
Community industry1355• 
The major problem, however, is the reconstruction of the situation of the Community industry 
without the dumping. This requires an economie model which bas to be based on assumptions 
1354 Supra, 435-437. 
1355 BOL'IUCK, R.D., «An EconQmic Analysis. of Dumping», Joumal of World Trade Law, 1987, (45), 45-54 ; BOLTUCK, R.D., 
ccReply to ProfeBBOr Lazar's Comment on "An Economie Analysis of Dumping"•, JouriUJl of World Trade Law, 1988, (129), 129-131 ; 
KAPLAN, 8., d!ijury and Causation in USrrc Antidumping Determinations: FiveRecent Approaches", in Policy lmplicatioru of 
Antidumping Mecuurea, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 158-163; KNOLL, M.S., ecLegal and 
Economie Framework for the Analysis of Injury by the U.S. International Trade Commission», Journal of World Trade Law, 1989, 
(95), 103-107; LAZAR, F., tcStructural/Strategic Dumping: A Comment ·on Richard Boltuek's "An Economie Analysis of 
Dumping"•, Journ.al of World Trade Law, 1988, (91), 91-93. 
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which do not always corn~spond to the real situation1356• 0 However, this disavantage does not 
render the comparative analysis useless. 
4.3 .2.2. The comparative analysis applied 
As is shown by the analysis of the in jury investigation in European anti-dumping case law, 
thresholds with regard to the criteria used to establish injury are difficult to determine. Economie 
reality is, indeed, difficult to capture in strict numbers. It is, however, difficult to undo the 
impression that the injury determination is a political decision based oot only on objective criteria, 
but also on motives of mere political expediency, which are clearly influenced by the effective 
lobbying of the Community producers to the European anti-dumping authorities and the authorities 
of the Memher States1357• It may indeed be wondered why- if not for any politically 
0 motivated decision -, it bas never been properly explained why in some cases an increase of x % 
is held to show injurious dumping while in other cases, showing the same increase of x %, the 
dumping was not considered to in jure the Community industry1358• 
In jury determinations which are the result of a bargaio struck between the Community industry, 
the dumping exporters, the European authorities and the national authorities of the Memher States, 
are oot predictabie and, therefore, create legal uncertainty. In order to render the in jury 
determination more objective and, consequently, more predictable, the comparative analysis may 
be usefull. It should, at least, be used as a touchstone in such a way that the European anti-
dumping authorities should explain in plain terms why they make an injury determination contrary 
to the results under the comparative 0 analysis. Their explanation should rely on the basic 
characteristics and assumptions and, thus, defaultsof the economie model by means of which the 
counterfactual world used ·in the comparative analysis is determined. 
In order to prove the usefulness of the comparative analysis, it is applied hereinafter to four 
European anti-dumping cases. The results of the comparative analysis are compared with those of 
the injury findings of the European anti-dumping authorities. For the application of the 
1356 KAPLAN, 8., tc~JVury and Causation in USri'C Antidumping Determinations: Five Recent ApproacheS», in Policy 
lmplicatioru~ of Antidumping Meaaures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 163-165 ; VERMULST, 
E., and W AER, P., •The Calculation of bVury Margins in EC Anti-Dumping Proceeding&», Journcil of World Trade, 199116, (6), 26-
27. 
1357 See: THARAKAN, P.K.M., and WAELBROECK, J., «Antidumping and countervalling duty decisio111 in the E.C. and in the U.S. An 
experiment in comparative political economy», Europeon Economie Review, 1994, (171), 171-193. 
1358 For a similar critical comment, see : BELLSTEDT, C., ccAntdiumpingverfahren der . Kommission der Europäischen 
GemeinschaftellJt, Recht der lnternation.cûen. W'll"tschaft, 1979, (630), 632; DAILLIER, P. erl.a pratique communautaire de lutte 
contre Ie dumping., Revue du Marché Commun., 1979, (667), 662-663. 
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comparative analysis, the economie model elaborated by R.D. BOLTUCK is used1359• The 
model bas two main limitations : it is based on the assumption of constant marginal oost of 
production of the dumping exporter and it assumes dumping to be third-degree price 
discrimination. The first assumption can be challenged for not being always realistic. Because of 
the second assumption, the model does not fully comprise- European anti-dumping law, which 
defmes dumping not only as third-degree price discrimination, but also as second-degree price 
discrimination, sales at a loss and NME dumping. 
Nevertheless, an application of the metbod of the comparative analysis on the basis of the model 
of R.D. BOLTUCK is made, be it only because of the simplicity of the model. First, it is easy to 
interpret the results of the application of the model. lts application -yields numerical values of the 
change in terms of percentage of the Community industry's price (dln Pd) and of the quantity they 
have sold on the Community market (dln Pd) in the factual world, as compared with the 
counterfactual world. Negative (positive) values indicate that the dumping bas (not) inflicted 
in jury upon the Community industry. Hence, it is easy to conclude whether or not the 
Community industry is being injured. As, under GA TI and European anti-dumping law, material 
injury is required, only substantial negative changes should result in findingsof injury. 
Second, no complicated calculations are required and the calculations are based on only seven 
parameters, which are : 
the share of the dumping exporter' s sales made at home with regard to hls combined 
Community and home sales if he does not practise dumping (in the model called «a») ; 
the own-price elasticity of the Community industry's supply of the like product in the 
Community market (in the model called «Ed») ; 
the own-price _ elasticity of demand in the Community market for the Community producers' 
-like product (in the model called «Nd») ; · 
the own-price elasticity of demand in the home market of the dumping exporter for the 
dumped product (in the model called «Nb») ; 
the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the dumped product (in the 
model called «Ne») ; 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in the C.ommunity for the Community producers' like 
product with respect to the price of the dumped product on the Community market (in the 
model called «Ndc,.) ; 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in the Community for the dumped product with respect to 
the price of the Community producers' like product (in the model called «Ncd»). · 
1359 BOLTUCK, R.D., Assessing the Effects on the Dornestic InduBtry of Price Dumping. Parts I and II, Washington, 
mim.eographed, 1988 (preaented at the EIASM International Workshop on Policy lm.plications of Anti-Dumping Measures, Brussela, 
October 19-20, 1989), 35 p. + 18 p; (including: The Cadic Bulletin, BOLTUCK, R.D. (ed.), •.L, 15 February 1989, 6 p.; The Cadic 
Bulletin, BOLTUCK, R.D. (ed.), •.L, 16 June 1989, 18 p.); BOLTUCK, R.D., ecA8118ssing the Effects on the Dornestic lndustry of 
Price Dumping», in Policy Implication.~~ of Antidumping Mea.ures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, 
(99), 99-141. The model of R.D. BOLTUCK is discussed and applied later because it is the basis of one of the different views 
concerning i)\jury and causation in anti-dumping determinations of the United· Stateainternational Trade Commission (KAPLAN, 
8., cciDjury and Causation in USrrc Antidumping Determinations : Five Recent Approaches", in Policy Implicatiom of 
Antidumping Mea.ures, THARAKAN, P.K.M. (ed.), Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1991, (143), 168). 
---------------------~ -~-~-~~~~-~---
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All these parameters refer to the factual world, with the exception of parameter «a» which refers 
to the counterfactual world, but which can be calculated easily. Moreover, if the parameters 
which refer to the factual world, are also unknown, they can be calculated on the basis of some 
plausible assumptions. Then it is sufficient to know the value of the following parameters : 
the actual share of the dumping exporter' s sales made at home with regard to his combined 
Community and homesales (quantity basis) (in the model called «a'») ; 
the quantity sold by the dumping exporter on the Community market (quantity basis) (in the 
model called «De») ; 
the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community market of the like 
product (value basis) (in the model called «V d,.) ; 
the market share of the sales of the dumping exporter on the Community market of the like 
product (value basis) (in the model called «V c») ; 
the dumping margin (in the model called «M») ; 
the own-price elasticity of the Community inciustry's supply of the like product in the 
Community market (in the model called «Ed») ; 
the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate product 
category (Community industry's like product + dumped product + imported non-dumped like 
product) (in the model called «NA») ; 
the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market (in the model called «Sdc») ; 
the Herfmdhal index (in the model called «H»). 
As European anti-dumping determinations are very brief as to the parameters necessary for the 
economie model, many of these parameters will have to be estimated. Moreover, it is not always 
possible to deduct, from the anti-dumping determinatons, the exact value of the parameters for 
which the value must be entered into the economie model and which will be used as basis for 
calculating the other parameters. This shows that the European anti-dumping authorities ignores 
some criteria which provide useful information as to the effect of the dumping on the condition of 
the Community industry. If, nevertheless, the European anti-dumping authorities take such data 
into consideration, without mentioning them in their anti-dumping determinations, their 
assessements would be unduly motivated and, therefore, contrary to Artiele 190 of the EC 
Treaty1360. 
As European anti-dumping case law does not provide much information, the results obtained 
through applying the economie model do not measure in precise quantitative terms by how much 
Community industry' s prices and sales volume have changed as a result of the dumping. 
Nevertheless, the results provide some general idea as to the degree of legality of the European 
anti-dumping authorities' determinations. 
136° Contra : C.J.E.C., case 121186, 28 November 1989, Anon.ymoa Etaireia Epicheiriaeon. Metalleftikon. Viomichan.ikon. lai 
Naftilialon. AE a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1989, (3919), 3952. According to the Court of Justice, Artiele 190 EC Treaty will not be 
violated if the data not expressly mentioned are not of such a nature as to alter the anti-dumping finding. The Court of Justice 
cannot be agreed with. Data which do not alter the findings of the European anti-dumping authorities, but which have actually 
been taken into account, should be mentioned merely because they underlie the findings made. 
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Because of . the poor information provided in the European anti-dumping determinations, the 
following bas to be home in mind for · the examina ti on of the four applications of the economie 
model made hereinafter : 
the dumping margin used is the dumping margin as provided by the European anti-dumping 
authorities ; no adjustment is made for possihle differences between the export price and the 
price charged on the Community market for the dumped product ; 
the own-price elasticity of the foreign non-dumping producers' supply of the like product in 
the Community market, Ef, is assumed to equal infinity ; 
the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market, Sdc' is assumed to he equal to the 
elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to the price of 
the imported non-dumped like product on the Community market, Sdf' and the elasticity of 
substitution of the imported non-dumped like product with respect to the price of the dumped 
product on the Community market, Sfc ; 
for each individual exporting country the Herfiodhal index is assumed to equal one, merely 
because the market shares of each individual exporter are not provided ; 
if the parameter a' is not provided, it is assumed as high as possihle ; the higher the value of 
a', the higher, ceteris paribus, the injury will be ; 
if the anti-dumping determination provides several figures for the same parameter, the 
weighted average of these data is calculated ; if no information is provided ahout the weighing 
factor, the arithniical average is calculated. 
4.3.2.2.1. Bali hearings from Thailand: desperately seeking for injurious dumping 
The Pederation of European Bearing Manufacturers' Associations (FEBMA) is a quite active and 
successful complainant within the framework of European anti-dumping law. It bas ohtained anti-
dumping relief against dumped imports of hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in 
1 a pan 1361 , Singapore1362 , Po land 1363 , Roman ia 1364 and the Soviet U nion 1365• 
1361 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/s& of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, No L 19311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3280/84 of 22 
November 1984 ~ending the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and exporied 
hy NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd., O.J., 24 November of 1984, NoL 307/16; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1238/86 of 13 May 1986 
amending the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and exported hy Nippon Seiko 
KK and others, O.J., 16 May 1986, NoL 129/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports óf certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1986, No 
L 167/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3628/87 of 23 November 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importsof certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 26 November 1987, NoL 33611; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 486/88 of 22 Fehruary 1988 amending the regulations, recommendations and decisions imposing 
anti-dumping duties, O.J., 24 Fehruary 1988, NoL 60/6. 
1362 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ball 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, No L 19311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3628/87 of 23 
November 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapol'e, O.J., 26 November 1987, No L 33611 ; · Commission Regulation (EEC) No 486/88 of 22 
Fehruary 1988 amending the regulations, recommendations and decisions imposing anti-dumping duties, O.J., 24 Fehruary 1988, 
NoL 50/5. 
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Nevertheless, the Commission withdrew the anti-dumping rellef against Poland, Romania and the 
Soviet Union after having re-opened on its own initiative the anti-dumping investigation against 
these three countries1366• With respect to ball hearings originating in Thailand, FEBMA was 
rather unsuccessful until1990. Indeed, the first complaint stranded because the ball hearings were 
not of Thai origin1367• The second complaint did not result either in anti-dumping rellef 
because of lack of· dumping1368• Only after a third complaint, the Commission found 
injurious dumping and, consequently, granted anti-dumping relief1369• The dumping margin 
amounted to a mere 6. 71 %. 
Precisely that low dumping margin, combined with the history of this anti-dumping case, makes it 
worthwile to subject it to the comparative analysis. Therefore, the following parameters were 
entered into the economie model : 
(i) the actual share of the dumping exporters' sales made at home with re gard. to their 
combined Community .and home sales (quantity basis) 
In view of }\ = 62 650 pieces and De = 31 500 000 pieces, the following expression holds : 
a' = 62 650/(62 650 + 31 500 000) = 0.0020 
(ii) the quantity sold by the dumping exporters on the Community market (quantity basis) 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations: De = 31 500 000 pieces. 
1363 Commission Decision 811406/EEC of 4 June 1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of hall and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union and termina-
ting that proceeding, O.J., 11 June 1981, NoL 152/44. 
1364 CommiBBion Decision 81/406/EEC of 4 June 1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of hall and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union arid termina-
ting that proceeding, O.J., 11 June 1981, No L 152/44. 
1365 Cammiseion Decision 81/406/EEC of 4 June 1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of hall and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union and termina-
ting that proceeding, O.J., 11 June 1981, No L 152/44. 
1366 Cammiseion Decision 86/100/EEC of 15 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of hall 
hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 18 April 1986, No L 102/31. 
1367 Cammiseion Decision 85/158/EEC of 22 February 1985 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
certain hall hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 27 February 1985, No L 59/30. 
1368 Cammiseion Decision 86/151/EEC of 29 April 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
baH hearings originating in Thailand, O.J., 30 April1986, NoL 113/61. 
1369 Cammiseion .Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of hall 
hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 1521'24; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2934190 of 9 October 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with 
greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand and colleeting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 12 
October 1990, No L 28111. 
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(iii) the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, overall consumption on the Community market 
equals 356 100 000 pieces, and the prices of the dum.ped imparts undercut Community producers' prices by 
17 %. Due to lack of precise information, assume that the prices of the imported non-dum.ped hall hearings 
originating in third countries equal the prices charged by the Community producers1370• Moreover, 
assume that the prices of the dumped Thai hall hearings on the Community market equal unity. In view of 
the price undercutting of 17 %, the Community producers' prices and those of the imported non-dumped 
hall hearings equal 1.20 [ = 1/(1-17 %)]. As a consequence, overall consumption (value basis) amounts to: 
31 500 000 + 1.20. (356 100 000- 31 500 000) = 422 584 337.4 
Therefore and in view of Dd amounting to 116 000 000 pieces, V d (value basis) equals : 
vd = 1.20 • 116 ooo 000/422 584 337.4 = 33.07 % 
(iv) the market share of the sales of the dumping exporters on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
On the basis of the same assumptions made in (üi), Vc (value basis) equals : 
V c = 31 500 000/422 584 337.4 = 7.45 % 
(v) the dumping margin 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, the weighted average dumping margin M 
amounts to 6.71 %. 
(vi) the own-price elasticity of the Community industry 's supply of the like product in the 
Community market 
The Commission and the Council Regulations do not provide direct information on Ed. They do give 
information about Community producers' prices, production volume, capacity, rate of capacity utilization 
and employment. However, these changes are always intertemporal changes whereas Ed is not. 
According to the Commission Regulation, Community production bas declined by 9.7 % between 19-SS and 
March 1988. Over the same period, the average decreases of the Community producers' prices, in current 
terms, varled from 2.6 to 9 %. The relationship between the arithmetical average of 2.6 and 9 %, i.e., 
5.8 %, and the decline in Community production equals + 1.69 %. Since the rate of capacity utilization 
amounts to 83 % in March 1988, Community production may increase smoothly if prices would rise. 
Moreover, employment bas decreased by 11.76 % over the period 1985-March 1988, which is exceeds the 
decline by 9. 7 % of Community production over the same period. Thus, employment is a rather flexible .. 
production factor. · 
Therefore, Ed is assumed to equal 2. 
(vii) the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate product 
ctilegory 
According to the Commission and the COuncil Regulations, the global demand for hall hearings depends 
directly on the demand for the final product in which the hall hearings are incorporated. As the hall 
hearings generally account for only a small fraction of the cost of the final product, the price of hall 
hearings can only marginally affect the price of and, thus, the demand for the final product. Therefore, a 
small change in the price of ba1l hearings will not induce a change in the demand for hall hearings. As a 
consequence, NA may he assumed to equal zero. 
1370 This 888umption is not entirely correct, as the Commission pointed out that the Japanese ball hearings undercut the 
Community producers• prices, but by a smaller amount than the Thai hall hearings. However, no quantification of the Japanese 
price undercutting is aupplied. 
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(viii) the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to ·the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market 
According to the Commission Regulation, the category of ball hearings covers a large number of standani 
hearing types, all available with different accessories, plus many special types made to the specification of 
the customer. Therefore, a not too high elasticity of substitution is assumed : Sdc = 2. 
The introduetion of these parameters into the economie model, yields : 
dln pd = -0.00% 
dln ~ = -0.00 % 
Thus, contrary to the conclusion of the European anti-dumping authorities, the dumping of Thai 
ball hearings does not cause in jury to the Community industry. The results of the comparative 
analysis cannot be challenged by arguing that the parameter values for Ed, NA and Sdc are only 
rough estimates on the basis of incomplete.data. Indeed, the comparative analysis shows the same 
. results, even though different parameter values are introduced for Ed, NA and Sdc· 
4.3.2.2.2. Ammonium paratungstate from the People's Republic of China and the Republic 
of Korea : about rmding no causal relationship where it exists 
Originally the anti-dumping complaint against imports of ammonium paratungstate from the 
People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea was supported by three Community 
producers. At the time of the termination of the investigation by the Commission, two of them 
did no longer support anymore the anti-dumping complaint, undoubtedly because they themselves 
imported Chinese and Korean · ammonium paratungstate. This made the complaint of" the 
remaining complainant Community producer less convincing, especially as the latter · also used 
imported Chinese ammonium paratungstate. Moreover, the rate of capacity utilization and the . 
profits of the sole remaining complainant Community producer improved durlog the investigation 
period. Both facts seem to have induced the Commission to conclude that the dumping did not 
cause in jury to the Community industry, which comprises only the sole remaining complainant 
Community producer1371 • 
The fact that this Community producer is doing better than before, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the dumping did not harm him. Indeed, it is quite possible that without the dumping he 
would even do better than he is actually doing. Moreover, the Commission failed to investigate 
why this remaining Community producer, as well as the two other Community producers started 
to import and use. dumped ammonium paratungstate. Por those reasons, the comparative analysis 
is applied to the dumping of ammonium paratungstate by China and Korea. The investigation is 
1371 Commission Decision 90/154/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No 
L 831117. 
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confined to the sole remaining complainant Community producer merely because only for this 
producer data are set forth in the Commission Decision. 
(i) the actual share of the dwnping exporter's sales made at home with regard to his 
combined Community and homesales (quantity basis) 
According to the Commission Decision, no ammonium paratongstate is sold on the Korean market by the 
Korean exporter ; therefore, a' K = 0. 
With regani to China no data are given about the sales on the Chinese market. Therefore, neither a'e, nor 
a' fortotal dumped importscan be determined. 
From a certain level of a' onwards, the estimated «a» will equal one, i.e., the dumping exporter will choose 
not to export if he cannot dump. In such a case the probability of distorted estimates is quite high. Indeed, 
the cross-price elasticities of demand are estimated on the basis of the initial market shares. However, the 
cross-price elasticities will change, given a constant elasticity of substitution, if the exporter ceases to 
practise dumping. The consequent distartion will be negligible unless the dumping exporter's market share 
sharply decreases1372• 
In the anti-dumping case concerning ammonium paratongstate from China and Korea, the dumping 
exporters' market share of 93 % (quantity basis) would drop to zero if a' would be assumed to equal to 
16 % because at that level «a» would be estimated to equal one. Astheinjury increases with a', a' is set as 
high as possible. In this case, a' is assumed to equal 15 %. 
(ii) the quantity sold by the dwnping exporters on the Community market (quantity basis) 
According to the Commission Decision : De = 3 559 tonnes, of which De e = 3 402 tonnes and DKe = 
157 tonnes. 
(iii) the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
According to the Commission Decision, De = 3 559 tonnes and Ve = 93 % (quantity basis) ; therefore, 
total consumption on the Community market equals 3 827 tonnes ( = 3 559 tonnes/0.93). The prices of the 
dumped Chinese îmports undercut Community producers' prices by 41.96 %, whereas the prices of the 
dumped Korean imports undercut Community producer's prices by 26.37 %. As no precise information is 
available, assume that the prices of imported non-dumped ammonium paratongstate originating in third 
countries amount to the prices charged by. the Community producers. Moreover, assume that the prices of 
the Community producer and, thus, the non-dumped imported ammonium paratungstate equal unity. In 
view of the price undercutting of respectively 41.96 % and 26.37 %, the prices of the dumped Chinese 
product equal 0.5804 [ = 1 - 41.96 %] and those of the dumped Korean product equal 0. 7363 [ = 1 -
26.37 %]. As a consequence, total consumption (value basis) amounts to: 
0.5804 * 3 402 + 0. 7363 * 157 + (3 827 - 3 559) = 2 358 
Therefore and in view of Vd (quantity basis) which equals 2 % and, consequently, Dd amounting to 77 
tonnes, V d (value basis) equals : 
vd = 1112 358 = 3.25 % 
(iv) the market share of the sales of the dumping exporters on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) _ 
0n the basis of the same assumptions made in (iii), vee and VKe (value basis) equal ! 
vee = 0.5804 * 3 402/2 367 = 83.80 % 
VKe = 0.7363 * 157/2 367 = 4.88 % 
Thus, Ve (value basis) equals : 
Ve =Vee+ VKe = 88.68% 
1372 The Cadic Bulletin., BOLTUCK, R.D. (ed.), a.I., (presented at the EIASM International Workshop on Policy lmplicatioJUJ of 
Anti-Dumping Measures, BI'U888ls, October 19-20, 1989), 15 February 1989, 4. 
(v) the dumping margin 
According to the Commission Decision, the weighted average dumping margin ~ on Chinese imports 
amounts to 7S.74 %, whereas the dumping margin MK on Korean imports amounts to 62.16 %. The 
weighted average dumping margin M on both Chinese and Korean imports equals : 
M = (3 402 * 7S.74 % + 1S7 * 62.16 %)/3 SS9 = 7S.14 % 
(vi) the own-price elasticity of the Community intlustry's supply of the like product in the 
Community market 
The Commission Decision does not provide direct information on Ed. lt does give information about 
Comm.unity producers' prices, production volume and rate of capacity u~ilization.· However, these changes 
are always intertemporal changes whereas Ed is not. 
According to the Commission Decision, the volume of production and the rate of capacity utilization have 
so rapidly risen during the investigation period which covers only 9 months, that the decline in both factors 
during the two previous years were more than neutralized. Therefore, a rather high Ed is assumed : 
Ed = S. 
(vii) the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate product 
category 
The own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate product category is not 
investigated in the Commission Decision. However, intertemporal changes in the prices and the sales 
volumes of the dumped product, the non-dumped imported like product and the Community producer's like 
product are given in or may he calculated on the basis of the Commission Decision. 
lf the price of the Community producer's like product during the investigation period is assumed to equal 
unity, then, as indicated above, the prices of the Chinese and Korean dumped imports during the same 
period are: 
pCC = 1 - 0.4196 = 0.S804 
PKç = 1 - 0.2637 = 0. 7363 
Over · the period 1984-investigation period, the prices of the Community producer's like product, the 
Chinese dumped product and the Korean dumped product decreased respectively by 4S %, . SS % and 29 %. 
This yields the following prices in 1983 : 
pst.= 11(1 - 0.4S) = 1_.82 
~ c = O.S804/(1 - O.SS) = 1.29 
pKC = 0. 7363/(1 - 0.29) = 1.04 
In 1984, 167 .tonnes of Chinese ammonium paratungstate were imported on the Community market, . 
conesponding toa market share of 12 % (quantity basis). In the same year, S87 tonnes of the like product 
originating in third countries other than China and Korea, were imported into the Community market, 
representing 43 % of the total Community market. As a consequence, total consumption on the Community 
market equals 1 371 tonnes [ = (167 + S87)tonnes/(0.12 + 0.43)]. Because Korean imports and 
Comm.unity producer's sales on the Community market represent respectively a market share of 20 % and 
24 % (guantity basis), their absolute volume is : 
J>K c = 20 % * 1 371 tonnes = 27 4 tonnes 
Dd = 24 % * 1 371 tonnes = 329 tonnes 
lf the prices of the non-dumped produels are assumed to equal the Community producer's price, the 
weighted average price level in 1984 equals : 
[167 * 1.29 + 274 * 1.04 + (329 + S87) * 1.82]/1 371 = l.S8 
Under the same assumption, the weighted average price level in the investigation period; is : 
[3 402 * O.S804 + 1S7 * 0. 7363 + (3 872 - 3 SS9)]/3 872 = 0.62 
As a consequence, the change in price level between 1984 and the investigation period is: 
4 PIP = ·0.62/l.S8 - 1 = -60.76 % 
The change in sales volume over the same period is : 
4 Q/Q = 3 872/1371- 1 = +182.42% 
As aresult: 
(4 Q/Q)/(4 PIP) = -3.00 
Because: 
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NA is assumed to equal -3. 
(viii) the elasticity of substitution of the Community producer's like product with respect to the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market 
In order to estimate NI (i.e. , the own~price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate 
imported product category (dumped product + imported non-dumped like product) it should be pointed out 
that in the economie model : 
NI = (1 - V d) * NA - V d * Sdc 
In this equation only NI and Sdc are unknown. Thus, it is sufficient todetermine either NI or Sdc· NI can 
be estimated in the same way as NA. Under the same assumptions, the weighted average price level for the 
dumped product and the non-dumped imported like product in 1984 is : 
[167 • 1.29 + 274 * 1.04 + 587 • 1.82]/1 028 = 1.53 
Under the same assumption and because the imports of the non-dumped like product represent a market 
share of 5 % (quantity basis) on the Community market, the weighted average price level in the 
investigation period, on the other hand, is : 
[3 402 * 0.5804 + 157 • 0. 7363 + 3 872 • 0.05]/[3 402 + 157 + 3 872 * 0.05] = 0.61 
As a consequence, the change in price level between 1984 and the investigation perioei is : 
~ PIP = 0.6111.53 - 1 = -60.13 % 
and the change in sales volume over the same perioei is : 
~ Q/Q = [3 402 + 157 +3 872. 0.05]/1 028- 1 = +265.04 % 
resulting in : 
(~ Q/Q)/(~ PIP) = -4.41 
Because: 
aQ 
N - Q ] --
. aP 
p 
NI is assumed to equal -4.41. 
As a consequence, sdc can be estimated : 
NI = (1 - V d) * NA - V d * Sdc 
or: 
Sdc = [(1- Vd) *NA- NI]Nd 
Thus, 
sdc = [(1 - o.o325) * (-3) - (-4.41)]/0.0325 = 46.38 
(ix) Herfindhal index 
Because VC c = 83.80 % and vK c = 4. 88 %, the Herfindhal index is : 
H = [83.802 + 4.882]/[83.80 + 4.88]2 = 0.8960 
The introduetion of these parameters into the economie model, yields : 
dln Pd = -17.41 % 
dln ~ = -87.06 % 
7---- ==--===== 
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A drop in the sole rema1rung complainant Community producer's price and sales volume by 
respectively 17.41 % and 87.06 % must undoubtedly be considered as material injury caused by 
the dumping to this Community producer. However, it might easily be challenge tha the 
estimated parameters of Ed, NA and Sdc are very high. But even if they are estimated lower, the 
dumping will still be found to cause material in jury to the Community producer. lndeed, if 
Ed = 2.5, NA = -0.75 and Sdc = 11.6, then : 
dln pd = -10.90 % 
dln <4 = -27.25 % 
Or, if Ed = 1, NA = -0.3 and Sdc = 4.6, then : 
dln pd = -9.20 % 
dln <4 = -9.20% 
Therefore, the comparative analysis clearly proves · that, without the dumping, the Community 
producer would even be doing better than in the prevalling situation with dumping in which bis 
volume of production, rate of capacity utilization and profits are already improving. 
4.3.2.2.3. Printers from Japan: about like products 
In March 1987 the Committee of European Printer Manufacturers (Europrint) lodged an anti-
dumping complaint against imports of Japanese printers. Europrint considered the category of like 
products to contain serlal-impact dot-matrix printers (SIDM-printers) as well as serlal impact fully 
formed printers (SIFF-printers). The Commission, backed up by the Council, did not agree and 
restricted the original anti-dumping complaint to SIDM-printers1373• Because Europrint 
maintained its complaint against the dumping of Japanese SIFF-printers, the Commission initiated 
a separate anti-dumping proceeding with regard to SIFF-printers based on the. same complaint of 
Europrint of March 19871374• In both cases the dumping was found to cause material injury 
to the Community industry. 
It is sometimes argued that a too restrictive definition of the like product category makes it easier 
to fmd in jury inflicted to the Community industry, whereas, conversely, a too extensive defmition 
1373 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a pl'Ovisional anti-dumping duty on imports of seri~­
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130112; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 
November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 
24 November 1988, NoL 317/33. 
1374 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a pl'Ovisional anti-dumping duty on importsof serlal 
impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, NoL 17711; Council Regulation (EEC) No 34/89 of 
5 January 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serial impact fully formed (SIFF) character printera 
originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No L 5/23. 
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would make it very difficult to find injurious dumping1375• It bas also been alleged that the 
Community industry bas an incentive to adopt the broadest possible definition of the product in 
order to get more complete protection1376• It seems worthwhile to examine these contentloos 
by means of the comparative analysis for both the anti-dumping proceedings concerning SIDM-
and SIFF-printers. Indeed, in both anti-dumping proceedings, the European anti-dumping 
authorities had grave difficulties in delineating the like product category, because of the enormous 
variety of the features and specifications of the different printers. Therefore, it may be questioned 
why the printing element (needles versus «daisy wheelS») was so decisive for dividing the general 
category of printers into two like product categories. 
In order to investigate the impact of the definition of the like product category under the 
comparative analysis, the effects of the dumping of SIDM-printers and SIFF-printers are frrst 
investigated separately. . The consequent results are then compared to the results of the 
comparative analysis of the dumping of the general category of printers. 
SIDM-printers 
(i) the actual share of the dumping exporters' sales made at home with regard to their 
combined Community and homesales (quantity basis) 
No data are given about the sales of SIDM-printers on the Japanese market. Therefore, a' cannot be 
determined. 
As the probability of distortions in the estimates is high, when the market share of the dumping exporters 
drops considerably, a' is determined on a level below which the probability of distortions decreases1377• 
lt is determined on the highest possible level because the injury increases with a'. 
In the anti-dumping case concerning SIFF-printers, the dumping exporters' market share of 73.91 % 
(quantity basis) would drop to zero if a' would equal 18 % because at that level the parameter«&» would be 
estimated to equal one. For the sake of aggregation~ a' is asumed to equal 17 % for both SIDM- and 
SIFF-printers. 
(ii) ihe quantity sold by the dumping exporters on the Community market (quantity basis) 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations: De = 1 522 000 units. 
(iii) the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, overall consumption on the Community market 
amounts to 2 093 000 units. The prices of the dumped Japanese imports undercut Community producers' 
prices by 3.93 to 43.42 %, i.e., by 23.68 % on average. As no precise information is available, assume 
that the prices of the imported non-dumped SIDM-printers originating in third countries equal the prices 
charged by the Community producers. Moreover, assume that the prices of the Community producers and, 
thus, the non-dumped imported SIDM-printers equal unity. In view of the price undercutting of 23.68 %, 
1375 BESELER, J.-F., Die Abwehr von Dumping und Subventionen durch die Europö.ï.che GemeiMchaften, Baden-Bad~n, Nomos, 
1980, 104; BESELER, J:F., and WILLIAMS, A.N., Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Law. The European Communities, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, 150. 
1376 MESSERLIN, P., cAoti-Dumping Regulationa or Pro-Cartel Law? The EC ChemicalCase&», World Economy, 1990, (465), 478. 
1377 Supra, 576. 
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the prices of the dumped Japanese printers equal 0.7632 [ = 1 - 23.68 %]. As a consequence, overall 
consumption (value basis) amounts to: 
0. 7632 • 1 522 000 + (2 093 000 - 1 522 000) = 1 732 590 
Because Dd amounts to 258 000 units, V d (value basis) equals: 
vd = 258 00011 732 590 = 14.89 % 
(iv) the market share of the sales of the dumping exporters on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
On the basis of the same assumptions made in (iü), Vc (value basis) equals : 
vc = 0.7632 * 1 522 000/1 732 590 = 67.04% 
(v) the dumping margin 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, the weighted average dumping margin differs 
from exporter to exporter. The arithmical average of the different dumping margins, M, equals 37.51 %. 
(vi) the own-price elasticity of the Community intlustry's supply of the like product in the 
Community market 
The Commission and the Council Regulations do not provide direct information on Ed. They do give 
information about Com.munity producers' prices, production volume, capacity, rate of capacity utilization, 
investments. However, those changes are always intertemporal changes whereas Ed is not. 
According to these Regulations, -the volume of production increased from 175 000 units to 390 000 units 
between 1983 and 1986, which represents a growth rate of 30.62 % on a yearly basis. Notwithstanding this 
considerable increase in the volume of production, the Com.munity industry is faced with excess capacity. 
Indeed, in recent years, considerable investments were made to extend production capacity. However, as 
the printer market is characterized by continuous technological developments, new types of printers which 
incorporate the new technology, have to be introduced on the market, which requires considerable and 
continuous investments in research & development and mä.rketing. Therefore, a modest but not too low Ed 
seems plausible, for example a value of 3. 
(vii) the own-price elasticity of tiemand in the Community market for the aggregate product 
category 
The own-price elasticity of demand in the Com.munity market for the aggregate product category is not 
investigated in the Commission and the Council Regulations. However, intertemporal changes in the prices 
and the sales volumes of the dumped product, the· non-dumped imported like product and the Com.munity 
·producers' like product are given in or may be calculated on the basis of the Commission and the Council 
Regulations. 
Between 1985 and March 1987, the weighted average prices of a representative Com.munity producer, 
whose products are represented in all three market segments, decreased in the various Memher States in the 
low segments by between 25 and 38 %, in the medium segment by between 6 and 23 % and in the high 
segment by between 4 and 14 %. Thus, the arithmical average decline of bis prices is 14.96 % on a yearly 
basis. If that decline is representative for the whole Com.munity industry and if the price of the Community 
industry's like product on the Community market equals unityin March 1987, then: 
in 1986 : p d = 1/(1 - 0.1496)3112 = 1.04 
in 1985 : p d = 1/(1 - 0.1496)(1 +3112> = 1.22 
In 1986 the price of the Japanese printers undercut the price of the Community producers' like product with 
23.68 %. Consequently, the price of the Japanese printers during the same year equals 0. 7937 
[ = 1.04 * (1 - 0.2368)]. 
Between 1983 and 1986, the weighted average prices of the Japanese exporters decreased in the low and the 
high segment by 35 % and in the medium segment by 21 %. Consequently, the arithmical average decline 
of the Japanese prices is 11.35 % on a yearly basis. This yields for 1985 : · 
Pc = 0.7937/(1- 0.1135) = 0.8953 
In 1983 and 1986, 390 000 and, respectively, 1 522 000 Japanese printers were imported on the 
Community market. Japanese imports of printers increased during this period by 57.44 % on a yearly 
basis. Therefore, the imports of Japanese printers in 1985 are estimated at 996 714 units 
[ = 1 522 000/(1 + 0.5744)]. 
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During 1983 and 1986, the Japanese market share on the Community market increased from 48.75 % to 
72.72 ~ ; on a one-year basis the Japanese market share increased with 14.26 %. Therefore, the Japanese 
market share in 1985 is estimated at 63.64 % [ = 72.72 %/(1 + 0.1426)]. As a consequence, total 
consumption on the Community market in 1985 is estimated at 1 566 175 units [ =996 714 units/0.6364]. 
If the prices of the non-dumped produels are assumed to equal the Community producers' price, the 
weighted average price level for the aggregate product category of SIDM-printers in 1985 equals : 
[996 714 * 0.8953 + (1 566 175 - 966 714) * 1.22]/1 566 175 = 1.04 
Under the same assumption, the weighted average price level in 1986, is : 
[1 522 ()()() * 0. 7937 + (2 093 ()()() - 1 522 000) * 1.04]/2 093 000 = 0. 86 
As a consequence, the change in price level between 1985 and 1986 is: 
ll PIP = 0.86/1.04- 1 = -17.31 % 
The change in sales volume over the same period. is : 
ll Q/Q = 2 093 000/1 566 175- 1 = +33.64 % 
As aresult: 
(ll Q/Q)/(Il PIP) = -1.94 
Because: 
5Q 
N - Q ~--5P 
p 
NA is assumed to equal -2. 
(viii) the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market 
In order to estimate NI (i.e., the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate 
imported product category (dumped product + imported non-dumped like product)) it should he pointed out 
that in the economie model : 
NI= (1-Vd)*NA-Vd*Sdc 
In this equation only NI and sdc are unknown. Thus, it is sufficient to delermine either NI or sdc· NI can 
he estimated in the same way as NA. 
According to · the Commission and the Council Regulations, the market share of the Community industry. · 
dropped from 33 % in 1983 to 18 % in 1986. Thus, it bas decreased by 18 .. 29 % on a yearly basis. The 
1985 market share of the Community industry can, thus, he estimated at 22.03 %. In view of overall 
consumption being estimated above at 1 566 175 units in 1985, the volume of sales of the Community 
industry in absolute terms can he estimated at 345 015 units in 1985 [ = 22.03 % * 1 566 175 units]. 
Therefore, non-dumped imports account for 224 446 units [ = 1 566 175- 345 015- 996 714] in 1985. 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, they account for 313 000 units [ = 2 093 000 -
258 ()()() - 1 522 000] in 1986. 
Under the same assumptions, the weighted average price level for the dumped product and the non-dumped 
imported like product in 1985 is : 
[996 714 * 0.8953 + 224 446 * 1.22]/[996 714 + 224 446] = 0.95 
whereas it in 1986 it equals : 
[1 522 ()()() * 0. 7937 + 313 000 * 1.04]/[1 522 000 + 313 000] = 0. 84 
As a consequence, the change in price level between 1985 and 1986 is: 
ll PIP = 0.84/0.95- 1 = -11.58 % 
The change in sales volume over the same period is : 
ll Q/Q = [1 522 ()()() + 313 000]/[996 714 + 224 446] - 1 
= + 50.27% 
As aresult: 
(ll Q/Q)/(Il PIP) = -4.34 
Because: 
..... ------------------ -----:r 
NI is assumed to equal -4.34. 
As a consequence, sdc can be estimated : 
NI = (1 - Vd) *NA- Vd * Sdc 
or: 
Sdc = [(1- Vd) *NA- NI]Nd 
Thus, 
==-=-=-=--=--=-=-=--=-~~~~-=-==-=---- ----=---=== 
sdc = [(1- 0.1489) • (-2)- (-4.34)]/0.1489 = 11.12 
SIFF -printers 
----------------
"583 
_(i) the actual share of the dumping exporters' sales made at home with regard to their 
combined Community and home sales (quantity basis) 
No data are given about the sales of SIFF-printers on the Japanese market. Therefore, a' cannot be 
detennined. 
As noted above, a' is assumed to equal 17 % because it is the highest possible a' for SIFF-printers for 
which the market share of the dumped imparts on the Community market does not drop to zero. 
(ii) the quantity sold by the dumping exporters on the Community market (quantity basis) 
According to the Commission and the Cooncil Regulations, De = 195 000 units. 
(iii) the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
According to the Commission and the Cooncil Regulations, overall consum.ption on the Community market 
equals 263 840 units. Two Japanese exporters with a market share of 6 % did not ondercut Community 
producers' prices ; the other Japanese ·exporters, however, ondercut Community producers' prices by 15 %-
With a market share of 6 %, the "two Japanese exporters import 15 830 units [ = 6 % * 263 840 units]; 
thus, their share. in overall Japanese dumped imparts equals 8.12 %. Therefore, the weighted average 
margin of price undercutting is : 
15 % • (1 - 0.0812) + 0 % • 0.0812 = 13.78 % 
As no precise information is available, assume that the prices of the im.ported non-dumped SIFF-printers 
originating in third countries equal the prices charged by the. Community producers. Moreover, assume that 
the prices of the Community producers and, thus, the non-dumped imported SIFF-printers equal unity. In 
view of the price ondercutting of 13.78 %, the prices of the dumped Japanese printers equal 0.8622 [ = 1 -
13.78 %]. As a consequence, total consum.ption (value basis) amounts to: 
0.8622 • 195 000 + (263 840- 195 000) = 236 969 
Because Vd (quantity basis) equals 9 %, Dd amounts to 23 746 units [= 9 % * 263 840]. Therefore, Vd 
(value basis) equals : 
vd = 23 746/236 969 = 10.02% 
(iv) the market share of the sales of the dumping exporters on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
On the basis of the same assum.ptions made in (iii), Vc (value basis) equals : 
vc = 0.8622 • 195 000/236 969 = 70.95 % 
(v) the dumping margin 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations the dumping margin for the two Japanese 
exporters with a market share of 6 % on the Community market, which corresponds toa share of 8.12 % 
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in total Japanese dumped imports, equals 21.05 % and 22.01 %, the arithmical average of which is 
21.53 %. The Commission and the Council assume that the dumping margin for the other Japanese 
exporters, which represents (1 - 8.12 %) of total Japanese dumped imports, equals 58 %. Therefore, the 
average weigthed dumping margin M is : 
0.0812 • 21.53 % + (1 - 0.0812) • 58 % = 55.04 % 
(vi) the own-price elasticity of the Community industry's supply of the like product in the 
Community market 
The Commission and the Council Regulations do not provide direct information on Ed. They do give 
information about Community producers' prices, production volume, capacity, rate of capacity utilization 
and investment. However, these changes are always intertemporal changes whereas Ed is not. 
According to these Regulations, the volume of production increased from 16 238 units to 28 555 units 
between 1983 and March 1987, which represents a growth rate of 18.97 % on a yearly basis. Though this 
yearly increase is smaller than for SIDM-printers, the same value for Ed may be assumed for SIFF-printers 
as for SIDM-printers. As in the SIDM-printer market, the Community industry is faced with serious excess 
capacity ; in recent years considerable investments were made to extend production capacity ; the printer 
market is characterized by continuous technological developments ; therefore, new types of printers which 
incorporate the new technology have to be introduced on the market which requires considerable and 
continuous investments in research & development and marketing. Therefore, Ed is bere also assumed to 
equal 3. 
(vii) the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate product 
category 
The own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate product category is not 
investigated in the Commission and the Council Regulations. Moreover, it is not possible to deduce some 
indications concerning the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market from these Regulations. 
However, because of the fact that SIFF-printers and SIDM-printers have common features, as wellas for 
the sake of aggregating those parameters, NA is assumed to be equal to the NA used for SIDM-printers. 
Therefore, NA = -2. 
(viii) the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market 
For the same reason as given in (vii), Sdc is assumed to be equal to Sdc for SIDM-printers, i.e., 
sdc = 11.12. 
SIDM- and SIFF-printers aggregated 
(i) the actual share of the dumping exporters' sales made at home with regard to their 
combined Community and home sales (quantity basis) 
No data are given about the sales of SIDM- and SIFF-printers on the Japanese market. Therefore, a' 
cannot be determined. 
lt bas been assumed that a' equals 17 % both for SIDM- and SIFF printers. Therefore, a' also equals 
17 % when both printer types are aggregated. 
(ii) the quantity sold by the dumping exporters on the Community market (quantity basis) 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, De = 1 522 000 SIDM-printers + 195 000 
SIFF -printers = 1 717 000 printers. 
(iii) the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, total consumption on the Community printer 
market equals : 
2 093 000 SIDM-printers + 263 840 SIFF-printers = 2 356 840 printers 
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The arithmical average margin of price undercutting for SIDM-printers is 23.68 %, and the weighted 
average margin of price undercutting for SIFF -printers is 13.78 %. The weighted average margin of price 
undercutting on the Community printer market is : 
[23.68 % * 2 093 ()()() + 13.78 " * 263 840]/2 356 840 = 22.57 " 
As no precise information is available, assume that the prices of the imported non-dumped SIDM- and 
SIFF-printers originating in third countries are equal .to the prices charged by the Community producers. 
Moreover, assume that the prices of the Community producers and, thus, the non-dumped imported SIDM-
and SIFF-printers equal unity. In view of_ the price undercutting of 22.57 %, the prices of the dumped 
1apanese printers equal 0. 7743 [.= 1 - 22.57 % ]. As a consequence, total consumption (value basis) 
amounts to: 
0.7743 * 1 717 ()()() + (2 356 840- 1 717 000) = 1 969 313 -
Because Dd amounts to 281 746 units [ =258 000 units + 23 746 units] V d (value basis) equals : 
vd = 281 746/1 969 313 = 14.31 % 
(iv) the market. share of the sales of the dumping exporters on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
On the basis of the same assumptions made in (iii), Vc (value basis) equals : 
vc = 0.7743 * 1 717 000/1 969 313 = 67.51 % 
(v) the dumping margin 
In view of the dumping margin of 37.51 % for SIDM-printers and of 55.04 % for SIFF-printers, the 
weighted average dumping margin for printers is : 
[37.51 " * 1 522 ()()() + 55.04 % * 195 000]/1 717 ()()() = 39.50 % 
(vi) the own-price elasticity of the Community intlustry's supply of the like product in the 
Community market 
With respect to SIDM- and SIFF-printers, Ed is assumed to equal 3. Therefore, Ed is also assumed to 
equal 3 with regard to the aggregated category of printers. 
(vii) the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the aggregate product 
category 
With respect to SIDM- and SIFF-printers, NA is assumed to equal -2. Therefore, NA is also assumed to 
equal -2 with regard to the aggregated category of printers. 
(viii) the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market 
With respect to SIDM- and SIFF-printers, Sdc is assumed to equal 17.72. Therefore, Sdc is also assumed to 
equal 17.72 with regard to the aggregated category of printers. 
The introduetion of these parameters into the economie model, yields : 
dln P d = - 6.57 % for SIDM-printers 
for SIFF-printers 
for aggregated SIDM- and SIFF-printers 
dln pd = -10.88 % 
dln P d = - 7.01 % 
dln ~ = -19.70% 
dln ~ = -32.64 % 
dln ~ = -21.02% 
for SIDM-printers 
for SIFF-printers 
for aggregated SIDM- and SIFF-printers 
Thus, by dividing the general category of printers into two categories, a result is obtained for one 
of the categories, i.e., SIDM-printers, which approaches the result of the aggregated product 
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category, whereas the result for the other product category, i.e. , SIFF-printers, indicates even 
greater in jury. 
In the anti-dumping cases concerning Japanese printers, the division of the general category of 
printers over two distinct categones does oot have real consequences. In both cases, material 
injury caused by the dumping is found under the trends analysis applied by the European anti-
dumping authorities, as well as under the comparative analysis. However, in other cases it may 
have far-reaching consequences. In order to show this, it should be pointed out that the results of 
the comparative analysis for the aggregated SIDM- and SIFF-printers are in fact the weighted 
average sum of the results for the two separated categones of SIDM- and SIFF-printers. Indeed, 
the weighted average sum of those individual results are : 
dln pd = [1 522 ()()() * (-6.57 %) + 195 ()()() * (-10.88 %)]/[1 522 ()()() + 195 000] 
= -7.06% 
dln ~ = [1 522 000 * (-19.70 %) + 195 000 * (-32.64 %)] 
/[1 522 ()()() + 195 000] 
= -21.17% 
which is practically equal to the results obtained for the aggregated SIDM- and SIFF-printers. 
The small differences are undoubtedly due to errors as a result of rounding off. 
In order to show the importance of the determination of the like product category, take an 
hypothetical case. Assume that there are two products A and B, which closely resembie to each 
other so that they could be said to be like products in the sen se of Artiele 1 ( 4) basic EC 
Regulation and of Artiele 2(9) basic ECSC Decision .. A quantity of 200 000 units of product A 
and a quantity of 9 800 000 units of product B are dumped into the Community. Assume that the 
results of the comparative analysis for product ·A are : 
dln pd = -25% 
dln ~ = -50% 
and for product B : 
dln Pd = -0.25 % 
dln ~ = -0.50 % 
The results of the comparative analysis for the aggregated category of products A and B, which 
may be assumed to be equal to the weighted average sum of the individual results, therefore, are : 
dln Pd = [200 000 * (-25 %) + 9 800 000 * (-0.25 %)]/[200 000 + 9 800 000] 
= -0.745 % 
dln ~ = [200 000 * (-50 %) + 9 800 000 * (-0.50 %)]/[200 000 + 9 800 000] 
= -1.490 % 
In this example, it can hardly be argued that the dumping has caused material injury to product.B 
nor to the aggregated product A and B. Only if product A is considered separately, material 
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injury is found and anti-dumping rellef may be granted. Thus, the definition of the like product 
category is important for the application of European anti-dumping law. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude, on the basis of this example, that it is always profitable 
for the Community industry to uphold a narrow like product definition. Indeed, take the same 
example, but assume that a quantity of 9 800 000 units of product A and a quantity of 200 000 
units of product B are dumped into the Community. Assuming . that the separate results for 
· products A and B are the same, the results for the aggregated product category are : 
dln pd = [9 800 ()()() * (-25 %) + 200 ()()() * (-0.25 %)]/[200 ()()() + 9 800 000] 
= -24.505% 
dln ~ = [9 800 ()()() * (-50 %) + 200 ()()() * (-0.50 %)]/[200 000 + 9 800 000] 
= -49.010% 
In this case, it would be possible to grant anti-dumping rellef against the dumping of both 
products A and B, if these two products are aggregated, whereas it would be difficult to conclude 
that the dumping of product B considered separately is causing material in jury. 
Thus, the success of an anti-dumping complaint largely depends on the definition of the like 
product category. However, the link between the amplitude of the like product category and the 
results of the injury determination is not straigthforward. Nonetheless, it can be put that, if one is 
sure that, fora eertaio type of product, the Community industry suffersinjury from dumping, it is 
safe to restriet the complaint to this product type ; by extending the complaint to other product 
types, . one incurs the risk of watering down the results for the first product type by the results of 
the other product type, especially if the imported volume of the other product is larger than the 
imported volume of the first product type. 
4.3.2.2.4. Urea · from all-over-the-world : the question of cumulation 
The co·mparative analysis is made with regard to the anti-dumping complaint concerning urea from 
(the former) Czechoslovakia, the (former) German Democratie Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, the (former) USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and (the former) Yugoslavia 1378, in order to 
prove the contention that it is profitable to lodge an anti-dumping complaint against as many 
exporting countries as possible. It is proved that the cumulation with other countries may make 
an anti-dumping complaint against a eertaio exporting country suceessful, even if the dumping 
1378 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratie Republie, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of<& November 1987 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
import& of urea originating in Czeehoslovakia, the German Democratie Republie, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia and terminating these investigatione, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 31711. 
~---------
1 
! 
588 
from this country does not cause (material) injury to the Community industry. It is also shown 
that the new GA TI and EC rules on cumulation will not prevent such a result. 
Therefore, the following parameters are introduced into the economie model : 
(i) the actual share of the dumping exporters' sales made at home with regard to their 
combined Community and home sales (quantity basis) 
With regard to Kuwait and Trinidad and Tobago, the constructed value was used as normal value standani 
because there were no significant sales on their dornestic market. Consequently, in view of the 5 % 
threshold1379, their dornestic sales must be less than 5 % of their exports to the Community. 
Therefore, it is assumed that they reach this threshold of 5 %, which implies a' equal to 4. 76 %. 
With regard to the other exporting countries, the Commission and the Council Regulations do not provide 
any indication conceming a'. , 
In view of the high probability of distortions in the estimates when the market share of the dumping 
exporter drops considerably, a' is determined on a the highest possible level below which the probability of 
distortions decreases1380• It is set on the highest possible level since the injury increases with a'. 
In this anti-dumping case, the dumping exporters' market share for Czechoslovakia, the Oerman Democratie 
Republic, Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia would drop to zero if a' would equal 13 % because at that level«&» 
would be estimated to equal one. Therefore, for these exporting countries, a' is assumed to equal 12 %. 
Similarly, for Libya and the USSR, «&» would be estimated at one if a' equals 12 %. Consequently, for 
Libya and the USSR, a' .is assumed to equal 11 %. This yields the following figures: 
Exporting country De a' Db 
(tonnes) (%) (tonnes) 
Czechoslovakia 42 631 12.00 5 813 
G.D.R. 89 739 12.00 12 237 
Kuwait 46 710 4.76 2 336 
Libya 284 303 11.00 35 139 
Saudi Arabia 110 475 12.00 15 065 
USSR 270 849 11.00 33 476 
Trinidad and Tobago 147 936 4.76 7 397 
Yugoslavia 41408 12.00 5 647 
All countries 1 034 051 10.17 117 108 
(ii) the quantity sold by the dumping exporters on the Community market (quantity basis) 
The table above contains the different values of De for each country. 
(iii) the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
1379 
1380 
The Commission and the Council Regulations do not provide a general margin of price undercutting for 
total dumped imports of urea on the Community market. Instead some disparate data are given for the 
national market of some Memher States and these data concern only a sub-market of the total market of 
urea in these Memher States. lndeed, the Commission and the Council Regulations provide the following 
information on price undercutting : 
Supra, 139-143. 
Supra, 576. 
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ltaly: a) the agricultural urea market : 
weighted average margin of price undercutting = between 15 and 21 % ; 
52 % of total Community consumption of agricultural urea, i.e., 1 000 000 
tonnes; 
b) the technical urea market : 
weighted average margin of price undercuuing = between 5 and 17 % ; 
24 % of total Community consumption of technical urea ; 
France: a) the agricultural urea market: 
weighted average margin of price undercutting = between 27 and 35 % ; 
20 % of total Community consumption of agricultural urea, i.e., 375 000 tonnes ; 
United Kingdom : a) the agricultural urea market : 
weighted average margin of price undercutting = 4. 8 % ; 
6.4 % of total Community consumption of agricultural urea ; 
Jreland : a) agricultural market : 
weighted average margin of price undercutting = between 18 and 23 % ; 
4 % of total Community consumption of agricultural urea. 
Assume that the margin of price lmdercutting for the Community equals the weighted average of the 
margins of price undercutting in these four Memher States : 
the agricultural urea market : 
Total Community consumption of agricultural urea is : 
[1 000 000 tonnes + 375 000 tonnes]/[0.52 + 0.20] = 1 909 722 tonnes 
Therefore, consumption of agricultural urea in the United Kingdom is : 
6.4 % * 1 909 722 tonnes = 122 222 tonnes 
and in lreland : 
4 % * 1 909 722 tonnes = 76 389 tonnes 
Total consumption of agricultural urea in Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Ireland, thus, equals 
1 573 611 tonnes [= 1 000 000 + 375 000 + 122 222 + 76 389]. 
As a consequence, the weighted average of the margins of price undercutting in the four Memher 
Statesis: 
[1 ()()() ()()() * (15 % + 21 %)/2 + 375 ()()() * (27 % + 35 %)/2 
+ 122 222 * 4.8 % + 76 389 * (18 % + 23 %)/2]/1 573 611 
= 20.19% 
the technical urea market : 
The Commission and the Council Regulations only mention the margins of price undercutting on the 
ltalian tec~cal urea market. . Therefore, the average margin of price undercutting for the total 
technical urea market of the Community is assumed to equal the arithmical average of these margins, · 
i.e., 11 % [= (5 % + 17 %)/2]. 
total urea market : 
The Commission and the Council Regulations assume that 90 % of the dumped imports are sold in the 
agricultural sector. Therefore, the weighted average margin of price undercutting for the total urea 
market is: 
20.19 % * 0.9 + 11 % * 0.1 = 19.27 % 
As no precise information is available, assume that the prices of the imported non-dumped urea originating 
in third countries equal the prices charged by the Community producers. Moreover, assume that the prices 
of the Community producers and, thus, the non-dumped imported urea equal unity. In view of the price 
undercutting of 19.27 %, the prices of the dumped Japanese printers equal 0.8073 [ = 1 - 19.27 %]. 
In view of the fact that the volume of the dumped imports amounts to 1 034 051 tonnes,. which represents a 
market share of 20.28 %, total consumption (quantity basis) on the Community market is: 
1 034 051 tonnes/0.2028 = 5 098 871 tonnes 
Therefore, total Community consumption (value basis) is : 
0.8073 * 1 034 051 + [5 098 871- 1 034 051] = 4 899 609 
Because Dd amounts to 3 461 000 tonnes, V d (value basis) equals : 
vd = 3 461 000/4 899 609 = 69.72% 
590 
(iv) the market share of the sales of the dumping exporters on the Community market of the 
like product (value basis) 
On the basis of the same assumptions made in (iii), Vc (value basis) equals : 
Exporting country De vc 
(tonnes) (%) 
Czechoslovakia 42 631 0.70 
G.D.R. 89 739 1.48 
Kuwait 46 710 0.77 
Libya 284 303 4.68 
Saudi Arabia 110 475 1.82 
USSR 270 849 4.46 
Trinidad and Tobago 147 936 2.44 
Yugoslavia 41 408 0.68 
All countries 1 034 051 17.04 
(v) the dumping margin 
According to the Commission Regulation the weigthed average dumping margin M amounts to : 
Exporting country M 
(%) 
Czechoslovakia 36.00 
G.D.R. 51.00 
Kuwait 36.00 
Libya 58.00 
Saudi Arabia 55.00 
USSR 60.00 
Trinidad and Tobago 37.00 
Yugoslavia 78.00 
All countries 53.49 
(vi) the own-price elasticity of the Community industry 's supply of the like product in the 
Community market 
The Commission and the Council Regulations do not provide direct information on Ed. They do give 
information about Community producers' prices, production volume, capacity, rate of capacity utilization 
and employment. However, these changes are always intertemporal changes whereas Ed is not. 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, Community production bas declined by 12.5 % 
between 1984 and 1985 and by 11.4 % between 1985 and 1986. Also the Community producers' prices 
dropped significantly, namely up to 40 %. As the rate of capacity utilization equals 66 % in 1986, whereas 
it reached 77 % in 1985 and 85 % in 1984, Community production may increase smoothly if prices would 
rise. Moreover, it is possible to close down a plant during several months and to re-activate it on an even 
shorter period. 
Therefore, Ed is assumed to equal10. 
In this respect it should be pointed out that the value of Ed as well as the value of NA and Sdc are not 
important for the purpose of the application of the comparative analysis to the anti-dumping case in 
question. lndeed, the purpose of this exercise is to investigate the effects of cumulation rather than to 
ascertain whether the European anti-dumping authorities have incorrectly found injurious dumping. 
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(vii) the own-price elasticity of tiemand in the Community market for the aggregate product 
category 
According to the Commission and the Council Regulations, ~ is a very price-sensitive product. In other 
words, the own-price elasticity of~ must be high, for example -10. 
For the sake of cumulation, the same value of NA is taken for all dumping countries. Moreover, in view of 
the relatively low market share of the separate imports, it may be argued that they would only marginally 
affect the value of NA. 
(viii) the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with respect to the 
price of the dumped product on the Community market 
A rather high Sdc seems to be appropriate. Indeed, there were no great difficulties in the determination of 
the like product category ; only marginal differences in physical characteristics existed, which did notaffect 
the interchangeability of the different forms of urea. Therefore, sdc is assumed to be equal to 50. 
The introduetion of these parameters into the economie model, yields the following results : 
Exporting country dln Pd dln~ 
(%) (%) 
Czechoslovakia -0.09 -0.87 
G.D.R. -0.27 -2.69 
Kuwait -0.03 -0.33 
Libya -0.82 -8.19 
Saudi Arabia -0.36 -3.60 
USSR -0.80 -8.05 
Trinidad and Tobago -0.11 -1.06 
Yugoslavia -0.19 -1.88 
All countries -2.63 -26.25 
With the exception of Libya and the USSR, the results for the exporting countries, taken 
separately, can hardly be considered to indicate material injury caused by the dumping. However, 
if the dumping from all those countries is cumulated, the dumping of each country will be found 
to be causing injury. Moreover, the new GATTand ECrules on cumulation (Article 3.3. GATT 
Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(4) basic EC Regulation) will not prevent those countries from 
being cumulated. Indeed, the cumulative market share of those countries was well above 3 % of 
Community consumption (no information is available on their share in total Community imports) 
and their dumping margins laid markedly above 1 %. 
It bas been argued that CQuntry-cumulation should be possible only if the dumped imports have a 
collective injurious effect, i.e. , if the the sum of the injuries caused by the individual dumped 
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imparts is smaller than the injury caused by the dumped imparts taken as a whole1381 • In this 
anti-dumping case conceroing urea, country-cumulation does not seem to be justified. Indeed, the 
sum of the injury caused by the individual imparts is : 
E dln Pd = -2.67 % 
E dln ~ = -26.67 % 
which is marginally higher than the results for the cumulated dumped imports. The marginal 
difference is undoubtedly the result of errors of rounding off. Consequently, there is no ground 
for country-cumulation. However, it is passible that, after rectification of these errors, the sum of 
the individual results will come to less than the results of the dumped imports taken as a whole, in 
which case country-cumulation would have been appropriate. 
The results obtained for the dumped imports as a whole, are based on the assumption that all 
dumping exporters located in different countries behave as a cartel on the Community market. 
However, the Commission and the Council Regulations do not contain evidence of a cartel 
between these dumping exporters. lt, thus, is quite possible that there is no cartel. In this case, 
the Herfindhal index cannot be assumed to equal one, but it must equal : 
H = [0. 702 + 1.482 +0. 772 +4.682 + 1.822 +4.462 +2.442 +0.682] 
/[0. 70+ 1.48+0. 77 +4.68+ 1.82+4.46+2.44+0.68]2 
= 0.1889 
The introduetion of this Herfindahl index, which implies the assumption of Couroot oligopoly, 
yields : 
dln Pd = -1.98 % 
dln ~ = -19.75 % 
In the case of Couroot oligopoly, the conciosion alters entirely : the sum of the results for the 
individual dumped imports is considerably higher than the results for the dumped imports as a 
whole. · Thus, country-cumulation must not have been made. This conciosion bas far-reaching 
consequences : anti-dumping relief should have been granted only in respect of the dumping from 
Libya and the Soviet Union because the dumping from the six other countries had not been 
causing material in jury to the Community industry. 
1381 Supra, 533-534. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Merely by exporting to the Community, all exporters, broadly speaken, cause in jury to the 
Community producers. lndeed, either they forestall the Community producers to sell or they 
stiffen competition and, thus, exert a decreasing effect on prices. They can even deprive the 
Community producers from monopoly positions and high monopoly prices on the Community 
mar ket. Clearly, since such kind of in jury is only the result of normal competition, it should not 
· be sanctioned. 
The issue in European anti-dumping law is whether such kind of injury should be sanctioned when 
it is caused by dumping exporters. At first glance, European anti-dumping law seems to require 
more : the in jury must be material ; it must be caused by the dumping, and it must be inflicted 
upon a Community industry. However, an examination of European anti-dumping law shows that 
all injury caused 'by dumping exporters may be sanctioned (so-called «one-way flexibility»). 
Indeed, the injury has not necessarily to be caused by the dumping exporters as they may be 
sanctioned merely because their exports and the injury coincide in time. Since the dumping 
exporters cannot have foreknowledge of such coincidence, they are unable to know in advance 
whether they injure the Community industry in terms of European anti-dumping law (lack of legal 
certainty). This Chapter is concluded by a recapitulation of those remarkable results of the 
analysis of the injury requirement. 
5.1. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY 
The requirement for the injury to have been suffered by a Community industry should limit the 
scope of European anti-dumping law. Indeed, if there is no Community industry, in jury eannot be 
found. However, the concept «Community industry» is implemented in such a «one-way flexible» 
way that there will practically always be a Community industry. 
A Community industry encompasses Community producers manufacturing a product like the 
dumped product. A like product is strictly defined as a product with identical or, at least, closely 
resembling physical characteristics. Elements of substitutability are taken into account, in order to 
determine the close resembienee of physical characteristics. As the dumped products and the 
Community products will seldom be entirely identical, the degree of substitutability may play a 
crucial role. In order to measure the degree of substitutability, the European anti-dumping 
authorities do not use the cross elasticity of demand and supply. lnstead they only use general 
terms such as the application and the perception of the product by the customer. Such general 
terms allow a like product definition made to fit the Community producers. Thus, Community 
~-· 
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industries may be and indeed already have been found to be injured by the dumping of products, 
though they do not (yet) produce such products. 
A Community industry does not necessarily have to include all Community producers of the like 
product. It may refer to some Community producers whose collective output constitutes a major 
proportion of the total Community production of the like product. Since a minority may constitute 
a major proportion (25 % constitutes a major proportion), anti-dumping rellef can be granted 
when the majority of the Community producers does not suffer injury from the dumping. Clearly, 
the requirement of only a major proportion makes the injury requirement easier to be met and 
anti-dumping rellef more readily. 
In order to determine a Community industry, producers who are related to the dumping exporters 
or who import the dumped product, may be disregarded, though not necessarily. Interestingly, 
the European anti-dumping authorities use this possibility in such a way as to make sure that the 
complainant Community producers represent a major proportion of the total Community 
production. Indeed, they practically never disregard complainant producers who are related to the 
dumping exporters or who import the dumped product, whereas, in the few instances in which the 
question of non-complainant producers related to the dumping exporters or importing the dumped 
product, was treated, all these non-complainant producers were disregarded. The difference in 
treatment is meaningful. Overall Community production does not include disregarded producers 
and disregarded complaining producers also disappear as complainants. By disregarding non-
complainant producers, overall Community production drops, but the share of the complainant 
Community producers in overall Community production and, thus, the probability that they 
represent a major proportion increase. Conversely, by disregarding a complainant producer, both_ 
total Community production and the production of the category of complainant producers drop, 
but since the latter proportionally decreases to a greater extent than the first, the probability that 
the remaining complainant producers represent a major proportion decreases. 
When the Community can be divided in regional markets, a Community industry is not held to 
represent a major proportion of total Community production. In such a case, it must represent 
almost all of the production within such a regional market Regional markets are only 
exceptionally used. Nevertheless, they clearly make the injury requirement easier to fulftl. 
Moreover, the criteria which determine a regional market, are not adequate. They only pertain to 
there not being intra-Community trade between the regional markets. However, there being no 
intra-Community trade is not adequate : it does not measure the substitutabillty between the 
products sold in the regional markets but after a sufficiently long period of time. Since European 
anti-dumping law does not guarantee that a sufficiently long period of time is allowed for, the 
Community may be divided erroneously into regional markets and, consequently, a Community 
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industry may be found to exist even though it does not represent a major proportion of total 
Community production. 
5.2. INJURY STANDARDS 
The requirement that the Community industry must suffer injury being rather vague, it may be 
applied arbitrarily, which, of course, does not guarantee legal certainty. As a consequence, 
European anti-dumping law makes it possible to find injury even if there are strong indications 
that the Community industry does not suffer in jury ( «one-way flexibility»). 
0 There are three instances of injury : actual in jury, threat of in jury and material retardation of the 
establishment of a Community industry. Thus, if the Community industry does not suffer actual 
in jury, one can always rely on either threat of in jury or even the rètardation of the establishment 
of the Community industry. European anti-dumping case law, however, bas seldom relied on 
threat of injury and material retardation. It may be difficult to prove threat of injury and material 
retardation since they must be based on hard facts and not on mere allegations or potentialities. 
The true reason, however, is that there is little need to rely on them as · actual in jury can 
practically always be demonstrated. 
Indeed, GA TI and European anti-dumping law contain a non-exhaustive list of economie factors 
on the basis of which actual injury may be established. None of these factors is conclusi~e. 
Thus, injury may be assessed on any factor which evidences that the Community industry is not 
doing well. As in practically each case the factors analysed allow divergent conclusions, it has to · 
be decided which factors are conclusive. However, hardly ever an explanation is provided, 
indicating why some factors are decisive, whereas others are not. The European anti-dumping 
authorities only provide an overview of the factors analysed, frequently foliowed by a 
recapitulation of the decisive factors. Sometimes, when factors truly hinder the finding of in jury, 
it is explained why injury is nevertheless found. That explanation is seldom convincing, since it 
usually stated that the negative factors outweigh the positive factors. Moreover, as in each case 
different factors are decisive, no general guidelines can be deduced from European anti-dumping 
law as to know from which threshold on injury is found. 
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5.3. CAUSALITY 
Because of its vagueness, the requirement that the injury must be caused by the dumping bas little 
impact on the result of an anti-dumping proceeding. Indeed, a causal relationsbip between the 
dumping and the deterioration in the state of the Community industry may be found in cases 
wbere the dumping did not cause (material) injury to the Community industry .. 
The injury caused by other factors than the dumping must not be attributed to the dumping. This 
requirement triggers the question wbether dumped imports coming from another country are also 
sucb «other factorS» or wbether all dumped imports ooming from various oountries sbould be 
oonsidered together, i.e., cumulated. In pursuance of GA TI and European anti-dumping law, 
dumped imports are cumulated wben their cumulation is appropriate in the light of tbe conditloos 
of oompetition between them and between them and the Community products. As tbe notion 
«oonditions of competition» probably enoompasses an unrestrained variety of factors, there will 
always be some ground for cumulating the dumped imports, even if several otber factors speak 
against cumulation. Moreover, most factors are irrelevant for the question of cumulation. For 
instance, if the dumping exporters offer oomparabie products, their imports may be cumulated. 
The oomparability of the dumped products, bowever, does oot limit the possibility of cumulation 
and caooot expiain wby imports should be cumulated since eacb anti-dumping proceeding applies 
only to like and, therefore, oomparabie products. The use of sucb irrelevant factors oontributes to 
finding dumping exporters to cause (material) injury in cases wbere tbey do oot. Indeed, tbe fact 
that a dumping exporter bimself does not cause (material) injury, bas explicitly been rejected as a 
reason for preventlog cumulation and the new GA TI and EC rules on de minimis dumping 
margins and negligible import · volumes will only marginally prevent the cumulation of non-
injurious dumped imports. Moreover, it is not investigated whether tbe in jury results from a 
oollective action taken by several dumping exporters, tbougb dumping exporters sbould be held 
liable only for the injury they inflict. They may intliet injury by tbemselves or by means of a 
oollective action with other exporters. If the injury is tbe result of a oollective action on bebalfof 
the dumping exporters, only then their exports should be cumulated. 
Once the issue of cumulation is solved, it will be clear what is to be understood by «other 
factors». The examination of the «<ther factors» is usually restricted to an overview of the «<ther 
factors» analysed, together with a short account explaining why they do oot prevent the fmding of 
a causal relationsbip between the dumping and the injury. That finding is always based on a 
ooincidence in time of the dumping and the deterioration in the state of the Community industry 
(trends analysis). However, a coincidence in time does not prove a causal relationship. The 
deterioration of the condition of the Community industry may be caused by another factor which 
may even not be detected and analysed. 
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European anti-dumping law does not detect all cases of injurious dumping either. It only detects 
injurious dumping when the state of the Community industry has deteriorated. It does not fmd 
injurious dumping which prevents the condition of the Community industry to improve. 
Those drawbacks may be undone through replacing the trendsanalysis by the comparative analysis 
which compares the factual state of the Community industry, i.e., in the presence of dumping, 
with a counterfactual state without dumping. Since the counterfactual state is identical to the 
factual state but for the dumping, the dumping will be the cause of the injury if the factual state of 
the Community industry is worse than its counterfactual state. However, the counterfactual world 
does not exist, but must be calculated on the basis of eertaio assumptions which are not always in 
accordance with reality. Therefore, the comparative analysis should not be automatically applied : 
the results of the comparative analysis should not be used, if it can be demonstrated that the 
assumptions are not in accordance with reality. 
--l-
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APPENDIX 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
ECONOMIC MODEL OF R.D. BOLTUCK 
ON LOTUS 1-2-3 
1. ANTI-DUMPING CASE CONCERNING 
2. ============================================== 
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sdr 
Sre 
NA 
Ed 
M 
H 
NI 
Nr 
Nd 
Ne 
Ndf 
Nrd 
Nef 
Nre 
·Nde 
Ned 
N'e 
Nh 
+ B3*B4/(1-B3) 
·--------------------------------------------------
(1-B6)*B11-B6*B8 
-(B6*B9+ B7*B10-(1-B6-B7)*B11) 
-((1-B6-B7)*B9 + B7*B8-B6*B 11) 
-((1-B6-B7)*B10+B6*B8-B7*B11) 
(1-B6-B7)*(B9+B11) 
+B6*(B9+B11) 
(1-B6-B7)*(B10+ B11) 
+ B7*(B10+ B11) 
+B7*(B8+B11) 
+B6*(B8+B11) 
(B19+(B25*B24)/(B12-B18))/B14 
(B26*(1 + B13))/(1-B26*B13) 
---------------------------------------------------------------
a" 
11(1 + 11(B3*B27 +(1-B3)*B26)) 
11(1 + 1/B27) 
11(1 + 1/B26) 
+ B27*B5*(B29-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B29-B31)/B31 
(B5 + B32)/((B5 + B32) +(B4+ B33)) 
11(1 + 11(B34*B27 +(1-B34)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B35-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B35-B31)/B31 
(B5 + B36)/((B5 + B36) + (B4 + B37)) 
1/(1 + 1I(B38*B27 +(1-B38)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B39-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B39-B31)/B31 
(B5 + B40)/((B5 + B40)+(B4+ B41)) 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
p. 
I 
40.. 
4Dc 
pi 
4Dh 
4Dc 
a• 
pi 
4Dh 
4Dc 
a 
I a•-a I 
1/(1 + 11(B42*B27 +(1-B42)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B43-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B43-B31)/B31 
(BS + B44)/((B5 + B44)+(B4+ B45)) 
l/(1 + 1/(B46*B27 +(1-B46)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B47-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B47-B31)/B31 
(B5 + B48)/((B5 + B48) + (B4 + B49)) 
11(1 + 1/(B50*B27 +(1-B50)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B51-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B51-B31)/B31 
(B5 + B52)/((B5 + B52) + (B4 + B53)) 
11(1 + 1/(BS4*B27 +(1-B54)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B5S-B30)/B30 
+ B 19*B4*(B55-B31 )IB31 
(B5 + B56)/((B5 + B56) + (B4 + B57)) 
1/(1 + 11(B58*B27 +(1-B58)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B59-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B59-B31)/B31 
(B5 + B60)/((B5 + B60)+(B4+ B61)) 
11(1 + 11(B62*B27 +(1-B62)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B63-B30)/B30 
+ B19*B4*(B63-B31)/B31 
(B5 + B64)/((B5 + B64) + (B4 + B65)) 
11(1 + 11(B66*B27 +(1-B66)*B26)) 
+ B27*B5*(B67-B30)/B30 
+ B 19*B4*(B67 -B31 )IB31 
(B5 + B68)/((B5 + B68) +(B4+ B69)) 
((B66-B70)"2)"(0.5) 
·---------------------------------------------------
-(B70*B13)/((B70*B13)+ 1) 
(B24/(B 12-B 18))*B73 
+B75*B12 
TI. ============================================== 
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Whereby: 
a' = the actual share of the dumping exporter' s sales made at home with regard to bis 
combined Community and homesales (quantity basis) 
De = the quantity sold by the dumping exporter on the Community market (quantity 
basis) 
1\ = the quantity sold by the dumping exporter on bis home market 
V d = the market share of the sales of the Community industry on the Community 
market of the like product (value basis) 
V c ~ the market share of the sales of the dumping exporter on the Community market 
of the like product (value basis) 
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sdc = 
sdr = 
sfc = 
NA= 
Ed = 
M= 
H= 
NI= 
Nr = 
Nd = 
N = c 
Ndf = 
Nrd = 
Ncf = 
Nrc = 
Ndc = 
Ncd = 
Nb= 
p. = 
1 
ph= 
p = c 
anh = 
ID= c 
the elasticity of substitution of the Community producers' like product with 
respect to the price of the dumped product on the Community market 
the elasticity of substitution of the Community producer's like product with 
respect to the price of the foreign non-dumping producers' like product on the 
Community market 
the elasticity of substitution of the foreign non-dumping producers' like product 
on the Community market with respect to the price of the dumped product on the 
Community market 
the own-price elasticity of demand on the Community market for the aggregate 
product category (Community industry's like product + dumped product + 
imported non-dumped like product) 
the own-price elasticity of the Community industry's supply of the like product 
to the Community market 
the dumping margin 
Herfmdhal index 
the own-price elasticity of demand on the Community market for the aggregate 
imported product category (dumped product+ imported non-dumped like 
product) 
the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the foreign non-
dumping producers' like product 
the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the Community 
producers' like product 
the own-price elasticity of demand in the Community market for the dumped 
product 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in the Community for the Community 
producers' like product with respect to the price of the foreign non-dumping 
producers' like product 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in the Community for the foreign non-
dumping producers' like product with respect to the price of the Community 
producers' like product 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in the Community for the dumped product 
with respect to the price of the foreign non-dumping producers' like product 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in the Community for the foreign non-
dumping producers' like product with respect to the price of the dumped product 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in the Community for the Community 
producers' like product with respect to the price of the dumped product on the 
Community market 
the cross-price elasticity of demand in. the Community for the dumped product 
with respect to the price of the Community producers' like product 
the own-price elasticity of demand in the home market for the dumped product 
the price charged by the dumping exporter on bis home market and the 
Community market if he does not practise dumping 
the price charged by the dumping exporter on bis home market 
the price charged by the dumping exporter on the Community market 
the change in the quantity sold by the dumping exporter on bis home market 
the change in the quantity sold by the dumping exporter on the Community 
market 
--------------rr 
I 
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a" = the calculated share of the dumping exporter' s sales made at home with regard to 
his combined Community and home sales, whereby dumping is still being 
practised ( quantity basis) 
a = the share of the dumping exporter's sales made at home with regard to bis 
combined Community and home sales if he does not practise dumping ( quantity 
basis) 
P d = the price charged by the Community producers on the Community market 
<4 = the quantity sold by the Community producers on the Community market 
dlnP c = the percentage change of Pc a result of the dumping 
dlnP d = the percentage change of P d as a result of the du'mping 
dln<4 = the percentage change of <4 as a result of the dumping 
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Under GA 'TT anti-dumping law, it is thought ifl «desirable» «that the imposition (of anti-dumping 
rJ 
measures) be ~rmissive» in cases where dumping is proved to injure the Community industry 
(Article 9.1. GA'IT Anti-dumping Code). European anti-dumping law translates that idea by 
means of the concept «Community interests», which plays a crucial role in European anti-dumping 
law. If the Community interests so require, 
where an undertaking is withdrawn or violated, provisional anti-dumping duties may be 
applied forthwith on the basis of the facts established before the acceptance of the undertaking 
(Article 8(9) and (10) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 10(6) basic ECSC Decision) ; 
provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties against injurious dumping must be imposed 
(Articles 7(1) and- 9(4) basic EC Regulation ; Articles 11(1) and 12(1) basic ECSC Decision) ; 
the anti-dumping measures imposed may be su~pended) for a limited pefi.cxt ~nder EC anti-
dumping law (Article 14(4) basic EC Regulation) ; · -----
anti-dumping proceedings must be continued, under ECSC anti-dumping law, even after the 
withdrawal of the complaint (Article 5(4) basic ECSC Decision). 
EC anti-dumping law stipulates that «a determination as to whether the Community interest calls 
for intervention shall be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, 
including the interests of the dornestic industry and users and consumers» ; it goes further by 
providing that «(i)n such an examination, the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of 
injurious dumping and to restore effective competition shall be given special consideration» 
(Aiticle 21(1) basic EC Regulation). Thus, the Community interests encompass, inter alia, the 
interests of the Community in~stry13~J2-.~sers and consumers of the dumped product and 
competition (or antitrust}_l!Olicy._ However, other elements may aîso be taken- into ~account. Thus, 
in 1lpplication of forme~ EC ilfld 12resent ECSC anti-dumping law, which do not define the concept 
«Community interests», European ~Ji-dY.IJJping authorities have ço~sJ9.~rfA tb~_jnte~ests of the 
~- -~-----~ -~---·--0- .. ---------------- ' .. -
employees in the Community industry and the processing industrie~,-~~-lV.elLas-the-intet:ests-ef-the 
~--~-~-~--~--~-----... . ----·---~----~--- --------- ~------~~-·-~--"-------~--~-~·-~-~--~~~-·-
1382 The concept .. Community industry,. is used here in its specific meaning under European anti-dumping law, i.e., it refers to 
the Community producers as a whole of the like product or to those whose collective output of the products constitutes a m~r 
proportion of the total Community production of those product& (Article 4(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC 
Decision). See : •upra, 376-434. 
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Community authorities in pursuing other policies than antitrust policy, such as trade policy and 
national security. It, thus, seems that the concept «Community interests» involves all . the 
Community components haVinganmteresr-rn.-~the~oUmped-îmlJOrts~- ---~ ·- · · · -~~-
~ --------··--··-··- .. 
In the wording of EC anti-dumping law, the investigation of the Community interests involves an 
appreciation of its various components. Also bere, EC anti-dumping law seems to have codified 
European anti-dumping case law where the different components of the Community interests are 
weighted against each other. Notwithstanding the definition provided by EC anti-dumping law, 
the European anti-dumping authorities enjoy broad discretionary powers1383 since the concept 
«Çommunity interests» involves an appraisal of complex economie situations1384• Hence, the 
question is w.h~ther the different components of the concept «Community interestS» are correctly 
- . . .. . .,.···· ..... -' .,, ... ,. - ·······-~-··-~"~--~~~~~---.... 
valued, especially in view of the-facrtfiaf-ffiis 'concept~ is' an. iÏlstrUment for weighing conmeting 
~· . 
mterests 1385• 
2. COMPONENTS OF THE COMMUNITY INTERESTS 
2.1. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY 
It might seem peculiar that the concept «Community interests» covers the Community industry 
(see: Artiele 21(1) basic EC Regulation). Tbe concepDCom.munity__int_~rests» offers aJ.eC.Q!}d 
owortunity~rscore how much the Community indus!!Y.J.Yffu~s_frQ!!tJhe_dumP!_ng. Indeed, 
~ .. . ... - ... -- - -~ 
the èoncept «injury» already takes into account the Community industry's interests. The question, 
therefore, is why special attention should be paid to the Community industry' s interests by means 
1383 BOUDANT, J., L'anli-dumping comniUIIQUIQire, Paria, Economica, 1991, 152. 
1384 CJ.E.C., caae 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 843; C.J.E.C., case C-
174/87, 10 March 1992, IUcoh Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1404; CJ.E.C., caae C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushito Electric 
Intlustrial Co. Lid and Matsushita Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1487; C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, 
Konishirolcu Photo INÜistry Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1531 ; C.J.E.C., caae C-1n/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electrlc Co. Lid v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1573; CJ.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporadon v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1685; 
C.J.E.C., case C-358/89, 11 June 1992, &tmmet Industrie SA v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (3813), 3840 (Opinion of Advocate General JACOBS). 
1385 BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., «EC Anti-dumpingEnforcement- Selected Second Generationa Issue&», in Antitmst and Trade Policy in the Uniled 
SIQtes and the Europeon Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Dender, 1986, (563), 590. 
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of the concept «injury»1386• A first answer lies with the GA IT ongtns of European anti-
dumping law. GA TI anti-dumping law only allows anti-dumping rellef if the producers of the 
like product in the importing country suffer material injury from the dumping. In order to comply 
with GA TI anti-dumping law, European anti-dumping law pays special attention to the 
Community industry by imposing the injury test. The requirement, under European anti-dumping 
law, that anti-dumping rellef must be in the Community interests, did not affect the injury test. A 
second answer is the «<ne-way flexibility• of European anti-dumping law. Since dumped imports 
· practically always injure the Community industry and, therefore, go against the Community 
igdustry' s interests, the concept «Community interests• doubles the apparent size of the in jury and 
the strength of the argument that the injury should be repaired. 
Many anti-dumping cases exclusively refer to the injury inflicted by the dumping on the 
Community industry onder the heading «Community interests•1387• Consequently, the 
Community interestsare reduced to the Community industry's interests. If the Community should 
only consist of Community producers manufacturing the like product, the interpretation of the 
concept «Community interests• as referring only to the Community industry's interests might be 
accepted/ Otherwise, the term «Community interests». must take a different meaning from the 
concept «injury•, for, if not, its interpretation would be contrary to European anti-dumping case 
law which describes the concept «Community interests• _ as «various interests taken as a whole, 
iocloding the interests of the dornestic industry and users and consumers» (Article 21(1) basic EC 
Regulation)1388• Moreover, onder such an interpretation, the use of the concept «Community ~ 
interests» would be superfluous. However, tl!~ concept «C_Qffi. ___ m ____ ._urn_ ·t. Y. interests» is introduced into )r'ift_~ .. 
European anti-dumping law in order to make anti-dumping ___ ~f!~!ef against injurious dumpinV rit} : 
~rmissive instead of mandatory, but without assig!!!~g __ ~!!l!mi~J!J~_po.w.eu-to...the-aati- ~/ ~-
dum~ing__ authorities. Consequently, the interpretation of the Community interests as exclusively) 
referring to the Community industry's interests when there are still other interested parties, is 
contrary to European anti-dumping law because it either renders the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures automatic or grants the anti-dumping authorities unlimited discretionary powers. 
1386 As Advocate-General TESAURO rightly argues, an incorrect assessment of the Community interest will he made ü no 
assessment is made of the injury suffered by the Community industry (C.J.E.C., case 121186, 28 November 1989, Anon.ymo• 
EtaireÜJ Epicheiri.Beon. Metallefti./con. Viomichan.ihon lcai Naftilialwn. AE a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1989, (3919), 3936). Thus, he 
implicitly asserts that the Community industry's interest& are part ofthe Community interest&. 
1387 See e.g. : Commission Decision 91/392/EEC of 21 June 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain asbestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, 
O.J., 31 July 1991, NoL 209/37. See also: BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., tcEC Anti-dumpingEnforcement- Selected Second Generations 
Issues,., in Antitrut an.d Trade Policy in the Uniled Statea an.d the European. Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 
1986, (563), 589. 
1388 Under former EC and prevailing ECSC anti-dumping law, lhe Court of Jultice bas held that the European anti-dumping aulhoritiea «JDUit 
take into account the interelltl of the Community lncluding amongsr olhers daose of consumern (C.J.E.C., case C-170/89, 28 November 1991, 
Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5709), 5743) (emphasis added). See also: BOURGEOIS, 
J .H .J ., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generations Issues., in Antimuf tmd Trade Policy in lhe Unired Slales and lhe European 
Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 589. 
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Indeed, in case the Community interests are equated with the Community industry's interests, the) 
Community interests should always call- for anti-dumping relief, if the Community industry suffers 
injury from the dumping, and, when no rellef is granted in such a case, no objective criterion can 
be invoked explaining why no anti-dumping action is taken. 
Only in a few cases, the reference to the Community industry under the heading of Community 
interests could have ~ value in that it seems to take account, though implicitly, of the total 
welfare of the Community. In those cases, anti-dumping rellef was found to be in the Community 
interests because it would allow the Community · industry to attain a reasonable rate of capacity 
utilization necessary to depress production costs1389• These cases seem to comply with 
economie theo!Y since tlley impose anti-dumping relief in ord~-to-e~abie--ih~c-c~~~~~iiY--i~d.ustry 
to attain external eco~~mi~~--~y-~~.~--As-·lias-beer1-éxplairie<f'iii-- Cfiäptef~III1J90;-·carnt=dumping 
reliéf can;--lilitee(i, increase the welfare of the Community in case of such economies of scale. 
Por this to be the case, certain other conditions must be fulfilled, though (namely whether there is 
only competition between the Community industry and the dumping exporters on the Community 
market, or whether only the Community enforces anti-dumping law). However, European anti-
dumping law does not investigate whether those other necessary conditions are fulfilled. It takes 
accouqt_oLthe-mere-interests_ of the Com_!!!_unity industcy rather than the overaJ~elfare-of the 
C~mmun!!r. Co~uently, the. anthdumping_~rclief~.it~-.gran.ts.r=mighL~=weU~-ge~against the 
Community interests1391 • 
1389 Commiaaion Dcciaion No 891/92/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertaio semi-tinisbed 
produels of alloy llleel, originaûng in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 95126 ;cCommiasion-Regulation <EEÇ) No 3296/92 of 12 
November 1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertaio &eamleas pipea and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia 
and of Montenegro, the fonner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J.; 14 
November 1992, NoL 328/15. 
1390 Supra, 349-355. 
1391 In the ca~ in qucation, it was argued that the maintenance of the production of the lowor-grade mau like produels was necessary to prevent 
a significant deterioriation of the coat structure within the coupled production of specialized produels and to prevent significant·price increaacs for 
the downstream coDJUmen of these specialized producls. The effect of attaining extemal economie& of scale on the pricea of other, specialized 
produels is irrelevant to the question of whether the Community interelts call for anti-dumping re lief. The argument on which these cases rely, 
only admils that anti-dumping relief may ca~ae a redistribuûon of consumer surplus between the consumen of lower-grade maaa productl aod the 
consumen of specialized producta. lt does nol show that there is no net coat of anti-dumping proteetion or rather a lower net coat. 1be 
redistribution of CODJUmer 111rplua only involvea 1hat the. Community producen transfer (a part of) the gain in their surplus caused by the anti-
dumping proteetion to the conaumen of apecialized producls. 
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2.2. COMMUNITY INDUSTRY VERSUS CONSUMERS AND PROCESSING 
INDUSTRY 
Although the Community interests include the interests of consumers1392, the final consumers 
and processing industries using the like product in many cases do not _r~c~ against the imposition 
antf;dwnping -~~-oNOtWiffistanding the -~~;-"dfect anti-dumping measures have 
on them 1394, the absence of any reaction on their behalf should not come as a surprise. It 
may be caused by so-cal~~~ protecti~ : the processing ·mdustry does not oppose the 
Community industry's request for anti-dumping proteetion because it expects that the proteetion of 
the Community industry will deteriorate its position and, thus, increases the probability of the 
processing industry gaining proteetion in turn 1395. 
A more general reason may be that processing industries, as well as · consumers ignore that an 
anti-dumping proceeding bas been initiated. It is true that the initiation of an anti-dumping 
proceeding and the consequent decisions of the European anti-dumping authorities must be 
publisbed in the Official Joumal of the European Communities (Articles 5(9), 11(2)(c), 11(5) and 
14(2) basic EC Regulation ; Articles 7(1), 9(2), 10(1), 13(1), 15(2) up to (5) basic ECSC 
Decision) and that a table of contents of the Official Joumal of the European Communities is 
publisbed in the official gazettes of the Memher States. HQ._wever, only a slight minority of the 
citizens actually reads them. Moreover, the European anti-dumping authorities will probably 
never advise consumers and processing industries of the initiating of an anti-dumping proceeding. 
1392 C.J.E.C., ca1e C-170/89, 28 November t~91, Bunau ~/!Jen des Unions de Consommateurs v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5709), 
5743. 
E. A. VERMULST and J .J. HOODER, however, hold that consumer organizations have no interest in anti-dumping proceedings, since they 
«cannot substantiaUy contribute or add elements conceming thèl:ey elementsof tbccase (auch as eX-Iactory pnces, the composldon of-production 
costs of a product, export prices, etc.)• («Annotation on Case C-170/89, Bunau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v. Commission, Judgment 
of 28 November 1991 ; CaiC C-105/90, Goldstar Co. Lid. v. Council, Judgment of 13 February 1992; Case C-188/88, NMB (Deutschland) 
GmbH, NMB lralia Srl, NMB (UK) Lid. v. Commission ofrhe European Communities, Judgment of 10 March 1992; Case 171/87, Canon Inc. v. 
Council ; Case 172/87, Mila Industrial Co. Lid. v. Council ; Case 174/87, Ricoh Company Lid. v. Council ; Case 175/87, Mt~tsushita Electric 
lndustrial Co. Lid and Matsushila Electrlc Trading Co. Lid. v. Council; Case 176/87, Konishiroky Photo Intlustry Co. Lid. v. Council; Case 
177/87, Sanyo Electrlc Co. Lid. v. Council ; Ca1e 178/87, Minolta Camera Co. Lid. v. Council ; Case 179/87, Sharp Corporadon v. Council, 
· Judgments of 10 March 1992; Case C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Judgment of 11 Juoe 1992•, Common Market Law Review, 1993, 
(115), 160-161). They diaregard, th4_gh, 1the notion gfsCommuoity jutereUt w!\ieh i'l"Judea the-conlljllfiêlnte"MQ. ~· c . ' 
1393 Several anti-dumping cases underscore the absence of such a reaction (Answer of the Commission to written question No 
75190, O.J., 17 September 1990, No C 233112. See e.g. : Commssion Regulatio~ (EC) No 1076/94 of 6 May 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain watcb movements originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1994, 
No L 120/3 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2199194 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain magnatie disks (3,5" microd.isks) originating in Hong Kong and tbe Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, NoL 23612). 
1394 Supra, 347-349. 
Contra: CJ.E.C., cue C-170/89, 28 November 1991, Bunau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5709), 
5727 and 5730 (Opinion of Advocate General MISCHO), and 5641. , 
1395 HOEKMAN, B.M., and LEIDY, M.P., «Caacading contingent protection., Europeon Economie Review, 1992, (883), 883-892. 
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Indeed, under EC anti-dumping law, th~y§~~~Qply_, J~,d:vise~ _tb~. ~x~~!~'"-jmiMUteit,~_~d 
representative_associations __ of_expo_rters_ .. andjmpotters~known- to"theJ:p, as well as representatives of \ .. -------~.-.. -- -~-~ "'-~'-'' ' - -
the exporting country and the complainants (Article 5(11) basic EC Regulation). Moroovêr~ fhey 
~- ~--~--- .. ------'"~-----------·- ---· --~----~~-·--"----"-~--
inform only the economie operators identified in the request for initiation of an anti-dumping 
proceeding1396• Since requests mention only exporters . and importers, this administrative 
practice, without there being a legal obligation, though, to advise consomers and processing 
industries of the opening of an anti-dumping proceeding, actually disfavours them1397• This 
contrasts sharply with the right to a fair hearing of the Ç!?lllP!~mwt Community producers, 
exporters and importers which ~~tails that the European anti-dumping authorities «must act with 
all due diligence by~ seeking ( ... ) ·to provide the undertakings concemed ( ... ) with information 
relevant to the defence of their interests, choosing, if necessary on their own initiative, the 
appropriate means of providing such information»1398• Though it would be highly exaggerated 
to require the European anti-dumping authorities to advise the various millions of consomers 
individually and to identify all producers who process the imported product, this different 
treatment stiJl Sf!ents to,- infringe'·"upan . the cprinciple---of. equalicy~_qf _ .tr~t~ent1399• ~A -~luti~n~-.­
mfgilt .. ~nsist in advising organizations of consomers and processing industries of the initiation of 
anti-dumping proceedings which affect them. Indeed, prevalling EC anti-dumping law already 
provides that consumer organizations and processing industries, which have made themselves 
known, are, upon their request, allowed access to all non-confidential information available to the 
European anti-dumping authorities, which is relevant to the defence of their interests (Article 6(7) 
basic EC Regulation) and have a. right to a fair hearing (Article 21(2) up to (5) basic EC 
Regulation). In order to know, from the early start of an anti-dumping proceeding, which 
consumer organizations and processing industries have an interest in the proceeding, the European 
anti-dumping _aJ!fu9riti~s __ ~ll.oJ.Ild~ in Yiew _of..the" relativelylow- number of consumet:ocganizatioifs, 
register the consumer organizations, upon their request, and · indicate in respect of whi~h-p~Oducts 
-------~~----·-~-------·----- -· ____ ..._.___,-------~-"'•--~----·c 
those organizations stand up for the interests of consumers, whereas the complainant Community 
1396 C.J.E.C., joined ca~e~ C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945), 2955-2956 (Report for tbc Hearing : concluaions of the Conunission)." 
1397 See: CJ.E.C., caac C-49/88, 27 Junc 1991, Al-Jubail Ferdüzer Company and SaudJ Arabian Ferdüzer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, 
I, (3187), 3229-3230 (Opinion of Advocate General DARMON), whcre Advocate General DARMON stresses in respect of complainant Community 
producers, exporten and importera how esscntial the knowledge of infonnation is to defend their inten:ms. 
1398 C.J.B.C., caac 264/82, 20 March 1985, 7imex Corporalion v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1985, (849), 868-870; CJ.E.C., caac C-
49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail Fertiüzer Company and SaudJ Arabian Fertiüzer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3241. Sce alJo: 
C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail Fertiüzer Company and Saudi Arabian Ferdüzer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 
3243-3243, whcre tbc Europcan anti-dumping authoritics are assumed not to have discharged thcir duty to inform the exporters propcrly, unlcu 
they provide sufficicnt and convincing counterproof. 
1399
. With respect 10 complainant Community producers, exporten and irnporte~, Advocate General DARMON staled that «the anti-dumping 
proceeding, although conductcd by an administrativc authority, must meet tbc ~sof a ~fair hearing", which implies that an "equality of UIDI" 
must prevail between the partiea» (CJ.E.C., caac C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail Ferdlizer Company and SaudJ Arabian Fertilizer Company v 
Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3231 (Opinion of Advocate General DARMON). ~incc consumen also have an interest in anti-du~ 
proc~i~~~-thi• ~uality-of ai'IDI» llboulchliO prevail widt a:eg!~- ~- ~em. -
==~====~~=========~=-=-== =---------------"-~"' 
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producers should be required to mention in their request the companies processing the dumped 
product, or their organizations. 
There is, however, a more fundamental problem : organizations of consumers and processing 
industries must really exist. Compared with the Community industry, consumers and processing 
industries have no great incentive to get organized and to react against anti-dumping rellef ; 
therefore, the chances for a well-functioning lobby llable to influence the decision-making of the 
European anti-dumping authorities are much sllghter. As a consequence, the European anti- \ 
dumping authorities will be better informed about the interests of the Community industry than ) 
about the interestsof the users of the like product1400• 
The absence· of a well-functioning lobby also explains .why the efforts of consumers and 
processing industries, if they react against the imposition of anti-dumping measures, are so 
unsuccessful in convincing the European anti-dumping authorities that anti-dumping rellef is not in 
the Community interests1401 • Exceptionally, only processing industries seem to be able to 
organize a well-functioning lobby. Indeed, in the only_three_~sin which"n(t.anti:dum}ling.I~f 
~"-'~~"-"--~'·-=-~--···" ' ~-- •. •' ' ~----, 
was granted because __ Qfits _negative effects. on .the _processing .industcy, .the._.processing.~ industcy 
----------appears~ro-have had a well-functioninglobby. 
In a;;rylOnitrlkfrom t,;;-i];it;J-8;;;;~ of ~-ca1402 the Council held that the Community interests did not call 
for anti-dumping proteetion because : 
«acrylonitrile is the feedstock for the acrylic fibre industry, accounting for 40 % of its production costs ( ... ) 
[and], given the harsh competition on the Community and world acrylic fibre markets, proteelive measures 
would not he in the Community's interests at present». 
The outcome of this anti-dumping case, however, should not come as a surprise. There probably was a well-
organized processing industry manufacturing acrylic fibres which is rather successful in anti-dumping proceedings 
against third countries. lndeed, when the Council reached its conclusion concerning acrylonitrile from the United 
1400 Supra, 71-72. 
1401 See, however: ootton yCJI'n. from Brazi~ Egypt and Turleey and polyester yarn.s from Taiw~ lndonesia, India, the People's 
Republic of Chin4 and Turleey, where the oompl~~t organization represen~ing the Community industry also represents the 
processing industry. The Commission oonsidered this ccasclear evidence that, in balancing the intereets of both categories, priority 
should be given to the proteetion of the (Community industry)t (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ootton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ootton yarn 
originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, NoL 82/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, 
India, the People'a Republic of China and Turkey and oollecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No L 8811 
(corrigendum, O.J., 6 June 1992, NoL 163116)). However, it can also be interpreted u evidence that the processing industry did 
not realize the impact of anti-dumping rellef on its situation. 
1402 Council Decision 83/162/EEC of 18 April 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of acrylonitrile 
originating in the United Statesof Am.erica, O.J., 20 April1983, NoL 101.129. 
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StaJes of America, anti-dumping measures were in force against imports of acrylic fibres from Japan1403 , 
Spain1404 and the United Statesof America1405• 
In furfural from Spain and the People's Republic of China1406, furfura1 heing a raw material used in the 
production of furfuryl alcohol, the Commission did not grant anti-dumping relief on the basis of the following 
considerations : 
« Whereas the Commission had to take account of the fact that hefore and during the period of investigation 
prices of Dominican exports, which were exclusively sold to the two producers of furfuryl alcohol and 
which generally accounted for over 60 % of the Community market, have been as low or lower than prices 
of Chinese exports ; whereas the quantity of Spanish exports compared to the volume of imports from the 
Dominican Republic and China was negligible ; whereas, moreover, another increase of the price of 
Chinese imports is not lik:ely to improve the situation of the Community producers, given the relatively 
small margin between present prices of the Chinese product and the selling price of furfuryl alcohol, which 
is hardly sufficient to cover present manufacturing costs of alcohol producers accounting for approximately 
75 % of Community consumption of furfural ; whereas an eventual increase in the selling price of furfuryl 
alcohol to cover higher costs for furfural would he lik:ely to lead to a reduction in consumption of alcohol 
and its partial substitution by other, less expensive products, and therefore inevitably lead to a fall in 
Community consumption of furfural.» 
Probably the two producers of furfuryl alcohol to whom the Dominican exports of furfural are exclusively sold, are 
the sameproducers of furfuryl alcohol accounting for 75 % of the Community consumption of furfural. If that is the 
case, it should, in view of the small numher of processing producers, he not all that difficult to organize a well-
functioning lobby. Indeed, the price increasing effect of anti-dumping measures would he clearly feit by these two 
producers. 
In gum rosin from the People's Republic of China1401, no anti-dumping relief was granted because it would have 
resulted in a substantial increase of the costs of production of numerous processing industries. On the other hand, as 
the Commission stated, anti-dumping relief would not have been adequate. lndeed, the Community industry made use 
of a limited natural resource and, therefore, was able to meet only a minority share of overall Community demand. 
As a consequence, anti-dumping relief would only have resulted in a quick peneteation of the Community market by 
substitute products which, at that time, were not a viabie alternative because of their high prices. 
The availability of limited natural ressources, which put a limit to the expansion of production capacity, may seem to 
he quite convincing. Anti-dumping relief would only push prices up without causing the dumped products to he 
substituted by the Community products. However, the Commission seems to ignore that the Community industry 
applies its production capacity at a rate of only 48 %. The Commission bas equally disregarded the competition of 
American manufacturers of gum rosin on the Community market1408• Moreover, this case contrasts with other 
1403 Comniission Decision 80/488/EEC of 6 May 1980 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding ooncerning certain acrylic fibres originating in Japan and terminating this proceeding, O.J., 9 May 1980, NoL 118/60. 
1404 O.J., 4 January 1980, No. C 2/6. 
1405 O.J., 29 December 1979, No. C 325/21; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 of 30 April 1980 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres originating in the United Statea of America, · O.J., 3 May 1980, No L 114/37 ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 485/83 of 28 February 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on certain acrylic fibres originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 2 March 1983, NoL 55/1. 
1406 Commission Decision_81/493/EEC of 6 July 1981 terminating the anti-dumping procedure ooncerning imports of furfural 
originating in the Dominican Republic, Spain and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 July 1981, NoL 189/57. 
1407 Commiuion Decision 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding conceming imports of gum rosin originating in 
e People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41150. 
1408 Answer of tbe Commiuion to wriUen question No 2868/92, O.J., 3 March 1993, No C 61140; Answer of the Commission to written 
question No 2867/92, O.J., 22 March 1993, No C 81/17; Answer of the Commission to written question No 2866/92, O.J., 15 May 1993, No 
c 137/11. 
======~~=========--=--~,~ ~~ _,_ ,-=--=-=--=-=====c-ç 
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cases, in which the Community .industry was also unable to substitute the dumped products1409• It seems that the 
Memher States had conflicting interests in this case. Indeed, the Community industry was established only in one 
Memher State, whe~ most Memher States defended the interests of the processing industries. Undoubtedly, the 
processing industries were established in the other Memher States. The govemments of those Memher States were 
probably well aware of the interests of the processing industries (e.g., tyres, paper manufacturing, painting, adhesive 
and vamish) as the latter have the necessary characteristics for organising a well-functioning lobby. For example, 
there is only limited number of large-scale producers of tyres in the Community. 
In all other cases, consomers and processing industries could oot prevent the imposition of anti-
dumping measures, though identical arguments were invoked as in the three abovementioned 
cases1410• Their arguments were tumed down, merely because of lack of evidence1411• 
This lack of evidence may be due to the fact that consomers and processing industries do oot have 
a well-functioning lobby or because their lobby, contrary to those of the complainants, the 
exporters and the importers and the exporting country, was refused access to the non-confidential 
fJ.le of the European anti-dumping authorities1412 : for both those reasons, their views will be 
put less effectively and their claims will be less substantiated. Indeed, in contrast, lack of 
1409 lnfra, 633-637. 
141 O There may have been a third antiedumping case in which,_~!!_!_ interests of the users of the like product played a decisive role 
against )be'g;anting of anti-dumping relief. lndeed, in aluminium j;;;;,~Ni»-~ Surin.am, the Souiet Un.ion. an.d Yugoslavia, anti-
dumping rellef was considered not to he in the Comm.unity interests because prices both worldwide and on the Comm.unity market 
had increased conaiderably- and enquirieB made into the likely price trend for the future indicated that no significant reduction in 
market prices was foreseen (Comm.i&sion Decision 84/103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 
28 February 1984, NoL 67119). Perhaps the Europe~ anti-dumping authorities were concerned for the consumers and processing 
industries, nam.ely that they did not want to burden them with a price increase induced by the anti-dumping relief additional to 
the worldwide trend of price increases. However, they could a}AO baye pursued the maçro-eoonomi~:.aoal of fiahting inflation. This 
is rather probable because the anti-dumping ~ liates from 1984, a period in which anti-inflationary policies were "äètively 
pursued. In 1990 anti-inflationary policies were not so actively pursued as in 1984. Perhaps therefore the fact that prices were 
in easi did not ~ J~Y.ent_Jh•t_full_&Dti~umping rellef (i.e., anti-dumping duties equal to tlie _,dumping margJ.ns):was .eiitêd 
ag the dum.pj__ngi_D.RAMa_/rQm .Jt!PG" (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti \nnping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning imports of· these product& and terminating the investigation in their respect, 0 . .1., 25 January 1990, No L 20/6 
(corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22!79 ; corrigendum, 0 . .1., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44)). 
In another anti-dumping case, the proceBBing industries were fll'st gaining ground in preventing the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures, but finally failed in doing so. lndeed, in syn.thetic fibres of polyesters from Mexico, Roman.ia, Taiwan., Turkey, the Un.ited 
States of Americca or Yugoelavia, the proceuing industries of fiberfill, at the start, obtained the suspension of the defmitive anti-
dumping duty for a period of five montluJ pending an investigation of their allegations about the existence of recent shortages of 
fiberfill (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
synthetic fibree of polyestere originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 
17 December 1988, NoL 348/49). However, after that period the suspension was lifted, as the allegations about the e:xistence of 
shortages proved to ~ without foundation (Notice concerning the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of synthetic fibres of 
polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of America and Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 13 May 1989, No 
c 119/15). 
1411 C.J.E.C., case C-323188, 11 July 1990, SA Sermes v Directeur des seruices dee douanes de Strasbourg, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3027), 
3043-3044 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 3064). 8ee e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 1116191 of .29 April 
1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-
silicon originating in Brazil, 0 . .1., 3 May 1991, No L 11111; CommiBBion Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting 
undertakings off'ered by certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-
silicon originating in Brazil and terminating the investigation as regarde those exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 111147. 
1412 C.J.E.C., ca11e C-170/89, 28 November 1991, Bureau Européen des Uni~ de Consommaleun v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5709), 
5129-5130 (Opinion of Advocate Gcnenl MISCHO) and 5140-5143. 
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evidence of injury suffered by the Community industry bas not yet been invoked1413• The 
. r------
rej~J!on ()f~ the con~ urners ' ... !I!~~~P!~~§jng,Jncl~strie,s~ arguments.,{o~.Jae:k .C?f e~ide11~. impl~es that 
th~:liurd~n~:of.p~oof."liè;::;ith-them. Thus, in faet, the concept «Community interests» favours · the 
Community industry because it is basedon the rebuttable assumption that anti-dumping relief does 
have a negativ~. effest on consumers and processing industries1414 and, consequently, is in the 
Community intei'ests1415• From an economie point of view, however, the assumption should 
be reversed because, as shown in tigure 15 in Chapter N 1416, an~-dumPil!&_!elief reduces the 
welfare of the Community precisely, for the very faet t!tatit affec~Jbf! \Velfare of the eonsumers 
negatively1417: . - ~- . . .. . . . . . , 
~ 
Moreover, in several other cases the consumers' and processing industries' arguments have been 
rejected for reasoos whieh, from an economie point of view, are ~ith~r irrelevant or ev~n.pJainly 
~-_,.......-~'="-~ ,--
(~rong. 
'""-
1413 Only the lack of cooperation of the Community industry is a reaso~ for not finding injury (see : s 'era, 644). Though the lack 
of cooperation may have as consequence that there is no sufficient evidence of injury, it must not he co~used with a situation in 
which a party cooperates, but is not able to provide sufficient evidence. ' 
1414 C.J.E.C., caac C-170/89, 28 November 1991, Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommoteurs v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5709), 
5741, where the Court of JUitice takea the pure legaliatic point of view that an anti-dumping proceeding and anti-dumping relief do not adveracly 
affect consumen aince they are directed agaillllt importa of eertaio produels and no allegation is made against consumers (sec also; CJ.E.C., caac 
C-170/89, 28 November 1991, Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs v Commission, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5709), 5121 and 5730 (Opinion 
of Advocate General MISCHO). 
1415 BOURGEOIS, Jli.J., ecEC Anti-dumpingEnforcement- Selected Second Generation Issues», in Antitrust an.d Trade Policy i.n. 
the United State• an.d the European. Community, HA 'WK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (663), 689. 
1416 Supra, 347-349. 
1417 Jli.J. BOURGEOIS fears that obliging the European anti-dumping authorities to make a «consumer-impact. asseBBment 
would considerably delay the anti-dumping proceedings and that such an aBBeBBDlent would tend to he rather speculative 
(BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., teEC Ar..ti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generation lseueB», in Antitrust an.d Trade Policy in the 
United State• an.d the Europetlil Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (663), 686, note 47). Reversing the 
assumption bas the practical adv&ltage of not delaying the anti-dumping proceedings, nor make them more speculative. For it is 
the mirror image of the present situation - a mirror image which bas the advantage to oorreepond to economie reality. 
( 
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The "fact that anti-dumping relief bas (b~~~-~~!._-~~~~1'418 on the prices of the like product to final 
CODS\PJleUL~419 or on the total production costs of the processing industries142,Y does not alter the 
conclu8ion that anti-dumping relief usually reduces total welfare of th~t_~mmunity. Immaterial price increases 
may imply only a s~er net cost of anti-dumping protection. r 'ff;:=d()_ nol ~r_g)he net cost of anti-dumping 
proteetion into a net gam1421 • --- -
1418 In rd . . . th . . . ~ f "-d . •. f th Eu "-d . th . . h h ld . nd o er to mmuruze e pnce-mcreasmg euecta o anti umpmg re ae , e ropcao anti urnpang au ontaes ave even e , m one a 
the same case, that any increase in price should be limited and that the argument thAt anti-dumping relief would reauit in higher retail prices had no 
foundation (Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa of colour 
television receiven originating in Malaysia, the People'a Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, 
No L 255/50). 
1419 See e.g. : Council Regulation (EC) No 3369/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amendedanti-dumping measures on import& of 
ferro-silicon originating in RliBsia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, 
NoL 302/1. 
In large electrolytic aluminium capoeitora from Japan the Commission found the impact on final consumers negligible in view of the 
low proportional oost of capacitors in the total oost of the end product (namely 1 %) (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 
June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium 
capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3482192 of 30 November 1992 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain large electrolytic 
aluminium capacitors originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 3 December 1992, 
No L 363/1 (conigendum, O.J., 28 January 1993, No L 19/34)). This point of view sharply contrasta with the opinion it expreued 
in the same case as to the import& of dumped product& by a proceBBing company which is part of the same induBtrial group of a 
complainant Community producer of the like product. In that respect, the CommiBBion was of the opinion that this proceBBing 
company had to to import the dumped product& in order to e)\joy the same competitive advantages as its competitors and that, 
accordingly, the complainant Community producer could remain part of the Community industry. However, if it is true that 
capacitors repreaent a low proportional oost in the total production costs of the finished product&, it was not neceBBary for the 
processing company to import the dumped product and, accordingly, the Community producer had to he excluded from the 
Community indu.stey. 
1420 8ee e.g~~;BBion Regulation (EC) No 3119/94 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
offerr~manganese originating in RUBBia, Ukraine, Brazil an,d South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, NoL 330/15. 
1421 The same holda if, due to the anti-dumping relief, prices stabilize (as invoked in Commission Decision 911256/EEC of 14 May 
1991 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of welded wire-mesh 
-originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 18 May 1991, No L 123/54). The net oost of anti-dumping 
proteetion then equals the benefits which would have resulted from the price decrease precluded by the granting of anti-dumping 
re lief. 
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The minor effect of the price increase caused by anti-dumping relief on the volume bought by consumers1422, 
in other words, the low price elasticity of consumer demand1423 (i.e., a steeper demand curve D in terms of 
tigure 16 in Chapter N 1424), does not alter the conclusion that anti-dumping relief generally bas a negative 
impact on the welfare of the Community. 
The argument that anti-dumping rellef will not have negative effects on the user interests in view of the fact that 
prices in the Community have continued to decline, is irrelevant notwithstanding the competition that exists on 
both the world and the Community market1425• Indeed, this argument does not refute the fact that anti-
dumping rellef causes a price increase, but in fact implies that this price increase will be counterbalanced by the 
general fall in price. The reference to existing competition, on the other hand, will -not preclude the price 
increasing effects of anti-dumping relief, unless th~d products are replaced by as cheap imparts coming 
from third countries. But then, anti-dumping relie wil not · rove the welfare of the Community1426• 
The argument that anti-dumping relief will not nega 1vely affect the production costs of the processmg mdustry 
and will have no negative effect on the end users since the price increase of the dumped product was caused by 
an increasing demand for it1427, is not conclusive as it merely implies that the price increases will be further 
enhanced by anti-dumping relief. 
The argument that the negative impact of anti-dumping relief on the competitiveness of the processing industry is 
mitigated by the comparative advantages in terms of marketing of this industry vis-à-vis producers of the same 
product in third countries1428, recognizes that anti-dumping rellef bas a negative effect on the processing 
industry and that comparative advantages do not entirely compensate, but merely mitigate this negative effect. 
1422 See e.g.: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617190 of 11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings ofTered 
in conneetion with such imports, O.J., 15 December 1990, NoL 351/17. 
1423 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium 
chloride originating in_the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, NoL 228128. 
See also: Commission Decision 86/497/EEC of 7 October 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the USSR, and 
terminating the investigation regarding imports of that product originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Yugoslavia, O.J., 10 October 1986, NoL 287/25. 
See also : video ca .. ette• an.d video tape reeZ. from th.e Republic of Korea an.d Hong Kong, where the fact that the like product is a 
low-value complement to other high-value products was invoked to prove the low price elasticity of consumer demand (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and 
video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 24 December 1988, No L 356/47; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April1991, NoL 106/15). 
As the price elasticity of consumer demand is assumed to he low because of lack of evidence of a high price elasticity of consumer 
demand, the burden of proof of a high price elasticity of consumer demand lies with the consumers and processing industries 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/83 of 19 August 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride 
originating in the People's Republic of China and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1983, No L 228128). 
1424 Supra, 347-349. 
1425 Council Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imp01ta of eertaio magnetic diaka 
(3,5" microdisb) originating in Hoog Koog and the Republic of Korea, and collecting definitively the provisional duty impo&ed, O.J., 10 
September 1994, No L 23612. 
1426 lnjra, 633-637. 
1427 Commiuion Deciaion No 1751194/ECSC of 15 July 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of 
hematite pig-iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Ruuia and Ukraine, O.J., 16 July 1994, NoL 182137. 
1428 Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imporll of eertaio polyester yama (man-
made ataple fibrea) originating in Taiwan, lndoneaia, India, the People'a Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the proviaional 
duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153/16). 
====-=------=--============~=====~-=-==-=~-=~======~ 
615 
The argument that the alleged increase in production costs would not cause a competitive disadvantage to the 
processing industry in the Community because another importing country had recently imposed substantial anti-
dumping duties on the same dumped imports1429, does not refute the fact that the processing industry will be 
less competitive when faced with competition by processing industries established in· other countries which have 
not enacted anti-dumping proteetion. Moreover, even if it were true that the Community processing industry 
would not be put at a competitive disadvantage, this argument still disregards the loss in consumer surplus of the 
final consomers to whom a higher price will be charged for the finished product. 
The argument that the processing industry will not incur a competitive disadvantage because the processed 
product will also be subject to the anti-dumping duty1430, does not take away the competitive disadvantage 
which the processing industry will have vis-à-vis the processed product originating in third countries. Moreover, 
this argument disregards the loss in consumer surplus of the final consomers who will have to pay a higher price 
for the processed product, unless they can obtain it from third countries. 
The argument that the processing industry will not be put at a competitive disadvantage outside the Community 
market as they could continue to derive their inputs from the dumping country under the inward processing 
arrangements without paying the anti-dumping duty1431 , is correct, but does not cover processed produels 
sold in the Community. 
The fact that · the price increase caused by the anti-dumping action cannot be passed on by the processing 
industries to their costomers through higher selling prices without brioging about a loss in sales volume1432, 
does not mean that anti-dumping relief will increase, or, at least, will notaffect the welfare of the Community. 
The net cost of anti-dumping proteetion remains unchanged. Only the burden of anti-dumping proteetion will be 
distributed differently over processing industries and their customers. 
The argument that the processing industries are enabled to pass on the price increase of the raw materials to their 
costomers because the Community industry, which also manufactures the final product, must increase the prices 
of its final product in order to re-establish profitability1433, does neither hold. lt only recognizes the 
possibility of a redistribution of the burden of anti-dumping relief. lt does not refute the usual negative effect of 
anti-dumping relief on the welfare of the Community. 
1429 Council Regulation (EEC) No 611/93 of IS March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain 
electronic microcircuita known aa DRAMa Öriginating in the Republic of Korea and exported by companies nol exempted from this duty, and 
collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 March 1993, NoL 66/1. 
143° Commission Replation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 impoaing a provisionalanti-dumping duty on importsof calcium metal originating 
in the People'a Republic of China and Ruaaia, O.J., 23 April 1994, NoL 104/S. 
1431 Commiaaion Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating 
in the People'a Republic of China and Ruaaia, O.J., 23 April 1994, No L 104/S; Council Regulation (EC) No 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof calcium metal originating in the People'a Republic of China and Ruaaia, O.J., 21 October 
1994, No L 270/27. 
14~2 Anti-dumping relief is considered not to hijure the interesta of the users of the like product when there is no evidence that 
the price increase eaueed by the anti-dumping action could not he passed on by the processing industries to their. customers through 
higher selling prices withoutlossof sales volume, see e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 450/89 of 20 February 1989 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in the United States of America or Venezuela and ac:ljusting the 
definitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi Arabia laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 24 February 1989, NoL 62/1. 
Compare with United States' antitrust law, where the United States' Supreme Court rejected the argument that a processing 
industry could not have suffered from the price increases because of its ability to pass on its losses to its customers. The Supreme 
Court noted that if the passing-on defense was accepted, the ultimate customer to whom the passing-on defense could not he 
applied, would have only a tiny stake in a lawsuit under Beetion 4 of the Clayton Act and little interest in attempting a class 
action (RIESENFELD, S.A., •Consumer Proteetion and Antitrust Law&», RabelB Zeilschrift für auslan.di8ches under intern.ation.ales 
Privatrecht, 1976, (679), 682-683. The Supreme Court puts thereby the finger on the spot. lndeed, applied to anti-dumping action, it 
says that the greater the distance between the producer and the user of the like product, the less each individual user of the like 
product will be aware of the negative effects of anti-dumping action, and the greater the num.her of users will he, the consequence 
being that it will be beoome even more diffi.cult to set up a well-functioning lobby. 
1433 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of 
video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 366147. 
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The fact tbat anti-dumping relief does not prevent the Community industry from lowering its prices on the 
occasion of a drop in the price of the main raw materia11434 does not alter the fact that anti-dumping 
proteetion causes the price of the like product to increase or, at least, prevents that price from decreasing as 
much as the rednetion in the price of the main raw material would allow. 
The fact that consumers will not substitute the like product by other non-like products1435 does not prove that 
there is no loss in consumer surplus or that the loss in consumer surplus is fully compensated by the gain in 
producer surplus and the revenue gained by the Community authority from the anti-dumping relief. lt may only 
show that no substitutes exist for the like product. 
The fact that the supply of the like product is guaranteed to the processing industries because of the 
substitutability between the dumped product and the Community producers' like product1436 or because the 
Community industry is able to meet Community demand1437 only proves that the dumped produels and the 
Community producers' like produels are substitutes. lt does meao tbat anti-dumping relief enhances the welfare 
of the Community. On the contrary, it implies that the more efficiently produced foreign produels are 
substituted by less efficiently produced Community products, thereby inflictinf a net cost of anti-dumping 
proteetion on the Community (area eed in figure 16(c) in Chapter IV143 ). Moreover, it does not 
com.pensate the cost of anti-dumping proteetion due to the fall in Community consumption (area fhg in figure 
16(c) in Chapter IV). 
When the dumped product can he substituted by foreign supplies1439, anti-dumping relief will not cause any 
net cost to the Community · only if the prices of the foreign substitute products are the same as the ones of the 
1434 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Lihya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, No L 317/1. 
1435 Anti-dumping rellef is considered not to injure the interesta of the users of the like product when there is no evidence that 
the price increase caused by the anti-dumping action would lead to the use of substitutes, see: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
997/85 of 18 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April1985, 
NoL 107/8. 
1436 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 699/88 of 15 March 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof oxalic 
acid originating in Taiwan and South Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 18 
September 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China 
and the Boviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports, O.J., 20 September 
1989, No L 27111 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 1991, No L 106/15; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2799192 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of deadburned (sintered) 
magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282115; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2800192 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of magnesium oxide originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282123. 
1437 Commiaion Replation (EEC) No 1031/92 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importBof potassium chloride 
(potash) originating in Belarua, Ruuia or Ukrainc, O.J., 28 April 1992, NoL 110/5; Council Replation (EEC) No 3642/92 of 14 December 1992 
imposing a defioitive anti-dumping duty on imporb of ferroailicon originating in Poland and Egypt and authorizing the defmitive collcction of the 
provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 December 1992, No L 369/1 ;Council Regulation (EEC) No 54/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive 
duty on imporu of aynthetic fibres of polyesten originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, No L 9/2; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of magnesium oxide originating in the People'a 
Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imporu of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5• microdisks) originating in Hoog Koog and the Republic of Korea, and collecting 
definitively the proviaional duty impoaed, O.J., 10 September 1994, NoL 236/2. 
1438 Supra, 349-351. 
1439 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2305/92 of 4 August 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in 
Brazit and definitively collccting the amounts aec~red by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 August 1992, No L 222/1 ; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 impoling a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imporb of calcium metal originating in the People'a 
Republic of China and Ruuia, O.J., 21 October 1994, No L 270/27. 
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dumped products. In all other possible cases, anti-dumping relief will negatively affect the welfare of the 
Community1440• 
The argument that, in view of the rapid decline in the production capacity of the product involved in the dumping 
countries, the disappearance of the Community industry would result in a shortage of supply and, accordingly, in 
higher prices1441 , is not conclusive. Indeed, the Community industry, like the European anti-dumping 
authorities, should have this information about the rapidly diminishing production capacity in the dumping 
countries. On the basis of that information, the Community industry should be able to ascertain that the dumping 
is only temporary and should, accordingly, stay in the market, even if no anti-dumping relief is being granted. 
Thus, anti-dumping relief is superfluous and does not have the claimed advantage which might offset the net cost 
of proteetion it would impose on the Community. 
The fact that the absence of effective substitution of the dumped product by the Community producers' like 
product is caused exclusively by long-term contracts between the distributors and the dumping exporters1442 
is no reason for granting anti-dumping relief. The absence of substitution causes anti-dumping relief to entail a 
cost to the Community in addition to its usual welfare-decreasing effect. Indeed, as there will be no substitution 
between the dumped produels and the Community producers' like product, there will be no increase in the 
Community producers' surplus, so that the loss in consumer surplus will be even less compensated (the loss in 
consumer surplus represented by the area P1cdP2 in tigure 16(c) in Chapter IV1443 will not be compensated). 
If anti-dumping relief would result in the cancellation of long-term contracts, it would not be the tirst-best 
salution ofr remedying the possible market imperfection caused by such contracts. Indeed, it will always have a 
negative impact on the welfare of the Community and there is no evidence that the cost of anti-dumping 
proteetion is lower than the cost of the.. market imperfection caused by long-term contracts. Moreover, if a more 
market-conform measure which remedies directly the market imperfection caused by long-term contracts, is 
adopted, the welfare of the Community will be higher. Indeed, as a market-conform measure will nothave the 
negative impact of anti-dumping relief on the welfare of the Community, the Community will enjoy the full 
benefit of the disappearance of the market imperfection caused by long-term contracts. 
The argument that low dumped prices cannot be justified nor considered as a permanent right because they are 
the result of unfair competition1444 is not conclusive. The characterisation of dumping as unfair competition 
is wrong in most cases : dumping is usually the result of the normal business objective of profit maximization, 
regardless of whether dumping is interpreled as price discrimination or as selling below production costs1445• 
l440 The sublltituûon of the dumped producta by other, foreign producta ia called «trade divenio~, which is studied hereinafter (injra, p ••.. ). 
1441 Commiuion Deciaion No 67194/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of 
hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Ruuia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, NoL 12/5. . 
1442 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain 
paper photocopiers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5. 
1443 Supra, 349-351. 
1444 See e.g. : Council Regulation (EC)- No 2556/94 of 19 October 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2552193 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of artificial co:rundum originating in the People's Republic of China, . the Russian 
Faderation and Ukraine, with the exception of those imports sold for export to the Community by companies whose Ulidertakinga 
have been accepted, and definitively collecting the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed by 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1418194, 0 . .1., 21 October 1994, No L 270/24. 
The Europaan anti-dumping authorities consider it irrelevant that Europaan anti-dumping action randers the Community 
processing industries .less competitive than processing industries established in third countries, in which dumpingalso takes place 
but where no anti-dumping action is undertaken (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access 
memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of these product& and terminating the investigation in their respect, 0 . .1., 25 January 1990, No 
L 20/5 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 27 January 1990, No L 22!79 ; corrigendum, 0 . .1., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44)). 
1445 Supra, 23-52. 
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Only in the case of predatory pricing, dumping may he considered as unfair competition1446 ; but, in this 
very case, the low dumping prices are not permanent, for the predatory dumper will increase bis prices from the 
moment on that bis Community competitors are driven out of the Community market. However, the European 
anti-dumping authorities never investigate whether the dumping is the result of predation ; to them, dumping, by 
definition, is unfair competition. 
The argument that the short-term disadvantages of anti-dumping relief for the Community consumers and 
processing industries are outweighed by its medium- and long-term advantages1447 is only valid if the 
dumping is predatory, i.e., if it bas an anti-competitive effect on the Community market. However, the 
European anti-dumping authorities never examine whether the dumping is predatory. 
2.3. ANTITRUST POUCY 
As to the European anti-dumping authorities, to stop distartion of competition arising from UJ)fair 
~~-----c•-~•"·c~--------·--•-··~-~----•~"-,·-••--•·•'"·--"--'"~-----•,-~:-..---=' 
com!!l~~r~~~R~!;i.~s,. ~4_tllQS,to_ :r~~~~1J.li~h 9~~-- ana fair competition on the __ Copl~_l.!!!!!Y~~~~t, 
i~~~IY- _purpose- .of anti.,.dumping. __ m~yr~s, and is, moreover,. in the ... general interest __ of t~~ 
Community as Artiele 3(t) of the EC Treaty provides that the Community must g~arantee 
undisto~ __ _çoropetition __ on_j~_qqm~~t!_~ market1448• This is completely in line with the n~ 
~ ---·--~-.:;Jr~,.l>~ 
EC ànti-dumping legislation which requires that the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects 
of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition must be given special consideration 
(Article 21(1) basic EC Regulation). The aim to m3i.n_1:(rin undist~!t~ com_petition on the 
Community market is, from an ~nomic ~ill~ of:~iew,justified insofar as anti-~dumping_r~lj~(Js_ 
only ~rimted agäinst preclat()ry dumping~449 • However, the European anti-~umping __ authorities 
con~~~eL~~~~~§~~~s oi"'d~_~E_~g ~ unfair ~mmercial practires~459 -and, accordingly,- never 
1446 Supra, 23-52. 
1447 C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council imd Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 843; 
C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1405; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 
1992, MatsushitG Electric ln.duatrial Co. Ltd cmd Matsushila Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1488; 
C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Kon.ï.hirolcu Photo ln.dustry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1532; C.J.E.C., case 
C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1573; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, 
Sharp Corporation. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1686. See e.g. : Commission Regulation (EC) No 1648194 of 6 July 1994 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of furazolidone originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 
1994, NoL 17414. 
1448 See e.g. : Commiasion Regulation ~f:C) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on irnporta of fe~ 
cbrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.I., 2 April 
1993, NoL 80/8. 
1449 For the definition ofpredatory dumping, see: •upra, 24-25. 
1450 See e.g. : Anlwer of the Commisaion to wriuen question No 3276/91, O.I., 4 July 1992, No C 168/37; Answer of the Commisaion to 
wriuen question No 3270/91, O.I., 10 Auguit 1992, No C 202/36; Answer ofthe Conuni~ion to wriuen question No 3/92, O.I., 14 September 
1992, No C 235128. 
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investigate whether the dumping is predatory1451 • They only make a distinction between 
short\run···disadvantages · ·and medium~~~ arrd long-run advantages of anti-dumping rellef for 
Community consumers, in order to point out that, without anti-dumping relief, the immediate 
price-decreasing effects of the dumping may result in the monopolization of the Community 
market by the dumping exporters which eventually would allow them to charge high monopoly 
prices1452• However, such a potentiality does not show that the dumping is predatory, since a 
1451 Thcre ia but one caiC in wbich tbc dumping exporten wcre aaid to practiac prcdatory pricing : in large electrolydc aluminium capacitors 
jrom Japan, the Commiaaioo held that «(t)he price aenaiativity of thia product and the tranaparancy of the market, togelher with the widespread 
predatory prlcing of some of lhe cooperaling Japanese producers, clcarly had a deprellive effect on the prices of tbe Community industry and 
inevitably eauled injury aa cUltomen chose to be mpplied at the lower prices of the dumped product» (Commi88ion Regulation (EBC) No 145J192 
of 2 June 1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa into tbc Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors 
originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152/22 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163/21)) (emphasis added). In this case, the 
Conuni88ion seema to have advanced prcdatory pricing aa an aggravating circumstance («together with•) in order to explain why the Community 
induBtry suffen iqjury, rather than aa an essential condition for finding anti-dumping relief to be in tbc Community interesta. lndeed, the existcnce 
.of predatory pricing wu only mentioned intheinjury inveatigation, but was not recalled in the aueaamcnt of the Cominunity intereats. Moreover, 
only some dumping exporten were aaid to have engaged in predatory pricing, though anti-dumping dutiea were impoaed on all exporta coming from 
tbe dumping country. 
Also, in relevision camera systems jrom Japan, some proof may be found of predatory dumping. In this case, tbe dumping exporten were found to 
«have sold tbeir camen ayatcma in the Community ar aubstantiall088ea, while in general aubatantial profits have been made on sales in Japan-. AB 
to tbe European anti-dumping authoritiea, «the behaviour of the Japanese exporten (could) only be interpreled aa a strategy to drive thcir 
competiton out of the market». The European antidumping authoritics further held that «(i)n the absence of any comparativc advantage for the 
Japanese exporten, thia atrategy bas been facilitated by the fact that they have been able to charge prices up to 100 % higher on the Japanese 
dornestic market, where only Japancse companiea are present» (Commiuion Rcgulation {EBC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 impoaing 
provisional antidumping dutiea on importa of televiaion camera syatema originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No L 271/1). In thia case, the 
fact tbat the dumping exporten did oot e~oy comparative advantagea, in combination with their aales at a lo88, points into the direction of 
predatory dumping. The croaa-aubaidization between national markets, however, ia oot concluaive evidence of predatory dumping, as demonalnled 
in Chapter I. 
In ferro-chrome Jrom Kazalchstan, Russia and Ulcraine, thc Community induBtry was conaidered to be unable to compcte with thc low prices 
charged by the dumping exporten, because the dumping exporten' priccs did oot bear a relationsbip to thcir coats of production (Commiuion 
Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 · impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa of ferro-chromc witb a carbon content by 
weight of max. 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-chromc) originating in Kazakhstan, Ruaaia and Uknine, O.J., 2 April 1993, NoL 80/8). Probably, the 
European anti-dumping authoritiea referred to tbc fact that the dumped producta wcre sold at a loaa in the Community in order to underacore the 
unfairne88 of the dumping. However, they did oot investigate whether the dumping exporten actually practise predatory dumping. lndeed, as 
demonstraled in Chapter I, the mere reference to aalea at a Ion is no proof of predatory dumping, whereas predatory pricing does not imply sales at 
a loss. 
See also: BOUDANT, J., L'and-dumping comntUIJQUIQÎre, Paria, Economica, 1991, 151. 
1452 For instance, in eth.anokunine from tM United State• of America and televi.ion camera system• from Japan., the Commission 
distinguished the short-run advantages and the medium- and long-run disadavantages of the dumping. In this connection, it 
referred to the reduction of competition on the Community market in case of disappearance ofthe Community industry, as wellas 
to the fact that prices on the dornestic market of the exporting country on which only dornestic suppliers (in ethanolamine from the 
United State• of AmericCJ limited to three suppliers) were active, tended to be much higher than on the Community market 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2172193 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ethanolamine 
originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, NoL 196/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3029193 of 29 
October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties on imports of television camera systems originating in Japan, O.J., 30 
October 1993, No L 27111). 
See also : Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1986, No L 163/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper photocopiers originating in- Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No 
L 239/6 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional ànti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 726/89 of 20 
March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the 
People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such import&, O.J., 22 March 1989, No 
L 79/24 ; Council Regulatiou (EEC) No 17ll8189 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of video casset-
tes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding with regard to the import& of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, No 
L 174/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
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producer may obtain a dominant position on the market merely· because he is the most efficient 
one. Hence, anti-dumping relief, in terms of antitrust policy, is presumed to be in the 
Community interests, since, in the European anti-dumping authorities' view, all instances of 
dumping are unfair commercial practices. This idea, indeed, is incorporated in the new EC anti-
dumping ·tegislation which treats of the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping of the 
restoration of effective competition (Article 21(1) basic EC Regulation). This codification of the 
assumption about the trade-distorting and anti-competitive. effects of dumping is even worse than 
the assumption created in European anti--dumping case law : it is a far more rigid assumption as it 
leaves no doubt anymore as to the legal view of the effects of dumping on competition and, 
because of its particularly straightforward wording, it even seems to have made the assumption on 
the unfairness of dumping unrebuttable. Moreover, it is more difficult to repeal this assumption 
for such a repeal requires a legislative action. Hence, the mere existence of injurious dumping is, 
especially since the enactment of the new EC anti-dumping legislation, clearly sufficient to find 
the Community interests to call for anti-dumping relief. However, as the new EC anti-dumping 
legislation describes the examination of the Community interests as being based on an appreciation 
of all the various interests taken as a whole (Article 21(1) basic EC Regulation), the only 
barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, No 
L 227124; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores and 
concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning import& originating in Hong 
Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83123; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, No 
L 83129 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
tungsten carbide and f'used tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of those product& from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83136; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a greatest 
external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, NoL 152124; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) 
No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in 
Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, NoL 321119; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
14 72191 of 29 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in India or China and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of oxalic acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No 
L 138/62 ; Commi88Îon Regulation (EEC) No 2054191 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187/23; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) 
No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on· import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in 
motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 3418 ; Comm.iBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 
June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium 
capacitors originating. in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127) ; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1956192 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti::dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters 
originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197125; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2799192 of 25 
September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/15; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2800192 of 25 September 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
26 September 1992, No L 282123 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 550193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 920193 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,6• 
microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April1993, NoL 95/6; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1473193 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of magnesium oxide originating in the 
People'a Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; Commi~ion Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 September 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 
1993, No L 22613 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386193 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
dead-burned. (sintered) magnesia originating in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, NoL 306/16; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2567194 of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal originating in 
the People's Republic of China and RUBSia, O.J., 21 October 1994, NoL 270127. 
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possibility that anti-dumping relief, in the face of injurious dumping, will not be found to be in 
the Community interests, is that there is another reason which offsets the need to stop the 
allegedly unfair competition by the dumping. 
/br the field of antitrust policy, SW:I:i.Dther reasóri-ffiighi be tb~ ~~~-~f fue êolnmunity 
I market by the Coml'.l'!nity pród~cers after the granting of anif:aumpiiïi relief. Indeed, an~ 
dumping rellef may isolate the Community market from competition by the dumping ex}X!rtets, 
·.,thereby~--enabling __ ~-~ Community producers to. m~nopqlize. the- Gommunity market14s-3:-- These 
monopolizing effects -~houlci -be béllanced -agai~~t-the need to proteet the Community producers 
against dumping1454• However, the European anti-dumping authorities do not have the same 
concern as to the monopolization of the Community market by Community producers and the 
monopolization by dumping exporters. They ;v.al~e- competition between Community produ~rs 
- _, ____ , __ , __ ._,_".,_._ ____ _ 
higher than compe!i!ion_.Jrom Jhe _dumping. e;,cpot:te.rs. . Indeed, they~ interpret_«open and fair 
competitiori»1455 on the Community market as competition between Community producers, 
1453 C.J.E.C., cue C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Niille v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihajen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5177-5178 (Opinion of 
Advocate General VAN GE'R.VEN); C.J.E.C., case C-358/89, 11 June 1992, Ettramet Industrie s.4 v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (3813), 3840-
3841; BOURGEOIS, J.HJ., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement- Selected Second Generationa luue~», in AntilniSt and TroJe Policy in the United 
States and the European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 569-571. 
Sec also: MESSERLIN, P., «Anti-Dumping Replationa or Pro-Carte) Law? The EC Chemica) Case&», World Economy, 1990, (465), 465-492, 
who provides empirical evidence that in the two anti-dumping cases he bas investigated, the Community industry bas used anti-dumping law in 
order to monopolize the Community mark:et. 
1454 C.J.E.C., case C-16/90, 22 October 1991, Eugen Niille v Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihajen, E.C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5177 (Opinion of 
Advocate General VAN GER.VEN); C.J.E.C., case C-358/89, 11 June 1992, Ettramet Industrie SA v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (3813), 3837 and 
3840-3842 (Opinion of Advocate General JACOBS). 
1455 The European anti-dumping authorities lilOmetimes use the concept ccworkable competition», which seems to have the same 
meaning as the concept ccopen and fair competition. See : Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 · June 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No L 163/1; 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, NoL 239/5; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, 
No L 130/12 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, 
distemper, varnishand similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting~the provisional anti-
dumping duty on such import&, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 791'24 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting 
definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the import& of video tape reela 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, NoL 17411; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 1989 
· imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or the 
German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, No L 2271'24; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, NoL 31411; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the 
proceeding concernillg import& originating in HongKong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83123; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
762190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty o~ impórts of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83129; Commis;;ion Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's 
Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding ooncerning import& of those products from the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83136 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 
1990, No L 1521'2• ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) NÓ 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990~ No L 188110 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 
1990, No L 321119; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1472191 of 29 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
622 
with or without competition from foreign producers1456• Open and fair competition does not 
impo:rts of oxalic acid originating in India or China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of oxalic 
acid originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 1 June 1991, No L 138/62; Co:mmiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2054191 of 11 July 1991 
imposing a provieional anti-dumping duty on import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 
July 1991, NoL 187/23. 
1456 In eeveral anti-dumping cases the continued existence of the Community indUBtry is considered to guarantee workable 
competition : 
infurfu.raldeh~ from the People'• Republic ofChintJ, the disappearance ofthe sole Community producer, supplying one third 
of the Community market, was considered to cauee considerable disruption of supply, whereas the application of anti-dumping 
measures on the dumped imports, supplying almost half of the Community market, was not. The fact that there would 
always be im.po:rts coming from third countries, is irrelevant to this dift'erent treatment (Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186111) ; 
in EPROM• from Japan., the disappearance of the Community production was considered to provide the dumping exporters 
with an even more dominant position on the Community market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable 
programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1). The Community indUBtry 
consisted of only one producer (after from the merger of the only two Community producers). At least five dumping exporters 
were known to the European anti-dumping authorities. Moreover, EPROMs were also imported from the United Statesof 
America into the Community, though at a decreasing rate. During the investigation period, the dumping exporters held a 
market share of 54 '*> (coming from 71 '*> three years before). Thus, the Community induBtry and the American exporter(s) 
together held a market share of 46 '*> ; 
in silicon carbicle from the People's Republic of China, Polcmd, the Russian Federation an.d Ukraine, calcium metal from the 
People'• Republic of ChiTUJ an.d Ru.1ia and ammonium nitrate from Lithucmia an.d Russia, the disappearance of the 
Community industry, which might occur if no anti-dumping relief would be granted, would result in reduced competition 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon carbide, 
originating in the People'• Republic of China, Poland, the RUBBian Faderation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94121 ; 
Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 89~ of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of calcium 
metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April 1994, No L 104/5; Commission Decision 
941293/EC of 18 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
impo:rts of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and RUBBia and terminating the investigation with regard to these 
countries ; u well u terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24; Council Regulation (EC) No 
2557194 of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal originating in the People's 
Republic of China and RUBBia, O.J., 21 October 1994, No L 270/27); 
in decuU>urned (1intered) magne•ia from the People'• Republic of Chin4, the European anti-dumping authorities considered 
that to refrain from anti-dumping relief would endanger the future existence of the Community induBtry and would lead to 
less competition ; in this respect, they referred to the low amount of the anti-dumping duty in order to show that the 
dumping exporters would remain in the Community market; moreover, intheir view, there would not be any shortage of 
supply, as there were also many other non-Community suppliers on the Community market (Council Regulation (EC) No 
8386193 of 6 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 1993, No L 806/16) ; 
in televilion camera •y•tem• from Japan., anti-dumping relief which would safeguard a variety of sourees of supply in the 
Community, was said to have positive long-term effects as regard the number of competitors (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3029/98 of 29 October 1998 imposing provisional antidumping duties on import& of telavision camera systems originating 
in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No L 27111) ; as the dumping exporters and the Community producers were the only 
competitors active on the market, this point of view implies either competition exclusively between Community producers, or 
competition between Community producers and dumping exporters ; 
in isobuttmol from the Ru.1ian Federation, it was expected that, in view of the high number of producers in competition to 
supply the Community market, there will continue to be considerable price competition on the market (Council Regulation 
(EC) No 721194 of 29 March 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on isobutanol originating in the Russian 
Federation, O.J., 81 March 1994, NoL 87/8); 
in watch movemenU from Malay•ia an.d Thailand, anti-dumping relief was expected to have no adveree effects on the 
competitive situation on the Commuuity mar ket, given the high availability of the product from various sourees ( Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1076194 of 6 May 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain watch movements 
originating in Malaysia and Thailand, O.J., 11 May 1~, No L 120/8) ; 
in pota .. ium permang~ from the People'5 Republic of Chin4, the mmntenance of the Community industry was said to 
ensure competition between the Community producers and import& &om other non-memher countries which will have a 
beneficiary effect on price levels (Council Regulation (EC) No 28l.9194 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of potaBBium permanganate orginating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, 
No L 298182) ; 
in compact dilc pltJyer1 from Japan. on.d South Korea, video tapes in caBsettel origineding in the People's Republic of Chin4 and 
dihydroatreptomycin from the People'• Republic of China, it was recognized that anti-dumping relief would affect price levels 
of the dumping exporters and consequently might have some influence on the relative competitiveness of their product&; 
=====--= -~------ =--==="-===========r--============ 
nevertheleaa, no eubstantial reduction in competition amongst the producen selling the like product on the Community 
market wu expected; moreover, the preBervation, under normal competitive conditions (i.e., without dumping), of a 
Community production of the like product wu found to eafeguard the Community consumer against any possible coneerled 
action which may beundertaken by foreign producers dominant on the Community market (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 impoeing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating 
in Japan and South Korea, O.,J., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, NoL 267/27); CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provieional anti-dumping duty on importB of video tapes in 
caesetteB originating in the People'• Bepublic of China, O.J., 26 April1991, NoL 106/16; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 
2054191 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of djhydrostreptomycin originating in the 
People's Bepublic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187/23); 
in barium chloride from th.e People's Republic of China or th.e German. Demoeratic Republic, the Commission did not find anti-
dumping rellef to be contrary to the Community interest&, though it would have guaranteed the continued existence of only 
three Community firma. The eurvival of these three Community firma, being of different eizes and having divergent 
reBBOurces, wu considered to eneure continued competition on the Community market. The fact that the main producer'• 
selling price i• .fixed by another economie operator marketing the product wu Been u eneuring to some extent that there was 
no tendency towards a monopoly on the part of that main producer (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 
1989 impoBing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or 
the German Demoeratic Republic, O.,J., 4 August 1989, No L 227/24). In barium chloride from the People's Republic of China, 
the Council did not,confirm the CommiBBion's finding. Insteadit coneidered .that eneuring the survival of the Community 
firma will be beneficial for competition on the Community market and that the disappearance of a mY>r part of Community 
production would pose a threat to the supplies of Community coneumers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 641191 of 4 March 
1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 7 March 1991, No L 6011). Thus, the. Council, in fact, weakens the CommiBBion'• finding. Whereas the CommiBBion 
found the continued existence of the Community producers neceBBary to eneure competition on the Community market, the 
Council found that it would only benefit it. The Council tries to strengthen its fmding by referring to the interest& of the 
Community producers. However, its raferenee is not conclusive. lf there is a shortage on the supply side, the price of the 
product will rise. Such a price rise will precisely enable the Community producers to stay in or to re-enter the Community 
market. As a result, the feared shortage of supply prove& the opposite of what the Councils wanted to demonstrate : the 
continued existence of the Community producers does not depend on anti-dumping relief; 
in ferrcH:hrome from KaztJchstcm, Russia an.d UJeraine, the anti-dumping measures were said to have a positive effect on 
competition in the Community, as it would allow the traditionally strong competitors tore-enter the Community market and 
give the sole Community producer the poBBibility ofparticipating in this competition (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717193 of 
28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of 
maximum 0,6% Oow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, RUBBia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, No 
L 246/1); 
in audio tapes in cCJBsette• from Japan, th.e Republic of Korea cuul Hong Kong, the Commission, after having recognized that 
anti-dumping relief may have some influence on the relative competitiveneBB of the dumping exporters, considered that anti-
dumping relief ecis designed to prevent the decline of the Community induBtry and thus to help to maintain the availability of 
a wide choice of product& and even to strengthen competition .. (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in caesettee originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea 
and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36)) ; 
in ferro-süico-mangan.ese from Rus•ia, UJeraine, Brazil cuul South Africa, the CommiBBion, after having recognized that anti-
dumping relief may infl.uence the relative competitiveness of the dumping exporters, held that «DO adverse effects on the 
competitive situation ofthe Community market should be expected from the taking ofmeasures», but that tcOD the contrary, 
removing the unfair advantages gained by the dumping practices should prevent the further deterioration of the Community 
induBtry and of those exporters which do not reaort to unfair pricing and thus guarantee the availability of a wide choice of 
suppliers.. (CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 3119194 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of ferro-silico-manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No 
L 330/16); 
in ethan.olcunine from th.e Un.ited State• of America, the Commission held that the disappearance of the Community indUBtry 
would reduce competition and that its substitution by a lesser amount of third country suppliers should be prevented. The 
fact that the Community induBtry was not in a position to meet Community demand did not prevent anti-dumping relief from 
being granted, probably in view of the determination of,the dumping exporters to defend their markets haree on tbe 
Community market and the poBBibilities for them to absorb high anti-dumping duties to a large extent (CommiBBion 
&gulation (EEC) No 2172193 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ethanolamine 
originating in the United Statea of America, O.,J., 4 August 1993, NoL 196/6); 
in syn.thetic fibres of polye•ter• from India . an.d th.e Republic of Korea, the CommiBBion referred to the low amo~t of the 
proposed anti-dumping duty in order to show that the dumping eXporters would be able to remain in the Community market 
and that the current degree of competition would be guáranteed (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1966192 of 7 July 1992 
imposing a p1·ovisional anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of 
Korea, O.,J., 16 July 1992, NoL 197126); 
in magnetic dï.lu (3,6" microcliM•) from Japan., Taiwan. cuul th.e People'• Republic of China, the disappearance of tbe 
Community indUBtry was said to reduce supply and competition and the anti-dumping relief was expected not to prevent 
producers in third countries from competing in the Community market (Commission Regulation (EEC) 'No 920193 of 16 April 
1993 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnatie disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 96/6; CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 634194 of 9 
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cover competition exclusively between foreign produ~rs. As competition implies that less 
efficient producers are driven out of the market by more efficient producers, that interpretation 
can hardly be upheld, when the Community producers are less efficient than the dumping 
exporters. According to the European anti-dumping authorities, though, less efficient Community 
producers are even entitled to ·protection against the unfair competition of dumping1457• S~uch~c~, 
March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertam magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in 
Hong Kong and the Republlc of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/6) ; 
in ferro-•Uioon. from South Africa an.d the People'• Republic of Chin.a and from Rru•Ïll, Kazalchst~ Ukraine, lcelan.d, Norway, 
Sweden, Venezuela cuad BrazU, the Commission admitted that ant-dumping rellef may have some effects on the relative 
competitivene88 of the dumping eçortera, but was nevertheless convineed that the number of competitors on the Community 
market would not be reduced. They were even of the opinion that anti-dumping rellef would arrest the decline of the 
Community industry and thus help to maintain the availability of a wide choice of ferro-silicon producers (CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2681193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in South Africa and the People's Republlc of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, No L 237/2; Council Regulation 
(EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating in 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1); 
in several anti-dumping cases, the European anti-dumping authorities did not expect competition amongst companies selling 
the like product to be reduced by the imposition of anti-dumping duties ; instead, they held that the dumping exporters would 
still be in a position to.compete in the market and that, next to them, there were still a great number of other producers from 
different countries offering the like product within the Community (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the 
Republlc of Korea, 0 . .1., 31 August 1988, NoL 24015; Council Regulation (EEC) No 601/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea 
and definitively collecting the provisional duty, 0 . .1., 28 February 1989, No L 57/55; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof small screen colour television receivers 
originating in tbe Republlc of Korea, 0 . .1., 28 October 1989, NoL 31411; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 
March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the 
People's Republlc of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning imports originating in HongKong, 0 . .1., 30 March 
1990, No L 83123 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, 0 . .1., 29 November 1990, NoL 330/16; 
Commission Decision 93/479/EEC of 30 July 1993 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the review of anti-
dumping measures appllcable to certain import& of monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia, the Republlc of Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand, O . .T., 4 September 1993, NoL 225/35; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republlc of China, 
0 . .1., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, No · 
L 246112); 
it should be pointed out that, in practically all these cases, there would have been competition with or without anti-dumping 
relief : with anti-dumping relief there would have been competition between the Community producers, the dumping 
exporters and exportera established in third countries ; without anti-dumping relief, there would have been competition 
between the dumping eçorters and exporters established in third countries ; there is only one exception in which it was 
noted that, without anti-dumping relief, competition on the Community market would wane as the Community would beoome 
dependent on the dumping eçorters which exported towards the Community through a the samejoint venture company 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, 0 . .1., 29 November 1990, NoL 330/16). 
In this respect, it should be noted that recent economie research bas shown that Community industries with high concentration and 
cohesion are quite auccessful in obtaining iJüury finding. This conneetion between fmdings of injury and the degree of 
concentration and cohesion in the Community induBtry is a matter of concern, aince anti-dumping relief may favour collusion 
among the Comunity producers ('I'HARAKAN, P.K.M., and WAELBROECK, J., teAntidumping and countervailing duty decisions in 
the E.C. and in the U.S. An experiment in comparative political economy», European. Economie Review, 1994, (171), 183 and 187). 
1457 C.J.E.C., case 260/86, 6 October 1988, Brotherln.dustries Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6683), 5728 ; C.J.E.C., joined cases 277 
and 300/85, 6 October 1988, Canon. ln.c. o.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (5731), 6809; C.J.E.C., case C-16190, 22 October 1991, Eugen. 
Nölle v HauptMJllamt Bremen.-Freika{en., E.C.R., 1991, I, (6163), 5177 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN); Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 Novembor 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix 
printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33. 
See, however, paraformaldehyde from Spain., where it is underscored that anti-dumping rellef is not aimed at protecting 
Community producers against more efficient producers in third countries (Commission Decision 84/612/EEC of 23 October 1984 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of paraformaldehyde 
originating in Spain and terminating the investigation, O.J., 26 October 1984, No L 282/58). 
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an in~!P~~t.i,QJ:t_9f"the .concept .. ,~«eompetition•- ·"disregards" ,. however," .. the .. very, .. ~.essen~~-9f 
co~petition __ and dec_reases-welfare.· Indeed, co_!!!petition enhan~~~~!f~~~i?~'J~ it_ inc.r~ 
efficiency in p_roduction which allo~s lowçr ,Rrices Jo .È.~ charged. 
[:
As to the evaluatiQn of_ their monopolizing _. ~y.rer _on the Community mar ket, . the Commynity 
pr~;-d~m;~g exporters. are- als~ tr~~-~~~;-Iiy~·'-'"111;~ &r~~ anti-dumping 
autlîorities have not yet'refuse((anti~ilnipillg-~reif~r·~because of the monopolizing effects which the 
anti-dumping relief may have1458. Sometimes, _ their rejection seems to be well-
founded1459. But, in several cases, they merely invoke lack of evidence of the fact that the 
1458 There is one, but only pa:rtial exception, i.e., the anti-dumping case oonce:rning glycine from Japan, in which the Commission 
noted that: 
.cSome users a:rgued that the adoption of p:rotective measu:res is not in the interest of the Community because they 
would beoome totally dependent on supplies f:rom Tessenderlo Chemie [i.e., the main Community producer whose output 
of glycine oonstitutes practically all Community production of glycine]. 
However, it hu not been established that if p:rotective measu:res are taken the users will beoome dependent on 
Tessenderlo Chemie and will have no possibllity of benefiting f:rom different sourees of supply. It is not inoonceivable 
that the other Community producer (Rexim) would increase its production or expand its production capacity taking into 
account the fact that the oonsumption of this product is e:xpected to increase significantly because of new applications. 
Fu:rthe:rmo:re, the absence of measu:res may possibly lead to the ciosure of the plant of Tessenderlo Chemie, the effect of 
which would be that Community U88l"s would depend almost exclusively on the Japanese expo:rters, whose price 
behaviou:r on the EEC market oould ve:ry well change in order to raise prices to world levels. Finally, the imposition of 
protective measu:res is not aimed at the elimination of the imported product from the Community market, but at taking 
away the negative effects of the unfair p:ricing practised by exporters f:rom non-memher oount:ries» 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 997/85 of 18 April 1986 imposing a p:rovisional anti-dumping duty _on impo:rts of glycine 
originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April1985, NoL 107/8). 
In the defmitive assessment ooncerning glycine from Japan, the Council argued fu:rthe:rmore : 
«In view of the p:robable effect on the oompetitive situation and st:ructu:re in the Community market characterized by 
the presence of essentially one Commünity producer and two non-Community fi:rms, it is oonsidered in the Community's 
interest to take protective measu:res without fully eliminating the injury dete:rmined to have been suffered by the main 
Community producer du:ring the perioei of mvestigation, but oonsidered adequate to enable the said producer to operate 
eoonomically the plant at which :regular production ofthe product ooncerned started only at the beginning of 1984» 
· (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/86 of 12 August 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of glycine originating 
in Japan, O.J., 16 August 1986, No L 21811). 
The Council and the Commission, thus, aimed at preserving oompetition on the Community market between the main Community 
producer and the two dumping Japanese exporters. The:refore, an anti-dumping duty was imposed in order to prevent 
monopolization by the dumping exporters; but, in. order to prevent inonopolization by the main Community producer, the rate of_/) 
the anti-dumping duty was set lower than the dumping margin and, therefo:re, was not p:rohibitive for Japanese expo:rts. (/' 
1459 In oxalic acid .from India, the European anti-dumping authorities held that the argument according to which the Community producer would 
acquire a monopoly, had but liule ground in view of the Community producer's market share, the presence of other Community producen and the 
rate of market penetntion in the Community of importa from other countries (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3434/91 of 25 November 1991 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of oxalic acid originating in India or the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 28 November 1991, 
No· L 326/6). 
In calcium metal from the People 's RepubUc of Cltina and Russia, the Council concluded that competition on the Community market wu 
enelangered in view of the fact that supplies werc available from third countries (Council Regulation (EC) No 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 impoaing 
a detinitive anti-dumping duty on importa of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Ruuia, O.J., 21 October 1994, No 
L 270127). 
In magnetJe dirles (3,5" microdislcs) Jrom Japan, Taiw~n and the People's RepubUc of Oûna and magnesium oxide from the People's RepubUc of 
Oûna and deod-bumed (sinlend) magnesia froin the People's RepubUc of Oûna, the European anti-dumping authorities held that the dumping 
exporten would oot e:xperience diminished acceu to the Community market becausc the amount of the proposed anti-dumping duty was lower than 
the amount required to undo tbc injury fully (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on importa of eertaio magnetic diska (3,5" microdiska) originating in Japan, Taiwan aod the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 21 Apri11993, No 
L 95/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definiti-\ie anti-dumping duty on importa of magneaium oxide 
originating in the Pcople'a Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No i. 145/1 ; Couocil Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 
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Community producers would monopolize the Community market after the imposition of anti-
dumping measures1460 or they rely on rather unconclusive evidence which is said to show that 
the dumping exporters can stay in the Community market1461• In only one case, the European 
imposing a definitivc aali-dumping duty on importa of dead-bumcd (sintered) magnesia oi'ÏgÏDIÛJII in tbe Pcople's Republic of China, O.J., 11 
December 1993, NoL 306/16; Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 534/94 of 9 March 1994 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
eertaio magnetic dilb (3,5• microdiaks) originatiog in HongKong and tbe Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5. Sec also: 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on irnports of synthetic fibres of polyesten 
originating in India and tbe Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, No L 197/25, wbere the amount of the anti-dumping duty was below tbc 
margin of price undercuuing). AB the amouot required to remove fully the injury, equala tbc dUferenee between the dumping price and tbc price 
tbe Community producen lbould get in order to cover tbeir production coats and to make a profil, such an anti-dumping duty caonol cause the 
dumping pricea to riae above tbc Community producen' prices. AB tbe dumping pricea will ltill undcrcut the Community producen' pricea -
though to a lc~~er c:xtent -, it aecma reasonablc to conclude that such an anti-dumping duty wiU oot drive tbc dumping exporten out of the 
Community market. 
146° Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361/87 of 18 May 1987 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-calcium/calcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 May 
1987, NoL 129/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof 
mercury originating in the Boviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports, 
O.J., 10 December 1987, No L 346127; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3905/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn 
originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, No L 347/10; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, NoL 348/49. 
8ee however : glycine from Japan., where the Council referred to tcthe probable effect on the competitive situation and structure in 
the Community market characterized by the presence of essentially one Community producer and two non-Community firmB» 
(emphasis added) in order to explain why no full anti-dumping rellef was granted (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/85 of 12 
August 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 15 August 1985, No 
L 218/1). 
1461 See e.g. : 
calcium mellll.from the People's Repubüc ofOaina and Russia, where the Commission stated that «the imports from the People's Republic of 
China and Ruuia would remaio available,., without providing any evidence why (Commiuion Rcgulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importsof calcium metal originating in the Peoplc'a Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 
April 1994, NoL 104/5); 
urea ammonium nitrate solulion jrom Bulgarla and Poltmd, where the Commission pointed out that impmts from third, non-dumping 
countries were «patcntially still available» and tbat there was «DO reason to believe that a shortagc of the product will occur, hearing in mind 
that tbc Community market will bc potentially more attractive for supplien from tbird countrics oncc a fair competitive situation ia re-
establishecb (Council Regulation (EC) No 3319/94 of 22 December 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea 
ammonium nitrate aolution originating in Buigaria and Poland, exported by companies not cxempted from tbc duty, and collccting definitivcly 
the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31 December 1994, No L 350/20) ; 
colour Ielevision receivers from Malaysia, the People's Repubüc of Oaina, the Repubüc of Korea, Singapore and 7hailtmd, where tbc 
Commiuion held that tbc expccted remedial effect of anti-dumping relief would occur in tenna of a change of the relative market shares held, 
but that anti-dumping relief would not prevent produccn from third countries from competing in the Community market (Commiuion 
Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imporb of colour telcvision receiven 
originating in Malaylia, tbc Pcople's Rcpublic of China, tbc Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No 
L 255/50). 1bc Commiuion, however, did not clarify why tbe anti-dumping measurea should have precisely those effects; 
jurazolidone orlginaling in the People's Repubüc of Olina, where the disappeanncc of the aolc Community producer was ·considcred to 
render tbc Conununity entirely dependent on tbe dumped imports (Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 1648/94 of 6 July 1994 imposing a 
proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa of funzolidone originating in the Peoplc'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, No L 174/4). 
Here, tbc Europcan anti-dumping autboritiea did not investigatc whether the enviaaged anti-dumping measures would not drive tbc dumpïn, 
exporten out of tbe Community market. They only 1eemed to aasurne that the dumping exporten would remain in the Community market, 
as they considered the irnports coming from tbird countriea to be negligible. Otherwisc, their dcciaion would imply tbc monopolisation of the 
Community market by tbc aolc Community producer ; 
dihydrostreptomycin from the People 's Repubüc of Olina, where the pouible disappcarance of the Chinese exporten from tbe Community 
market was oot considered to result in a monopoly or dominant position of the aole Community producer. The presencc of one Japaneae 
exporter wu found to maintain competition on the market (Commission Rcgulation (EEC) No 2054/91 of 11 July 1991 imposing a 
proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa of dihydrostreptomycin originating in tbc Pcople'a Rcpublic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, No 
L 187123). With two producers on the market, a monopoly ia, indeed, excluded. lnatead a duopoly will exist, with a possible dominant 
position for either of tbc two producen or even a collcctive dominant position ; 
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anti-dumping authorities seemed not y_eT'j_ convineed themselves by their rejection of the 
monopolization by the Community producers of the Community market, as they announced that 
they would undertake a review of their decision after six months would have elapsed, provided 
that competition conditions would so require1462 ; in the meantime, though, the dumping 
exporters would be subject to anti-dumping rellef and the Community industry would perhaps have 
driven them out of the Community market. 
On the other hand, the European anti-dumping authorities hardly ever insist on strict evidence, 
when 1 they consider the possible mQ!!~li~1ion __ of the Commun~ar:ket _ QY the dumping 
fuifuraldelryde jrom the People 's RepubUc of a.ina, where the Commisaion held that «the purpose of trade defence measures is oot to 
exclude from the Community market, exporten found to have dumped iJVuriouslya and, at the same time, added that «the high number of 
exporten from other third countries eosure that 1Upply will be · maintained at a level IUfticient to meet the demanda (Commisaion Regulation 
(EC) No 1783/94 of 18 July 1994 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa of furfuraldehyde originating in the People'a 
Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11). There ia, however, a clear difference between purpose and effect; 
DRAMs (dynomic random access memories) Jrom the RepubUc of Korea, where the Commiuion referred to the fact that anti-dumping relief 
againat import& of the same product from another dumping country had not reduced the number of exportera of that country, in order to ahow 
that the anti-dumping relief enviaaged would oot eliminale the dumping exporten from the Community market (Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertaio types of electrooie microcircuits 
known aa DRAMa (dynamic random acceaa memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272/13). 
Obvioualy, IUCb a precedent ia oot quite relevant as there ia no evidence that the exporten of these two countriea are identical ; 
magnedc dhlc.r (3,5• microdislcs) jrom Japan, Taiwan and the People's RepubUc of a.ina, where the Commission held that the dumping 
exportera would oot IUffer a diminiahed acceu to the Community market because the rise in the dumping price to be caused by the anti-
dumping duty, which equaled the amount neceuary to re move the injury, was «limiled to a level which reflects a fair competitive Community 
market aituation permiuing the Community industry to seU at economie priceaa (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the 
People'a Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 95/5). Clearly, the fact that the dumping pricea would rise tothelevel of the pricea 
the Community producen must charge in order to eam a profil, does oot ahow that the dumping exporten will atay in the Community 
market. On the contrary, in BUcb a case, the dumping exporten may well be driven out of the Community market, at least if the Community 
producenare able to meet Community demand. In that case, their production waa aaid to be, at the time of the anti-dumping investigation, 
insufficient to meet demand. However, the price increase which would be caused by the anti-dumping duty, might well have induce the 
Community producers to iocrcase their production capacity. lndeed, as haa been admitted by the European anti-dumping authorities, the 
Community industry, aince the end of the investigation period, bas tried to increase production capacity and new Community producen had 
set up production facilitiea in the Community (Couocil Regulation (EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 impoaing a detinitive anti-dumping 
duty on importa of eertaio magnetic disks (3,5" microdiaks) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People'a Republic of China, and collecting 
detinitively the proviaional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4); 
etlumolamine jrom the United Sloles of Ámerica, where the Commisaion admitted that the Community industry did not have the capacity to 
fully satiafy the demand on the Community market, but conaidered it to be in the Community interest& to rnaintaio a viabie Community 
industry and to prevent its aubatitution by a leuer number of third country aupplien. According to the Commiuion, the inaufficient capacity 
of the Community industry would enable third country producen to continue to 1Upply the Community market, which would prevent the 
Community industry from achieving oligopolistisc protitability. Nevertheleu, the Commiuion imposed a high anti-dumping duty, equal to 
the amount neceuary to remove the iJVury. Though it did explicitly treat of the problem of the pouible disappearance of the dumping 
exporten from the Community market, it mentioned the determination of the dumping exporten to defend their market aharea on the 
Community market, to the pouibilitiea for them to absorb to a large extent high anti-dumping duties and to the vulnerability of the 
Community i.nduatry_ (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2172/93 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on importa of · 
ethanolamine originating in the Uniled Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, No L 195/5 ; Couocil Regulation (EC) No 229/94 of 1 
February 1994 impoaing detinitive anti-dumping duties on import& into the Conmwnity of ethanolamine originating in the Uniled Statea of 
America, and collecting detinitively the proviaional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 2 February 1994, NoL 28/40). However, none of theae three 
elements ia coocluaive. Fint, though the dumping exportera may be determined to defend their market aharee at all coats, they may Btill he 
driven out of the market. Second, if they actually absorb the anti-dumping duty, the Community may take meaaures nece881ry to remedy the 
effects IUch absorption (aee : Artiele 12 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(11) basic ECSC Decision). Third, the anti-dumping relief granted 
may remedy- at least, it ia intended to do so- the Community induatry'a vulnerability. Moreover, as the Commiuion bas admiUed, the 
Community industry waa making continuoua efforta to meet increased demand. 
1462 Council Replation (EC) No 2557/94 of 19 October 1994 impoaing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal originating in 
the People'a Republic of China and Ruuia, O.J., 21 October 1994, NoL 270/27. 
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exporters as true, on the basis of potentialities and probabilities1463• The unequal treatment 
between dumping exporters and Community producers is all the less acceptable, since the 
elements on which the expectation of possible monopolization by the dumping exporters is based, 
do notprove the anti-competitive effects of the dumping. 
The application of the criteria of European antitrust law to European anti-dumping law shows that 
the alleged anti-competitive effects of the dumping are notbasedon sufficient evidence. 
1463 A potential or probable anti-competitive effect of dumping was found sufficient in : 
glycine from Japan, where the CommiBBion held that •the absence of (anti-dumping) measures may possibly lead to the 
ciosure of the plant of (the main Community producer), the effect of which would be that the Community users would depend 
almost exclusively on the Japanese exporters, whose price behaviour could very well change in order to raise prices to world 
levels• (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 997/85 of 18 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April1985, NoL 107/8) (emphasis added); 
linear tungsten halogen lamps from Japan, where it was stated cc(w)hile low prices may be in the consumer's interest, it 
cannot in the longer term be to his advantage to see supply of LTH lamps to the Community market restricted to virtually 
one single souree of supply (ie., the Japanese import&) which would consequently reduce competition and thus probably lead 
in the medium and long term to higher prices- (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of linear tungsten halogen lampa originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No 
L 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, No L 321/19)) (emphasis added) ; 
dihydrostreptomycin from the People's Republic of China, where it was stated that .the halting of Community production of 
DHS, which might well happen ü the present situation were to ·continue, ( ... ) would reduce the num.her of DHS suppliers on 
the Community market. (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2054/91 of 11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on. import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 13 July 1991, No L 187/23) 
(emphasis added) ; 
,.adio-bNHJdccut noeiue,.• of a leinel used in moto,. vehicles from South Korea, where, in the view of the Commission, tcit would 
appear probable that in the medium-term (Community) production would cease to exist• (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
313192 of<& February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in 
motor vehiclea, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8) (emphasis added); 
ootton yarn from B,.azil and Tu,.lcey, where the European anti-dumping authorities stated that .the trend in factory closures 
due. to dumped import& is such that, without measures, the continued existence of the induBtry as a whole may be said to be 
in danger- (Council Regulation (EEC) No 738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
ootton yam. originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, NoL 82/1) (emphasis added); 
potassium ch.lo,.ide (potash) from Belarus, Russia o,. U/c,.aine, where the .Commission feels ( ... ) that without (oountermeasures) 
the (Community industry) will continue to register losses and face the threat of premature extinction. (CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1031/92 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium chloride 
(potash) originating in Belarus, RUBBia or Ukraine, O.J., 28 April 1992, No L 110/5). 
In plain pape,. plwtocopie,.s from Japan, more substantial evidence has been invoked. In that case, it was pointed out that •without 
the imposition of anti-dumping measures, the num.her of competitors in the market will be reduced. This is particularly the case 
regarding certain of the complainants who may be vulnerable to a takeover similar to that of one of the original complainants by 
one of the exporters during the proceeding. (Council Regulation (EEC) No 535187 of 23 February 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& ofplain paper photocopiera originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54112. See also: C.J.E.C., 
case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1405; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, 
Matsushila Electl"ic lndust,.ial Co. Ltd. and Matsushila Elect,.ic T,.ading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1488; C.J.E.C., 
case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroleu Photo IndUBtry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1532; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 
10 March 1992, San.yo Blectl"ic Co. Ltd. v Council, B.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1573; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp 
co,.po,.ation V Council, B.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1685) (emphasis added). In addition, it was Btated that tcSÎX of the nine exporters 
who could realistically be interested in manufacturing in the Community are either already doing so or have indicated that they 
will do so in the near future• and that tc(t)here is also no indication that the number of Japanese suppliers to the Community will 
be reduced•. 
~-~~-~=--=~==~~===c 
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There are only two anti-dumping cases, namely concerning glycine from Japan1464 and linear 
tungsten halogen lamps from Japan1465, in which some elaborated information is given about 
the possible monopolization of the Community market by the dumping exporters. However, the 
information provided in these two anti-<f!Jmping casesJs_ not suffieient to justify the application of 
European antitrust law and more specifically of Artiele 86 EC Treaty1466• Under_ Artiele 86, 
three conditions m]lst _ be _fulft]J~ ___ e__umulatiy_ely__: frrst, there must be a dominant position on the 
common market ; sec9nd, the behaviour of- the fmn(s) having sueh a dominant position must 
imply an abuse ; and, third, trade between Memher States must be affected by the abuse1467• 
In respect of the third condition, no information is provided in both anti-dumping cases. It will be 
- assumed that the third condition is nevertheless fulfilled, merely because the Community market 
was not divided in several regionat markets (see : Artiele 4(l)(ü) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 
4(5) basic ECSC Decision). Therefore, the applicability of Artiele 86 depends on two criteria : 
bas the dumping firm a dominant position on the Community market 1 And is the monopolization 
of the Community market through dumping an abuse of its dominant position 1 
(i) Has the dwnping .firm a dominant position on the Community market ? 
The mere practice of dumping does not prove that the dumping exporters have a dominant position on the 
Community market. Indeed, dumping may occur under conditions of perfect competition on the Community 
market - implying no dominant position - as well as under conditions of imperfect competition - which do not 
necessarily imply a dominant position. 
Glycine from Japan : 
As only three firms are present on the Community market of glycine, there does not seem to be a situation 
of perfect competition : the main Community producer, holding an average market share of ± 45 % 
between 1980 and 1984, and two dumping Japanese firms, holding a collective market share of ± SS % 
over the same period. Thus, it might be argued that the two Japanese firms have a collective dominant 
position on the Community market. However, it is not investigated whether the two Japanese firms 
cooperate on the Community market and, thus, whether there is a collective Japanese dominant position. In 
view of the fact that the two Japanese firms charge different prices, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
they do not cooperate and, thus, have no collective dominant position. If the two Japanese firms do not 
cooperate, the individual market share of the Japanese firms might both be lower than the market share of 
tbe Community producer. But even on the assumption of there being some kind of cooperation between the 
two Japanese exporters, the difference in market shares is not very well pronounced. Therefore, the 
stmcture of the Community market of glycine can best he qualified as an oligopolistic market stmcture, 
implying market power of the two Japanese exporters as wellas of the main Community producer. 
464 Commi.SBion Regulation (EEC) No 997/85 of 18 April 1985 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof glycine 
originating in Japan, O . .J., 19 April 1985, No L 107/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine originating in Japan, O . .J., 16 August 1985, No L 218/1. 
1465 Commi.SBion Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, ·o . .J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, O . .J., 21 November 1990, No 
321/19) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991.imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of linear 
t sten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O . .J., 19 January 1991, NoL 1411. 
1466 As there is no specific information about a possible coneerled action between the dumping exporters, the applicability of 
Artiele 85 EC Treaty is not examined. The only information in this respect is the same as that about the poSBibility of a collectiva 
dominant position held by the dumping exporten. 
1467 BELLAMY, C., and CHILD, G.D., Common Marleet Law ofCompetition, London, Sweet A Maxwell, 1987, 390, § 8-003. 
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Linear tungsten halogen lamps from Japan : 
On the Community LTH lamp market, the Japanese dumping exporters hold a collective market share of 
more 60 9ri, · against a market share of 29 9ri held by the Community industry. However, at least ten 
Japanese exporters are known to the Commission and the Commission Regulation also mentions four 
Community producers. lf the market shares were evenly distributed, a Japanese exporter would hold an 
individual market share of only 6 9ri, while the individual market share of a Com.munity producer would 
amount to 7.25 %. In fact, everything depends on whether or not the Japanese exporters act collectively. 
Oo this point, no evidence can be found in the Commission Regulation. Thus, no proof is fumished of a 
dominant position of the Japanese exporters. 
(ii) Is the monopolization of the Community market through dumping an abuse of its dominant 
position ? 
Obtaining, preserving or extending a dominant position on the Community market by means of normal business 
practices based on the finn's efficiencies is not contrary to Artiele 861468• As du!!!J?ing is the result of 
normal profit maximizatjon, with the exception of predatory dumping,~ it caonat he cilnsidered as an abw;e of a 
doÎÏiinant position. Therefore, it should be investigated whether the Japanese exporters were practising predatory 
dumping. In other words: do the Japanese exporters intend to drive the Community producer(s) out of the 
Community market by means of dumping in order to obtain a monopoly position, enabling them to charge 
aftetwards unreasonably high prices ? 
Glycine from Japan : 
In the Japanese glycine case the Commission contended that cthe absence of (anti-dumping) measures may 
possibly lead to the ciosure of the plant of (the main Com.munity producer), the effect of which would be 
that Community users would depend almost exclusively on the Japanese exporters, whose price behaviour 
could very well change in order to raise prices to world levelS» ( emphasis added). This assertion points in 
the direction of predatory dumping. However, it is based .2!1 potentialities («possibly•, ccould very well•). 
Thus, no hard proof of precJatory"_dumping is"being-ptöViaed. 
~------···--··- - . ._ -
Linear tungsten halogen lamps from Japan : 
In linear tungsten halogen lamps from Japan, the Commission noted that c(w)hile low prices may be in the 
consumer's interest, it cannot in the longer term be to bis advantage to see the supply of LTH lamps to the 
Community market restricted to virtually one single souree of supply (i.e., the Japanese imports) which 
would consequently reduce competition and thus probably lead in the medium and long term to higher 
priceS» (emphasis added). Here too, a potentiality is upheld as proof o.f..predato()! dumping. 
"C 
Antitrust considerations are welcome within the framework of anti-dumping law1469• A-
genent!~--- ~~~rn~~-~b<?_!l~! ____ ~l!l~~~O_I!_~~HtJ~!LJQ --=!>J!!y ___ _p~~ë.!QD' ... !illiDPing.c,being~. sanctioned. . 
Moreover, it will prevent Community producers from applying anti-dumping law to isolate the 
Community market from foreign competition. Only the (unrebuttable) assumption that all 
1468 C.J.E.C., case 8öf16, 13 February 1979, Holfmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission., E.C.R., 1979, (461), 641; BELLAMY, 
C.W., and CHILD, G.D., Common Marleet Law of Competition., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, 186-186, § 7-48 ; BELLAMY, C., 
and CHILD, G.D., Common Marleet Law of Competition., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, 408, § 8-038; VAN GERVEN, W., 
MARESCEAU, M., en STUYCK, J., Handel.- en economisch recht. Deel2 B- Mededingingarecht- Kartelrecht, in BeginBeien uan 
Belgisch PrivaDtrech.t, DILLEMANS, R., and VAN GERVEN, W. (eds.), xm, Gent, Story-Scientia, 1986, 330, Dl'. 293; 
WERTHEIMER, H.W., tellet adagium van artikel 86, EEG: 'Quod licet bovi non licet jovi'•, in Europees kartelrecht anno 1980, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1981, (143), 177 en 228. 
1469 See, however, BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., ecEC Anti-dumpingEnforcement- Selected Seoond Generation Issues•, in Antitrust an.d 
Trade Policy in thc Uniled Statea t:.lll.d the Europeon Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (673), 674, according 
to whom tc(antitruat) allegations can only be taken into consideration once they have been established following · the proper 
procedures of competition law or where, at the very least, proceedings were initiated under competition law». Nevertheless, the 
opinion of J.H.J. BOURGEOIS cannot be shared. The concept "Community interest&» allows the Europaan anti-dumping 
authorities to inveatigate whether the antitrust _allegations are founded. 
-_ ~ 
----~-~=~-1----:_-~ 
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dumping is predatory and the selective concern about competition in European anti-dumping law, 
though, should be criticized. The nationality of the competitois on the Community market should 
be irrelevant. More generally, it should be pointed out that even a general antitrust concern in 
anti-dumping case law is only a second-best approach. The tirst-best solution. is the dit:ect 
~ app~tion of antitrust law for detecting and sanctioning predatory pricing1470• 
··-"'-....e-~:.;;.,..,..".,......,.,,.3..,.,__(~----;";_._;,·_o_~:-~·:!.:t~·...,-."..,--~.l..O;.~-------_.., 
2.4. THE «INFANT INDUSTRY»-ARGUMENT 
According to the ·-«infant industry»-argument, a country may not be able to realize its true 
comparative advantage under free trade if other countries are already established in the relevant 
sectors. In European anti-dumping case law, the «infant industry»-argument bas implicitly been 
adduced for granting anti-dumping relief1471 • 
1470 lnjra, 777-786. 
1471 The ccinfant industry•argument is applied i.m.plicitly in: 
serieU-impact dot-matrix printer• from Japan, where the steady decline in profitability eaueed by reduced sales in the face of 
huge quantities of dumped import&, was considered to prevent the Community producers from i.m.proving their oost structure 
and from building more cost-efficient SIDM printers ; thus, the inefficiency of the Community producers was considered to be 
eaueed by maaaive dumped import& and anti-dumping rellef was considered to allow the Community producers to invest in 
more efficient production methods (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 i.m.posing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33) ; 
DRAM• from Japan., where it was noted that uof the three complainant companies that had serious commitments to large-
scale DRAM production during the perioei under investigation, two are already in commercial production although production 
plans have not yet beèn fully implemented. This state of affairs renden them particularly vunerable to any renewed -
dumping practices- (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in 
Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
import& of these products and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22!19 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144)) ; 
welded wire-me•h origi1Uiting in. Yugo•lavia, where anti-dumping relief was granted because the viability of the new Greek 
investments and the deepening of the Greek dornestic production facilities would be jeopardized by the dumped import&; 
furthermore, the i.m.plicitly invoked «infant indUBtrya-argument was underbuilt by the serious economie and social costs to 
the Greek economy of its proceBB of integration into the Community indUBtry ; in other words, the Greek induBtry of welded 
wire-mesh could not bear the burden of the Yugoslav dumping because of the costs it had to bear for its integration into the 
Community market (CommiBBion Decision 911256/EEC of 14 May 1991 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of welded wire-mesh originating in Yugoslavia and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 18 May 1991, NoL 123154); 
gaB-{Iulled, non.-nfillDhle poclr.et flint lighter• origi1Uiti.ng in. Japan, the Peopk'• Republi.c of China, the Republi.c of Kona and 
Thailand, where anti-dumping rellef was considered to be necessary in order to put the Cominunity indUBtry in a position to 
regain market share in the Community, to benefit from the same economies of scale as most of the dumping exportera and 
consequently to beoome more competitive ; for the European anti-dumping authorities held that as long as the return on 
investment remained weak, it was unlikely that the Community indUBtry would increase its marketing efforts or make the · 
new investments required to reduce their manufacturing oost (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, 
the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133120). 
8ee also : plain. paper ~~_p~here the European anti-dumping authorities calculated the anti-dumping duty in ~ëïlieCOmmunity produ;;.-ers to permit them to undertake adequate research and development ei~nditure (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plaiD paper photocopiers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No I~ 54112). 
[::: 
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The «infant industry»-argument is only valid, if market distortions prevent a country from 
realizing its comparative advantages. It bas been argued that in such a case trade-restrictive 
measures may allow the country to obtain its comparative advantages. Under this approach, the 
«infant-industry»-argument is quite attractive. Nevertheless, it should b~,_b~u~~~~~it 
-~~--~----~-------·-- ~ 
does not take into account the nç! __ çg_st_Qf~.tm!l~.~~(_>~tion __ !t:!_ ___ g~Qer(l}_and _Qf_ ~ti-dumping 
proteetion in particular. Without the netcostof anti-dumping protection, a country may realize its 
co~~tages by employing direct measures aimed at removing the market distortions. 
Moreover, «Înfant industry•-protection raises two problems. Q «Înfant -industry»-protection is 
by defmition temporary : it should be granted until the country realizes its comparative advantage. 
However, it appears to be very difficult to withdraw proteetion once it bas been granted. At first 
sight, anti-dumping relief seems to be temporary under European anti-dumping law. Indeed, anti-
dumping measures Iapse five years after the date on which they entered into force or were last 
modified or confirmed (Article 11(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 15(1) basic ECSC Decision). 
In several anti-dumping cases, however, anti-dumping measures remaio in force for more than 
five years because they are confrrmed or modified before the five-year period expires, so that a 
new period of five years sets in (see : Artiele 11(2) basic EC Regulation which codifies existing 
European anti-dumping case law as to the so-called expiry reviews, i.e., reviews initiated at the 
occasion of the impending expiry of anti-dumping reliet). Indeed, as the new EC anti-dumping 
legislation puts it, anti-dumping relief must remaio in force as long as necessary to counteract the 
injurious dumping (Article 11(1) basic EC Regulation). As a consequence, the basicly temporary 
nature of anti-d~ll1P~~~ !l!()tec~~ ~ï_pfoll:ticallY Joose its contenY'nd the drawl>a~k.~rJb.Ç_;~fant 
industcy-»_...ar-gumetn-ru--so~ápplies to anti-dumping relief. 
',,Q anti-dumping relief does not necelisarily stimulate investments made by the industry 
necessary to realize the country's comparative advantages. On the contrary, as anti-dumping 
proteetion shelters the in dustry from foreign competition, it removes the incentives to in vest in 
more efficient production methods1472• The ~~---anti:dumpin~-autherities·,~--however,-
1472 For example, it follows from rodio-broadcast receivers of a ldnd used in mo10r vehicles jrom SoutJa Korea that the competition by tbe 
Korean exporten had incited the Community producen to make major investmenll and to take rationalization measures (Comminion Regulation 
(EEC) No 313/92 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imporll of radio-broadcast receiven of a kind used in motor 
vehicles, originating iu South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8). lt is an open question whether the Community producen would have 
taken sucb drastic measures without Korean competition. 
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assume=tlmt ~!!--_d_l!!!l_ping proteetion indu~s Community producers to achieve their comparative 
ad~73. -- . ----··-
2.5. TRADEPOUCY 
2.5.1. Trade diversion 
"--
Anti-dumping rellef may divert trade to a great extent. For example, between 1980 and 1985, 
anti-dumping rellef caused à decreasein the volume of the dumped imports by 57.9 % (i.e., a 
yearly decllne of 15.9 %) , whereas the volume of non-dumped imports and intra-Community trade 
increased by, respectively~~i.e., a yearly increase of respective11(1.2 j and 
16.9 %)1474• Thus, the ~ing exporters benefited more that}~Jh~ __ ÇQmmunity prO<f_~cers 
V~=------·~-- ~ . . . - . ---- - ··- •· '"··· -... - . ,_ - -.. -,-. -~- -- "'-' -~ '" ~~-
from the decrease in the volume- iiflliè dumped imoorts . 
..........:>------ -- .. _ --- . --""'~-----------' '· - ...... ,-, .. ~-~=-'"·"-"=-~ 
There is no consistent European case law as to this phenomenon. In some anti-dumping cases, 
------~-___ "_ ......... ..__,__..", 
anti-dumping relief was not considered to be in the Community interests because it was expected 
~-------~--
1473 In seriaJ,..impact dot-matrix printers from Japan, .the Commission (could not) accept the argument that anti-dumping duties 
(imposed on printers would) retard technological development or modernization of office automation since these duties are supposed 
to help the Community printer induBtry to regain suffi.cient profitability under .normal busineBB conditions in order to invest in new 
technology .. (Coromiseion Regtllation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O . .T., 26 May 1988, NoL 130112) (emphasis added). See also: CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 impo~ing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact disc players 
originating in Japan and South Korea, O . .T., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O . .T., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27); 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tungsten 
halogen lamps originating in Japan, O . .T., 20 July 1990, NoL 188/10 (corrigendum, O . .T., 21 November 1990, NoL 321/19). 
During the initial investigation, in bin.ckr and baler twine from Brazil and Mexico, it was considered that the Community 
producers were likely to convert production to a new synthetic product for which demand was expected to increase. In the review 
proceeding, the CommiBBion admitted that this forecast has turned out to he inaccurate, but pointed to ecological concerns in favour 
of the use of natural product& in order to explain why the conversion had not taken place (CommiBBion Decision 931521/EEC of 3 
September 1993 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review in respect of imports of binder and haler 
twine originating in Brazil, terminating the anti-subsidy review proceeding with regard to these imports and terminating the anti-
dumping and anti-aubsidy review in respect of imports of binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O . .T., 8 October 1993, No 
L 251128). 
1474 MESSERLIN, J? .A., ·Th~ EC. Antidumping~Regulations---:--A~·First:-::-EconnmicApprai~tal,_l_~8(H~6!t, _W_eltwirtsch.aftliches ..-\rchiv, 
198~, (563};~-~fu~~estingly~ugh, the initiation of anti-dumping proceedings also causes trade di~~rsion .. lnd~d, P.A. 
MESS~und that in anti-dumping cases which were terminated without anti-dumping relief the dumped imports 
declined by 35 ~ over a perioei of five years, while the non-dumped imports and intra-Community trade rose respectively by 26.7 
and 63.4 ~ (ibidem). 
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to favour substitution of dumped imports by imports from third countries1475 or substitution of 
the Community producer's exports to third countries by the dumping producers' product1476• 
Similarly, if the Community industry is unable to substitute the dumped products, anti-dumping 
rellef will be considered as not being in the Community interests1477• Likewise, anti-dumping 
1475 The Community interesta were considered not to call for anti-dumping rellef in tube cmd pipe fittings from Brazil, Yugoslavia 
and Japan., because anti-dumping rellef tewould be likely to favour mainly other low-priced imports and increase their market share 
further at the expense of imports from these countries without any consequent improvement in the situation for the Community 
industry» (CommiBBion Decision 86/536/EEC of 7 November 1986 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
certain tube and pipe fittings originating in Brazil, Taiwan, Yugoslavia and Japan, O.J., 8 November 1986, No L 313120). 
Similarly, no full anti-dumping relief was granted in nichel from the Boviet Union and oxalic acid from Brazil because full anti-
dumping relief could result in the substitution of the dumped imports by non-dumped imports from third countries, without there 
being any relief for the Community indwrt.ry (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1613183 of 16 June 1983 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of cathocles produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut 
into squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No L 159/43 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2553184 of 4 
September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic acid originating in Brazil, accepting an undertaking 
offered by the exporter in the German Demoeratic Republic of oxalic acid and terminating the proceeding regarding imports of 
oxalic acid from the German Demoeratic Republic and Spain, O.J., 7 September 1984, No L 239/8). 
Trade diversion between dumping exporters and Community producers-not included within the Community induBtry mayalso be 
invoked as a reason for not granting anti-dumping relief. lndeed, in codeïne an.d iU •alt• from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland 
eind Yugoslavia the Community indwrt.ry comprised only the two m~r German manufacturers which, at that time, accounted for a 
large proportion of the total Community output of codeïne and its salts. Anti-dumping relief was not considered to be in the 
Community · intereets because the Community induBtry would not take advantage of any anti-dumping protection. For it was 
thought probable that the dumped imports would be replaced by low-priced imports from the rest of the Community (Council 
Decision 8319/EEC of 17 January 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of codeïne and its salts 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 January 1983, No L 16/30). The motivation for not 
granting anti-dumping relieftestifies totheimpact ofthe definition ofthe concept teCommunity industry». Moreover, it also proves 
a sustained approach. lndeed, ü the Community industry had not been limited to two G~rman producers, anti-dumping relief 
would probably have been granted, precisely because the dumped imports would he replaced by low-priced Community products. 
1476 See: urea from Czecho•lovakia, the German Democratie Republic, Kuwai4 Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and 
Tobago cmd Yugo•lavia., where an exporter had argued that anti-dumping proteetion would have a counter-productive effect 
because, due to the expected reduced exports to the Community, competition on third markets would increase and therefore lead to 
a further loss of export& by Community producers. The Council did not reject the argument as such. It rejected it because of lack 
of evidence. lndeed, it considered that it was difficult, if not impossible, to predict whether or notanti-dumping proteetion would 
have negative effects on the export performance of Community producers (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, 
the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1). 
1477 See : phoû:J album• from South Korea cmd HongKong, where certain types of photo albums were not subjected to the anti-
dumping measurea because the market supply by the Community induBtry was insufficient and a shortage in overall supply would 
have to be expected. ü anti-dumping proteetion was taken with respect to all categoriea of photo albums. (Commiaaion Deciaion 
90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
photo albums originating in South Korea and HongKong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, NoL 188/48). 
· See alao : CommiBBion Deciaion 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of gum 
rosin originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, No L 41/50. 
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rellef bas been granted because trade diversion was not expected to occur1478 and, if it should 
occur, the European anti-dumping authorities undertook to enact anti-dumping relief against those 
new imports1479• They do, indeed, grant anti-dumping relief against imports coming from 
third countries if the latter substitute dumped imports already subject to. anti-dumping 
relief1480• In other anti-dumping cases, though, anti-dumping rellef was granted, in spite of 
trade diversion1481 and the inability of the Community industry to substitute the dumped 
1478 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of 
electronic microcircuita known as DRAMa (dyoamic random acccas memories) origioating in Japan, accepting ondertakinga offered by eertaio 
exporten in conneetion with tbc anti-dumping procecding concerning imports of these producta and tenninating the investigation in thcir respect, 
O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22179; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on imports of linear tongsten halogen lamps 
originating in Japan, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 5TI/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitivc anti-
dumping duty on importa of eertaio types of clectronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (eraaablc programmabie read only memories) originating in 
Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 65/1. 
See also : dicumyl peroxide jrom Japan, where already imposed anti-dumping proteetion was found not to be contrary to the Community interesta, 
though the Japancse cxporter had argucd that Japan would be excluded from the Community market in favour of its Taiwanese competitor. The 
Commiuion, howevcr, regardcd this argument as unfounded «in so far as the retention of proteelive measures against Japan should nothave any 
substantial effect on the present state of competition between the two countries (i.e., Japan and Taiwan)» (Commission Decision 89/573/EEC of 30 
October 1989 terminating the investigation conceming importa of dicumyl peroxide originating in Taiwan and accepting an undertaking offered in 
the context of the review concerning importa of dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan and terminating the procecding, O.J., 31 October 1989, No 
L 317/49). 
1479 In deadbumed (rinlered) magneriafrom the People's RepubUc of a.Jna and magnesi";,. oxide jrom the People's RepubUc of a.Jna it was 
expected that the increaae in the Chineae prices resulting from tbc imposition of anti-dumping duties would be foliowed by the other exporten since 
the Chinese exporten were the market price leadera (Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping· duty on importa of deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in tbc People's Repoblie of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No 
L 282/15; Conunisaion Rcgulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof magnesium 
oxide originating in the Peoplc's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282123; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 
1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 
December 1993, NoL 306/16). 
148° Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of 
polyesten originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 16 July 1992, No L 197/25; Council Regulation (EEC) No 54/93. of 8 January 
1993 imposing a definitivc duty on importsof synthetic fibres of polyesten originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, 
No L 912; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide 
originating in the Peoplc's Repoblie of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, NoL 145/1 ; CommiAion Regulation (EEC) No 24TI/93 of 6 September 1993 
imposing a provisionafariû-dumping duty on importa of eertaio photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 
1993, No L 228/16. 
1481 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86 of 24 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ball 
hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1986, No L 167/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200190 of 27 July 1990 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping 
duty on importsof silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 July 1990, NoL 198/57; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3433191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket 
flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand and defmitively collecting 
the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 November 1991, NoL 326/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-braadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating 
in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 3418 ; C',ouncil Regulation (EEC) No 830192 of 30 March 1992 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain polyester y8l'Jl8 (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the 
People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April1992, NoL 8811 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 5 June 1992, No L 153116); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477193 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/16 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
magnetic disks (3,5• microdisk.s) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and collecting defmitively the 
provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4. 
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products1482• The Court of Justice confrrmed the latter cases, for it held that «the interests of 
the Community are effectively guaranteed by protective measures against dumped imports, even 
though an anti-dumping duty does oot have the effect of shielding Community manufacturers 
against competition from products which originate in other non-memher countries but are oot 
being dumped»1483• The Court of Justice, though, did oot state that anti-dumping relief will 
never be in the Community interests when only imports from third countries are being favoured. 
As a consequence, the dichotomy in European anti-dumping case law subsists : ~
r~gif!lJ!Qrts~from-tlmd-oountrie~tJ!l~Y-~~-!~_E~~--~-~--~- the Community lptter~~-~3 
well as ~h-witlrit. · · ··· ·· " - · · · 
IJ Since the question of trade diversion arises only in the hypothesis of anti-dumping relief, the ~ combined effect of trade diversion and anti-dumping relief on Community welfare must be investigated. Beonornies shows that their combination never increases Community welfare. 
epending on the circumstances, trade di~ersion may oîüy lncrease-orTedn~tliëflèt costof anti-
urnping proteetion 1484• First, if anti-dumping relief causes the products of the dumping 
exporters to replace the Community producers' products in foreign markets, the net cost of anti-
dumping proteetion will be increased by . the extra loss in the Community producers' surplus 
caused by the decline in their exports. Second, if the dumped products are replaced on the 
Community market 7 products from third countries, the net cost of anti-dumping proteetion will 
not always increase. If the prices of the products from third countries equal· the ~ urnping prices 
the net cost of anti-dumping proteetion will fall to zero and anti-dumping protee on 'will not affect 
the welfare of the Community. If the price of roducts from third countries ever, equals the 
~;~-iliëOiiiîiPêdprodUCtSSUbf~ to an anti-dumping duty or an undertakin th;net ~s1:7 
an~rotec.tion eqiJlll~ J:!l~Jj~ loss ÏJt_ COil_SUIIler_ su_rplus, ~LnQ i11ç_~.in_the . 
\~ . 
/ ~~7' ''. 
'\ 1 y In ÜMCII' l""'f•len halogen lam: m J~the inability of the Community indUBtry to llUJ>ply whole the Community . 
~arket did not prevent anti-dumping rellef from being considered to be in the Community interesta (Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in 
Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, NoL 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 November 1990, NoL 321/19)). 
See also : Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 
17 December 1988, No L 348/49 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importB of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing importB of these product& and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/6 
(corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22/79; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44); Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten ores and concentratea 
originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing imports originating in HongKong, O.J., 
30 March 1990, No L 83123 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importe of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 365/25. 
1483 C.J.E.C., case 250/85, 5 October 1988, Brotherlndlutries Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5683), 5728. See also: C.J.E.C., case 
C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalt.qjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2166 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ); 
C.J.E.C., case C-6/H R, 11 March 1994, Descom Scales Man.ufacturing Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1994, I, (867), 874. 
1484 About the net cost of anti-dumping protection, see : supra, 343-373. 
----- - ~ ----~~ 
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Community producers' surplus (they do not sell more) and, in case of an anti-dumping duty, the --
anti-dumping duty does not yield revenue to the Community authorities. If, the price of the 
products from third countries is somewhere between the dumping price and the price of the 
dumped products subjected to an anti-dumping duty, the effect of trade diversion on the net cost 
of anti-dumping proteetion is uncertain/ On the one hand, anti-dumping proteetion will cause the 
price level on the Community market fo rise because the price of the product from other countries 
is higher than the dumping price. Because of the price rise, the consumption on the Community 
market will drop, thereby causing a lossin consumer surplus. That loss will, however, be lower 
in case of trade diversion because the price of the product from third countries is lower than the 
price of the dumped product subjected to an anti-dumping duty. On the other hand, no anti-
dumping duty will be levied on -the products coming from third countries which the dumped 
products are substituted by. As a_ consequence, as the iocome generate(j from the anti-dumping 
. 4uty· will be lower, there will be less iocome for the Community authorities to compensate the loss 
in consumer surplus. The combination of a smallerlossin consumer surplus and the decrease in 
the iocome of the Community r authorities makes it impossible to predict the effect of trade 
diversion on the net cost of an anti-dumping duty. If, however, an undertaking is accepted instead 
of an anti-dumping duty, the outcome is eertaio because undertakings never generate iocome for 
the Community authorities. As a result, the net oost of an undertaking must decline in case of 
trade diversion because the loss in consumer surplus is smaller. 
(:
ince trade-diversion can, at the most, neutralire the net cost of anti-dumping relief, it can, from 
an economie point of view, never be raised to prove that anti-dumping relief is in the Community 
mterests. It may only prove that less harm or no harm at all is done to the Community interes~. 
Since economics do not provide an unequivocal answer, in case trade diversion decreases, the net 
cost of anti-dumping · protection, the dichotomy in European anti-dumping case law cannot be -
criticized as such. However, it must be criticized because the effects of trade diversion on the net 
cost of anti-dumping proteetion are never investigated. However, since trade diversion affects the 
welfare of the Commun!cy_, _ __sue_h __ an~in:vesti-gation is necessary. 
- --- .. ----
------
2.5. 2. Inlegration of anti-dumping re lief into the Community 's general trade policy 
Various aspects and instruments of the Community's trade policy are taken into consideration to 
determine whether anti-dumping relief is in the Community interests. Interestingly enough, in the 
vast majority of anti-dumping cases, they do not prevent anti-dumping relief from being 
considered to be in the Cotnmunity interests : 
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anti-dumping rellef is found to be in the Community interests because it guarantees the 
effectiveness of anti-dumping rneasures imposed on durnped imports of the like product 
coming frorn other countries1485 ; 
the principle of non-discrimination results in anti-dumping rellef being in the Community 
interests when anti-dumping rellef is already granted against imports of the llke product 
coming from other countries1486 ; ·. · 
1485 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission Deciaion No 80/664/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of import& of fibre building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceed.ing with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 26 June 1982, NoL 181119; Commisaion Decision 83/76/EEC of 16 February 1983 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping prooaeding concerning import& of certain fibre building board originating in Brazil, O.J., 19 
February 1983, NoL 47/30; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2444/83 of 29 August 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain import& of hardboard originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Sweden and re.,opening the anti-dumping 
proceedings concerning these import&, O.J., 31 August 1983, No L 24119 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3648/83 of 19 December 
1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of hardboard originating in Czechoslovakia and Poland and defmitively 
collecting the am.ounts secured by way of a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of hardboard originating in Sweden, 
O.J., 24 December 1983, NoL 36116; Commission Decision 831649/EEC of 19 December 1983 accepting undertakings in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping procedure in respect of certain import& of hardboard originating in Sweden and terminating that procedure, 
O.J., 24 December 1983, NoL 361147; Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 668/84 of 29 February 1984 imposing a provisional anti• 
dumping duty on import. of hardboard originating in the Boviet Union and re-opening the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing 
those import&, O.J., 2 March 1984, NoL 61121; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1826/84 of 28 June 1984 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of hardboard originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 29 June 1984, NoL 170/68; Commission Decision 
84/407/EEC of 10 August 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
certain kraft liner paper and board originating in Spain and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 August 1984, No L 224/30 ; 
Commission Decision 861232/EEC of 9 June 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& ofhardboard originating in Argentina, Switzerland and Yugoslavia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 12 
June 1986, No 167/61; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a pl"ovisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings 
offered in conneetion with auch import&, O.J., 16 December 1990, NoL 361117; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 
June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-silicon origïnating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, 
No L 18318 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of certain types of electronic microcircuits Jmown as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272/13 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 611193 of 16 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs originating in the Republic of 
Korea and exported by companies not exempted from this du~y, and colleeting defmitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 
18 March 1993, No L 6611 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping 
duties on import& of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, No 
L 237/2. 
1486 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea 
originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 31711; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 
24 August 1988 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, 
the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 26 August 1988, No L 236/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in 
Venezuela and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with such import&, O.J., 16 December 1990, No L 361117 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video tapes in cassettes 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April 1991, NoL 106/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 
June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, 
No L 18318 ; Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti.dumping duty on import& 
of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acceu memories) originating in the Republic of 
Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272113 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 611193 of 16 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain electronic microcircuit& lmown u DRAMs originating in the Republic of 
Korea and exported by companies not exempted from this duty, and colleeting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 
18 March 1993, No L 6611 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping 
duties on import& of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, No 
L 237/2; Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into 
the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 Februa:i'y 
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there is no legal incompatibility between anti-dumping relief, on the one hand, and customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions, on the other hand1487, though customs duties and 
1994, No L 48/10 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 634194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
"'certain magnetic disks (8,6" microdisks) originating in HongKong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, NoL 68/6. 
1487 The absence of any legal incompatibility between anti-dumping relief, on the one hand, and customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions, on the other hand, is underscored in : 
polyester yarn. from Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan an.d Turlcey, where .(t)he Council (found) that ( ... ) neither Community law 
nor international rules - notably the (Fourth Multifibre Arrangement) - prohibit(ed) the imposition of anti-dumping duties ( ... ) 
affecting import& subject to quantitative restrictions, provided it is established that iJVury has been eaueed despite these 
restrictiollSit (Council Regulation (EEC) No 8906/88 of 12 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
of polyester yam originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 16 December 1988, No L 847/10. See also : 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 8946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic 
fibres of polyelltere originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the Uniteel Statea of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 
December 1988, No L 848/49 ; Commiuion Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakings ofTered in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning impor:ts of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia or 
Romania, confirming the undertakings accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 8889/87 and terminating the 
investigations, O.J., 24 February 1989, NoL 62/87; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2061190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a 
temporary anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefin bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 
1990, No L 187136 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, NoL 266/38); Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 
December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 28 December 1990, NoL 866126; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830192 of 80 March 1992 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the 
People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 8 April 1992, No L 8811 
(corrigendum, O.J., 6 June 1992, NoL 163116)); 
DRAM• from Japan, where the argument according to which injurious dumping should be tolerated, at least up to the level 
of any tariff, was considered to .cbe contrary to the general principle that injurious dumping is actionable and ( ... ) (to) lead to 
a negation of deciaions taken in the area of customs dutie81t (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 166/90 of 23 January 1990 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic 
random acceu memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating the investigation intheir respect, O.J., 26 
January 1990, No L 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22179 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No 
L 38144)); 
Bingle ph.Gse, two-Bpeed electrio motorB from Bulgaria, Romemiet an.d Czechoilouakia, where the Commission noted that .the 
customs dutiea and quantitative restrictions in question were not introduced to compensate for dumping». (Commission 
Decision 90/399/EEC of 26 July 1990 terminating an anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain single phase, 
two-speed electrio motors originating in Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 81 July 1990, NoL 202/47); 
ootton yarn from Brazil, Egypt, Turlcey, ln.dicJ an.d Thailand and polyester yarn.s from Taiwan, ln.don.esia, India, th.e People'• 
Republic of China an.d Turlcey, where the Commission considered tethat quantitative restrictions proteet the Community 
industry from exceuive volumes of import& but cannot prevent iJVury reeuiting from unfair trading practices such as 
dumping importe at very low priceSJt (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 28 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of ootton yam originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of ootton yam originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271/17 ; Commiuion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester 
yarns (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of these yarns originating in the Republic of Korea. 0 . .1., 3 
October 1991, No L 276fT). 
---r 
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quantitative restrictions may make anti-dumping rellef superfluous1488, at least if they are 
sufficient to relleve the Community industry from the injury caused by the dumping1489 , . 
the Community interests do not call for anti-dumping rellef if a trade agreement between the 
Communitv and the dumping country is concluded with respect to trade of the dumped 
products1400, insofar as that agreement is complied with1491 ; 
1488 8ee: Answer ofthe Comm.iBSion to written question No 1646/81, O.J., 19 April1982, No C 9819, where the CommiBSion he~d 
that circumstances may make the imposition of anti-dumping relief, in addition to quantitative restrictions, not to be in the 
Community interest.. 
1489 The insuffi.ciency of quantitative restrictions has been based on the fact that : 
the dumped exporis were concentrated on the markets of the Memher Statee not protected by quantitative restrictions 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 2236/82 of 11 August 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on upright pianos 
originating in the USSR, O.J., 13 August 1982, No L 23811 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 September 1982, No L 271120) ; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of polyester 
yam originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151/39 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 
1988, No L 152158) ; Comm.iBSion Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 1-' June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statee of America or 
Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 17 June 1988, No L 151/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3946/88 of 16 December 1988 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the 
Un.i,ted Statee of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 December 1988, No L 348/49; Commission Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 
February 1989 accepting undertakings oft'ered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of urea 
originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia or Romania, confmning the undertakings accepted pursuant to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 3339/87 and terminating the investigations, 0 . .1., 24 February 1989, No L 52/37 ; Comm.iBSion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefm bags 
originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 19 July 1990, NoL 187/36 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 20 September 1990, No 
L 256/38) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3308190 of 15 November 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
woven polyolefin sacks originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping 
duty on such import&, O.J., 17 November 1990, No L 31812 ; CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 3798/90 of 21 December 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 
December 1990, NoL 365125); 
the quantitative restrictions were not respected (Commission Recommendation No 2242/82/ECSC of 10 August 1982 imposing 
a · provisional anti-dumping duty on broad-flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 13 August 1982, No L 238132 ; 
CommiBBion Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakings oft'ered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing import& of urea originating in Austria, H~gary, Malaysia or Romania, confmning the undertakings 
accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the investigations, O.J., 24 February 1989, No 
L 52/37). 
The insufficiency of cu.stoms duties has been based on the fact that, despita these duties, the Community industey was materially 
injured (CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acceBS memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 17 September 1992, NoL 272/13). 
1490 In acrylic fibre• from Romt:.ania, it was considered that the Community interest& made it necessary to exclude discontinuous 
acrylic fibre carded, combed or otherwise prepared, from any anti-dumping maasure because it is among other products covered by 
the agreement between the Community and Romania on trade in textile products, which establishes agreed quantitative limit& for 
this category of product& (Council Decision 86/-'68/EEC of 22 September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain acrylic fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 24 September 1986, No L 272129). 
Similarly, in several anti-dumping cases the Community intereets were considered to no longer call for anti-dumping rellef as soon 
as a trade agreement between the Community and the dumping country was concluded with respect to trade of the dumped 
product& (Commiuion Recommendation No 714178/ECSC of 6 April 1978 providing for suspension of provisional anti-dumping 
duties established in relation to import& of steel product& originating in Japan, O.J., 8 April 1978, No L 94121; Comm.iBSion 
Recommendation No 859n8/ECSC of 27 April 1978 providing for the suspension of provisional anti-dumping duties established in 
relation to import& of steel product& originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 28 April1978, No L 116/20 ; CommiBBion Recommendation 
No 931178/ECSC of 28 April 1978 providing for suspension of provisional anti-dumping duties established in relation to import& of 
steel product& originating in Spain, 0 . .1., 4 May 1978, NoL 120121; CommiBBion Recommendation No 1236n8/ECSC of 8 June 
1978 providing for suapen.sion of the definitive anti-dumping duty established in relation to import& of steel product& originating in 
Romania, O.J., 9 June 1978, No L 153119 ; CommiBSion Recommendation No 1704178/ECSC of 19 July 1978 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Czechoslovakia, Japan, Poland and Spain, O.J., 20 
July 1978, NoL 195117; CommiBBion Recommendation No 1715n8/ECSC of 20 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on certain galvanized sheets and plates originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 22 July 1978, NoL 198/1; Commission Recommendation No 
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a trade agreement between the Community and the dumping country which explicitly provides 
the application of anti-dumping measures, does oot prevent anti-dumping relief from being in 
the Community interests1492. ; 
a trade agreement between the Community and the dumping country aimed at developing and 
diversifying trade from that country with the Community does oot prevent anti-dumping relief 
from being in the Community interests, if anti-dumping rellef restores fair competition on the 
Community market without reducing the overalllevel of competition 1493 ; 
1716/78/ECSC of 20 July 1978 providing for the suspension of the provisional anti-dumping duty established in relation to import& 
of iron or steel coils for re-rolling originating in Australia, O.J., 22 July 1978, No L 198/4; Commission Recommendation No 
1758n8/ECSC of 26 July 1978 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain angles, shapes and sections of iron or steel, 
originating in Spain, O.J., 27 July 1978, No L 203128; CommiBBion Recommendation No 2739n8/ECSC of 23 November 1978 
p~oviding for the 8118pension of the definitive anti-dumping duty established in relation to iron or steel coils for re-rolling 
originating in Soutb Korea, O.J., 25 November 1978, NoL 330/13; CommiBBion Recommendation No 165n9/ECSC of 30 January 
1979 providing for the suspension of definitive anti-dumping duties established in relation to import& of steel product& originating 
in Bulgaria, O.J., 31 January 1979, NoL 22111; CommiBBion Recommendation No 720n9/ECSC of 9 April 1979 providing for tbe 
termination of the application of tbe provisional anti-dumping duty established in relation to import& of certain hematite pig iron 
originating in Brazil, O.J., 11 April1979, NoL 92/10; CommiBBion Recommendation No 787n9/ECSC of 20 April 1979 providing 
for the termmation of tbe provisional anti-dumping duties established in relation to import& of certain steel product& originating in 
Spain, O.J., 21 April 1979, No L 99/31; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306/82 of 19 August 1982 repealing the definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain ootton yarns-originating in Turkey, O.J., 21 August 1982, NoL 246/14; CommiBBion Decision 
No 1064/83/ECSC of 28 April 1983 suspending the application of the definitive anti-dumping duty and terminating the anti-subsidy 
proceeding concerning broad-flanged beama originating in Spain, O.J., 30 April 1983, No L 116191; Commission Decision 
831334/ECSC of 4 July 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceedings concerning certain U + I sections of iron or steel 
originating in South Africa, O.J., 6 July 1983, No L 181126 ; CommiBBion Decision No 1563184/ECSC of 5 June 1984 suspending the 
application of the definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of concrete reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 6 June 1984, No 
L 150/15 ; CommiBBion Decision No 1718/85/ECSC of 21 June 1985 repealing the defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of broad-
flanged beams originating in Spain, O.J., 25 June 1985, NoL 165111; CommiBBion Decision No 1719/85/ECSC of 21 June 1985 
repealing the defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of concrete reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 25 June 1985, No 
L 165/12; CommiBBion Decision No 1957/85/ECSC of 15 July 1985 suspending the application of the definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of certain iron or steel coila originating in Brazil, O.J., 17 July 1985, No L 184/6 ; Commission Decision No 
1532/87/ECSC of 2 June 1987 suspending the application of the definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel 
coils for ·re-rolling originating in Venezuela, O.J., 3 June 1987, NoL 143116; Commission Decision 931526/EEC of 6 October 1993 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain seamleBB pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, O.J., 9 October 1993, NoL 252/39). 
The same holde when trade arrangement& with the dumping country are still at the negotiation stage (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-
alloy steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and definitively collecting provisional anti-dumping duties, 
O.J., 15 May 1993, No L 120/34. See also : BOUDANT, J., L'anti-dumping communautaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 90). 
See however : Answer of the CommiBBion to written question No 50/68, O.J., 9 July 1968, No C 68/8, where the Commission stated 
that the fact that export& take place within the frameworkof a trade agreement, is not decisive for the application of European 
anti-dumping law. 
1491 If the dumping country doesnotrespect the trade agreement it concluded with the Community, anti-dumping relief will be 
considered to be in the Community interesta (CommiBBion Decision No 3113183/ECSC of 4 November 1983 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of concrete reinforcing bars originating in Spain, O.J., 5 November 1983, No L 303113). 
If the trade agreement provides that trade between the Community and the allegedly dumping country must take place within the 
scope of the respective laws and rules, which undoubtedly include the anti-dumping rules, and dumping actually o00urs, anti-
dumping relief will not be contrary to that trade agreement, nor to the Community interesta (C.J.E.C., case C-16190, 22 October 
1991, Eugen Nölle v Hau.ptzolkunt Bremen.-Freihafen., E. C.R., 1991, I, (5163), 5170-5171 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the 
Council). 
1492 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 impoaing definitive anti-dumping dutiea on importa of certain aeamleu pipea and 
tubes, of iron or non-alloy llleel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and definitively collecting provisional anti-dumping 
duties, O.J., 15 May 1993, NoL 120/34. 
1493 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping dutiea on importa of certain aeamleu pipea and 
tubes, of iron or non-altoy llleel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and definitively collecting provisional anti-dumping 
duties, O.J., 15 May 1993, NoL 120/34. 
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the Community interests do not call for anti-dumping rellef when the govemment of the 
dumping country adopts a series of measures to control the export of the dumped product 
(i.e., when it enters into an orderly marketing agreement)1494 ; 
anti-dumping rellef is found to be in the Community interests when the dumping threatens the 
renewal or the observance br. third countries of the trade agreements which they have 
concluded with the Community 495 ; 
the adverse effect of anti-dumping rellef against dumped imparts from East European 
countries on the Community exports under compensation agreements with those Bast 
European countries is found to be outweighed by the difficulties facing the Community 
production of the like product, in combination with the economie and social importance of 
such production 1496 ; 
the Community's asserted commitment toencourage trade or to increase economie links with 
Bast European countries in order to facilitate their transition to market economies does not 
exclude that anti-dumping measures should be taken1497 ; 
1494 CommiBSion Decision 831126/EEC of 30 March 1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of telavisi-
on image and sound recorders or reproducers originating in Japan, O.J., 31 March 1983, No L 86/23; Commission Decision 
911142/EEC of 15 March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of Atlantic salm.on originating in 
Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, NoL 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 1991, NoL 75/64). 
1495 Anti-dumping relief has been granted because the Commission feared that third countries which had concluded steel trade .. 
arrangement& with the Community would only respect and renew these arrangement&, ü they saw a reasonable chance of selling 
the quantities provided for at the price levels agreed (Commission Decision No 2158/88/ECSC of 20 July 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain iron or steel sections originating in Yugoslavia or Turkey, O.J., 21 July 1988, 
No L 190/5 ; CommiBSion Decision No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain flat-rolled product& of iron or non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 March 1989, No L 78/14). 
1496 CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain 
deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating 
the proceeding concerning import& of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
29/87 of 22 December 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain deep freezers originating in the Soviet 
Union, O.J., 8 January 1987, NoL 6/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import. of .tandardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively 
collecting the amounts secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1304/82 of 25 May 1982 establishing the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty on certain welded steel tubes 
originating in Romania, O.J., 29 May 1982, NoL 150/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1334/82 of 28 May 1982 accepting an 
undertaking offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning certain welded steel tubes originating in Romania, 
terminating that procedure and cancelling the proVisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 29 May 1982, No L 150n9. 
1497 Commiaaion Deciaion 94/293/EC of 13 Apri11994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
importa of ammonium nitratc originating in Uthuania and Russia and tenninating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as weU u 
tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of ammonium nitratc originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24; Commiasion Regulation (EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on importa 
ofurea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16. 
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there is no legal incompatibility between anti-dumping rellef and the generalized preferences 
system 1498 nor is there an interdependence between anti-dumping relief and general 
preferences1499 
a preferential treatment, under European anti-dumping law, of developing countries, i.e., no 
or less anti-dumping relief being applied, is rejected on the basis of a literal reading of Artiele 
15 GATI Anti-dumping Code whieh provides «that the stage of development of exporting 
countries should be taken into account when examining what measures are most appropriate in 
a partienlar case, but should not determine whether or not it is appropriate to take protective 
measures at all»1500 ; . · 
1~98 Council Regulation (EEC) No 460/89 of 20 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of Ul'ea 
originating in the United Statea of America or Venezuela and adjusting the definitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi Arabia laid 
down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 2• February .1989, No L 52/1. 
1499 lnpotcuaium permangan.ate from Czechoalovaiia, th.e German. Democratie Republic and the People'B Republic of China, it was 
underscored that the benefits of the generalized Community system of preferences could not be made conditional on there being no 
dumping (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2496/86 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China. O.J., 
5 August 1986, NoL 217/12). 
See also: 
urea from Venezuela, where the advantage confened by the generalized preferences system was taken into account and was 
considered to be preserved, though full anti-dumping relief (anti-dumping duty equal to the dumping margin) was granted 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 460/89 of 20 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of Ul'ea 
originating in the United Statea of America or Venezuela and adjusting the definitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi Arabia 
laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 24 February 1989, NoL 62/1); 
DRAMa from ,Japan., where the Commiuion considered that the suspension of customs duties had no impact on anti-dumping 
proceedings because the objectives pur•ued by both rules are entirely different (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 
January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as 
DRAMs (dynamic random acceu memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in 
conneetion with the anti-dUmping proceeding concerning import& of these product& and terminating the investigation in their 
respect, O.J., 26 January 1990, No L'20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, ~o L 22179; conigendum, O.J., 10 February 
1990, No L 381«)). 
1500 Council Decision 87166/EEC of 19 January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with importsof binder and haler 
twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, and terminating the investigations, O.J., 6 February 1987, NoL 34/66. 
See also : Co:mmiBBÎon Regulation (EEC) No 724/82 of 30 March 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0.76 kW but not more than 76 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoalovakia. the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and terminating the proceeding in 
respect of import& of said product& originating in Hungary, O.J., 31 March 1982, No L 86/9; Co:mmiuion Recommendation No 
2976/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, 
originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, No L 312110 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia. the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya. 
Saudi Arabia. the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia. O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3121/89 of 16 October 1989 modifying the anti-dumping measures applicable to import& of certain acrylic fibres originating in 
Mexico by introducing an anti-dumping duty on such import&, other than those from exporters to the Community whose 
undertakings are accepted, O.J., 19 October 1989, No L 301/1 (without explicit reference to Artiele 16 GA'IT Anti-dumping Code) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of • November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating 
in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with import& of Ul'ea originating in Czechoslovakia. the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoalavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 
7 November 1987, No L 31711. 
See however : urea from Malay•ia, where the provisional anti-dumping duty was not defmitively collected because Malaysia 
qualifi.ed for special differential treatment undeJ' Artiele 16 GATI' Anti-dumping Code (Commission Decision 891143/EEC of 21 
February 1989 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of urea 
originating in AUBtria. Hungary, Malaysia or Romania, confirming the undertakings accepted pursuant to Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the investigations, O.,J., 24 February 1989, NoL 52137). It is not sure whether this case really 
heraids a new and consistent interpretation of Artiele 16 GA'IT Anti-dumping Code. It seems that Artiele 16 GATI' Anti-dumping 
Code was raised u an easy explanation for the non-collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty uiB-à-viB Malaysia in order to 
treat it in the eame way as the other exporting countries subject to the same anti-dumping proceeding. lndeed, the provisional 
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a multilateral free-trading system, whieh implies that sales do not take place at dumped 
prices, is considered to be in the interests of all partleipants (ineluding the Community), 
though good relations with the dumping countries are in the Community interests as 
well1501. 
Clearly, the pursuance of an integrated trade poliey seldom results in holding anti-dumping 
proteetion to go against the Community interests. It bas, at the least, a ·neutral effect, but, 
usually, it increases trade proteetion since it results in anti-dumping relief being even more in the 
Community interests. 
Sueh an integrated trade poliey must be rejected from an economie point of view. First, the 
European anti-dumping authorities do not investigate whether the advantages of an integrated trade 
poliey outweigh the net cost of anti-dumping protection1502. Second, as an integrated trade 
poliey whieh anti-dumping relief fits into, must be protectionist by nature, it is economically 
wrong to give it a high value. Indeed, by giving a high value to an integrated protectionist trade 
poliey, the European anti-dumping authorities in faet argue that the net eost of the existing 
protectionist trade poliey is not yet high enough and must be inereased by the net oost of anti-
dumping protection. 
Also from a legal point of view, European anti-dumping case law must be eriticized in two 
respects. First, though Artiele 15 GATI Anti-dumping Code explieitly deals only with the kind 
of remedy whieh may be taken against dumping from developing countries, its scope should not 
be restrieted to the ehoice between different types of anti-dumping measures. As a broader 
anti-dumping duties against these other exporting countries were not collected either for reasons of either a very sm.all provisional 
anti-dumping duty or the absence of export& between the imposition of the provisional anti-dumping duty and the termination of 
the anti-dumping investigation. The first one of these two reasons certainly did not apply to Malaysia (a provisional anti-dumping 
duty of 31.5 '11 is not sm.all) and the second one neither probably did. This impre88ion is further strengthened by the fact that in 
the definitive phase of the anti-dumping proceeding, rellef was granted against Malaysia as it has against the other eçorting 
countries. A consistent appllcation of Artiele 15 GA'IT Anti-dumping Code, however, would nothave ~sulted in a definitive anti-
dumping rellef : if Malaysia neeels a special dift'erential treatment in terms of provisional anti-dumping rellef, it will also need it in 
terms of definitive anti-dumping rellef. However, in the provisional phase of the anti-dumping proceeding, such a special 
dift'erential treatment was rejected because it would have forced the Community to act in a discriminatory way against exporters 
engaged in the same dumping practices (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 
1988, NoL 235/5). Thus, Malaysia was given aso-called special dift'erential treatment in order to treat it identically as the other 
exporting countries. 
1501 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea 
originating in Czechoalovakia, the German Demoeratic Republlc, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with 
import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republlc, Kuwait, the USSR, · Trinidad and Tobago and 
Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 31711; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 
24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, 
the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnish and simHar brushes orginating in the People's Republlc of 
China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such import&, O.,J., 22 March 1989, No L 79124. 
1502 About the net coat of anti-dumping p~tection, see : aupro., p .... 
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interpretation seems to be allowed1503 , it might also offer the opportunity of not granting any 
anti-dumping rellef. As required by Artiele 15 GA TI Anti-dumping Code, no anti-dumping 
measure may be the most constructive remedy which is provided for by the GA TI Anti-dumping 
Code. Indeed, a decision not to enact an anti-dumping measure is an outcome provided for onder 
the GA IT Anti-dumping Code, since this Code does not require injurious dumping to result 
automatically in anti-dumping rellef (Article 9.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code). As that idea is 
rendered in the concept «Community interests» in European anti-dumping law1504, the decision 
not to grant anti-dumping rellef against dumping from developing countries does not go against 
Artiele 15 GATT Anti-dumping Code. The only limit to granting a preferentlal treatment to 
developing countries is the principle of non-discrimination (Article 9.2. GAIT Anti-dumping 
Code ; Artiele 9(5) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(5) basic ECSC Decision). That principle, 
however, does not exclude a preferentlal treatment of developing countries. lt only requires for 
such preferentlal treatment to be grounded on objective criteria justifying a differentlal treatment 
between developing and developed countries. 
Second, it is not clear why, in some anti-dumping cases, reference is made to the legal 
compatibility between quantitative restrictions and anti-dumping rellef and why it there is 
concluded that anti-dumping rellef is in the Community interests, whereas, in other anti-dumping 
cases, it is investigated whether quantitative restrictions are sufficient to remedy the injury the 
Community industry suffers from the dumping. It is also rather vague why the legal compatibility 
is invoked in respect of quantitative restrictions, but not in respect of trade agreements, though the 
latter usually also incorporate quantitative restrictions. Such case law seems to be characterized 
by arbitrariness. The fact that European anti-dumping case law bas not yet underscored the legal 
compatibility between anti-dumping relief and trade agreements gives, moreover, the impression 
that anti-dumping law is applied in order to induce the dumping countries .to conclude trade 
agreements with the Community. This impression is strengthened by the fact that, in one anti-
dumping case, no anti-dumping rellef was granted after the government of the dumping country 
entered into an orderly marketing agreement1505• This improper use of European anti-
dumping law cannot be reconciled with the purpose and the spirit of GA IT and European anti-
du-mping law. Nevertheless, onder a strict interpretation, the refusal of anti-dumping rellef 
because of the existence of a trade agreement with the dumping country cannot be said to be 
illegal insofar as it is demonstrateel that anti-dumping relief, in view of the trade agreement, does 
1503 The GATT Committee on Anti-dumping Practices provides an extensive reading of Artiele 15 GATT Anti-dumping Code 
since, according to that Committee, Artiele 15 allows the use of normal value standarde other than the domestice market price in 
the country of origin (JJ.l.S.D., Twenty-seventh Supplement, Geneva, GATT, 1981, 17), though that Artiele does not treat of normal 
value determination. 
1504 Supra, 608. 
1505 See: Commission Deeision 91/142/EEC of 15 Mareh 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importsof 
Atlantie salmon originating in Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, NoL 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 Mareh 1991, NoL 75/64). 
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not benefit the Community interests. Thus, through the concept «Community interest», the 
Community can pursue «procedural protectionism», i.e. , to use the loopholes in GA TI in order to 
restriet tradein an apparently legal way1506• 
2.6. ARGUMENTS FOR THE 
COMMUNITY INDUSTRY 
CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A 
In. several anti-dumping cases, it is admitted that, without anti-dumping relief, the continued 
existence of the Community industry would be endangered. In some of these cases it is not 
explained why the continued existence of the Community industry is in the Community 
interests1507• Usually, however, a forther explanation is given. Sometimes, that explanation 
1506 Supra, 80-84. 
1507 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1631/83 of 16 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and Japan, accepting a price underta-
king from one Japanese exporter and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of certain glass textile fibres (mats), 
originating in Czechoslovakia and the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 18 June 1983, NoL 160/18; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2024/83 of 18 .July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United 
States of America, O.J., 22 .July 1983, No L 199/4; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3640/83 of 14 December 1983 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 16 December 1983, NoL 364/16; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2823/86 of 7 October 1986 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 10 October 1986, No L 268/11 ;Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 264/86 of 4 February 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain clogs originating in 
Sweden and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 February 1986, No L 32/1; Commission Decision 
86121/EEC of 4 February 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping investigation coneerDing import& 
of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 7 February 1986, No L 32128 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 23 January 1989 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Buigaria or the Boviet Union, O.J., 27 
January 1989, No L 2311 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1937190 of 4 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of pure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China, and accepting an undertaking offered 
by the exporter, O.J., 7 .July 1990, NoL 174127; Commission Decision 90/378/EEC of 13 July 1990 accepting an undertaking given 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping review coneerDing import& of oxalic acid originating in Brazil and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 17 .July 1990, No L 184/16 ; CommiBBion Decision 91/392/EEC) of 21 June 1991 accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of certain aabestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, NoL 209/37. 
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is very brief, namely in cases where the economie and/or social importance1508, the 
strategic1509 or technological importance1510 of the Community industry is referred to. In 
lSOS Council Regulation (EEC) No 550/83 of 8 March 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importe of certain eodium 
carbonate originating in the United Statea of America, 0 . .1.., 10 March 1983, No L 64123; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1613/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of 
catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No 
L 159/43 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 512/84 of 27 Februaey 1984 imposing a proviàional anti-dumping duty on importe of 
vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada, 0 . .1.., 29 February 1984, No L 5811.7 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1826/84 of 28 
June 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importe of vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 June 
1984, No L 17onO ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain ball bearings originating in Japan and Singapore, 0 . .1.., 21 July 1984, NoL 19311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86 of 
24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain ball hearings and tapered roller bearings originating 
in Japan, 0 . .1.., 27 June ·.1985, No L 167/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-
dUm.ping duty on importsof certain electronic scales originating in Japan, 0 . .1.., 12 April1986, NoL 97/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2495/86 of '1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of potassium permanganate originating 
in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, No L 217/12; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800181 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
deep freezers originating' in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep 
freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the 
proceeding concerniilg importe of ce:rtaiil deep ~zere, 0 . .1.., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; Council Decision 861468/EEC of 22 
September 1986 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of certain acrylic 
fibres originating in lsrael, Mexico, Romania and Turkey and terminating the investigation, 0 . .1.., 24 September 1986, No 
L 272129 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
deep freezers originating in the Boviet Union, 0 . .1.., 8 January 1987, NoL 6/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361/87 of 18 
May 1987 imposing a p~visional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-calcium/calcium silicide originating in B~azil, 0 . .1.., 
19 May 1987, NoL 129/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on imports of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings offered by ltalmagnesio BA of Brazil and from 
Promsyrio-Import of the USSR, 0 . .1.., 8 August 1987, No L 219124 ; ColDIDiSsion Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mercury originating in the Union of BOviet Socialist Republics, 0 . .1.., 14 
August 1987, No L 227/8 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of tungsten ores and concentratee originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing 
import& originating in HongKong, 0 . .1.., 30 March 1990, NoL 83123. 
1509 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1613/83 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the 
Boviet Union, 0 . .1.., 17 June 1983, No L 159/43 ; Council Regulation: (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 191/80 imposing a deûnitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statee of America and 
the Boviet Union, 0 . .1.., 26 October 1983, No L 294/3; Commission Decision 83/522/EEC of 24 October 1983 accepting the 
undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of lithium hydroxide originating in the 
People's Republic of China and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 26 October 1983, NoL 294129; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain ball hearings originating in Japan and 
Singapore, 0 . .1.., 21 July 1984, No L 193/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain ball hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, 0~.1.., 27 June 1985, No 
L 167/3 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361/87 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-
silico-calcium/calcium silicide originating in Brazil, 0 . .1.., 19 May 1987, No L 129/5 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 
August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and accepting undertaki.ngs 
offered by ltalmagnesio BA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-Import of the USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, No L 219/24; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports ofmercury originating in 
the Boviet Union and defmitively colleeting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports, 0 . .1.., 10 December 1987, 
No L 346127 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing imports 
originating in Ho~ Kong, 0 . .1.., 30 March 1990, NoL 83123; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing 
a provisional anti~umping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-
chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, 0 . .1.., 2 April 1993, NoL 80/8. 8ee also: Answer of the Commission to 
written question No• 188-191183, 0 . .1.., 5 October 1983, No C 266120. 
151° Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
electronic scales originating in Japan, 0 . .1.., 12 April1986, NoL 97/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April1993 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" mic:rodisk.s) originating in Japan, Taiwan and 
the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1..-, 21 April 1993, No L 9515 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisb) originating in HongKong and the Republic 
of Korea, 0 . .1.., 11 March 1994, No L 68/5. 
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other cases, the explanation is more elaborate and tries to demonstrate the high technological 
importance of the Community industry1511 , the high degree of innovation and competitiveness 
as a result of considerable investment1512, the multiple uses which may be made of the like 
1511 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 26Stl88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of 
video cassette recordere originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes and 
video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, O.J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No · 501/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain video cassette recorders 
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, No 
L 57/55 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
compactdisc playere originating in Japan and South Korea, 0 . .1., 18 July 1989, NoL 205/5 (corrigendum, ä.T., 2 September 1989, 
NoL 257/27); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of small screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 28 October 1989, NoL 314/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits Jmown as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings ofTered by certain 
exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of these products and terminating the investigation 
in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22!19; corrigendum, 0 . .1., 10 
February 1990, No L 38/.U) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 665190 of 16 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of ferroboron alloy originating in Japan, O.J., 20 March 1990, No L 7316; Commisaion Decision 90/138/EEC of 16 
March 1990 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain diesel 
engines originating in Finland and Sweden, and terminating the investigation, 0 . .1., 22 March 1990, No L 76/28; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 720190 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in 
the People's Republic of China, 0 • .1., 27 March 1990, No L 8019; Com.mission Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of hall hearings with a graatest e:xternal diameter not exceeding SO mm 
originating in Thailand, 0 . .1., 16 June 1990, No L 152124 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits Jmown as DRAMs (dynamic random accesa 
memories) originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 25 J'uly 1990, No L 193/1; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2685190 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a defi.nitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, 0 . .1., 20 September 1990, No L 256/1 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, 0 . .1., 13 
November 1990, No L 313/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36) ; Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 
January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong · · 
Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No L 14/31; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 
1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits Jmown as EPROMs (erasable 
programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2805/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain thermal paper 
originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 September 1991, No L 270/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in 
So:uth Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8; Commission Decision No 891192/ECSC of SO March 1992 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain semi-tinisbed product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, 0 . .1., 9 April1992, 
No L 95/26 ; Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-clwilping duty on import& 
of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random accesa memories) originating in the Republic of 
Korea, 0 . .1., 17 September 1992, No L 272113 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 611193 of 15 March 1993 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain electronic microcircuits known u DRAMa originating in the Republic of 
Korea and exported by companies not exempted from this duty, and collecting defi.nitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 
18 March 1993, No L 6611 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 29 April 1993, No L 104/4 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties on import& of telavision camera systems originating in 
Japan, O.J., SO October 1993, No L 27111. 
1512 Commiuion Decision 91/512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dum-
ping measures concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the 
People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of artificial corundum 
originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 275/27 ; Commisaion 
Regulation (EEC) No 813192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers 
of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 34/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of isobutanol originating in the Russian 
Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/12. 
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product1513, the importance of Community production of the like product because of 
environmental reasons1514, the strategie importance of Community production because of the 
applications and uses of the like product1515, the strategie importance in view of the national 
stockpiling programme set up by some Memher State1516, the widespread repercussions the 
shutdown of the Community industry would have upstream and downstream of the production 
process1517, the economie, social, technological and/or strategie importance of the industry in 
1513 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& ofweldeel 
tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, 0 . .1., 13 October 1989, No L 294/10 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 385190 of 12 
February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potaniurn permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and 
defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on thoae import&, O.J., 16 February 1990, No L 4211; 
Commiuion Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of methenamine 
(bexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the 
proceeding concerning import& of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, No L 104/14 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of potaniurn permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, No L 145/9 ; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefin bags 
originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 20 September 1990, No 
L 256/38); Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3617190 of 11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain weldeel tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings offered in 
conneetion with such import&, O.J., 15 Dece~ber 1990; NoL 351117. 
1514 Commiuion Decision ~96/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and accepting undertakings ofTered in conneetion 
with the proceeding concerning imports of methenamine. (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Romania, O.J., M April 1990, No L 104114. See also : Commission Decision 91/512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of artificial corundum originating 
in the Boviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning importsof artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, 0 . .1., 
2 October 1991, No L 275127, where the continued existence of the Community industry was motivated by its exemplary 
investment in anti-pollution installations. 
1515 Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 
1991, No L 6511 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1808192 of 30 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of ferro-silicon originating in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 3 July 1992, No L 18318 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 
1994 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 
July 1994, No L 186/11. 
1516 Council Replation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 irnpoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-chrome with a 
carbon content by weigbt of maximum 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, Rusaia arid Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, No 
L 246/11 
1517 Conuniuion Replation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on irnporta of iaobutanol 
originating in the Ruuian Fedention, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/12; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 
imposing proviiÏonal antidumping duties on irnporta of television camen systema originatiog in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No L 27111; 
Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour te1evision receiven 
originating in Malayaia, the People's Repoblie of China, the Repoblie of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50. 
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the Community processing the like product1518, the importance of the suppliers of the 
Community industry1519 or the fact that the Community industry is a key part of a more 
1518 Commiesion Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Bulga"' 
ria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, No 
L 280/68 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,76 kW but not more than 76 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and definitively collecting the 
amounts securedas provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/87 of 6 August 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0, 76 
kW but not more tha:D. 76 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 7 August 1987, No L 21812; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of welded tubes originating in Yugoslavia and 
Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No L 294110 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela 
and accepting undertakings off'ered in conneetion with such imports, O.J., 16 December 1990, No L 361117; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 677/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of eleetronic microcircuits 
known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 66/1 ; 
Commission Deciaion 91/612/EEC of 26 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping 
meuures concerning import& of arti.ficial corundum origi:nating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the 
People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the uti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of artificial corundum 
originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 276/27; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1031192 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potusium chloride (potuh) 
originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 28 April 1992, No L 110/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3296/92 of 12 
November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with 
regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/16; Commission Decision 931479/EEC of 30 July 
1993 accepting undertakings · off'ered in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping meuures applicable to certain import& of 
monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, No 
L 226/36. 
1519 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of welded 
tubes originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, NoL 294/10; Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 
1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of photo albums originating 
in South Korea and Hong Kong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 May 1990, No L 138/48 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain welded tubes of iron or non-
alloy steel, originating in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings oft'ered in conneetion with such import&, O.J., 16 
December 1990, No L 361/17; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying .the anti-dumping duties 
following the review of the anti-dumping meuures applicable to import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, 
Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating 
the said review in respect of import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statee of America, O.J., 22 
October 1992, No L 30611 (conigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68) ; Commi&Sion Regulation (EEC) No 3296192 of 12 
November 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain Beamless pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, 
originating in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia· and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with 
regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O.J., 14 November 1992, No L 328/16. 
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general industry1520• The consideration that the Community would be entirely dependent on 
outside sources1521 or the threat to the securities 1522 or the stability1523 of supplies of . 
152° C.J.E.C., case 156187, 1.& March 1990, GeBtetner Holdings plc v CouncU an.d Commission., E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 848; 
C.J.E.C., caae C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v CouncU, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1885), 1406; C.J.E.C., caae C-175/87, 10 March 
1992, Mat•u.hito Electric lndu.struu Co. Ltd an.d Mat•ushito Electric Tra.ding Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1488; 
C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Kon.ishirolcu Photo lndu..try Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1498), 1532; C.J.E.C., caae 
C-177187, 10 March 1992, Sa.n.yo Electric Co. Ltd. v CouncU, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1578; C.J.E.C., caae C-179/87, 10 March 1992, 
Sharp Corporation v CouncU, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1685; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/5 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54112 ; CoiDD1ÏBsion Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, 
NoL 180/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
serlal impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 8 July 1988, No L 17711 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating 
in Japan, O.J., U November 1988, NoL 817133; Council Regulation (EEC) No 34189 of 5 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of serial impact fully formed (SIFF) character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No 
L 5/23 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1084191 of 28 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of video 
tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April1991, NoL 106/15; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1115191 of 29 April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures 
concerning import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, O.J., 8 May 1991, No L 11111; Commiuion Decision 91/240/EEC of 29 
April 1991 accepting undertakings ofTered by certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning 
import& of ferro-silicon originating in Bruil and terminating the investigation as regarde those exporters, O.J., 8 May 1991, No 
L 111147; CommiBBion Decision No 891192/ECSC of SO March 1992 imposing a provieional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
semi-finished products of alloy steel, originatmg in Turkey and Brazil, 0 . .1., 9 April 1992, No L 95/26 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, 
No L 272/13 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993198 of 26 April 1998 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
electronic weighing scales originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 29 April 1993, No L 104/4 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2172198 of SO 
July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on import& of ethanolamine originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 
4 August 1998, No L 195/5 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of colour television receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, 0 . .1., 1 October 1994, NoL 255/50. 
1521 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3541/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
natural magnesite, caustic-burned, originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., SO December ·1982, No L 871121; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 8542/82 of 22 December 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of natural 
magnesite, dead-burned (sintered), originating in the People's Republic of China and in North Korea, O.J., SO December 1982, No 
L 371125 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 551/88 of 8 March 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on kraftliner paper and 
board originating in the United Statea of America and accepting undertakings give~ in conneetion with the review of the anti-
dumping proceeding on kraftliner paper and board originating in Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the BOviet Union and 
Sweden, O.J., 10 March 1988, NoL 64125; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 985/88 of 26 April1983 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China and the German Demoeratic Republic, 
O.J., 27 April 1988, NoL 110/11; CommiBBion Decision 88/306/EEC of 16 June 1988 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of low carbon ferro-chromium origi.nating in South Africa, Sweden, Turkey 
and. Zimbabwe, and terminating that proceeding, O.J., 21 June 1983, No L 161115 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2370/88 of 19 
August 1988 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China 
and in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 20 August 1988, No L 228128 ; CommiBBion Decision 84/129/EEC of 6 March 198<& 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of caustic-burned natural magnesite originating in the People's 
Republic of China, 0 . .1., 8 March 1984, No L 66/82 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 997185 of 18 April 1985 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April 1985, No L 107/8; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in 
Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 168/1; Commission Decision 86/86/EEC of 26 February 1986 accepting undertakings entered into 
in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain categorie& of glass originating in Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No 
L 51118 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 August 1986, No L 289/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 28 
February 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., U 
February 1987, NoL 54/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 707189 of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China or the Boviet Union, O.J., 21 March 1989, No L 78110 ; 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 81 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of barium chloride 
originating in the People's Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, NoL 227/24; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 18 September 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China and the Boviet Union and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty 
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the like product after the Community industry would have disappeared, are also a reason for 
maintaining the Community industry. 
imposed on such imports, O.J., 20 September 1989, NoL 27111; Commi88Ïon Deciaion 89167SIEEC of 30 October 1989 tenninating 
the investigation concerning import& of dicumyl peroxide originating in Taiwan and accepting an undertaking offered in the 
context ofthe review concerning import& of dicumyl peroxide originating in Japan and terminating the proceeding, O.J., 31 October 
1989, No L 317/49; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, 
accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of these 
product& and terminating the investigation intheir respect, O.J., 26 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, 
No L 22n9; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 720190 of 22 March 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 27 March 
1990, No L 80/9 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding concerning import& 
originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123 ; Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of methenamine (hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia 
and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the proceeding concerning import& of methenamine 
(hexamethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 April 1990, No L 104114 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan and collecting defmitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 26 July 1990, No L 19311; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 November 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of aspartame originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, O.J., 29 November 
1990, No L 330116; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, 
O.J., 12 March 1991, No L 65/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115/91 of 29 April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in 
conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, 
No L 11111 ; Commission Decision 911240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion 
with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and terminating the investigati-
on as regarde those eçorters, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 111147; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % Oow carbon ferro-
chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April1993, NoL 80/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 
of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in 
Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 96/6 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 
September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/16 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2681193 of 20 September 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on import& of 
ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 September 1993, No L 23712; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 3369/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on imports of ferro-silicon originating 
in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 December 1993, NoL 302/1; Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" 
microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No L 68/6 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1648194 of 6 July 1994 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of furazolidone originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 8 July 1994, No L 174/4; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186111. 
1522 For example, in hematite pig iron from Brazil, Poland, Russia an.d U1craine, the Commission found that existing worldwide 
production capacity for the product involved was rapidly diminishing as a reauit of environmental and economie policy changes in 
the exporting countries. Therefore, the Community interesta were found to call for the maintaining of the Community indUBtry 
(Commission Decision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the 
Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 16 January 1994, No L 1215). 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2051190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefin 
bags originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, NoL 187136 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No 
L 266/38); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % Oow carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8. 
1523 Commiaaion Rcgulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imparts of iaobutaool 
originating in tbc Ruuian Fedcration, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/12; CouacU Rcgulation (EC) No 2819/94 of 17 November 1994 impoaing a 
defioitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of potuaium pennanganate orginating in tbc People'• Rcpublic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No 
L 298/32. 
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The many reasons why the continued existence of the Community industry is in the Community 
interests, clearly show that the importance of each industry for the Community may always be 
demonstrated. 
Por example, the Community industry of photo albums bas been found to be of crucial im.portance for the Community 
merely because its disappearance would affect the upstream industry, i.e., the suppliers of paper, board, PVC foil etc. 
would suffer a consequent decline in demand 1524• However, no explanation was offered why it was in the 
Community interests to proteet these suppliers against a decline in demand. 
Similarly, it is possible to show that not only serlal-impact dot-matrix (SIDM) printers1525 and serlal-impact fully 
_ formeel character (SIFF) printers1S26, but also electronic typewriters1527 are ·a key part of office equipment 
industry: 
the Council, in electronic typewriters from Japan1528, was not convineed by the Japanese exporters' 
argument cthat the future of the overall business equipment and office automation industry depends not so much 
on the viability of the electtonic typewriter industry but rather on the viability of the office computer industry». 
It held that it is not for the Community authorities to prejudice the outcome of the argued evolution from 
electronic typewriter to computer as key element of business equipment and office automation, by sacrificing the 
Community electtonic typewriter ~roducers ; 
in SIFF printers from Japan15 9 the Commission, however, recognized that other print technologies had 
reduced the importance of SIFF printers in the market. Nevertheless, on the basis of the Community industry's 
forecasts, it considered itself qualified to predict that SIFF printers were, at least in the near future, to occupy a 
significant share of the total printer market. Consequently, it was able to draw the same conclusion in respect of 
SIFF printers as in respect of SIDM printers1S30 that : 
«(in view of the fact) that printers are the computer's main output device and the only device capable 
of providing the end user with a hard copy of the computer input and output ( ... ) printer technology 
bas to be developed in parallel with computer technology in terms of configuration, sophistication and 
1524 Commission Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning import& of photo albums originating in South Korea and Hong Kong, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 
May 1990, NoL 1381-'8. 
1525 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3661/88 of 23 
November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of sarial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 
24 November 1988,- No L 317/33. · 
1526 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 6 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of serial 
impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, NoL 177/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 34/89 of 
6 January 1989 i.m.posing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serlal impact fully formed (SIFF) character printers 
originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No L 6123. 
1527 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, 
O.J., 22 December 1984, NoL 336/43; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1986, No L 16311. 
1528 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& ~f electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1986, No L 16311. 
1529 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 6 July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal 
impact fully formeel character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1 ; Council RegUlation (EEC) No 34/89 of 
6 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal impact fully formed (SIFF) character printen 
originating in J'apan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No L 6123. 
153° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3661/88 of 23 
November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 
M November 1988, NoL 317/33. 
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power. Since printers and computers are closely connected, the abandoning of, or substantial cuts in, 
the production of printers by the Community industry would also have serious negative effcts on the 
electrooie data-processing industry in the Community .» 
Furthermore, the Commission considered that : 
csince the numerous printer technologies are fast developing, printer manufacturers have to he in a 
healthy economie position in order to participate in this development. It is indeed evident that only 
companies which have sufficient resources can make the market for the latest generation of printers, 
i.e. those possessing non-impact technologies such as laser, ion deposition, thermal or ink-jet 
techniques.» 
Both examples show that only a little good willis required for demonstraling the vital character of 
any industry. The argument that the continued existence of an industry is in the Community 
interests is based on ~ political evaluation of the advantages of preserving a national industry from 
the costs of anti-dumping protection. Indeed, mere legal and/or economie criteria do not indicate 
whether or not an industry is essential for the welfare of the Community. From a legal point of 
view, European anti-~umping case law can only be criticized for its sametimes brief statements of 
reasons. From an economie point of view, anti-dumping proteetion is not the most adequate 
instrument to preserve the continued existence of a Community industry. Sometimes, any 
govemment intervention will be superfluous. For example, if the European anti-dumping 
authorities can acknowledge that the production capacity for the dumped product in the dumping 
countries is rapidly diminishing, but that there will be long-run supply requirements in the 
Community1531 , the Community industry should also have this information. In . view of that 
information, they should know that the dumping will only be temporarily and, therefore, they 
should stay in the market. Moreover, in cases where anti-dumping relief is necessary for 
maintaining the Community industry, the same objective may be realized by a production subsidy 
to the Community industry. As such a production subsidy does not affect the Community 
eonsumers' ·decision, it cannot cause a loss in consumer surplus and, consequently, it avoids the 
net cost. of anti-dumping protection1532•. As to the European anti-dumping authorities, such 
subsidies, however, are a reason for granting anti-dumping relief when, despite such subsidies, the 
dumping causes in jury to the Community industry. The European anti-dumping authorities 
consider such subsidies as showing the importance of the Community industry1533• 
1531 Cornmiuion Dccision No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa into the Community of 
hcmatite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukrainc, O.J., 15 January 1994, NoL 1215. 
1532 E'lHIER, W., Modern Int.ernational Economie•, New York, Norton, 1983,202-203. 
1533 Cornmiuion Rcgulation (EEC) No 2686/92 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisionalanti-dumping duty on importa of certain typelof 
clectronic microcircuita known •• DRAMa (dynamic random acccu memories) originating in tbc Rcpublic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No 
L 272/13. 
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2.7. EMPLOYMENT 
In several anti-dumping cases, the negative effects of the dumping and, conversely, the positive 
effects of anti-dumping rellef on employment are underscored. Usually, only the positive effect of 
~ti-dumning_relief Oll.-eillpl.of.m.enL.wit:b.i.n._the Communi.t)! indus!!ï is taken into _ account1534• 
I --Sometimes, attention is paid to its effect on employment in the industries which supply the 
1534 C.J.E.C., case 156/87, 14 March 1990, Gestetner Holdings plc v Council and Commission, E.C.R., 1990, I, (781), 843; 
C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Riooh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1405; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 
1992, MatsushittJ Electric lndustrial Co. Ltd and MatsushittJ Electric TrCJding Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1488; 
C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Kon.ishiroleu Photo lndustry Co. Ltd v CouncU, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1532; C.J.E.C., case 
C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Stm.yo Electric Co. Ltd. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1573; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, 
ShtJrp CorportJtion. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1685; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing 
a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain imports of video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, 
0 . .1., 31 August 1988, NoL 240/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, 0 . .1., 4 
August 1989, No L 227124; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232189 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of amall ac:reen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 385190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium. 
permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on th~se 
import&, O.J., 16 February 1990, NoL 4211; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 547190 of 2 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of 
0 
certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand, and accepting undertak.ings in conneetion with import& of certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in these 
countries, O.J., 3 March 1990, No L 56123 ; Commission Decision 90/138/EEC of 16 March 1990 accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain diesel engines originating in Finland and Sweden, and 
terminating the investigation, O.J., 22 March 1990, No L 76128; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in the USSR, 0 . .1., 8 June 1990, No 
L 14519 ; Commi•ion Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ball 
hearings with a greatest enemal diameter not exceeding SO mm originating in Thailand, 0 . .1., 16 June 1990, No L 152124; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3421190 of 26 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of aspartame 
originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, 0 . .1., 29 November 1990, NoL SS0/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of amall-screen colour television receivers 
originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, NoL 14/31; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
738192 of 23 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof ootton yarn originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 
27° March 1992, No L 8211; Commission Decision No 2297/92/ECSC of 31 July 1992 amending Decision No 2131/88/ECSC, 
accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic 
of Slovenia and the Yugoslav republics of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with 
regard to the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, O.J., 6 August 1992, No L 221136 ; CommiHion 
Regulation (EEC) No 560193 of 5 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of bicycles originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 March 1993, No L 58/12; Commission Decision 931479/EEC of SO July 1993 accepting 
undertakings offered in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures applicable to certain importa of monosodium 
glutamate originating in lndone&ia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, No L 225135 ; 
Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with. regard to 
these countries ; u well as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of ammonium nitrate origin~ting in 
Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129124; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
3119194 of 19 Deoamber 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-&ilico-manganese originating in Rusaia, 
Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No L 330/15. 
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Community industry or process the Community industry's like product1535• Exceptionally, the 
decline in employment caused by anti-dumping relief in the sector distributing the dumped product 
on the Community market, is also taken into account1536• In none of the anti-dumping cases, 
an attempt is made to calculate the net effect of anti-dumping proteetion on total 
employment1537• Because of anti-dumping relief, the fall in employment in other sectors of 
the Community may, indeed, exceed the growth of employment in the Community industry. In 
such case, anti-dumping relief is apparently not in the Community interests. 
1535 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1•U8/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serial-
impact dot-matrix printera originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 May 1988, No L 130/12 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 6 
July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed character printers originating in 
Japan, 0 . .1., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3661/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 2-' November 1988, NoL 317/33; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 34/89 of 6 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed 
(SIFF) character printers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 7 January 1989, NoL 6123; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 
July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South 
Korea, 0 . .1., 18 July 1989, NoL 206/6 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 2 September 1989, No L 267/27); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, 0 . .1., 13 November 1990, No L 31316 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36) ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1391/91 of 27 May 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of of aspartame 
originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, 0 . .1., 29 May 1991, NoL 13411; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2806191 
of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain thermal paper 
originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, NoL 270/16; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017192 of 19 October 1992 modifying 
the anti-dumping · dutiee following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to import& of synthetic polyester fibres 
originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United 
Statea of America, 0 . .1., 22 October 1992, NoL 306/1 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 6 February 1993, NoL 30/68); Commission Decision No 
1761194/ECSC of 16 July 1994 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of hematite pig-iron, 
originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, 0 . .1., 16 July 1994, NoL 182/37. See also: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of video tapes in cassettes originating in the 
People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 26 April 1991, No L 106115, where raferenee was made to the ccrelated industrie&~~ without any_. 
further e:xplanation. 
See, however: arlificuu oorundum from the People's Republic ofChi1UJ an.d Czechoslovakia, where the argument that anti-dumping 
proteetion would cause problems in the processing indUBtry which employs a greater number of workers than the artificial 
corundum manufacturing industry, was, according to the Commission, outweighed by the dagree of i)\jury suffered by the arlificial 
corundum manufacturing industry (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2690/84 of 21 September 1984 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of artificial corundum originating in the People's Republic of China and Czechoslovakia and terminating 
the proceeding in respect of import& of artificial corundlJDl originating in· Spain .and Yugoslavia, 0 . .1., 26 September 1984, No 
L 26619). 
1536 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17. May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-
impact dot;;.matrix printera originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 6 
July 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal impact fully formed character printers orlginating in 
Japan, 0 . .1., 8 July 1988, No L 177/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 24 November 1988, No L 317/33 ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 34/89 of 6 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact fully formed 
(SIFF) character printers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 7 January 1989, No L 6/23; Commission Regulation (EC) No 237619<4 of 27 
September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour telavision receivers orlginating in Malaysia, the 
People's ~public of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 0 . .1., 1 October 1994, No L 266160. 
1537 8ee: plain. paper plwtocopiera from Japtm., where the lack of evidence which might suggest that the overall effect on 
employment in the PPC business in the Community eaueed by the imposition of anti-dumping measures would be anything but 
limited, was sufficient to disprove . the argument that total employment drops in pursuance of anti-dumping rellef (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers 
originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 August 1986, No L 239/6 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 636/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports ofplain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 24 February 1987, NoL 64/12). 
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However, as, within the framework of ·the Community's general economie poliey, not all jobs 
may be given the same value, a sharp decline in the number of low-valued jobs may be 
outweighed by a small inerease in the number of high-valued jobs. lndeed, in some anti-dumping 
cases, employment in the distribution sector is valued lower than employment in the 
manufaeturing sector because the distribution sectors depends to a greater extent on 
imports1538• In other anti-dumping cases, anti-dumping rellef is granted because otherwise 
employment would have deteriorated in regions with high unemployment rates1539• The 
valuation of jobs is purely political. The only valid economie eritieism concerns the ehoice of the 
instrument to inerease overall employment or to obtain import-independent and regionat 
employment. In view of its net cost, anti-dumping rellef is not the most appropriate metbod to 
preserve or to inerease employment1540• 
1538 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2640/86 of 21 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof plain 
paper photocopien originating in Japan, O • .J., 26 August 1986, No L 239/6 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 of 23 February 
1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, 
No L 64112 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O . .J., 26 May 1988, No L 130112 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 
of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of video cassettes and video tape reels originating in the 
Republic of Korea and HongKong, O . .J., 24 December 1988, NoL 356/47. 
1539 Co1lncil Regulation (EEC) No 1198/88 of 26 April 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of roller chains 
for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China and providing for the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping 
duty on the said import&, O . .J., 3 May 1988, No L 116/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1631/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively 
collecting the provieional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O . .J., 3 June 1988, No L 138/1 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 17"/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of paracetamol originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O • .J., 22 June 1988, No L 166129 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 726/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushee orginating in the People's Republic of China an.d 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such import&, O • .J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2402/89 of 31 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating 
in the People's Republic of China or the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 4 August 1989, No L 227/24 ; CommiBBion Regulation 
(EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of welded tubes originating in 
Yugoslavia an.d Romania, O . .J., 13 October 1989, No L 294110 ; CommiBBion Decision 90/241/EEC of 22 May 1990 accepting 
undertakings given in· conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of photo albums originating in South Korea 
and HongKong, and terminating the investigation, O • .J., 31 May 1990, NoL 138/48; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2064191 of 
11 July 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O . .J., 13 July 1991, No L 187/23; CommiBBion Decision No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain semi-finished product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O . .J., 9 April 1992, No 
L 96/26; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3296192 of 12 November 1992 impoeing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain seamleBB pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Czechoelovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Republic of 
Croatia and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Slovenia, O . .J., 14 November 1992, No 
L 328/16 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provieional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
furfuraldehyde originating in the People'e Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186111. 
1540 IITHIER, W., Modern.In.tern.t:Jtional Econ.omics, New York, Norton, 1983, 207. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
The concept cCommunity interests» is intended to meet the idea of GA TI anti-dumping law that 
anti-dumping rellef should be permissive. As it comprises· not only the Community industry's 
interests, but also the interests of the consumers and processing industries, as well as employment 
in the Community and the various Community pollcies, it might frequently prevent anti-dumping 
rellef in view of the netcostof anti-dumping protection. 
However, because of the European anti-dumping authorities' assessment of its components, the 
concept cCommunity interests» seldom prevents anti-dumping rellef from being granted. First, in 
many cases, tl}e Community interests are equated to the Community industry's interests. Since 
~------==--~~~ _"---.."~~~~--"'-'=~·~- ... 
the dumping causes in jury to the Community industry, the Community interests must then ca11 for 
anti-dumping rellef. · Second, the interests of consumers and processing industries, which are 
----~·---- ·---·-·- • -=--·-- _.___ - --·- ---_,,, __ .• , •. ,.' ' -
hanned by .. anti~dumping._ rellef,_ are disregarded (()r ll)any, though irrelevant reasons.--=Th=-_-.-ir-d.--, lh-e 
•-- -' :_' ,_,, o;:_,,-.;,-~·.-,,>C.'.I'1" 0 •c~·7~'!~0', '••·' ~I' •."·~~-,_·,-••">::,-::_!.,_i-~.:.J-~";;IJ.ifr'O• 
aim _!Q_~!!l.~n.tain -competition -on- -the- Commllf1Ïty market is understood as the need to rnaintaio 
~----· ... , .. ,_ ---------~-----------·-----····-····------ ..... _____________ ~~
competition between Community producers, with or without competition from for~j~~oducers; 
~d-the expected monopolization by the dumping producers -is proved on the basi_$~Qf_~in;;fflc~ 
--- _---· ----~---
evidence, such as the (uiltebuttable) assumption that du~pJilgj~ __ predatory. Fourth, the question 
about the welfare effects-of-~div:~J~on __ is only second~, since it only arises in the hypothesis 
{ ~ 
that anti-dumping rellef is granted. Trade diversion never increases Community welfare. Under 
./'---. 
certain circumstances, it may decrease the netcostof anti-dumping protection, but European anti-
dumping case law never investigates whether it actually does. ~fth, the pu...rslliLoLan integrated_, 
!rctcle policy does not prevent the imposition of anti-dumping relief, if that trade policy is 
. -
protectionist by nature ; on the contrary, it enhances the granting of anti-dumping relief. Sixth, 
the continued existence of the Community industry is a clineher in favour of RT.Q.tec.tionism, which 
it is as easy to p-rove--as--to-di-sprove .. -Seventh,- only employlni~nt within the Community industry is 
taken in_to account _fQr, . whereas overaiCeinploymenfshoulcfbe- oollsldered. 
Moreover, when anti-du~l!_i!!~llef_js ~!!Q!11L~ly justified, it is usually__ not the tirst-best 
- --- ----··------------------------~------------~-
remedy. First, the «infant industry»-argument is a valid cause for granting temporary anti-
dliïiïPing relief. However, anti-dumping relief is seldom temporary and does not remedy the 
market imperfections which prevent a country from realizing its comparative advantages. On the 
contrary, it would permanently be neerled as it shelters the Community industry from foreign 
competition, which is the very incentive for the Community industry to invest in more efficient 
production methods. Second, anti-dumping relief may also guarantee competition and may 
increase overall employment, but, contrary to tirst-best remedies, always causes a net cost to the 
Community. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
=====--=--=- -----
CHAPTER VII 
ANTI-DUMPING RELlEF 
-------------=-,- -~~1-
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In European anti-dumping law four types of anti-dumping rellef are being distinguished : 
provisional measures, which take the form of a provisional anti-dumping duty (Article 7 basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 11 basic ECSC Decision), definitive anti-dumping duties (Article 9 basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 12 basic ECSC Decision), undertakings>(Article 8 basic EC Regulation ; 
A~cle 10 basic ~SC Decision). :md s~s~. (Article 22(iii). basic. EC Re~ulati~n ; 
Artiele 17(2) baste ECSC Dectston)154 . The two types of anti.:.dumptng duties, z.e., 
provisional and defmitive anti-dumping duties, are identical but for the following, especially 
formal differences : 
provisional duties may be imposed where a preliminary investigation shows that there is 
sufficient evidence of injurious dumping and where the Community interests call for 
intervention to prevent injury from being caused durlog the anti-dumping proceeding (Article 
7(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 11(1) basic ECSC Decision) ; definitive anti-dumping 
duties may only be imposed, if the facts as .finally established show that the Community 
interests call for intervention against injurious dumping ( Artiele 9( 4) basic EC Regulation ; 
Artiele 12(1) basic ECSC Decision) ; as a consequence, an anti-dumping investigation may be 
concluded. by a definitive duty, but not by a provisional (Article 9(4) basic EC Regulation ; 
Articles 7(9)(a) and 12 basic ECSC Decision) ; nevertheless, provisional duties, like defmitive -
duties, cannot be imposed unless the three conditions concerning dumping, irtjury and 
Community interestsare fulftlled1542 ; 
under EC anti-dumping law, provisional duties are valid for a maximum period of nine 
months ( Artiele 7(7) basic EC Regulation), whereas, under ECSC anti-dumping law, they are 
valid for a maximum period of six months (Article 11(5) and (6) basic ECSC Decision) ; 
definitive duties Iapse five years after the date on which they entered into force or were last 
1541 In GATI' anti-dumping law only tbree categorie& of anti-dumping relief are being distinguished: provisional.measures 
(Article 7 GATI' Anti-dumping Code), anti-dumping duties (Article 9 GA'IT Anti-dumping Code) and price undertakings (Article 8 
GA'IT Anti-dumping Code). As the provisional measures may take the form of a provisional duty or, preferably, a security equal to 
the amount of the anti-dumping duty provisionally estimated, they oorreapond to the provisional measures of European anti-
dumping law. The anti-dumping duties and price undertakings correspond respectively to the defmitive anti-dumping duties and 
the undertakings of European anti-dumping law. GA'IT anti-dumping law does notprovide special measures as a type of anti-
dumping reli.!f. European anti-dumping law defines its special measures as measurea which do notrun counter to the GA'IT 
obligations. \A. it is inherent in each legal order that it only allows those measures which do not violate that legal order, GA'IT 
anti-dumping law does not have to pronounee such special measures. 
1542 CommiBBion Decision 83164/EEC of 14 February 1983 concerning a request for the immediate imposition of a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of nickel originating in the Boviet Union, 0 . .1., 15 February 1983, No L 43119. 
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modified or confrrmed, and may only be extended by re-opening the investigation for their 
review (Article 11(2) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 15 basic ECSC Decision) ; 
contrary to defmitive duties, provisional duties are not immediately collected, but the release 
of the products subjected to a provisional duty for free circulation in the Community is 
conditional upon the provision of security for the amount of the provisional duty (Article 7(3) 
basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 11(1) basic ECSC Decision) ; the provisional duty may onlybe 
definitively collected, if the facts as finally establlshed show that there has been injurious 
dumping (Article 10(2) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 12(2)(b) basic ECSC Decision) ; the 
definitive collection of the provisional duty does not depend on the imposition of a definitive 
duty (Article 10(2) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 12(2)(a) basic ECSC Decision). 
Therefore, section 2 deals with provisional and definitive anti-dumping duties simultaneously. 
Section 3 discusses undertakings and section 4 pays attention to the special measures. These three 
sections investigate if and how those three types of anti-dumping rellef are legally regulated, 
" whe!_her they_are.,_from a lew--PQint of vie~ co!!_~~1~~PE_l!~,~g __ whaLare-the._ecom~nse-
ql!~Jlces--of~European-:anti~dump!!lg}~~~-~dcAt~~=.M>,Q,!~~n. They investigate in partienlar whether 
European anti-dumping law helps todetermine the type and degree of anti-dumping relief required 
to remedy only the injury caused by the dumping, and examine whether it sufficiently regulates 
the different types of anti-dumping rellef in order to prevent a too excessive anti-dumping rellef 
from being granted. 
2. ANTI-DUMPING DUTlES 
2.1. FORM OF DUTY: AD· VALOREM, SPECIFIC AND VARIABLE 
DUTJES 
As GA TT and European anti-dumping law do not regulate the form of anti-dumping duties, 
European anti-dumping authorities may freely choose between the different possible forms of 
duty1543 , namely : 
1543 C.J.E.C., case 189/88,27 March 1990, Cartorobica SpA v Min.istero delle Finonze dello Stato, E.C.R., 1990, I, (1269), 1286 and 
1298; C.J.E.C., joined cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmahuport GmbH v Commission cmd Counci~ 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 2989 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN) and 3007; C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 June 1991, AJ. 
Jubail Fertilizer Company cmd Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3208 (Opinion of Advocate 
General DARMON). 
a specific duty, i.e. , a fixed amount per unit, weight of measure imported1544 ; 
an ad valorem duty, i.e. , a percentage of the import price ; 
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a variabie duty, i.e. , the amount by which the import price undercuts a eertaio minimum 
price ; 
a combination of an ad valorem and a variabie duty, i.e. , either the ad valorem or the 
variabie duty will be effectiveiy applied depending on which of them yieids the highest 
revenue; 
a combination of a specific and a variabie duty, i.e., either the specific or the variabie duty 
will be effectiveiy applied depending on which of them yieids the highest revenue or on other 
conditions. · 
European anti-dumping case law hardiy specifies the reasoos for choosing one or the other of the 
various forms of anti-dumping duty. In some cases, it is oniy stated that a specific duty is 
appropriate1545, .or that a variabie duty is appropriate1546 or the most equitabie1547 • 
. An ad valorem duty has also been chosen because it has already been imposed on the dumped 
imports coming from other countries1548• In other cases, identical reasoos are put forward to 
justify the choice of different forms of duties. Those reasoos do not ciearly focus on the 
characteristics of each form of duty. 
1544 Sometimes, an anti-dumping duty is imposed, taking the form of a percentage of a fixed am.ount per unit, weight or measure, 
which boils down to a fixed amount per unit, weight or measure. See: Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on lithium -hydroxide originating in the United Statee of America and the Boviet Union, 
O.J., 30 January 1980, No L 23119 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 February 1980, No L 31/23) ; Commission· Regulation (EEC) No 2516/81 of 
26 August 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of light aod.ium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, O.J., 29 
August 1981, No L 246114 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and the Boviet Union, 
O.J., 26 October 1983, NoL 294/3. 
1545 CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 3018/82 of 11 November 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain sod.ium carbonate originating in the United Statea of America and accepting certain undertak.ings concerning the import& of 
certain &odium carbonate originating in the United Statee of America, O.J., 13 November 1982, NoL 317/5; Commission Decision 
No 2767/86/ECSC of 6 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or 
steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O . .J., 6 September 1986, No L 264/18 ; CommiBSion Decision No 2247/87/ECSC of 28 July 1987 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 29 
July 1987, NoL 207rJ1; CommiBSion Decision (EEC) No 3499/87/ECSC of 19 November 1987 imposing a rl.efinitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico and definitively collecting the provisional anti-
dumping duty imposed on those import&, O.J., 21 November 1987, NoL 330/42. 
1546 Commiuion Dcciaion No 67/94/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a proviaionalanti-dumping duty on imports into tbc Community of 
hematite pig iron, origioating in Bnzil, Poland, Rusaia and Ukraine, O.J., 15 January 1994, NoL 12/5. 
1547 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1633182 of 23 June 1982 imposing a provisional anti:.dumping duty on import& of fibre 
building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing CommiBSion Decision No 801664/EEC of 4 June 1980 and accepting 
undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of import& of fibre building board from Czechoslovak.ia, Finland, 
Hungary, Norway, Poland, 8pain, Sweden and the Boviet Union and terminating the proceeding with regard to those countries and 
Bulgaria, O.J., 25 .June 1982, No L 181119. 
1548 Council Reguiltion (EC) No 621/94 of 17 March 1994 impoaing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on irnporta of ferro-ailicon originating in 
Soutb Africaand in tbc Pcople's Republic of China, O.J., 19 March 1994, NoL 77/48. 
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Specific duties1549, variabie duties1550, as well as combinations of variabie duties with 
1549 Co:mmiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2516/81 of 26 August 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of light 
sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, O.J., 29 August 1981, No L 246114; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3366/87 of 9 
November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-silico-calciumlcalcium silicide originating in Brazil, 
O.J., 12 November 1987, 32211; Commiuion Decision No 163/88/ECSC of 20 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of certain iron or steel coils, originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O.J., 22 January 1988, No L 18/31 ; 
Commission Decision No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain flat-rolled 
product& of iron or non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 March 1989, NoL 78/14; Commiuion Decision 
No 2297192/ECSC of 31 July 1992 amending Decision No 2131188/ECSC, accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with import& 
of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Slovenia and the Yugoslav republics of Maoedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia, and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, O.J., 6 August 1992, No L 221136 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % Uow carbon ferro-chrome) 
originating in Kazakhstan, Ruuia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, No L 80/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 
September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of maximum 
0,5% Uow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, Ruuia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/1; Commiuion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of isobutanol originating 
in the Russian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, NoL 246/12; Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 892194 of 21 April1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April 
1994, No L UW5 ; Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& 
of furfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, No L 186/11; Council Regulation (EC) No --
2819194 of 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium -permanganate orginating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, No L 298/32. 
See also : mercury from th.e Souiet Union, where a specific duty was chosen tc(i)n view of the characteristics of the world market for 
the product in queation and the competitive situation on that market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of mercury originating in the Soviet Union and definitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such import&, O.J., 10 December 1987, NoL 346127). In particular, these characteristics 
referred to the Soviet ezporter as a price maker on the world market, i.e., his power to determine the world prioe. As the Soviet 
exporter is able to manipulate his prices, only a duty that is calculated on another basis than the prioe of the product, would 
prevent him to avoid the payment of the anti-dumping duty. 
155° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of oertain 
sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 6 
October 1982, No L 28319 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1306/89 of 11 May 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof lightsodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland and Romania, O.J., 13 May 
1989, No L 13114 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 385190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on 
those import&, O.J., 16 February 1990, NoL 4211; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1473193 of 14 June 1993 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, No L 145/1 ; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2172193 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of ethanolamine 
originating in the United States of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, NoL 195/5; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 
September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, 
O.J., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386193 of 6 December 1993 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 11 December 199á, No 
L 306/16 ; Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 1506194 of 27 June 1994 imposing provisional duties on import& of urea ammonium 
nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16. 
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either ad valorem1551 or specitic duties1552 are adopted in order to prevent evasion. 
It seems rather astonishing that the prevention of evasion is advanced as the reason for 
imposing not only specitic and ad valorem duties, but also variabie duties. Indeed, the 
payment of variabie duties can be completely avoided. The dumping exporters must only 
raise their prices to the level of the minimum price1553 Moreover, it is highly probable 
that the dumping exporters will try to avoid the payment of variabie duties. Indeed, by 
charging prices below the minimum price, the dumping exporters suffer a loss of income : 
they would have to pay anti-dumping duties and they cannot increase their sales figures since 
their prices on the Community market remain at the minimum price level because of the 
variabie duty. 
The payment of specific and ad valorem duties may only partially be avoided. The total 
amount of duty to be paid declines only in ~ropo~on to the drop, respectively, in the volume 
and in the prices of the dumped imports1 54• Therefore, evasion bas probably a different 
1551 In some cases the ad valorem duty is backed up by a variabie duty in order to prevent evasion (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) 
No 2667/82 of .t October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain sodium carbonate originating in 
Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 6 October 1982, No L 28319; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 273183 of 1 February 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of light &odium carbonate 
originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 3 February 1983, No 
L 3211; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 of 3 October 1983 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper 
sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 7 October 1983, NoL 27411; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1244186 of 
28 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April 
1986, No L 1131-t ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2495/86 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 5 August 1986, NoL 217/12; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2512187 of 18 August 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
2786/83 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovak.ia and the USSR, O.J., 
20 August 1987, NoL 235/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 1987, NoL 259n); Council Regulation (EEC) No 1198/88 of 25 April 
1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of roller ebains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China 
and providing for the definitive collection ofthe provisional anti-dumping duty on the said imports, O.J., 3 May 1988, NoL 115/1). 
In other cases the variabie duty is backed up by an ad valorem duty in order to prevent evasion (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1531/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate originating in the People's 
Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those importS, O.J., 3 June 1988, No 
L 13811; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
paracetamol originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, No L 155/29 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1812191 
of 24 June 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China 
and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 June 1991, NoL 166/1). 
1552 Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide 
origmating in the United Statea of America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, No L 23119 (corrigendum, O.J., 8 
February 1980, NoL 31123); Council Regulation (EEC) No 407/80 of 18 February 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
certain sodium carbonate originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 22 February 1980, No L 48/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2516/81 of 26 August 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, 
O.J., 29 August 1981, No L 246/1-t ; CommiBBion Recommendation No 2086/82/ECSC of 28 July 1982 amending recon:unendation 
No 1104/82/ECSC imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil and 
proionging this provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 30 July 1982, No L 221117; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3836/91 of 19 
December 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People's Republic of 
China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 36211; Council Regulation (EC) 
No 643194 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of 
potassium chloride originating in Belarus, RUBBia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, No L 8011. 
1553 C.J.E.C., joincd cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945), 2963-1964 (Report for tbe Hearing : concluaions of tbe intervener), 2989 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GER.VEN) and 3007. 
1554 C.J.E.C., case 189/88, 27 March 1990, Carlorobica SpA v Ministero delle F'uuuaze dello Stato, E.C.R., 1990, I, (1269), 1288 
(Opinion of Advocate-General TESAURO). 
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meaning bere. In respect of specific and ad valorem duties, prevention of evasion should 
meao that the dumping exporters cannot avoid paying some amount of duty1555• In 
respect of variabie duties, which guarantee a constant and a priori known minimum price 
level below which the prices of the dumped product cannot drop, it should meao that the 
dumping exporter cannot prevent the prices of the dumped product from falling below the 
minimum price1556• · . 
Specific duties1557, ad valorem duties1558, as well as combinations of variabie duties 
1555 Commiuion Rcgulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof ferro-chromc witb a 
carbon content by weight of max. 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-chromc) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 2 April 1993, NoL 80/8 
(a specitic duty caooot bc circumvented by meana of pricc manipulation); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a 
detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of fcrro-chromc with a carbon content by wcight of maximum 0,5 % (low carbon ferro-chromc), 
originating in Kazakhlltan, Ruaaia and Ukrainc, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/1 (a l!pCCitic duty cannot be circumvented by means of price 
manipulation); Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
isobutanol originating in the Ruuian Federation, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/12 (a l!pCCitic duty cannot be circumvented by means of price 
manipulation) ; Couocil Replation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of detinitive anti-
dumping dutiea on import& of potauium chloride originating in Belarus, Ruuia and Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, No L 80/1 (a specitic duty 
cannot bc circumventod by mcana of price manipulation); Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imporu of calcium mctal originating in tbe People's Republic of China and Russia, O.J., 23 April 1994, NoL 104/5 (a specitic 
duty cannot be circumvented by price manipulation); Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 1783/94 of 18 July 1994 impoaing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on importsof furfuraldehyde originating in tbe People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11 (a specific duty cannot 
be circumvented by price manipulation). 
1556 Couocil Replation (EEC) No 3836/91 of 19 December 1991 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of dihydrostrcptomycin 
originating in the People'a Republic of China and detinitivcly collec~ng the proviaional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1991, No 36211; 
Cou.icil Regulation {EEC) No 1473/93 of 14 June 1993 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in tbc 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 17 June 1993, NoL 145/1 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2172193 of 30 July 1993 imposing provisional 
anti-dumping dutiea on importa of ethanolamine originating in the Uniled Statea of Amcrica, O.J., 4 August 1993, No L 195/5; Commiuion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof fluorspar originating in tbc People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3; Council Regulation (EC) No 3386/93 of 6 December 1993 imposing a detinitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of dead-burned (sintered) magnesia originating in tbc People's Republic of China, O~J., 11 December 1993, No 
L 306/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 643/94 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068/92 in respect of detinitive anti-dumping 
duties on import& of potauium chloride originating in Belarus, Rusaia and.Ukraine, O.J., 24 March 1994, NoL 80/1; Commiuion Regulation 
(EC) No 1506/94 of 27 June 1994 impoaing proviaional duties on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, 
O.J., 30 June 1994, NoL 162/16. 
1557 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2409/87 of 6 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-
silicon originating in Brazil and accepting undertakings offered by ltalmagnesio SA of Brazil and from Promsyrio-lmport of the 
USSR, O.J., 8 August 1987, No L 219124; Commission Decision No 2131/88/ECSC of 18 July 1988 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia and definitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 19 July 1988, NoL 188/14; Commission Decision No 2158/88/ECSC 
of 20 July 1988 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain iron or steel sections originating in Yugoslavia or 
Turkey, O.J., 21 July 1988, No L 190/5; Commission Decision No 708/89/ECSC of 17 March 1989 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy .teel, cold-rolled, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 21 
March 1989, NoL 78/14; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 547190 of 2 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, and accepting 
undertak.ings in conneetion with import& of certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in these countries, O.J., 3 March 1990, 
NoL 56123; Commiuion Decision No 2297192/ECSC of 31 July 1992 amending Decision No 2131/88/ECSC, accepting undertakinge 
offered in conneetion with import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Yugoslav republica of. Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the 
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, O.J., 6 August 1992, No L 221136. 
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with ad valorem1559 or specific duties1560 are adopted in order to make anti-dumping 
rellef effective. 
Anti-dumping duties are effective in a different way, depending on the form of duty : a 
variabie duty will be effective if the prices of the dumped product do not fall below the 
minimum price1561 and specific and ad valorem duties will be effective if the amount due 
by the dumping exporters is actually paid. 
1558 Commiaeion Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester 
yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 151139 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, 
No L 152/58) ; Commiaeion Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 
17 June 1988, NoL 151147; Commiaeion Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 2• August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, No 
L 235/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 23 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper 
sulphate originating in Buigaria or the Boviet Union, O.J., 27 January 1989, No L 2311 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 
18 September 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of 
China and the Boviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such import&, O.J., 20 
September 1989, No L 27111 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3121/89 of 16 October 1989 modifying the anti-dumping measures 
applicable to import& of certain acrylic fibres originating in Mexico by introducing an anti-dumping duty on such import&, other 
than those from exporters to the Community whose undertakings are accepted, O.J., 19 October 1989, NoL 301/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores and 
concentratea originating in the Peopie's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing import& originating in Hong 
Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1937190 of • July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imports of pure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics originating in the Peopie's Republic of China, and accepting an 
undertaking offered by the exporter, O.J., 7 July 1990, NoL 174127. 
1559 In some cases the ad valorem duty is backed up by a variabie duty in order to guarantee the effeetiveness of anti-dumping 
proteetion (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2667/82 of 4 October 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 
6 October 1982, No L 28319 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 273183 of 1 February 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Boviet 
Union, O.J., 3 February 1983, .No L 3211; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1244/86 of 28 April 1986 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on importsof oopper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April1986, NoL 11314; Council Regulation (EEC) · 
No 2512/87 of 18 August 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
copper sulphate originating in Czechosiovakia and the USSR, O.J., 20 August 1987, NoL 235/18 (corrigendum, O.J., 9 September 
1987, No L 259m ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1198/88 of 25 April 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
roller ebains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China and providing for tbe definitive colleetion of the provisional 
anti-dumping duty on the said import&, O.J., 3 May 1988, NoL 115/1). 
In other cases the variabie duty is backed up by an ad valorem duty in order to guarantee the effeetiveness of anti-dumping 
proteetion (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1531/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potaaeium 
permanganate originating in the Peopie's Republic of China and definitiveiy collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed 
on those import&, O.J., 3 June 1988, NoL 13811; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1745/88 of 21 June 1988 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of paracetamol originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1988, No L 155129). 
156° Comrniuion Replation (EEC) No 1031/92 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of potauium chloride 
(potash) originating in BelaNa, Ruuia or Uknine, O.J., 28 April 1992, NoL 110/S. 
1561 The fact that a variabie duty can induce the dumping exporters to raise their prices has been invoked as an argument for 
imposing a variabie duty (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof &tandardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, 
originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 
October 1986, No L 280/68 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
importsof standardi.r.ed multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating 
in Bulgaria, Czechosiovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union, and defmitively colleeting· 
the amounts aecured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311). Effective variabie duties, thus, must not yield income 
for the Community authorities ; they must result in prices at least as high as the minimum price. 
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Specific duties1562, as well as ad valorem duties1563 are adopted because they are easy 
to administer. 
The basis to calculate the amount of duty to be paid for ad valorem and variabie duties, on 
the one hand, and for specific duties, on the other hand, is not alike. For ad valorem and 
variabie duties, the price of the dumped products must be known, whereas specific duties are 
calculated on the basis of the quantity of the dumped imports. Because the calculation basis 
for ad valorem and variabie duties is the same, it may be wondered why the ease of 
administration bas never been invoked as argument for preferring a variabie duty1564• On 
the other hand, there is not necessarily a contradiction in the fact that the ease of 
administration bas been invoked for both specific and ad valorem duties. It is quite possibie 
that the quantity of some products may be more easily determined than their price and vice-
versa. 
1562 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
mercury originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, NoL 227/8; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 647190 of 2 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain glutamic acid andits salts originating 
in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, and accepting undertakings in conneetion with imports of certain 
glutamic acid and its salts originating in these countries, O.J., 3 March 1990, NoL 66123. 
1563 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 699/88 of 16 March 1988 impósing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of oxalic 
acid originating in Taiwan and South Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72112 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 
June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of polyester yarn originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, 0 . ..,., 17 June 1988, No L 161/39 (corrigendum, O . .i., 18 June 1988, No L 162/68); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 161/47; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in 
Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 26 August 1988, NoL 236/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
176/89 of 23 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper sulphate originating in Buigaria or the 
Soviet Union, O.J., 27 January 1989, No L 2311 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2808/89 of 18 September 1989 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and the Boviet Union and definitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports, O.J., 20 September 1989, No L 27111 ; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3121/89 of 16 October 1989 modifying the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain acrylic fibres 
originating in Mexico by introducing an anti-dumping duty on such imports, other than those from exporters to the Community 
whose undertakinga are accepted, O.J., 19 October 1989, No L 30111 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 6 February 1990 
accepting undertakinga and imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon origin.ating in lceland, Norway, 
Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertakings have been 
accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 3811; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of tungsten ores and concentratas originating in the People's Republic of China,· and terminating the 
proceeding concerning imports originating in Hong Kong, O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83123 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1937190 of 4 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of pure silk typewriter ribbon fabrics originating in 
the People's Republic of China, and accepting an undertaking offered by the exporter, O.J., 7 July 1990, NoL 174127; Councll 
Regulation (EEC) No 1116191 of 29 April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review of anti-
dumping measures concerning imports offerro-silicon originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, NoL 11111. 
1564 Perhaps, variabie duties are not yet that easy to administer as ad valorem duties, though their calculation basis is identical. 
Advocate-General TESAURO, for instance, has held that variabie duties are more difticult to apply than specific and ad valorem 
duties, but he does notoffer an explanation in this respect (C.J.E.C., case 189/88, 27 March 1990, Cartorobica SpA v Min.iatero 
delle Finanze dello Stato, E.C.R., .1990, I, (1269), 1286). 
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Ad valorem duties1565, as wen as variabie duties1566 are adopted because of the 
variety of the dumped products. 
It is no at all clear why the existence of a wide range of products is brought up in order to 
explain the imposition not only of ad valorem, but also of variabie duties. It will not be easy 
for the European anti-dumping authorities to determine the height of a variabie duty, if there 
is a wide variety of dumped products. If the dumping margin, which is usually expressed in 
terms of a percentage of the dumping price, is identical for all the types and models of the 
dumped product, it will be sufficient to determine one single ad valorem duty. However, 
several variabie duties should be determined, as prices of the different product types will 
vary, even if their dumping margin is identical. Thus, when there is a variety of dumped 
products, ad valorem duties will be easier to determine and to apply than variabie 
duties 1567. . 
Ad valorem1568, as wen as variabie duties1569 are adopted because of the price 
differences between the various types or modelsof the dumped product. 
1565 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698185 of 19 June 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 16311; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DBAMs (dynamic 
random acce88 memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings off'ered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-
dumping prooaeding concerning import& of these product& and terminating the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 
1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22179 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144) ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acceu memories) originating in Japan and collecting defmitively the provisional 
duty, O.J., 25 July 1990, No L 193/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 621194 of 17 March 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& offerro-silicon originating ~ South Africa and in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 March 1994, NoL 77/48. 
1566 CommiNion Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports ~f 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulga-
ria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, No 
L 280/68 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the 
amounts secured aa provisional duties, 0 . .1., 27 March 1987, NoL 83/1. See also: Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 
April 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of 
more than 0,75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 14 April1987, NoL 102/5. 
1567 Council Regulation (EC) No 621/94 of 17 March 1994 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of ferro-ailicon originating in 
South Africa and in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 19 March 1994, NoL 77/48. 
1568 CommiNion Regulation (EEC) No 2865/85 of 14 October 1985 hnposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
eleCtronic scales originating in Japan and accepting undertakings and terminating the proceeding in respect of certain import& of 
such product& originating in Japan, O.J., 16 October 1985, No L 275/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 of 8 April 1986 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic scales originating in Japan, O.J., 12 April .1986, No 
L 97/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 374/87 of 5 February 1987 definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty and 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of housed hearing units originating in Japan, O.J., 6 February 1987, No 
L 35132 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dlimping duty on import& of paint, 
distemper, varnishand similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-
dumping duty on such import&, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24. 
1569 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 365125 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3091191 of 21 October 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of video ·tapes in caBBettas originating in the 
People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 24 October 1991, No L 29312. 
668 
Price differences between the varloos types or rnodels of the durnped product do not 
sufficiently explain why variabie duties are irnposed. Such price differences necessitate the 
determination of as much variabie duties as there are product types or models, whereas only 
one ad valorem duty suffices if the dumping margin is identical for all product types or 
models. 
Specific1570, ad valorem1511 , as well as variable1572 duties are adopted because of 
the volatility of the prices (and sornetirnes also of the production costs) of the durnped 
product. 
V ariabie duties guarantee a constant minimum price level : as long as prices do oot rise above 
that level, prices in the Cornmunity will remaio constant. However, a drawback as to 
variabie duties is that the Community will never benefit from price decreases, e.g., caused by 
a decline in the price of the inputs used for rnanufacturing the product or the price-decreasing 
effect of the rationalisation of production rnethods. As to the European anti-dumping 
authorities, variabie duties have been imposed precisely because of that «drawback»1573• 
But, perhaps, in other cases, this drawback of variabie duties explains the choice of specific 
and ad valorem duties. It should, however, be noted that a price decrease benefits the 
Community more for ad valorem duties than for specific duties. Indeed, only for ad valorem 
duties, the amount of duty to be paid will decrease in ~roportion to the price decrease and the 
Community will fully benefit of the price decrease15 4 • With specific duties, on the other 
hand, the amount of duty to be paid will remaio unchanged when the same volurne is 
157° Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2450/87 of 12 August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
mercury originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, NoL 227/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
729192 of 16 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain thermal paper originating in Japan and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 26 March 1992, No L 81/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 May 1992, No·· 
L 138/40). 
lS7 l Commission Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of these product& and terminating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 26 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22179; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38144); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 25 July 1990, No L 193/1; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2799192 of 26 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of deadburned (sintered) magnesia 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15. 
1572 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1292/92 of 18 May 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 with rcgard toa definitive anti-dumping 
duty on importa of video casacttea originating in Hoog Koog, O.I., 22 May 1992, NoL 13911 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 
September 1993 impoling a provisional anti-dumpm, duty on importa of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.I., 7 September 
1993, NoL 226/3. 
1573 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 imposina a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of tluonpar 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.I., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3. 
1574 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 1992 imposiog a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of deadbumed 
(sintered) magnesia originating in the People's Republic of China, O.I., 26 September 1992, No L 282/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2800/92 of 25 September 1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on importa of magnesium oxide originating in the People '1 Republic of 
China, O.I., 26 September 1992, No L 282123. 
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imported ; consequently, the amount of duty to be paid will increase in proportion to the price 
as prices decline and the Community will benefit only partly of the price decline1575• 
Variabie duties1576, as well as combinations of ad valorem and variabie duties1577 are 
adopted in order to prevent increased dumping. 
The reference to the prevention of increased dumping probabiy does not reflect accurateiy 
what is meant by the European anti-dumping authorities. Indeed, neither specific, ad valorem 
and variabie duties nor a combination of them can prevent increased dumping. However, 
there is a difference between specific and ad valorem duties, on the one hand, and variabie 
duties, on the other hand, if the dumping margin is calculated on the basis of prices after the 
Ievy of the anti-dumping duty : specific and ad valorem duties do not exciude increased 
dumping, whenever the export price declines or normal value increases ; under variabie 
duties, however, increased dumping will oniy be possibie through an increase in normal 
value1578• Since under a variabie duty the dumping prices cannot fall beiow the minimum 
price, the prevention of increased dumping probabiy means that variabie duties prevent 
increased dumping through further decreases in the dumping prices. 
Specific1579 and variabie1580 duties, as well as combinations of ad valorem and 
variabie duties1581 are adopted in order to remedy price decreases of the dumped imports. 
It is impossibie to understand how specific duties, besides variabie duties, may remedy price 
decreases of the dumped product. Indeed, whereas variabie duties induce the dumping 
exporters to charge prices equal to the minimum price, specific duties do not guarantee that 
1515 Probably thia ditTerenee in effects made the European anti-dumping authoritiea prefera apecific duty, rather than an ad valorem duty, when 
confronted with a continuing decline in the import prices (Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/92 of 16 March 1992 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import1 of certain thennal paper originating in Japan and definitively collecting the proviaional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 26 March 
1992, NoL 81/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 May 1992, NoL 138/40)). 
1576 Commiesion Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of potaesium 
permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9. 
1577 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 of 3 October 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper 
sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 7 October 1983, No L 27411; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2495/86 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, No L 217/12. 
1578 See e.g.: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2294/80 of 28 August 1980 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and the Boviet Union, O.J., 30 
August 1980, No L 228/59. 
1579 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200190 of 27 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 July 1990, NoL 198/57. 
1580 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1537190 of 28 May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& ofpotassium 
permanganate originating in the USSR, O.J., 8 June 1990, NoL 145/9; Council Regulation (EC) No 3319194 of 22 December 1994 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea ammonium nitrate solution originating in Buigaria and Poland, 
exported by companies not exempted from the duty, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31 December 
1994, No L 350120. 
1581 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2786/83 of 3 October 1983 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of copper 
sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 7 October 1983, No L 27411 ; Commiesion Regulation (EEC) No 
2495/86 of 1 August 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty. on imports of potassium permanganate originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 5 August 1986, NoL 217/12. 
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the dumping exporters will increase their prices, since specifie duties are calculated on the 
import volume. 
By way of exception, one reason bas been invoked in respect of variabie duties which cieariy fits 
only the charaeteristics of this type of duty1582• In particuiar, variabie duties have been 
imposed because their economie effect is the same as that of price undertakings1583• Indeed, 
like a price undertaking1584, a variabie duty sets a minimum price beiow whieh the price of 
the imported product cannot fail. 
Though European anti-dumping case law only very exceptionally justifies the choice of a specific 
type of duty on the basis of the characteristics of that type of duty, the Court of Justice probabiy 
wili oot consider European anti-dumping case Iaw to provide an insufficient statement of reasons. 
The ·Court does not consider the information with regard to the type of duty as essentia11585• 
The Court, though, undervalues the difference in economie effects of the different duties1586• 
For instance, as the Court bas admitted 1587, a variabie duty always favours the exporters as 
they cao avoid paying the duty mereiy by raising their export prices up to the minimum price; on 
the other hand, they cao never fully avoid the payment of ad valorem and specific duties1588• 
1582 In two caaea tbc choicc of a variabic duty was cxplained tbrough an argument which bas oot yct been invoked for tbe other types of duty, 
namely .cthc economie structurc of tbc exporten» (sic) (Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No. 3798/90 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of espadrilles originating in tbe Pcople's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No. L 365/25; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3091/91 of 21 October 1991 imposing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on importsof video tapes in cassettes originating in tbc 
People's Republic of China and definitively collccting tbe provisional duty, O.J., 24 October 1991, No L 293/2). The insufticient infonnation 
makes it impoBSiblc to know whctber tbia rcason actually concema tbc specific characteristic• of variabic duties. 
1583 Council Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 of 14 January 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof pentaerythritol originating in 
Canada, O.J., 16 January 1985, No L 13/1 (corrigendum, O.J;, 24 January 1985, No L 20/46); Council Regulation (EEC) No 338/86 of 14 
Fcbruary 1986 impo1ing a dcfinitivc anti-dumping duty on imports· of roller ebains for cyclcs originating in tbe People's Republic of China and 
definitively collcctins tbc proviaional anti-dumping duty imposed on tbose import&, O.J., 15 February 1986, No L 40/25 ; Commission Dccision 
No 1751/94/ECSC of 15 July 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into tbc Community of hematite pig-iron, originating in 
Brazil, Poland, Ru88Ïa and Ukrainc, O.J., 16 July 1994, NoL 182/37. 
1584 Supra, 368. 
1585 CJ.E.C., caiC C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail FertiUzer Compairy and Saudi Arabian FeniUzer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, 
(3187), 3243. 
1586 VERMULST, E.A., and HOODER., JJ., «Annotation on Case C-69/89, Nalwjima AU Preelsion Co. v. Council, Judgment of 7 May 1991, 
oot yet rcported; CaiC C-358/89, Extramet v. Council, Judgment of 16 May 1991, oot yet rcported; Case C-49/88, Al-Jubail FertiUzer Company 
(Samad) and Saudi Arabian FeniUzer Company (Sqfco) v. Council, Judgment of 17 Junc 1991, oot yct reported; Case C-16/90, Dellef NIJlle v. 
HaupzoUamt B~-F~jen, Judgmentof22 October 1991, oot yet reported», Common Marleet Law Review, 1992, (380), 394-396. 
1587 C.J.E.C., joincd cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexpon GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945), 3007. 
1588 According to tbc European anti-dumping autboritiea, exporten may indeed fully avoid tbc payment of an ad valorem duty : tbcy only sbould 
raiae tbeir export prieel to a level at which the duty cxcceds entirely tbc dumping margin ; in that case, a refund of tbe duty paid (Articlc 11(8) up 
to (10) baaic EC Rcgulation; Artiele 16 basic ECSC Dccision) may bc poasiblc (CJ.E.C., caiC C-49/88, 27 Junc 1991, Al-Jubail FertiUzer 
Company and Saudl Arabian FeniUzer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3194 (Report for tbe Hearing: conclusions of tbc Council)). 
The European anti-dumping authoritica, however, diarcgard tbe costa for tbe exporters to initiale such a rcfund proceeding (e.g., tbe fccs of lcgal 
councillors), a• weU a• tbc unccrtainty about tbc outcome of it (sec injra, 681-685). 
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Clearly, to exporters, this difference is quite essential. Another difference, which certainly is 
essential to the Community authorities, concerns the fact that ad valorem duties are more easily to 
administer : when there is a wide range of products, only one and the same percentage must be 
applied, whereas for each type of the product another specific or variabie duty must be 
determined. 
The European anti-dumping authorities, on the other hand, have argued that the reasoos for the 
· choice made between the different types of duties does not have to be provided each time, as the 
features concerning their evasion and administration are inherent in their nature1589• Their 
point of view is quite surprising as European anti-dumping case law bas characterized all types of 
duties as difficult to evade and easy to administer. In view of such a confusion in European anti-
dumping case law, the idea to offer no explanation at all seems unappropriate. Instead, European 
anti-dumping case law should explain more clearly the choice made between the different types of 
duty by relying only on the characteristics of each type of duty. 
2.2. SCOPE OF APPUCATION 
2. 2.1. Ratione temporis 
h) 1-l{J'b 41)\ 
As anti-dumping duties are imposed by regulation, they enter into force on the date specified in 
the regulation or, in absence thereof, on the 20th day following their pubHeation in the Official 
Joumal of the European Communities (Article 191(1) EC Treaty). Practically all regulations 
imposing anti-dumping duties specify the date of their entry into force : it is usually the day of 
lSS9 C.J.E.C., ca10 C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail Ferdlizer Company and Saudi Arabian Ferdlizer Company v Council, E.C.R.,. 1991, I, 
(3187), 3197 (Report for the Hearing : coocluaiona of the Commiuion). 
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their publication or the day following their pubHeation 1590• As they never explain why, they 
may seem to go against the Court of Justice's case law, according to which the European 
authorities cannot resort without reason to the procedure of an immediate entry into force, without 
having an adverse effect on a legitimate regard for legal certainty1591 • However, for the 
Court, these reasoos need not necessarily to be set out in the preamble to the regulation, insofar as 
the Court, in the provisions which the regulation enacts, finds serious reasoos for holding that any 
interval between the publication and the entry into force of the regulation might be prejudicial to 
the Community1592• According to the Court of Justice, such a reason can be found in respect 
of defmitive anti-dumping duties, when their immediate entry into force is necessary in order to 
ayoid a hiatus in the proteetion of the Community interests between the date of expiry of the 
provisional duty and the date of entry into force of the defmitive one. The immediate entry into 
force of the definitive anti-dumping duty is indeed foreseeable for exporters and importers when · 
its enters into force at the end of the period of validity of the provisional duty and when the 
European anti-dumping authorities constantly keep the exporters and importers informed of the 
course of the procedure1593 • In view of this application of the Court's case law to definitive 
anti-dumping duties, it seems that the legality of the immediate entry into force of provisional 
anti-dumping duties will not stand before the Court, unless the European anti-dumping authorities 
can prove that it was foreseeable for exporters and importers as they were constantly kept 
informed of the course of the procedure. Or, perhaps, the Court may find the explanation why 
1590 Exceptionally, they enter into force tbree days after their pubHeation (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 of 22 December 
1980 imposing. a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yam originating in the United States of America, 
O.J., 31 December 1980, NoL 368191; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1882/82 of 12 July 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on machanical wriet-watches originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 July 1982, NoL 20711; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2236/82 
of 11 AuguSt 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping·duty on upright pianos originating in the USSR, O.J., 13 August 1982, No 
L 238/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 September 1982, No L 271120) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 273/83 of 1 February 1983 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of light sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, 
Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union, O.J., 3 February 1983, No L 32/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3386/86 of 28 November 
1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of basic chromium sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 November 
1986, No L 321181), or even ten days after their pubHeation (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2696/80 of 21 October 1980 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yam originating 
in the United Statea of America, O.J., 23 October 1980, NoL 279/18; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2843/80 of 30 October 1980 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarn originating 
in the Uniteel State• of America, O.J., 4 November 1980, No L 294/6 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3198/81 of 9 November 1981 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yam originating 
in the Uniteel States of America, O.J., 11 November 1981, No L 32212 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 486/88 of 22 February 
1988 amending the regulations, recommendations and decisions imposing anti-dumping duties, O.J., 24 February 1988, NoL 60/6; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3443/89 of 14 November 1989 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2347/87 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on machanical wriet-watches originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, O.J., 16 November 1989, No 
L 331/44). 
1591 C.J.E.C., caac 17/67, 13 December 1967, FimuJ Max Neumann v HauptzoUamt Hoj/Saale, E.C.R., 1967, (441), 456. 
1592 C.J.E.C., caae 17/67, 13 December 1967, FimuJ Max Neumann v HauptzoUamt Hof/Saale, E.C.R., 1967, (441), 456. 
1593 CJ.E.C., joined cases C-304/86 and C~185/87, 11 July 1990, Enital SpA v Comnüssion and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2939), 2941; 
C.J.E.C., joined cues C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexpo11 GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 
2990-2991 (Opinion of Advocate GeneralVAN GERVEN). 
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the Community interests called for intervention to prevent injury from being caused during the 
proceeding, to constitute a sufficiently serious ground for the immediate entry into force. 
In . . 1 . d . d . b . ll--ttsedl tfl,l . ed .th . . f"e. (Arti 1 pnnctp e, anti- umpmg uties can not e tmpo nor mcreas w1 retroactive e 1ect c e 
10.1. GATI A~-dumping Code; Artiele lO(l) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(4)(a) basic 
ECSC Decision). Only onder very exceptional cir~~mstances, retroactive effect may be given to 
defmitive anti-dumping duties, though not to provisional duties (Articles 8.6. and 10.6. GA'IT 
Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 10(4) and (5) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(4)(b) basic ECSC 
Decision). There is no evidence that the European anti-dumping· authorities have imposed or 
increased anti-dumping duties with retroactive effect1594, but in one case1595• 
lS94 Th Eu '-d • th . . h ... fused . . • d ti . . '-d . d . 'th . -e ropean anti umpmg au onties ave ways re to 1mpose or mcrease e mtive anli umpmg uties wa retroactave euect : 
in video ct~Uetla jroni lhe Republic of Ko~a and Rong Kong, preu articles referring the anti-dumping proceeding in question we re oot 
conaidered u IUfticienl· evidence that the importen were, or should have been aware, that the exporten practised dumping and that auch 
dumping would cause iJVury; moreover, in view of the relatively low dumping margins, it could not be reasonably considered that the 
importen should have been aware of any dumping (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imporb of video caueues originating in the Republic of Korea and Hoog Koog, collecting definitively the provisional duty 
and tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the importa of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 
June 1989, NoL 174/1); 
in mercury Jrom lhe Soviet Unlon, irrespective of whether the importen were or should have been aware that the exporter practised dumping, 
it was found DOl neceuary to impoae an anti-dumping duty with retroactive effect becauae the dumped imports durlog the 90 days prior to the 
imposition of the provisional anti-dumping duty were negligible ; nevertheless, the European anti-dumping authorities agreed that it was a 
case of sparadie dumping (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3687/87 of 8 December 1987 imposing a defanitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
mercury originating in the Soviet Union and definitive1y collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on such imports, O.J., 10 
December 1987, No L 346121) ; 
in aspattamefrom Japan and lhe Unlted Slmes of Alnerica andjurazolidonefrom lhe People's Republic of China, the European anti-dumping 
authorities did oot e:xamine whether the conditions for imposing anti-dumping duties with retroactive effect were fulfiUed, as the Community 
producer did oot IUbstantiate hia request IUfticiently (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1391/91 of 27 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imporb of of aspaname originating in Japan and the United Statea of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, NoL 134/1 ; Couocil 
Regulation (EC) No 2674/94 of 31 October 1994 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of furazolidone originating in d1e 
Peop1e's Republic of China and collecting definitive1y the provisiona1 duty imposed, O.J., 4 November 1994, NoL 285/1). · 
See also : compoct disc plllyen jrom Japan and lhe Republic of Ko~a, where dle extension of dle acope ralione nuuerlae of the defanitive anti-
dumping duty entered into force only on the day foUowing its publication, whereas the limitation of ita acope entered into force in retroaction to the 
date the definitive anti-dumping duty entered into force (Council Regulation (EEC) No 819/92 of 30 March 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
112/90 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact diac playen originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and 
collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 2 April1992, NoL 87/1). 
The fact that definitive anti-dumping duties have oot yet been imposed or increased with retroactive effect, does not mean that there have oot been 
anti-dumping deciaiona with retroactive effect. Usually, these decisions do not impoae or increase anti-dumping duties. lndeed, retroactive effect 
bas been given to deciiÏODB : 
repealina existing anti-dumping dutiel (Council Regulation (EEC) No 4017/88 of 19 December 1988 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
3205/88 a1 regarda cenain plain paper photocopien assembied in the Community by Mataushita Business Machine (Europe) GmbH and 
Toshiba Sylltèmea (France) SA, O.J., 23 December 1988, NoL 355/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 359/89 of 13 February 1989 repealing 
Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 in respect of eertaio plain paper photocopien auembled in the Community by Konica Busineu Machine• 
Manufacturing GmbH, O.J., 15 February 1989,' No L 43/1 ; Commiuion Deciaion 89/116/EEC of 23 December 1988 accepting an 
undertakïna relating to the anti-dumping proceeding concerning cenain plain paper photocopien auembled or producëd in the Community by 
Konica Buaineu Machines Manufacturing GmbH, O.J., 15 February 1989, No L 43/54; Council Regulation (EEC) No 502/89 of 27 
February 1989 amending Replation (EEC) No 2735/88 repealing Regulation {EEC) No 1021/88 in respect of certain electronic aca1ea 
assembied in the Community by TEC (UK) lJd, O.J., 1 March 1989, NoL 58/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3490/89 of 21 November 
1989 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 3042189 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 to cenain aerial-
impact dot-matrix printen auembled in the Community, O.J, 23 November 1989, NoL 340/5; Commission Decision 89/596/EEC of 13 
October 1989 accepting undertakinga relating to dle anti-dumping proceeding concerning eertaio serlal-impact dot-matrix printen usemb1ed 
in the Community by NEC Tecbnology lJd and Star Microniel Manufacturing Ltd, O.J., 23 November 1989, No L 340/25; Couocil 
Replation (EEC) No 3514/91 of 2 December 1991 amending Regulation (EEC) No 450/89 in 10 far as it adjusts the definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imporb of urea originating in Saudi Arabia laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 5 December 1991, No L 334/1; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2553/93 of 13 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on impoda of eenaio ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 18 September 1993, No L 235/3; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 26SS/93 of 27 September 1993 repealing with retroactive effect the anti-dumping meaaurea applying to import1 into the 
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Nevertheless, retroactive effect may have actually been granted : a regulation may have entered 
into force on the .date the Official Journal, in which bas been published, is hearing, but the 
Joumal may have been distributed several days later1596• 
Community of tapered roller hearings originatiug in Japan, 0.1., 30 September 1993, NoL 244/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2238/94 of 
14 September 1994 amending Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 in ao far aa it impo1ea an anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon 
originanting in Brazit and produced by the Brazilian company Rima FJectrometalurgia SA, 0.1., 15 September 1994, NoL 240/28); 
suspending anti-dumping dutiea (Council Regulation (EC) No 5194 of 22 December 1993 on the suspension of the anti-dumping measul'CII 
against EFTA countriea, 0.1., 5 January 1994, NoL 3/1); 
decreasing the amount of anti-dumping dutiea (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3280/84 of 22 November 1984 amending the defmitive aoli-
dumping duty on imparts of eertaio ba1l hearings originating in Japan and exported by NTN Toyo Bearing Co. Ltd., 0.1., 24 November of 
1984, No L 307/15; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1238/85 of 13 May 1985 amending the definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
eertaio baU hearings originating in Japan and exported by Nippon Seiko KK and othen, 0.1., 15 May 1985, No L 129/1; Commiuion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2871/88 of 15 September 1988 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1695/88 imposing a provisionalanti-dumping duty on 
imparts of polyellter yam originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey, 0.1., 17 September 1988, No L 257/24; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2966/92 of 12 October 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1798/90 in reapeet of the definitive anti-dumping duty on 
eertaio imporu of rnanosodium glutamate originating, inter alia, in Indonesia and the Republic of Korea, 0.1., 15 October 1992, No 
L 299/1. See alao : Council Regulation (EEC) No 2166/89 of 18 July 1989 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on importa of vinylacelate monomer originating in the Uniled Statea of America, 0.1., 20 July 1989, NoL 20812, where 
one of the dumping companiea changed ita buaineaa name without any change in ownerahip, production or marketing atructurea of the 
company ; in order to maintain the application of the anti-dumping duty of 5.9 % to that company, the Regulation imposing the aoli-dumping 
dutiea had to be amended ; the amendment waa given retroactive effect ; nevedheleu, it ia not illegal becauae without the amendment the 
company would have been subjeeled to the residualanti-dumping duty of 15 % ; thua, the amendment decreaaed the amount of anti-dumping 
duty); 
restricting the scope of an anti-dumping duty (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3002/85 of 28 October 1985 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
1698/85 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electrooie typewriten originating in Japan, 0.1., 30 October 1985, No 
L 288/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 113/86 of 20 January 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importa of electrooie typewriten originatiug in Japan, 0.1., 23 January 1986, NoL 17/2; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2127/86 of 7 July 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof electrooie typewriten 
originating in Japan, 0.1., 9 July 1986, NoL 187/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 154/88 of 18 January 1988 amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 1698/85 imposing a definitive duty on imports of electrooie typewriten originating in Japan, 0.1., 22 January 1988, No L 18/4;. 
Commiaaion Deciaion No 1324/89/ECSC of 12 May 1989 amending Decision No 708/89/ECSC imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importa of eertaio flat-rolled producta of iron or non-altoy steel, cold-rolled, originating in Yugoslavla, 0.1., 17 May 1989, No L 133/5; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2519/93 of 13 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 129/92 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imparts of eertaio thermal paper originating in Japan, 0.1., 15 September 1993, NoL 232/1); 
definitively coUecting provisional aoli-dumping duties (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2761/81 of 22 September 1981 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumpina duty on o-xylene (odhoxylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the Uniled Statea of America, 0.1., 25 September 1981, No 
L 270/1).; 
adapting the scope ralione penonae of the anti-dumping duty to the new name of the dumping exporter (Council Regulation (EC) No 872194 
of 19 .April 1994 amending Regulationa (EEC) No 2089/84 and (EEC) No 1739/85 coneerDing definitive anti-dumping duties on importa of 
eertaio ba1l hearings originating in Japan, 0.1., 20 April 1994, NoL 10117). 
1595 In brruhea from the People'• Republic from China the extension of the scope of the provisional anti-dumping duty was made 
retroactive (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3453188 of 4 November 1988 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3052/88 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 8 November 1988, NoL 303111). As it concerned a provisional anti-dumping duty, it cannot have been an application 
of one of the exceptions in which retroactivity is legally allowed, since these exceptions apply only to definitive anti-dumping 
duties. 
There may also be another instanee of illegal retroactivity. In aheeta an.d platea, of iron. or steel, from Yugoalavia a decision 
adapting the scope ratione materiae of a provisional anti-dumping duty to the new combined nomenclature was granted retroactive 
effect (Commission Decision No 980/88/ECSC of 13 April 1988 amending Decision No 229/88/ECSC im.posing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 15 April 1988, No L 98/33). 
The retroactive effect ofthat decision is only illegal in sofaras the new nomenclature islarger is than the former. 
1596 C.J.E.C., joined caaea C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexport GmbH v Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(2945), 2991 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN). 
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Anti-dumping duties are imPQ_~~ILJuture~lmW~ ( Artiele 10.1 GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; 
Arlicle 10(1)--b~~"-oc--ii~gulation) 1597, but the existence of injurious dumpiE~ determined 
on imports in the past. Indeed, the investigation of dumping should normally cover a period of 
nbt less than six months immediately prior to the initiation of the proceeding (Article 6(1) basic 
EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(1)(c) basic ECSC Decision). Further, the investigation should normally 
be concluded within one year after the initiation of the proceeding (Article 5.10. GATI Anti-
dumping Code; Artiele 6(9) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 7(9)(a) basic ECSC Decision), with the 
possibility of an extension of maximum six months, under GATI anti-dumping law (Article 5.10. 
GATI Anti-dumping Code), and of maximum three months, under EC anti-dumping law (Article 
6(9) basic EC Regulation)1598• Thus, as the period of one year is usually not 
observed1599, the anti-dumping duties would be imposed on the basis of facts which occurred 
1597 C.J.E.C., ca.e C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalcajima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2085 (Report for tbe Hearing: 
concluaiona of tbc Commiuion) and 2164 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ). 
As tbe Commiuion haa held, .c(t)he basic purpose of these dutiea ia oot to compenaatc'for past injury, but to stop dialortion of competition arising 
from unfair coounercial practicealike dumping. (Anawer oftbe Commiasion to written question No 3270/91, O.J., 10 August 1992, No C 202/37). 
1598 ECSC anti~umping law does nol provide tbc poaaibility of any extenaion of tbe period witbin which tbe investigation must be concluded. 
1599 Answer ofthe Commission to written question No 1795191, O.J., 16 March 1992, No C 66/37. 
According to the Court of Justice, t e frequent non-observance of the perioei of o e ear is not necessaril .. 'l)e period of o;ae 
year is a guide rather than a man a ry peri . Nevertheless, the anti-dumping proceeding must not be extended beyond a 
reàsonable period. to be assessed according to the partJ!Lular c~um__!!__ances of each case (C.J.E.C., case 246/87, 12 May 1989, 
Continentale Produ.Jt.ten.Ge.ellschaft ErhtJI"dt-Renlcen GmbH & Co. v Hauptzolläïnt Mllnchën-West, E.C.R., 1989, (1151), 1162-1163 
and 1172 ; C.J.E.C., case 121/86, 28 November 1989, Anonymos Etaireia Epicheiriseon Metalle/tikon Viomich.anikon leai NaftiliaJeon 
AE a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1989, (3919~ 3953). 
Since the judgement of the Court of Justice, the non-observance of the perioei of one year has always been explained. The following 
reasons have been invoked : 
the complexity of the case (sic) (CommiBBion Decision 90/507/EEC of 7 September 1990 terminating the review of the anti-
dumping measures concerning dense sodium cilrbonate originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 16 October 1990, 
NoL 283138; Council Regulation (EC) No 2557194 of 19 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
calcium metal originating in the People's Republic of China and RUBBia, O.J., 21 October 1994, No L 270/27) ; 
the volume lUid complexity of the data gathered initially (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating 
in South Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, No L 34/8) ; 
the volume and complexity of the data gathered and examined (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnatie disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Japan, 
Taiwan ancl the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, No L 95/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 
October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in 
Japan, ,Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and collecting defmitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 
1993, NoL 262/4; CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in HongKong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 
1994, No L 6815 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 2199/94 of 9 September 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 10 September 1994, NoL 23612); 
the volume and complexity of the data initially gathered and examined, together with the fact that the investigation had 
required the study of related issues which arose during the proceeding and which could not have been foreseen at its outset 
(Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of small 
screen colou:r ielevision :receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411; Commiuion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13. June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ball bearinga with a 
greatest enemal diameier not · exceeding 30 mm originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 152124 ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2685190 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 25611 
(corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38) ; Commission Decision 90/540/EEC of 29 October 1990 terminating the anti-
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dumping review prooeeding concerning imparts of propanlol originating in the United Statea of Ameria, O.J., 6 November 
1990, No L 306123 ; Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of amall-screen colour telavision receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 
January 1991, No L l.USl ; Commi88ion Begulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imparia of cert&in polyester JariUI (man-made .taple fibrea) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India,· the 
People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imparts of these yams 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 October 
1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of video tape• in cassettes originating m the People's Republic of 
China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 24 October 1991, No L 29312; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2849192 of 28 September 1992 modifying the definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of hall hearings with a greatest 
external diameter exceeding SO mm originating in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86, O.J., 1 October 1992, No 
L 28612 (corrigendum, O.J., 26 March 1993, No L 72/36) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 993193 of 26 April 1993 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic weighing acales originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, No 
L 104/4); . 
the complexity of the proceeding and the volume of the data gathered (Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April 19H 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of silicon carbide, originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, 
the Ruseian Federation and Ukraine, O.J., 13 April1994, No L 94121) ; 
the complexity of the investigation, in particwar the numerous models of the product and the variety of technical 
specifications (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474193 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
into the Community of bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting defmitively the provisional anti-
dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/1); 
the complexity of the investigation, in particwar in the light of the numerous product types and the calcwation of the normal 
value on a quarterly basis (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2686192 of 16 September 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on imparts of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 17 September 1992, No L 272113) ; 
the large number of exporters and importers, the very high number of modela of the product and the variety and oomplenty 
of the distribution systems of the individual companies on the individual markets (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 
of 12 Jwy 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan 
and South Korea, O.J., 18 Jwy 1989, NoL 206/6 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 2 September 1989, NoL 267/27)); 
the complexity of the proceeding, in particwar the difficwties met by the Commission in obtaining, from interestad parties, 
the relevant data (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 666/90 of 16 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of ferroboron alloy originating in Japan, O . .T., 20 March 1990, No L 7316 ; Commission Decision 90/383/EEC of 13 
Jwy 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imparts of NPK fertilizers originating in Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Yugoslavia, O.J., 20 Jwy 1990, No L 188/63 ; CommiBBion Decision No 3692191/ECSC of 12 December 1991 
repealing Decision No 2132/88/ECSC imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain iron or steel coils, 
originating in Algeria, Mexico and Yugoslavia, O • .T., 19 December 1991, No L 360/11 ; Commission Decision No 322192/ECSC 
of 7 February 1992 repaaiing Decision No 3499/87/ECSC imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain sheets 
and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Mexico, O.J., 12 February 1992, No L 3619 ; Commission Decision No 891192/ECSC 
of SO March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain semi-finished product& of alloy steel, 
originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April1992, Nó L 96/26); 
the complexity of the proceeding and the numerous argument& put forward (Council Regulation (EEC) No 64193 of 8 January 
1993 impoaing a definitive duty on imparts of synthetic fibres of polyester• originating in India and the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 16 January 1993, No L 9/2) ; 
the complexity of the proceeding, in particwar the detailed verification of the voluminous data involved and the numerous 
argument& put forward (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 26 April 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imparts of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 27 April1990, NoL 107/66 (corrigendum, O . .T., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192); Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2112190 of 23 Jwy 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuit& 
known u DRAMa (dynamic random accesa memories) originating in Japan and collecting defmitively the provisional duty, 
O.J., 26 Jwy 1990, NoL 193/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1261191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the 
provisional duty and terminating the procedure coneerDing HongKong, O.J., 14 May 1991, NoL 119/36; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1391191 of 27 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of of aspartame originating in Japan 
and the Uniteel Statea of America, O.J., 29 May 1991, NoL 134/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3836191 of 19 December 
1991 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& Óf dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People'a Republic of 
China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, 0 . .1., 31 December 1991, No 362/1; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3068192 of 23 October 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium chloride originating in 
Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.,J., 24 October 1992, NoL 308/41; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3482192 of 30 November 1992 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan 
and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 3 December 1992, No L 36311 (corrigendum, O.J., 28 
January 1993, No L 19/34)), including the study of related iBBuea which arose during the proceeding and which cowd have 
been foreseen at its outset (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093191 of 16 Jwy 1991 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import. of 811lall-screen colour televison receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 18 Jwy 1991, NoL 196/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts . of certain polyester YariUI (man-made staple fibres) originating in 
Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisional duty, 0 . .1.~ 3 
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April1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 June 1992, NoL 163116)); 
the complexity of the proceeding, in particular the detailed verification of the data and the number of exporters involved and 
the numerous argument& put forward (Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, NoL 13121); 
the comple:Uty of the proceeding, in particwar the useBSlD.ent of the status of the dumping exporters and the Community 
indUBtry and the new developmente occuning after the perioei of investigation and affecting the Community industry 
(Commiuion Decision 931376/EEC of 16 June 1993 terminating the review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council 
Regulation (EEC) 1698/86 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import. of el~nic typewriters originating in Japan, 
O.J., 29 June 1993, No L 167n6) ; 
the complexity of the proceeding and the difficuities of communication and information-gathering, reeuiting in numerous 
request& from the parties concerned for extensions of deadlines, which were granted by the CommiBBion when justified by the 
circumstances (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of 
certain seamleu pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy steel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the Republic of Croatia and 
definitively collecting provisional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 16 May 1993, NoL 120134); 
the large number of interesteel parties involved, and the complexity of the proceeding, in particuiar the difficuities met by the 
CommiBBion in obtaining from interesteel parties, the relevant data (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 
September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of cotton yarn originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 
1991, No L 271117) ; 
the complexity of the case, in particuiar due to the number of producers located in the Community and due to the fact that 
the Polish producers and exporter, as wellas the producers located in the analogous country, were newly operating under 
market economy conditions (Council Regulation (EC) No 3319194 of 22 December 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of urea ammonium nitrate aolution originating in Buigaria and Poland, exported by companies not exempted 
from the duty, and collecting defmitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 31 December 1994, NoL 360120); 
the large number of interestad parties involved and the numerous extensions of time limits requestad by aome of the 
exporters involved (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of audio tapes in caBSettee originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.,J., 13 November 1990, 
No L 31316 (corrigendum, O.,J., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36)) ; 
the large number of interestad parties involved, the number of hearings which had to be granted, the prolongation of time 
limits requesteel by aome exporters and the extension of the inv~stigation to import& from two additional countries 
(Commission Decision 911612/EEC of 26 July 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dum-
ping measures concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and the People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of artificial 
corundum originating in Bruil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 2 October 1991, NoL 276127) ; 
the large number of both Community producers and exporters in third countries, together with their relatively small average 
size (Answer ofthe Commisaion to written question No 3270/91, O.J., 10 August 1992, No C 202/36); 
the large number of Community producers involved (CommiBBion Decision 931326/EEC of 18 May 1993 terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of paint, distamper, varnish and Bimllar brushes originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 26 May 1993, No L 127/16) ; 
the number of e:xporting countries (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 647190 of 2 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in lndonesia, the Republic of Korea, -Taiwan and 
Thailand, and accepting u:ndertakings in conneetion with import& of certain glutamic acid and its salts originating in these 
countries, O.J., 3 March 1990, No L 66123) ; 
the complexity of the like product industry combined with the internationalization of the manufacturing processes 
(Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random accesa memories) originating in Japan, accepting 
undertakings oft'ered by certain exportere in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of these 
product& and terminating the investigation intheir respect, O.,J., 26 January 1990, NoL 20/6 (corrigendum, O.,J., 27 January 
1990, No L 22179 ; corrigendum, O.,J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic 
random acceN memories) originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 26 July 1990, No 
L 19311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 677/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import&. of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 
12 March 1991, No L 66/1) ; 
the complexity of the data examined and the difficuities faced in selecting the reference country (Council Regulation (EC) No 
486194 of 4 March 1SS. imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic 
of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 6 March 1994, No L 62/1) ; 
the difficulty of finding a raferenee country to determine the dumping margin in respect of the allegedly dumpbig NME 
country (Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 720190 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.,J., 27 March 1990, NoL 80/9; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2061190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a temporary anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefin bags originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, No L 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 266/38); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1031192 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
potassium chloride (potash) originating in Belarus, Russia or Ukraine, O.J., 28 April 1992, No L 110/6 ; Commisaion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain photo 
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twenty-one months before, a period over which for changes· in circumstances and pricing policies 
may have taken place. Nevertheless, the injury incurred twenty-one months before is qualified as 
present injury1600• Moreover, the European anti-dumping authorities have consistently and, 
according to the Court of Justice1601 , rightfully refused to take into account changes in 
circumstances and pricing policies which occurred after the investigation period. According to 
them, any other metbod would render anti-dumping investigations virtually permanent,· would 
albums originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, NoL 228/16; Council Regulation (EC) No 
3664193 of 22 December 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of photo albums in 
bookbound form originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting defmitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, 
O.J., 31 December 1993, NoL 333167); 
the diffi.culty of finding a cooperative producer in a raferenee country to determine the dumping margin in respect of the 
allegedly dumping NME country and the compexity of the injury examination (Commi88ion Decision 94/389/EC of 6 June 
1994 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding regarding import& of refined antimony trioxide originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41) ; 
the fact that the Commi88ion had to contact various companies in different ME countries in order to establish normal value 
for the allegedly dumping NME countries (Commission Decision 90/196/EEC of 10 April 1990 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of methenamine (hexam.ethylenetetram.ine) originating in Hungary and Yugoslavia and 
accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the proceeding coneerDing imports of methenamine 
(hexam.ethylenetetramine) originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania, O.J., 24 April1990, NoL 104114); 
the complexity of the proceeding, in particwar the difticulties met by the Commission under the prevailing political 
conditions ('m former Yugoslavia in 1992) in obtaining the relevant data (Commission Decision No 2297/92/ECSC of 31 July 
1992 amending Decision No 2131188/ECSC, accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with import& of certain sheets and 
plates, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Slovenia and the Yugoslav republics of Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia, and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, O.J., 6 August 1992, No L 221136) ; 
the duration of the exchanges of information with the dumping exporter (Commiuion Decision 92/313/EEC of 13 June 1992 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the review proceeding of the anti-dumping measure concerning import& of 
container corner fittings of worked cast steel originating in Austria and terminating the investigation,. O.J., 19 June 1992, 
No L 165/37) ; 
the time spant in consultation within the Advisory Committee (see : Artiele 15 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 6 basic ECSC 
Decision) (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 761190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the proceeding coneerDing 
import& originating in HongKong, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83123; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 
1990 impósing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 30 March 1990, NoL 83129; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic 
of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of those product& from the Republic of Korea, O.J., 
30 March 1990, No L 83/36 ; Oommiseion Decision 90/154/EEC. of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding · 
coneerDing import& of ammonium paratungstate originating in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, 
O.J., 30 March 1990, No L 83/117 ; Oommiseion Decision 90/155/EEC of 26 March 1990 terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of tungsten metal powder originating in the People's Republic of China or the Republic of 
Korea, O.,J., 30 March 1990, NoL 831124; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2735190 of 24 September 1990 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten ores and concentratea originating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, NoL 264/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2736190 of 24 September 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid 
originating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, No 
L 264/4 (corrigendum, O.J., 24 October 1990, No L 292/30); Council Regulation -(EEC) No 2737/90 of 24 September 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten carbide and fuaed tungsten carbide originating in the 
People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional duty, O.J., 27 September 1990, No L 26417 
(corrigendum, O.J., 24 October 1990, No L292/30)). 
1600 C.J.E.C., caae C-121186, 28 November 1989, Anonymos Etaireia Epicheiriseon Metalle.ftikon Viomichanikon kal Na.ftiliakon AR a.o. v 
Council, E.C.R., 1989, (3919), 3955; C.J.E.C., caae C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalcajima AU Preelsion Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 
2164 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ). 
1601 C.J.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo BeCU"ing Compan.y Limited a.o. v Councü, E.C.R., 1987, (1809), 1856 ; C.J.E.C., 
case 258/84, 7 May 1987, Nippon. Seilco KK v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1923), 1971; C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 June 1991, AJ..Jubaü 
Fertilizer Compan.y and Saudi Arabian. Fertüizer Compan.y v Councü, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3212-3216 (Opinion of Advocate 
General DARMON) ; C.J.E.C., case C-216191, 7 December 1993, Rima. ElectrometalurgiG SA v Councü, recital 71 (Opinion of 
Advocate General LENZ) (not yet reported). 
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allow exporters to manipulate the results of the anti-dumping investigation by short-lived price 
increases and is not warranted under European anti-dumping law nor under GA TI anti-dumping 
law1602• Another approach would be illegal in view of the provision that the investigation 
period must cover the period prior to the initiation of the proceeding (see : Artiele 6(1) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 7(1)(c) basic ECSC Decision)1603• 
In principle, anti-dumping duties are a_ppli~ble durlog a. five-year ~riod { Artiele 11.3. GA TI 
Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 11(2) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 15(1) basic ECSC Decision). 
Consequently, a period of six and a half years may have lapsed between the facts which have 
triggered the anti-dumping duties and the last day on which the anti-dumping duties are applicable. 
The circumstances and pricing policies may vary over such a long period. Two remedies may 
1602 C.J.E.C., caae C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail Ferlilizer Company an.d Saudi Arabian. Fertilizer Company v Council, E.C.R., 
1991, I, (3187), 3200 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the Council) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 
1984, No L 19311 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86 of 24 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on impo:rts of 
certain hall hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1986, NoL 167/3. 
1603 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of urea 
originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these 
investigatio:ns, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 31711. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping. duty on import& of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1986, No L 176/1 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 490190 of 26 February 1990 repealing Regulations (EEC) No 1826/84 and (EEC) No 1282/81 imposing 
definitive anti-dumping duties on import& of vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada and the United Statee of America 
respectively, O.J., 1 March 1990, No L 6SI1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200190 of 27 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating. in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 July 1990, NoL 198/67. 
There are, however, 110me exceptions which are prior to 1987: 
in several anti-dumping cases, projected import& have been taken into account (see : •upra, 440-441, note 1126) ; 
in two anti-dumping caèes, increases either in world market and Community market prices, or in the dumping prices, which · 
occurred after the investigation period, have been taken into account (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 
1983 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the form of cathocles 
produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 19 October 1983, No 
L 286/29 ; Cammiseion Decision 841103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
import& of non-alloyed unwrought aluminium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Boviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 
February 1984, NoL 67/19). 
In 1987, the European anti-dumping authorities, in pursuance of Artiele 7(1Xc) of the then prevailing basic EC legislation, adopted 
the general principle as tO the illegality of taking into account developments occurring after the investigation period (this principle 
is now explicitly provided by Artiele 6(1) basic EC Regulation). With regard to the assessment of the volume of the dumped 
impo:rts, they, moreover, in the same year, held that this aspect of European anti-dumping caae law was illegal, because European 
anti-dumping law required only to establish •whether there has been a significant increase• (Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 
22 December 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain deep freezers originating in the Boviet Union, 
O.J., 8 January 1987, NoL 6/1). As similar wordinga prevail in respect of the assessment of the developinent of the dumping 
prices (see : Artiele 3(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(2)(b) basic ECSC Decision), this decision probably also applies to it. 
In two cases dating from after 1987, the European anti-dumping authorities, though, have taken account of decisions taken by a 
number of Community produeers after the investigation perioei (Commission Decision 981376/EEC of 16 June 1993 terminating the 
review of anti-dumping measures adopted under Council Regulation (EEC) 1698/85 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 29 June 1993, No L 157n6 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 
18 October 1993 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisb) originating in 
Japan, Taiwan and. the People's Republic of China, and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, O.J., 21 October 1993, 
No L 262/4). Thia is probably due to the fact that European anti-dumping law allows the taking into account of the actual and 
potential trends in the relevant economie factors for assessing the state of the Community industry (see : Artiele 4(6) basic EC 
.Regulation; Artiele 4(2Xc) basic ECSC. Decision) and, thus, provides an exception to the rule that the investigation periOei m118t 
cover the perioei prior to the initiation of the proceeding. 
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remedy such changes : a review of the anti-dumping duty (Articles 11.2. up to 11.4. GA TI Anti-
dumping Code ; Artiele 11(2) up to (7), (9) and (10) basic EC Regulation ; Articles 14 and 15 
basic ECSC Decision) and an application for a refund (Article 9.3. GATT Anti-dumping Code; 
11(8) up to (10) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 16 basic ECSC Decision)1604• A review bas 
only effects for the future1605• It does not remedy the fact that in the past anti-dumping dutles 
have been paid on non-dumped imports or on dumped imports which did not intliet injury upon 
the Community industry1606• Moreover, a review implies that the investigation will be started 
all over again, which holds the risk that a higher insteadof a lower dumping and/or injury margin 
may be found1607• Therefore, the cost of a review may exceed the expected, but uncertain 
benefits of a successful review. A refund proceeding, on the other hand, directly remedies the 
application of anti-dumping dutles on non-dumped imports. However, the probability of a 
successful request for refund is slight. Though anti-dumping duties are only intended for 
removing the in jury suffered by the Community industry, refunds will not be possible on the basis 
of a reduction in the in jury suffered by the Community industry1608• Moreover, if the 
exporter wholly or partly bears the borden of the anti-dumping duty1609, an increase of the 
export price by the amount of the dumping margin will not always entall the full refund of the 
1604 C.J.E.C., caae C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail FemUzer Company ond SaUIÜ Arabian FemUzer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, 
(3187), 3203 (Report for tbc Hearing : concluaio01 of the Council). 
1605 BELLIS, J.-F., «'lbe EEC Antidumping Syltelll», in Anlidwnping Law and Practice. A Comparalive Study, JAOOON, J.H., and 
VERMULST, E.A. (eda.), New Vork, Harvelter Wheataheaf, 1990, (41), 64; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade of European 
Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to lmp011s from China•, Joumal ofWorld Trade, 1992/3, (5), 35. 
1606 See: CJ.E.C., caae C-358/89, 11 June 1992, Extramet Industrie SA v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (3813), 3836 (Opinion of Advocate 
General JACOBS), whcre Advocate General JACOBS bas held that it is clearly not aufficienl to point to the possibility of a review of the iqjury 
determination at the occasion of the Community producers being found to have violated antitrust taw, aince the exporters, accusing the Cornmunity · 
producers of inflicting injury upon themselves by engaging in anti-competitive behaviour, may very well have suffered irreparable damage. 
1607 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties following the review of the anti-
dumping measures applicable to imports of &ynthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of 
Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of import& of 
synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statesof America, O.J., 22 October 1992, NoL 306/1 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68). 
See e.g. : lithium hydrazide from th.e Uniled State• of America, where the original anti-dumping Regulation imposed a variabie anti-
dumping duty (Council Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 of 29 January 1980 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on lithium 
hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and the Soviet Union, O.J., 30 January 1980, No L 23/19 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 8 February 1980, No L 31/23)}. However, the price on the American domestic market, which was u.eed as normal value 
standard, increased after the conclusion of the investigation, while the minimum price on which the variabie anti-dumping duty 
was determined, aqualed the American dornestic market price as established during the investigation. As a consequence, even if 
the export price• equaled the minimum price, dumping occurred again. Therefore, the original Regulation was reviewed and the 
minimum price wu increased (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2294/80 of 28 August 1980 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 
imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statea of America and the Soviet Union, 
O.J., 30 August 1980, No L 228/59). 
1608 BELLIS, J.-F., «'lbe EEC Antidumping Systelll», in Anlidumping Law and Practice. A Comparative Study, JACKSON, J.H., and 
VERMULST, E.A. (eda.), New Vork, Harvelter Wheataheaf, 1990, (41), 61 ; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade of European 
Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to Importa from China•, Joumal ofWorld Trade, 1992/3, (5), 37; VERMULST, E., and 
WAER, P., «The Calculation oflqjury Margins in EC Anti-Dumping Proceedinga., Joumal ofWorld Trade, 199116, (5), 32. 
1609 lnfra, 733-739. 
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anti-dumping duty paid1610• Since, from an economie point of view, absorption of anti-
161 O In order to 1ee wbetber 1he anti-dumping dutiea paid must be reimbursed, 1he CoDIIDiuion recalculates nonnal value and export price, in the 
ume way as withia the ICope of an ordinary anti-dumpina proceeding (Article 11(9) baaic EC Regulatioa; Artiele 16(1) basic ECSC Decision), and 
comparea the reauiting dumping maraio with 1he ami-dumping duty actually paid. 1be amount by which the anti-dumping duty exceeda the thua 
established dumping mai'JÎ11, will be reimbuneci. 
The results of thia technique are correct aa long u the exporter doea nol bear (part of) the borden of the anti-dumping duty and as long as the 
export price ia oot constructed oa the basia of tbe price at wbicb the product is fint re10ld to an independent buyer minus the costa incurred 
between importatioa aad reule, IUCb as ami-dumping dutiea ( Artiele 2(9) balie EC Replation ; 2(8)(b) basic ECSC Decision). lf bolh thellC 
conditiona are fulfilled, then leu tban the amount by whicb the anti-dumping duty actually paid exceeda the dumping margin, will be reimbursed, aa 
the following numerical example clearly demonstratea : 
during the investigatioa period the normal value and the export price equaled reapectively 120 and 100; 
bence, a dumping margin of 20 was establiabed ; 
conaequently, an anti-dumping duty of 20 ~ wu impoaed ; 
it might be expected lhat the export price, duty paid, will rille from 100 up to 120. This would indeed be so if lhere was no absorption of lhe 
anti-dumping duty. Auume, bowever, lhat lhere is absorption up to 50 ~ of 1he anti-dumping duty. Then lhe export price, duty paid, 
incrcasea only by 10 inatead of20, and will equalllO; 
a88Ume further lhat, after lhe imposition of lhe anti-dumping duty, lhe exporter iocrcases hia export price, duty unpaid, by 20. Hence, if bis 
normal value remaina unchanged, he will nol dump anymore ; 
at Ibis new export price, it might be expected lhat the export price, duty paid, will go up by 24 and will equal 144 (=120+24). However, 
asthereis abaorption of 50 ~. lhe export price, duty paid, willactually will go up by 12 and will equal132; 
since at an export price, duty unpaid, of 120, the exporter does nol dump anymore, a fuU refuad of the anti-dumping duty actually paid might 
be expected. At sucb an export price, the amount of anti-dumping duty to be paid equals 24, which the exporter actually bas paid (the fact 
that he bean part of 1he borden of the duty does nol imply that he does nol have to pay the full amount of the anti-dumping duty). 
However, the exporter will be refunded only 12 inslead of 24. lndeed, a88Ume that the anti-dumping duty is lhe only coat between 
importation and reaale, then lhe price fint paid by an independent buyer will equal 132. 1be Commission will lhen deduct the amount of 
anti-dumping duty actually paid (i.e., 24) out oflhat price of 132 and will obtain a conatructed export price of 108. Since, at such an export 
price, the dumpm, margin equals 12 and lhe amount of anti-dumping duty must nol exceed 1he dumping margin (Articles 7(2) and 9(4) baaic 
EC Regulation; Artiele 13(3) baaic ECSC Deciaion), lhe exporter, according to European anti-dumping law, bas paid 12 too much in anti-
dumping duties. Thia surplus of 12 will be reimbursed to lhe exporter (Article 11(8) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 16(1) basic EC 
legislation), allhough he does nol actually dump anymore and yet bas paid an amount of 24 on anti-dumping duties. 
This technique, which the Commission bas conaistently applied, bas been criticized becauiC it requires exporters aBBOCiated with their importers to 
incrcase the export price by twice the amount of the dumping margin (VERMULST, E.A., and HOOUER, 1.1., «Annotation on Case C-170/89, 
Bureau Européen du Unions de ConsommaleUT'8 v. Commission, 1udgment of 28 November 1991; Case C-105/90, Goldstar Co. Lid. v. Council, 
1udgment of 13 Febnaary 1992; Case C-188/88, NMB (Deuzschland) GmbH, NMB Jtaüa Srl, NMB (UK) LJd. v. Commission of the European 
Communities, Judgment of 10 March 1992; Case 171187, Canon Jnc. v. Council; Case 172/87, Mita Jndustrlal Co. LJd. v. Council; Case 174/87, 
Ricoh Company Lid. v. Council ; Case 175/87, Matswhita Electrlc Jndustrlal Co. LJd and Matswhita Electrlc Trading Co. Lid. v. Council ; CaiC 
176/87, Konishiroky Plwto Jndustty Co. LJd. v. Council; Ca~e 1n/87, Sanyo Electric Co. Lid. v. Council; Case 178/87, Minoha Camera Co. 
LJd. v. Council ; Cue 179/87, Sharp Corporadon v. Council, Judgments of 10 March 1992 ; CaiC C-358/89, Extraniet Industrie SA v. Council, 
Judgment of 11 June 1992», Common Market Law Review, 1993, (115), 110-111). Therefore, Advocate General TESAURO bas argued that the 
full amount of the anti-dumping duty must be reimbursed when lhe prices first paid by an independent buyer are incrcased by an amount equal to 
the dumping margin (C.1.E.C, case C-188/88, 10 March 1992, NMB (DeUlschland) GmbH a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1689), 1712-1715 
(Opinion of Advocate General TESAURO). This point of view, however, cannot be shared. On lhe contrary, the technique applied by the 
Commi11ion and approved by the Court of 1ustice (CJ.E.C, case C-188/88, 10 March 1992, NMB (DeUlschland) GmbH a.o. v Commission, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1689), 1736-1739), is correct inlofar as the exporter does oot bear the borden of lhe anti-dumping duty. Then, it is 
mathematically logicallhat the export price, anti-dumping duty paid, must go up twice the amount of the dumping margin, namely once to stop the 
dumping and once becauiC of lhe payment of the anti-dumping duty. Aa in that case, after a refund proceeding, lhe amount of the anti-dumping 
duty would be fuUy reimbursed, the export price will eventually iocrcase only once ; accordingly, ao dumping occun anymore aad DO anti-dumping 
duty is paid. The alternative approach as suggested by Advocate General TESAURO would in this case eventually result in lhe full rcimbunement 
of lhe anti-dumping duty while dumping is still being pnctised, since lhe unique iocrcase in lhe export price was caused only by the payment of the 
anti-dumping duty and oot by the disappeannce of the dumping. 
However, in caae the exporter fully or partly bean the borden of lhe anti-dumping duty, the approach of lhe Commission and the Court of Justice 
caooot be sustained from an economie point of view. A twofold increase of lhe export price is then too exaggerated. lnstead, it should be 
examined by how much the exporter bears lhe borden of the anti-dumping duty and, for a full rcimbunement of lhe anti-dumping duty, the export 
price must increue by the amount of the anti-dumping duty actually paid plus the amount of the duty nol being absorbed by lhe exporter. 
Finally, it should be poinaed out that lhe approach of the Commission and of the Court of Justice, though partially incorrect from an economie point 
of view, ia entirely loJÏcal from a Ie gal point of view. Their dieregard of a possible absorptioa by the exporter of lhe borden of 1he anti-dumpÎIJI 
duty is, indeed, fully conaistent with the provisions of European anti-dumping law which sanction such absorption by lhe imposition of additional 
duties and, thu1, prohibit absorption. 
The new GAIT Anti-dumping Code, though, might render lhe economie point of view in legal terms. They hold that, when lhe export price hu 
been conatructed, that price must be calculated, in refund proceedings, with DO deduction for the amount of anti-dumping duties when concluaive 
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dumping duties is quite ordinary1611 , refund proceedings will setdom prevent the payment of 
anti-dumping duties in cases where no (or less) dumping is being practised1612• Thus, unless 
evidence is provided that the anti-dumping authorities have actually taken account of any change in oormal value, any change of coats incurred 
between imporun, and reaale, aod any movement in 1he reaale price which is duly retlectecfin mbsequcntselling prices (Article 9.3.3. GATr Anti-
dumping Code). Thia provision may be interpreled u an obligation for the anti-dumpina authoritiea to investigatc whether the e:xporter bean (part 
of)· the burden of the anti-dumping duty aod, if 10, not to deduct the amount of the anti-dumpm, duty. However, it mayalso be interpreled u 
allowing current European anti-dumping case law. In particular, the requirement that any movement in reaale prices is «duly retlectcd in subsequent 
selling prices. may beopen to such an interpretation (VERMULST, E.A., aod HOODER., JJ., «Anoolation on Case C-170/89, Bureau Européen 
des Unions de Con.rOiniiiQUurs v. Commiuion, Judgmcnt of 28 November 1991; Case C-105/90, Goldstar Co. Ltd. v. Council, Judgment of 13 
February 1992; Cue C-188/88, NMB (Deuuchland) GmbH, NMB ltalia Srl, NMB (UK) Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 
Judgment of 10 March 1992; Case 171/87, Canon Inc. v. Council; Case 172187, Mita Intlustrial Co. Lid. v. Council; Case 174/87, Ricoh 
Company Lid. v. Council ; Case 175/87, Matsushila Eleclric Intbutrial Co. LJd and Ma16tuhhtl Electrlc Trading Co. Lid. v. Council ; Case 176/87, 
Konishiroky Pholo lnduslly Co. Lid. v. Council; Case 177/87, Sanyo Electric Co. Lid. v. Councll; Case 178/87, Minolta Camera Co. Lid. v. 
Council; Case 179/87, Sluup Corporalion v. Council, Judgments of 10 March 1992; Case C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Judgment 
of 11 June 1992», Common Marleet Law Review, 1993, (115), 173; WAFR, P., and VERMULST, E., «EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice aftcr 
the Uruguay Rouncl. A New Lease of Life ?-., Joumal of World Trade, 1994/2, (5), 20). 
The new EC anti-dumping legislation, which ha• been enacled in order to adapt EC anti-dumping law to the new GA Tr Anti-dumping Code, does 
not use a clearer wording than the GATr Anti-dumping Code. h stipuiales that, when the export price is conatructcd, the export price must be 
calculaled «With no deduction for the amount of anti-dumping duties paid when concluaive evidence is provided that the anti-dumping duty ia duly 
retlectcd in reaale pricea and the subsequent selling prices in the Community» ( Artiele 11 (1 0) basic EC Regulation). In view of the fact that EC 
anti-dumping law sanctions the abaorption of the burden of the anti-dumping duty (see : Artiele 12 basic EC legislation), it might be argued that the 
wording «the duty ia duly retlecled in reaale prices and the subsequent selling prices in the Community» should logically be interpreled as requiring 
that the anti-dumping duty is fully reileeled in the selling prices ; only in that case, the e:xporter will nol bear (part of) the burden of the anti-
dumping duty. Thi• «logical-. interpretation implies that existing European anti-dumping case law will be maintained. If GATT and EC anti-
dumping law should, nevertheleu, be interpreled as requiring that the reaale prices must only be increased by the amount of the anti-dumping duty, 
they will be too genel'OUI in respect of exporten who do nol bear the burden of the anti-dumping duty. 
1611 lnjra, 736-739. 
1612 The small chance of a succesful application for refund might explain the low num.her of applications for refund (see: 
VERMULST, EA., and GRAAFSMA, F., «A Decade ofEuropean Community Ant-Dumping Law and Practica Applicable to Imports 
from China., Journal of World Traàe, 1992/3, (5), 13). lndeed, only in 51 cases, the refund of undue anti-dumping duties bas been 
reqvtested : Commiaaion Decision 85/19/EEC of 29 October 1984- ooncerning an application for refund of anti-dumping dutiea 
oollected on certain i.mporte of ootton yam from Turkey, O.J., 12 January 1985, NoL 11134; Commission Decision 851166/EEC of 
11 February 1985 ooncerning an applicati~n for refund of anti-dumping duties oollected on certain import& of glass textile fibrea 
(rovings) originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 2 March 1985, No L 63129; CommiBBion Decision 85/207/EEC of 22 March 1985 
ooncerning an application fortherefund of anti-dumping duties oollected on certain i.mports of ootton yarn originating in Turkey, 
O.J., 29 March 1985, NoL 89/61; CommiBBion Decision 85/256/EEC of 2 May 1985 ooncerning an application for refund of anti-
dumping duties oollected on i.mports of certain acrylic fibres originating in the United States of America, 0 . .1., 11 May 1985, No 
L 125/32 ; Comm.iuion Decision 85/319/EEC of 21 June 1985 ooncerning applications aubmitted by Görtz & Co., Duisburg, for the 
refund of anti-dumping duties oollected on certain import& of ootton yam originating in Turkey, 0 . .1., 27 June 1985, NoL 167/50; 
Commiuion Deciaion 85/421/EEC of 1 August 1985 ooncerning an application submitted by ApS Holger Pedersen & Co., Odenae, 
for the refund of anti-dumping duties oollected on certain import& of hardboard from Sweden, 0 . .1., 4 September 1985, No L 237117 ; 
CommiBBion Deciaion 85/515/EEC of 22 November 1985 ooncerning applications eubmitted by Nellen & Quack GmbH & Co KG, 
Gronau, for refund of anti-dumping dutiea oollected on certain imports of ootton yarn originating in Turkey, O.J., 27 November 
1985, NoL 316/M; CommiBBion Decision 861207/EEC of 10 April1986 ooncerning applications submitted by Beckmann & Vagedes 
KG, Bocholt, for refund of anti-dumping duties oollected on certain import& of ootton yarn originating in Turkey, O.J., 5 June 1986, 
NoL 151126; Commiuion Deciaion 861208/EEC of 10 April 1986 ooncerning applicationB submitted by Industrieverband Gewebe, 
FrankfurtJMain, on hebalf of Hecking & Co, Leo Middelhoff GmbH & Co KG and Frottierweberei Vossen GmbH, for refund of anti-
dumping duties oollected on certain importsof ootton yam originating in Turkey, O.J., 5 June 1986, NoL 151128; Commiuion 
Decision 861209/EEC of 10 April 1986 ooncerning applications aubmitted by Carl Weiske, Hof/Saaie, for refund of anti-dumping 
duties oollected on certain import& of ootton yam originating in Turkey, O.J., 5 June 1986, NoL 151130; Commission Decision 
861210/EEC of 10 April .1986 ooncerning applications submitted by ~.rextilveredlungs- und handelsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG, 
Neuenkirchen, for refund of anti-dumping dutiea oollected on certain imports of ootton yam originating in Turkey, O.J., 6 June 
1986, No L 151/32; Commiuion Decision 861211/EEC of 10 April 1986 ooncerning applications submitted by Cotimex GmbH, 
Düsseldorf, for refund of anti-dumping dutiea oollected on certain import& of ootton yam originating in Turkey, O.J., 6 June 1988, 
No L 151134 ; CommiBBion Deciaion 861212/EEC of 10 April 1986 ooncerning applications aubmitted by Textil-Imex GmbH, Bremen, 
for refund of anti-dumping dutiea oollected on certain i.mports of ootton yam originating in Turkey, O.J., 6 June 1986, No 
L 161/36; Comm.iuion Decision 87/232/EEC of 27 March 1987 ooncerning the application submitted by Vita-tex Ltd, Slough, 
United Kingdom, for renmd of anti-dumping duties oollected on certain import& of polyeater yarn originating in the United Statea 
of America, O.J., 1o& April 1987, No L 102126; CommiBBion Decision 881327/EEC of. 22 April 1988 ooncerning applicationa for 
refund of anti-dumping duties oollected on certain imports of certain hall bearinga originating in Singapore (NMB (UK) Limited), 
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O.J., 15 June 1988, No L 148126 ; Commiuion Decision 88/328/EEC of 22 April 1988 conceming applications for refund of anti-
dumping duties collected on certain imporia of certain ball hearings originating in Singapore (NMB (Deutschland) GmbH), O.J., 15 
June 1988, No L 148128 ; Commiuion Decision 881329/EEC of 22 April 1988 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping 
duties collected on certain import. of certain ball hearings originating in Singapore (NMB ltalia SA), O.J., 15 June 1988, No 
L 148/30; Commission Decision 891257/EEC of 21 March 1989 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected 
on certain imporia of hydraulic excavators originating in Japan (Kobemac Ltd), O.J., 19 April 1989, No L 108/1; Comm.iBBion 
Decision 891258/EEC of 21 March 1989 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import. of 
hydraulic excavaton originating in Japan (Oswald de Bruycker NV), O.J., 19 April 1989, No L 108/3; CommiBBion Decision 
89/259/EEC of 21 March 1989 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties ~llected on certain import& of hydraulic 
excavaton originating in Japan (Boeg-Thomsen AIS), O.J.~ 19 April 1989, No L 10815; Commission Decision 891260/EEC of 21 
March 1989 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of hydraulic excavaton 
originating in Japan (Louis Reyners BV), O.J., 19 April 1989, NoL 10817; CommiBBion Decision 89/261/EEC of 21 March 1989 
concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain importa of hydraulic excavators originating in Japan 
(Tridiam Ltd), O.J., 19 April 1989, No L 10819 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 July 1989, No L 216176) ; CommiBBion Decision 89/262/EEC of 
21 March 1989 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of hydraulic excavaton 
originating in Japan (Hitachi Construction Machinery (Europe) BV), O.J., 19 April 1989, No L 108/11; CommiBBion Decision 
89/263/EEC of 21 March 1989 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of hydraulic 
excavators originating in Japan (Equipco SA), O.J., 19 April 1989, NoL 108114; CommiBBion Decision 89/264/EEC of 21 March 
1989 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of hydraulic excavaton originating in 
Japan (C.H. Beuer (Plant Sales) Ltd), O.J., 19 April 1989, No L 108117 ; CommiBBion Decision 90/86/EEC of 22 February 1990 
concerning applications for · refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import. of light sodium carbonate originating in 
Buigaria (lndustrial Resinera Valcan, SA), O.J., 9 March 1990, NoL 60114; CommiBBion Decision 90/87/ECSC of 22 February 1990 
concerning an application for refund of an anti-dumping duty collected on the import& of flat-rolled product& of iron or non-alloy 
steel originating in Mexico and Yugoslavia (l'ransformados Sidenirgicos, SA), O.J., 9 March 1990, No L 60/17 ; CommiBBion 
Decision 90/460/EEC of 6 August 1990 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on the import of vinyl 
acetate monomar originating in the United Statea of America (Gantrade (UK) Ltd.), O.J., 3 September 1990, No L 240/19; 
Commission Decision 90/461/EEC of 6 August 1990 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties CQllected on the 
import of vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United Statea of America (Quantum Chemical Corporation), O.J., 3 September 
1990, No L 240121 ; CommiBBion Decision 90/462/EEC of 6 August 1990 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties 
collectedon the import of vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United Statea of America (Guzman, SA), O.J., 3 September 
1990, No L 240123 ; CommiBBion Decision 91/80/EEC of 4 February 1991 co~cerning the application for the reimbursement of anti-
dumping duties imposed on import& of dense sodium carbonate originating in the United Statea of America (V errerie Cristallerie 
d'Arques - J.G. Durand et Cie), O.J., 20 February 1991, No L 47/8 ; CommiBBion Decision 91/164/EEC of 20 December 1990 
concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of vinyl acetate monomar originating in 
the United Statee of America (Gantrade (UK) Ltd), O.J., 27 March 1991, No L 80/49; Commission Decision 91/165/EEC of 20 
December 1990 concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain the imports of vinyl acetate 
monomer originating in the United Statea of America (Quantum Chemical Corporation), O.J., 27 March 1991, No · L 80/51 ; 
CommiBBion Decision 91/166/EEC of 20 December 1990 concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on 
certain import& of vinyl acetate monomer originating in the United Statea of Alnerica, (Guzman SA), O.J., 27 March 1991, No 
L 80/58 ; CommiBBion Decision 911233/EEC of 9 April 1991 concerning an application for reimbursement of anti-dumping duties 
collected on import. of certain kinds of compact disc players originating in Japan (Harman Deutschland), O.J., 24 April 1991, No 
L 104/44 ; CommiBBion Decision 911283/EEC of 15 May 1991 concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected 
on· certain import& of compact disc players in Japan (Amroh BV - Elektronica & Technische Produkten), O.J., 7 June 1991, No 
L 143151 ; Commiasion Decision 911284/EEC of 15 May 1991 conceming applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected 
on certain import& of compactdisc players originating in Japan (PIA Hi-Fi Vertriebs GmbH), O.J., 7 June 1991, No L 143154; 
CommiBBion Decision 911302/EEC of 23 May 1991 concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain 
import& of compact disc playen originating in Japan (Analog und Digital Systeme GmbH), O.J., 15 June 1991, No L 151186 ; 
CommiBBion Decision 911550/EEC of 26 September 1991 concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on 
certain import& of compact disc players originating in Japan (Analog and Digital Systeme GmbH), 0 . .1., 29 October 1991, No 
L 298/16 ; Commiuion Decision 92/832/EEC of 3 June 1992 concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected 
on certain impo:rts of certain ball hearings originating in Singapore (NMB France Sari), O.J., 4 July 1992, No L 185135; 
Commission Decision 92/833/EEC of 3 June 1992 concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain 
importsof certain ball hearings originating in Singapore <NMB (Deutschland) GmbH), O.J., 4 July 1992, NoL 185/88 ;·CommiBBion 
Decision 92/834/EEC of 3 June 1992 concerning applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of 
certain ball hearings originating in Singapore (NMB UK Ltd), O.J., 4 July 1992, No L 185/41 ; Commission Decision 92/835/EEC of 
3 June 1992 conceming applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of certain ball hearings 
originating in Singapore <NMB ltalia Srl), O.J., 4 July 1992, No L 185/44 ; Commission Decision 93/363/EEC of 9 Jllne 1993 
concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan 
(Amroh BV, PIA Hifi, MPI Electronic), O.J., 22 June 1993, No L 150/44; Commission Decision 94/132/EC of 8 Febru&ry 1994 
concerning an application for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imports of certain polyester yam& (man-made 
staple fibres) originating in lndonesia (Codev Textiles Ltd), O.J., 3 March 1994, No L 59/19 ; CommiBBion Decision 941133/EC of 8 
February 1994 concerning an application for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imports of certain polyester 
yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Indonesia (Ottoman Pacific Ltd), O.J., 3 March 1994, No L 59/21 ; Commission 
Decision 94/184/EC of 8 February 1994 concerning an application for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imporia 
of certain polyester yams {man-made staple fibres) originating in lndonesia (Pax Yams Ltd), O.J., 3 March 1994, No L 59128; 
Commission Decision 941135/EC of 8 February 1994 concerning an application for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on 
l~.-.·_· -
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an exporter successfully applies for a refund, there is no guarantee that anti-dumping duties will 
not be levied on non-dumped imports. 
2. 2. 2. Ratione personae 
The Regulations imposing anti-dumping duties must indicate the name of the supplier, . if 
practicabie (Article 9.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 14(2) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 
13(2) basic ECSC Decision)1613• The scope ratione personae of anti-dumping duties is 
usually defined by a reference to individual producers, whose product is exported to the 
Community1614• Anti-dumping duties are not imposed on exporters, who do not manufacture 
the product, because such exporters are free to purebase from any souree and may change their 
souree of supply whenever convenient1615• lf such exporters export a product manufactured 
by a producer subj~t to an individual duty, that duty will be applied1616• 
Anti-dumping duties are, in principle, not imposed on importers either, because such duties would 
be complex, open to circumvention and probably unworkable since specific dumping margins are 
established for each individual producer1617• They will only be imposed on importers when 
certain import& of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in lndonesia (Rowson & Son Ltd), O.J., 3 March 
1994, NoL 59126; Commission Decision 941136/EC of 8 February 1994 coneerDing an application fortherefund of anti-dumping 
duties collected. on certain importe of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Indonesia (Unicom 
BVBA/Unitrac), O.J., 3 March 1994, NoL 59/27; Commission Decision 941764/EC of 16 November 1994 coneerDing an application 
for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 29 November 1994, No L 804/38; CommiBBion Decision 941951/EC of 12 December 1994 
coneerDing applications for the refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain import& of certain hall hearings originating in 
_Thailand (NMB France Sàrl, NMB GmbH, NMB Italia Srl and NMB UK Ltd), O.J., 81 December 1994, No L 371110. 
1613 Th Eu '-d ' th '' be . fth' ' ' th th'nk: lha Eu '-d ' I I . ' e . ropean anü urnpang au onties aeem oot to _aware o as provasaon, as ey a t ropean anta urnpang aw mere y requarea 
that anti-dumpU., regulationa apecify the country and thc product. Their conclusion that iodividual treatmentis not always required, is nevertheleu 
right (Council Reguiltion (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of 
bicycles originating in the People's Republic of China and coUecting definitively the proviaional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/1; Commiuion Reguiltion (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertaio pboto 
albums originatm, in tbe People'a Republic of China, O.J., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16). 
1614 See e.g. : eerial-impact dot-matriz printer• from Japan., where some producers claimed a general anti-dumping duty applicable 
to all producers. No •uch general anti-dumping duty was imposed because the amount of the price undercutting of one producer 
must not be used for the duty calculation of another producer when the price undercutting margins are individually calculable and 
vary considerably (Council Regulation (EEC) No 8651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& 
of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, NoL 317/33). 
1615 Conuniuion Reguiltion (EC) No 371/94 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of 
large aluminium electrolytic capaciton originatm, in tbe Republic of Korea and Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, No L 48/10. See alao: 
Commiuion Reguiltion (EC) No 892/94 of 21 April 1994 impoaing a provisionalanti-dumping duty on importsof calcium metal originating in the 
People's Republic of China and Ruuia, O.J., 23 April 1994, NoL 104/5, wbere the Commiuion held that the question of individual treatment did 
not arise aince there was only a single dumping producer. 
1616 C.J.E.C., case C-136/91, 1 April 1993, Findling Willzûlger Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollaml Karlsruhe, recital 12 (Opinion of 
Advocate Genenl VAN GERVEN) and conaidention 13 (oot yet reported). 
1617 Council Reguiltion (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a defanitive anti-dumpifll duty on import& of plain paper photocopien 
originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12. 
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the sole producer authorizes bis importers to do whatever is neccesary to create normal conditions 
forthesale of the product concerned on the market and to take appropriate measures1618• 
According to the European anti-dumping authorities, the wording cif practicable» implies that 
individual treatment is not legally required. As to them, «practicable» equals «appropriate», i.e. 
when individual treatment produces a more proportionate and effective remedy against injurious 
dumping1619• There seems, however, to be a clear difference in meaning between the notions 
cpracticable» and «appropriate» : «practicable» refers to whether it is possible to name the 
individual suppliers, whereas «appropriate» rather implies a judgement of whether it is fitted or 
warranted to name the producers individually. It seems that European anti-dumping law, as well 
as GA TI anti-dumping law require, in principle, individual treatment, unless it is impossible to 
name the individual suppliers1620• 
There will be such an impossibility in respect of producers who are not known or who have not 
cooperated. Usually, a general or residual duty is imposed on those producers1621• Their 
dumping margin is assumed to be equal to the highest individual dumping margin 
established1622• As a result, the residual duty can never be lower than the highest individual 
1618 Commiaaion Deciaion 80/599/EEC of 19 June 1980 acccpting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding conceming 
importsof Btandardizcd electtic mulli-pbase moton baving an output of more than 0.75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in the USSR and 
tenninating that proceedina, O.J., 21 June 1980, NoL 153/48. See also: Council Regulation (EEC) No 551/83 of 8 March 1983 impoaing a 
definitivc anti-dumping duty on kraftliner paper and board originating in the United Statea of America and acccpting undertakings given in 
conneetion with thc review of the anti-dumping proceeding on kraftliner paper and board originating in Austria, Canada, Finland, Portugal, the 
Soyiet Union and Sweden, O.J., 10 March 1983, NoL 64/25. 
1619 Commiuion Replation (EC) No 1648/94 of 6 July 1994 imposing a provisionalanti-dumping duty on importsof furazolidone originating in 
the People's Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, NoL 174/4. 
1620 BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement- Selected Second Generationa luuea., in A,;,;tnut and Trade Pollcy in the Uniled 
Stales and the European Communlty, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New Vork, Bender, 1986, (563), 595. 
1621 BOURGEOIS, J.HJ., «EC Anti-dumping Enforccment- Selected Second Gencrationa Issue•, in Antitnut and Trade Pollcy in the Uniled 
Statea and the European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New Vork, Bender, 1986, (563), 595-596. 
1622 Supra, 328-329. 
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duty1623• As it is not actually shown that those producers practise injurious dumping, it might 
1623 8ee e.g. : Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 767/M of 22 March 19M imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain electronic acalea originating in Japan, O.J., M March 1984, No L 8019 (corrigendum, O.J., 17 April 1984, No L 104126); 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/86 of 4 July 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hydraulic 
excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1986, NoL 17611; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2006/88 of 6 July 1988 imposing 
a provisional. anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal impact fully formed character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 8 July 1988, 
No L 177/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/88 of 11 July 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic 
acid originating in Taiwan and South Korea, O.J., 16 July 1988, No L 1Wl; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3661188 of 23 
November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 
M November 1988, NoL 317/33; Council Regulation (EEC) No 34/89 of 6 January 1989 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of serlal impact fully formed (SIFF) character printers originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, No L 6123; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain compact 
disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 20616 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 257/27); Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
compact disc playere originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting defmitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 
January 1990, No L 13121 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on import& of linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, O.J., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 
November 1990, No L 321119) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2686190 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
2089/M imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 
September 1990, No L 266/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7138) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 6 
November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic 
of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 313/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 12 January 1991, No L 9/36) ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3-'21190 of 26 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of aspartame originating 
in Japan and the United Statee of America, O.J., 29 November 1990, NoL 330/16; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3617190 of 11 
~cember 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating 
in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with auch imports, O.J., 16 December 1990, No 
L 361117 ; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 28 December 1990, No L 366126; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
677/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as 
EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 66/1; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure concerning Hong 
Kong, O.J., 14 May 1991, NoL 119/36; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People 's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, O.J., 28 May 1991, No L 133120 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093/91 of 16 July 1991 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-screen colour televison receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's 
Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 18 July 1991, NoL 196/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2805/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts into the Community of certain thermal .. 
paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, No L 270/16; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2900/91 of 1 October 1991 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 with regard to the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of small screen 
colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 2 October 1991, No L 276/24 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yarns (man-made staple 
fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping 
proceeding in respect of import& of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276fT ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 906192 of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of silicon metal originating in 
Brazil, O.J., 10 April 1992, No L 96/17 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1956/92 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, O . .T., 16 July 1992, No 
L 197126; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1994/92 of 14 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the 
Community of outer rings of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 18 July 1992, No L 199/8 ; Commission Decision No 
2297/92/ECSC of 31 July 1992 amending Decision No 2131188/ECSC, accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with import& of 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in the Republic of Slovenia and the Yugoslav republics of Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia, and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, O.J., 6 August 1992, No L 221136; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306/92 of 4 August 1992 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in Brazil and defmitively collecting the amounts secured by 
way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 
1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-braadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating 
in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 7 August 1992, NoL 222/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 January 1993, NoL 13120); Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2M9192 of 28 September 1992 modifying the definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of hall hearings with a greatellt 
external diameter exceeding 30 mm originating in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86, O.J., 1 October 1992, No 
L 28612 (corrigendum, O.J., 25 March 1993, NoL 72/36); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the 
anti-dumping dutie• following the review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of synthetic polyester fibres 
originating in Bomania, Taiwan, Turkey and the Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect of import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 22 October 1992, No L 30611 (corrigendum, O.J., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68) ; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 64193 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the 
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be argued that such a residual duty infringes upon European and GA TT anti-dumping law, for 
they allow anti-dumping relief only against imports which are actually shown to have been 
dumped during the period of investigation, which, by definition, is prior to the imposition of the 
anti-dumping duty, and to have caused injury thereby (Article 5.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; 
Artiele 6(1) basic EC Regulation ; Articles 7(1)(c) and 12 basic ECSC Decision)1624• It 
seems that the European anti-dumping authorities will have to choose between this provision and 
the provision as to the practicability of individual treatment. They have actually chosen to apply a 
residual duty on unknown of uncooperative producers, on the basis of an appealing argument, 
which certainly overrules the objection that these producers are not shown to have been practising 
injurious dumping. The European anti-dumping authorities argue that these producers will quickly 
make themselves known and cooperate when they can prove that they do notdump and/or injure 
the Community industry, or dump and/or injure to a lesser extent1625• 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9/2; Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of outerringsof tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9n; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861193 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic 
disks (3,5" microdisb) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, and collecting definitively the provisional 
duty imposed. O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2887/93 of 20 October 1993 imposing a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 
October 1993, No L 26311 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping measures on 
imports of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O.J., 9 
December 1993, No L 302/1 ; Commis&ion Regulation (EC) No 534194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain magnetic disks (3,5" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 11 March 1994, No 
L 68/5 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 621194 of 17 March 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silicon 
originating in South Africa and in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 March 1994, NoL 77/48; Commiuion Regulation (EC) 
No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of colour television receivers originating in 
Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, 0 . .1., 1 October 1994, No L 255/50; 
Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 3119194 of 19 December 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-
manganese originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, O.J., 21 December 1994, No L 330/15. 
1624 Advocate General Sir Gordon SLYNN infen from Artiele 5.2. GAIT Anti-dumping Code and the Articles 7(1)(c) and 12 basic ECSC 
Decision that the imposition of an anti-dumping duty llhould be determined on the basis of the dumping and the injury durlog the period of 
investigation and oot at the time of the imposition of the duty (C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 June 1991, .Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company and Saudi 
Arabian Fertilizer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3212-3216 (Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon SLYNN)). A fortiori, it 
cannot be determined on the basis of dumping and injury which will perhaps occur afterwards. 
The Court of Justice and even the European anti-dumping authorities have also on severa1 occasions held that the dumping must be established 
durlog the period of investigation and that facta which occur afterwards, must be disregarded (CJ.E.C., case 240/84, 7 May 1987, NTN Toyo 
Beoring Company Limited a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1987, (1809), 1856; CJ.E.C., case 258/84, 7 May 1987, Nippon Seiko KKv Council, E.C.R., 
1987, (1923), 1971 ; C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 Juoe 1991, Al-Jubail Fenilizer Company and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company v Council, 
E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3200 (Report for the Hearing: conclusions of the Council); Council ReJUlation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio ball hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, NoL 193/1 ; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/85 of 24 June 1985 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of eertaio ball hearings and tapered 
roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 Juoe 1985, NoL 167/3). 
1625 Supra, 332. 
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However, they cannot rely on such an appealing argument when imposing individual1626, as 
well as general1627 anti-dumping duties on producers who do not (yet) export to the 
Community. According to the European anti-dumping authorities, such producers cannot «be 
exonerated from the charge of dumping»1628• Thus, producers are assumed guilty until the 
contrary is shown. That assumption may cause a problem, as it goes against GA TI and European 
anti-dumping law which require actual evidence of injurious dumping (Article 5.2. GATI Anti-
1626 See: 
uideo ct.UNUeB from Hong Kong, where a residual anti-dumping duty waa im.posed. It concerned a variabie duty with a 
minimum price equal to the normal value determined for the producertHxporten .. It waa noted that the Co:mmiuion waa 
ready to initiate without delay a review proceeding ü a producer waa able show that he did notexport to the Community 
during the inveatigation period, that he only atarted to export after the said period and that he is not related to or associated 
with any of the producers subject to the investigation (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting 
definitively the provisional duty and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the import& of video tape reels 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 June 1989, NoL 17411). Two companies had never exported own-produced 
video ca.saettea to the Community but were about to begin such export& after the imposition of the residual anti-dumping 
duty. They requested a review of the residual anti-dumping duty. On the occasion of the review, the Council waa unable to 
establish a dumping margin forthese two companies had not yet exported video caBSettea to the Community. Nevertheless~ 
individualanti-dumping duties were imposed, taking the form of a variabie duty, whereby the minimum price was set equal 
to the normal value established for these two companies (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3622190 of 4 December 1990 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 1768189 with regard to the imposition of a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of video cassettes 
originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 7 December 1990, No L 34311) ; 
monoaodium glutomate from lndone•ia, where the Commission proposed to im.pose on producers who had not yet exported to 
the Community an anti-dumping duty amounting to the iJ:üury margin, because the rate of that duty waa below the amount 
of a duty guaranteeing that their (future) export prices would not drop below the level of their normal values (Commission 
Decision 92/493/EEC of 12 October 1992 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping 
meaaures applicable to certain import& of monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia and terminating the investigation, 
O.J., 15 October 1992, No L 299/40) ; 
ferro-silicon. from BrazU, where three producers did not export to the Co:mmunity during the investigation period. For them, 
a dumping margin equaling the weighted average dumping margin of the other cooperating producers was established and an 
anti-dumping duty equal to that dumping margin was imposed (Council Regulation (EC) No 3359/93 of 2 December 1993 
imposing amended anti-dumping meaaures on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, lceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, O . .T., 9 December 1993, NoL 30211). 
1627 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 eatablishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-isopropylidenediphenoloriginating 
in the Uniteel Statea of America, O.J., 22 Ju1y 1983, NoL 199/4; Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 December 1984 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrooie typewriters originating in Japan and tcnninating the anti-dumping proceeding with regani to 
Nakajima All Co. Ud, O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43 ; Commiasion Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 March 1985 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio hydraolie excavaton originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1985, No L 68/13; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 3433/91 of 25 November 1991 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-fueUed, non-refallable pocket flint lighters originating 
in Japan, the Pcople'1 Repoblie of China, the Repoblie of Korea and Thail~nd and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 
28 November 1991, NoL 326/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
cotton yam originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 impoaing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio polyester yams (man-made stapte fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the Pcople'a 
Repoblie of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the proviaional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, No 
L 153/16); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2966/92 of 12 October 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1798/90 in respect of the definitive anti-
dumping duty on eertaio import& of moDOIOdium glutamate originating, inter aüa, in lndonesia and the Repoblie of Korea, O.J., 15 October 1992, 
No L 299/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3642192 of 14 December 1992 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of fermsilicon 
originating in Poland and Egypt and authorizing the definitive collection of the proviJional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 December 1992, 
No L 369/l ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2455/93 of 2 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1798/90 in respect of the definitive anti-
dumping duty on importa of mollOliOdium glutamate originating in Indoneaia, the Repoblie of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, 
No L 225/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 821/94 of 12 April 1994 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon carbide, 
originating in the People'a Repoblie of China, Poland, the Ruasian Pederation and Uknine, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/21. 
1628 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2024/83 of 18 July 1983 establishing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 4,4'-
isopropylidenediphenol originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 22 July 1983, NoL 199/4; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3433191 of 25 November 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lightera 
originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand and defmitively collecting the provisional 
anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 November 1991, NoL 326/1. 
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dumping Code; Artiele 6(1) basic EC Regulation; Articles 7(1)(c) and 12 basic ECSC 
Decision)1629• It is being argued that, nonetheless, there is not any violation of GA TI and 
EC anti-dumping law, as GA TI and EC anti-dumping law allow to name the dumping country if 
it is impracticable to name the individual suppliers ( Artiele 9 .2. GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; 
Artiele 14(2) basic EC Regulation)1630• However, in respect of the cases in which individual 
duties have been imposed on producers who do not (yet) export to the Community, it cannot be 
argued that it was impracticable to name the individual exporters. In the cases in which general 
duties were imposed, it seems that there was no impracticability to name the individual producers 
who did not (yet) export to the Community (in order to provide an exemption intheir respect), as 
they were well-known to the European anti-dumping authorities. The European anti-dumping 
authorities, though, do not rely on that argument, but point out that anti-dumping duties will 
eventually not be levied on non-dumped imports since producers may request a review or a refund 
proceeding (Article 11 basic EC Regulation ; Articles 14 and 16 basic ECSC Decision) as soon as 
they start to export to the Community1631 • This is, however, a poor excuse : it disregards the 
chilling effect of anti-dumping proceedings, the costs to initiate such proceedings, including the 
uncertainty about their outcome1632, and, more fundamentally, it does not tackle the problem 
that producers who do not (yet) export can impossibly practise injurious dumping. Since the entry 
into force of the new GA TI Anti-dumping Code and the new EC anti-dumping legislation, 
another argument is available in favour of the legal~ty of anti-dumping duties imposed on 
producers who do not (yet) export to the Community. lndeed, the GATI Anti-dumping Code and 
EC anti-dumping legislation contain explicit provisions on the review of anti-dumping duties in 
respect of producers who start to export (Article 9.5. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 11(4) 
1629 See alao: BELLIS, J.-F., cThe EEC Antidumping System-, in Antidumping Law and Praclice. A Comparalive Study, JACKSON, J.H., and 
VERMULST, E.A. (eds.), New York, Harvester Wheatlheaf, 1990, (41), 56. 
1630 BOURGEOIS, J.HJ., cEC Anti-dumpingEnforcement- Selected Second Genentions laaue~», in Anlitnut and Trade Policy in the Uniled 
Stales and the Europet111 c:Ommunuy, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 595. 
1631 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3337/84 of 27 November 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on eertaio import& of de01e IOdium 
carbonale originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 29 November 1984, No L 311126 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 
December 1984 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of electrooie typewriten originating in Japan and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding with regard to Nalcajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 
March 1985 impoam, a proviaionalanti-dumpm, duty on importsof eertaio hydnulic excavaton originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1985, No 
L 68/13; Council R.egulation (EEC) No 3433/91 of 25 November 1991 impoaing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of gas-fuelled, non-
retillable pocket flint lighten originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand and definitively collecting 
the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 November 1991, NoL 326/1 ; Council Replation (EEC) No 738/92 of 23 March 1992 impoaing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on jmp01ta of cotton yam originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 27 March 1992, No L 82/1 ; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 830/92 of 30 March 1992 impoaing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio polyester yams (man-made ataple tibrca) 
originating in Taiwan, lndoneaia, India, the People'a Repoblie of China and Turkey and collecting definitively the provisiona1 duty, O.J., 3 April 
1992, No L 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, No L 153/16). Sec alao : BOURGEOIS, J.HJ., cEC Anti-dumping Enforcement- Selected 
Second Genentiona luue&», in Antitnut and Tmtk Policy in the Unired Stales and the Europet111 Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New Yort, 
Bender, 1986, (563), 591. 
1632 STEGEMANN, K., cEC Anti-Dumping Policy: Are Price Undertakings a Legal Substitute for Diegal Price Fixing», Wehwinsch4ftlichu 
Archiv, 1990, (268), 289-290; suprtJ, 679-684. 
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basic EC Regulation). However, those provisions simultaneously confirm the principle that anti-
dumping duties should not apply to imports which are not yet proven to have been dumped. 
General instead of individual duties are also imposed if different rates of duty for each producer 
cannot be calculated 1633• A general duty is also imposed on associated producers in order to 
preetude the circumvention of the higher duties through channeling all exports through the 
producer subjected to the lowest duty1634• For the same reason, general duties are imposed 
on producers established in NME countries, unless the producers show that their business 
decisions are taken independently of the State authorities and that this will also be the case in the 
~ture1635 • Both in case of associated producers and in case of NME producers, individual 
1633 Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, NoL 54/12; Commission Decision No 2131/88/ECSC of 18 July 1988 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, O.J., 19 July 1988, No L 188/14 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ootton yarn originating 
in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of ootton yarn originating in India and 
Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, NoL 271117. 
1634 Commission Recommendation No . 2975/82/ECSC of 8 November 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain 
sheets and platea, of iron or steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 9 November 1982, NoL 312/10; Commission Recommendation No 
376/83/ECSC of 14 February 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or 
steel, originating in Brazil, O.J., 17 February 1983, No L 45/14; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 
imposing a provieional anti-dumping duty on imports of hall hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm 
originating in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No L 152124 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2685190 of 17 September 1990 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and 
Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 25611 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 1991, No L 7/38) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2093191 of 15 July 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of small-screen colour televison receivers originating 
in HongKong and the People's Repuhlic of China and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 18 July 1991, NoL 195/1; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
polyester y8J'Jl5 (man-made staple fihres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Repuhlic of China and Turkey and 
terminating tbe anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of these yams originating in the Repuhlic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 
1991, No L .276fT ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3836191 of 19 December 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imp«>rts 
of dibydrostreptomycin originating in tbe People's Repuhlic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, 
O.J., 31 December 1991, No 36211. 
1635 Council Regulation (BBC) No 830/92 of 30 Marcb 1992 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio polyester yama (man-
made stapte fibrea) originating in Taiwan, lndoneaia, India, tbe People's Republic of China and Turkcy and collecting definitively tbe proviaional 
duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, No L 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, No L 153/16); Commiaaion Regulation (BBC) No 2799/92 of 25 
September 1992 impo•ina a proviaional anti-dumping duty. on import& of dcadbumed (aintcrcd) magnesia originating in tbc Peoplc'a Republic of 
China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/IS; Commiaaion Rcgulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 impoaing a proviaional anti-
dumping duty on importa of magnesium oxide originating in tbe People'a Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/23; Commiaaion 
Regulation (EEC) No 920/93 of IS April 1993 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio magnetic disks {3,5• microdiab) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and tbc Pcoplc'a Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 9515; Commission Deciaion 93/377/EFC of 22 Junc 
1993 tcrminating tbe procccding to review anti-dumping meaaures applicable to eertaio imports of gaa-fuelled, non-refillablc pocket flint ligbten 
originating in the Pcoplc'a Republic of China, O.J., 30 June 1993, NoL 158/43; Commiaaion Rcgulation (BBC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 
imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of fluorspar originating in tbc Peoplc'a Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, No 
L 226/3 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2474/93 of 8 September 1993 impoaing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on import& into tbc Community of 
bicycles originating in the Peoplc'a Rcpublic of China and collecting definitively tbc proviaional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 9 September 1993, No 
L 228/1; Council Rcgulation (EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 imposing a dcfinitivc anti-dumping duty on importa of eertaio magnetic diab 
(J,S• microdiab) on,inating in Japan, Taiwan and tbc Pcople'a Republic of China, and collecting definitively tbe proviaional duty impoaed, O.J., 
21 October 1993, No L 26214 ; Council Regulatioo (BC) No 3664/93 of 22 December 1993 impoaing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on imports 
into thc Community of pbo&o albuma in bookbound fonn originating in the Pcoplc'a Rcpublic of China and collecting dcfinitivcly tbc proviaional 
anti-dumping duty, O.J., 31 December 1993, No L 333/67; Commiuion Deciaion 94/82/EC of 10 January 1994 tenninating tbe anti-dumpina 
proceeding conccrning importa of gum roain orijinating in tbc People'a Republic of China, O.J., 12 February 1994, NoL 41/50; Commiaaioo 
Regulation (EC) No 1648/94 of 6 July 1994 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on impoiU of furazolidone originating in tbc Peoplc'a 
Republic of China, O.J., 8 July 1994, No L 174/4 ; CommiBSion Deciaion 94/389/EC of 6 Junc 1994 tenninating tbc anti-dumping proceeding 
regarding impoiU of refined antimony trioxide originating in tbe People's Rcpublic of China, O.J., 9 July 1994, No L 176/41; Commiuion 
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treatment would be impracticable ; indeed, as they are economically interconnected, it is 
practically impossible to make a distinction between them. 
The case in which a general duty was imposed on two ME producers, though they were not 
associated and individual duties could be calculated, seems to raise more problems. The producer 
with the lowest dumping margin argued that the imposition of such a general duty would be 
discriminatory because it would allow the producer with the higher dumping margin and a lower 
export price to sell at prices ultimately lower than those of the producer with the lowest dumping 
margin. The European anti-dumping authorities did not agree because the price disparity was 
created by the producers themselves and would remaio the same under a general duty, unless the 
producers would decide to alter their pricing policies. Moreover, the European anti-dumping 
authorities held that it is not an objective of European anti-dumping law to bring about an 
alignment of the prices for export to the Community. Such an alignment was considered not to be 
in the Comunity interests because it would reduce competition in a market where only a limited 
number of ooropanies (three) are competing1636• 
Though individual treatment was possible, this case was nevertheless legal. Indeed, the European 
anti-dumping authorities did not refuse individual treatment because of its being impracticable 
(i.e., they did not rely on Artiele 14(2) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 13(2) basic ECSC. 
Decision), but explained that the general duty was more in the Community interests (i.e. , they 
relied on Artiele 9(4) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 12(1) basic ECSC Decision). In terms of 
Community interests, the decision of the European anti-dumping authorities may be endorsed, 
from a legal point of view : pnce disparity between dumping producers cannot be said to be an 
objective criterion to base a differentiated treatment on. It is not objective because it may be 
influenced by the parties concerned. · Indeed, producers in an oligopolistic market (in this anti- -
dumping case, there are only three competitors and a homogeneaus product) are price-makers and, 
thus, influence their prices. From an economie point of view, the anti-dumping case is even more 
important. The European anti-dumping authorities rightly admit that differentiated individual 
duties may result in price alignments, thereby reducing competition. Higher dumping margins 
result from a combination of higher normal values and lower export prices ; higher injury margins 
result from lower export prices, since those margins are usually determined by the margin by 
Regulation (EC) No 1783/94 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importa of furfuraldchyde originating in tbc People'a 
Republic of China, O.I., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11 ; Commiuion Regulation (EC) No 2376/94 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on importa of colour tclcvision receivers originating in Malaysia, the Pcoplc'a Republic of China, tbc Republic of Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand, O.I., 1 October 1994, No L 255150. 
1636 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322186 of 12 August 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of glycine. 
originating in Japan, O.J., 15 August 1986, No L 21811. 
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which the dumping prices undercut the Community producers' prices1637• Since higher 
dumping and injury margins lead to higher duties, lower export prices entall higher duties. As a 
result, the export prices will be allgoed through the use of individual duties1638• Unless the 
price differences are caused by predatory dumping, there is, however, no reason to atign prices. 
Except for predatory dumping, price differences result from differences in efficiency of the 
different competitors on the market whereby the most efficient competitors able to charge the 
lowest price will eventually remaio in the market. Individual duties prevent this result of 
competition, namely that the most efficient competitors charge lower prices. Instead, individuat 
anti-dumping duties result in higher prices, the less efficient producers being guaranteed that the 
prices of the most efficient producers will undercut their own prices. Thus, individuat duties lead 
to a general price increase and price alignment. General duties also increase prices, but they do 
not guarantee a price alignment. Under general duties, a price alignment requires that the 
dumping producers decide by themselves to atign their prices. As a consequence, general duties 
do not distort competition between dumping producers. They should, therefore, be preferred to 
individual duties, contrary to what is provided under European anti-dumping law. 
2.2.3. Ratione loci ~v 
2.2.3.1. Destination 
Anti~dumping duties must be imposed with respect to the whole Community, even when, pursuant 
to GATI and European anti-dumping law (Article 4.l.(ii) GAIT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 
4(1)(ii) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision), the Community is divided in 
several regionat markets. In the latter case, however, the dumping exporters must be given the .. 
opportunity to offer undertakings in respect of the regionat market concerned. If an adequate 
undertaking is not offered promptly or is not met, an anti-dumping duty may be imposed in 
respect of Community as a whole (Article 4.2. GAIT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 4(3) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 13(6) basic ECSC Decision). No format reason is provided for a general 
anti-dumping duty, applicable to the whole of the Community, to be preferred to a regionat anti-
dumping duty, applicable to the regionat market in which dumping occurs. In view of the 
different effects of a general and a regionat anti-dumping duty, the reason is probably twofold. 
1637 Under Europeon anti-dumping law, the amount of anti-dumping duty must not exceed the il\iury margin, i.e., the amount 
adequate to remove the il\iury caused by the dumping to the Community induetry (Article 9(4) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele lS(S) 
basic ECSC Decision) (see: in/ra, 707-708). 
1638 V:ERMULST, E., and WAER., P., «The Calculation of Injury Margins in EC Anti-Dumping Proceeding~»: Joumal oJWorld Trade, 1991/6, 
(5), 30. 
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Figure 18 examines the effects of a general and of a regional anti-dumping duty1639• The conditions under GAIT 
and European aD.ti-dumping law for dividing the Community in two competitive markets, a regional market and the 
rest of the Community, are assmned to be fulfilled. The Community producers within the regional market are 
assumed to sell their production in that market and the demand in that market is assumed to be supplied only by the 
Community producers established in that market and by the dumping exporters. The Community producers 
established in the rest of the Community do not export to the regional market. lt is forthermore assumed that the rest 
of the Community is self-sufficient, for GA TI and European anti-dumping law require that the dumped imports are 
concentraled in the regional market. That situation is twice reptesenled in tigure 18 : the regionat market in tigure 
18(b) and (d) and the rest of the Community in tigure 18(a) and (c). Figure 18(a) and (b) examine the effects of a 
general anti-dumping duty; tigure 18(c) and (d) look into the effects of a regional anti-dumping duty. 
De and Sc represent demand and supply fortherest of the Community; Dr and Sr represent demand and sur~ for 
the regional market. World supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic and the price of the imports is OPw • lt 
is assumed that, within the frameworkof the Community's common external tariff, a customs duty of PwPc is levied 
on all imports into the Community. Thus, originally a general price OPc prevails in both markets. At that price the 
rest of the Community is self-sufficient : the same quantity O'J2 is produced and consumed. In the regionat market a 
quantity Oq10 is consumed, of which CkJs is produced by the Coinmunity producers established in the regionat market, 
the rest, 'lsq10, being imported. 
The imports into the regionat market are dumped. As the dumping exporters do not offer an undertaking, a general 
anti-dumping duty is imposed (Article 4.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 4(3) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 
13(6) basic ECSC Decision). The general anti-dumping duty is assumed to be PcPoA· Consequently, the price of the 
dumped imports will rise to OP GA. The Community producers established in the rest of the Community are not 
subjeeled to the anti-dumping duty. Like the Community producers established in the regionat market, they will also 
benefit from the price increase. As soon as the price rises above OP C• the Community producers established in the 
rest of the Community will export to the regional market. Their willingness to export to the regionat market amounts 
to Me which is the difference between their supply Sc and the demand on their local market De. Thus, the effective 
supply of all the Community producers on the regionat market amounts to abSr+Mc in tigure 18(b). At the price 
OPGA the effective supply curve cuts the demand curve Dr on the regionat market. On that market a quantity <kis will 
be consumed of which the Community producers in the regionat market will supply Ü<I7 and the other Community 
producers '17'18· As the general anti-dumping duty applies also to possible imports into the rest of the Community, the 
Community producers may there also raise their price up to OP GA in the rest of the Community. At that price, 
consumption in the rest of the Community will drop to Oq1• That quantity wiil be supplied by the Community 
producers established there. In total, these Community producers supply a quantity Ü<J4· 
A genetal anti-dumping duty causes welfare effects on both the regionat market and the rest of the Community. In 
the regionat market it causes a fall in consumption with a welfare cost equal to the area def in tigure 18(b). The 
increase in production by the Community producers established in the regionat market entails a welfare cost of beg in 
tigure 18(b ), for more efficient world suppliers are replaced by less efficient Community producers. The general anti-
dumping duty also causes trade diversion : more efficient world supplies are replaced by less efficient intra-
Community trade. The welfare cost equals the areas beih (loss in income from the customs duty PwP c) and cdfg 
(loss in income fr01n the anti-dumping duty PcPGA) in tigure 18(b). Thus, there is a total welfare loss for the 
regional market amounting to the total area bcdeih in tigure 18(b). In the rest of the Community, however, the 
welfare effect is positive. The lossin welfare caused by lower consumption (area ade in tigure 18(a)) and by the use 
of extra and, therefore, less efficient production resources (area bce in tigure 18(a)) are more than outweighed by the 
extra-income whieh the Community producers gain from their exports to the regionat market (area abdc in tigure 
18(a), equaling the area cdfg in tigure 18(b)). The net welfare rise in the rest of the Community, thus, amounts to 
the area abe in tigure 18(a). Figure 18(a) and (b) clearly show that the welfare rise in the rest of the Community is 
lower than the welfare cost in the regionat market. Thus, for the whole Community a general anti-dumping duty 
results in a serious welfare cost. 
1639 The analysis in tigure 19 is based on the economics of international integration, see: ROBSON, P., The Economie• of 
ln.tern.ationalln.tegration., in Studie• m Economie•, CARTER, C. (ed.), London, Allen & Unwin, 1984, 11-30. 
1640 For the sake of simplicity, a perfectly elastic world supply is assumed, especially ~p_rice-mMtliJhl.P 
(an impe~y-~lastic world aupply) wo~d,-~o! ~tel"_~~~~ons. 
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lf, however, a regional rather than a general anti-dumping duty is imposed, the welfare effects will be lower. The 
amount of the regional anti-dumping duty is assumed to equal the amount of the general anti-dumping duty, i.e. , 
PcPGA· The price on the regional market can, thus, at most, go up to OPGA· Since the regional anti-dumping duty 
does not apply to the rest of the Community, the price there will remain OP c· As a consequence, it will be protitable 
for the Community producers to export toward the regional market insofar as the price on the regional market does 
not drop below OPc, which is the price they can get in the rest of the Community. Consequently, effective 
Community supply on the regional market is the curve Pc&Sr+Sc in tigure 18(d). At the price OPRA the demand 
curve Dr intersects the effective supply curve. At that price a quantity Oq9 will be consumed. The Comm.unity 
producers in the regionat market produce a quantity <kl6· The Comm.unity producers in the rest of the Comm.unity 
export a quantity '16Q9 into the regional market, which is equal to their production. As a consequence, they are not 
able to produce themselves the quantity demanded by the consumers intherest of the Community. However, it will 
be protitable to import that quantity from the rest of the world. As in the rest of the Community, the regionat anti-
dumping duty will not apply, the price of the imports will be equal to OP c and at that price a qüantity Oq2 will be 
consumed in the rest of the Comm.unity. · 
Figure 18(c) and (d) show that the negative welfare effects of a regional anti-dumping duty are lower than those of a 
general anti-dumping duty. In the regional market the regional anti-dumping duty of PeP GA causes a decline in 
consumption, the welfare cost being the area def in tigure 18(d). lt causes the less efficient Community producers in 
the regional market to increase their production entailing thereby a welfare lossof beg in tigure 18(d). Furthermore, 
the welfare cost of trade diversion is equal to the areas cdfg and beih in tigure 18(d). Thus, the regional market 
suffers a total welfare loss of bcdeih in tigure 18(b). That total welfare loss is lower than under the general anti-
dumping duty because the price increase is lower, namely PcPRA is smaller than PeP GA· Moreover, intherest of the 
Community welfare is increased by the income from the customs duty PwP c levied on the imported quantity of ~' 
represented by the area PcabPw in tigure 18(c). That area is larger than the welfare gain for the rest of the 
Community under a general anti-dumping duty (the area abe in tigure 18(a)). As a result, the total welfare lossof a 
regionat anti-dumping duty is lower than that of a general anti-dumping duty. 
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The preferenee of a general anti-dumping duty to a regionat anti-dumping duty, thus, cannot be 
explained by their respective welfare effects since the welfare loss of a general duty is larger than 
· that of a regional one. Figure 18 reveals the twofold reason underlying the preferenee for a 
general duty. First, contrary to a general duty, a regional duty does not correspond with the idea 
of the European common market in which only one price prevails and where a common extemal 
tariff is applied to imports1641• Indeed, under a regional duty the price in the regional market 
increases, whereas the price in the rest of the Community remains the same. Under a general 
anti-dumping duty, the prices in both markets increase by the same amount. Second, a regional 
duty does not offer the Community producers established in the regional market as much 
proteetion as a general duty. Indeed, the price increase caused by a general duty will be the 
same, irrespective of whether the Community producers established in the rest of the Community 
or the dumping exporters supply the regional market. Thus, the increase in production by the 
Community producers established in the regional market is not affected, even if trade is diverted 
in favour of the Community producers established in the rest of the Community. As under a 
regional duty, however, the price in the regional market does not increase as much as under a 
general duty, the Community producers in the regional market cannot increase their production as 
much as under a general duty. 
2.2.3.2. Origin 
Anti-dumping· duties apply to the imports from the cóuntries indicated by the Regulation imposing 
·the anti-dumping duties ( Artiele 9.2. GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 14(2) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 13(2) basic ECSC Decision). There is no guarantee that they apply to all 
countries whose dumped imports cause injury to the Community industry. The scope of anti-
dumping duties follows the scope of the anti-dumping proceeding which, in its turn, is determined 
by the complaint fued on hebalf of the Community industry ( Artiele 5 .1. GA TI Anti-dumping 
1641 8ee: Answv of the CommiBBion to written question No 658/80, O.J., 23 October 1980, No C 275/18, where the Commission 
argued that anti-dumping duties must apply uniformly to the whole of the Community territory, in view of the uniform character 
of the common customa tariff. 
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Code ; Artiele 5(1) basic EC legislation)1642• Thus, the scope ratione loci of anti-dumping 
duties depends on the scope of the anti-dumping complaint. However, if imports from other 
countries which, at first sight, seem to be dumped, are not yet subject to an anti-dumping 
proceeding, an anti-dumping proceeding is usually initiated against them1643 , or the anti-
1642 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3308190 of 16 November 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of woven 
polyolefin sacb origi.nating in the People's Republic of China and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such 
import&, O.J., 17 November 1990, No L 31812. · 
According to Artiele 6(1)(b) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 6(6) basic ECSC Decision, the Commission may initiate an anti-
dumping proceeding, when a Memher State comm.unicates suffi.cient evidence to the Commiuion bothof dumping and of i.JVury. 
Those Articles have not yet been applied. 
In pursuance of the new GA'IT Anti-dumping Code .(Article 6.6.), EC anti-dumping law takes explicitly account of the poBBibllity of 
anti-dumping proceedings being initiated by. the CominiBBion, without having received a complaint by or on behalf of the 
Comm.unity industry (Article 6(6) basic EC Regulation). ECSC anti-dumping law does not explicitly grant the CommiBBion the 
authority to start an anti-dumping proceeding on its own initiative. However, it may be argued that Artiele 7(1) basic ECSC 
Decision m.ight provide a basis for such an action since, according to that Article, the CommiBBion has to start the investigation if 
it is apparent that there is suffi.cient evidence to justify the initiation·of a proceeding (see: BELLIS, J.-F., ccThe EEC Antidumping 
System,., in Antidumping LGw and Practice. A Comparatwe Study, JACKSON, Jll., and VERMULST, E.A. (eds.), New York, 
Harveeter Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 47; BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., .EC Anti-dumpingEnforcement- Selected Second Generations Issues-, 
in An.titru.t an.d Trade PoUcy in the Uniled State• and the European. Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (663), 
690; VAN BAEL, L, and BELLIS, J.-F., An#-Dumping cuul other Trade Proteetion Lllw• ofthe EEC, Bicester,CCH Editions, 1990, 
181). With regard to ECSC anti-dumping law, the Commiuion, however, bas held that it •can only carry out such investigations if 
it bas received an adequately documented complaint from the Community industry concernedN (Answer of the Commission to 
written question No 263192, O.J., 19 October 1992, No C 269/34; Answer ofthe Commiuion to written question No 1602192, O.J., 
18 October 1993, No C 280/8). 
1643 C.J.E.C., case C-323188, 11 July 1990, SA Serme• v Directeur de• .ervice• de• douane• de StrCJ8bourg, E.C.R., 1990, I, (3027), 
3037 ; Comm.iuion Decision 80/664/EEC of 4 June 1980 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceedings 
concerning import& of fibre building board originating in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, the Boviet 
Union and Sweden and determining those proceedings, O.J., 11 June 1980, No L 146/39 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 
March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of 
more than 0,76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoalovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Boviet Union, and defmitively eollecting the amounts secured as provisional duties, O.J., 27 March 1987, No 
L 8311 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of urea 
originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting widertakings given in conneetion with imports of urea originating in . 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these 
investigations, O,.J., 7 November 1987, No L 31711; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 699/88 of 16 March 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in Taiwan and South Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72112 ; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3074/89 of 11 October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of welded tubes 
originating in Yugoslavia and Romania, O.J., 13 October 1989, No L 294/10 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 
October 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of small screen colour television receivers originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 October 1989, No L 31411; Council Regulation (EEC) No 386190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those import&, O.J., 16 February 1990, No L 42/1 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
920/93 of 16 April 1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisb) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 21 April 1993, NoL 96/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
993193 of 26 April 1993 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain electronic weighing scales originating in 
Jápan, O.J., 29 April1993, NoL 104/4. 
When potential complainants unofficially seek the advice of the Comm.iuion before lociging their anti-dumping complaint, the 
CommiBBion normally draw& their attention to the need to include dumping from all 10urces (BOURGEOIS, Jli.J., .EC Anti-
dumpingEnforcement- Selected Second Generations lssueSat, in An.titru.t an.d Trade PoUcy in. the Un.ited State• an.d the European.. 
Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (663), 694). 
8ee also: 
wouen. polyolefin. bcw• from the People'• Republic of China and radio-broadcCJ8t receiver. of a kin.d used in. motor vehicle• from 
South Korea, where the scope rati.one loci was not extended because no evidence of dumping by other exporters was provided 
for (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3308190 of 16 November 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of woven 
polyolefin aacb originating in the People's Republic of China and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on 
such import&, O.J., 17 November 1990, No L 31812 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 313192 of 4 February 1992 imposing a 
1
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dumping proceeding is terminated without anti-dumping rellef being granted1644• Similarly, 
an anti-dumping review proceeding is initiated against dumped imports from other producers 
established in the same country of origin not subject to adequate anti-dumping measures1645• 
The principle of non-discrimination, as laid down in GA TI and European anti-dumping law with 
regard to the imposition of anti-dumping duties (Article 9.2. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 
9(5) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(5) basic ECSC Decision), is underlying both 
outcomes1646, though it only guarantees non-discrimination between countries. European anti-
dumping case law, however, extends its scope to exporters established in the same country. Thus, 
the principle of non-discrimination necessitates that anti-dumping duties are imposed on all 
dumping exporters established within the same country1647• 
The application of the principle of non-discrimination is unequivocal in this respect. Countries 
and exporters should be treated the same if their dumping causes material injury to the 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used in motor vehicles, originating in South 
Korea, O.J., 11 February 1992, NoL 3418); 
urea from the GermtJII. Demoeratic Republü; Czechoslovalcia, KuwcUt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Boviet Union, Trinidad an.d 
Tobago an.d Yugoslavia, where the scope ratione loci wasnotextended to urea from Canada, because the Canadian market 
shares on the Community market were negligible (C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 June 1991, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company an.d 
Saucli Arabian. Femlizer Company v CouncU, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3211 (Opinion of Advocate General DARMON)); 
deculburned (•in.tered) magnesia from the People'• Republic of Chi1UJ and magnesium oxide from the People's Republic of 
China, where no anti-dumping proceeding was initiated against North Korea as no trade diversion of Chinese by North 
Korean imports was expected ~md no complaint had been lodged against North Korea. The Commission, though, promised to 
monitor the situation closely and to initiate an anti-dumping proceeding against North Korean imports when, due to trade 
diversion, the Community indUBtry would remain suffering injury (CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2799/92 of 25 September 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of deadburned (sintered) magnesia originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 26 September 1992, NoL 282/15; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 25 September 1992 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
26 September 1992, No L 282/23). 
1644 Council Regulaûon (EEC) No 2907/83 of 17 October 1983 tenninating the anû-dumpina proceeding concerning imports of unwrought 
nickel, not alloyed, in the form of catbodes produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 19 
October 1983, No L 286n9 ; BOURGEOIS, J .HJ ., «BC Anti-dumping Enforcement- Selectcd Second Generationa Issues., in Antitnut and Tmde 
Policy in the United Slales tmd the European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 594. 
1645 Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/83 of 17 January 1983 imposing a deimitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemica! 
fertilizer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, NoL 15/1. 
1646 See also: CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof 
urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on importe of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in 
conneetion with imports of urea originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Yugoalavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2623/88 of 24 August 1988 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, 
Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, NoL 235/5; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3617/90 of 11 
December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded tubes of iron or non-alloy steel, originating 
in Turkey or in Venezuela and accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with such imports, O.J., 15 December 1990, No 
L 351117. 
1647 Commiesion Regulation (EEC) No 1682/78 of 17 July 1978 extending the provisional anti-dumping duty on ferrochro~um 
originating in Sweden, O.J., 18 July 1978,. No L 193/14. See also : C.J.E.C., case C-216191, 7 December 1993, Rima 
Electrometalurgia SA v CouncU, recital 58 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ) (not yet reported). 
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Community industry. Two anti-dumping cases, however, do not comply with the principle of 
non-discrimination. In one case, anti-dumping duties were imposed, but no anti-dumping 
proceeding was initiated against imports from third countries, though there were grounds for 
assuming that these imports were also dumped1648• In the other case, the anti-dumping 
proceeding was initiated against only two exporters, although a larger number of exporters was 
established in the same country1649• Neither of those cases paid attention to the principle of 
non-discrimination. The formal argument advanced by the European anti-dumping authorities in 
the second case that the anti-dumping proceeding was initiated against and, therefore, limited to 
two exporters, does not allow to disregard the principle of non-discrimination. For, in practice, 
the European anti-dumping authorities usually face complainants with the choice of either 
requesting an extension of the proceeding or witnessing the termination of the case on the ground 
of no injury1650., The principle of non-discrimination appears, therefore, to be raised 
arbitrarily. It is probably only invoked to serve the political goals of the European anti-dumping 
authorities. For example, it would not serve their political goals in respect of countries or 
exporters which have concluded an export restmint agreement under the threat of being subjected 
to an anti-dumping proceeding1651 • Such an improper use of European anti-dumping law is all 
the worse because such forced export restraint agreements may be concluded without proof of 
injurious dumping or without evidence that the Community interests call for anti-dumping relief. 
1648 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these products and terminating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22179 ; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38144). 
1649 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of 
video cassette recordera originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 501/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain video cassette reeorden 
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and definitively collecting the proviaional duty, O.J., 28 February 1989, No 
L 57/55. 
1650 VAN BAEL, L, and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping cuul other Trade Proteetion Law• ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editiona Ltd., 
1990, 143. 
1651 BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., dC Anti-dumpingEnforcement- Selected Second Generation lsaueBit, in Antitrust an.d Trade Policy in. 
the Un.ited State• and the European. Commun.ity, HAWK, B.E., (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 594. See also: DAVENPORT, 
M.W.S., 4CThe Enemal Policy of the Community and its Effects upon Manufactured Exporte of the Developing CountrieBit, JourTllil 
of Common. JIGI'Icet Studies, 1990-1991, (181), 195, according to whom anti-dumping actiona often lead to voluntary export 
restraints. 
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Things are even worse, as the Court of Justice bas refused to annul an anti-dumping duty imposed 
on an exporter because of positive discrimination of other exporters1652• This case renders the 
principle of non-discrimination unenforceable. The positively discriminated exporters will have no 
interest in attacking their favourable treatment and the other exporters will have no standing 
before the Court as the anti-dumping determination in respect of the positively discriminated 
exporters is not addressed to the other exporters and is neither of direct and individual concern to 
the latter. 
2. 2. 4. Ratione materiae 
Anti-dumping duties apply to the imparts of the product indicated by the Regulation imposing the 
anti-dumping duties (Article 14(2) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(2) basic ECSC Decision). 
The product is generally identified by its common name, by reference to the combined 
nomenclature and coding system (CN code)1653 , and, if necessary, by an additional 
description. Sometimes, the description of the product is then still too broad so that eertaio types 
or models must be excluded explicitly1654• Each of these elements is decisive1655• 
Anti-dumping duties should apply only to the products mentioned in the anti-dumping complaint or 
to a limited number of them insofar as the conditions for granting anti-dumping relief against each 
1652 CJ.E.C., ca1e 301/85, 5 October 1988, Sharp Corporalion v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5813), 5844 (Opinion of Advocate General Sir 
Gordon SLYNN) and 5852; C.J.E.C., joined cues 260/85 and 106/86, 5 October 1988, Tolcyo Electric Company Lid (IEC) a.o. v Council, 
E.C.R., 1988, (5855), 5894 (Opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon SLYNN); CJ.E.C., joined cases 273/85 and 107186, 5 October 1988, 
Silver Seiko I.JmiUd a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1988, (5927), 5983; C.J.E.C., case C-49/88, 27 Junc 1991, Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company and Saudi 
Arabian Fertilizer Company v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (3187), 3210-3211 (Opinion of Advocate General DARMON). 
1653 Since 1988 the CN code has replaced the Common Customs Tariffsubheading and the NIMEXE code number. 
1654 An appropriate example in this respect is the description of the dumped product subject to the definitive anti-dumping duty 
in electronic typewriter• from .laptlll : 
oómmon nmne : .electronic typewriters, whether or not incorporating calculating mechanism&» ; 
reference to the combined nomenclature code : Jalling within subheadings ex 84.51 A or ex 84.62 B of the Common Customs 
Tariff and oorrasponding to NIMEXE codes 84.51 ex 12, ex 14, ex 19, ex 20 or 84.62 ex 95,. ; 
additional de•cription: •an electronic typewriter is a machine which is steered by microprocessor(&) and which initiates, 
implementil and/or controls its relevant functions by means of software programs. lts main application is printing of text 
derived from a keyboard, even ü an electronic typewriter can be used for additional functions (e.g. computing, communication 
and storage).; 
model. excluded : 
«- Brother : EP 20, EP 22, EP 41, EP 44, TC 600, 
Canon: 8 60 (Typestar 5), 8 60 R (rypestar 6 R), 8 60 (Typestar 6), 
Casio : CW 10, CW 20, CW 26, 
Bilver Seiko : EXD 10, EXD 16• 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewri-
ters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1986, NoL 16311). 
1655 In reapeet of tbc CN code, ace: CJ.E.C., joincd cases C-305/86 and C-160/87, 11 July 1990, Neotype Techmashexpon GmbH v 
Commission and Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, (2945), 2989-2990 (Opinion of Advocate General VAN GER.VEN); C.J.E.C., cue C-90/92, 24 Junc 
1993, Dr Tretter GmbH &: Co. v Hauptzollamt Baden-Warttemberg, considerations13-16 (not yct rcported). 
-------,e-------r---,--- -.-...._-----;::---".3-;;--;._--- -
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type or model of the product are fulfi11ed1656• Sometimes, however, the scope ratione 
1656 See e.g.: 
polyeater ylll"n. from the Un.ited Stales of America: 
provisional anti-dumping duty: tceertain polyester yam originating in the United States of America falling within 
subheading 61.01 A of the Common Customs Tarift', corresponding to NIMEXE code 61.01-23, 26, 26 and 28,. ; as a 
reault, the provisional anti-dumping duty was applicable to aewing thread (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2297/80 of 
29 August 1980 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yam originating in the 
United Statea of Am.erica, O.J., 2 September 1980, No L 23116) ; 
amended proviaional and definitive anti-dumping duty: explicit exception for aewing thread becauae the complaint did 
not relate to aewing thread (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2843/80 of 30 October 1980 amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 2297/80 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yam originating in the United 
Statea of America, O.J., 4 November 1980, No L 294/6 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 of 22 December 1980 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yam originating in the United States of 
Am.erica, O.J., 31 December 1980, No L 368191) ; 
amended definitive anti-dumping duty: explicit exception for yarn specifically manufactured for the woven label trade, 
synthetic absorbable surgical sutures and unfiniahed aewing thread becauae these products were not envisaged by the 
complaint (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3198/81 of 9 November 1981 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3439/80 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yam originating in the United Statesof Am.erica, O.J., 
11 November 1981, No L 32212) ; 
ethan.okunin.e from the Un.ited Statea of America: 
initiation and provisional anti-dumping duty : •ethanolamines falling within CN codes 2922 11 00, 2922 12 00 and 
2922 13 00. (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of ethanolamine originating in the 
United Statea of Am.erica, O.J., 8 August 1992, No C 201112 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2172193 of 30 July 
1993 impoaing provisional anti-dumping duties on import& of ethanolamine originating in the United States of Am.erica, 
O.J., 4 August 1993, No L 19616) ; . 
definitive anti-dumping duty : .ethanolamine, with the exclusion of aalt of ethanolamine, falling within CN codes 
ex 2922 11 00, ex 2922 12 00 and ex 2922 13 00.. aince salts made from ethanolamine are not covered by the complaint -
and the proceeding (Council Regulation (EC) No 229194 of 1 February 1994 impoaing definitive anti-dumping duties on 
import& into the Community of ethanolamine originating in the United States of Am.erica, and collecting definitively 
the provisional anti-dumping duties, O.J., 2 February 1994, No L 28/40) 
See also : Council Regulation (EEC) No 3002/86 of 28 October 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1986, No L 288/6 ; Commission. 
Regulation (EEC) No 3476186 of 9 December 1986 amending Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2823/86 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain clogs originating in Sweden, O.J., 11 December 1986, No L 333/18 ; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 113/86 of 20 January 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 23 January 1986, NoL 1712; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2127/86 of 7 July 
1986 amending Begulation (EEC) No 1698/86 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan, O.J., 9 July 1986, No L 187/3; Council Regulation (EEC) No 647/87 of 23 February 1987 amending 
Begulation (EEC) No 1698/86 imposing a definitive duty on imports of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 26 
February 1987, No L 6611 (corrigendum, O.J., 11 March 1987, No L 66121); Council Regulation (EEC) No 164/88 of 18 January 
1988 amending Begulation (EEC) No 1698/86 imposing a definitive duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, 
0 . .1., 22 January 1988, NoL 18/4; Commission Decision No 1324/89/ECSC of 12 May 1989 amending Decision No 708/89/ECSC 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, cold-rolled, originating 
in Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 May 1989, No L 13316; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2904/91 of 27 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dwnping duty on imports of certain polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, Indonesia, 
India, the People'• Bepublic of China and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of these yarna 
originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 1991, No L 276/1 ; CommiBBion Begulation (EEC) No 2800/92 of 26 September 
1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of magnesium oxide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 
26 September 1992, NoL 282123; CommiBBion Decision No 67194/ECSC of 12 January 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping· 
duty on import. into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, O.J., 16 January 
1994, No L 1216. 
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materiae of anti-dumping duties is extended1657 beyond the scope of the anti-dumping 
1657 In many cases the scope ration.e materiae bas been modified during the anti-dumping proceeding. In principle, a modification 
of the scope ration.e materiae is illegal when it implies that anti-dumping rellef ie granted against product& for which no anti-
dumping proceediug is initiated. 
Sometimes, however, thoae modifications are not illegal, namely when: 
they are mieprints which are not noticed and therefore not rectified 
8ee e.g. : ootton yarn from Brazil and Tu.rlcey : 
initiation: H8 codes 5206 and 5206 (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of cotton 
yarn notput up for retail sale originating in Brazil, Egypt, India, Thailand and Turkey, O.J., 22 March 1990, No 
c 72/3); 
provisional anti-dumping duty : CN codes 5205 11 00 to 5205 45 90 and 5206 11 00 to 5206 45 90 (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2818191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton yarn 
originating in Brazil, Egypt and Turkey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of cotton yarn 
originating in India and Thailand, O.J., 27 September 1991, No L 271117) ; 
definitive anti-dumping duty : CN codes 5205 11 00 to 5205 45 90 and 5211 00 to 5206 45 90 (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 830192 of 30 March 1992 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain polyester yams (man-made 
staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 3 April 1992, NoL 88/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 5 June 1992, NoL 153116)), where 
CN code 5211 00 probably should be read as CN code 5206 11 00 ; 
reviews and amended defmitive anti-dumping duty : CN codes 5205 11 00 to 5205 45 90 and 5206 11 00 to 5206 45 90 
(Notice of initiation of a review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of cotton yarn, originating in Brazil and 
Turkey, O.J., 23 September 1992, No C 244/14; Notice ofinitiation of a review ofRegulation (EEC) No 738192 imposing 
a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of cotton yam, originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 11 May 1993, No 
C 13112; Council Regulation (EC) No 3203193 of 22 November 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No .738192 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of cotton yarn, originating in Brazil and Turkey, O.J., 24 November 1993, No 
L 289/1), where the mieprint in the definitive anti-dumping duty was not copied ; 
they are in fact rectifications of mieprints 
See e.g. : upright piano• originating in the USSR : 
initiation and provisional anti-dumping duty (before rectification) : tariff subheading 92.01 Al and Nimexe code 92.01-
11 (Notice of extension of the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of upright pianos, initiated against the 
German Demoeratic Republic and Poland, in order to · include the import& of upright pianos originating · in 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR, O.J., 23 July 1981, No C 18113; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 871182 of 14 April 
1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on upright pianos originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 April 1982, No 
L 101130); . 
j,rovisional and definitive anti-dumping duty (after rectification) : tarift' subheading ex 92.01 A I and Nimexe code 
92.01-12 (Commi&&ion Regulation (EEC) No 871/82 of 14 April 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
upright pianos originating in the USSR, O.J., 16 April 1982, No L 101/30 (corrigendum, O.J., 29 April 1982, No 
L 115122) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2236/82 of 11 August 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on upright 
pianos originating in the USSR, O.J., 13 August 1982, No L 23811 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 September 1982, No 
L 271120)); 
they are adaptations in respect of modifications in the CN codes 
See e.g. : DRAM• from .Japan (see: C.J.E.C., case C-30193, 2 June 1994, AC-ATEL Electronics Vertriebs GmbH v 
Hau.ptzolkunt München.-Mitte, E.C.R., 1994, I, (2305), 2325-2326): 
initiation: DRAMs falling within CN codes ex 8542 1110 (wafers), ex 8542 11 30 (dice) and ex 8542 11 71 (finished 
DRAMa) (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain types of electronic 
microcircuit. known as DRAMs (Dynamic Random AcceBB Memorie&) originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 9 July 1987, No 
c 18113); 
provisional and defmitive anti-dumping duty : DRAMS falling within CN codes 8542 11 41, 8542 11 43, 8542 11 45, ex 
8542 1110, ex 8542 11 30, ex 8473 30 00 and ex 8548 00 00 (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs 
(dynamic random acceu memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of theae product& and terminating the investigation in 
their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, NoL 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, NoL 22!19; corrigendum, O.J., 
10 February 1990, No L. 38/44) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acceu 
memorieB) originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, 0 . .1., 25 July 1990, NoL 19311); 
(See also : Notice of initiation of a partial review of anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain types of electronic 
microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 17 July 1992, No 
c 181f1). 
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complaint1658• The prevention of circumvention1659, the impossibility to make a 
1658 Th . . h bee _._ ded • e scope ratione materr.ae as n e .. ...,n m : 
photographic en.kvger• from Poltuul an.d the USSR : 
initiation : photographic enlargers for amateur use falling under subheading ex 90.09 of the Common Customs Tariff 
oorreeponding to NIMEXE code ex 90.09-30 (O.J., 23 October 1981, No C 27114) ; 
provisional anti-dumping duty : .photograhic enlargers, falling under subheading ex 90.09 of the Common Customa 
Tariff' (NIMEXE code ex 90.09-30). (Commi88ion Regulation (EEC) No 1958182 of 16 July 1982 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of photographic enlargers originating in Poland and the USSR, accepting an undertaking 
and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of photographic enlargers originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 21 
July 1982, No L 212132) ; 
light aodium carbonale from Bulgaria, the German. Democratie Republü; Polan.d, Roman.ÜJ an.d the Boviet Un.ion.: 
initiation and provisional and definitive anti-dumping duty : product& Jalling within subheading 28.42 A ex ll of the 
Common Cuetome Tarift', oorrasponding to NIMEXE code ex 28.42-31» (888 e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 273183 of 
1 February 1983. imposing a defurltive anti-dumping duty on import& of light aodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, 
the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 3 February 1983, No L 32/1) ; 
amended defurltive anti-dumping duty : product& afalling within aubheading 28.42 A ex ll of the Common Customs 
Tariff', with or . without the addition of sand, falling within subheading 38.19 ex X - oorreeponding to NIMEXE code 
ex 28.42-31 or ex 38.19-99. because mixing the product with small quantities of sand does not give rise to any change 
in the use to which it is put (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1946/86 of 24 June 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
273183 impoaing a defurltive anti-dumping duty on import& of light aodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union, O.J., 26 June 1986, No L 169/1) ; 
electron.ic typewriter• from Japan. : 
initiation and provisional anti-dumping duty : product& falling within subheadings ex 84.51 A of the Common Customs 
Tariff' and oorreeponding to NIMEXE codes 84.51 ex 14, ex 19, ex 20 (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 24 March 1984, No C 8314 ; Com.mi88ion 
Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, 
O.J., 22 December 1984, NoL 336/43); 
definitive anti-dumping duty : product& falling within subheadings ex 84.51 A or ex 84.52 B of the Common Customs 
Tariff' and oorreeponding to NIMEXE codes 84.51 ex 12, ex 14, ex 19, ex 20 or 84.52 ex 95, in order to oomprise 
electronic typewriters with a calculating mechanism (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, No 
L 16311); 
compact cliac plo.yer• from Japan. an.d the Republic of Korea : 
initiation : certain compact disc· players falling under subheading ex 92.11 A ll a) of the Common Customs Tariff and 
Nimexe code ex 92.11-20, i.e., stand-alone sound reproducers, including sound reproducers which may be incorporated.in 
a «!'ach system, but can neverthele88 · operate alone separately from the «J"ack• aystem (Notice of initiation of an anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of compactdisc players originating in South Korea and Japan, O.J., 7 July 
1987, No C 178fT) ; 
provisional and definitive anti-dumping duty, initiation of review proceeding and initiation about an additional anti-
dumping duty : certain compact disc players falling within CN code ex 8519 99 10, i.e., stand-alone sound reproducers, 
including sound reproducers which may be incorporated in a «J"ack• aystem, but can neverthele88 operate alone 
separately from the «J"ack• ayetem (Commi88ion Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 
1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No L 257/27) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112190 of 16 
January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan 
and the Republic of Korea and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 17 January 1990, NoL 13121; Notice of 
initiation of a partial review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of certain compact disc playera originating 
in Japan and the Republic of Korea (Accuphase Laboratory lnc.), O.J., "July 1991, No C 17313; Notice of initiation of 
an investigation provided for in Artiele 13(11) of anti-dumping Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 concerning import& of 
compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 5 July 1991, No C 174/15) ; 
amendeel defurltive anti-dumping duty: certain compact disc players falling within CN codes ex 8519 3100, 
ex 8519 39 00, ex 8519 99 10, ex 8520 31 90, ex 8520 39 10, ex 8520 39 90 and ex 8527 31 91, i.e., stand-alone sound 
reproducers, including sound reproducers which may be incorporated in a «J"&ek• aystem, but can neverthele88 operate 
alone separately from the «!'ach aystem. This extension was neceuary in order to include also compact disc players 
incorporated in a «!'ach system where another apparatus givea the «!'ach system its e88ential characteristics (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 819/92 of 30 March 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 112190 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 2 April1992, NoL 87/1); 
thermal paper from JtJ[KIII. : 
initiation : thermal paper falling within CN code ex <&810 11 90. But the Notice of initiation also reaels that •• 
divergence of opinion exists among certain Community customa authorities concerning the tariff classification of this 
product u in some Memher Statea it is clauified · within CN code ex 3703 90 go,. (Notice of initiation of an anti-
dumping proceed.ing concerning import& into the European Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, 
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O.J., ~ January 1991, No C 1613) ; 
proviaional anti-dumping duty : thermal paper falling within CN codes ex 3703 90 90 and ex 4810 11 90 (CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2805191 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the 
Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 26 September 1991, No L 270/15) ; 
adaptation of the CN codes and definitive anti-dumping duty : thermal paper falling within CN codes ex 3703 10 00, 
ex 3703 90 90, ex -&809 90 00, ex "-810 11 90, ex 4811 90 10, ex 4811 90 90, ex 4823 59 10 and ex 4823 59 90 (Notice 
relating to the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& into the Europaan Community of certain thermal paper 
originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1991, No C 33417; Council Regulation (EEC) No 729192 of 16 March 1992 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain thermal paper originating in Japan and defmitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 26 March 1992, No L 8111 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 May 1992, No 
L 138140)); 
fluor•par from the People'• Republic of ChinG : 
initiation : fluonpar presenteel in filter cake form which is alleged to fall within CN codes 2529 21 00 and 2529 22 00 
(Notice of initiation of an Anti-dumping proceeding concerning import. of fluorapar originating in the People's Republic 
of China, O.J., 25 April1992, No C 105123) ; 
extension of the anti-dumping proceeding : fluorspar presented in filter cake form and in powder form (Notice relating 
to the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 4 
August 1993, No C 210/6) ; 
provi•ional and definitive anti-dumping duty : fluorspar presented in filter cake form and in powder form falling within 
CN codes ex 2529 21 00 and ex 2529 22 00 (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 September 1993 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 
1993, No L 226/3 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 486194 of 4 March 1994 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on 
import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional anti-
dumping duty, O.J., 5 March 1994, NoL 6211); 
television. CGmera •y•tem• from Japan : 
initiation : telavision camera systems which are alleged to fall within CN codes ex 8525 30 99, ex 8537 10 91, 
ex 8537 10 99, ex 8529 90 98 and ex 8543 80 80 (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& 
of certain telavision camera systems originating in Japan, O.J., 10 March 1993, No C 67/8) ; 
provisional anti-dumping duty : telavision camera systems falling within CN codes ex 8525 30 99, ex 8537 10 91, 
ex 8537 10 99, ex 8529 90 98, ex 8543 80 80, ex 8528 10 31, ex 8528 10 41 and ex 8528 10 49 (CommiBBion Regulation 
(EEC) No 3029193 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of telavision camera systems 
originating in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, NoL 271/1). 
See also: 
ball betU"ing• from Japan : 
initiation and provisional and definitive anti-dumping duty : «single-row deep-groove radial hall hearings with an 
outaide diameter of up to 30 mm falling within ON-code ex 8482 10 10. (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 14 July 1983, No 
C 18818; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 744184 of 19 March 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on·· 
import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 23 March 1984, No L 79/8 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 29 March 1984, NoL 86131); Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, NoL 19311, 
as amended by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 486/88 of 22 February 1988 amending the regulations, 
recommendations and decisions imposing anti-dumping duties, O.J., 24 February 1988, NoL 50/5); 
initiation of review proceeding : «all hall hearings with graatest external diameter not exceeding 30 mm, i.e. including 
angular contact, thrust ball hearings etc .• (O.J., 18 June 1988, No C 15912), though the scope of a review proceeding 
cannot he broader than the anti-dumping maaslires to he reviewed for otherwise it would he a new proceeding ; 
hydrau.lic UCGVtdor• from Japon : 
initiation and provisional and defmitive anti-dumping duty : «&elf-propelled hydraulic excavators, track-laying or 
wheeled, of a total oparating weight exceeding six tonnes but not exceeding 35 tonnes, equipped with a single bucket 
mounted on a boom capable of pivoting through 360°, or intended to he so equipped, falling within CN code 
ex 8429 52 00. (Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of hydraulic excavators 
originating in Japan, O.J., 31 July 1984, No C 201/3; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 March 1985 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 8 
March 1985, NoL 68113; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1877/85 of 4 July 1985 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on import& of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 6 July 1985, No L 17611, as amended by 
Oommiseion Regulation (EEC) No 486/88 of 22 February 1988 amending the regulations, recommendations and 
deciaions imposing anti-dumping duties, O.J., 24 February 1988, NoL 50/5); 
proceeding concerning the aBSembly of the dumped product within the Community : hydraulic excavators falling within 
not only CN code ex 8429 52 00, but also CN code ex 8429 59 00 (CommiBBion Decision 881225/EEC of 18 April 1988 
terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 concerning certain hydraulic 
excavaton assembied or produced in the Community, O.J., 20 April 1988, No L 101124), though the proceeding 
concerning the usembly of the dumped product within the Community (Article 13(10) former basic EC Regulation) ia 
only pouible with regard to product& subject of defmitive antiidumping duties (see : in.fra, 722) ; 
urea from Trmickld and Tobergo and Venezuela: 
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distinction between the different products1660, the almost identical character of the 
products1661 , and the different interpretations placed by the customs authorities of the different 
initiation, provisional anti-dumping duty and undertaking in respect of Trinidad and Tobago : . ure a falling within 
subheadings ex 31.02 B and ex 31.02 C of the Common Customs Tariff and Nimexe codes ex 31.02-15 and ex 31.02-80 
(Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of urea originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic, Yugoslavia, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the BoViet Union, Trinidad and Tobago and Czechoslovakia, O.J., 
11 October 1986, No C 254/3 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty ·on import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No SSS9/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of urea originating in Libya 
and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertak.ings given in conneetion with import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, 
the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these 
investigatioll8, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 31711); 
initiation in respect of Venezuela: urea falling within subheadings 31.02 B and ex 31.02 C of the Common Customs 
Tariff and Nimexe codes 31.02-15 and 31.02-80 (Notice of extension of the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& 
of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Boviet 
Union, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, in order to include the import& of the said product originating in Austria, 
Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, tbe United Statee of America and Venezuela, O.J., 9 October 1987, No C 27114); 
provisional and definitive anti-dumping duty in respect of Venezuela : urea falling within CN codes 3102 10 10 and 
3102 10 99 (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 25 August 1988, 
No L 235/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 450/89 of 20 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of urea originating in the United Statee of America or Venezuela and adjusting the definitive anti-dumping 
duty for Saudi Arabia laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 24 February 1989, NoL 52/1); 
initiation of review proceeding in respect of Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela : urea falling within CN codes 
3102 10 10, 3102 10 99 and 3102 10 91 (Notice of review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of urea 
originating in Trinidad and Tobago or in Venezuela, O.J., 2 March 1991, No C 55/4), though the review proceeding 
(Article 11.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 11(2) up to (7) basic EC Regulation; Artiele 14 basic ECSC Decision) 
is only possible with re gard to product& subject of the original anti-dumping proceeding (see : infra, 722) ; 
amended underta.king in respect of Trinidad and Tobago and amended definitive anti-dumping duty in respect of 
Venezuela : urea falling within CN codes 3102 10 10 and 3102 10 99 (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2835191 ·of 23 
September 1991 amending a definitive anti-dumping duty following a partial review of anti-dumping measures 
coneerDing import& of urea originating in Venezuela and terminating the review of anti-dumping measures coneerDing 
import& of urea originating in Trinidad and Tobago, O.J., 28 September 1991, No L 272/10 (corrigendum, O.J., 22 
October 1991, No L 290/44)). 
1659 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 of 19 June 1985 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1985, NoL 16311; O.J., 18 June 1988, No C 159/2; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1946/86 of 24 June 1986 amending Regulation (EEC) No 273183 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of light sodium 
carbonate originating in Bulgaria, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland, Romania and the. Boviet Union, O.J., 26 June 1986, 
NoL 169/1. 
1660 Bee: photograph.ic enlargers from Polan.d and the USSR, where the anti-dumping duty was imposed on all photographic 
enlargers, though the anti-dumping complaint and proceeding concerned only photographic enlargers for amateur use ; the anti-
dumping duty was imposed on all photographic enlargers because it was difficult to define for customs purposes the term •amateur 
use» since all enlargers imported from the dumping country are used for amateur use (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1958/82 of 
16 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of photographic enlargers originating in Poland and the USSR, 
accepting an undertaking and terminating the proceeding in respect of import& of photographic enlargers originating in 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 21 July 1982, No L 212/32). 
1661 Notice relating to the anti-dumping proceeding conceming importl if fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 4 Auguat 
1993, No C 210/6. 
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Memher States on the combined nomenclature and coding system 1662 are invoked as a 
justification of the extension of the scope ratione materiae. Whatever the reason may be, this 
extension of the scope ratione materiae is illegal1663 as it entails the imposition of anti-
dumping duties on products against which no anti-dumping proceeding is initiated 1664• 
Furthermore, when the scope ratione materiae is extended, it occurs not during the anti-dumping 
investigation, but when the anti-dumping duty is imposed1665• Thus, the products to which 
the scope ratione materiae is extended, are not subjected to the anti-dumping investigation. 
Consequently, they are not shown to have been dumped, nor has it been assessed whether their 
dumping caused in jury. The extension of the scope ratione materiae implies that anti-dumping 
duties are imposed on products in respect of which it is not shown that the conditloos for 
imposing anti-dumping duties are fulftlled. This is at varianee with GA TI and European anti-
dumping law which only allowan anti-dumping duty to be imposed on products which are shown 
to have been dumped and to have been causing injury to the Community industry (Article V1(2) 
GATT ; Articles 7.1. and 9.2. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Articles 7(1) and 9(4) basic EC 
Regulation ; Articles 2(1), 11(1) and 12(1) basic ECSC Decision)1666• 
1662 CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 165/90 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random acce88 memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of these products and terminating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 26 January 1990, No L 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22f19; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 38144); Notice relating to the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& into the 
Europaan Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, O.J., 28 December 1991, No C 334!7 ; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 3029193 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on import& of telavision camera systems originating 
in Japan, O.J., 30 October 1993, No L 27111. 
1663 In ball bearing• from Japan, the Europaan anti-dumping authorities did not pronounee on the legality ofthe extension ofthe 
scope ratione materiae of the review proceeding because th~ extension was in fact not justified (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2686/90 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
· certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 20 September 1990, No L 266/1 (corrigendum, O.J., 10 January 
1991, No L 7/38)). 
1664 Since 1992, the noticea of initiation of new anti-dumping prooecdinga are less affinnative than before in respect of the delimitation of the 
prooeeding in terms of the CN code. Instead of staling that the product is cfalling within CN codea •••• , it is now being asserted that «it is allegeel 
that the product falla within CN code• ••. •, wbicb leavea more room for adapting the CN codea and is certainly aimed at precluding that a 
modification or e:xtenaion of the CN codea durlog the prooeeding are Nid to be at varianee with GA IT and European anti-dumping law. 
1665 Sec, bowever : fluorspar Jrom the People's RepubUc of Olina, wbere the e:xtension of the scope ratione materlae took place durlog the anti-
dumping invelltigation (Notice relating to the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 4 Auguit 1993, No C 210/6). Strictly legally apeaking, thia e:xtenaion doea oot cause a problem. In practice, it does oot conatitute 
sucb a great dift'ereoce with the otber cases in wbicb the e:xtension incurred on the occasion of the imposition of the anti-dumping duty. Indeed, the 
investigation aa to the producll newly included look leas than one month (the e:xtension dates from 4 August 1993 and the provisional anti-dumping 
duty was imposed on 1 September 1993 (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2463/93 of 1 September 1993 (imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imporll of fluonpar originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 September 1993, NoL 226/3), wbereas it took one year and 
five months to examine the produels wbicb fell from tbe start under the anti-dumping proceeding (the notice of initiation dates from 25 April 1992 
(Notice of initiation of an Anti-dumping prooeeding concerning importa of fluorspar originating the People's Republic of China, O.J., 2S April 
1992, No C 105123)). Even more so, the Commiuion bad only twelve days to invelltigate the newly included produels since the intereliled partiea 
bad fiftcen days to lUbmil their view on the e:xtension of the proceeding to the Commiuion (Notice relating to the anti-dumping proceeding 
conceming imporll of fluorspar originating in the People'a Republic of China, O.J., 4 Auguit 1993, No C 210/6). 
1666 C.J.E.C., cue C-90/92, 24 June 1993, Dr Treuer GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Badm-Wilruemberg, recital 5 (Opinion of Advoacte Genent 
Gulmann) and conaideration 9 (oot yet reported). 
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2.3. AMOUNT OF DUTY 
The amount of anti-dumping duty must not exceed the dumping margin1667• The «desire» 
expressed in GA IT anti-dumping law that the amount of duty be less than the dumping margin, if 
such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the Community industry, is translated 
into a legal obligation1668 in European anti-dumping law ( Artiele 9 .1. GA TT Anti-dumping 
Code ; Articles 7(1) and 9(4) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(3) basic ECSC Decision)1669• 
Thus, the amount of anti-dumping duty depends on the injury margin (also called «injury 
1667 In one anti-dumping case, however, the am.ount of duty exceeded the dumping margin: the dumping margin of R & M 
International Salee Co. am.ounted to 2.6 %, whereas an anti-dumping duty of 6.6 % was imposed (Comm.ission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statea of America or Yugoslavia, O.J., 17 June 1988, NoL 161/47). Of course, this 
case is illegal, unless the difference between the dumping margin and the amount of anti-dumping duty is due to some misprint or 
perhaps a miscalculation of the dumping margin. lndeed, the relevant dumping margin is the real dumping margin : if errors are 
made in the computation of the dumping margin, the anti-dumping duty remains valid as long as it does not exceed the real 
dumping margin (C.J.E.C., case 250/86, 6 October 1988, Brather Industrie• Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6683), 6724; C.J.E.C., 
joined cases 260/86 and 106/86,6 October 1988, Tokyo Electric Compan.y Ltd (TEC) a.o. v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1988, (6866), 6922). 
1668 C.J.E.C., case 63183,23 May 1986, AUied Corporation a.o. v Council, E.C.R., 1986, (1621), 1669. 
The European anti-dumping authorities, however, do not consider it to be a legal obligation. Instead, they interpret Articles 7(1) 
and 9(4) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 13(3) basic ECSC Decision, especially the wordings ashould be less,., as conferring onto 
them the respoJUIIlbility to avoid anti-dumping measures which may have exceuive consequences, such as the elimination of the 
dumping exportera from the Community market (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the 
provisional duty and terminating the procedure concerning HongKong, O.J., 14 May 1991, NoL 119/36). Intheir view, it would 
be excessive to fix the anti-dumping duty at a level exceeding the injury margin (Comm.iuion Regulation (EEC) No 2064191 of 11 
July 1991 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of dihydrostreptomycin originating in the People'a Republic of 
China, O.J., 13 July 1991, NoL 187123). 
1669 The aam.e holcis with regard to countervailing duties (Articles 9(2) and 11(6) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3284194 of 22 
December 19H on proteetion against subsidized import& from countries not membere of the European Community (().J., 31 
December 1994, No L 3491'22; Artiele 13(3) basic ECSC Decision). Artiele 14(1) basic EC Regulation and Artiele 13(9) basic EC 
legislation also prohibit that the sam.e injury is remedied both by anti-dumping and countervailing duties. It follows from the 
combination of those Articles, that, when both anti-dumping and countervailing duties are imposed, their combined am.ount cannot 
exceed the am.ount nece881ll'J to remove the injury suffered by the Comm.unity industry from the dumping of countervailably 
subsidized products (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of ball hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding. 30 mm originating. in Thailand, O.J., 16 June 1990, No 
L 162124). 
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threshold»), i.e., the amount by which the dumping prices must increase in order to remedy the 
in jury caused by the dumping1670, unless the in jury margin exceeds the dumping margin 1671 • · 
. 
167° C.J.E.C., case 53183, 23 May 1985, Alli.ed Corporation e.a. v. Council, E.C.R., 1985, (1621), 1659. See also: Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1812191 of 24 June 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of espadrilles originating in the 
People's Republic of China and defi.nitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 28 June 1991, NoL 16611. 
This rule may even reauit in the exemption of certain dumping exporters from the anti-dumping duty. See e.g. : 
sensitized paper for oolour photograph• from Japan : 
dumping margin of Mitsubisbi Paper Mills Co : 12.2 % 
i.njury margin of Mitsubishi Paper Mille Co : 0.54 % 
anti-dumping duty for Mitsubisbi Paper Mille Co : none since the i.njury margin is de minimis 
Commission Decision 841259/EEC of 10 May 1984 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping procee-
ding concerning import& of certain sensitized paper for colour photographs originating in Japan and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 11 May 1984, NoL 124145 
serial impact fully formed (SIFF) character printera from Japan : 
dumping margin : 
Tokyo Electric Co. Ltd: 21.05% 
Juki CorpÖration : 22.01 % 
other exporters : 58 % 
i)\jury margin : 
Tokyo Electric Co. Ltd and Juki Corporation : 0 % 
other exporters : 23.5 % 
anti-dumping duty : 
Tokyo Electric Co. Ltd and Juki Corporation: exemption (i.e., 0 %) 
other exporters : 23.5 % 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 34189 of 5 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serial impact 
fully formed (SIFF) character printers originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 7 January 1989, No L 5/23). 
1611 If the i.nj~ margin ~x~eds the d~p~ margin, the amoun~ of the. anti-dumping duty will be equal to the dumping margin 
use the dumpmg margm IB the upper limit of the amount of anti-dumping duty, see e.g. : · 
photocopiera from Japan: 
i.njury margin = 20 % ; 
dumping margin and anti-dumping duty for tbree Japanese exporters = respectively, 7.2 %, 10.0% and 12.6% 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 imposmg a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of plain paper 
h~~piers originati~ in. Japan, O.J., 21-Feb~ary~87, ~o L 54/12); 
- seried-unpact dot-matriX prJntera from Japan : · 
i.njury margin = 33.4 % ; 
·dumping margin and anti-dumping duty for 8 Japanese exporters = respectively 4.8 %, 7.4 %, 9.2 %, 10.5 %, 12.3 %, 
13.6 %, 18.6 % and 22.4 % ; 
(Co:mmission Regulation (EEC) No 1418188 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of serlal-
impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, NoL 130/12); 
video ctJBseUe recordera from Japan cuul the Republic of Korea : 
i.njury margin = 46.7%; 
dumping margin and anti-dumping duty for four exporters = respectively 18.0 %, 25.2 %, 26.4 % and 29.2 % ; 
(Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of 
video cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5) ; 
ferroboron alloy from Japan : 
i.njury margin = 34.3 % for Nippon and 42.3 % for Y ahagi ; 
dumping margin and anti-dumping duty = 23.3 % for Nippon and 11.4 % for Y ahagi ; 
(Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 665190 of 16 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferrobo-
ron alloy originating in Japan, O.J., 20 March 1990, NoL 7316); 
ball hearing• from Thailand : 
i.njury margin = 34.8 % ; 
dumping margin and anti-dumping duty = 6. 7 % ; 
(Co:mmisaion Regulation (EEC) No 1613190 of 13 June 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ball 
hearings with a greatest external diameter not exceeding SO m.m. originating in Thailand, 0 . .1., 16 June 1990, NoL 152rl4); 
gt~~~-fWlled, non-refillable poeleet flint lighters from Japan, the People'• Republic of China, the Republic of Korea an.cl 
Thailcuul: 
i.njury margin = 45.54 % for Gao Y ao, 36.18 % for Thai Merry and 31.32 % for Politop ; 
dumping margin and anti-dumping duty = 17.8% for Gao Yao, 15.0 %.for Thai Merry and 5.8% for Politop; 
(Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailancl, O.J., 28 May 1991, NoL 133120); 
•üico" JJNüÜ from Brazil : 
iDjury margin for 3 Brazilian exportere = 43.8 %, 24.2 % and 61.0 % ; 
709 
reepective dumping margin and anti-dumping duty for those 3 Bruilian exporten = 26.4 %, 20.4 % and 18.3 % ; 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 1992 im.poeing a definitive anti-dumping duty on im.ports of silicon metal 
originating in Brazil and definitively collecting the am.ounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, 0 . .1., 7 
August 1992, No L 22211) ; . 
silicon. ct:U"bide from Poland, the Ru .. iGn. Federation. and Ulcraine: 
iDjury margin = 27 % for Poland and 61.1 % for the Russian Pederation and Ukraine ; 
dumping margin and anti-dumping duty = 8.3 % for Poland and 23.3 % for the Ruesian Federation and Ukraine ; 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 821194 of 12 April1994 im.posing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on im.ports of silicon carbide, 
originating in the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Russian Faderation and Ukraine, 0 . .1., 13 April1994, No L 94121) ; 
ferro-silico-meu&gtuaeH from Rus•ÜJ, Ulcraine, BrazU and South Africa : 
iDjury margin = 82.8 % for Ruseia, 70.7 % for Ukraine, 70.9 % for Bruil and 66.6 % for one South-African exporter ; 
dumping margin and anti-dumping duty = 67.4 % for Russia, 62.8 % for Ukraine, 40.6 % for Brazil and 46.3 % for the 
South-African exporter ; 
( Commission Regulation (EC) No 3119194: of 19 December 1994 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of ferro-
silico-manganeae originating in Russia, Ukraine, Brazil and South Africa, 0 . .1., 21 December 1994, No L 330/16) . 
. See also : Com.miaeion Regulation (EEC) No 4062/88 of 23 December 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of 
video cassette• and video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea and HongKong, 0 . .1., 24 December 1988, NoL 366/47; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 601/89 of 27 February 1989 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on im.ports of certain video 
cassette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and definitively collecting the provisional duty, 0 . .1., 28 
February 1989, NoL 67166; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 of 19 June 1989 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
im.ports of video cassettes originating in the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, collecting defmitively the provisional duty and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to the im.ports of video tape reels originating in the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 
22 June 1989, NoL 17411; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
im.ports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, 0 . .1., 18 July 1989, No L 206/6 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 2 
September 1989, No L 267/27) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 112/90 of 16 January 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on im.ports of certain compact disc players originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and collecting defmitively the 
provisional duty, 0 . .1., 17 January 1990, No L 13121 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 6 February 1990 accepting 
undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-eilicon originating in lceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Venezuela or Yugoelavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies whose undertak.ings have been accepted, 
0 . .1., 10 February 1990, NoL 3811; Council Regulation (EEC) No 386190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping 
duty imposed on thoae imports, 0 . .1., 16 February 1990, No L 42/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1048190 of 26 April 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on ïmports of smali-screen colour telavision receivers originating in the Republic of Korea 
and collecting definitively the provisional duty, 0 . .1., 27 April1990, NoL 107/66 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 24 May 1990, NoL 133192); 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1637190 of 28. May 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium 
permanganate originating in the USSR, 0 . .1., 8 June 1990, No L 14619 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 of 21 December 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 28 
December 1990, No L 366126 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 129191 of 11 January 1991 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on importsof 11111all-screen colour telavision receivers originating in HongKong and the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1., 19 
January 1991, No L 14/31; Council Regulation (EEC) No 577191 of 4 March 1991 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
im.ports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in 
Japan, 0 . .1., 12 March 1991, NoL 6511; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1261191 of 13 May 1991 im.posing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of audio tapes in caseettee originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional 
duty and terminating the procedure concerning HongKong, 0 . .1., 14 May 1991, NoL 119/36; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 
2064191 of 11 July 1991 impoeing a provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of dihydroatreptomycin originating in the People'• 
Republic of China, 0 . .1., 13 July 1991, NoL 187/23; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2093191 of 16 July 1991 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of smali-screen colour televison receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of 
China and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O . .J., 18 July 1991, No L 19611; CommiBBion Decision 91/392/EEC) of 21 
June 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning im.ports of certain asbestoa 
cement pipeB originating in Turk.ey, and terminating the investigation, 0 . .1., 31 July 1991, NoL 209/37; CommiBBion Regulation 
(EEC) No 2806191 of 23 September 1991 im.posing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain 
thermal paper originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 September 1991, No L 270115; CommiBBion Decision 91/612/EEC of 26 July 1991 
accepting undertakinga given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning importsof artificial corundum 
originating in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovak.ia and the People'• Republic of China and in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of artificial corundum originating in Brazil and · Yugoslavia, and terminating the 
investigation, O • .J., 2 October 1991, No L 275127; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on im.ports of cert8in polyester yams (man-made lltaple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, 
India, the People'• Republic of China and Turk.ey and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of imports of these yams 
originating in the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 3 October 1991, No L 27Gn ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3091191 of 21 October 1991 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of video tapes in cassette• originating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitively collecting the provisional duty, 0 . .1., 24 October 1991, NoL 29312; Council Regulation (EEC) No 729192 of 16 March 
1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain thermal paper originating in Japan and definitively collecting 
710 
the provisional aDti-dumping duty, 0 . .1.., 26 March 1992, NoL 81/1 (corrigendum, 0.~, 21 May 1992, NoL 138/40); Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 906192 of 30 March 1992 impoeing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in 
Brazil, 0 . .1.., 10 April 1992, No L 96117 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1031192 of 23 April 1992 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of potassium chloride (potash) originating in Belarue, Russia or Ukraine, 0 . .1.., 28 April 1992, No 
L 110/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1292192 of 18 May 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1768/89 with regard to a defmitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of video cassettes originating in Hong Kong, 0 . .1.., 22 May 1992, No L 139/1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain 
large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, 0 . .1.., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 (corrigendum, 0 . .1.., 17 June 1992, No 
L 163127) ; Commission Decision No 1776/92/ECSC of 30 June 1992 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
semi-finished product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty 
imposed on such import& and accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& 
of these product&, 0 . .1., 2 July 1992, No L 182123 ; Commission Regwation (EEC) No 1966192 of 7 July 1992 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in India and the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1.., 16 July 1992, 
NoL 197126; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1994192 of 14 July 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into 
the Community of outer ring& of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, 0 . .1.., 18 July 1992, No L 199/8 ; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2306192 of 4 August 1992 imposing a defi.nitive anti-dumping duty on import& of radio-broadcast receivers of a kind used 
in motor vehicles, originating in the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1.., 7 August 1992, No L 222/8 (corrigendum, 0 . .1.., 21 January 1993, No 
L 13120); Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/92 of 19 October 1992 modifying the anti-dumping duties follo.wing the review ofthe 
anti-dumping meaaures applicable to import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Romania, Taiwan, Turkey and the 
Republics of Serbia and of Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and terminating the said review in respect 
of import& of synthetic polyester fibres originating in Mexico and the United Statee of America, 0 . .1.., 22 October 1992, NoL 30611 
(corrigendum, 0 . .1.., 6 February 1993, No L 30/68) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 66/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on importsof outer ring& of tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 16 January 1993, NoL 9n; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 650193 of 6 March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of bicycles 
originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1.., 11 March 1993, NoL 68/12; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 797/93 of 30 
March 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of max. 0,6 IJ, 
(low carbon ferro-chrome) originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, 0 . .1.., 2 April1993, NoL 80/8; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 920/93 of 16 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) 
originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People'• Republic of China, 0 . .1.., 21 April 1993, NoL 96/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
993193 of 26 April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain electronic weighing scales originating in 
Japan, 0 . .1.., 29 April 1993, No L 104/4 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1103193 of 30 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of 
Korea, 0 . .1.., 6 May 1993, No L 112120 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2463193 of 1 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1.., 7 September 1993, No L 226/3; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2477/93 of 6 September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof certain 
photo albums originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1.., 9 September 1993, No L 228/16 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 2681193 of 20 September -1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on import& of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa 
and the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1.., 22 September 1993, No L 237/2; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2720/93 of 28 
September 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation, 0 . .1.., 2 · 
October 1993, No L 246/12 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2887/93 of 20 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain electronic weighing scales originating in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 22 October 1993, No 
L 26311; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2967/93 of 26 October 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Thailand, O.J., 28 October 1993, NoL 267/2; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 3029/93 of 29 October 1993 imposing provisional antidumping duties on import& of telavision camera systems 
originating in Japan, 0 . .1.., 30 October 1993, No L 27111 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3203193 of 22 November 1993 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 738192 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof ootton yam, originating in BraziJ and Turkey, 
O.J., 24 November 1993, No L 289/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 3369/93 of 2 December 1993 imposing amended anti-dumping 
measures on import& of ferro-silicon originating in Russia, Kazak.hstan, Ukraine, lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela and Brazil, 
O.J., 9 December 1993, No L 302/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 371194 of 17 February 1994 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& into the Community of large aluminium electrolytic capacitors originating in the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan, O.J., 19 February 1994, No L 4811.0; Council Regulation (EC) No 486/94 of 4 March 1994 imposing defmitive anti-
dumping dutiea on import& of fluorspar originating in the People's Republic of China and collecting defmitively the provisional 
anti-dumping duty, O.J., 6 March 1994, No L 62/1 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 634194 of 9 March 1994 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import. of certain magnetic disks (3,6" microdisks) originating in Hong Kong and the Republic of Korea, 
0 . .1.., 11 March 1994, No L 6816 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 643194 of 21 March 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3068192 in 
respect of defi.nitive anti-dumping duties on imports of potassium chloride originating in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, 0 . .1.., 24 
March 1994, No L 8011 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1783194 of 18 July 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& offurfuraldehyde originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1.., 21 July 1994, NoL 186/11; Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1828194 of 26 July 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 738/92 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of ootton 
yam, originating in BraziJ and Turkey, 0 . .1.., 27 July 1994, NoL 191/3; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 
1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour television receiver. originating in Malaysia, the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore- and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 266/60 ; Council Regulation (EC) No 
2674194 of 31 October 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of furazolidone originating in the People's Republic 
of China and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed, 0 . .1.., 4 November 1994, No L 286/1 ; Council Regulation (EC) No · 
2819/94 ()f 17 November 1994 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate orginating in the 
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GATI nor European anti-dumping law provide guidelines to calculate the injury margin. As a 
result, the European anti-dumping authorities have a broad discretionary power to determine tbe 
level of the anti-dumping duties1672• Nevertheless, they have adopted a consistent practice to 
calculate the injury margin : they calculate it on the basis of the price increase of the dumped 
products required to guarantee the Community industry prices which cover the Community 
producers' production costs (including a reasanabie amount for selling, administrative and other 
general expenses), plus a reasonable profit margin1673• In case of monopolistic non-price 
competition, this metbod may imply that a positive injury margin is found even when the dumping 
prices exceed the actual Community producers' prices. This result may seem to prove «one-way 
flexibility». However, on the condition that the general metbod applied to calculate the in jury 
margin is economically justified, this result, from an economie point of view, is correct insofar as 
prices have oot been adjusted for differences in non-price elements, such as differences in physical 
characteristics, on which competition is based. Indeed, such differences should be taken into 
·account either by adjusting the Community producers' prices and the dumping prices, or by 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 November 1994, NoL 298/32. 
1672 C.J.E.C., joined cases 133/87 and 160/87, 14 March 1990, NGBhuo. Corporation v Commission an.d Council, E.C.R., 1990, I, 
(719), 760-762 and 777; C.J.E.C., case C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1336), 1406; C.J.E.C., 
case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, MatsushitD Electric IndUBtrial Co. Ltd and MatsushitD Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1409), 1489; C . ..J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishiroku Photo ln.dustry Co. Ltd v Councü, E.C.R., 1992, I, 
(1493), 1533; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San.yo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1574; C.J.E.C., case 
C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1686-1687; VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, 
F., teA Decade of European Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to Import& from China.., Journ.al of World 
Trcuk, 1992/3, (5), 30; VERMULST, E., and WAER, P., «The Calculation of hUury Margins in EC Anti-Dumping Proceedings., 
Journ.al of World Trcuk, 199116, (5), 5-6 and 26. 
1673 VERMULST, E.A., and GRAAFSMA, F., ..A Decade of European Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Applicable to 
lm.ports from China-, Journ.al of World Trade, 1992/3, (5), 29. 8ee e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiere originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No 
L 54/12 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1418/88 of 17 May 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of aerial-
impact dot-matrix printere originating in Japan, O.J., 26 May 1988, No L 130112 ; OommiNion Regulation (EEC) No 2005/88 of 5 
July 1988 i.mposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of aerial impact fully formed character printers originating in 
Japan, O.J., 8 ..July 1988, No L 17711; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on importa of aerial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 November 1988, No L 317133; 
Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2140/89 of 12 July 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain compact 
disc players originating in Japan and South Korea, O.J., 18 July 1989, No L 205/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 2 September 1989, No 
L 257/27). Sometimes individual iD.jury margins are calculated for each dumping exporter (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1251191 of 
13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in casaettes originating in Japan and the Republic 
of Korea, collecting definitively the provisional· duty and terminating the procedure concerning Hong Kong, O.J., 14 May 1991, No 
L 119/35). 8ee also: C.J.E.C., case C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nalcqjima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2106-
2107 (Report for the Hearing : conclusions of the CommiBBion), 2167 (Opinion of Advocate General LENZ) and 2196. 
As a consequence, if the Community producers' production coats decline, a downward adjustment of the amount of anti-dumping 
duty will be carried out (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2879/87 of 28 September 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1826/M 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of vinyl acetate monomer originating in Canada, O.J., 29 September 1987, No 
L 276/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3366/87 of 9 November 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No 96/85 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of pentaerythritol originating in Canada, O.J., 11 November 1987, No L 321/1; OommiNion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2684/88 of 26 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of video cassette 
recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 31 August 1988, No L 240/5 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 460/89 
of 20 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating in the United Statea of America or 
Venezuela and acljusting the definitive anti-dumping duty for Saudi Arabia laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87, O.J., 2-i 
February 1989, No L 52/1). 
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allowing positive injury margins to be found even if the dumping prices exceed the Community 
producers' prices1674• 
The problem, however, is that the general metbod applied to calculate the injury margin, though 
approved by the Court of Justice1675, cannot be accepted as such from an economie point of 
view. Indeed, as for the constructed value, the metbod to calculate the injury margin assumes full 
oost pricing. Hence, calculating the injury margin may only be accepted, if it is applied in a 
flexible way so that not only production costs, but also demand and competitive forces are taken 
into account1676• However, European anti-dumping case law can only be said to be «one-way 
flexible». First, an interpretation is placed on the «reasonable profit margin» inflating the injury 
margin : it refers either to the profit margin realised by the Community producers before they had 
to compete with the dumping exporters1677, or to the profit margin increased by an amount 
which should make up for the past loss of sales due to the dumping practices1678• There is 
only one exception, i.e., a lower (but still non-negligible) profit margin bas been used, as the 
Community industry, being at an early stage of development, could not expect to achieve profit 
1674 Contra: VERMULST, E., and WAER., P., «The Calculation of Injury Margins in EC Anti-Dumping Proceedings., Joumal ojWorld TroJe, 
1991/6, (5), 22-23 and 27. 
1675 C.J.E.C., caae C-69/89, 7 May 1991, Nakojima AU Precision Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1991, I, (2069), 2196; CJ.E.C., case C-174/87, 
10 March 1992, Jtjcoh Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1406; C.J.E.C., caae C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Malsushita Electric lndustrial 
Co. Lid and Malsushha Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1489; CJ.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, 
Konishirolcu Photo Jndusrry Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1533; C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Lid v 
Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1574. 
1676 Supra., 161-162. 
1677 The reasonable profit margin is not neceBBarily the actual profit margin realised by the Community producers (cf. the 
determination of the constructed value : infra., 173-180). In order to take account of the price-depressive and price-suppreBBive 
effects of the dumping on the Community producers' prices, the profit margin realised before increased penetration of dumped 
imports is used as reasonable profit margin (Council Regulation (EEC) No 541191 of 4 March 1991 imposing a defmitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of barium chloride originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 7 March 1991, No L 60/1; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2904191 of 27 September 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
polyester yams (man-made staple fibres) originating in Taiwan, lndonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of import& of these yams originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 3 October 
1991, No L 276fT ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1451192 of 2 June 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
into the Community of certain large electrolytic aluminium capacitors originating in Japan, O.J., 4 June 1992, No L 152122 
(corrigendum, O.J., 17 June 1992, No L 163127)). See also: ferro-silicon from South A{ricB tmd the People'• Republic of China, 
where the profit margin was based on past performances of the Community industry and was considered reasonable in order to 
guarantee the industry productive investment on a long-term basis (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2581193 of 20 September 
1993 imposing provisional anti-dumping dutiea on import& of ferro-silicon originating in South Africa and the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 22 September 1993, NoL 23712). 
1678 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3262190 of 5 November 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof audio 
tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, the Republic of Korea and Hong Kong, O.J., 13 November 1990, No L 31315 (corrigendum, 
O.J., 12 January 1991, No L9/36) ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1034191 of 23 April 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of video tapes in cassettes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 26 April1991, No L 106116 ; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1261191 of 13 May 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of audio tapes in cassettea 
originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea, collecting defmitively the provisional duty and terminating the procedure 
concerning Hong Kong, O.J., 14 May 1991, No L 119/35. 8ee : VERMULST, E., and W AER, P., tcThe Calculation of hüury 
Margins in EC Anti-Dumping P:roceedings., JourntJl of Worlel Trade, 199116, (5), 23-25 and 28. 
~~~~--:=.=_~~-...:z: --~-- ...... --____ 
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levels in line with those realized. by already well-established producers in third countries1679 
Second, the metbod to calculate the injury margin is applied strictly. In only four cases, the 
injury margin was based on the price just sufficient to cover the Community producers' 
production costs (thus, excluding a profit margin). Intwoof these cases, the competitive situation 
on the market, namely the existing worldwide unused production capacity and the excess of 
production over consumption, bas justified the deviation from the strict cost-full pricing metbod in 
order to explain why the Community industry should be enabled to reach only break-even 
level1680• The third case does not provide any explanation1681, whereas, in the fourth 
case, the injury margin did not include a reasonable profit margin because, even without a 
reasonable profit margin, it would have exceeded the dumping margin1682• 
This fourth case does not show a flexible approach. Instead, it shows a «one-way flexible» and 
possibly illegal approach, since the real injury margin is not calculated. In several anti-dumping 
cases, the injury margin is not calculated because it is assumed to be higher than the dumping 
1679 Commiuion Rcgulation (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof eertaio magnctic disks 
(3,5" microdisb) originating in Japan, Taiwan and tbc Pcoplc's Rcpublic of China, O.J., 21 April1993, NoL 95/5. 
168° Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of urea 
originating in Czechoslovak.ia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Yugoslavia, O.J., 9 May 1987, No L 121111; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of colour telavision receivers originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 October 1994, No L 265/50. 
1681 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
angles, shapes and aections, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April 1984, No L 109111. 
There may be two similar cases in which, without any explanation being offered, the il\iury margin was calculated on the basis of 
the production coats, excluding a profit margin. lndeed, in trichloroethylene from the German. Democratie Republü; Polan.d, 
Czechoslouaiia, Roman.ia, Spain. an.d the Uniled Stales of America and perchlorethylene from Czechoslouakia, Roman.ia, Spain an.d 
the Uniled Statea of America anti-dumping duties based on the price required to ensure that the Community producers no longer 
had to sell their product& at a loss, were considered sufficient to eliminate the iJ\iury. lf a strict interpretation is adopted, · such an 
anti-dumping duty does not guarantee the Community producers a reasonable profit margin (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
2127/82 of 28 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene originating in the German Demoeratic 
Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Spain and the United Statea of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No L 223176; Commission Decision 82/881./EEC of 23 
December 1982 aocepting undertak.ings offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping prooaeding concerning import& of 
perchlorethylene originating in Czechoslovaki~ Romania, Spain and the United Statea of America and terminating that 
proceeding, O.J., 30 December 1982, NoL 371/47). 
1682 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
types of electronic microcircuit& known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain e:çorters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of these product& and terminating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 26 January 1990, No L 20/5 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22179 ; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38/44) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 55/93 of 8 January 1993 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on import& of outerringsof tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 15 January 1993, NoL 9n. 
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margin when the margin of price undercutting of the dumped imports exceeds the dumping 
margin 1683• The margin of price undercutting is, thus, considered to measure the in jury 
caused by the dumping. Indeed, in cases where the dumping is not the sole cause of the injury 
suffered by the Community industry, the margin of price undercutting is used for determining that 
part of the injury caused by the dumping and, as a consequence, the anti-dumping duty is set 
equal to the margin of price undercutting insofar as that margin does not exceed the dumping 
margin1684• However, the assumption that the margin of price undercutting arnounts exactly 
to the injury margin does not always hold. For exarnple, the price undercutting may be caused by 
the fact that the dumping exporters are more efficient than the Community producers. As a 
result, the injury margin may be overestimated, when it is equated to the margin of price 
undercutting. Consequently, contrary to European anti-dumping law, the anti-dumping duty may 
exceed the amount necessary to remedy the injury caused by the dumping. 
The metbod to calculate the in jury margin holds the same deficiency, since it is determined on the 
basis of the difference between the production costs of the Community producers, including a 
profit margin, and the dumping prices1685• In view of this method, it is important to know 
which Community producers are taken as standard to determine the injury margin. In order to 
1683 See e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 2717/93 of 28 September 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
ferro-chrome with a carbon content by weight of maximum 0,5 % Oow carbon ferro-chrome), originating in Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Ukraine, O.J., 2 October 1993, No L 246/1. 
In artificial corundum from the Boviet Un.ion, Hungary, Polan.d, Czechoslovalek4 the People's Republic of China and Brazil cuu:l 
Yugoslavia, the margin of price undercutting was used as injury margiil, because the price undercutting was considered to be the 
n;1ain cause of the injury suffered by the Community industry (CommiBBion Decision 911512/EEC of 25 July 1991 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of artificial corundum originating 
in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoalovakia and the· People's Republic of China and in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding ooncerning import& of artificial corundum originating in Brazil and Yugoslavia, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 
2 October 1991, No L 275/27). 
See also : ootton yarn.s from Turlcey, where Jor technica! reasoll.BH the anti-dumping duty had to oorraspond to the lowest of 
dumping margins established (Council Regulation (EEC) No 789/82 of 2 April 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain ootton yams originating in Turkey, O.J., 3 March 1982, NoL 9011). However, it was not explained what these 
technica! reasoiUI were. These technical reasons are only legal insofar as the injury margin exceeded the dumping margin or if it 
was in the Community interesta to impose an anti-dumping duty the amount of which is not high enough to remove the injury 
(see : in.fra, 718). But even if the technical reasons are legal, the anti-dumping decision remains illegal for lack of motivation 
which is contrary to Artiele 190 EC Treaty. 
1684 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 129/91 of 11 January 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of smali-
screen colour telavision receivers originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 19 January 1991, No 
L 14/31; Commiaaion Decision 911392/EEC) of 21 June 1991 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding concerning import& of certain asbestos cement pipes originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 
July 1991, No L 209/37 ; CommiBBion Decision No 891192/ECSC of 30 March 1992 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain semi-finished product& of alloy steel, originating in Turkey and Brazil, O.J., 9 April 1992, No L 95126 ; 
CommiBBion Regulation (EC) No 2376194 of 27 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of colour 
telavision receivere originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, O.J., 1 
October 1994, No L 255/50. 
1685 Contra: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2861/93 of 18 October 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importa of certain magnetic 
disks (3,5" microdiaks) originating in Japan, Taiwan aod lhe People's Republic of China, and collecting definitively lhe provisional duty imposed, 
O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/4. 
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calculate the exact in jury margin, i.e. , without the in jury suffered by the Community producers 
because of their relative inefficiency, only the production costs of the Community producers 
which are as efficient as the dumping exporters should be maintained as standard to calculate the 
mJury margin. European anti-dumping case law, however, does not guarantee that the injury 
margin does not include the injury suffered by the Community industry from their relative 
inefficiency. First, Community producers are assumed to be efficient, unless the dumping 
exporters are able to prove the contrary1686• Since the Euro~ anti-dumping authorities 
hold that «(i)t is in fact extremely difficult to measure precisely the efficiency and/or inefficiency 
of the different (Community) producers and to make comparison as between these and with the 
(dumping) exporters»1687, it will be extremely difficult to convince the European anti-dumping 
authorities that the Community producers are less efficient than the dumping exporters. Indeed, 
there has been but one case in which the European anti-dumping authorities have adjusted the 
Community producers' production costs in order to exclude the increase in unit production costs 
due to the combination of overcapacity and low rates of capacity utilization1688• Moreover, 
the European anti-dumping authorities consider the efficiency of the dumping exporters relevant 
only insofar as it is reflected in export as well as in dornestic market prices without any 
discrimination. If the dumping is established on the basis of a comparison between export and 
dornestic market prices, it involves price discrimination. As, in such a case, the efficiency of the 
dumping exporter will not be reflected equally in export and in dornestic market prices, the 
1686 See: 
video ca..ette recorders from Japan. an.cl the Republic of Korea, where the allegation made by the dumping exporters that the 
technical design and production methods of the Community producers were out of date, was rejected for lack of evidence 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 601/89 of 27 February 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain 
video casaette recorders originating in Japan and the Republic of Korea and definitively collecting the provisional duty, 0 . .1., 
28 February 1989, No L 67/55) ; 
linetJI' tungsten halogen lamps from Japan, where the Commission reacted to claims of the ·dumping exporters about their 
greater productivity by stating that ..there was no evidence to cast doubt on the efficiency of the Community LTH lamp 
industry• (Council Regulation (EEC) No 117191 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
linear tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 19 January 1991, No L 1411) ; 
gt18-fuelled, non.-refiUable poc]cet flint lighters from Japan, the People's Republic of Chin.a, the Republic of Korea an.cl Thailand, 
where the dumping exporters' allegation that the productivity of the Community indUBtry is lower, was rejected because of 
lack of evidence. The Commission relied on its experience to adopt the assumption that the productivity of the Japaneae 
exporters and the Community industry is not different (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23. May 1991 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, 0 . .1., 28 May 1991, No L 133120). 
1687 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of electronic 
typewriters originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 22 June 1986, No L 16311. 
1688 Commiuion Deciaion 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting ondertakinga given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
importa of ammonium nitrate originating in Uthuania and RUISia and tenninating the inveatigation with re gard to these countriea ; · aa well u 
tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding conceming importa of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarua, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekiatan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24. 
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efficiency of the dumping exporters will not be taken into account1689. Furthermore, the 
inefficiency of the Community producers will also be disregarded if the downward pressure of the 
dumped prices on the Community producers' prices prevented them from making the investment 
needed to improve productivity1690. 
Second, according to the European anti-dumping authorities, the Community industry as a whole 
must be taken into account to determine the injury margin, since European anti-dumping law 
defmes the Community industry as referring to the Community producers as a whole ( or, at least, 
to the Community producers whose collective output represents a major proportion of the total 
Community output) and the Community may only under exceptional circumstances be divided into 
two or more markets (Article 4.l.(ü) GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 4(1)(ü) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(5) basic ECSC Decision)1691 . Their point of view, however, disregards 
the legal defmition of the concept «injury», according to which injury caused by other factors must 
not be attributed to the dumping (Article 3.5. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 3(7) basic EC 
Regulation ; Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision). Such other factor may be the relative 
inefficiency of Community producers. Since this defmition of the concept «injury» also prevails 
for the injury margin1692, the injury margin must not incorporate the effects of the 
Community producers' inefficiency. Otherwise, the injury margin will be overestimated and the 
amount of the anti-dumping duty will exceed the margin of injury actually caused by the dumping. 
1689 CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 2064190 of 17 July 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 20 July 1990, No L 188/10 (corrigendum, 0 . .1., 21 November 1990, No 
L 321/19) ; CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 1386191 of 23 May 1991 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand, 0 . .1., 28 May 1991, No L 133120 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2805/91 of 23 September 1991 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain thermal paper originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 26 September 1991, No 
L 270/16. 
1690 Council Regulation (EEC) No 117/91 of 16 January 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of linear 
tungsten halogen lamps originating in Japan, 0 . .1., 19 January 1991, No L 1411. 
1691 Council Regulation (EEC) No 34189 of 6 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof serlal impact 
fully formed (SIFF) charaeter printers originating in Japan, O.J., 7 January 1989, NoL 6/23. 
1692 The concept •il\iury• used in Articles 7(2) and 9(4) basic EC Regulation and in Artiele 13(3) basic ECSC Decision, under 
which the anti-dumping duty. must not exceed the iJ\iury margin, refers to the concept •il\iury» as defined by Artiele 3 basic EC · 
Regulation and Artiele 4(1) basic ECSC Decision (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3232/89 of 24 October 1989 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of small screen colour television receivers originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 28 
October 1989, No L 31411). 
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In several anti-dumping cases, however, the injury margin is determined on the basis of the 
production costs and profit margins of representative Community producers1693, the 
Community producers with the highest rate of capacity utilization1694, or even (the most) 
efficient Community producers1695• However, the rate of capacity utilization, though easily to 
1693 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3678/88 of 16 December 1988 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
choline chloride originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Romania, O.J., 20 December 1983, No L 366/12 ; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 1129/84 of 18 April 1984: impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of certain angles, shapes and 
sections, of iron or steel, originating in the German Demoeratic Republic, O.J., 26 April 1984, No L 109111; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 1289/87 of 8 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of urea originating in 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia, 
O.J., 9 May 1987, NoL 121111; Council Regulation (EEC) No SSS9/87 of .t November 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping 
duty on import& of urea originating in Libya and Saudi Arabia and accepting undertakings given in conneetion with imparts of 
urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia 
and terminating these investigations, O.J., 7 November 1987, NoL 317/1; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1696/88 of 14 June 
1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of polyester yam originating in Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Turkey, O.J., 17 June 1988, No L 151139 (corrigendum, O.J., 18 June 1988, No L 162158); Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
1696/88 of 14 June 1988 impasing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of synthetic fibres of polyesters originating in 
Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Statesof America or Yugoslavia, 0 . .1.., 17 June 1988, NoL 161/47; CommiBBion 
Regulation (EEC) No 2623188 of 24 August 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of urea originating in 
Austri.a, Hungary, Malaysia, Romania, the USA and Venezuela, O.J., 26 August 1988, NoL 235/6; Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 720190 of 22 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of silicon metal originating in the People's 
Republic of China, 0 • .1.., 27 March 1990, No L 8019; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 30 
March 1990, No L 83129 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 763190 of 26 March 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imparts of tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the anti-
dumping proceeding concerning import& of those product& from the Republic of Korea, 0 . .1., 30 March 1990, No L 83136. 
1694 Commisaion Regulaûon (EEC) No 920/93 of 15 April 1993 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain magnetic disks 
(3,5" microdisb) originating in Japan, Taiwan and the People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 21 April1993, NoL 9515. 
1695 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2127/82 of 28 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on trichloroethylene 
originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and Poland and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding in respect of 
trichloroethylene originating in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Spain and the United States of America, O.J., 31 July 1982, No 
L 223n6 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2243182 of 12 August 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imparts of 
methylainine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and accepting an undertaking 
and terminating the procedure in respect of imparts of methylamine, dimethylamine and trimethylamine originating in Romania, 
O.J., 13 August 1982, No L 238135 ; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2317/85 of 12 August 1985 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of roller chains for cycles originating in the USSR and the People's Republic of China, O.J., 14 August 
1985, NoL 217n; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1244/86 of 28 April1986 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of 
copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, 0 . .1.., 30 April 1986, No L 11314; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 
September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of certain deep freezers originating in the USSR, accepting 
the undertakinga in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep freezers originating in Yugoslavia or in the 
Germ.an Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and terminating the proceeding concerning import& of certain 
deep freezers, 0 . .1.., 11 September 1986, No L 269/14; Council Regulation (EEC) No 29/87 of 22 December 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain deep freezers originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 8 January 1987, NoL 611; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imparts of standardized multi-
phase electric motol'S having an output of more than 0,76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and definitively collecting the amounts secured as 
provisional duties, O.J.~ 27 March 1987, No L 8311; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 1043187 of 10 April 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,76 kW but 
not more than 76 kW, originating in Yugoelavia, O.J., 14 April 1987, No L 10215; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/87 of 6 
August 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of standardized multi-phase electric motors having an output of 
more than 0,76 kW butnotmore than 76 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 7 August 1987, NoL 21812; Commiuion Regulation 
(EEC) No 699/88 of 16 March 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of oxalic acid originating in Taiwan and 
South Korea, O.J., 18 March 1988, No L 72112 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1198/88 of 26 April 1988 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of roller chains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China and providing for the definitive 
collection of the provieional anti-dumping duty on the said import&, O.J., 3 May 1988, NoL 116/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
341190 of 6 February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of feiT<HJilicon 
originating in lceland, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for export to the Community by companies 
whose undertak.inga have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, NoL 3811; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 647190 of 2 March 
1 
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measure, does not guarantee the injury margin to be assessed correctly : such Community 
producers may incur high (low) production costs because their production technology is less 
(more) efficient than the one of the other Community producers or because there are negative 
(positive) economiesof scale ; in both cases, the injury margin will be too high (too low). Insofar 
as the representative Community producers are really represeiltative of the Community industry as 
a whole, the in jury margin thus determined will, seemingly, correspond to the in jury margin of 
the Community industry as a whole. However, if it is true that it is extremely difficult to measure 
the efficiency/inefficiency of the Community producers, it will be as extremely difficult to 
measure their representativity. As a result, so-called representative Community producers, in 
terms of efficiency, will probably not resembie the rest of the Community industry. If they are 
less efficient, the injury margin will be overestimated and, from a legal point of view, the amount 
of the anti-dumping duty will be too high. If they are more efficient, the injury margin will be 
underestimated. That underestimated in jury margin may, however, also result in the amount of 
the anti-dumping duty which is not in keeping with European anti-dumping law. The most 
efficient Community producer is not necessarily at least as efficient as the dumping exporters. If 
he is more efficient, the injury margin will be underestimated. If he is less efficient, the injury 
margin will be overestimated. In both cases, European anti-dumping law will be violated. The 
fust case will be at varianee with European anti-dumping law because the amount of the anti-
dumping duty will not be adequate to remove the in jury, unless the Community interests require 
only an anti-dumping duty the amount of which is lower than the one needed for removing the full 
injury caused by the dumping1696• The second case is illegal as the injury margin oomprises 
1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping · duty on imports of certain glutamic acid and ita salta originating in lndonesia, the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, and accepting undertakings in conneetion with imports of certain glutamic acid and ita 
salta originating in these countries, O.,J., 3 March 1990, NoL 66123. 
1696 See e.g. : 1tandardized mulri-phase electric motorB from Bulgaria, CzechoBlovaleia, the German Democratie Republic, Hungary, 
Polan.d, the Boviet Union and YugoBltwia, where the level of anti-dumping relief was detennined on the basis of the oost prices of 
the most efticient induatrial-acale manufacturers in order to maintain as far as possible the oompetitiveness of the downstraam 
industries (Council Regulation (EEC) No 864/87 of 23 March 1987 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
standardized multi-phue electric motor• having an output of m~re than 0,76 kW but not more than 76 kW, originating in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Boviet Union, and defmitively oollecting the 
amounts securedas provisional dutie&, O.J., 27 March 1987, NoL 8311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2382/87 of 5 August 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors ha ving an output of more than 0, 75 
kW butnotmore than 75 kW, originating in Yugoslavia, O.,J., 7 August 1987, NoL 21812). See alao: Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 1613183 of 15 June 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof unwrought nickel, not alloyed, in the 
form of cathocles produced by electrolysis, either uncut or cut into squares, originating in the Boviet Union, O.J., 17 June 1983, No 
L 169/43; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 997/86 of 18 April 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of 
glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 19 April1986, NoL 107/8; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2322/86 of 12 August 1986 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping ciuty on import& of glycine originating in Japan, O.J., 15 August 1986, No L 21811 ; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2800/86 of 9 September 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain deep freezere 
originating in the USSR, accepting the undertakings in conneetion with the investigation of import& of certain deep freezere 
originating in Yugoalavia or in the German Demoeratic Republic and terminating the investigation, and term.inating the 
proceeding ooncerning import& of certain deep freezers, O.J., 11 September 1986, NoL 259/14; Council Decision 87/66/EEC of 19 
January 1987 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with import& of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil and Mexico, 
and terminating the investigations, O.J., 5 February 1987, No L 34155; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 
1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of serlal-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 Novem-
ber 1988, No L 317/33 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 165190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random acceBB memories) originating in Japan, 
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also the in jury the Community producer suffers because of bis lower efficiency in. respect to the 
dumping exporters. 
2.4. ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES 
2. 4.1. Rules of origin 
Anti-dumping duties, contrary to customs duties, do not apply to exports regardless of their 
rigin. The scope of the anti-dumping duties is limited to exports originating in eertaio countries. 
e impact which anti-dumping duties have on the dumping exporters' profits, may be so 
important that the dumping exporters may change their production location to remove their 
products from the anti-dumping duties1697• 
ough such a change in production location is an economically justified decision based on profit 
maximization, European anti-dumping law, under eertaio conditions, considers it to be an 
unlawful evasion of anti-dumping duties. According to European anti-dumping law, the rules on 
accepting undertakinge offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importe of these 
products and terminating the investigation intheir respect, O.J., 26 January 1990, NoL 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, 
No L 22179 ; corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144) ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 762190 of 26 March 1990 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of tungstic oxide and tungstic acid originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.,J., 30 March 1990, No L 83129 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynam.ic random access memories) originating in 
Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 26 July 1990, NoL 19311; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3798190 
of 21 December 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importe of espadrilles originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.,J., 28 December 1990, No L 366126). Contra: STANBROOK, C., ecThe Impact of Community Interest. and hüury 
Determination on Antidumping Measures in the EEC .. , in Antitrrut an.d · Trade Policy in the United Stales and the European 
Community, HA WK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (623), 630-631 and 634; VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping 
an.d other Trade Proteetion Lawe ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 162. 
8ee also: electronk typewriter• from Japan, where ecthe Council (was) not convineed that Community interest necessarily requires 
that the specific situation of an allegedly less efficient producer when confronted with unfair trade practices he disregarded ; the 
Council conaiders that by setting the iJüury elimination level (i.e., the injury margin) by including all three Community producers 
rather than having regard to the allegedly less efficient one alone, Community interest is appropriately reflected.. (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1698/86 of 19 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of electronic typewriters 
originating in Japan, O.J., 22 June 1986, No L 16311). Thus, ü the Council was convinced, it would have disregarded the situation 
ofthe less efficient Community producer. 
Conversely, it is illegal that for reasons of Community interesta the am.ount of anti-dumping duty would he determined higher than 
the injury margin. As the concept ecCommunity interestBit was introduced into European anti-dumping law in order totranslate 
the ccdesire• of GA1T anti-dumping law to make the imposition of anti-dumping duties permissive (Article 9.1. GA1T Anti-dumping 
Code), it can have only a moderating effect on the anti-dumping rellef to he granted. It cannot he used to grant more anti-dumping 
proteetion than allowed by European anti-dumping law. 
1697 See: WEBB, M.A., .Anti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and PriceBit, Journal of International Economie•, 1987122, 
(363), 363-368. The imposition of an anti-dumping duty does not always result in foreign direct investments by the dumping 
exporters in the Community ; it may also cause a shift away from foreign direct investment that would have been made in case of 
free trade (see : MOTrA, M., «Multinational firma and the tariff-jumping argument. A gam.e-theoretic analysis with some 
unconventional conclusioBBit, Europeon Economie Reuiew, 1992, (1667), 1667-1671. 
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the common definition of the concept of origin and the relevant common implementing provisions 
apply to anti-dumping dutles (Article 14(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(7) basic ECSC 
Decision)1698• Under the common rules, «any processing or working in respect of which it is 
established, or in respect of which the facts as ascertained justify the presumption, that its sole 
object was to circumvent the provisions applicable in the Community to goods from specific 
countries shall under no circumstances be deemed to confer on the goods thus produced the origin 
of the country where it is carried out» (Article 25 Council Regulation No 2913/92 establishing the 
Community Customs Code) (emphasis added)1699• As exception to the general rule (see: 
Artiele 24 Regulation (EEC) No 2913/9217~, this provision must be interpreted strictly. 
Such a strict interpretation of the already narrow defmition implies that circumvention will only be 
found when the operation' s sole object is to circumvent origin rules. Thus, if the operations are 
economically justified, there will be no circumvention since it is oot the sole object of these 
operations1701 • Consequently, changes in production locations made after the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties cannot be considered as circumvention if they are grounded on considerations 
of profit maximization. The Court of Justice, however, presomes that such changes are made in 
order to circumvent origin rules when they coincide with the entry into force of anti-dumping 
duties. The onus of proof thus shifts onto the exporter who must prove that he bas changed bis 
production locations for reasoos other than the evasion of anti-dumping duties1702• By shifting 
the onus of proof, the Court of Justice increases the chances of finding circumvention. For the 
exporter will oot always be able to prove that the change of bis production locations was not 
(solely) grounded on bis intention to circumvent origin rules. As a result, the Court of Justice 
supports the European anti-dumping authorities in their •one-way flexibility». The Court of 
Justice, ·though, does oot go against the rules on the oommon definition of the concept of origin, 
since those rules allow to create presumptions ~f the facts ascertained justify them. It may well be 
argued that the coincidence with the entry into force of anti-dumping duties may justify the 
presumption that the exporter' s sole object was the circumvention of origin rules and, thus, of the 
anti-dumping duties. 
1698 This compliea witb tbc GATI Agreement on Rulea of Origin, according to which tbe common definition of tbe concept of origin applics to 
anti-dumping law (cxccpt for tbc defmition of tbc Community industry) (Article 1.2.). 
1699 O.J., 19 October 1992, No L 30211. 
1700 Sup,.a, 118-120. 
1701 . C.J.E.C., cue 93183, 23 February 1984, Zentr'algenossenschaft des Fleuchergewerbe• e.G. (Zentrag) v Hauptzollamt Bochum, 
E.C.R., 1984, (1095), 1110 (opinion of Advocate General 8. ROZES); C.J.E.C., caee 26188, 13 December 1989, Brother ]n.te,.,uJtional 
GmbH v Hauptzolüunt GU!jJen, E.C.R., 1989, (4253), 4273 (opinion of Advocate General VAN GERVEN). 
1702 C.J.E.C., cue 26188, 13 December 1989, Brothe,. International GmbH v Hauptzollamt GU!jJen., E. C.R., 1989, (4253), 4282. 
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Besides the application of the rules on the common definition of the concept of origin, EC ant-
dumping law forther provides that anti-dumping duties may be extended to apply to imports from 
third countries of like products, or parts thereof, when circumvention of the anti-dumping 
measures in force is talring place. Such circumvention is defined as a change in the pattem of 
trade between third countries and the Community which sterns from a practice, process or work 
for which there is insufficient due cause or economie justification, other than the imposition of the 
duty, and there is evidence that the remedial effects of the duty are being undermined in terms of 
the prices and/ or quantities of the like products and there is evidence of dumping in relation to the 
normal values previously established for the like or similar products (Article 13(1) basic EC 
Regulation). As this new anti-circumventon rule bas oot yet been applied, it is unclear how it 
relates to the common definition of the concept of origin. It seems safe to assume that the new 
anti-circumvention rule, as a special provision applicable to anti-dumping duties, will prevail over 
· the general common definition of the concept of origin, insofar of course as it deviates from this 
common definition. Hence, as the new anti-circumvention rule does oot define the notion -«Change 
in the pattem of trade», -that notion should be interpreted on the basis of the common definition of 
the concept of origin : there will be only a change in the pattem of trade, if the origin bas been 
shifted from one country to another. Indeed, if the origin of the product bas oot changed, the 
anti-dumping duty will remaio applicable since the scope ratione loci of anti-dumping duties is 
defined by the origin of the dumped products1703• Moreover, under the new anti-
circumvention rule, for there oot being circumvention, it must be shown that there was insufficient 
due cause or economie justification (other than the imposition of the anti-dumping duty), rather 
than that the sole object was to circumvent the anti-dumping duty. This new rule makes the proof 
that the change in the pattem of trade is intended to circumvent the anti-dumping duty easier. 
Moreover, it may be .expected that the case law of the Court of Justiceon the onus of proof will_ 
be applied bere too : if the change in the pattem of trade coincides with the imposition of the anti-
dumping duty, the exporter will probably have to show that there was sufficient due cause or 
economie justification for this change. On the other hand, the new circumvention rule seems 
more exacting than the common defmition of the concept of origin, as it imposes two additional 
conditloos : first, there must be evidence that the remedial effects of the anti-dumping duty are 
being undermined in termsof the prices and/or quantities of the like products ; second, there must 
be evidence of dumping in relation to the normal values previously established for the like or 
similar products. With regard to the fust additional condition, the new anti-circumvention rule 
probably requires that the Community industry is suffering injury caused by massive and low-
priced imports originating in the country to which the production of the originally dumping 
country bas been relocated. The second condition seems to imply that those «relocated» imports 
must be made at export prices below the normal value established in respect of the originally 
1703 Supra, 6~98. 
---~~---:·._-_-_ --.• 
I._ .. 
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dumping country. Finally, the scope of the new anti-circumvention rule is restricted to the 
circumvention of anti-dumping duties, whereas the common definition of the concept of origin 
equally applies to undertakings. 
2.4.2. Assembly within the Community 
2.4.2.1. The legislation and its application 
Another metbod for evading anti-dumping duties is to import parts and materials into the 
Community in order to assembie them into the product subject to the anti-dumping duty. The 
products imported are not covered by the anti-dumping duty. Under EC anti-dumping law, 
though, the scope of definitive anti-dumping duties may be extended to apply to imports from 
third countries of partsof like products if three conditions are fuiftlied (Article 13(1) and (2) basic 
EC Regulation) (hereinafter called «the screwdriver factory provision»). GATI does notprovide 
any remedy against such evasion of anti-dumping duties (see: preamble to basic EC 
Regulation)1704• The original EC rules on assembly1705, however, have been found illegal 
under GATI1706• This conviction bas not resulted in the EC rules on assembly being 
repealed. Rather they have been replaced by new rules, which closely resembie the old ones. 
There are two major differences : first, contrary to the old rules, it is not required that the 
assembly operations are carried out by a party related or associated with the dumping exporters 
subject to the anti-dumping duty ; second, the new rules do not impose to take account of the 
circumstances of each case, such as the variabie costs incurred in the assembly operation and the 
research and development carried out and the technology applied within the Community. 1t seems 
that the disappearance of those requirements will have but a minor effect. U sually, the dumping · · 
exporter will .. only relocate · bis production actlvities in favour of a party to which he is related or 
associated. This is especially so in view of the fact that the terms «related» and «associated» did 
1704 Supra, 96-91. 
1705 Artiele 13(10) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on proteetion against dumped or aubsidized import& &om countriea 
not memben of the European Economie Community, O.I., 2 August 1988, No L 209/1. 
1706 GAIT Doe. No. U6657, 22 March 1990. See: irifra, 731-733. 
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not only oomprise corporate links1707, but also contractual arrangements 1708• Moreover, 
the circumstances of the case which had to be taken into account have never prevented the 
extension of the anti-dumping duty. The major innovation is the new condition that the remedial 
effects of the anti-dumping duties must be undermined by the assembly and that the as.sembled 
products are soldat prices below the normal value of the dumped product. Another difference is 
1707 Corporate linb falling within the tei'DUJ .relatec:Lt and •a.uociatec:Lt are : 
wholly owned subsidiaries of the dumping exporters (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1021188 of 18 April 1988 extending the 
anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1058186 to certain electronie IIC&les assembied in the Community, 0 . .1.., 
20 April 1988, No L 10111 ; Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 1022/88 of 18 April 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed 
by Regulation (EEC) No 1698186 to certain electronie typewriters assembied in the Community, 0 . .1.., 20 April 1988, No 
L 10114 ; Commiuion 'Decision 881225/EEC of 18 April 1988 terminating the inve.tigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation 
(EEC) No 2176/84 concerning certain hydraulie exeavators assembiedor produced in the Community, 0 . .1.., 20 April1988, No 
L 101124 ; Commission Deeision 881226/EEC of 18 April 1988 terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of 
Regulation (EEC) No· 2176/84 concerning certain typewriters assembied or produced in the Community with regard to TEC 
Elektronik-Werk GmbH and Brather Industries (UK) Ltd, O.J., 20 April 1988, No L 101126; Commission Decision 
881227/EEC of 18 April 1988 terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 concerning 
certain electronie scales assembiedor produced in the Community with regard to TEC-Keylard Weegschalen Nederland BV, 
0 . .1.., 20 April 1988, No L 101128 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 of 17 October 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty 
imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 53ó/87 to certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Com.munity, O.J., 19 October 
1988, No L 284136 ; Commission Decision 881519/EEC of 17 October 1988 accepting undertakings and terminating the 
investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 concerning certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in 
the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, NoL 284/60; Commission Decision 89157/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the 
praeeedinga under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 concerning certain hall hearings assembied in the 
Community, 0 . .1.., 28 January 1989, NoL 25190; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3042189 of 6 October 1989 extending the anti-
dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 to certain serlal-impact dot-matrix printers assembied in the 
Community, 0 . .1.., 10 October 1989, NoL 291152; Commission Decision 89/543/EEC of6 October 1989 accepting undertakings 
and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 concerning certain serial-impact dot-
matrix printers assembied in the Com.munity, 0 . .1.., 10 October 1989, NoL 291157; Commission Decision 90/47/EEC of 1 
February 1990 terminating the proceeding under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 concerning plain paper 
photocopiers assembied or produced in the Community by Ricoh Industrie France SA, O.J., 6 February 1990, No L 34128) ; 
partially owned subsidiaries of the dumping exporters (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3042/89 of 6 October 1989 extending the 
anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 to certain serlal-impact dot-matrix printers assembied in the 
Community, 0 . .1.., 10 October 1989, No L 291152 ; Commission Decision 89/543/EEC of 6 October 1989 accepting undertakings 
and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 concerning certain serlal-impact dot-
ma,trix printers assembied in the Community, 0 . .1.., 10 October 1989, NoL 291157); 
a 50 % plWI one shareholding or a mqjority shareholding held by the dumping firm (Council Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 of 
17 October 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 to certain plain paper photocopiers 
assembied in the Community, 0 . .1.., 19 October 1988, No L 284/36; Commission Decision 88/619/EEC of 17 October 1988 
accepting undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 concerning 
certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Com.munity, 0 . .1.., 19 October 1988, NoL 284/60). 
1708 Contractual arrangement& falling within the terms .related. and •associated. are : 
a joint venture between the fmn established in the Community and the dumping exporter (Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3205/88 of 17 October 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 to certain plain paper 
photocopiers assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, No L 284/36; Commission Deeision 881519/EEC of 17 
October 1988 accepting undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 
concerning certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Com.munity, 0 . .1.., 19 October 1988, NoL 284/60); 
substantial capital links and close economie and commercial relations with the dumping exporter (Couneil Regulation (EEC) 
No 1021188 of 18 April 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1058186 to certain electronie 
scales assembied in the Community, 0 . .1.., 20 April 1988, NoL 10111; Commission Decision 881227/EEC of 18 April 1988 
terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 concerning certain electronie scales 
assembiedor produced in the Community with regard to TEC-Keylard Weegschalen Nederland BV, 0 . .1.., 20 April 1988, No 
L 101128); 
the arrangement that the mere assembly of all parts which are imported and delivered at its premises by the dumping 
exporter is the sole activity ofthe company established in the Community, whereas the fmished product is exclusively aold in 
the Community by the dumping exporter who bears all coats incurred between importation of the parts and the sale of the 
finished producta the assembly fee of which paid to the assembly ·rmn constitutes only a small percentage (Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 1022/88 of 18 April 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1698186 to certain 
electronic typewriters assembied in the Community, 0 . .1.., 20 April1988, NoL 10114). 
See also : VAN GERVEN, G., tcNew Anti-Circumvention Rules in EEC Anti-Dumping Law•, International Lawyer, 1988, (809), 819. 
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that the application of the ruleon assembly cannot result in the acceptance of an undertaking ; if 
there is anti-circumvention, the only sanction will be the extension of the scope of the anti-
dumping duty to the imports of the parts assembied in the Community1709• 
(i) The assembly operation must have been staned or substantially increased since, or just 
prior to, the initiation of the anti-dumping investigation and the parts must be from the 
country subject to anti-dumping measures 
Whereas the oommencement of the assembly and production actlvities does not raise 
questions of interpretation, the term «substantial increase» leaves some room for 
interpretation, though small, normal and cyclical increases seem a priori to be 
excluded1710• The European anti-dumping authorities usually oompare the 
development in assembly or production before and after the opening of the anti-dumping 
investigation, in order to determine whether there has been a substantial increase in 
1709 Under tbc old ~ercwdriver factory rule, it was poasible to accept ondertakinga in order to stop tbc circumvention (see : Artiele 13(10)(d) of· 
Council Regulation (BBC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on proteetion against dumped or subsidized imports from countriea nol memben of tbc 
Europeen Economie Conununity, O.J., 2 August 1988, NoL 209/1). Such ondertakinga involved tbc obligation to attain a eertaio proportion of 
Community partl for tbe aucmbly or production in tbc Community of tbc finiabeel product by a party which ia rclated or associated to a 
manufacturcr whoac export& of tbc like product are subject to a dcfinitivc anti-dumping duty (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1329/88 of 16 May 
1988 amending Rcgulation (EEC) No 1022/88 witb rcgard to eertaio clcctronic typewriters a~~embled in tbe Community by Kyulbu Matlushila 
(UK) Ltd, O.J., 17 May 1988, NoL 123/31 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2076/88 of 11 July 1988 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1022/88 
witb rcgard to eertaio electrooie typewriters auembled in tbc Community by Canon Bretagne SA, O.J., 14 July 1988, NoL 183/1 ; Commiuion 
Deciaion 88/387/EEC of 11 July 1988 accepting ondertakinga coneerDing eertaio clcctronic typewriters asaembled or produced in tbe Community by 
Canon Bretagne SA, O.J., 14 July 1988, NoL 183/39; Commiuion Deciaion 88/398/EEC of 15 July 1988 accepting an undertaking conccrning 
eertaio electrooie wcighing ~ealcs a88embled or produced in tbc Community, O.J., 20 July 1988, No 189/27 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2329/88 of 25 July 1988 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1022/88 insofar as it concerns eertaio clcctronic typewriters assembied in tbe Community 
by Sharp Manufacturing (UK) Ltd, O.J., 28 July 1988, NoL 203/1; Commiuion Deciaion 88/424/EEC of 25 July 1988 accepting an undertaking 
relating to tbe anti-dumping proceeding conccrning eertaio clcctronic typewriters a88Cmbled or produced in the Community by Sharp Manufacturing 
(UK) Ltd, O.J., 28 July 1988, No L 203/25 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 of 17 October 1988 extending tbe anti-dumping duty imposed 
by Regulation (BBC) No 535/87 to eertaio plain paper photocopien asaembled in tbc Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, No L 284/36; 
Commiuion Deciaion 88/519/EEC of 17 October 1988 accepting uridertakinga and terminating tbc invcatigation under Artiele 13 (10) ofRcgulation 
(EEC) .No 2423/88 conccrning eertaio plain paper photocopicn asaeinbled in tbc Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, No L 284/60; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4017188 of 19 December 1988 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 as regarda eertaio plain paper photocopiers a88Cmbled 
in tbe Community by Mataulbita Busineu Machine (Europe) GmbH and Toahiba Syatèmea (France) SA, O.J., 23 December 1988, NoL 35511; 
Commiuion Deciaion 88/638/EEC of 16 November 1988 accepting ondertakinga rclating to tbc anti-dumping proceeding conceming eertaio plain 
paper photocopien aiiCmbled in tbe Community by Matsushila Buaineu Machine (Europc) GmbH and Toahiba Syatèmea (France) SA, O.J., 23 
December 1988, NoL 355166; Council Reguiltion (EEC) No 359/89 of 13 February 1989 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 in respect of 
eertaio plain paper photocopic,a asaembled in tbc Conununity by Konica Buaineu Machines Manufacturing GmbH, O.J., 15 Fcbruary 1989, No 
L 43/1 ; Conuniuion Deciaion 89/116/EEC of 23 December 1988 accepting an undertaking rclating to tbe anti-dumping proceeding conceming 
eertaio plain paper photocopicn asaembled or produced in the Community by Konica Buaineu Machines Manufacturing GmbH, O.J., 15 February 
1989, No L 43/54 ; Commiuion Deciaon 89/309/EEC of 28 April 1989 accepting an undertaking relating to tbc anti-dumping proceeding coneer-
Ding eertaio plain paper photocopien asaembled or produced in tbc Community by Sharp Manufacturing (UK) Ltd, O.J., 9 May 1989, No 
L 126/38; Couocil Replation (EEC) No 3042/89 of 6 October 1989 extending the anti-dumping duty impoaed by Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 to 
eertaio serlal-impact dot-matrix printen a88Cmbled in tbc Community, O.J., 10 October 1989, NoL 291152; Commission Decision 89/543/EEC of 
6 October 1989 accepting undertalclnga and terminating tbc inveatigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 coneerDing eertaio 
serlal-impact dot-matrix printen auembled in the Community, O.J., 10 October 1989, NoL 291/57; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3490/89 of 21 
November 1989 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 3042/89 cxtending tbc anti-dumping duty impoaed by Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 to eertaio 
serlal-impact dot-matrix printen asaembled in tbc Conununity, O.J, 23 November 1989, No L 340/5; Commiuion Deciaion 89/596/EEC of 13 
October 1989 accepting ondertakinga relating to the anti-dumping proceeding concerning eertaio serlal-impact dot-matrix printera a88Cmbled in tbc 
Community by NEC Tcchnology Ltd and Star Micronies Manufacturing Ltd, O.J., 23 November 1989, No L 340/25. 
1710 Thus, no •ubetantial increase was found in electronic typewriter• from .Japan where the firm had ceased assembling electronic 
typewriters in the Community before the beginning of the investigation (Commission Decision 88/226/EEC of 18 April 1988 
terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2176184 concerning certain typewriters assembied or 
produced in the Community with regard to TEC Elektronik-Werk GmbH and Brother Industries (UK) L~ O.J., 20 April1988, No 
L 101126). , 
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assembly or production171l. Only when the increase is substantial, a comparison with 
the period before the opening of the anti-dumping investigation is held 
superfluous1712• Through this interpretation it will be difficult to distinguish 
increases which are merely the consequence of the imposition of anti-dumping duties, on 
the one hand, and increases which, on the other hand, are the implementation of 
decisions to start and increase a8sembly actlvities within the Community, which were 
taken or planned long before anti-dumping proceedings were initiated1713• Moreover, 
the relocation of assembly and production facilities into the Community may result from 
pure profit maximization1714 and producers may hardly be reproached to maximize 
pro fits. 
1711 A .substantial increase has been found in : 
in plain paper photocopiers from Japan" namely an increase of 30 % in the year following the opening of the original 
investigation, because during the five year period prior to the opening of the original investigation production increased by a 
mere 4.6% and because a 30% increase from a large basis is greater, in absolute terms, than from a smaller basis (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3206/88 of 17 October 1988 enending the .anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 to 
certain plain. paper photocOpiers assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, NoL 284/36; Commission Decision 
88/619/EEC of 17 October 1988 accepting undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation 
(EEC) No 2423188 concerning certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 OctobSr 1988, No 
L 284/60); 
in bcall bearing• from Japan" namely an increase of more than 24% in the year following the opening of the original 
investigation and of more than 40 % in the two year period following the opening of the original investigation, in view of the 
fact that during the four year period before the opening of the original investigation production incre~UJed by only between 0 
and 2.3% (Commission Decision 89167/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the proceedings under Artiele 13 (10) of 
Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 concerning certain hall hearings assembied in the Community, O.J., 28 January 1989, No 
L 26190). 
1712 In plain paper photocopier• from Japan" the output of the assembly faeility increased by 74 % in the first year and by 38 % in 
the second year alter the opening of the investigation. During those years, the Japanese moelels - the fll'lll assembliilg. Japanese 
photocopiers produced also own models- comprised 48 and 66 %, respectively, ofthe total units produced and assembled. Thua, the 
increase in the production of Japanese models exceeded 38 % in the second year (Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 3206/88 of 17 
October 1988 enending the anti-dumping duty. imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 to certain plain paper photocopiers 
assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, NoL 284136; CommiBBion Decision 88/619/EEC of 17 October 1988 accepting 
undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 concerning certain plain 
paper photocopiera assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, NoL 284/60). · 
1713 VAN GERVEN, G., .New Anti-Circumvention Rules in EEC Anti-Dumping Law•, International Lawyer, 1988, (809), 821. 
1714 8ee: WEBB, M.A., tcA.nti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and Prices., Journal of International EconomicB, 1987122, 
(363), 363-368. 
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In principle, the origin of the parts must be determined in accordance with Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establisbing the Community Customs Code1715 (Artîcle 
14(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(7) basic EC Decision). The European anti-
dumping authorities sametimes cboose to ignore the actual composition of tbe finisbed 
product. Thus, they have assumed that the parts bougbt frrst were used frrst for the 
production of the finisbed products, even if the parts bougbt last were actually 
used 1716• It should be pointed out that the parts bougbt frrst originated in the 
dumping country, wbereas the parts bought last did not. 
(ii) The parts must constitute 60 % or more of the total value of the parts of the assembied 
1715 
product (the so-called 60/40 provision) 
At first sight, the 60/40 provision seems to exclude any «<ne-way flexibility» : it seems 
only to require that the value of tbe parts originating in the dumping country are added 
and are compared with the value of the assembied product. Nevertbeless, tbere is room 
for «<ne-way flexibility» because the application of the 60/40 provision requires the 
determination of tbe value of the various parts. 
The value of the parts is usually determined on an into-factory, duty paid basis, i.e., on 
the basis of the companies purebase prices of parts when delivered to factorles in the 
Community. If, bowever, sucb purebase prices do not cover all production and export 
costs, the value of tbe parts will be assessed on the basis of a kind of constructed value, 
i.e. , on the basis of adjusted sales prices reflecting the dumping firm' s purebase price of 
the parts manufactured by third parties, or on the basis of the dumping firm' s own total 
O.J., 19 October 1992, NoL 302/1. 
Thus, if a suffieient degree of parts and materlala orlginating in the Community are used, the sub-asse;mbly within the Community 
of part& and materlala into parts or materlala used for the production of the finished product ean confer Community orlgin to the 
assembied part& and materlala (Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 1021/88 of 18 April 1988 enending the anti-dumping duty imposed by 
Regulation (EEC) No 1058/86 to certain electronie scales assembied in the Community, O.J., 20 April 1988, No L 10111; 
Commission Deciaion 881226/EEC of 18 April 1988 terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 
2176/84 coneerDing certain typewriters assembied or produced in the Community with regard to TEC Elektronik-Werk GmbH and 
Brother Industries (UK) Ltd, O.J., 20 April1988, NoL 101126; Commission Deeision 881227/EEC of 18 Aprll1988 terminating the 
investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 coneerDing certain electronie scales assembied or produced in 
the Community with regard to TEC-Keylard Weegschalen Nederland BV, O.J., 20 Aprll1988, NoL 101128). On the other hand, 
the mere aub-assembly within the Community of part& and materials all originating in the dumping country into parts and 
materials used for produeing the finished product does not alter the orlgin (Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 1022/88 of 18 April 1988 
extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1698/85 to certain electronie typewriters assembied in the 
Community, O.J., 20 April 1988, No L 10114; Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 of 17 October 1988 extending the anti-
dumping duty impoiJed by Regulation (EEC) No 635/87 to certain plain paper photocopiera assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 
Ociober 1988, No L 284/36 ; Commisaion Decision 88/619/EEC of 17 October 1988 accepting undertakings and terminating the 
investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 concerning certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the 
Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, NoL 284160). 
1716 Commi~~&ion Deeiaion 881227/EEC of 18 April 1988 terminating the inveatigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 2176/84 coneerDing certain electronie scales assembiedor produced inthe Community with regard to TEC-Keylard Weegschalen 
Nederland BV, O.J., 20 April1988, NoL 101128. 
-----------------------~~~-~~~~--~~~=~ 
727 
production costs plus its sales, general and administrative expenses1717• The use of 
such a constructed value must be criticized because it relles on the metbod of full-cost 
pricing which does oot pay attention to the demand side and the competitive forces on the 
market1718• Furthermore, the constructed value of pa.rts is determined differently, 
according to the origin of . the pa.rts. If the price for parts of Community origin is 
unknown or unreliable, the pa.rts will be vaiued at their production costs1719• Selling, 
general and administrative expenses are oot considered. . Moreover, insofar as the 
production costs in the Community are assembly costs, they are considered simply as a 
«value-added» and, therefore, are oot included in the value of the parts of Community 
origin1720• In comparison with the pa.rts originating in the dumping country, the parts 
of Community origin will be. underestimated. As a result, the 60/40 provision will be 
easier fulfilled. 
There is one important exception to the 60/40 rule: in no case may circumvention be 
considered to be taking place where the value added to the parts brought in, durlog the 
assembly operation, is greater than 25 % of the manufacturing oost. Under the old rule 
on assembly activities, the 60/40 provision was applied straightforwardly, without any 
1717 Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 1022/88 of 18 April 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 
1698/85 to certain electronie typewriters assembied in the Community, O.J., 20 April1988, NoL 10114; Couneil Regulation (EEC) 
No 3042/89 of 6 October 1989 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 to certain serial-impact 
dot-matrix printers assembied in the Community, O.J., 10 October ÜJ89, No L 291152; Commission Deeision 89/543/EEC of 6 
October 1989 accepting undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 
concerning certain serlal-impact dot-matrix printers assembied in the Community, O.J., 10 October 1989, NoL 291157. 
1718 Supra, 161-162. 
1719 Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 of 17 October 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 
535/87 to certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, NoL 284/36; Commission Deeision 
88/519/EEC of 17 October 1988 accepting undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 2423/88 conoerning oertain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, No L 284/60; 
Commission Deciaion 89/57/EEC of 20 January 1989 terminating the proceedings under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 
2423188 conoerning certain ball hearings assembied in the Community, O.J., 28 January 1989, No L 25190; Couneil Regulation 
(EEC) No 3042189 of 6 October 1989 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 3651188 to oertain serlal-
impact dot-matrix printers assembied in the Community, O.J., 10 October 1989, NoL 291152; Commission Decision 89/543/EEC of 
6 October 1989 accepting undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423188 
concerning oertain serial-impact dot-matrix printers assembied in the Community, O.J., 10 October 1989, NoL 291157. 
172° Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 1022188 of 18 April 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by .Regulation (EEC) No 
1698/85 to certain electronie typewriters assembied in the Community, O.J., 20 April 1988, NoL 101/4; Commission Decision 
88/225/EEC of 18 April 1988 terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 concerning 
certain hydraulie excavators assembiedor produced in the Community, O.J., 20 April 1988, NoL 101124; Commission Decision 
88/227/EEC of 18 April 1988 terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 (10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 conoerning 
certain electronie scalea assembiedor produced in the Community with regard to TEC-Keylard Weegschalen Nederland BV, O.J., 
20 April 1988, No L 101128 ; Couneil Regulation (EEC) No 3205/88 of 17 October 1988 extending the anti-dumping duty imposed by 
Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 to certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 1988, NoL 284/36; 
Commission Deciaion 88/519/EEC of 17 October 1988 accepting undertakings and terminating the investigation under Artiele 13 
(10) of Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 concerning certain plain paper photocopiers assembied in the Community, O.J., 19 October 
1988, NoL 284/60. 8ee also: VAN BAEL, 1., and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti--Dumping an.d other Trade Proteetion Law• of the EEC, 
Bice&ter, CCH Editions, 1990, 236-237. 
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exception. There was much criticism as to the old 60/40 provision which was said to be 
an arbitrary ceiling, especially when ooropared to the definition of the Community 
industry in European anti-dumping case law. lndeed, a Community producer having 
corporate links with a dumping exporter is considered to be part of the Community 
industry, though he is importing parts of the dumping exporter and bis assembly 
operations create only a value added of 20 to 35 %1721 • Through bis inclusion in the 
Community industry, a Community producer may, thus, be granted a safe-conduct to 
ondertake actions for which other producers are sanctioned under the screwdriver factory 
provision 1722• The fact that the Community industry is interpreted so as to include 
all the complainant Community producers and to exclude all the non-complaining 
Community producers 1723 increases the arbitrariness of the 60/40 provision 1724• 
Probably, in order to bend this criticism, the exception of the 25 % value added bas been 
introduced. 
(iii) The remedial effects of the duty must he undermined and the assembied product must 
he dumped 
For anti-dumping duties to be extended to apply to products assembied within the 
Community, the «classical» conditions for anti-dumping rellef must be fulfilled : there 
mustbedumping which causes injury. In the case of assembly operations, however, the 
dumping bas a specific meaning : there will be dumping bere if the prices at which the 
1721 C.J.E.C., case C-174187, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1399; C.J.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 
March 1992, Mauu.hita Electric In.cbutrial Co. Ltd. and Matsu.hita Electric Trading Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 
1483; C.J.E.C., cue C-176187, 10 March 1992, Konishirolcu Photo InduBtry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1526; · 
C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San:yo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1568; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 
March 1992, Sh.arp Corporation v CouncU, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1680; Council Regulation (EEC) No 535/87 of 23 February 1987 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of plain paper photocopiers originating in Japan, O.J., 24 February 1987, No 
L 54112 ; VAN BAEL, I, .Japanese in vestment in the EC : Trojan Horse or hostage ?•, International Financial Law Review, June 
1987, (10), 11. Fora critical comment, aee: •upra, 416-417. 
1722 C.J.E.C., C88e C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 1349 (Report for the Hearing: plea 
in law of the applicant); C.J.E.C., case C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Matsushila Electric IndUBtrial Co. Ltd and Matsushita Electric 
Trading Co. Ltd. v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1432-1433 (Report for the Hearing : plea in law of the applicants); C.J.E.C., case 
C-176187, 10 March 1992, Konishirolcu Photo InduBtry Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1499 (Report for the Hearing: plea 
in law of the applicant); C.J.E.C., case C-177/87, 10 March 1992, San:yo Electric Co. Ltd v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1535), 1541 
(Report for the Hearing: plea in law of the applicant); C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v CouncU, 
E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1647-1648 (Report for the Hearing: plea in law of the applicant); VAN GERVEN, G., •New Anti-
Circumvention Rules in EEC Anti-Dumping Law•, International Lawyer, 1988, (809), 820. 
1723 8ee : supra, ~26. 
1724 Thia compariaon with tbc dcfinition of tbc Community induatry doca nol imply that tbc 60/40 provision actually applies or should apply to 
the dcfinition of tbc Community induatry (CJ.E.C., caac C-174/87, 10 March 1992, Ricoh Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1335), 13n 
(Opinion of Advocate Gcncnl MISCHO) and 1399; CJ.E.C., case C-175/87, 10 March 1992, Malsushita Electric Industrial Co. Lid and 
Malsushita Electric Trading Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1409), 1482; CJ.E.C., casc C-176/87, 10 March 1992, Konishirolcu Photo 
Intlustry Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1493), 1526; CJ.E.C., casc C-177/87, 10 March 1992, Sanyo Electric Co. Lid v Council, E.C.R., 
1992, I, (1535), 1568; C.J.E.C., case C-179/87, 10 March 1992, Sharp Corporation v Council, E.C.R., 1992, I, (1635), 1680). It only ahowa 
that Europcan anti-dumping law ia nol consistent, aa it invo1vca disparate provisions on aimilar problcma. 
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assembied products are soid, are below the normal value of the dumped products 
established during the previous anti-dumping investigation which was terminated by the 
imposition of the definitive anti-dumping duty. Thus, the normal value used is not the 
price at which the products assembied within the Community are sold on the dornestic 
market of the dumping country, nor their constructed value. Such normal value 
standards, however, are impracticable if it is the intention to sanction the dumping of 
products assembied within the Community. lndeed, those products will probably not be 
soid on the dornestic market of the dumping exporter. The use of the constructed value 
will probably seldom resuit in a finding of dumping since the dumping of the assembied 
products is caused by the dumping of the parts of it. 
With regard to the requirement of the existence of in jury, it must not be shown that the 
assembly cause in jury to the Community industry, but prevents the Community to benefit 
from the proteetion granted by the anti-dumping duty. 
2.4.2.2. Evaluation 
2.4.2.2.1. Economie point of view 
The screwdriver factory provision is criticizeel for its alleged effect on direct foreign investments 
within the Community. It is argued that this provision will impede gradual foreign investments 
within the Community, implying the following steps : first the imports of the product, further the 
assembly of foreign parts in the Community, next the reptacement of these by Community parts, 
leading fmally to full production in the Community1725• Commissioner W. DE CLERCQ, 
however, is «convinced that this measure will not discourage investment but, on- the contrary, will 
encourage investment in volving high value added and a transfer of technology»1726• Both 
points of view are not COntradietory. From a purely economie point of view, they may be both 
right. Without the screwdriver factory provision, anti-dumping measures may cause the relocation 
of .assembly actlvities which may ultimately result in a relocation of in-depth production actlvities 
into the Community. The screwdriver factory provision, on the other hand, deters direct foreign 
investments in simple assembly actlvities in the Community, but may induce in-depth direct 
foreign investments. 
1725 VAN BAEL,·L, and BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Law• ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 
232 ; VAN GERVEN, G., .New Anti-Circumvention Rules in EEC Anti-Dumping Law•, International Lawyer, 1988, (809), 827. 
1726 P.ress releaae of W. DECLERQ, EC Commissioner for External Relations, 26 June 1987, quoted in: VAN BAEL, L, and 
BELLIS, J.-F., Anti-Dumping and other Trade Proteetion Lllw• of the EEC, Bicester, CCH Editions, 1990, 232, note 33; VAN 
GERVEN, G., .New Anti-Circumvention Rules in EEC Anti-Dumping Law•, International Lawyer, 1988, (809), 827. 
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Nevertheless, the screwdriver factory provision should not be seen as a guarantee for in-depth 
direct foreign investments in the Community. Not only the effect of the anti-dumping duty and its 
possible extension to assembly actlvities in the Community, but also production costs (e.g., 
wages) and other circumstances determine the choice between direct exports (or mere assembly 
actlvities within the Community) and in-depth direct foreign · investments in the Community. In 
other words, the exporter will oompare the profits in all the possible situations- exportation, 
simple assembly within the Community and in-depth direct foreign investments within the 
Community, or direct foreign investments in third countries - and will choose the situation 
yielding the highest profit1727. 
Whether the Community wants to attract in-depth direct foreign investments rather than mere 
assembly activities, is a pure political choice1728. As to this choice, the Community 
authorities should be aware that direct foreign investments require a elimate of confidence and 
legal certainty. Investments are long-term decisions based upon expectations about the future. 
Only if prospective investors are confident that there will be a elimate in which their expectations-
will be honoured, they will invest. Since ever increasing protectionist policies favouring the 
Community producers at the expense of direct foreign investments, do not create such a elimate of 
confidence, direct foreign investments, from simple assembly up to in-depth investments, will be 
deterred 1729. 
The Community authorities should also be aware that trade-restrictive measures, such as the 
extension of anti-dumping duties in accordance with the screwdriver factory provision, prevent 
production allocation on the basis of comparative advantages. They distort production location not 
only between the Community and the exporti~g country, but also within the Community, merely 
because Community resources will switch from production sectors in which the Community bas a 
comparative advantage, to production sectors in which the Community does not have a 
comparative advantage. Even within the production sector distortions will appear. lndeed, 
whereas producers who are related or associated with an exporter subjected to a definitive anti-
1727 See : MO'IT A, M., «Multinational fi1'1111 and the tariff-jumping argument. A game theoretic analysis with some unconventional 
conclusiollB», European Economie Review, 1992, (1551), 1551-1511. 
For example, following the impoaition of anti-dumping duties, in ball hearings jrom Japan and Singapore, a multinational company with locationa 
in Singapore ernbarked upon massive expansion of its ma nufacture in Thailand. Only when some years later an anti-dumping duty was also 
impoaed on hall bearinga from Thailand, it hegan producing ball hearings in the Cornrnunity (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2553193 of" 13 
September 1993 ameodina Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 impoaing a definitive anti-dumpina duty on imports of eertaio hall hearings originatina in 
Japan and Singapore, O.J., 18 September 1993, No L 235/3). 
1728 The Community seems to prefer foreign investments in volving high value added, see : Answer of the CommiBBion to written 
question No 540/88, 0 . .1., 12 June 1989, No C 145113. 
1729 VAN BAEL, I., .Japanese in vestment in the EC : Trojan Horse or hostage ?•, International FiiUJII.Cial Law Reuiew, June 
1987, (10), 14. 
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dumping duty and who assembie or produce the finished product, come under the screwdriver 
factory provision, the Community producers assembling the like product do not. This unequal 
treatment does not induce a favourable elimate for attracting direct foreign investments 1730 
either1731• 
2.4.2.2.2. Legal point of view 
The unequal treatment between Community producers and producers assemblying products by 
using parts originating in a dumping country caused by the old screwdriver factory provision bas 
rightly been condemmed by a GATI panel which, at a request of Japan, in accordance with 
Artiele xxm of GA TI, investigated whether the screwdriver factory provision was conform with 
GATI. The GATI panel started its investigation from the assumption that, as had been argued 
by the Community, the extension of anti-dumping duties does not fall within GA TT anti-dumping 
law and could, therefore, not be justified on that basis1732• It found the extension of anti-
dumping duties contrary to Artiele · ill(2) GA TT, under which it is forbidden to subject «the 
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party ( ... ), directly or indirectly, to intemal taxes or other intemal charges of any kind 
in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like dornestic products». The GA TI panel 
held that the extension of anti-dumping duties indirectly . imposes an intemal charge in excess of 
that applied to like dornestic products on parts and materials originating in the dumping country 
indirectly. Under Artiele XX(d) GATI, the contracting parties may adopt or enforce measures 
«necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement( ... )». However, it provides no justification for the breach of Artiele 
ID(2) GA TT, because the relocation of assembly a~tivities coinplies with anti-dumping law. For 
the same reason, Artiele XX( d) GA TI did not offered a justification either for the acceptance of 
undertakings on assembied products. Those undertakings, in which the assembling frrms 
ondertake to limit the use of imported parts and materials, were found to be contrary to Artiele 
ID( 4) GA TT, because they were considered to come under the definition of «all laws, regulations 
or requirements affecting (the) intemal sale» of the imported parts and materials1733• 
1730 VAN BAEL, L, ecJapanese investment in the EC : Trojan Horse or hostage ?•, International Finan.cial Law .Reuiew, June 
1987, (10), 14. 
1731 See alao : BOURGEOIS, J .H .J ., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generationa Issue&», in AntitiUst and Trade PoUcy in. rite 
Unlted Stales and rite &ropean Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 600, where it is held that anti-dumping law ia 
oot deaigned to punue policiea with respect to foreign investment. 
1732 See also : BOURGEOIS, J .HJ ., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement- Selected Second Generationa laaue&», in AntitiUst and Trade PoUcy In rite 
United Stales and rite European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 598-599. 
1733 GA'IT Doe. No.IJ6657, 22 March 1990. 
I_ 
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The GATT panel found only the extension of anti-dumping duties and the acceptance of 
undertakings on assembied products as being contrary to GATT law. As such, the screwdriver 
factory provision, however, was not considered to be inconsistent with GATT law, because that 
provision does not mandatorily impose the extension of anti-dumping duties or undertakings. 
Nevertheless, the GATT panel suggested that the screwdriver factory provision be withdrawn. 
The Community authorities decided not to withdraw it, but made clear that any alteration of it 
would be contingent upon the runendment of the GA TI Anti-dumping Code to address the issue of 
circumvention in the Uruguay Round negotiations1734• They decided not to apply the 
screwdriver factory provision any longer1735• In the meantime, however, the anti-dumping 
duties imposed and the undertakings accepted on the basis of the screwdriver factory provision 
remained in force1736• Thereby, the European anti-dumping authorities have done a good 
stroke of business. The screwdriver factory provision, intended to put pressure on the Japanese 
govemment to open up its market for Community products, bas been applied exclusively against 
Japanese exporters 1737• 
The Uruguay Round, however, did not reach an agreement on anti-circumvention, but referred the 
problem to the GATT Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices1738• On the occasion of the 
adaptation of EC anti-dumping law to the new GA TI Anti-dumping Code, the Community 
authorities found it necessary to introduce a new provision to deal with practices, such as simple 
assembly in the Community, which have as their main aim the circumvention of anti-dumping 
measures. They explained their point of view by referring to «the failure of the multilateral 
negotiations (i.e., the Uruguay Round) so far» and presented the new screwdriver factory 
provision a8 «pending the outcome of the referral to the GATT Anti-dumping Committee» 
(preamble to the basic EC Regulation). ·With the new provision they try to meet the remarks 
made by the GA TI panel. In particular, the new requirement that the assembied products must 
be dumped and must cause in jury to the Community industry, should be viewed from this 
1734 PETERSMANN, E.-U., cGATI Dispute Settiement Proceedings in the Field of Antidumping Law», Common Marleet Law Review, 1991, 
(69), 84; STEWART, T.P. (ed.), 7he G..t7T Uruguay Round. A Negotialing Ristory (1~1992), Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1993, vol. D, 1625. 
1735 SMEETS, M., •Globalisation and the Trade Policy Response•, Journal ofWorld Trade, 1990/5, (57), 67. 
1736 For instance, in electronic weighJng scales jrom Japan, IUCb an undertaking was repealed in 1993 because, aince ita acceptance, no 
circumvention had taken place (Council Regulation (EEC) No 993/93 of 26 April 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imporll of 
certain electronic weighing ~ealea originating in Japan, O.J., 29 April 1993, NoL 104/4) 
1737 VAN BAEL, L, .Japanese investment in the EC : Trojan Horse or hoatage ?., International Finan.cial Law Review, J~e 
1987, (10), 10-11. 
1738 Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Tnde Negotiationa, Part m. 
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perspective. By requiring that the assembied products are dumped and that their dumping inflicts 
in jury upon the Community industry, the Community authorities try to represent the screwdriver 
factory provision as a genuine anti-dumping provision. Indeed, under GATI anti-dumping law, 
anti-dumping duties may only be imposed when injurious dumping is being established. However, 
their attempt will not succeed. First, the dumping margin is not determined on the basis of a 
comparison between the normal value of the like product and the export price of the dumped 
product. Instead, the dumping is determined on the basis of a comparison between the normal 
value previously established for the like product and the resale price of the assembied product. 
That resale price does not meet the definition of the export price, i.e. , the price of the product 
sold from the exporting country to the Community ( Artiele 2(8) basic EC Regulation), and the 
normal value is not the normal value of the assembied product sold on the dornestic market of the 
exporting country. Second, the in jury is defined as the undermining of the remedial effects of the 
anti -dumping duty by the sale of the assembied product on the Community mar ket. . However, 
. GATI anti-dumping law does not define injury as a situation in which the Community industry is 
denied the effects of anti-dumping rellef (see : Artiele 3 GA TI Anti-dumping Code). Only within 
the framework of a review proceeding, it allows the continued imposition of anti-dumping duties 
if 4<Ïnjury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied» (Article 11.2. 
GATI Anti-dumping Code). However, the screwdriver factory provision does not concern the 
effects of the removal of the anti-dumping duty on the situation of the Community industry, but 
rather the absence of the expected effects of the anti-dumping duty. Hence, the screwdriver 
factory provision is not an anti-dumping provision and, as it treats the Community producers and 
the producers carrying out assembly operations, differently, it is not consistent with GA TI just as -
the old screwdriver factory provision was. 
2. 4. 3. Anti-absorption measures 
In order to avoid the effects of the anti-dumping duty on the sales prices of his product on the 
Community market, the dumping exporter ma}'_ hea!~-~J!~~--~( t!!~~~ti-dumping_Qy!y~­
th.an shift it to t}J~ __ ÇQ!l!!l!~~ cons_u~rs. The anti-dumping duty then only affects the profits of 
the dumping exporter. It does not remedy the in jury caused to the Community industry. 
Etiropean anti-dumping law wants sales prices of the dumping exporter on the Community market 
to increase by an amount rouesponding to the anti-dumping duty1739• Therefore, EC anti-
dumping law allows to recalculate the dumping margin if it is demonstrated that the lack of 
1739 Nevertheleu, the European anti-dumping authoritiea dare uae the argument that there are poaaibilitiea for dumping exporten to absorb anti-
dumping dutiea to a large extent, in order to abow that high anti-dumping dutiea will not drive the dumping exporten out of the Community market 
(Commiuion R.egulation (EEC) No 2172/93 of 30 July 1993 impoaing proviaional anti-dumping dutiea on importa of ethanolamine originating in the 
Uniled Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, NoL 195/5). 
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sufficient movement in the prices of the dumped product in the Community, i.e. , the absence of 
an increase in those prices by the amount of the anti-dumping duty, is due to a fall in the export 
prices. If such is the case, the anti-dumping duty may be amended (Article 12 basic EC 
Regulation). Though EC anti-dumping law is silent on this point, probably the rule that the 
amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the dumping margin and should equal the injury 
margin if the latter is smaller than the dumping margin (Article 9(4) basic EC Regulation), 
applies. 
Under ECSC anti-dumping law, on the other hand, an additional anti-dumping duty may be 
imposed to compensate for the amount of the anti-dumping duty borne by the dumping exporter, 
whenever the Community interests call for intervention (Article 13(11) basic ECSC Decision). 
The amount of the additional duty thus can never be higher than the amount of the anti-dumping 
duty1740. 
Mathematically, the total amount of the anti-dumping and additional duty together can exceed the 
injury margin and even the dumping margin. Under European anti-dumping law, though, the 
amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the dumping margin . and should even be less if 
the injury margin is lower (Article 13(3) basic ECSC Decision). European anti-dumping law does 
not state whether it considers the additional duty to be an ordinary anti-dumping duty. If it does, 
then the additional duty should be below both the dumping margin and the injury margin. 
However, it will be impossible to apply the injury margin. Indeed, if it would be subject to the 
latter, then an additional duty might never be imposed without the in jury margin being exceeded, 
since the amount of anti-dumping duty equals already the injury margin. Consequently, in respect 
of additional duties, European anti-dumping law probably incorporates an implicit derogation from · · 
the rule that the in jury margin must not be exceeded. As GA TT anti-dumping law does not 
prohibit the amount of the anti-dumping dutles from exceeding the injury margin, this derogation 
is legal. On the other hand, the additional duty must not deviate from the ceiling of the dumping 
margin since GA IT anti-dumping law prohibits the amount of the duties from exceeding the 
dumping margin (Article 9.3. GATT Anti-dumping Code) and does not require the dumping 
prices to increase by the amount of the anti-dumping duty. Even if European anti-dumping law 
would consider the additional duty not as an ordinary anti-dumping duty, it would be at varianee 
with GA TI. In that case, the additional duty would be a customs duty the imposition and 
increase of which are prohibited by GATT (Article n GATT). Moreover, as it applies only in 
1740 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1607192 of 22 June 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2200190 by imposing an additional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 25 June 1992, NoL 17011; VAN 
BAEL, 1., and BEI I IS, J.-F., An.tj..Dumping an.d other Trade Proteetion L4w ofthe EEC, Bicester, CCH Editioll8, 1990, 176. 
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respect of imports coming from a limited number of countries, it would not conform to the 
principle of non-discrimination ( Artiele n GA TI)1741• 
lt is not yet clear which interpretation the European ·anti-dumping authorities uphold. Probably, 
they consider the additional duty as an anti-dumping' duty since the imposition of an additional 
duty is effectuated by an increase in the amount of the definitive anti-dumping duty ; 
consequently, the dumped imports are subject to a higher anti-dumping duty and not to two 
different kinds of duty1742• In the few cases which have resulted in the imposition of an 
additional duty, the dumping margin was not exceeded 1743 or it was impossible to ascertain 
whether it was exceeded1744• 
1741 In the aamc se01e, 11ee: BELLIS, J.-F., «The EEC Antidumping System., 'in Antidumping Law and Practice. A Comparative Study, 
JACKSON, J.H., aod VERMULST, E.A. (eda.), New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 60. 
E.A. VERMULST aod JJ. HOODER. point out that there ia no obligation in GATI' anti-dumping law to paBB on anti-dumping dutiea to cultomen 
aod, therefore, hold the GAIT-legality of tbc European anti-abaorption rulea ia unclear («Annotation on Case C-170/89, Bureau Européen des 
Unions de Consontmo~eun v. Commission, Judgment of 28 November 1991; Case C-105/90, Goldstar Co. Ltd. v. Council, Judgment of 13 
February 1992; Case C-188/88, NMB (Deutschland) GmbH, NMB Itaüa Srl, NMB (UK) Ltd. v. Commission of the European Communities, 
Judgment of 10 March 1992; Case 171/87, Canon Inc. v. Council; Case 172/87, Mita Intlustrial Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 174/87, Ricoh 
Company Ltd. v. Council; Case 175/87, Malsushlta Ekctric Intlustrial Co. Lid and Malsushlta Ekctric Trading Co. Ltd. v. Council; Case 176/87, 
Konishiroky Photo lndustTy Co. Ltd. v. Council ; Case 177/87, Sanyo Ekctric Co. Ltd. v. Council ; Case 178/87, Minolta Camera Co. Ltd. v. 
Council; Case 179/87, Sluup Corporation v. Council, Judgmenta of 10 March 1992; Ca1e C-358/89, Extramet Industrie SA v. Council, Judgmcnt 
of 11 June 1992», Common Marleet Law Review, 1993, (ltS), 171, notc 29). 
1742 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1607/92 of 22 June 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 by impoaing an additional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of allicon metal originating in the People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 2S June 1992, NoL 170/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2346/93 of 23 August 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3308/90 by imposing an additional anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefin 
aacks originating in the People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 2S August 1993, No L 215/1. 
1743 See: siUc011 metalfrom the People's RepubUc ofOaina: 
dumping mai'JÎD = 38.73 % = 451.4 ECU per tonne ; 
definitive anti-dumping duty = 198 ECU per tonnc ; 
· additional + definitive anti-dumping duty = 396 ECU per tonne ; 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 of 27 July 1990 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in the 
People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 28 July 1990, No L 198/57; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1607/92 of 22 June 1992 amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 2200/90 by impoaing an additionalanti-dumping duty on import& of silicon metal originating in the People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 2S 
June 1992, NoL 170/1 ; own calculationa). 
17 44 lt impouible to ucertain whether the dumping margin ia exceeded in woven polyolejin saclcs originating in the People 's RepubUc of OUna 
becauae the dumping margin and the duty are e:xpreued at a different level of trade : 
dumping margin = 80.8 f, of the tota1 cif value at the Community frontier ; 
de finilive anti-dumping duty = 43.4 % of the net, free-at-Community frontier price ; 
additional + definitive anti-dumping duty = 85.7 % ofthe net, free-at-Community frontier price; 
(CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2051/90 of 17 July 1990 impoaing a temporary anti-dumping duty on imports of woven polyoletin bags 
originating in the People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 19 July 1990, NoL 187/36 (corrigendum, O.J., 20 September 1990, NoL 256/38); Couocil 
Regulation (EEC) No 3308/90 of 15 November 1990 impoaing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefin aacka originating in 
the People'a Repoblie of China and definitively collecting the proviaional anti-dumping duty on auch import&, O.J., 17 November 1990, No 
L 318/2; Couocil Regulation (EEC) No 2346/93 of 23 Auguil 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3308/90 by impoaing an additional anti-
dumping duty on import& of woven polyolefin sacb originating in the People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 2S Auguil 1993, NoL 215/1). 
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The scope of the provision . of European anti-dumping law allowing the imposition of additional 
duties is probably wide. For in product markets where the Community is a price-maker, the 
exporter is likely to bear a part of the anti-dumping duty. Only in product markets where the 
Community is a price-taker, the exporter will shift the entire burden to the Community 
consumers. 
In figure 19 perfect competition is assumed. The Community is assumed to be a price-taker, i.e., the Community is 
. assumed to be unable to influence, by means of the quantity it purcbases, the price level at which exporters offer their 
products on the Community market. Therefore, the supply curve of the dumping exporters is given by the horizontal 
line Sw, whereas D and Sd represent, respectively, the Community consumers' demand and the Community producers' 
supply. Without there being any anti-dumpin~ duty, the price paid for the like product on the Community market 
equals OP1• If a specific anti-dumping duty1 45 t0 , equal to P1P2, is imposed, the supply curve of the dumping 
exporter shifts to Sw + ,t0 • As a result, the price at which the dumping exporters sell the product on the Community 
market, goes up by the same amount P1P2• The full amount of the anti-dumping duty, thus, is shifted to the 
Community consumers and Artiele 13(11) basic ECSC Decision cannot be applied. 
However, in the case of price-makership Artiele 13(11) basic ECSC Decision always applies. The case of price-
makership, i.e. , the case where the Community may influence the price at which the like products are offered on the 
Community market by means of the quantity it purchases, is represented in figure 20. The Community consumers' 
demand curve and the Community producers' supply curve are provided respectively by the curves DD' and Sd. If 
the Community producers are assumed to supply first the Community market, the dumping exporters are faced with a 
residual demand curve represented by the curve deD', obtained by deducting Sd from DD'. In case of perfect 
competition, the price at which the dumping exporters offer the product, is determined by the intersection between the 
residual demand curve, deD', and their supply curve, Sw· Thus, without anti-dumping duties, the price equals OP1• 
If a specific anti-dumping duty lo' equal to ab, is imposed, the dumping exporters' supply curve shifts upwards to 
Sw + t0 • lf the full amount ab of the specific anti-dumping duty lo is shifted to the Community consumers, the price 
will rise from OP1 to OP3• However, at the price OP3 the Community market is faced with excess supply: at that 
price, the dumping exporters want to sell more than the Community consumers are willing to buy. Equilibrium on the 
Community market is reached at the price OP2 as determined by the intersection between the residual demand curve 
deD' and the new supply curve Sw + t0 • Thus, the dumping exporters bear P2P3 of the burden of the anti-dumping 
duty t0 , whereas the full burden of the anti-dumping duty lo amounts to P1P3• In order to obtain a price increase of 
P1P3, an additional duty ta amounting to bc must be imposed. Then the sl1pply curve shifts to Sw + t0 + ta and the 
price on the Community matket increases to OP3• Thus, aftei' the imposition of the additional anti-dumping duty fa, 
the Community consumers bear P1P3 which corresponds to the burden of the original anti-dumping duty lo· . However, 
the full burden of the combination of the original and the additional anti-dumping duty amounts to P1P 4• 
Consequently, the dumping ex porter bears again part of the burden of the anti-dumping duty, namely P3P 4• 
1745 The analyais also holels with regard to ad ucalorem anti-dumping duties. Only ü variabie anti-dumping duties are imposed, it 
will never be neceseary to apply Artiele 13(11) basic ECSC Decision : since variabie anti-dumping duties eneure the price of the like 
product on the Community market to beat least equal to the minimum price used as basis for the variabie anti-dumping duty, the 
e:xporter can never bear any burden of a variabie anti-dumping duty. 
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In both the figures 19 and 20 the only change with regard to the original situation was the 
introduetion of anti-dumping duties : the dumping exporters did not alter their pricing policy, nor 
did their production costs change. In such case, the dumping exporters could not invoke any 
defence against the imposition of an additional duty. The only defence accepted onder European 
anti-dumping law, is the absence of a price increase equal to the amount of the anti-dumping duty 
because of a reduction in the costs and/or profits of the importer for the product (Article 13(ll)(c) 
basic ECSC Decision)1746• In view of the analysis made in tigure 20, the basis for the 
defence is clearly too narrow. The fact that the price-increasing effects of anti-dumping duties on 
the supply side (represented by the upward shift of the dumping exporter's supply curve in tigure 
20) are counterbalanced by their price-decreasing effects on the demand side, snould be accepted 
as a defence. Indeed, the price increase caused by an anti-dumping duty reduces the Community 
consomers' demand and that reduced de mand decreases the price level. Also other defences 
should be accepted, such as, for instance, the effect of increased competition on prices and the 
cyclical development of the price levei1747• 
1746 The following have not ~n upheld : 
the argument that the lower quality of the dumped product& justified a price iower than that of the 88me product coming from other countrie1 
because the alleged differcnce in quality could not justify the deercase in the price of tbc dumped produels and the difference between tbe 
price of the dumped products and that of identicaUy the 88me product coming from other countries had increased (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1607/92 of 22 June 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 by imposing an additional anti-dumping duty on imp01'ts of lilicon 
metal originalÏnl in the People'1 Repoblie of China, O.J., 25 June 1992, NoL 170/1); 
the argument that the deercase in the price of the dumped products could be linked to on overall trend in the market because the price of tbe 
dumped producll decrcased, wherea1 tbe price of other importa of the like product coming from olher countries remained atable over the 
same period (Council Regulation (EEC) No 1607/92 of 22 June 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 by imposing an additional 
anti-dumping duty on impon. of lilicon metal originating in the People'1 Repoblie of China, O.J., 25 June 1992, NoL 170/1); 
tbe argument tbat the cOlt of tbe nw material in tbe exporting NME had declined becau1e tbc nonnat value of NME countriea ha1 to be 
based on the normal value of tbe like product in a refcrcnce country (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2346/93 of 23 August 1993 ameodm, 
Rcgulation (EEC) No 3308/90 by impoaing an additionalanti-dumping duty on importa of woven polyolefin sacks originating in tbc Peoplc'1 
Repoblie of China, O.J., 25 Aug1llll1993, NoL 215/1). 
The effect of tluctuatiool in tbc exchange ntes 1incc tbc imposition of the anti-dumping duty are neutnlised by using tbe same exchange rate as for 
tbe calculation of tbc prieel in tbe original invcatigation period (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2346/93 of 23 August 1993 amending Rcgulation 
(EEC) No 3308/90 by impoaing an additional anti-dumping duty on importa of woven polyolefin aacks .originating in tbe People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 25 Auguat 1993, NoL 215/1). 
1747 In ethanolaminejrom the Unired Stales of Amerlca, the Commiuion pointed out tbat, notwithstanding tbc high anti-dumping duties propoled, 
tberc wa1 no dangcr that tbc pricca would be kept unjuatifiably high given the cyclical low level of tbe pricea of tbe imports of tbe product involved 
and given tbe high dcaree of competition from producen in other third countries (Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 2172/93 of 30 July 1993 
imposing proviaional anti-dumping dutiea on importa of ethanolamine originating in tbc Uniled Statea of America, O.J., 4 August 1993, No 
L 195/5). 
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3. UNDERTAKINGS 
3.1. CONTENTS 
Two types of undertakings may be distinguished : price undertakings and quantity undertakings. 
Under the former, prices are revised and, under the latter, exports are ceased to the extent that the 
dumping margin or the injurious effects of the dumping are eliminated ( Artiele 8.1. GA TT Anti- -
dumping Code ; Artiele 8(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 10(2)(b) basic EC legislation). In 
practice, there appears to be a clear preferenee for price undertakings in European anti-dumping 
case law1748• However, undertakings to reduce exports to a level at which there will be no 
further injury, have also been accepted1749.• The European anti-dumping authorities usually do 
17 48 In binder and haler IWine from BrazJl, quantitativc ondertakinga wcre acccptcd bccausc, in tbc absence of an international sport quolation 
conccming sisal fibre, variations in pricc of tbc prime material cannot bc monitored and crcate a factor of unpredictability as to whetbcr a pricc 
undertaking would lti1l be cffcctivc aborty after ita acccptancc (Commission Dccision 93/521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting ondertakinga 
givcn in conneetion witb tbe anti-dumping review in reapeet of import& of binder and balcr twinc originating in Brazil, terminating the anti-subsidy 
review procceding witb regard to these import& and tenninating tbc anti-dumping and anti-subsidy review in respect of import& of binder and balcr 
twinc originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, NoL 251/28). 
STEGEMANN, K., «EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Are Pricc Undertakings a Lcgal Substitute for Diegal Price Fixing•, Wellwinscha.ftüches Archlv, 
1990, (268), 269 and 282. 
1749 Commission Decision 86/639/ECSC of 23 December 1986 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping investigation concerning import& of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia and tenninating 
the investigation, O.J., 31 December 1986, No L 371184; Council Decision 87/104/EEC of 9 February 1987 accepting an 
undertak.ing given in conneetion with the ánti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar 
brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 14 February 1987, No L 46/46; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 of 4 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of urea originating 
in Libya and Saudi Arabia and. accepting undertakings given in conneetion with import& of urea originating in Czechoslovakia, the 
German Demoeratic Republic, Kuwait, the USSR, Trinidad and Tobago and Yugoslavia and terminating these investigations, O.J., 
7 November 1987, NoL 317/1; Commission Decision No 2131188/ECSC of 18 July 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of certain ahaets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia and defmitively collecting the provisional anti-
dumping duty imposed on those import&, O.J., 19 July 1988, No L 188/14; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3052/88 of 29 
September 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating 
in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 4 October 1988, No L 272/16 ; Council Decision 88/576/EEC of 14 November 1988 repealing 
Decision 871104/EEC accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of paint, 
distemper, varnish and aimilar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the investigation, O.J., 18 
November 1988, No L 312/33 ; Commiaion Deciaion 93/521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting undertakings given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping review in respect of import& of binder and haler twine originating in Brazil, terminating the anti-subsidy 
review proceeding with regard to these import& and terminating the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy review in respect of import& of 
binder and haler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, No L 251128 ; CommiBBion Decision 941202/EC of 9 March 1994 
accepting undertakings oft'ered. in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of silicon carbide originating in 
the "People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the former USSR and terminating the proceeding against.imports originating 
in Norway and several republics previously part of the former USSR, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/32; Commission Decision 
941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of 
ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and RUBBia and term.inating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well 
as terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24. See also : Council Régulation (EEC) No 2109/86 of 26 
July 1985 impo•ing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain kinds of polystyrene sheet originating in Spain, O.J., 30 
July 1985, NoL 19811; C.J.E.C., joined cases 133187 and 150/87, 14 March 1990, Na8huo. Corporation. v. Commission an.d CouncU, 
E.C.R., 1990, I, (719), 742. 
Contra: BOUDANT, J., L'an:tH:lumping oommun.tJUtaire, Paris, Economica, 1991, 189, according to whom quantity undertaki.ngs 
must cease all import&. See also: BELLIS, J.-F., •The EEC Antidumping System•, in Antidumping Law an.d Practice. A 
Comparatiue Study, JACKSON, Jli., and VERMULST, E.A. (eds.), New York, Harveeter Wheatsheaf, 1990, (41), 54. 
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not justify their preferenee for either price undertakings or quantity undertakings. Just once, they 
have referred to the fluctuation in prices in order to explain why they preferred a quantity 
undertaking ; because of those price fluctuations, an undertaking based on a minimum price level, 
could have ended up excluding the dumped imparts from the Community market1750• 
GA TT and EC anti-dumping law also stipulate that the exporter from whom an undertakings bas 
been accepted, must provide, periodically, information relevant to the fulfilment of such 
undertaking, and must permit verification to pertinent data (Article 8.6. GATT Anti-dumping 
Code ; Artiele 8(7) basic EC Regulation) ; however, even under ECSC anti-dumping law, which 
is silent in this respect, undertakings provide that regular (e.g., half-yearly) reports on quantities 
and prices of exports (unit prices and total value). of the product to the Community must be 
submitted by the exporters to the Commission1751• 
GATT and European anti-dumping case law do notprovide much further information about the 
contents of undertakings. The content of undertakings appears to be confidential and cannot be 
disclosed (Article 6 GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 19 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 8 basic 
ECSC Decision)1752• However, GATT and EC anti-dumping law require that the non-
175° Commiuion Deciaion 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakinga given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding conceming 
import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Ruuia and terminating the inveatigation with regard . to these countriea ; as weU as 
tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding conceming import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarua, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekiatan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24. 
1751 CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 2444/83 of 29 August 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of 
hardboard originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Sweden and re-opening the anti-dumping proceedings concerning these im-
po:rts, O.J., 31 August 1983, No L 24119; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 668/84 of 29 February 1984 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of hardboard originating in the Boviet Union and re-opening the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
those import&, O.J., 2 March 1984, No L 6l!J1; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 14/88 of 23 December 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of roller ebains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 6 January 
1988, NoL 316; Commission Decision No 229/88/ECSC of 26 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or .teel, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 January 1988, No L 23113; CommiBBion Decision 
931157/EEC of 4 March 1993 accepting undertakings offered by three producers in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning certain import& of electronic microciruits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 18 March 1993, No L 66/37; Commission Decision 931521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review in respect of import& of binder and baler twine originating in 
Brazil, terminating the anti-subsidy review proceeding with regard to these import& and terminating the anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy review in respect of import& of binder and baler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, No L 25l!J8; 
Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing import. of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to 
these countries ; u well u terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129124; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1418194 of 20 June 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of artificial corundum originating in the People'a 
Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1994, No L 156/8 ; Commission Decision 941825/EC of 12 December 1994 accepting an 
undertaking offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of urea ammonium nitrate solution 
originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 31 December 1994, NoL 360/116; Answer of the Commission to written question No 
280/87, O.J., 6 November 1987, No C 295/18; Answer of the Commission to written question No 2522186, O.J., 28 January 1988, 
No C 23n. 
1752 8ee : Anewer of the Commission to written question No 658/80, O.J., 23 October 1980, No C 276/18 ; Anawer of the 
Commission to written question No 1609/81, O.J., 13 April1981, No C 92129 ; STEGEMANN, K., ccEC Anti-Dumping. Policy : Are 
Price Ondertakinga aLegal Substitute for lliegal Price Fixing», WeltwirlBchaftliche• Archiu, 1990, (268), 286. 
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confidential part of the undertaking is made available (under EC anti-dumping law, tough, only to 
the interested parties to the investigation, i.e. the exporters, importers and representative 
associations of importers or exporters, the representatives of the exporting country and the 
complainants, and probably the representative users and representative consumer organizations 
which have made themselves known as well (Articles 5(11) and 21 basic EC Regulation)) (Article 
12.2.3. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 8(4) basic EC Regulation). 
The information made available to the pubtic is usually limited to the standard statement that the 
undertaking offered is acceptable, because it increases the export prices of the product to a level 
necessary to eliminate the injury caused by the dumping and that the price increases indoeed by 
the undertaking do not exceed the dumping margin (see: Artiele 8.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code; 
Artiele 8(1) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 10(2)(b) basic ECSC Decision). To that end the 
exporters undertake to comply with certain minimum export prices. Those minimum prices are 
determined on the basis of the price necessary to cover the Community producers' production 
costs and a reasonable profit margin1753• They, thus, bear no relationship to the normal value 
determination, the latter being based on actual data on prices and costs of the dumping 
producer/exporter1754• Nevertheless, they frequently equal the normal value established by 
the European anti-dumping authorities1755• 
The contents of undertakings seems not confmed to the determination of ceilings on prices and 
quantities. They also oomprise the following elements : 
1753 CommiBSion Decision 88/47/EEC of 26 January 1988 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
review proceeding coneerDing import& of a herbicide originating in Romania, O.J., 30 January 1988, NoL 26/107. 
1754 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain types of 
electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in Japan and collecting defmitively the 
provisional duty, O.J., 25 July 1990, NoL 19311. 
1755 8ee e.g. : Council Regulation (EEC) No 341190 of 6 February 1990 accepting undertakings and imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of ferro-silicon originating in lcelarid, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela or Yugoslavia, except those sold for 
export to the Community by companies whose undertakings have been accepted, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 3811. 
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the reference price level will be determined quarterly on the basis of the constructed values of 
certain types of the product for each dumping exporter1756 ; 
the exchange rates which have to be applied when imports are made in another currency than 
the ECU, in which the minimum price is expressed, as well as their adjustment on a half-
yearly basis1757 ; 
the price increase consequent to the undertaking must be passed on to the Community 
market1758 ; · · 
the obligation of the dumping ex~rters not to enter into direct or indirect compensatory 
arrangements with their customers 1 59 · 
undertakings must bring some stability to the Communi~ market while allowing the dumping 
exporters to rnaintaio a share of the Community market1 60 ; 
the obligation to follow a pricing and marketing policy which does not disropt the like product 
market and the. traditional trading pattem in the Community (implying target volumes of 
imports into individual Memher States)1761 ; 
1756 Commiaaion Regulation (EEC) No 166190 of 23 January 1990 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMa (dynamic random acceBB memories) originating in Japan, accepting undertakings 
offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of these products and terminating 
the investigation in their respect, O.J., 25 January 1990, No L 20/6 (corrigendum, O.J., 27 January 1990, No L 22179 ; 
corrigendum, O.J., 10 February 1990, No L 38144) ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2112190 of 23 July 1990 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) 
originating in Japan and collecting definitively the provisional duty, O.J., 25 July 1990, NoL 193/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
677/91 of 4 March 1991 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on importsof certain types of electronic microcircuits known as 
EPROMs (erasable programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 12 March 1991, NoL 66/1; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 611193 of 16 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of certain electronic 
microcircuits known aa DRAMa originating in the Republic of Korea and exported by companies not exempted from this duty, and 
colleeting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 March 1993, NoL 6611; CommiBBion Decision 93/167/EEC of 4 
March 1993 accepting undertakings offered by three producers in conneetion with the anti-dumping procéeding coneerDing certain 
imports of electronic microciruits known as DRAMa (dynamic random acceBB memories) originating in the Republic of Korea, O.J., 
18 March 1993, No L 66137 ; CommiBBion Decision 931638/EEC of 18 October 1993 accepting an undertaking in conneetion with the 
anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of certain types of electronic micro-circuits known as EPROMs (erasable 
programmabie read only memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 21 October 1993, No L 262164. 
1757 Commiaaion Deciaion 93/479/EEC of 30 July 1993 accepting undertakinga offered in conneetion with the review of anti-dumping meaaurea 
applicable to eertaio importa of monoiOdium glutamate originating in lndoneaia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 
1993, NoL 225/35. 
1758 Commisaion Decision 81/406/EEC of " June 1981 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
coneerDing imports of hall and tapered roller hearings, originating in Japan, Poland, Romania and the Boviet Union and termina-
ting that proceeding, O.J., 11 June 1981, No L 162/44. 
1759 Commiaaion Deciaion 94/825/EC of 12 December 1994 accepting an undertaking offered in conneetion with the anti-dumpi~ proceeding 
conceming importa of urea ammonium nitrate aolution originating in Buigaria and Poland, O.J., 31 December 1994, No L 350/115. 
176° Commission Decision 89/143/EEC of 21 February 1989 accepting undertakinga offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
proceeding coneerDing imports of urea originating in Austria, Hungary, · Malaysia or Romania, confli'Dling the undertakinga 
accepted pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3339/87 and terminating the investigations, O.J., 24 February 1989, No 
L 52/37. 
1761 Commission Deciaion No 2131188/ECSC of 18 July 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets 
and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on 
those imports, O.J., 19 July 1988, No L 188114. 
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the obligation to cease the . concentration of exports on the market of one Memher 
State1762 ; 
the provision that regular (e.g., half-yearly) reports on quantities and prices of exports (unit 
prices and total value) of the product to the Community must be submitted by the exporters to 
the Commission1763 ; 
the obligation to comply with the price ceilings as determined by the undertaking, not only on 
its own account but also through its subsidiaries, branches and agents1764 ; 
1762 Commisaion Decision No 229/88/ECSC of 25 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain 
sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 January 1988, No L 23/13. 
1763 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 2444/83 of 29 August 1983 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import& of 
hardboard originating in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Sweden and re-opening the anti-dumping proceedings concerning these im-
ports, O.J., 31 August 1983, NoL 24119; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 558/84 of 29 February 1984 imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on import& of hardboard originating in the Boviet Union andre-opening the anti-dumping proceeding concerning 
those import&, O.J., 2 March 1984, No L 61121; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 14/88 of 23 December 1987 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of roller chains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 6 January 
1988, No L 315 ; Commisaion Decision No 229/88/ECSC of 25 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 January 1988, No L 23113; Commission Decision 
931157/EEC of 4 March 1993 accepting undertakings offered by three producers in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning certain import& of electronic microciruits known as DRAMa (dynamic random access memories) originating in the 
Republic of Korea, O.J., 18 March 1993, No L 66/37 ; Commission Decision 93/521/EEC of 3 September 1993 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping review in respect of import& of binder and haler twine originating in 
Brazil, terminating the anti-subsidy review proceeding with regard to these import& and term.inating the anti-dumping and anti-
subsidy review in. respect of import& of binder and baler twine originating in Mexico, O.J., 8 October 1993, No L 251128; 
Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to 
these countries ; as well as term.inating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in 
Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1418194 of 20 .Tune 1~ imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of artificial corundum originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 22 June 1994, No L 155/8 ; Answer of the Commission to written question No 280/87, O.J., 5 November 
1987, No C 295118; Answer ofthe Commission to written question No 2522186, O.J., 28 January 1988, No C 23fT. 
1764 Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 14/88 of 23 December 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of roller 
chains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 6 January 1988, NoL 315; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
360/88 of 4 February 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of potasaium perm.anganate originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 9 February 1988, No L 35/13; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2386/88 of 29 July 1988 
imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Buigaria and the USSR, O.J., 30 July 1988, 
No L 205/68 ; Commisaion Regulation (EEC) No 3052188 of 29 September 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on 
importsof paint, distemper, varnishand similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 4 October 1988, No 
L 272116; Council Decision 88/576/EEC of 14 November 1988 repaaiing Decision 87/104/EEC accepting an undertaking given in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes originating in 
the People's Republic of China and terminating the investigation, O.J., 18 November 1988, NoL 312/33; Commission Regulation 
(EEC) No 2535/89 of 2 August 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium perm.anganate originating 
in Czechoslovak.ia, O.J., 22 August 1989, No L 245/5; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2966192 of 12 October 1992 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 1798190 in respect of the definitive anti-dumping duty on certain import& of monosodium glutamate 
originating, in.te,. alÜI, in lndonesia and the Republic of Korea, O.J., 15 October 1992, No L 299/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
611193 of 15 March 1993 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& into the Community of certain electronic 
microcircuits known as DRAMa originating in the Republic of Korea and exported by companies not exempted from this duty, and 
collecting definitively the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 18 March 1993, NoL 6611. 
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the obligation to take the necessary steps to prevent circumvention of the undertaking by 
means of resa.le of the oompany's products from other countries1765 ; 
the obligation of the government of the dumping country to monitor a quantity undertaking by 
the introduetion of a general system of exporting licensing for the dumped product1766• 
3.2. SCOPE OF APPUCATION 
The scope of undertakings is identical to that of anti-dumping duties but for the elements which 
are being elaborated in the present section. 
1765 Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/83 of 17 January 1983 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain chemical 
fertilizer originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 19 January 1983, NoL 1511; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 14/88 
of. 23 December 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of roller chains for cycles originating in the People's 
Republic of China, O.J., 6 January 1988, NoL 315; CommiBBion Regulation (EEC) No 3052/88 of 29 September 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of paint, distemper, vam.ish and similar brushes originating in the People's Republic of 
China, O.J., 4 October 1988, No L 272/16; Council Decision 88/676/EEC of 14 November 1988 repealing Decision 87/104/EEC 
accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceed.ing conceming import& of paint, distemper, vam.ish 
and similar b:rushes originating in the People's Republic of China and terminating the investigation, O.J., 18 November 1988, No 
L 312/33; C.J.E.C., joined cases 133187 and 160/87, 14 March 1990, NashUCJ Corporation. v. Commission an.d Coun.cil, E.C.R., 1990, 
I, (719), 742. 
1766 Comrniuion Deciaion 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerni111 
import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Lithuania aod Ruuia aod tenninating the invelltigation with regard to these countries ; u well a1 
tenninating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imporb of ammonium nitnte originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine aod 
Uzbekiatan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129/24. 
~] 
746 
3. 2.1. Ratione temporis 
According to EC anti-dumping law, undertakings which are accepted during the course of the anti-
dumping investigation, are deemed to take effect from the date on which the investigation is 
concluded for the exporting country (Article 8(8) basic EC Regulation). Therefore, it seems that 
undertakings, which are accepted at the date of the termination of the investigation, enter into 
force on that date. In view of this provision of EC anti-dumping. law, the question crops up 
whether the undertaking or the Decision by which an undertaking is accepted, may determine the 
date on which the undertaking enters into force. Under ECSC anti-dumping law, which is silent 
as to the date of entry into force of undertakings, the answer is affirmative1767• Usually, 
though, , the Decisions by which unde~ngs are accepted do not determine on which day the 
undertakings enter into force. They only indicate the day on which the undertakings were 
· accepted. Under ECSC anti-dumping law, the undertakings enter into force probably immediately 
or on the day stipulated by the undertaking1768• 
3. 2. 2. Ratione personae 
Under GA TI and EC anti-dumping law, undertakings may only be accepted if they are offered by 
exporters (Article 8.1. GATI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 8(1) basic EC Regulation). Hence, 
European anti-dumping case law, built up in application of ECSC anti-dumping law which does 
oot specify by whom the undertaking is offered, cannot be upheld. Indeed, under ECSC anti-
1767 More recent dcciaiona detcnnined tbat tbc undertaking would take effect on tbc day of entry into force of tbc (modification of tbc) defini~ve 
anti-dumping duty impoaedon tbc importa of tbc dumping exportenwhohad not offered an undertaking (Commission Decision 92/177/EEC of 16 . 
March 1992 acccpting an uodertaking given by a Japancse producer in conneetion witb tbc anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of eertaio 
tbermal paper originating in Japan, and tcnninating tbe investigation with regard to tbe producer in qucstion, O.J., 26 March 1992, No L 81/22; 
Commission Decwon 92/494/EEC of 12 October 1992 accepting an undertaking in conneetion witb tbc anti-dumping proceeding conccrning 
importa on eertaio type& of electrooie microcircuita known as DRAMa (dynamic random acceu memories) originating in Japan, and tcrminating tbc 
investigation with regard to tbc producer in question, O.J., 15 October 1992, NoL 299/43; Conuniuion Decision 92/572/EEC of 14 December 
1992 accepting an undertaking by a Poliah producer in conneetion witb tbc anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of ferroailicon originating 
in Poland and Egypt, O.J., 18 December 1992, NoL 369/32; Commisaion Deciaion 93/538/EEC of 18 October 1993 accepting an undertaking in 
conneetion witb tbc anii-dumping proceeding concerning importa of eertaio types of electrooie micro-circuits known as EPROMa (eraaable 
programmabic read ooly memories) originating in Japan, O.J., 21 October 1993, NoL 262/64; Commiuion Decision 94/825/EC of 12 December 
1994 accepting an uodertaking offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning importa of urea ammonium nitratc 10lution 
originating in Buigaria aod Poland, O.J., 31 December 1994, NoL 350/115). 
UJ)dertakinga take 10metimca effect on a day, detcrmined by tbe Decision, well before tbe entry into force of tbe definitive anti-dumping duty 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 1189/93 of 14 May 1993 imposing dcfinitive anti-dumping dutiea on importa of eertaio seamless pipes and tubea, of 
iron or non-alloy lleel, originating in Hungary, Poland and tbc Republic of Croatia and definitively collecting proviaional anti-dumping dutiea, O.J., 
15 May 1993, No L 120/34; Commission Deciaion 93/260/EEC of 14 May 1993 accepting undertakings offered in conneetion with tbc anti-
dumping proceeding eoocerning imports of eertaio seamlesa pipes and tubes, of iron or non-alloy ateel, originating in Hungary, Poland and the 
Republie ofCroatia, O.J., 15 May 1993, NoL 120/42). 
1768 In DRAMs .frotrt ill lhe Republic of Korea, it waa atated in tbc preamble to the Deciaion tbat tbc undertaking had to enter into force on the 
same day as tbc definitive anti-dumping duty. Jd the provision of tbc Decision did oot atipulatc tbc day on which tbe undertaking entered into 
force, and u the Deciaioo datcel well before tbc entry into force of tbc definitive anti-dumping duty, only the provisiona of tbc undertaking abould 
have detennined the date of ita eotry into force (Commisaion Deciiion 93/157/EEC of 4 March 1993 accepting undertakinga offered by three 
producen in conneetion with tbc anti-dumping proceeding eoncerning eertaio importa of electrooie mierociruita known as DRAMa (dynamic random· 
accesa memorie•) originating in tbc Republie of Korea, O.J., 18 March 1993, NoL 66/37). 
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dumping law, undertakings may be offered not only by exporters, but also, for example, by the 
govemment of the exporting country1769• The European anti-dumping authorities have 
accepted undertakings offered by the govemment of a NME country1770• It seems that they 
only accept such undertakings in order to prevent their circumvention. Thus, they have rejected 
undertakings offered by exporters established in NME countries because accepting undertakings 
from those exporters would imply individual treatment. Such individual treatment is considered to 
be inappropriate if the govemement of the NME country can interfere in the exporters' economie 
operations and, thus, circumvent high anti-dumping proteetion by channeling imports through 
exporters subject to low anti-dumping protection1771• Therefore, the European anti-dumping 
authorities have also required that the govemment of the dumping country offered the undertaking 
and monitored it by the introduetion of a general system of exporting licensing for the dumped 
product. In view of.the large number of exporters, they thought that undertakings offered by the 
exporters might easily be circumvented1772• GATI and EC anti-dumping law, on the other 
hand, explicitly mention the large number of exporters as a reason to refuse the undertakings 
offered, and not as reason to accept undertakings offered by the govemment of the exporting 
country (Article 8.3. GATI Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 8(3) basic EC Regulation). 
A residual anti-dumping duty is usually imposed on unknown or uncooperative exporters when 
individual anti-dumping duties are imposed on cooperative exporters. Similarly, because of the 
individualired character of undertakings, they are frequently complemented by a residual anti-
dumping duty and sometimes by individualanti-dumping duties imposed on cooperative exporters 
whohave not offered an acceptable undertaking. 
1769 BOUDANT, J., L'anli-dumping communaulaire, Paria, Economica, 1991, 189. 
177° Commiasion Dccision 94/202/EC of 9 Marçb 1994 accepting undertakings offercd in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
conceming importa of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and the fonner USSR and tenninating tbe 
proceeding againat importa originating in Norway and aeveral republics previously part of the fonner USSR, O.I., 13 April 1994, No L 94/32; 
Commiasion Decision 941293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with tbe anti-dumping proceeding conceming importa 
of ammonium nitrate originating in Litbuania and Ruaaia and tenninating tbe investigation with regani 1o theae countries ; as well as terminating tbe 
anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekiatan, O.J., 21 
May 1994, NoL 129124. 
1771 Commiuion Dccision 941202/EC of 9 Marcb 1994 acccpting undertakings offercd in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding 
conceming importa of silicon carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, Norway, Poland and tbe fonner USSR and tenninating tbe 
proceeding against importa originating in Norway and aeveral republics previously part of tbe fonncr USSR, O.J., 13 April 1994, No L 94/32. 
1772 Commiuion Doeision 94/293/EC of 13 April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding conccJ'IÜoi 
import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Uthuania and Ruuia and terminating tbc inveatigation with regani 1o theae countries ; as weD u 
tenninating the anti~mping proceeding coneerDing importa of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, NoL 129124. 
--
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Since residual as well as individual anti-dumping duties are imposed on producers who do not 
export to the Community1773, the question emerges whether undertakings offered by such 
producers may be accepted. It may be argued that GATI and EC anti-dumping law allow the 
acceptance of such undertakings as they mention «the (too great) number of actual and potential 
exporters» as a reason for refusing undertakings (Article 8.3. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 
8(3) basic EC Regulation). Thus, if the number of the actual and potentlal exporters is not too 
great, the undertakings offered by those exporters should be accepted. Of course, GA TT and EC 
anti-dumping law may also be interpreted as· implying the undertakings offered by originally 
potentlal exporters being acceptable on the moment those exporters have become actual exporters. 
In that case, the undertakings of all exporters are not accepted because eventually, i.e. , as soon as 
the potentlal exporters have beoome actual exporters, the number of undertakings to be monitored 
would be too great. European anti-dumping case law, applying ECSC anti-dumping law which 
does not refer to actual nor potentlal exporters, does not provide an answer either. Indeed, 
originally, the European anti-dumping authorities adopted a rather casuistic approach : prior to 
November 1984, six undertakings offered by non-dumping or non-exporting companies were 
accepted 1774 whereas only one was rejected 1775• In sodium carbonare from the United 
States of America1176 of November 1984, the Council took the view that, in genera!, 
undertakings from potentlal exporters should not be accepted, on the following grounds : 
1773 
«(a) it is difficult to delermine an appropriate export price for a company that bas not exported to the 
Community, since any data which may he available are likely to relate to another period or to another 
destination and would therefore he of questionable relevanee ; 
Supra, 688-690. 
1774 Co~cil Regulation (EEC) No 2761181 of 22 September 1981 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on o-xylene (orthoxyle-
ne) originating in Puerto Rico and the United Statea of America, O.J., 25 September 1981, NoL 270/1; Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 2940/81 of 1-' October 1981 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on p-xylene (paraxylene) originating in Puerto Rico, the 
United Statea of America and the United Statea Virgin lslands, O.J., 15 October 1981, NoL 296/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
90/82 of 18 January 1982 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on phenol originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 18 
January 1982, NoL 1211; Commission Decision 83/625/EEC of 12 December 1983 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion 
with the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing import& of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in Japan and terminating 
this. proceeding, O.J., 15 December 1983, NoL 352/47; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3540/83 of 14 December 1983 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain glass textile fibres (rovings) originating in the German Demoeratic Republic and 
Czechoslovakia, O.J., 16 December 1983, No L 354115; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2275/84 of 1 August 1984 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 1100/80 imposing a defmitive anti-dumping duty on certain acrylic fibres originating in the United Statea of 
America, O.J., -' August 1984, No L 20911. See also : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1633/82 of 23 June 1982 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of fibre building board (hardboard) originating in Romania, repealing Commission 
Decision No 80/564/EEC of-' June 1980 and accepting undertakings in conneetion with the proceeding in respect of import& of fibre 
building board from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the Soviet Union and terminating the 
proceeding with regard to those countries and Bulgaria, O.J., 25 June 1982, NoL 181119. In the latter case, dumping margine 
were established for two product types. The Commission, however, did not specify whether the undertakings offered by exporters 
who dumped only one product type, only applied to that product type. 
1775 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain ball 
hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, NoL 193/1. 
1776 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3337/M of 27 November 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on certain import&. of 
dense sodium carbonate originating in the United Statea of America, O.J., 29 November 1984, No L 311126. 
(b) it is also likely to he difficult. or impossible in the case of the potential ex porter to delermine the 
volume of any possible future exports and, therefore, what impact they would have on the Community 
( ... ) ; 
(c) an anti-dumping investigatioo should, in the interests of all parties concemed he conducted 
expeditiously. If potential exporters were to he investigated, this would result in an unreasonable 
administrative burden on the investigative authorities, would leap to a protongation of the investigation 
and would thus impede their effectiveness in view of the statutory time requirements.» 
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As a result, the undertakings offered by non-exporting companies were not accepted in this case, 
nor were they in other cases1m before May 1991. As from May 1991, undertakings offered 
by producers who do not yet export to the Community, but who have the intention of doing so, 
have been accepted ; the undertaking price was not lower than the normal value1778• 
The reasoos put forward by the Council in sodium carbonale from the United States of America 
for refusing undertakings offered by non-exporting companies are convincing and are legally 
correct. They also apply to individual as well as to residual anti-dumping duties. The Council, 
however, did not stick to its reasoning when in the same case it imposed a residual anti-dumping 
duty on potentlal future exports of non-exporting companies. The Council thereby recognized that 
the non-acceptance of their undertakings could be disadvantageous, but that such refusal was not 
unreasonable. The Council held that view because these companies, if they start exporting to the 
Community, may request a review or arefund of anti-dumping dutles (Articles 9.3. and 11.2. up 
to 11.4. GATT Anti-dumping Code; Artiele 11 basic EC Regulation ; Articles 14 and 16 basic 
1777 Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 3643184 of 20 December 1984 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
electronic typewriters originating in Japan and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding with regard to N ak&jima All Co. Ltd, 
O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 336/43; Commiuion Regulation (EEC) No 596/86 of 7 March 1986 imposing a provisional anti-
dumping duty on import& of certain hydraulic excavators originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1986, No L 68/13. 8ee also: 
Commiuion Decision 87/135/EEC of 23 February 1987 accepting an undertaking given by Kyocera Corporation in conneetion with 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of plain paper photocopiere originating in Japan and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 24 February 1987, No L 54/36. In this anti-dumping case the Commiuion accepted an undertaking given by an 
exporter who exported during the investigation period, but who had since discontinued all exports and production of the product. 
However, this case is no deviation from the opinion of the Council insodium carboiUJie from the Uniled State• of America, as the 
exporter was found to practiae Ïl\jurious dumping during the investigation period and anti-dumping relief is granted on the basis of 
the facta established during the investigation period (see: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2089/84 of 19 July 1984 iÎnposing a 
defmitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain hall hearings originating in Japan and Singapore, O.J., 21 July 1984, No 
L 19311 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1739/86 of 24 June 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of certain ball 
hearings and tapered roller hearings originating in Japan, O.J., 27 June 1986, NoL 167/3). 
1718 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1115191 of 29 April 1991 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties in conneetion with the review 
of anti-dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil, O.J., 3 May 1991, No· L 11111 ; Commiuion 
Decision 911240/EEC of 29 April 1991 accepting undertakings offered by certain exporters in conneetion with the review of anti-
dumping measures concerning import& of ferro-silicon originating in Brazil and terminating the investigation as regards those 
exporters, O.J., 3 May 1991, No L 111147; Commiuion Decision 931538/EEC of 18 October 1993 accepting an undertaking in 
conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain types of electronic micro-circuits known as EPROMs 
(erasable programmabie read only memories) originatiilg in Japan, O.J., 21 October 1993, No L 262/64. 
- J 
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ECSC Decision)1779• However, the Council disregards that the same review proceeding is 
equally available in respect to undertakings (Article 11.5. GATT Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 11 
basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 14 basic ECSC Decision) and that exporters may withdraw their 
undertakings (Article 8(9) and (10) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 10(6) basic ECSC Decision). 
More fundamentally, the existence of review and refund proceeding do oot remove the illegality 
of anti-dumping duties on imports which are not shown to have been dumped and · to have caused 
injury1780• Moreover, as recognized by the Council, exporting and non-exporting companies 
are treated unequally when undertakings offered by non-exporting companies are rejected and 
when at the sametime anti-dumping duties are imposed on their potentlal future exports. Indeed, 
undertakings are more advantageous for exporters than anti-dumping duties1781 , since the price 
increases caused by undertakings aceroe to the exporters, whereas those of anti-dumping duties 
aceroe to the Community authorities1782• This discrimination is all the worse, because it 
disadvantages companies against which anti-dumping rellef caooot legally be granted. 
3.2.3. Ratione loci 
Whereas anti-dumping duties are always applicable to the whole territory of the Community, 
undertakings may be restricted to a region within the Community, but only in cases where the 
Community industry is interpreted, in accordance with Articles 4.1. (ü) GA TI Anti-dumping 
Code, 4(1)(ii) basic EC Regulation and 4(5) basic ECSC Decision, as referring to the producers in 
a eertaio regionat market ( Artiele 4.2. GA TI Anti-dumping Code ; Artiele 4(3) basic EC 
1779 Council Rcgulation (EEC) No 3337/84 of 27 November 1984 imposing a definitivc anti-dumping duty on eertaio imports of densc IOdium 
carbonale originating in tbc Uniled Statea of Amcrica, O.J., 29 November 1984, NoL 311/26; Conuniasion Regulation (EEC) No 3643/84 of 20 
December 1984 impoaing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on imports of electrooie typcwriten originating in Japan and tenninatirig tbc anti-
dumping procccding with regard to Nakajima All Co. Ltd, O.J., 22 December 1984, No L 335/43 ; Conunission Regulation (EEC) No 595/85 of 7 
March 1985 imposing a proviaional anti-dumping duty on import& of eertaio hydraulic cxcavaton originating in Japan, O.J., 8 March 1985, No 
L 68/13. 
1780 Supra, 688-690. 
1781 BELLIS, J.-F., «Thc EEC Antidumping SyB&cm., in Antidumping Law and Pracdce. A Comparadve Study, JACKSON, J.H., and 
VERMULST, E.A. (cda.), New York, Harvell&cr Wheatlheaf, 1990, (41), 56. 
1782 Supra, 367. 
751 
Regulation ; Artiele 13(6) basic ECSC Decision)1783• In a number of cases in which the 
Community market was not divided in two or more regional mar kets, however, undertakings only 
applied to some Memher States1784• Moreover, in some undertakings the minimum prices 
were differentiated as to the importing Memher State, as the injury varled for each Memher 
State1785• Both types of undertakings do not comply with European anti-dumping law : since 
none of those cases divided the Community market into two or more regional markets, the 
condition under which regionally applicable undertakings may be accepted, was not 
fulfilled 1786. 
1783 Artiele 13(6) basic EC legislation bas been used only four times, see : Commission Decision 86/36/EEC of 26 February 1986 
accepting undertakings entered into in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports into Greece of certain 
categories of glus originating in Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and terminating the 
investigation, O.J., 28 February 1986, No L 51173 ; Commission Decision 911256/EEC of 14 May 1991 accepting undertakings offe-
red in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of welded wire-mesh originating in Yugoslavia and termi-
nating the investigation, O.J., 18 May 1991, No L 123154; Commission Decision 91/392/EEC) of 21 June 1991 accepting 
undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of certain asbestos cement pipes 
originating in Turkey, and terminating the investigation, O.J., 31 July 1991, NoL 209/37; Commission Decision 941293/EC of 13 
April 1994 accepting undertakings given in conneetion with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of ammonium nitrate 
originating in Lithuania and Russia and terminating the investigation with regard to these countries ; as well as terminating the 
anti-dumping proceeding concerning import& of ammonium nitrate originating in Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and . 
Uzbekistan, O.J., 21 May 1994, No L 129/24. 
1784 See: 
welded ateel tube• from Roman.iG, where the exporter offered •an undertaking that it would adhere to certain minimum prices 
in reapeet of iU export• to the Federal Republic of German.y. (emphasis added) (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1334/82 of 28 
May 1982 accepting an undertak.ing offered in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning certain welded steel 
tubes originating in Romania, terminating that procedure and cancelling the provisional anti-dumping duty, O.J., 29 May 
1982, No L 150179) ; 
an.gles, ah.apea an.d aectiona of iron. or ateel from Roman.iG, where the exporter oft'ered •an undertaking to raise the prices of 
hili aporta to the Federal Republic of German.y an.d Frcm.ce. (emphasis added) (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1976/82 of 19 
July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import. of certain chemical fertilizer originating in the 
United Statea of America, O.J., 22 July 1982, No L 214n ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2302/82 of 18 August 1982 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1976/82 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain import&_ of chemical fertilizer 
originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 21 August 1982, NoL 24615). 
1785 Commisaion Decision 801252/EEC of 22 February 1980 accepting undertakings given by exporters in Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in connectio:p with the anti-dumping proceeding 
concerning import& of atandardized electric multi-phase motors having an output of more than 0.75 kW but not mo:re than 75 kW, 
originating in those countries, and terminating the procedure in respect of them, O.J., 27 February 1980, No L 53121. 
1786 Contra : Anewer of the Oommiseion to written question No 658/80, O.J., 23 October 1980, No C 275/18. Here the 
Commission argued that, contrary to undertakings, anti-dumping duties must apply uniformly to the Community territory as a 
whole, in view ofthe uniform character ofthe common customs tariff. The reference to the common cll:&toms tariffis, however, not 
to the point. Uniform anti-dumping duties are required by Artiele 13(6) basic EC legislation. 
752 
3.3. ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES 
When undertakings are violated (or withdrawn1787) and when the Community interests call for 
intervention, a provisional anti-dumping duty may be applied forthwith on the basis of the facts 
established before the acceptance of the ondertaldog (Article 8.6. GATI Anti-dumping Code; 
Artiele 8(9) and (10) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 10(6) basic ECSC Decision)1788• 
An undertaking willoot only be violated if the exporters do not observe the minimum price level, 
but also if they do not comply with procedural obligations, such as the obligation to submit 
reports to the Commission regarding their exports to the Community at the time as provided by 
the undertaking1789• An undertaking i~ oot violated when dumping recurs because the 
undertaking is outdated due to significant changes in the exporter's production costs1790• lt is 
·oot violated either when the Community industry still suffers injury, but export prices have fallen 
1787 See e.g. : Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1976/82 of 19 July 1982 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain 
imports of certain chemical fertilizer originating in the United Statesof America, O.J., 22 July 1982, NoL 214/7; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2302/82 of 18 August 1982 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1976/82 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty 
on certain import& of chemical fertilizer originating in the United States of America, O.J., 21 August 1982, No L 246/5; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2957/93 of 26 October 1993 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on certain importsof gas-
fuelled, non-refillable pocket flint lighters originating in Thailand, O.J., 28 October 1993, NoL 267/2; Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2286194 of 21 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of tungsten ores and concentrates, tungstic 
oxide, tungstic acid, tungsten carbide and fUsed tungsten carbide originating in the People's Republic of China, O.J., 23 September 
1994, NoL 2"8/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 14 October 1994, NoL 264/31). 
1788 See also: C.J.E.C., jobied cases 239 and 275/82, 21 ·February 1984, Allied Corporation a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 1984, 
(1005), 1032 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2286194 of 21 September 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of tungsten ores and concentrates, tungstic oxide, tungstic acid, tungsten carbide and fused tungsten carbide originating in the 
People's Republic of China, O.J., 23 September 1994, No L 248/8 (corrigendum, O.J., 14 October 1994, No L 264/31). 
1789 Commisaion Replation (EC) No 1418/94 of 20 June 1994 irnposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of artificial corundum 
originating in the People'a Repoblie of China, O.J., 22 June 1994, No L 155/8; Council Regulation (EC) No 2556/94 of 19 October 1994 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 2552/93 impoaing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of artificial corundum originating in the People'a 
Repoblie of China, the Ruuian Federation and Ukraine, with the exception of those irnporta sold for export to the Community by companies wh01e 
ondertakinga have been accepted, and definitively collecting the amounta secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty impoaed by 
Commission Replation (EC) No 1418/94, O.J., 21 October 1994, NoL 270/24. 
179° Council Regulation (EEC) No 906/83 of 18 April 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2761/81 imposing a deflniÜve anti-
dumping duty on o-xylene (ortho:xylene) originating in Puerto Rico and the United States of America, O.J., 20 April 1983, No 
L 10114; Council Regulation (EEC) No 2978/83 of 24 October 1983 amending Regulation (EEC) No 191/80 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on lithium hydroxide originating in the United Statesof America and the Boviet Union, O.J., 26 October 1983, 
No L 294/3; Commiasion Decision 84/408/EEC of 16 August 1984 accepting an undertaking given in conneetion with the anti-
dumping review proceeding coneerDing imports of copper sulphate originating in Czechoslovakia' and terminating that proceeding, 
O.J., 22 August 1984, No L 225/22; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3018/86 of 30 September 1986 repealing the Regulation 
accepting the und.ertakings given respectively by exporters in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Poland 
and Romania in conneetion with the anti-dumping procedure concerning imports of standardized multi-phase electric motors having 
an output of more than 0~75 kW butnotmore than 75 kW originating in these countries, O . .T., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/66; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3019/86 of 30 September 1986 imposing a provision&l anti-dumping duty on imports of standardi-
zed multi-phase electric motors having an output of more than 0,75 kW but not more than 75 kW, originating in Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Demoeratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, O.J., 1 October 1986, NoL 280/68. 
------- - -=-=-=-======== 
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because of a drop in the exchange rate of the currency of the exporting country1791• 
Moreover, as the anti-circumvention rule on assembly operations in the Community does not 
apply to undertakings (Article 11(2) basic EC Regulation), an undertaking will not be violated if 
the dumped imparts are replaced by assembly operations in the Community. The anti-absorption 
rule does not apply either to undertakings ( Artiele 12 basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 13(11) basic 
ECSC Decision). With regard to price undertakings, fixing ·a minimum price for the dumped 
imports, the exporter cannot bear the burden of the undertaking, unless he is violating the 
undertaking by charging a price below the minimum price ; in that case, the normal rule on the 
violation of undertakings applies. With regard to quantity undertakings, the non-application of the 
anti-absorption rule implies that those undertakings will not be violated if the prices of the dumped 
imports do not increase as much as the quantitative restrietion would normally have cause<l. 
In all the cases which impose provisional anti-dumping duties after a violation of an undertaking, 
the anti-dumping investigation is reopened 1792 ; in most of these cases, a definitive anti-
1791 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2455/93 of 2 September 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1798/90 in respect of the definitive anti-
dumping duty on imporb of monosodium glutamate originating in lndonesia, the Repoblie of Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, O.J., 4 September 1993, 
NoL 225/1. 
17~2 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2516181 of 26 August 1981 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of light 
sodium carbonate originating in Bulgaria, 0 . .1.., 29 August 1981, No L 246114; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 668/84 of 29 
Fehruary 1984 impoaing a provisional anti-dumping duty on importsof hardboard originating in the Boviet Union andre-opening 
the anti-dumping proceeding concerning those import&, O • .T., 2 March 1984, No L 61121 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3106186 
of 6 November 1986 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Yugoslavia, O • .T.., 8 
November 1986, No L 296126 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 14/88 of 23 December 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on import& of roller ebains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of China, 0 . .1.., 6 January 1988, No L 316; 
Commission Decision No 229/88/ECSC of 25 January 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets 
and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia, O . .T.., 28 January 1988, No L 23113 ; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 360/88 
of 4 February 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium permanganate originating in the People's 
Repuhlic of China, O.J., 9 February 1988, No L 36/13; Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2386/88 of 29 July 1988 imposing a 
provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of copper sulphate originating in Buigaria and the USSR, 0 . .1.., 30 July 1988, No 
L 206/68 ; CommiBSion Regulation (EEC) No 3062/88 of 29 September 1988 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of 
paint, distemper, varnieh and similor brushes originating in the People's Repuhlic of China, 0 . .1.., 4 October 1988, NoL 272118; 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2536/89 of 2 August 1989 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of potassium 
permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia, O.J., 22 August 1989, No L 24616 ; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1418194 of 20 
June 1994 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on import& of artificial corundum originating in the People's Repuhlic of 
China, 0 . .1.., 22 June 1994, NoL 166/8. 
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dumping duty is imposed1793, unless it is shown that the undertaking is not violated, in which 
case the originally imposed provisional anti-dumping duty is revoked1794. In principle, new 
undertakings offered by exporters who violate an existing undertaking, are not accepted because a 
renewal of the previous undertaking would not afford the Community industry sufficient 
proteetion 1795 or because an exporter who violates his undertaking should not be treated more 
favourably than exporters who fully meet their obligations1796. After a violation of an 
undertaking, a new undertaking bas only been accepted because, in view of the special 
circumstances on the dornestic market of the dumping exporters, the steps taken by the 
government of the dumping country and the monitoring possibilities available in the dumping 
country vouch for its compliance1797. 
1793 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3648/83 of 19 December 1983 imposing a dermitive anti-dumping duty on import& of hardboard 
originating in Czechoslovakia and Poland and definitively collecting the amounts aecured by way of a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on certain import& of hardboard originating in Sweden, 0 . .1., 24 December 1983, NoL 361/6; Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1825/84 of 28 June 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of hardboard originating in the Boviet Union, 0 . .1., 29 
June 1984, No L 170/68 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1244/86 of 28 April 1986 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
import& of copper suiphate originating in Yugoslavia, O.J., 30 April 1986, No L 11314 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1198/88 of 25 
April 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of roller ebains for cycles originating in the People's Republic of 
China and providing for the definitive collection of the provisional anti-dumping duty on the said imports, 0 . .1., 3 May 1988, No 
L 116/1 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 1631/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a detinitive anti-dumping duty on imports of pot888ium 
permanganate originating in the People's Republic of China and dermitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty impoaed 
on thoae import&, O.J., 3 June 1988, NoL 13811; CommiBBion Decision No 2131188/ECSC of 18 Juiy 1988 imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain sheets and plates, of iron or steel, originating in Yugoslavia and definitively collecting the 
provisional anti-dumping duty impoaedon thoae imports, 0 . .1., 19 Juiy 1988, NoL 188/14; Council Regulation (EEC) No 176/89 of 
23 January 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of copper suiphate originating in Buigaria or the Boviet 
Union, 0 . .1., 27 January 1989, No L 2311; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and 
dermitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, NoL 79/24; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 386190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating 
in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, 0 . .1., 16 February 1990, 
NoL 42/1. 
1794 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3333181 of 20 November 1981 revoking the imposition of a provisional anti-dumping.duty 
on imports of light sodium carbonate originating in Buigaria and terminating the proceedings, 0 . .1., 24 November 1981, No 
L 337/6. 
1795 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1631/88 of 31 May 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on import& of pot888ium 
permanganate originating in the People's Republic of China and dermitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed 
on thoae imports, O.J., 3 June 1988, NoL 13811; Council Regulation (EEC) No 725/89 of 20 March 1989 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of paint, distemper, varnish and similar brushes orginating in the People's Republic of China and 
definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty on such imports, O.J., 22 March 1989, No L 79/24; Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 386190 of 12 February 1990 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating 
in Czechoslovakia and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on thoae imports, 0 . .1., 16 February 1990, 
NoL 42/1. 
1796 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1825/M of 28 June 1984 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of hardboard 
originating in the Soviet Union, O.J., 29 June 1984, No L 170/68 ; Council Regulation (EEC) No 386190 of 12 February 1990 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of potassium permanganate originating in Czechoslovakia and definitively 
collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed on those imports, 0 . .1., 16 February 1990, No L 42/i. 
1797 Commission Decision 831649/EEC of 19 December 1983 accepting undertakings in conneetion with the anti-dumping 
procedure in respect of certain imports of hardboard originating in Sweden and terminating that procedure, O.J., 24 December 
1983, NoL 3611-'7. 
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4. SPECIAL MEASURES 
Special measures, i.e. , measures which are not anti~umping duties nor undertakings and which 
do not run counter to GA TI obligations ( Artiele 22(üi) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 17(2) basic 
ECSC Decision), are of no great practical importance, since they have been used only twice in 
European anti-dumping law. In these two instances, they consisted of an additional duty1798 
and a follow-up of the dumped imports in order to trigger the rapid imposition of either an anti-
dumping duty or an undertaking if necessary1799• 
Their conformity with GA TI law, however, may raise some doubts, unless they are applied 
against imports from countries not Contracting Parties to GA TT. For, in the latter case, GA TI 
anti-dumping law does not apply1800• In respect of imports coming from Contracting Parties 
to GA TI, it may be argued, though, that GA TI law only allows anti-dumping duties and 
undertakings to be enacted against injurious dumping, thus forbidding other types of measure. 
Moreover, the special measures enaèted by the European anti-dumping authorities, in particular, 
seem to beat varianee with GATI law. Indeed, the additional duty applies to the importsof one 
country and is therefore contrary to the principle of non-discrimination (Article I GATI). The 
follow-up is not necessarily contrary to GATI law. Only insofar as the information necessary for 
the follow-up imposes a too excessive administrative burden on the dumping exporters, it violates 
GA TI law. Indeed, an excessive administrative burden has a trade-restrictive or even a trade-
prohibitive effect and comes within the concept «other measures», in addition to duties, taxes or 
other charges meant by Artiele XI GA TI through which prohibit or restriet Moreover, such 
«<ther measure» would also violate the principle of non-discrimination ( Artiele I GA TI) because 
the follow-up .applies to ~nly a limited number of exporting countries. 
These two applications of special measures show that it is difficult to comply with GATI. 
Usually, any special measure will restriet trade and violates at least the principle of non-
discrimination ( Artiele I GA TI). Therefore, the special measures as a category of. anti-dumping 
rellef should be abolished. The cases where anti-dumping duties and undertakings are not 
1798 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2464/77 of 7 November 1977 adopting special measures in respect of imports of ce:rtain nuts of 
iron or steel originating in Taiwan, O.J., 10 November 1977, NoL 286fT. 
1799 Commiesion Decision 841103/EEC of 23 February 1984 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of non-
alloyed unwrought alwninium originating in Norway, Surinam, the Boviet Union and Yugoslavia, O.J., 28 February 1984, No 
L 57/19; Commiesion Decision 91/142/EEC of 15 March 1991 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding coneerDing imports of 
Atlantic salmon originating in Norway, O.J., 16 March 1991, NoL 69/32 (corrigendum, O.J., 21 March 1991, NoL 75/64); Answer 
of the Commiesion to written question No 3066190, O.J., 13 December 1991, C 32313. 
1800 BOUDANT, J., L'anli-dumping communautai~, Paria, Economica, 1991, 58; LESGUILLONS, H., «Le régime anti-dumping de la 
Communauté européennc•, Droit et pratique du commerce international, 1978, (459), 466 ; LESGUILLONS, H., Le régime communautai~ de 
proteelion contre Ie dumping et Iu subvenlions, Paria, F.E.D.U.C.I., 1983,27. 
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appropriate, are exceptional. There is only a legal difference between an anti-dumping duty and 
an additional duty, which precisely results in an additional duty violating GA TT law. Similarly, 
the sa.me trade-restrictive effects which may be monitored by a follow-up, may be obtained by 
means of an anti-dumping duty or an undertaking. Moreover, the possibility to direct the customs 
authorities to register imports, as provided by the new EC anti-dumping legislation, will make the 
category of special measures superfluous · for organising a follow-up ( Artiele 14(5) basic EC 
Regulation). The category of special measures will only be useful to the European anti-dumping 
authorities in that it allows the acceptance of engagements offered by the government of the 
exporting. country. Indeed, under the new GA TI Anti-dumping Code and EC anti-dumping 
legislation, undertakings may only be offered by the dumping exporters ( Artiele 8.1. GA TI Anti-
dumping Code ; Artiele 8(1) basic EC Regulation), whereas the European anti-dumping 
authorities, applying ECSC anti-dumping law, sometimes found it more appropriate to accept 
engagements of the government of the exporting country1801• In view of the prohibition of 
voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing agreements and similar measures, such as 
monitoring imports, under the 1994· GATT Agreement on Safeguard Measures (Article 11), it 
seems, however, that both the follow up and the engagements offered by the gavemement of the 
exporting country will run counter to obligations under GA TT. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Anti-dumping duties, undertakings and special measures constitute the different categones of anti-
dumping relief. The category of special measures is neglectible since it is seldom applied. lts 
unfrequent application may have different causes. First, it is highly probable that measures other 
than anti-dumping duties and undertakings will go against GATI obligations. Second, the same 
trade-restrictive effects may be obtained by an anti-dumping duty or an undertakifi:g. Third, 
instruments, such as trade agreements with the exporting country, are not classified as special 
measures, though they might and, under the new GATI Anti-dumping Code and EC anti-dumping 
legislation, should be classified as such ; instead, when such instruments are applied, · the anti-
dumping proceeding is said to be terminated without any anti-dumping relief1802• 
1801 Supra, 747. 
1802 Supra, 641-642. 
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The European anti-dumping authorities seem to prefer undertakings to anti-dumping duties. For 
anti-dumping proceedings seem always to be terminateel by the acceptance of undertakings 
whenever an exporter offers one, unless the undertaking does not sufficiently remedy the injury 
caused by the dumping1803 or the exporter did not observe a former undertaking. 
Notwithstanding their importance, there is but little information as to the contents of undertakings. 
Usually the information is confined to the statement holding, in the first place, that the 
undertaking affects prices and/or volume of the dumped imports so .as to remedy the injury, and, 
in the second place, that the price increase does not exceed the dumping margin. 
More information is available on anti-dumping duties. They may take the form of a specific, ad 
valorem or variabie ~duty or a combination of the three. However, it is impossible to know in 
advance which form of anti-dumping duty will be imposed. The choice made by the European 
anti-dumping authorities is not based on their specific characteristics. On the contrary, identical 
explanations sustaio the imposition of different forms of anti-dumping duty. 
The major problem raised by anti-dumping relief is that it may apply to non-dumped imports. 
First, anti-dumping rellef applies to the future, whereas it is determined on the basis of facts from 
the past. Second, each type of anti-dumping relief is completed by a residual anti-dumping duty 
applicable to unknown and uncooperative exporters. Third, anti-dumping relief is sometimes 
granted against products which were not subject to the anti-dumping proceeding and which, 
therefore, are not shown to have been dumped (an extreme example is the screwdriver factory 
provision which allows to extend anti-dumping duties to the import of parts of the dumped 
product). Fourth, anti-dumping duties apply to imports in the whole of the Community, even 
when only in some regional markets imports are dumped. 
The information on anti-dumping duties also shows that the European anti-dumping authorities 
tend to grant too high a degree of anti-dumping relief. European anti-dumping law prohibits the 
amount of anti-dumping duties to exceed the in jury margin, i.e. , the amount of in jury caused by 
the dumping only. However, the way the injury margin is determined, may result in an amount 
of anti-dumping duty exceeding that margin. For example, as the relative inefficiency of 
Community producers compared to the dumping exporters is not accounted for in the injury 
margin, the injury margin oomprises the injury Community producers suffer from the competition 
of more efficient foreign producers. Even worse, the amount of anti-dumping duty may exceed 
the dumping margin. lndeed, ECSC anti-dumping law allows to impose an additional anti-
dumping duty when the amount of anti-dumping duty is not fully reflected in an increase in the 
price of the dumped product. It does not prohibit that the combination of an anti-dumping duty 
1803 Supra, 359-363. 
-==M 
1 
758 
and such an additional duty exceeds the dumping margin. However, that combination may easily 
result in an amount which exceeds the dumping margin. 
CONCLUSION 
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CHAPTER VIII 
GENERAL CONCLUSION : 
SOME OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
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In this work GA TI and European substantive anti-dumping law have been examined from a legal 
and from an economie point of view. Substantive anti-dumping law may be divided into two 
parts : the assessment of dumping and the inquiry wl)ether anti-dumping-r.elief.-Should he granted. 
The legal and economie analyses of both parts have been made on a general and on a specitic 
level. The general approach bas examined the fundamental principles underlying anti-dumping 
law. The specitic approach bas investigated the concrete implementation of those fundamental 
principles. On both the generaland the specitic level, the confrontation between the legal and the 
economie analysis bas resulted in several proposals for improving current anti-dumping law. On), 
that occasion, it bas been investigated whether the innovations of the new GA TI Anti-dumping 
Code and EC anti-dumping legislation will actually · improve current anti-dumping law as 
suggested by this work. 
By way of a general conclusion, an overview will be given of the most important conclusions of 
this work. By oomparing the conclusions of the general and the specific approach, as wellas by 
consirlering simultaneo':lsly the conclusions con~rning dumping and anti-dumping relief, it 
becomes possible to makesome reflexions on the ~pprol>!.@teness of anti-dumping law to deal with · 
so-called un.mir trade ~-
"""" 
Therefore, this Chapter is divided in three sections. This frrst section will overview the results of 
the analysis of the fundamental principles on dumping and anti-dumping relief. The second 
section will summarize the major problems in the implementation and the interpretation of current 
substantive ~mpifigTaw--and h~~~~_y__can J>_e~~resQlYed. -The last- ~ti~n- ;ill~-;~~~;st;t· 
alternative approach to anti-dumping law which, from an economie point of view, is· the most 
appropriate instrument to deal with predatory practices. 
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1. THE FUNDAMENTALS-OF ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
GATT law allows the imposition of anti-dumping duties or the acceptance of undertakings, if 
dumping is being practised, which causes in jury to the dornestic industry of the importing country. 
By doing this, GA TI seems to negate its very goal, i.e. , the promotion of free trade. Indeed, the 
general conclusion this work bas drawn from the economie analysis of the welfare effects of anti-
dumping dutles and undertakings, is that anti-dumping measures generally reduce the importing 
oo~'sw~~.,~sco~m~nb~e~yin~ilio~~~n~ 
trade theory tha!_ free trade maximizes the welfare of each country and of the world. Admittedly, 
there may be in~ces, such as priee ___ m_äk..-e_r___,sh ... i~p-, .-im_pe_rfi~ec---=-t _co_m_pe--:ti-;:. ti7". o-n-an-,d.--m-ar-.~-et distortions, in 
which anti-dumping rellef increases the national welfare of the importing country. However, as it 
is extremely difficult to make a correct assessment as to whether the conditions are fuiftlied which 
are necessary for anti-dumping rellef to improve the importing country's national welfare, errors 
are quite probable. Moreover, the use of such welfare-improving trade restrictions will usually 
provoke retaliatory reactions by thè other countries, as their national welfare will be reduced. 
Such retaliation will make each country eventually worse off. Therefore, it seems appropriate, as 
a general guideline, not to resort to anti-dumping duties or undertakings, unless it bas been 
demonstrated that they actually will increase the importing country's welfare, due account being 
taken of possible retaliatory actions by other countries. Thus, anti-dumping rellef might be 
granted, for instance, in order to break through a third country's protectionist trade pollcy, though 
it should be pointed out that there will never be a fully waterproof guarantee that such actions will 
actually be successful. 
It might also. be argue4 that anti-dumping relief will benefit the importing country, as it may 
thwart the unfair trade practices resorted to by exporters. Indeed, the contradiction between free 
trade and anti-dumping rellef, inherent in GA TI, is usually explained by presenting dumping as 
an unfair trade practice. Such unfair trade practices are usually considered to be contrary to free 
trade. 
Economie theory recommends free trade as a guideline for trade policy, because free trade 
generally maximizes world welfare, as well as the national welfare of each country. lndeed, it 
does not distort the efficient allocation of production resulting from profit maximization ·pursued 
by the producers. The efficient allocation of production implies that products will be produced at 
the lowest possible costs and, consequently, will be offered at the lowest possible prices to the 
oonsumers. 
~e contention that unfair trade practices, such as dumping, are contrary tofreetrade will only be 
~rrect, if the notion of «unfair trade practices» refers to anti-competitive or predatory practices. 
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/)Indeed, predatory pricing should be distinguished from competitive pricing. A producer engages 
\,in predatory pricing, if he temporarily sells hls products at prices below bis short-run profit-
maximizing prices, in order to drive bis competitors out of the market . or to prevent new 
competitors from entering the market, bis object being to monopolize the market with a view to 
raise bis prices later on and, consequently, to gain monopoly profits. As a consequence, dumping 
will only be contrary to free trade, if it is predatory. In case of predatory dumping, anti-dumping 
rellef may be welfare-improving if it prevents the predator from monopolizing the importing 
country's market and if it does not result in the monopolization by the importing country's import-
competing industry of their dornestic market. Thus, anti-dumping relief should strike a balance 
between preventing the predator to monopolize and preventing the import-competing industry to 
monopolize. The problem, however, is that European anti-dumping law does not attain that 
balance. Indeed, European anti-dumping case law provides evidence that the danger of the 
Community industry using anti-dumping relief as a device to monopolize the Community market, 
is usually underestimated, whereas the danger of monopolization by the dumping exporters is 
generally accepted even without substantial proof to that effect. 
Another problem is that GA TI and European anti-dumping law provide a definition of dumping 
which does not distinguish predatory dumping from non-predatory dumping. They defme 
dumping as price discrimination between national markets and as sales at a loss. European anti-
dumping law forther distinguishes NME dumping (i.e. , pricing exports from NME countries 
below the prices or costs of a third ME country) as a third category of dumping. The problem is 
that, in most cases, those three. types of dumping will oot be predatory. Price discrimination and 
sales at a loss will frequently result from short-run profit maximization. Though NME dumping 
results from foreign. currency maximization, rather than from profit maximization, it is not 
predatory either, as NME dumping resulting from foreign currency maximization is not aimed at 
monopolizing the importlog country's market. Moreover, uniform pricing and selling at prices 
coverlog all production costs, as well as charging prices for NME products which are higher than 
or equal to the prices and costs in third ME countries, do not prove that the exporter is not 
engaged in predatory pricing. 
The main problem is that it is extremely difficult to distinguish predatory pricing from non-
predatory pricing. GATI and European anti-dumping law provide too simple a. definition, for it 
is impossible to capture predator}' pricing by means of bright-line rules. A flexible rule-of-reason 
test, which takes account of all relevant facts, without giving priority to any of those factors, 
seems to be the best possible approach to make a correct distinction between predatory pricing and 
non-predatory pricing. 
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In the field of international trade law, however, a flexible approach may result in cone-way 
flexibility», i.e. , · that such a broad interpretation will be placed upon the concept of «predatory 
dumping» so that predatory dumping will be found, even if it is oot being practised. «One-way 
flexbility» is quite probable, if not unavoidable, in the field of international trade. Indeed, the 
positive effects of free trade on a country's welfare result from the fact that the welfare gains 
obtained by the consumers and the exporting industries of that country outweigh the welfare losses 
incurred by the dornestic import-competing industries. In order to prevent .their welfare losses, 
the import-competing industries will try to goad their country's authorities into pursuing a 
protectionist policy. Consumers and exporting countries will not provide much counterbalance to 
this demand for protection, because the relationship between free trade and their welfare gains is 
not as apparent for them as the. positive effects of proteetion to the import -competing industries. 
Since consumers largely outnumber the producers part of an import-competing industry, the 
· individual welfare gain of each consumer is smaller than the individual welfare loss of each 
import-competing producer. The exporting industries, on the other hand, will usually not be 
aware of the relationship between their export performances and the trade policy pursued by their 
governments. As a result, governments will be more aware of the interests of the import-
competing industries and, in their efforts to get re-elected, they will try to meet the demand of the 
import-competing industries for proteetion against foreign competition. Govemments must also 
ob serve international law and, in particular, the international agreements · they have concluded. At 
least, they want to give the impression that they comply with them. Accordingly, in international 
trade, governments find themselves in an ambiguous situation : they want to adopt a protectionist 
policy, but that is prohibited by GATI. As GATI, though, allows the enactment of trade 
restrictions, under eertaio exceptional circumstances, the governments will rely on such lawful 
exceptions in order to .offer proteetion to their import-competing industries and will place a broad 
interpretation on those exceptions. lf necessary, they may even resort to illegal interpretations. 
In view of the danger of cone-way flexlbility», a flexible rule-of-reason test within the field of 
international trade law is not adequate. Indeed, the more room there is for interpretation, the 
higher the probability of a cone-way flexible» interpretation and the higher the chance will be of 
finding non-predatory pricing to be predatory. 
The mechanism which may result in «one-way flexibility» also explains why the current legal 
definition of dumping is not accurate, from an economie point view. Indeed, under prevailing 
GA TI and European anti-dumping law, it is not necessary to place a «one-way flexible» 
interpretation on the defmition of dumping for non-predatory dumping to be sanctioned. Thus, 
the argument that dumping, as legally defined, is an unfair trade practice· does not hold. 
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2. THE IMPLE:MENTATION OF ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law seem to encompass quite bright-line rules and, thus, seem 
to limit «<ne-way flexibility» to the minimum. lndeed, it seems easy to determine whether or not 
there is price discrimination : only the export price must be compared with the price charged by 
the exporter in bis home market. Similarly, the assessment of sales at a loss is as simple since it 
requires only a comparison between the export price and the exporter's production costs. Neither 
will the assessment of NME dumping cause major problems, as it involves only a comparison 
between the NME export price and the prices or production costs of a third ME country. 
It bas been shown, 'however, in this study that GATT and European anti-dumping law contain 
many open-ended provisions. Their provisions on in jury, for instance, are a clear example : the 
assessment of injury involves the evaluation of many economie factors the interconnection of 
which is extremely complex and will vary from case to case. Thus, the assessment of injury 
cannot be regulated by strict- though easy to apply- provisions. This bas been confirmed by 
recent economie research, showing that policy considerations, rather than teehoical considerations 
dominate injury determinations. The same economie research bas shown that dumping 
determinations are of a rather teehoical nature, but that policy considerations still play a role, be it 
to a lesser degree, in the assessment of dumping1804• This should not come as a surprise, 
since the assessment of dumping, under its current legal definition, also requires open-ended 
provisions. For example, as exporters may try to rnanipolate their prices or production costs in 
order to circumvent anti-dumping enforcement, anti-dumping law must offer the anti-dumping 
authorities sufficient flexibility in order to take account of such price and cost manipulations. 
Moreover, not only the implementation of GA TT and European anti-dumping law, but also the 
very provisions are characterized by «one-way flexibility». Indeed, the mechanism which explains 
why trade laws are interpreled in «ene-way flexible» way, applies equally to the enactment of the 
trade laws themselves. Indeed, import-competing industries will only induce their governments to 
agree to international trade agreements which allow a sufficient degree of protectionism. The new 
GATT Anti-dumping Code provides a good example in this respect : many of its provisions on 
dumping are but a codification of the «one-way flexible» interpretations which have been placed on 
current GA TT anti-dumping law. 
The new GA TT Anti-dumping Code, therefore, seems to be a missed opportunity. Nevertheless, 
it contains a number of welcome improvements which will exclude «ene-way flexibility» or, at 
lS04 THARAKAN, P.K.M~, and WAELBROECK, J., «Antidumping and counterveiling duty deciaions in the E.C. and in the U.S. An 
experiment in comparative politieel economy,., European Economie Review, 1994, (171), 171- 193. 
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least, render it more difficult to apply. Moreover, as it still en oompasses many open-ended 
provisions, there is always the possibility of reducing «ane-way flexibility» in their implementation 
and interpretation. Indeed, the problem is not the open-ended nature of the anti-dumping 
provisions, but their implementation and interpretation. To a eertaio extent, a correct assessment 
of all the conditions which must be met for granting anti-dumping relief, requires, indeed, a 
flexible approach allowing to take account of all relevant factors. Moreover, even the more strict 
or detailed provisions of GATI anti-dumping law, do notprevent the Community from adopting a 
less «one-way flexible» anti-dumping law, at least insofar as European anti-dumping law will not 
sanction exports which are not actionable under GA TI anti-dumping law. Indeed, GA TI anti-
dumping law does not require its Contracting Parties to sanction all instances of dumping 
actionable under GATT anti-dumping law ; it only. provides the possibility for its Contracting 
Parties to sanction those instances of dumping and, at the same time, prohibits them to sanction 
other pricing practices. 
Admittedly, though, chances are low that the implementation and interpretation of GA TT anti-
dumping law by the Community will become less «ane-way flexible». Probably, the Community 
will interpret the new GATI Anti-dumping Code as being a confirmation by GATI of its own 
anti-dumping law. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to point out the deficiencies in prevalling anti-
dumping law, be it only to put a limit to too extreme a «one-way flexible» implementation and 
interpretation of anti-dumping law. 
2.1. DUMPING 
A «one-way flexible» interpretation of the provisions regarding dumping allows to find dumping in 
cases where no dumping is being practised or to find dumping margins which are higher than the 
actual dumping margins. The most important causes of «one-way flexibility» in respect of the 
determination of dumping are the conviction that prices must cover all production costs and yield 
a reasanabie profit margin, the quasi-total refusal of using export prices to third countries as 
normal value standard, especially in respect to NME countries, the unequal treatment of 
associations, and the special techniques used for calculating the dumping margin. 
2.1.1. Sales at a loss 
The conviction that prices must cover all production costs (including selling, administrative and 
other general expenses) plus a reasanabie profit margin, results in a restrictive interpretation being 
placed on the concept «ordinary course of trade». By doing so, the constructed value, rather than 
the prices actually paid or payable, will frequently be used as normal value standard. The 
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defmition that the constructed value must be equal to the sum of all the production costs 
(including selling, administrative and other general expenses) plus a reasonable profit margin, is 
based on the assumption that producers apply the metbod of full-cost pricing for determining their 
prices. Producers are, thus, not allowed to sell their products at a loss, not even if those losses 
result from non-predatory profit maximization. This definition disregards the fact that sales at a 
loss may result from non-predatory profit~maximizing pricing. Obviously, there is no reason to 
disregard sales at a loss resulting from non-predatory profit maximization. As a general rule, 
prices resulting from non-predatory profit maximization should be applied as normal value. If this 
suggestion would still be too big a step to take, it might be envisaged to apply the assumption that 
sales at a loss do not result from non-predatory profit maximization, unless the exporter shows 
that, under short-run profit maximization, prices cannot cover all the production costs and yield a 
reasonable profit margin. 
Once it bas been accepted that sales at a loss may result from non-predatory profit maximization, 
the use of the constructed value as normal value standard will be limited. Indeed, under European 
anti-dumping law, the constructed value may be used if sales have not been made in the ordinary 
course of trade, whereas sales at a loss are considered not to have been made in the ordinary 
course of trade. Admittedly, certain conditions have to be fulfilled for sales at a loss to be 
considered not to have been made in the ordinary course- of trade : sales at a loss must have been 
made in substantial quantities at prices which do not permit the recovery of all costs during a 
reasonable period of time which is normally one year and minimum six months. Those 
conditions, however, do not prevent sales at a loss resulting from non-predatory profit 
maximization from being found not to have been made in the ordinary course of trade. Indeed, if, 
over a longer period than the period taken into account, sales permit the recovery of all costs, it is 
possible to fmd sales at a loss which are not in the ordinary course of trade by taking into account 
a smaller period during which only sales at a loss are made. This is possible because there is no 
obligation to adopt a period equal to the duration of a full business cycle. Thus, by obliging the 
European anti-dumping authorities to take into account at least one business cycle, it would 
already be possible torestriet the «<ne-way flexible» application of European anti-dumping law. 
2.1. 2. The export price to third countries : a valid normal value standard 
Once it is admitted that sales at a loss may result from non-predatory profit maximization; the 
strict application of the metbod of full-cost pricing for the determination of the constructed value, 
will have to be replaced by more complex rules in order to determine the price under short-run 
profit maximization. Since such complex rule will probably reduce the use of the constructed 
value, it will become more obvious to use the export price to third countries as normal value 
standard. The infrequent use of the export price to third countries in European anti-dumping case 
. ~~--~~~=:1 ~--J 
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law bas been explained by the fear that this price mayalso be a dumping price. Unless this price 
is the result of a predatory pricing strategy, there is, however, no reason why a dumping export 
price to third countries should oot be used as normal value standard. It is even possible to reverse 
the argument : oot the ex porter's dornestic market price, but rather bis export price to third 
countries should be used as normal value standard, since the simultaneous dumping of that 
exporter on the Community market and in. third countries may be proof of the specific conditloos 
prevailing in bis dornestic market in comparison with the rest of the world. Accordingly, the 
possibility that the exports to third countries are being dumped, is no sufficient reason for 
rejecting those dumping prices as normal value standard. It should, at least, be demonstrated that 
those exports are actually being dumped. It seems that the new GATI Anti-dumping Code and 
EC anti-dumping legislation share share this point of view. Under them, export prices to third 
countries may only be rejected if they do oot cover all production costs. Hence, export prices 
may be refused as normal value standard if the export transactloos are made at a loss. Since 
dumping is being defmed as sales at a loss and since the dornestic market price caooot be used as 
touchstone ( otherwise the dornestic market price should be used as normal value standard and the 
export price would oot be considered), GATI and EC anti-dumping law, thus, imply that export 
prices may be rejected if they are demonstrated to be dumping prices. 
This amelioration induced by the new GATT Anti-dumping Code, however, does oot pertain to 
NME dumping, though the use of the export prices to third ME countries is the most warranted in 
anti-dumping cases against NME countries. For they are the only available normal value standard 
guaranteeing a direct link with the allegedly dumping NME exporter. Moreover, they are the 
only prices directly oomparabie with their export prices to the Community as they are determined 
by the same interaction ~tween the economie syste~s of ME and NME countries. The prices or 
production costs of a ME country do oot have such a direct link with the NME country, nor are · 
they determined by the interaction between the economie systems of ME and NME countries. 
They are, moreover, a souree of arbitrariness in respect of the NME exporter. For he caooot 
know in advance which ME country will be selected as reference country. If, however, the NME 
export prices to third countries was used as normal value standard, he would have the opportunity 
of knowing in advance whether he will be found dumping under European anti-dumping law. 
2.1. 3. The unequal treatment of associations 
Under European anti-dumping law, associations are treated unequally. For determining the 
normal value in their respect, the economie unit theory is applied. Accordingly, the normal value 
is set equal to the price paid by the first independent purchaser. For determining the export price, 
on the other hand, the «dealing at arm's length» price is used. More specifically, the resale price 
is determined, i.e. , the price paid by the frrst independent purchaser after deducting the costs 
=========----- ---~-=-== 
------ --~1·•_.-. -.. _.". ~~~~l 
i 
t=<~~" 
769 
incurred between the imports and resales, including a reasonable margin of profit. As a result, if 
the allegedly dumping exporter does not actually dump, dumping will nevertheless be found, 
namely up to the amount of the costs incurred between imports and resales, plus the margin of 
profit. Thus, associated exporters will be sanctioned not because of their dumping, but because of 
their association. That result is contrary to GAIT and European anti-dumping law. It is all the 
more worrisome, because a broad interpretation is being placed on the concept «association». 
Indeed, the existence of an effective control of one associated party o~er the other is not required. 
Moreover, the prices between associated parties are assumed to be influenced by the association, 
unless the exporter can provide proof to the contrary on the basis -of a comparison of bis prices 
with the prices of non-associated producers. Thus, associated parties which are able to charge 
lower prices because :,of their higher efficiency will never be able to prove that their prices are not 
influenced by their association. 
In order to remedy the bias against associated exporters anti-dumping law should be modified in 
three respects. First, the concept «association» must be given a more restrictive meaning by 
requiring that one of the associated parties exercises an effective control over the other. Second, 
the assumption that the prices between associated parties are being influenced by the association 
must be reversed. Thus, until evidence to the contrary is being provided, the prices between 
associated parties should be assumed not to have been influenced by the association. Third, 
associated parties should be given an equal treatment. More specifically, the- «dealing at arm's 
length» price, in particular the resale price charged to an independent purchaser, excluding the 
costs and profits of the associated party reselling the product to the independent purchaser, should 
be used as export price as well as normal value standard. The new GAIT Anti-dumping Code 
bas opted for this third solution, but it gives ample opportunity, which the Community has made 
use of, to disregard its requirement of determining normal value and export price of associated 
parties at the same level of trade. 
2.1. 4. The calculation of the dumping margin 
Under European anti-dumping law, several techniques are being applied, which result in an 
overestimation of the dumping margin. The most apparent technique is one of disregarding the 
caSes of reverse dumping. By consirlering sales of small quantities in the dornestic market of the 
allegedly dumping exporter as not being comparable sales in the ordinary course of trade, 
European anti-dumping law incorporates a bias towards disregarding cases of reverse dumping. 
Indeed, if only small quantities are sold on the dornestic market of the allegedly dumping 
exporter, it is probable that reverse dumping is being practised. 
~~~i 
t:==: 
I:_-.-_-~_. [--
/ 
770 
There is, however, no reason for disregarding reverse dumping in order to calculate the dumping 
margin. Admittedly, exporters may adopt a strategy of «hit-and-run» in order to evade the 
application of anti-dumping law and still succeed in gaining or maintaining a foothold or even a 
dominant position in the Community market. On the other hand, it is also possible that their 
apparent «hit-and-run» strategy is purely · the result of competitive pricing. A stable, rigid price 
level is not a characteristic of a competitive market, on the contrary. This is, indeed, recognized 
under European anti-dumping law where sales at a loss may only be considered as not having 
been made in the ordinary course of trade, if the prices charged during a reasonable period of 
time do not permit the recovery of all production costs. Thereby, European anti-dumping law 
recognizes that sales at a loss may be compensated by profitable sales. The same should be 
accepted in conneetion with dumping, since it is equally possible that cases of dumping proper are 
compensated by cases of reverse dumping. But even that is nota necessary condition for taking 
· into account all cases, including cases of reverse dumping. Reverse dumping is not necessarily 
practised in order to compensate for the losses incurred from dumping proper. For dumping 
proper does not necessarily imply that the dumping exporters incur losses or reduced profits. 
Dumping proper may, indeed, be optimal under short-run profit maximization. Thus, insofar as 
dumping and reverse dumping result from short-run profit maximization, they should both be 
taken into account for determining the dumping margin. Only if may be shown that the dumping 
exporter adopts a predatory «hit-and-run» strategy in order to circumvent anti-dumping 
enforcement, reverse dumping should be disregarded. 
2.2. INJURY 
«One-way flexibility» allows to find dumping causing injury to the Community industry in cases 
where it does not intliet any in jury upon the Community industry. In order to find injurious 
dumping that is not actually there, the Community industry is defined in a «one-way flexible» 
manoer and a «one-way flexible» trends analysis is applied in order to determine whether the 
Community industry suffersinjury from the dumping. 
2."2.1. Community intlustry 
The definition of the Community industry depends on the defmition of the like product. In 
principle, the like product determination should not be influenced by its possible effect on the 
outcome of the anti-dumping proceeding. Through its relationship with the defmition of the 
Community industry, the like product determination, indeed, may affect the outcome of an anti-
dumping proceeding. For an anti-dumping proceeding will stand or fall depending on whether or 
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not a Community industry exists, and its very existence depends on the definition of the like 
product category. If too narrow a defmition is provided for the like product category, there may 
be no Community industry producing the 1ike product. On the other hand, if too broad an 
interpretation is placed on the like product category, there will probably exist a Community 
industry, but it will be less probable that this broadly defmed Community industry will be injured 
by the dumping. However, the like. product category may marginally be extended to encompass 
product types which do oot cause any injury, insofar as the majority of the products which are 
part of the like product category, do cause in jury. In such a case, the overall like product 
category, including the non-injurious product types, will still be found to intliet injury upon the 
Community industry .. 
As the like product determination may be a decisive element in the assessment of in jury, it should 
be govemed by strict and objective principles. GA IT and European anti-dumping law, however, 
do not provide many guidelines for determining the like product category. They should be 
supplemented by the requirement of using the cross elasticities of demand and supply. It. must be 
recognized that the use of the cross elasticities of demand and supply would still leave some room 
for interpretation, since a general clear-cut threshold of cross elasticity above which products must 
be considered to be like products, cannot be determined. Nevertheless, their use will ·prevent 
cases of extreme «ane-way flexibility» merely because it renders the like product determination 
more transparent 
GA TT and European anti-dumping law do not require the Community industry to comprise all the 
Community produ~rs producing the like product. Community producers whose collective output 
represents a major proportion of total Community output, may also constitute a Community 
industry. Thereby, anti-duinping proceedings are made possible, though not all Community 
producers are complaining to sufferinjury from the dumping. In respect of the determination of 
the Community industry, GA IT and European anti-dumping law further allow to disregard 
producers producing the like product within the Community, who are related to the dumping 
exporters or who are themselves importers of the dumped product. The European anti-dumping 
authorities have applied both possibilities restrictively in respect of complainant producers, but 
have allowed a more extensive application of them in respect of non-complainant producers. 
There is no legal ground justifying this inconsequentlal application of GA IT and European anti-
dumping law. Only «<ne-way flexibility» may explain this inconsistent attitude of the European 
anti-dumping authorities, since the inconsequentlal application of the definition of the Community 
industry increases the chances of finding a major proportion of the Community producers 
complaining about.the dumping. The.exclusion of a non-complainant producer reduces the overall 
output of the like product of Community origin, whereas it does not affect the amount of output of 
the complainant Community producers. Accordingly, the proportion of the output of the 
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complainant producers in the overall Community output increases. Conversely, by including a 
complainant producer, both total output and the output of the complainant Community producers 
increases. However, the relative increase in the output of the complainant Community producers 
will be higher than the relative increase in total Community output. As a result, the chances of 
finding a Community industry increase by including complainant producers. The inconsequential 
application of the possibility to exclude producers from the Community industry should be 
forbidden. 
2. 2. 2. Trends analysis 
The European anti-dumping authorities apply the trendsanalysis in order todetermine whether the 
Community industry suffers injury from the dumping. · They investigate whether the Community 
industry is suffering injury, whether the condition of the Community industry shows a parallel 
developments with the evolution of the volume and the prices of the dumped imports, and whether 
there are other factors which may also have caused in jury to the Community industry. In order to 
determine the state of the Community industry, an unlimited number of factors may be taken into 
account. If need be, there may always be found a factor, indicating that the Community industry 
is not doing well. On the other hand, the number of other factors which may have caused the 
in jury, is also unlimited. Thus, it may be expected that, if need be, it. will also be possible to find 
such other factor which may be said to have caused the in jury to the Community industry. In 
European anti-dumping case law, however, the other factors have only exceptionally been 
considered as the cause of the in jury. It has always pertained to cases in which it was completely 
impossible to uphold that it was still the dumping which was causing the in jury. With the 
exception of those cases, the injury suffered by the Community industry is usually found to have 
been caused by the dumping. Indeed, the European anti-dumping authorities apply several 
techniques in order to obtain a finding of injurious dumping. The most important device in· this 
respect is the cumulation of dumped imports. Cumulation may result in small volumes of dumped 
imports being found to cause or to attribute to the in jury suffered by the Community industry, 
though those imports are explicitly said not to cause injury by themselves to the Community 
industry. 
It should be clear that the trends analysis as applied under European anti-dumping law does not 
guarantee that the dumping is the actual cause of the injury suffered by the Community industry. 
The volume of the dumped imports and the deterioriation in the situation of the Community 
industry showing a parallel development does not prove that the dumping causes the in jury. The 
trends analysis cannot guarantee either that all other factors are known and, consequently, taken 
into account. Moreover, if the in jury is caused jointly by the dumping and some other factors, 
the trends analysis does not offer a metbod for determining the part of the dumping into the 
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in jury. On the other hand, the trends analysis does not allow to detect all cases of injurious 
dumping. Indeed, under the trends analysis, the Community industry will only be found to suffer 
in jury, if its state bas deteriorated in comparison with its prior condition. It is, however, possible 
that the state of the Community industry bas not deteriorated, but that the Community industry 
would be doing better without the dumping. Dumping which prevents the condition of the 
Community industry from improving, also causes injury to the Community industry. 
The drawbacks of the trends analysis may be avoided through substituting it by the comparative 
analysis. According to the comparative analysis, · the factual situation of the Community industry 
is compared with what its situation would have been without the dumping (the so-called 
counterfactual world). As both situations are identical but for the dumping, the difference 
between those two situations must be caused by the dumping. If the counterfactual situation 
(without dumping) is .. not as good as the factual situation (with dumping), the dumping must have 
been the cause of the in jury suffered by the Community industry. The comparative analysis also 
allows to assert whether the dumped imports should be cumulated. For dumped imports should 
only be cumulated, if they have a collective injurious effect on the Community industry. The 
comparative analysis allows to measure exactly whether there is such a collective injurious effect. 
Indeed, if the injurious effect of the cumulated dumped imports is higher than the sum of the 
injurious effects of each of the separate dumped imports, the dumped imports will have a 
collective injurious effect and should be cumulated. 
The problem with the comparative analysis is that the condition of the Community industry 
without dumping is not known. It must be calculated by means of a mathematica! model, a model 
which, for the sake o~ practicability, must nece~sarily be grounded on eertaio assumptions. 
Moreover, eertaio parameters, such as price elasticities of demand and supply, must be known. 
However, as it will seldom be easy to gain an exact knowledge of them, the results of the 
comparative analysis will not always be fully accurate. Nevertheless, the application of the 
comparative analysis should be recommended. The inaccuracy of its results. will only cause 
problems in cases situated right in between material in jury and no material in jury. In such cases, 
a combined use of the comparative analysis and the trends analysis might be considered. 
2.3. COMMUNITY INTERESTS 
By subjecting the imposition of anti~umping duties to the requirement that they must be in the 
interests of the Community, European anti-dumping law has taken a step in the right direction. In 
conformity with the desire expressed by GA TT anti-dumping law, it has, thereby, broken the 
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automatic relationship between the existence of injurious dumping and the granting of anti-
dumping relief. It should only be regretted that the European anti-dumping authorities have not 
made use of the concept «Community interest» to effectively break the automatism between 
injurious dumping and anti-dumping relief. Instead, _!bey have used it to strengthen _Jhe 
au!_o~atism linking injurious dumping and anti-dumping relie(f. The concept «Community interest» 
has always been relied upon in order to show the necessi!Y_ of anti-dumE_in_g__ re]ief, whereas the 
~- ' -
argument that anti-dumping rellef is injurious. to consumers of the c,tp:mped-producraml~·prCJCêssing 
---- -==--~~~----'- ~~- _-.:o<'-"-. ~~~--"' 
industries using it has nearly always been rejected. Indeed, the concept «Community interests» is 
""' -------- . - . . . . . .. . . ' 
used to give twice attention to the in jury suffered by the Community industry. Moreover, in 
several anti-dumping cases, the Community interests and the Community industry's interests are 
considered to coincide entirely. In such cases, anti-dumping relief will be found to be in the 
Community interests, as soon as is proven that the · Community industry suffers injury from the 
dumping. Such conciosion is, however, ~tra!Y=!L1Jt~.~~nclusioJ1S of the economic_analysï& of 
~Jng-rafef.- ---:Eëoiioriiic theory demonstrates that anti-dumping relief usually causes the 
welfare of the importing country to ·decline. It causes a decline in welfare because itLPOSitive 
'-- -
effects on the Community industry are offset by its negative effects-en---- the 
ly the assun1ption ~at anti-dumping relief is not in the Commun1ty 1nterests, unless proof to 
the contrary is being provided. The rebuttal of this assumption may be based, for example, on 
antitrust considerations (preventing the dumping exporters to monopolize the Community market 
by means of predatory dumping), or on reasoos of employment or even national security, the 
interests of the Community industry being valued higher than those of the consomers and the 
processing industries. 
2.4. ANTI-DUMPING REllEF 
In conneetion with anti-dumping relief, European anti-dumping law should be improved in three 
respects. First, anti-dumping duties should be preferred to undertakings, so that undertakings may 
be accepted only if anti-dumping duties, in comparison with undertakings, are shown to be less 
favourable to the Community interests. Indeed, economie theory shows that undertakings 
generally cause a bigger welfare loss than anti-dumping duties. 
Second, a more accurate observance of the provision that the magnitude of anti-dumping ·relief 
should not exceed the amount adequate to remove the injury, should be guaranteed. The way in 
which the injury margin is calculated does not guarantee that the amount of anti-dumping duty will 
be adequate to remedy the injury from the dumping. Indeed, the assumption applied in European 
=~====-=--~-- === 
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anti-dumping case law, that the margin of price undercutting measures the injury caused by the 
dumping, does not always hold. For example, the assumption will only hold insofar as the 
Community producers are as efficient as the dumping exporters. However, if the dumping 
exporters are more efficient, they may undercut the Community producers' prices, merely because 
of their higher efficiency and because their margin of price undercutting will only measure their 
higher efficiency. The European anti-dumping authorities, however, find it extremely difficult to 
measure and to oompare efficiency. That difficulty may be circu~vented if the comparative 
analysis, rather than the trends analysis, is being used for determining whether the dumping is 
causing injury. Indeed, by means of the comparative analysis, it is possible to determine exactly 
by what amount the dumping price must increase in order to remedy the injury caused by the 
dumping. 
·Finally, the trend in European anti-dumping law to extend the scope of anti-dumping rellef 
because such an extension is necessary for preventing circumvention, should be stopped. It 
concerns the screwdriver factory provision as well as several less conspicious cases in which the 
scope ratione materiae of anti-dumping rellef bas been extended to products not subjected to the 
anti-dumping proceeding. In those cases, too broad an interpretation is placed on the 
circumvention of anti-dumping rellef. Indeed, under GA TT, the relocation of assembly actlvities 
into the territory of the importing country bas been found not to violate anti-dumping law. As is 
the case for the relocation of assembly facilities, the substitution of dumped imports by imports of 
other, though similar, products not subject to the anti-dumping measures, cannot be said either to 
be a circumvention of anti-dumping relief. The argument about the circumvention of anti-
dumping law seems to be merely an excuse to extend the scope of anti-dumping law to products 
which have not been shown to have been dumped and to have been inflicting injury upon the 
Community industry. 
As they only cover a protectionist policy in violation of GA TT, the screwdriver factory provision 
should be repealed and the extension of the scope ratione materiae of anti-dumping measures to 
include products of which it is not shown that all the conditions for granting anti-dumping rellef 
are fulfilled, should be prohibited. 
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3. THE ALTERNATIVE FOR ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
One of the main conclusions of this work is that dumping should only be sanctioned if it is ______ .." 
~. This work bas 3.Iso pointed out that current anti-dumping law applies to non-predatory 
dumping, but cannot detect all instances o_f_ predatory dumping. It is, indeed, impossible to 
formulate general bright-line rules, which allow to detect only- though all- instances of predatory 
dumping. Therefore, this work proposes a rule-of-reason test, ~ such a test allows to take 
account of all relevant factors and provides the flexibility necessary to assess complex economie 
situations. However, flexibility in trade laws usually results in protectionist «<ne-way flexibility» 
because of the pronounced demand of the import-competing industries for proteetion against 
,/Ioreign competition. 
~----, 
This work has also shown that trade restrictions, such as anti-dumping duties and undertakings, 
usually reduce the importing country's national welfare, though they provide the import-competing 
industries with the required protection. Their negative welfare effects are due tothefact that their 
positive effects on the welfare of the import-competing industries do oot fully compensate their 
negative effects on the welfare of the dornestic consumers and other producers_. Though European 
anti-dumping law requires that anti-dumping relief may only be granted if it is in the Community 
interests, the European anti-dumping authorities have seldom held that anti-dumping relief was oot 
in the Community interests. They usually hold that the Community consumers and processing 
industries are oot that much injured by anti-dumping relief. Though they are right in asserting 
that anti~dumping relief only marginally affects the welfare of each individual consumer and each 
individual producer part of the processing industry, they ignore that the overall negative welfare 
effects on consumers and processing . industries are far greater than the positive effects on the. 
import-competing industries. 
Predatory dumping, though, should be sanctioned because of its anti-competitive effects. Anti-
dumping relief, however, is not the optimal instrument for sanctioning predatory dumping as it 
causes the importing country to suffer a welfare loss. Therefore, it might be contemplated to 
apply antitrust law to predatory dumping. Indeed, because of its anti-competitive effects on the 
dornestic market of the importing country, predatory dumping falls within the scope of antitrust 
hlw. 
Moreover, antitrust law does oot impose trade restrietloos in order to sanction anti-competitive 
practices and, thus, does not have a negative effect on the importing ·country's national welfare. 
Antitrust sanctions deal also more readily with predatory dumping. Indeed, under antitrust law, 
past predatory dumping practices are condemned and a fine is possibly imposed on the dumping 
producer. Moreover, periadie penalty payments may also be imposed in order to prevent future 
=====---=--===-'-===---------..---",----~--=-==- - ------ --~--- ---~==== ---- -l }fl 
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predatory dumping practices. The remedies of anti-dumping law, on the other hand, in principle, 
cannot sanction past dumping practices. Indeed, retroactive anti-dumping measures are, in 
principle, forbidden and, under European anti-dumping law, no use bas been made of the few 
exceptions, under wbich retroactivity is allowed. Furthermore, the remedies of anti-dumping law 
do not prevent future predatory dumping. Anti-dumping duties will make it only more costly for 
the dumping exporter to monopolize the market of the importing country. lndeed, if, after the 
imposition of an anti-dumping duty, he still intends to monopolize the market of the importing 
country, he will have to go on lowering bis prices, thereby cutting bis profits or increasing bis 
losses. Undertakings are even worse : they will replace the anti-competitive effects of predatory 
dumping by their own anti-competitive effects. Por they will probably result in restricting 
competition on the market of the importing country .. lndeed, dumping exporters will only offer 
price undertakings if they are sure that they will not be undercut by the dornestic producers of the 
importing country, whereas quantity undertakings will result in a market segmentation between the 
dornestic producers and the dumping exporters. 
Another important advantage of antitrust law is that it precludes «one-way flexibility» for two 
reasons. First, its object is to prevent injury to competition, rather than injury to import-
competing industries. As a consequence, it does not pay exclusive attention to the interests of 
import-competing industries, but considers equally the interests of consumers1805• Second, the 
import-competing industries will not demand «one-way flexible» antitrust law which might 
sanction non-predatory competition since antitrust law applies both to them and to their 
competitors and they certainly do not want their ordinary competitive actions to be sanctioned by 
antitrust law. 
((n wouid be appropriate to replace GA TT anti-dumping law by uniform international antitrust rules -
· \_and apply them to predatory dumping. ·International antitrust rules should be preferred to national 
antitrust law, since dumping implies international trade in volving at least two different countries. 
Without uniform international antitrust rules, those countries may enact quite disparate national 
antitrust laws which may clash and wbich may even distort free trade and result in predatory 
dumping, especially if they contain specific rules for exporters, such as exemptions for export 
cartels. However, it seems that, though there have been already several attempts to reach an 
agreement on binding international antitrust law, a worldwide consensus seems impossible to be 
lSOS BOURGEOIS, J .H .J., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcement - Selected Second Generationa Issues-, in Antitrust and Trade PoUcy in the Unired 
Stales and the European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 569. 
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reached soon, as there are still too many and all too divergent views on what international 
antitrust taw should be1806• 
As an alternative, the importing country might apply its national antitrust law to predatory 
dumping. Here too, there may be some problems in substituting anti-dumping law by antitrust 
law. Indeed, the import-competing industries will oppose such a change, precisely because 
antitrust law will be less strict for importers, as it will not sanction competitive pricing. It is, 
moreover, argued that a country will not give up a protectionist policy which, as is the case with 
anti-dumping policy, is allowed by GATT as long as the other countries do not give it up1807• 
It seems, however, that those problems will not remain insurmountable since, recently, countries 
have become increasingly aware of the interconnection between trade policy and competition 
policy1808, as well as of their increasingly protectionist implementation of anti-dumping law. 
They also notice that their exports may increasingly be harassed by anti-dumping enforcement in 
other countries which have started to copy their protectionist anti-dumping laws1809• If the 
degree of protectionism in anti-dumping law continues to increase and an increasing number of 
countries start to retaliate against this protectionist trend by resorting to anti-dumping enforcement 
themselves, the welfare losses caused by this increasing protectionism will become more and more 
apparent and eventually the point will be reached at which the countries will want to get rid of 
that protectionism. If, at that time, an agreement on a uniform international antitrust law is still 
unattainable, countries might perhaps decide that each country will apply its national antitrust law, 
and reach an agreement on the extra-territoria! application of their antitrust laws. Moreover, it 
should be stressed that, from an economie point of view, countries are better off not to adopt 
protectionist trade policies, even if the other countries do not want to give up their trade 
restrictive policies. 
As to the Community, the question is whether European antitrust law can substitute anti-dumping 
law : does it encompass all types of predatory dumping and is its application to dumping allowed 
under public internationallaw and under GA TT anti-dumping law ? 
1806 See: PETERSMANN, E.-U., «International Competition Rules for the GATI-MTO World Tradc and Lcgal Systcm., Joumal of World 
Trade, 199316, (35), 35-41 and 75-83. See al10: BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., «EC Anti-dumping Enforcemcnt- Selected Second Genentiona Issues-, in 
Anlitrust and TrtMle Po/Jcy in the United Stales and the European Community, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), Ncw York, Dender, 1986, (563), 561. 
1807 BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., ecEC Antidumping Enforcement- Selected Second Generation Issues-, in Antitrust an.d Trade Policy in. 
the Uniled State• an.d the Europeon Commun.ity, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (563), 565 and 577; VERMULST, 
E.A., ecEEG Anti-dumpiDg en Mededingingeracht : Twee handen op één buik ?., S.E. W., 1988, (430), 439-440. 
1808 PETERSMANN, E.-U., «lnlernational Competition Rules for thc GATI-MTO World Trade and Lcgal Sy&tem., Joumal of World Trade, 
1993/6, (35), 15. 
1809 HORUCK, G.N., «How the GAlT Became Protectionist. An Analysis of the Uruguay Round Dnft Final Antidumping Code», Joumol of 
World Trade, 199315, (5), 17. 
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UNDER EUROPEAN 
European antitrust law prohibits all agreements between undertakings, all decisions by associations 
of undertakings and all concerted · practices which are liable to affect trade between Memher States 
and which are designed to prevent, restriet or distart competition within the Common market or 
must have this effect (Article 85(1) EC Treaty). It also prohibits any abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant position within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it 
insofar as it may affect tradebetween Memher States (Article 86 EC Treaty). 
Thus, European antitrust law does not sanction dumping as such. It does not prohibit price 
discrimination between national markets, sales at a loss or, with respect to NME countries, sales 
at prices below the prices or below the production costs of a third ME country. On the contrary, 
arrangements intended to prevent dumping are prohibited under European antitrust law (Article 85 
EC Treaty), if they hamper compelition within the Community1810• However, this does no 
prevent European antitrust law from being applied to dumping. Indeed, the dumping, justas the 
arrangement preventing dumping, may come under European antitrust law1811 • However, not 
all kinds of dumped imparts as defined by GA TT and European anti-dumping law fall within the 
scope of European antitrust law. For dumping to be sanctioned under European antitrust law, it 
should result from either a cooperation between the dumping exporters1812 or from the abuse 
of the dominant position the dumping exporter has on the Community market1813• Moreover, 
the dumping must have anti-competitive effects on the trade between the Memher States of th~ 
Community. 
Hence, it seems safe to conclude that European antitrust will only sanction predatory dumping. 
Dumping practised by an exporter not having a dominant position on the Community market or by 
181° Commisaion Decision 75/497/EEC of 15 July 1976, IFTRA Rules for prodw:ers of uirgin. aluminium for the European. marleet., 
O.J., 29 August 1975, No L 228/3; Commission Decision 85/206/EEC of 19 December 1984, Aluminium imports from Etu~tern. 
Europe, O.J., 30 March 1985, No L 92/1. 
1811 See : BARACK, B., Th.e application ofthe Competition rules (an.titrust law) ofthe European. Economie Community, Deventer, 
Kluwer, 1981, 166-170. 
I 
1812 According to the Commisaion, arrangement& between exporterslocated outside the Community cantrolling import& in terms 
of quantity or price fall under Artiele 85 EC Treaty (Secon.d Report on Competition Policy of the Commission., Luxemburg, 1973, 25-
26. See also: BARACK, B., Th.e application of the Competition .rule• (an.titraut law) of the European. Economie Commun.üy, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1981, 166 ; BELLAMY, C., and CHILI>, G.D., Common Marleet Law of Competition., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1987, 117, § 2-215 and 178, § 4-062). 
1813 Predatory pricing may constitute an abuse of a dominant position, see: C.J.E.C., case C-62/86, 3 July 1991, Akzo Chemie BV 
v Commi.ssion., E.C.R., 1991, I, (3359), 3453-3456; Commisaion Decision 85/609/EEC of 14 December 1985, ECS/Akzo, O.J., 31 
December 1985, No L 37.ul. ; BELLAMY, C., and CHILI>, G.D., Common Marleet Law of Competition., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1987, 414-415, I 84-048 and 8-049. 
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exporters which do not hold a collective dominant position or which do not cooperate with each 
other, will not be sanctioned1814• Such dumping will usually not have anti-competitive 
effects, even if it is intended to be predatory, because, in order for predatory dumping to be 
successful, the predator bas to possess a eertaio degree of market power. Indeed, if the predator 
wants its predatory pricing strategy to succeed, he must be able to exercise control over the 
market priee in the short run, i.e., he must be able to reduee bis priees in thè short run1815• 
Thus, the requirement of market power does not imply that European antitrust law may only 
sanction predation after it bas resulted in the monopolization of the Community market. lt 
appears to be possible to sanction predatory dumping under European antitrust law, if there is 
proof to the effect that the dumping priees deviate from short-run profit-maximizing priees and 
that such pricing policy may reduee competition on the Community market1816• 
{ 
_;Because of . the requirement that the predator already possesses some degree of market power, it 
may be so that eertaio instances of predatory dumping will not be detected under European 
antitrust law. However, those cases· of predatory dumping practised by a predator without market 
power, willlikely result in lower priee increases than the instaneesof predatory dumping practised 
by a predator with market power. For, the current degree of market power may be said to 
indicate the lower bound to the power that would follow upon a successful predatory pricing 
stràtegy, and the lower the degree of market power, the lower the monopoly priees · will be that 
the predator may charge eventually. Therefore, the non-deteetien of predatory pricing by 
predators without market power will have less negative effects on eensurners (i.e. , there will be 
lower priee increases) and will also be less likely to be pursued (i.e., because of the lower price 
increases, the monopoly profits will be lower)1817• As a consequenee, European antitrust law 
seems to be adequate ~ sanction but predatory dumping and to disregard instanees of dumping 
which are not or are probably not predatory. Admittedly, it may disregard instances which are 
predatory, but the monopolizing effects in those instanees will be fairly unimportant. ~
European- antitmst~l~~~-t~-~ a mo~~-than. adequate alternative to anti-dumping law. J 
1814 LANDSITTEL, R., Dumping in AufJerhtmdels- und Wettbewerbsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, 141-143. 
1815 ~ JOSKOW, P.L., and KLEVORICK, A.K., «A Framewort for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy», Yale IAw Joumal, 1979-1980, 
(213),225-227. 
1816 Possible anti-competitive effects fall uoder European antitrustlaw, see : C.J.E.C., case 85n6, 13 FebiU8ry 1979, Ho./fmann-IA Roche &: Co 
KG., Basel v Commiuion, E.C.R., 1979, (461), 541. 
1817 JOSKOW, P.L., and KLEVORICK, A.K., «A Framewort for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy», Yale IAw Joumal, 1979-1980, 
(213),225-227 aod 237. 
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3.2. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPUCATION OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST 
LAW 
The problem which may arise in respect of the application of national antitrust rules to predatory 
dumping is that the dumping exporters are established outside the · Community. Therefore, it is 
important to know whether Euro~antitrust-la-W--iS-and,_undet:-public international law, may_l>ee 
~------extra-tercitorially applied. With regard to predatory dumping, the question is whether it is 
·~----'--~ --- ~----------·----·---.. __ _ 
sufficient that the -~ffects of Jb_~_P!__~_~tory d!!~P-ing_practices-lake--place on the Community~marJ.ret 
for European antitrust law to apply. 
According to the Court of Justice, cooperation between undertakings established outside the 
Community may be sanetioned under Artiele 85 EC Treaty, if that cooperation bas anti-
. competitive effects on the Community market1818• The Court, moreover, held that sueh extra-
tercitorial application of Artiele 85 EC Treaty is not contrary to publie internationallaw1819• 
Indeed, the Court's judgement doesnotseem to pose any problem in termsof publie international 
law, since, in respect of extra-tercitorial application of national laws, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice bas held that : 
«( •.• ) the courts of many countries, even of countries which have given their criminal legislation a strictly 
territoria! character, interpret crimina! law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment of 
oommission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to he regarded as having been committed 
in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects 
have taken place there»1820• . 
The Permanent Court's judgement, though, is open to two interpretations. On the one hand,_ it 
may be interpreted as allowing the effects doctrine, according to whieh a country's nationallaws 
may have extra-territoria! application, as soon as the effects of the infringement take place on the · 
territory of that country. On the other hand, it may also be interpreted as granting extra-territoria! 
application to a country's national laws, especially if, besides at least one of the constituent 
1818 CJ.E.C., joined caaea 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, 27 September 1988, A. AhlstriJm OsakeyhtiiJ a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 
1988, (5193), 5242-5243. 
It ·may be argued tbat the Court of Juatice did oot adopt a excluaively effecta-based teat of juriadiction (LANGE, D.G.F., and SANDAGE, J.B., 
cThe Woonl Pulp Decision aod ita hnplicationa for the Scope of EC Competition Law», Comon Marleet Law Review, 1989, (137), 157). Indeed, 
the Court did oot refer to the effects doctrine, but rather mentioned the principle of territoriality. However, the reference to thia principle must be 
read in combination !iÏth the fact that the locus of the implementation of the unlawful agreement, deciaion or coneerled buaine88 practice wu 
conaidered to be a deciaive factor for determining the Community'a juriadiction in respect of Artiele 85 EC Treaty. It followa from tbat 
combination tbat tbc Court adopted the effects doctrine aince this doctrine ia a apecific application of the principle of territoriality, in particular of 
the objective principle of territoriality. 
1819 CJ.E.C., joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, 27 September 1988, A. ÄhlstriJm OsakeyhtiiJ a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 
1988, (5193), 5243-5244. 
1820 . P.C.I.J., Cae ofthe SS -Lotus•, PCIJ Ser-.e• A, No 10, 1927,23. 
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elements of the infringement, its effects take place on the territory of the State in question1821 • 
In respect of antitrust law, it is irrelevant which interpretation is right. Indeed, an infringement of 
Artiele 85 EC Treaty consists of two elements : the conclusion of the agreement, decision or 
concerted practice, and the implementation thereof1822• Thus, also tbe effects of unlawful 
cooperation are constituent elements of the infringement1823• Therefore, it may be concluded 
~--that the extra-territoria! a plication placed on Eu_!o~ antitrust law is ih line with public 
international law. The Court of Justice bas chosen the effects of the unlawful cooperation as a 
~
relevant criterion because, if the application of Artiele 85 EC Treaty were to depend on the place 
wbere the agreement, decision or concerted practice was concluded, the enforcement of that 
Artiele could easily be circumvented1824• 
Public international law, though granting countries a wide margin of discretion, does put a limit 
·on the extra-territoria! application of their national laws. That limit is the principle of sovereign 
equality of States, implying that a State bas the right to exercise jurisdiction within the limitsof its 
sovereignty, but is not entitled to encroach upon the sovereignty of other States1825• lUimits 
the extra-territoriality of both the legislative ~~L~nfQ~!Jl~!!..~.J\lris~!giPR-"'f a State. 
1821 GOLDMAN, B., .Les cbamps d'application territoriale des lois sur la concurrence•, Recueil des Cours de l'Académi.e de Droit 
International, 19691III, (631), 700. 
1822 C.I.E.C., joincd caaca 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, 27 September 1988, A. Ahlström OsakeyhliiJ a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 
1988, (5193), 5243. 
1823 C.J.E.C., case 48169, 1• July 1972, Imperial Chemi.cal Industries Ltd. v Commï.sion, E.C.R., 1972, (619), 694 (Opinion of 
Advocate-General MA YRAS) ; GOLDMAN, B., «Les cbamps d'application territoriale des lois sur la concurrence•, Recueil des 
Course de l'Académi.e de Droit International, 1969/lll, (631), 700; VAN DER ESCH, B., uSome Aspects of "Extra-Territoria!" 
lnfringement of EEC Competition RuleB», in Antitrust cuul Trade Policy in the Uniled State• an.d the European. Commun.ity, 
HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (285), 289. 
1824 CJ.E.C., joincd caaca 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, 27 September 1988, A. Ahlstrlim OsakeyhliiJ a.o. v Commission, E.C.R., 
1988, (5193), 5243. 
1825 LEENEN, A.Tb.S., -Extraterritorial Application of the EEC-Competition Law•, Netherlan.cls Yearbook of International Law, 
1984, (139), 157; MANN, F .A., •The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited Af\er Twenty YearBN, Recueil des Cours de 
l'Académie de Droit International, 19841III, (11), (9), 20. 
In tbe Wood Pulp caes, tbe applicanta advanced tbe principlesof non-interference and international comity .. With regard to the 
principle of non-interference, tbe Court of Justice replied that the conditions for applying it, were not met, since the other country, 
which could also claim jurisdiction, did notorder the undertakings to adopt a conduct contrary to Artiele 85 EC Treaty. As a 
result, the Court of JWJtice held that the principle of international comity was not applicable either, astherewas no conflict oflawa 
(C.J.E.C., joined cases 89, 1o.t, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, 27 September 1988, A. Áhl&tröm Osalceyhtiö a.o. v Commï.sion, 
E. C.R., 1988, (5193), 52«). . 
The principle of non-interference may be said to be the mirror image or, at least, a consequence of the principle of sovereign 
equality of Statea. lndeed, on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality, each sovereign State has the right to exercise 
jurisdiction within tbe scope of its sovereignty, but has a duty to refrain from eneroaehing upon the sovereignty of other States, i.e., 
the duty to refrain from interlering with the internal affairs of other States. 
The principle of international comity, on the other hand, does not affect the scope of a State's jurisdiction. It is only a kind of 
criterion for resolving conflict& of laws on the basis of politeness, friendliness and good manners between Statea (O'CONNELL, 
D.P., International Law, London, Stevens, 1970, volume 1, 20-21). 
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In respect of Artiele 85 EC Treaty, a State may have extra-territoriallegislative jurisdiction, if the 
competition between undertakings located outside the Community creates a direct and immediate 
restrietion on competition on the Community market, that this anti-competitive effect is reasonably 
foreseeable and that the effect on the Community market is substantial1826• ~ principle _g_f 
sovereign equality of States, however, sejUnore_se\{e~,:e-limits to tbe enforcement-óf-Artiele-85-Ee 
Trèiity. Irideed, a StäteCinnot take coercive measures or measures of investigation beyond its 
te~torial scope, without the consent of the State in which the act of enforcement takes place or 
without the cooperation of the undertaking which is subject to the investigation1827• As a 
consequence, under pubtic international law, the Community may prohibit and deelare void any 
anti-competitive cooperation between undertakings located outside the Community. It is even 
possible to impose pecuniary sanctions. But it is. not possible to force, e.g., under pain of 
periodic penalty payments, the undertakings located outside the __ Community to undertake the 
""------- --- --. ----- - - ----------------
necessary actions to undo the prohibited cooperiiûon and its effec~~ Nor is it possible to collect 
the ~ctions·by-means of--forcible--ex-~8 • 
For Artiele 86 EC Treaty to apply, it is necessary that the dominant position of the dumping 
undertakings is being held on the Community market and that the abuse of that dominant position 
takes place on the Community market. On the other hand, it is not required that the undertakings 
having a dominant position are established within the Community. As all the constituent elements 
of the offence, including its effects, take place on the Community market, the Community bas 
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over exporters abusing their dominant position on the 
Community market . Hence, exporters located outside the Community and dominating a large 
share of the imports into the Community may be prohibited under Artiele 86 EC Treaty to make 
abuse of their dominant position1829• Undertakings, though not being established in the 
1826 C.J.E.C., cue .ts/69, 14 July 1972, Imperial Chemicalinclustries Ltd. v CommiBeion, E.C.R., 1972, (619), 693-694 (Opinion of 
Advocate-General MA YRAS) ; C.J.E.C., joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85, 27 September 1988, A Äh.Z.tröm 
Osakeyh.tiö a.O. v Commï..aion, E.C.R., 1988, (6193), 6224-6227 .. See also: GOLDMAN, B., ccLes champs d'application territoriale 
des lois sur la concurrence•, Recueil dea Cour• de l'Académie de Droit International, 1969/lll, (631), 689-698; LEENEN, A.Th.S., 
dxtraterritorial Application of the EEC-Competition Law•, Neth.erland. Yearbook of International Law, 1984, (139), 148-149. 8ee 
also: TURNER, D.F., .Application of Competition Laws to Foreign Conduct: Appropriate Resolution of Jurisdictional IssueBit, in 
Antitrust and Trad. Poücy in the Un.ited Statea an.d th.e European. Commun.ity, HAWK, B.E. (ed.), New York, Bender, 1986, (231), 
238, according to whom predatory export pricing bas substantial anticompetitive effects on the market ofthe importing country. 
1827 GOLDMAN, B., «Les champs d'application territoriale des lois sur la concurrence•, Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit 
International, 1969/lll, (631), 706-717; LEENEN, A.Th.S., ecExtraterritorial Application of the EEC-Competition Law .. , 
Neth.erlland. Yearbook of lntern.ation.t.û Law, 1984, (139), 169-163 ; MANN, F .A., •The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction 
Revisited After Twenty Years.., Recueil des Cour• de l'Académie de Droit International, 19841111, (11), 34-46. 
1828 C.J.E.C., case 48/69, 14 July 1972, Imperial Ch.emicalin.dwtries Ltd. v CommiB•ion, E.C.R., 1972, (619), 696 (Opinion of 
Advocate-General MA YRAS) 
1829 C.J.E.C., joined cases 6 and 7n3, 6 March 1974, Istituto Ch.emioterapico Italiano SpA an.d Commercial Solvents Corporation. v 
CommiBsion, E.C.R., 197-4:, 223; C.J.E.C., case 27n6, 14 February 1978, Un.ited Bran.cla Compo.n.y an.d Un.ited Brcuuls Continenttml 
B.V. v CommiB•ion, E.C.R., 1978, 207; BELLIS, J.-F., eclnternational Trade and the Competition Law of the European Economie 
Community .. , Common. Marleet Law Review, 1979, (647), 667-668. 
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Community, may also be enforced, e.g., under pain of periodic penalty payments, to put an end 
to their abuse of their dominant position on the Community market1830• 
Because of the limited extra-territoria! enforcement jurisdiction of the Community, Artiele 85 EC 
Treaty will only prevent unlawful cooperation between undertakings located outside the 
Community from being enforceable. before the courts of the Community. As a consequence, 
Artiele 85 EC Treaty does not provide a far-reaching effective guarantee against predatory 
dumping. However, frequently, Articles 85 and 86 EC Treaty will be simultaneously applicable 
in respect of predatory dumping. Indeed, in order for predatory dumping to be successful, the 
cooperating dumping exporters must collectively hold a sufficient degree of market power. 
Indeed, they should be able to influence prices in order to prevent their competitors to enter or to \ 
stay in the Community market Thus, in terms of European antitrust law, they must have a l 
collective dominant position on the Community market As a consequence, the cooperatinv 
dumping exporters may be found to abuse their collective dominant position in the sense of Artic.le 
86 EC Treaty, if they agree to practise dumping in such a way as to monopolize the Communi 
market 
3.3. CONFORMITY WITH GATr 
As, under pubtic international law, predatory dumping may be effectively sanctioned by European 
antitrust law, the only remaining question is whether GATT law also allows to sanction predatory 
dumping by means of antitrust law. According to Artiele 16(1) GATT Anti-dumping Code, no 
specific action against dumping of exports from a Party to the GA TT Anti-dumping Code may be 
taken except in accordance with the provisions of GA TT. At first sight, it might, therefore, be 
argued that the application of antitrust law to predatory dumping is contrary to GA TT law. 
GATT anti-dumping law will indeed be violated, if the Community would apply its antitrust law 
within the framework of its anti-dumping law. This would be the case if, for instance, the 
Community would apply its anti-dumping law in order to assess whether there is injurious 
lSJO Penalty paymente have been imposed oh exporters located outside the Community in e.g.: Commission Decision 72/457/EEC 
of 14 December 1972, ZOJA CSC-ICI, O.J., 31 December 1972, NoL 299/61; Commission Decision 76/363/EEC of 17 December 
1975, Ch.iquita, O.J., 9 April 1976, No L 96/1. 
These penalty payments have been upheld by the Court of Justice, see respectively: C.J.E.C., joined cases 6 and 7ns, 6 March 
1974, latituto Clwlmioterapi.oo ltalian.o SpA an.d Commercial Solventa Corporation. v Commission., E.C.R., 1974, (223), 265-257; 
C.J.E.C., case 27n6, 1" February 1978, Un.ited Brands Compan.y an.d Un.ited Brand. Continentaal B.V. v Commiasion., E.C.R., 
1978, (207), 306-308. 
See: B.ARACK, B., Th.e application. of tlwl Competition. rules (antitrust law) of tlwl European Economie Commun.ity, Deventer, 
Kluwer, 1981, 278-279. 
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dumping, and impose antitrust sanctions as a special (anti-dumping) measure provided by 
European anti-dumping law (Article 17(3) basic EC Regulation ; Artiele 17(2) basic ECSC 
Decision). For GA TI anti-dumping law only allows anti-dumping duties or undertakings in order 
to sanction dumping as defmed under anti-dumping law. By subsuming antitrust law under the 
concept «special measureS» of European anti-dumping law, antitrust law would be sanctioning 
dumping in the sense of price discriminatión or selling at a loss irrespective of its anti-competitive 
effects. 
It is, however, possible to apply antitrust law not as a special measure in the sense of European 
anti-dumping law, but separately from European anti-dumping law. Then, dumping will be 
sanctioned, not because it implies price discrimination between national markets or selling at a 
loss, but because of .its anti-competitive effects on the Community market. As a result, GA TI 
. law will not be violated if antitrust law is applied to predatory dumping1831 • It is even 
possible and legal for the same dumping practices to be subject to both anti-dumping and antitrust 
enforcement1832• 
Hence, it may be concluded that European antitrust law is a valid alternative to anti-dumping law. 
First, it encompasses all instances of predatory dumping - the only instances of dumping which 
should be sanctioned. Second, the application of European antitrust law to predatory dumping is 
not at varianee with pubtic international law or with GA TI law. Third, the remedies under 
antitrust law are more effective against the anti-competitive effects of predatory dumping than 
anti-dumping relief. Those are good reasoos for dumping anti-dumping law and for applying 
antitrust law against predatory dumping. 
1831 LANDSrrrEL, R., Dumping in.Au/Jerhandels- und Wettbewerbsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, 146. 
1832 In saveral anti-dumping cases, the Europaan anti-dumping authorities have stated : 
ccthat the purpose of anti-dumping proceedings is not, and cannot be, to condone or encourage restrictive business 
practices, and that the initiation of such a (anti-dumping) proceeding does not therefore deprive an undertaking of its 
right to initiate proceedings under Artiele 86 or 86 of the Treaty, the outcoma of which cannot be prejudiced by an anti-
dumping investigationa 
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1361/87 of 18 May 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of ferro-silico-
calcium/calcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.,J., 19 May 1987, No L 129/5; Commission Regulation (EEC} No 2450/87 of 12 
August 1987 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of mercury originating in the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, O.J., 14 August 1987, NoL 227/8 ; Council Regulation (EEC} No 3365/87 of 9 November 1987 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on import& of ferro-silico-calcium/calcium silicide originating in Brazil, O.J., 12 November 1987, 32211; Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2808189 of 18 September 1989 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of calcium metal 
originating in the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union and definitively collecting the provisional anti-dumping duty 
imposed on such import., O.,J., 20 September 1989, No L 271/1). 
Their statement wu a response to the allegation that anti-dumping law was being used by the Community producers as a means 
supporting their efforts of monopolising tbe Community market. Thus, the initiation of proceedings under Articles 86 and 86 EC 
Treaty would be against anticompatitive behaviour of the Community producers. However, the same holds in respect of 
anticompatitive behaviour of the dumping exporters whether or not the Europaan anti-dumping authorities terminate the anti-
dumping proceedinp by granting anti-dumping relief. 
With regard to American anti-dumping law, it has also been suggested that dumping may at the same time be subjected to 
antitrust and anti-dumping proceedings, see: DAVIDOW, J., «U.S. Antitrust, FreeTrade, and Nonmarket Economies., Journalof 
World Trade Law, 1978, (473}, 478. 
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